CONCLUSION:

A BRIEF SUMMARY AND QUESTIONS OF ARMS CONTROL

CONCLUSION: A Brief Sunnnary, and Questions of Arms Control

The Relation of Scientific Research to Weapons Development: The Tables

As the case studies which make up the greater portion of this study deal

with particular systems, the purpose of the opening chapter of this study

was to explain what military R&D is and how it works. The contribution of

basic and applied scientific research to producing every piece of military

hardware that exists is essential. Whether it is an ICBM or an aircraft,

or any other weapon or piece of support equipment every system and subsystem

that one can enumerate is the product of a concerted research effort: the

metal alloys, the fuels, the radar, the micro-electronics, the guidance

equipment, the sensors, the satellites, the counter-measures, the ordnance,

the (knowledge of) aerodynamic, geodetic, climatic effects, and so on. The

kn~wledge and the products do not, however, appear in a random environment

or in a policy and management vacuum. Military R&D is guided and directed:

questions are put, particular materials, effects, performance capabilities

are sought, and research funding is allocated accordingly. The tables that

accompanied the opening chapter were designed to explain this process as

best as possible. For this purpose they were organized into five groups, as

follows:

Group I:

Group II:

What is one looking for in military R&D, the capabilities and

applications -- and some indications of the process.

Where does one look: the funding of research in the basic

sciences. (The "D.T. & E." -- development, test and evaluation

of R&D are for the moment set aside.) It is important to stress

that this search takes place in virtually every discipline and

subdiscipline in nearly every area of theoretical, basic, and

applied science.

Group III: How does one organize the search: the "In-House" laboratories of

the US military services were used by way of example, although

less than one-third of US military R&D expenditure is allocated

to these institutions and nearly two-thirds are expended by con­

tracting to private industry. The choice was made Ln order to

permit the greatest clarity of explanation and to be able to pre­

sent a coherent organized illustration. Details were provided on

the organization of this laboratory structure in the United States,

Group IV:

Group V:

and of the functioning of US advisory panels, because in

the case of the US evidence is readily available and can be

provided, program direction and results can be quoted. The

organizational structure is equally important as regards mili­

tary R&D in the USSR, however evidence regarding it is extremely

sparse in comparison with that for the US. What one knows about

military R&D in the US, USSR, France, England, FRG, India,

Israel, Sweden, Netherlands, South Africa, Australia, etc. indi­

cate a very similar process in all cases, although the national

organization and funding structures may differ.

How does the process work: examples of nine weapon-development

histories of US weapon systems are given, as well as some

examples of parallels in US and USSR weapon development.

What is the result: the weapons. Since the four case studies

in the book and the greater part of all the tables in Groups I,

II, II, and IV are derived from materials dealing with the United

States, the examples of final weapons systems are provided from

those of the USSR. The essentials of the R&D process is basically

the same; the laws of nature and the methods of science make that

a certainty. However, as in Group III, one aspect of the Soviet

military R&D process was selected out for examination dispropor­

tionate to its probable place in the entire elaboration of USSR

military R&D. This is the aspect of technology acquisition from

abroad. This was done partly because it plays a more important

role in the overall functioning of USSR military R&D than it does

for the US, and at the same time to again provide the best demon­

stration of the phenomenon.

The information provided in the opening chapter demonstrates unequivocally

that weapon development, and the basic and applied R&D on which it is based,

is not an autonomous process. It is a cultivated, organized, goal-oriented,

purposeful process, In the area of weapons development and procurement deci­

sions in particular there seems to be extremely little "technological impera­

tive" without the ground for it having been prepared rather methodically.

Military R&D, the activity and the kno~ledge and technological products that

it produces -- like most products of modern society are a result of prior

government decisions and expenditures whose purpose it was to produce that

knowledge and those technological products. Military R&D is therefore not

likely to be the cause of the arms competition between the US and the

USSR, or of any other "arms race". Neither can its product, the weapon

systems, divorced from the decisions to develop and procure them, proper­

ly be understood as a cause. They were produced by an enormous enter­

pr1se consciously established by political decision to produce them.

That enterprise is military R&D. The tables demonstrate its scope and

functioning. The resulting weapons are neither an accident nor a mistake

in the sense that no one asked for them. The weapon capabilities produced

by the R&D process may drastically exacerbate the political climate, and

they may do so in a step function if the weapon developed is dangerous

enough. But the decision to procure the systems in always a political one,

and the R&D that produced the weapon was mandated in the first place.

Everyone is familiar with the remarks in Dwight Eisenhower's farewell

presidential address in which, after noting that research played an increasing­

ly crucial role in our society and that the ways in which it was conducted

had changed radically in recent years, he said:

";let in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific­technological elite."

This express£on by the President was, however, one of a pair on the subject,

and it was actually the second. "Part I" was in a radio and television

address to the American public on November 7, 1957, which began with the

words "My subject tonight is 'Science in National Security'." In this case

President Eisenhower explained:

As of now, the United States is strong. Our Nation has today, and has had for some years, enough power in its strategic retaliatory forces to bring near annihilation to the war-making capabilities of any other country.

This position of present strength did not come about by accident. The Korean war had the effect of greatly expanding our peacetime defense forces. As we began the partial demobilization of these forces we undertook also an accelerated program of modernization.

As a first step, scientific surveys were instituted soon after the Korean armistice. The result was a decision to give a "New Look" to the Defense Establishment, depending for increased efficiency more upon modern science and less upon mere numbers of men.

In short, it was the decisions of the Eisenhower administration which

extablished the "scientific-technological elite" that he was to warn of

only three years later.

The presentation provided in this study is lin ma~ked contrast to others

that can be found frequently. Sir Solly Zuckerman, for example, Chief

Scientific Advisor to the Minister of Defense in Great Britain from 1960

to 1966, has written as follows:

It is my view, derived from many years of experience, that the basic reason for the irrationality of the whole process is the fact that ideas for a new weapon system derive in the first place, not from the military, but from different groups of scientists and technologists who are concerned to replace or improve old weapons systems -- for example, by miniaturising components -- or by reducing weight/yield ratios of nuclear warheads so that they can be carried further by a ballistic missile (that is to say, by packing greater explosive power into a smaller volume and weight). At base, the momentum of the arms race is undoubtedly fuelled by the technicians in governmental laboratories and in the industries which produce the armaments.

In the nuclear world of today, military chiefs, who by convention are a country's official advisers on national security, as a rule merely serve as the channel through which the men in the laboratories transmit their views. For it is the man in the laboratory, not the soldier or sailor or airman, who at the start proposes that for this or that reason it would be useful to improve an old or devise a new nuclear warhead; and if a new warhead, then a new missile; and, given a new missile, a new system within which it has to fit. It is he, the technician, not the commander in the field, who starts the process of formulating the so-called military need. It is he who has succeeded over the years in equating, and so confusing, nuclear destructive power with military strength, as though the former were the single and a sufficient condition of military success. (1)

This is fatuous: the scientists are placed in the labaT1cat0'ry and payed fcrr 1>"y

the political and military leadership of the state -- not by themselves. They

are doing the job that they are hired to do, by military and political

decisionmakers. It is also ironic that some of the major spokesmen for the

argument of technological imperative spent large portions of their caree~

as senior managers of national military R&D programs.

Other statements are virtually a parody. A recent example was a brief paper

by a senior French administrator entitled "Irresistable, Irrational,

Indomitable, Military Technology."

Military technology is the wicked fairy mainly because it goes its own way ... in laboratories and industries that are not known, very often not even by the governments involved ..••

Governments, of course, could stop this if they decided to give no more money to military research. But because of their fear of other countries they cannot do so .•..

Military technology is would be strong enough produce this devise?"

irresistible. ~Vhen a device is invented, who or feel safe enough to say: "We will not It is asking too much ....

Politicians have no power to stop a project that has cost so many years, so much money and so much work. When it is ready, it comes out -- and the world is shaken. Each side accuses the" other of imperialism, bad intentions, and so on ••••

It appears that technology goes entirely its own way, even in the most planned economies. When something can be done, it is impossible to resist trying it. And when it has been tried, it seems impossible not to implement it. It all ends with a race between technologists, and not between politicians. It is natural, automatic ..•

How is it possible to stop a technology that secretly goes its own way? No one knows about it except those involved: "top secret" is written everywhere. Then when a new weapon appears, all governments, including that of the country where the weapon was made, are completely flabber­gasted. (2)

The evidence provided in the opening chapter should make clear that this

description is a fairy tale.

This study was not able to address the integration of military R&D with the

other major components of weapons acquisition: 1n the United States for

example, the interests of the military services, executive decisions,

congressional guidance and mandate, the positions of different agencies 1n

the US Dept. of Defense such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

or of DDR&E, ARPA, etc. Similarly it did not attempt to evaluate the relative

contributions of "push" effects from developers, vs. "pull" effects from

users, the roll of doctrine, or the "follow on imperative" produced by long­

established systems (aircraft, tanks, ships, etc.) and missions. Within the

area of R&D itself it did however emphasize the effect of simultaneous

contributions built up bit by bit in widely differing areas of scientific

research on the ultimate ability to compose these into a single sophisticated

weapon system. This conception is not very different from that described by

Kosta Tsipis, and which he called the "building block" principle of weapon

development.

The details of a research and development project that ultimately results in the deployment of a new military system are little known to the general public or even to many of those directly concerned with national security policy. Secrecy, bureaucratic complexities, and highly specialized technology hinder public awareness of the cost and danger of deploying such weapons systems. With the possible exception of the ABM system, there has been little public interest in the detailed technical characteristics of strategic weapons, and how they came to be established.

This article on strategic reconnaissance •.• reveals still another reason, a central one I believe, why it is so often diffic~lt to identify and follow a new weapon system from the early R&D stages of its development. It is what I would like to ca11 the "building­block" principle of weapons systems development.

Quite often a major military system grows out of the maturing of several seemingly unrelated technologies --·the building blocks -­which when pulled together, form a new and often unexpected system or make technically possible a system envisioned years before. The surveillance satellite program ••. displays the same building block origin as the Polaris s'ubmarine, which was made possible by the confluence of two unrelated technologies: the portable nuclear reactor and the inertial guidance system.

Two other examples are the modern cruise missile, now being deployed by the United States, and the remotely piloted vehicle, now emerging as a p:t;"actical military system. The former is a "cross-product" of microminiaturization of electronic components and the development of a small, efficient turbofan jet. The latter springs from the develop­ment of new sensors and the miniaturization of control electronics, which have made available inexpensive, lightweight~ jamproof datalinks for remote control and image transmission.

The list could go on. The conclusion, however, is clear: Weapon systems, even major ones, are rarely deployed as the end-result of a categorical decision to create them made at some level of the political, or even military, leadership of the country. Rather, weapon systems more or less emerge from an on-going R&D process that often develops entire new technologies rather than specific pieces of hardware, and that is guided in an overall way by technological leaders who are very much aware of and strongly share in, the general perceptions of the international situation.

Where the defense imperatives, or the prevalent strategic doctrine, and therefore the central decision-making role of the political and military leadership enter is in choosing which of the many systems -­made possible by the evolving technology and served up to the military by the industry -- will be funded, at what level, and when along their development cycle.

These choices affect the eventual deployment of a system, since not all systems that emerge from the R&D process are deployed. It is at this early point in the evolution of a weapon system that arms control considerations must be injected into the selection process.

If arms control measures are to take timely effect, there is a clear need for constant monitoring of a broad spectrum of weapons-related technologies .. (3)

There is one very significant difference however, in this summation from the

information provided in this study, and that is Tsipis conclusion that

Weapon systems, even major ones, are rarely deployed as the end result of a categorical decision to create them made at some level of the political, or even military leadership of the country.

of The evidence of the "Sununer Studies" andlthe von Neumann conunittee referred

to in the opening chapter contradicts Tsipis statement, and indicates

that many major systems did result from a "conunand decision" from above.

This was also the case for the development of the US nuclear and thermo­

nuclear weapons, as well as those of the USSR, Britain and China.

Another description of the effects of military R&D on major weapons competi­

tion between the US and the USSR which sounds superficially similar to both

that of Tsipis and the one presented in this study is the notion of "techno­

logy creep" presented by Deborah Shapely in a series of articles in the

journal Science in 1978 (4). However Shapely's description entirely omits

consideration of exactly the military R&D infrastructure which this study

takes pains to document: its establishment, organization and operation and

only thereby its production of the technology which is "creeping". Shapely's

presentation again fails to take into account the context in which the

process takes place, and thereby misses the main point: the "creep" is not

an accident or an artifact, it is precisely the function of the system to

produce it, and it was established and designed to do exactly that.

Lessons From the Case Studies

The largest portion of this book is made up of four case studies of weapon

system development. The four are:

1. The Origins of MIRV (Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles -- for

ICBMs and SLBMs)

2. The History of the Development of United States ASAT (Anti-Satellite)

Weapon Systems

3., Weather Modification: The Evolution of an R&D Program into a Weapon

System.

4. Research and Development in (C)BW: a study intended to examine in

particular the questions of "Basic" versus "Applied" research,

"Civil" versus "Military", and "offensive" versus "Defensive" research.

The central focus of each of the studies is somewhat different, but most

have -- in addition to the involvement of military R&D questions -- two

important considerations in common:

Arms control has had an impact on weapon-development processes in three

of the cases (weather modification, BW, ASAT)

Two are categorized as weapons of mass destruction or the equivalent,

(BW and weather modification), and the third at least Ln its earlier

years involved nuclear weapons either in the ASAT or its presumptive

target. MIRVs, of course, concern nuclear-weapon delivery systems.

All of these case studies are very much, if not primarily, concerned with

the development process of the weapon systems, and the decisions that were

taken regarding them. The case studies except in the study on BW, are not

focused on the research per se: that is dealt with in the opening chapter.

Aside from the first study on MIRV, however, none of these systems represent Ci) the weapons now basic to all military forces -- "tanks, planes, ships,

missiles -- all of which involve successive generational replacement. The

lessons that will be learned from these case studies can therefore be ex-

pected to be unrepresentative of those that might obtain regarding the more

"conventional" categories of weapons. The relations of R&D to the develop-

ment process will, however, probably not differ significantly.

The first study, The Origins of MIRV, seeks to isolate the reasons for which

MIRVs were developed and to assess the degree to which "technological

imperative" did or did not playa role. MIRV development appears to have

clearly been typical, "regular", as regards all of its major determinants o."a

except one. There were numerous reviews \internal debates on its character-

istics, and changes in its development program in the years 1962-1966. The

motive for the weapon also seems rather clearly to have been the larger

military-political considerations. The major studies on MIRV genesis in the

United States by Greenwood, Tammen and Sapolsky all demonstrate explicit

policy interest in the development of the system. The single brief study by

York that attributed the origin of MIRV to technological imperative appears

to be extremely selective and oversimplified in its treatment: only one the history of

element is discllssed,and\dec1sion making regarding the weapon is omitted

entirely. The one significant difference in the MIRV development program

from more routine "bread and butter" systems, a characteristic it however

shares with some of the other case studies covered here, is that all decisions,

including procurement, were made in secret.

The second study, a history of the development of US antisatellite systems,

concerns far more complex technological systems than are dealt with in the

other studies. ASAT -- and the related early programs which surrounded it

made far greater demands on coordinated research and significantly more 1n

terms of expenditure. The study also deals with the political determinants

of the development of the system, and of direct US/USSR interactions and

negotiations that affected the development process. The USSR's ASAT develop­

ment program is also described.

The original ideas for a (US) ASAT were born in the bravura period of 1958-

60-62. It was a period of both political and technological excitement, full

of threat perceptions. The systems proposed were technologically demanding

and they were expensive. Not all of the senior Air Force military decision

makers -- the service in which development took place -- agreed on the desir­

ability of the program,particularly its manned space element. The program

was essentially rejected by all senior civilian Dept. of Defense officials.

The decision to procure essentially a substitute direct asce~missile­

launched system of extremely limited capability was made in secret. All

tests of the system ~n subsequent years were also kept secret: he United

States did not want to jeopardize its own use of military satellites.

The impact of negotiations in 1962 and in 1968 on ASAT development programs

both in the US and in the USSR is ambiguous, or perhaps can be assumed to

have been inconsequential. The USSR assumedly did not deploy any space

orbiting nuclear delivery systems and the US had no interest in developing

these. However, the cancellation of the major US ASAT programs did not

impede USSR orbital ASAT R&D, or USSR manned programs. Continuous low level

R&D in the US, much of it under the ABM R&D program, developed an active

homeing conventional destructive device and eventually produced the capability

for a new ASAT program in 1976-1982. Major political decisions on the new

program, now in the context of an ongoing USSR ASAT R&D program,were made

by the end of the Ford administration in 1976 and in 1977-78 under President

Carter. Har~ld Brown, Secretary of Defense ~n the Carter administration)

had been instrumental in 1962 as Secretary of the Air Force in cancelling

the more extravagant US orbital ASAT R&D-programs. It ~s interesting also to

note that in the relatively rare case of the cancellation of the Dyna-Soar

program, its technological capabilities if not its mission conception were

more or less reborn in the US spac~~huttle program. ASAT negotiations during

1977-1979 produced no results and the Reagan administration introduced an

extravagant bravura period again, not unlike 1958-1960 in some ways, and one

program on which this atmosphere had a direct effect was the new US ASAT.

Even if one assumes that earlier negotiations in the 1960's had had some

restraining effects by reducing threat images and inhibiting interest in ASAT

system development in the United States, it would appear that it did not

restrain Soviet ASAT development, and after 15-20 years the restraining effects

on US programs were wiped out by a combination of new technology and a new

political situation.

The third study is concerned with weather modification. Both the discovery

of the phenomenon and its use as a weapon in war came only recently. Its use

came as a total surprise to the scientific, military and international politi­

cal community. The disclosure of its use also led almost immediately to

negotiations for its control as a weapon of war. The focus of the paper is

on the question of control -- or lack of control ~n the development of

weather modification from its discovery during WWII to its use some twenty

years later in a theatre of war, in Indochina.

Weather modification came to be used under the pressure of (or with the

opportunity of) the US war in Vietnam. It was only one of a substantial

group of exotic, substantially improvised and covert operations -- herbicides,

chemical warfare, weather modification -- sponsored primarily by organiza­

tions other than the uniformed services, by agencies such as the ARPA, the

Advanced Research Projects Agency in the Dept. of Defense, and the CIA.

The weather modification program succeeded in remaining super-secret long

after use began. The others were compromised upon initiation of the program

since the operations were easily noted by the enemy target. The programs

were all rushed into use and received only marginal and grossly innadquate

prior review. All of the programs were either operational failures or military/

political diplomatic disasters or both, and eventually had to be forcibly

curtailed by presidential order. Weather modification and chemical warfare

use both led directly to international negotiations on their restriction

The fourth study, on R&D primarily in the area of biological weapons, is an

attempt to probe the relation of R&D to arms control and disarmament agree­

ments, and the problems of verification in conjunction with such agreements

or of confidence assessments in the absence of verification. It is also a

more or less unique attempt to deal with the problem of distinguishing between

three pairs of opposed terms used to describe research: basic versus applied,

civil versus military, offensive versus defensive. It is also possible to

examine a historical example of conversion of military R&D facilities in this

study, the Fort Detrick and Pine Bluff BW R&D and production facilities in

the United Shates that were closed down and converted in the early and mid-

1970's.

Military R&D And Arms Control

It has not been the primary purpose of this study to go into arms control

questions in detail, but we can briefly survey some of the studies that have

focused on the relation of military R&D and arms control.

Very early after WWII the nuclear physicist Niels Bohr, in an extravagantly

idealistic plea, argued that " •.• the free access to information necessary

for common security •.. ", the removal of secrecy regarding the secrets of

nuclear energy and the transfer of such information to all states would

remove the suspicions that bred international military competition (5).

As we will see, the removal o~ secrecy and great~r openess of information

has been suggested also in more general frameworks as a constraining influence

on national military R&D programs. At another extreme, in a far more

realistic attempt to deal with the existing inter~ational reality, Lewis

Mumford essentially suggested an R&D moratorium in papers published in 1954

and 1955 (6). Although these proposals were an attempt to deal with the

most basic political and societal aspects of the problem, they were ridiculed

by the scientific community and were considered an atavism. Nevertheless,

Sir Solly Zuckermann, formerly Chief Scientific Advi£er to the British

Ministry of Defense and then to the British Government, suggested the same

thing some thirty years later. He argued that a moratorium on military research

and development was the first essential step to arms control. (7) In a

public address in Stockholm in the spring of 1983 he again suggested that

"a halt in funding for laboratories performing military R&D would be the best

method to stop the arms race, particularly the laboratories in East and West

that design new nuclear weapons."

Any suggestion for the curtailment of military R&D has always been fiercely

opposed by the senior military officials responsible for the management of

military R&D. Their arguments are always composed of a combination of claims

of pragmatic national security, combined with a claim to an ultimate philo­

sophical position which is supposed to remove the question from any possibility

of disagreement or debate. Military journals which deal with R&D frequently

carry exhortative articles on one or the other of the two themes, or at times

the combination of both. (8) The first theme reiterates the need to keep

ahead of the enemy Ln a technological race and makes clear that tomorrow's

weapons derive from and depend on today's research. The second propounds the

philosophical view that "science can't be stopped," "progress can't be stopped."

The conjunction of "progress cannot stop," and "we do not want it to stop" LS

frequent and hardly accidental. The continuity, for political reasons, of the

process of research-development-device procurement itself then becomes the

claimed proof of the thesis that "science can't be stopped," as if this were

a somehow ordained or predetermined process, as certain as the motions of the

planets and impossible to alter even if one wanted to -- rather than what it

actually is, a well-organized and highly successful goal-directed effort

funded and administered by the very authors of the journal articles. The senLor

US military leadership has not only maintained this position for rhetorical

purposes but has significantly made major policy choices on national security

questions on very similar grounds. On the question of a Comprehensive

®

(Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the US Joint Chief's explicitly prefered

to continue both US and USSR nuclear testing~ despite the ability of a

comprehensive treaty to freeze what they recognized as a US advantage at the

time. They believed that with continued testing the US would always maintain

a selective "lead" over the USSR on the basis of its examples of past R&D

successes. They have maintained this position in general despite the numerous

successive historical examples during the post WWII period which demonstrate

that provided the additional years to continue R&D the USSR has in every

case eroded any US technological advantage which existed and erased the "lead".

More significant perhaps is the fact that there was virtually no opposition

to this argument on the part of arms control specialists until very recently.

The case of ABM has been a prime example.

Until recently, official scientific advisers and some of the scientific community interested in such matters have advocated research and develop­ment to improve certain weapons technologies, even when they have strongly opposed the deployment of the corresponding specific weapons, whether because they were ineffective or because they would accelerate the arms race. Over a period of nearly fifteen years, independent scientific advice discouraged deployment of successive ABM systems. But each time the independent scientists recommended against deployment, they also advocated more research aimed at the next level of improve­ment, primarily-on the grounds that we could not afford to be taken by surprise over what was technically possible. Thus Nike Zeus was abandoned in favor of the development of Sentinel and, subsequently, of Safeguard. Next, the limited deployment of Safeguard was accompanied by advocacy of a strong research and development program for Hardsite, which turned out to be a system designed to meet the arguments of those who had publicly opposed the deployment of Safeguard. Only the ABM treaty brought about the abandonment of this program.

Since SALT, however, one hears less talk of the pursuit of Rand D as an alternative to deployment. The possibility of limiting technological progress in weapons prior to a deployment decision is beginning to be seriously discussed by those interested in arms control. (10)

Jerome Wiesner's testimony to Congress during the ABM debate can be considered

the class~c demonstration of this position. The argument may have been made

out of conviction or for political reasons, deemed necessary to make opposi­

tion to ABM deployment politically credible.

Even more~ increases in R&D have been demanded by the Joint Chief's of Staff

in return for their support of particular arms control treaties. The following

four "Safeguards" were understood as conditions for support of the Partial

Test Ban Treaty in 1963. These were

A. The conduct of comprehensive, aggressive, and continuing underground nuclear test programs designed to add to our knowledge and improve our weapons in all areas of significance to our military posture for the future.

B. The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and insure the continued application of our human scientific resources to these programs on which continued progress in nuclear technology depends.

C. The maintenance of the facilities and resources necessary to institute promptly nuclear tests in the atmosphere should they be deemed essential to our national security or should the treaty or any of its terms be abrogated by the Soviet Union.

D. The improvement of our capability, within feasible and practical limits, to monitor the terms of the treaty, to detect violations, and to maintain our knowledge of Sino-Soviet Huclear activity, capabilities and achievements. (11)

Eight or more "Safeguards" were again demanded by the Joint Chiefs and Sec.

of Defense Laird in 1972 in compensation for approval of the SALT I agreement.

On May 26, 1972, the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile

systems (ABM treaty), the Interim Agreement on the limitation of offensive

weapons and an additional protocol on the number of ballistic missile sub­

marines and launchers on submarines were signed in Moscow. Within a week

U.S.Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and John S.Foster, Jr., Director of

Defense, Research and Engineering, had presented a series of "SALT related

adjustments to strategic programs" in placing their budget request for fiscal

year 1973 before a U.S.Congressional committee. (12) These adjustments were,

in various presentations, six or eight new or accelerated strategic weapons

programs. Foster's position was that the United States must prepare to

deploy weapon systems permitted by SALT and to procure strategic systems

to give the United States a "timely and credible hedge" against abrogation

or expiration of the SALT arms agreements:

Both Secretary Laird and Admiral Thomas H.Moorer have made clear that the full success of SALT depends on sustained U.S. strength and that programs necessary to sustain that strength must go forward if the viability of the agreements is to be assured. There are several reasons for that position:

First, the initial agreements have slowed but not stopped the increase in Soviet strategic strength. They embody as effective limitations as we could get the Soviets to accept at this time. Although they impose no limits on some threats such as ASW (antisubmarine warfare), air defense and qualitative improvement in ICBM and SLBM (submarine­launched ballistic missile) forces, the agreements do provide for the U.S. programs necessary to counter Soviet developments in these areas. Our security depends on continuing the programs necessary to counter the threats not limited by the agreement.

Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went

so far as to say that they could not support the SALT agreements unless

these programs were approved. Foster listed eight programs:

1. The Trident submarine and the ULMS (undersea long-range-missile system)

submarine (to replace the U.S.Polaris-Poseidon fleet).

2. Satellite bomber basing (to disperse the U.S.strategic bomber force

to additional bases as a protective measure).

3. The B-1 bomber (a supersonic replacement for the B-52 and FB-lll

strategic bombers).

4. Site Defense or "Hardpoint Defense" and ABM system: "The objective

of the program is to develop and preserve the option to responsively

deploy a strategically significant terminal defense of U.S.ICBMs".

5. NCA (national command authority) Defense (an ABM system for Washington,

D.C.) .

6. Command, Control and Communications (and Advanced Airborne Command

Post, arld other aspects).

7. Submarine-Launched Cruise Missiles (a return to the Regulus-type

missile program deployed from 1955 to 1964-1965, which the U.S.Navy

had replaced with the Polaris system).

8. Augmented Verification Capabilities (to further improve the National

Means of Verification through such methods as satellite reconnaissance).

Secretary Laird listed five of these eight (2, 4, 6, 7, 8,/ but added a

rather important ninth program: "develop improved reentry vehicles for ICBMs

and SLBMs" (Laird, 12, p. 16). In the subsequent Senate records this was

identified as coming under the ABRES program (Advanced Ballistic Missile

Reentry Systems (13), an ICBM warhead development program going back over

10 years. Still other programs appeared as "hedges against future threats

or requirements":

mobile ICBMs,

early warning radars for the SLBM "threat,"

and the Sanguine VLF (Very Low Frequency) communication system for the

U.S.Polaris-Poseidon fleet.

The budget had also already contained substantial amounts for site defense

ABM development and for other advanced ABM technology.

Neither did the Pentagon regard recent arms control agreements as a justification for cutbacks in military R&D. Because the Vladivostok agreement limited total numbers of weapons and weapon carriers, the accord "re-enforces our need for technological progress. Evolution in performance of strategic systems will now be the decisive motivator on both sides as we seek further agreements."

Both arguments deserve careful scrutiny since they put the Pentagon in essentially a "never lose" pos~t~on. Detente and arms control are given as reasons for increasing R&D efforts. What if detente were

replaced by a more hostile political environmental and arms control gave way to an arms race? In such a case wouldn!t the Pentagon also cite those developments to justify greater R&D spending? ~~atever happens to those external variables, the result seems to be a request for additional funds. Apparently those variables are decidedly secondary and subordinate to the central test, which is the strategic value of weapons systems. As the Director of Defense Research and Engineering told the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1971: "if there were no Soviet threat, if there were no threat around the world, I would be the first to come in and ask this committee to reduce the research and development budget of the Department to zero."

The claim that detente requires a "renewed emphasis" on technological competition is not elaborated in the Department's published justifica­tion statement. When Senator McIntyre asked why competition could not be eased, Dr. Currie replied: "I think that long-range competition is uncontrollable from our point of view. That is the world environment ••• We are in a position of having to respond. We just don't have a choice in the matter."

The proposition that arms control requires greater R&D efforts received more attention. The request for funds for ballistic missile defense was justified in part as a hedge against sudden abrogation of the ABM Treaty. But other Pentagon officials plan their budgets on the assumption that there will not be abrogation. Mr. Leonard Sullivan, Jr. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, told the House Committee on the Budget that his five-year budget projec­tion was based on the assumption that there would.be no abrogation of SALT agreements.

Dr. Currie maintained that in an era of mutual restraints and arms limitation "we should continue to pursue promising technological options in our strategic programs both in order to preserve our capabilities and to encourage the Soviets to negotiate future arms limitations by convincing them of the futility of attempting to surpass us." (14)

Clearly, the same thing happened in the USSR -- or perhaps a bit more. In

the middle 1970's, during the period of ostensible max~mum East-West and

US - USSR political relaxation, following the West German "Ostpolitik", the

1975 Helsinki Accords, and the SALT agreements, the USSR made advanced

development or deployment decision on

(1) the SS-20 missile

(2) higher CEP warheads for the SS-18 and SS-19 MIRVed ICBM's

(3) the SS-2l, 22 and 23 shorter range ballistic missiles

(4) new SLBM missiles

(5) large aircraft carriers

(6) the Typhoon and Oscar class nuclear submarines

(7) strategic cruise missiles

(8) immediately following the deployment of a new generation of longer range

tactical strike aircraft in 1974-75, the development of follow-ons

to these

It was obsolete in 1957, and it gets more so with every passing year. It is

even misleading. It does not begin to take into account the elements which

it must in order to understand the interaction between scientific research

and the weapons-acquisition process, and it is the misdirection of scientific

knowledge which these elements bring about which IS the paramount

problem of science in our time. (19)

These elements have come from outside the scientific process, have super­

imposed themselves on it, and have used the scientific process for purposes

of national politics. The elements which have adapted the outputs of the

scientific method are systems for managing s.cience, applying it, organizing

it, funding it, and directing it to serve particular goals.

To aggravate matters, a faith in the classic dogma facilitates the utiliza­

tion of the scientific process by the imposed elements at the same time as

it makes the scientific community extremely reluctant, in the face of its

idealized credo, to realize what is actually taking place.

One can suggest a very crude three stage model describing the social utiliza­

tion of sc~ence and the interactions of science with society: (a) in the

earliest phase of its evolution, science subordinates itself to politics,

claiming to be value-free and neutral; (b) with time, the results of

scientific research influence the society but do not yet cause any

disruption in its framework -- the influence may be significant, but the

established institutions have not yet given way to the selection of one

applied social utility to be benefited at the expense of all others;

(c) eventually the consequences of science and technology may be so great

so as to change the very institutions of society, perhaps even developing

mechanisms whereby scientific and technological development become the

purpose of other social and political activities.

The trouble with the classical scientific dogma is that it fits only a world

which is still in the earliest of the above three stages, whereas many

societies today have long passed into being some amalgam of the latter two.

There exists no theoretical or conceptual framework which deals with the

new context. It is here that the insights in 1937 by Hans Kohn and in 1905

by Henry Adams are in important aspects more to the point than the responses

of most of contemporary society. As was indicated, Lewis Mumford's

suggestions in the mid-1950's based on these insights are rejected.

The break in the traditional way of thinking began around 1970. It had by

then become obvious that arms control negotiations concerning a single

major strategic system -- if at all successful --0 could take three to six

years, or longer. Within the same time the military R&D process on one or

both sides could produce several new strategic systems which bypassed the

controls put on the negotiated one. (18). Wolfgang Panofsky wrote:

Our knowledge of science will indeed increase continuously: the facts of nature are there to be explored, and they will not, and should not. remain hidden. But the process of going from science to military technology involves a protracted series of planned steps, including development, test, production, and deployment. This chain extends over many years, or even decades, and it is up to man to decide through his political processes to undertake such steps or not to ••.

I see no valid excuse why we should acquiesce in the development of weapons of ever-increasing lethality. If we subscribe to the belief that technology has a life of its own and that its progress in any direction, however antisocial, cannot be impeded, then it is indeed true that man has lost control over his own destiny. (19)

A major contributor to the conception of imposing restraints on the military

R&D program was the 1971 volume Impact of New Technologies on the Arms Race

authored by major scientific figures with senior experience ~n military R&D

and in goverr~ent. (20) Two more general papers by Franklin Long were

also important. (21)

Herbert York's 1971 paper listed seven proposals to limit military R&D both

~n general as well as in specific areas. The proposals were for

1) A Comprehensive Nuclear Test. Ban

2) A Missile Launch Rate Limitation

3) Specific Prohibitions of Certain Missile Improvements

4) Restrictions on ASW R&D

5) Restrictions on ASW Test and Evaluation

6) Gradual Demobilization of Manpower and Facilities Devoted to

Military R&D (22)

Harvey Brooks repeated these same seven suggestions ~n 1975 with the addition

of three more, i.e.

1) Restrictions to Permit International Observation on the Location of

(missile) Target Areas

2) Unilateral Action of Scientists as a World-Wide Community to Withhold

Their Services from Military Research and Development

3) Reorganizing Research and Development to Minimize the "Technological

Imperative." (23)

Several of these suggestions have received more detailed treatment by other

authors. Sidney Drell emphasized ICBM test limits, and there was some

hope that these might have been incorporated into SALT III. (24) A very

large group of limitations were included in the SALT I - ABM and in the

SALT I - Interim Agreement. These have been summarized by Makins and are

included in a group of tables following this section. (25) Makins points

out that

.Many of these limitations were introduced into the negotiations primarily to close theoretical, but in practice unattractive, means to circumvent the intent of the major limitations. Acceptance of them represented little more than a willingness to accept the logical consequences of the major limitations. (26)

It is uniformly understood that the same criteria on a larger scale were all

that made possible the arms control treaties agreed to by the US and USSR

such as the Antarctic, Outer Space, and "Sea-Bed" treaties. Agreement on

these was possible only because neither the US or USSR had any major weapon

development programs which they considered feasible for deployment in these

areas. In the case of sea bottom mounted strategic delivery systems for

example, the 1964 US Sea-Bed "Summer Study" whose role it was to determine

"the US requirements for future sea-based strategic deterrents beyond the

Polaris/Poseidon •.• " decided that strategic delivery systems mounted on the

ocean floor were impractical and undesirable. Given prior US military R&D

decisions ruling out such areas of interest, it was possible to reach

agreement on a sea-bed treaty with the USSR in 1967.

At the same time more than one arms control specialist has emphasized the

desirability of even these measures in order to "close off" areas from

expanded future efforts of military R&D programs.

It is an old question whether it is possible and feasible to put restrictions on research and development activities in order to prohibit possible expansion of the arms race into newareas .•.

The central difficulty is of course that a piece of research can serve the purposes both of peace and of war.ln the latter case it can be good for both offense and defense. One example is microbiological research promoting at the same time both public health and the development of biological warfare or protection against such warfare.

Another problem is that control measures established to verify international agreements must be easily described in treaty terms and they must be easily formalized to become suitable as a basis for political decision-making and action.

There is, therefore, no general way of controlling military R&D, as this control would sometimes have to deal with the intentions and thoughts of individual scientists. In specific areas, however, practical measures might be envisaged.

One example is R&D act~v~t~es involving operations of such a magnitude that distinct features of obvious significance for weapons development can be easily identified and observed in a formalized manner. The obvious example, of course, is the nuclear test ban, prohibiting activities where one single experiment has dimensions of geophysical size~ On the same grounds, a MIRV test ban has also been suggested.

The question, then, is whether there are attractive indirect ways to restrict military R&D in order to stop potential new arms races in new areas of potential confrontations. Here, certain recent arms­limitation agreements are of great importance. The Antarctic treaty, the outer-space treaty, the non-proliferation treaty, the sea-bed treaty about to emerge, etc. will be of great significance. It is also worth mentioning the further restrictions on biological and chemical weapons now under serious negotiation. These have been criticized because they do not result in real disarmament. This may be true:

but the fact that they exclude militarily untouched areas from being flooded by spectacular new weapons is important enough to justify them and to invoke further measures of this kind. In particular, it would be desirable to conclude such arms limitation agreements now, before these areas have been massively invaded by either military or peaceful activities, in order to establish first the security framework within which peaceful activities can then develop

This would exclude such new sectors from the arms race, make intended military R&D meaningless and justify peaceful developments only.

Another indirect type of restriction would be the internationalization of research efforts in the new areas. This does not necessarily mean the setting up of new international bodies to take over activities now national but rather to fulfill the function of opening up research results for common observation.

To make this effective, the international cooperation must be extensive enough to make it definitely attractive for institutions to participate actively. The efforts now undertaken ~y the United Nations to establish an international cooperation scheme are of great significance for this. Examples of possible future significance are weather and climate manipulations.

A last comment touches on the area between R&D and production. In certain cases the size of research operations overlaps that of small production and deployment. This is true, e.g. for bacteriological laboratories, from which a biological attack might be launched directly out of the peacetime research operation. Control, aiming at early detection of possible attacks of this kind, could be limited to an overall assessment of the nature and size of what is going on in the various laboratories. Other examples of this kind may be found to arise in the future. (27).

However, it would appear that these kinds of relatively blank areas on

the military R&D map can be filled by continuous low level R&D programs

that do not directly contravene the treaty provisions. This has clearly

happened in the case of the ABM treaty, where it would appear that the

USSR has evaded the margins of the treaty as regards radars, and the US has

done the same as regards testing of new interceptors. (28) The same may

very likely have happened with the 1972 BW treaty, whose restrictions

explicitly included development. (See chapter )

In this case genetic engineering capabilities developed subsequent to the

treaty may very well erode its provisions, if they have not done so already.

In a more difficu~t interaction, the problems in evaluating the USSR's

CW posture and procurement policy, and the difficulty of evaluating intel­

ligence on this score, may eventually also serve to undermine the BW

convention. The pressure of continuous development was also emphasized by

the 1971 Impact of New Technologies volume, which essentially posed the same

question for the basis of its study as did the Makins' report exactly ten

years later.

We are faced today with several new weapon systems, ABM and MIRV, which are at the stage of being deployed. The question to which we addressed ourselves is: Could the development of these systems have been avoided and can future weapon systems be avoided by some sort of national or inrernational policy on R&D?

We see today that technology which was considered remote or even un­achievable only ten years ago has in fact been realized. Startling breakthroughs in computer technology and missile guidance are now taken for granted.Indeed, in retrospect, these advancements were made far more easily than could have been imagined.

It seems that there is a general principle operating here: whatever appears to be even remotely possible turns out to be easy. This observation has frightening consequences, for scientists and engineers seem to have accepted the challenge of constructing whatever is possible. It is difficult to be optimistic about the prospects of changing this policy in the future. (29)

Makins devised a series of tables to attempt to define the point -- or

"time-window" -- at which bilateral arms control negotiations regarding

specific strategic systems would be most feasible, as well as the point

beyond which they are too late. The tables for MIRV, ABM, Cruise

Missile, and High Energy Laser are included below. Makins describes the

somewhat amorphous conciusions of the study as follows: ........

. ...

A number of representative cases or episodes of special relevance were briefly surveyed on the basis of readily available sources and the direct experience of selected individuals. The cases chosen were MIRV, ABM, cruise missiles, European theater arms limitation and CWo These cases were used to establish preliminary hypotheses about the arms limitation/defense procurement planning relationship which could form a basis for evaluating future possibilities. Three aspects of the process by which the United States and the Soviet Union develop new technologies for military application were identified as being critical to the arms limitation/defense procurement planning relation- . ship.

Application Diversity: some technologies are so multifaceted and broad in appeal that the strategic and bureaucratic momentum behind their application is hard to slow. Thus even though attractive arms limitation bargains covering certain applications of a given technology might be formulated, they could fail to be adopted because of a fear either of circumvention (because the bargains did not extend to cover the full range of potential applications of that technology) or of spillover (onto other applications of the technology on which limitattions were strategically undesirable).

Technological Momentum: applications which require relatively little further advance in technology development and towards which development is progressing smoothly and rapidly are relatively difficult to slow or stop by arms limitation negotiation and agreement. By contrast, those applications for which the additional development required before successful deployment is relatively great and the momentum of the develop­ment is relatively low, whether due to technical difficulty in the development or to budgetary restraints, are more likely to be suitable candidates for successful -- and mutually advantageous -- arms limitations.

Technological Asymmetry: advantage can be derived in arms limitation negotiations by the side that has a real or perceived technological lead in a vital area. However that advantage can normally not be applied to situations in which an agreement would in effect freeze the other side out of a technology application which its rival was close to being able to deploy and could, if necessary, deploy covertly to achieve a strategic advantage through breakout. A corollary of this is that there may be "time windows" in the development cycle of systems involving the application of new technologies during which arms limitation agreements based on prohibitions on development, as opposed to quantitative limits on prohibitions on development, as opposed to quantitative limits on deployment, may be possible, in the sense that neither side is yet the master of one or more of the relevant technologies.

The study of the five cases yielded some important perspectives for the

subsequent analysis of future arms limitation opportunities:

1. The interactions between national strategy, international relationships and arms limitation are of critical significance. Where national objectives are indeterminate, inconsistent or subject to frequent or rapid change, the use of arms limitation -- or any other means of policy -- is likely at times to prove unsuccessful and even self­defeating. The lesson of the experience of the 1970s is that analysis of future arms limitation possibilities must be based on precise and explicit assumptions concerning both U.S. and Soviet strategic concepts,

objectives and policies. The question for analysis is whether either side, or both, in the light of their assumed, different strategic objectives and policies would be likely to see advantage in the proposal. It is a matter of policy decision as to whether to accept the assumptions on which the analysis rests. The ABM Treaty case was especially instructive on this point and is a good point of reference in connection with the prospects for both BMD limitation and arms limitations in other areas.

2. The disparity between the inherently dynamic nature of the East-West military and technological competition and the relatively static nature of arms limitation agreements is an important one. While such agreements can be changed, this can by and large only be done with some difficulty. But if such agreements are not of some significant duration, they are likely to have little certain practical impact on the course of the strategic competition.

3. There are time periods - or "windows" - within which attempts to negotiate arms limitations in the form of the prohibition or effective prohibition of new technology applications which may be assessed as being in the u.s. national security interest have the treatest chance of being successful. These time windows are defined by the three factors cited earlier, namely, technological asymmetry, technological momentum and application diversity. Typically, there would be two such windows in the lifetime of a particular technology or systems concept during which prohibitions or significant limitations could be achieved.

The first window would open after development had proceeded successfully to the point at which the characteristics of the system were clearly enough defined to permit its strategic significance to be baubed and a detailed assessment of arms limitation possibilities to be made, but before either side's development program had reached the point at which one side, but not the other, was ready to produce and deploy the system.

This window might in some cases be open for a long time, e.g., when a development program makes little headway or stalls, due either to inability to solve a technical challenge (e.g., ABM in the 1960s/early 1970s) or lack of military interest/financial support (cruise missiles in the early 70s). But in other cases, this window may only open extremely briefly, as was the case with MIRV, which moved quickly through a successful development program to a point at which the system was ready to be deployed.

The second window would open after both sides have mastered the technology, but before full-scale deployment has been completed. Since at this point the military demand for the system would generally be real, the most likely arms limitation options would be for fairly permissive numerical limitations on deployments, though stricter limits, effective prohibitions or even complete prohibitions would still theoretically be possible.

4. A thorough process of net strategic and technical assessment LS

essential to the evaluation of arms limitation possibilities. This process would be both conceptually and bureaucratically more balanced than the existing arms control impact statement process and would, in addition, represent a vehicle for gauging both arms limitation proposals and defense procurements in relation to the statement of national

strategy and objectives contained in the Defense Guidance document. The process would involve the use of various techniques of analysis and technology forecasting to define and evaluate, in the light of specified u.s. and Soviet strategic objectives, the U.S./Soviet strategic relationships which would occur at different times in the future and under different arms limitation regimes (including a no-arms limitation regime). The cases studied suggested that the absense of such an assess-ment in the past was a distinct liability. (30)

At the same time, studies still continue designed to take advantage of

technological assymetries ~n the U.S./USSR weapons competition. (31)

The question of reduction of military R&D expenditure in particular (as

distinct from military expenditure in general has been raised only in

one occasion. In 1972 targets for monetary aid to developing countries,

specifically related to research and development, were established in the

United Nations as part of the World Plan of Action for the Second Develop­

ment Decade. There were three separate financial targets, the third of

which was the stipulation that five percent of R&D expenditure of developed

nations be devoted to the R&D problems of developing nations. (32) At

the time some six nations -- the USA, USSR, UK, France, Germany and Chinn

spent over 80 percent of world military expenditure, and by the only

estimate then available, somei98 percent of total world military R&D expendi­

ture. (33) It was pointed out that "the proposed 5 percent target was

approximately 12,5 percent of this sum, and could easily be met by a small

and gradual decrease of military research during the Decade". (34)

The US and USSR spent the great majority of this sum, and for these two

countries military R&D expenditure came to half or more of their total R&D

expenditure. The USSR resisted the suggestion that the five percent goal •

should be taken from all R&D expenditure of the postulated donor nations,

and insisted that it be assessed only from their non-military R&D expendij

ture. (35)

Of course the goals were not met in any case, and military expenditure was

unaffected. In the years 1971-1976, when US military expenditure did drop

in real terms for autonomous reasons, there was some concomitant reduction

~n military R&D expenditure (36) • (Se~ tc. \, tc ~ ~L:.w')

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LIS military rcscarch and dCYl'1 Ollllll'n I : DoD dirccl lind indircct funding and a 10111 it: Cllcrgy derellce aclhilies, FYs· 1963-83

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1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976" 1977" 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1980-83

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RDT&E

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What is the plausibility of the selective reduction of military R&D

expenditure? The experience of the 1970's that was described earlier,

both for the US and the USSR, certainly gives one no hope of the political

feasibility of such a suggestion. Some argue -- on logical grounds -­

that the hardest element to pry loose from the military services will be

that "farthest back" from deployment which is R&D. In addition, it

is difficult to produce a legislative debate on military R&D appropriations,

except in particular circumstance described below which do not deal with

arms control. Otherwise such appropriations are relatively neutral and

very few argue against them. For just the opposite reasons, however, one

might assume that it would be politically easier to cut R&D than to cut

procurement and deployment. The latter are far more tangible, and R&D has

to be argued for in the budgetary process in terms of more provisional

"threats" farther off in the future. In fact, for somewhat related reasons,

many people in favor of serious arms control and disarmament have tradi­

tionally felt that it would be much more significant to stop procurement

and let R&D go. Either the R&D could then be "afforded", politically and

economically, or it would suffer a sort of retrograde degeneration. It is

the weapons procured and deplyed that are more dangerous, and that preempt

political decisions, and not R&D.

The instances in which military R&D funds have been frequently cut, either

by the Dept. of Defense or by various congressional committees, are those

cases in which a weapon development program promises to be obsolete, far

too expensive, or will not meet technical performance requirements. There

have been a great many such cases: Dyna-Soar, MOL, The Navaho cruise missile,1

Cheyenne helicopter, B-70 bomber; the Blue Streak and Sky-Bolt missiles, etc.

However, none of these programs were cut for arms control reasons. In a very

rare instance, the chairman of the subcommittee on military R&D of the US

Senate Armed Services Committee, Sen. Thomas McIntyre, was able to obtain

the deletion of R&D funds for greater SLBM accuracy during the years 1973-75J

on the grounds that administration statements at the time claimed that it

was not official policy to seek such accuracy improvements.

In the USSR the greater portion (and possibly even the total) of military

R&D expenditure is funded from the "s~ience budget", and is not included

in reports of military expenditure at all. This obviously complicates the

problem enormously, certainly under any proposed arms-control regime.

The final suggestion, of Harvey Brooks -- the unilateral action of scientists

as a world wide community to withhold their services from military research

and development -- has been reflected to a slight degree in various marginal

activities in the post-war years. To the knowledge of the author, they have

occured primarily in the United States. In an extremely unusual case

Norbert Wiener, an eminent mathematician who had been involved in C WIl

military R&D programs, wrote an open letter to the government refusing any

further participation in military research. (37) A substantial group of

scientists that had been involved in the nuclear weapon program during WII at '(1,.a ..,a(l" ~

also resigned from further participation in the program .;-and there were at

least a few such cases in the United Kingdom as well. There were two very

substantial efforts by the US scientific community in particular to petition

the government in relation to particular weapon programs. The first of

these was the Pauling petition (named after Nobel Laureate Linus Pauling)

in 1957-1958, asking that the government cease nuclear weapon testing,

which can be considered an R&D program. The second case involved an oper~

ational program, the use by the United States of herbicidal and cHemical

warfare agents in Vietnam, and was thus not a protest against an R&D program.

The Pauling petition gained some 1800 signatures but did not have any sub­

stantial impact on the nuclear weapon testing program other than to add to

the pressures which led to the initiation of underground testing of nuclear

weapons. In the second case some 22 scientists -- including 7 Nobel Prize

w~nners -- wrote a public letter at the end of 1966 to President Lyndon

Johnson condemning the use of defoliants by the United States in Vietnam.

By February, 01967, this letter had gained the signatures of more than

5.000 scientists, including 17 Nobel winners and 129 members of the National

Academy of Sciences. Together with international diplomatic pressure in the

United Nations this protest did succeed in forcing the cancellation of the

program. As a result of opposition to the prosecution of the war in Vietnam

there also developed opposition on major American college and university

campuses against large scale defense research programs that were affiliated

with particular universities the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

and the Lincoln Laboratory, the University of California/Berkeley and the

Lawrence Livermore laboratory, programs at Stanford University and elsewhere.

There was some effort to dissociate these from their university affiliation,

and there was also an effort to curtail classified -- that is, secret -­

research, performed under contract to the Dept. of Defense in academic

institutions. (38)

Second to the attempt to curtail military R&D as a component of arms

control agreements with the USSR, the most significant development (at

least as initially hoped) was the initiation of Arms Control Impact

Statements -- ACIS -- in the United States in the mid-1970's. As early

as 1962 Bernard Feld had written:

The problem seems to be in developing reasonably accurate projections of the effects and dangers of a new discovery rather than imposing restraints on the research leading to the discovery. For this purpose, openness would seem a desirable end to pursue. (39)

The point was the same as Panofsky's in 1971, and the 1969 papers of

Franklin Long had also called for a process that paralleled "technology

assessment" or environmental impact statements for major weapon systems.

Perry had made a similar argument, not perhaps from the point of view of

arms control, but rather from that of a more rational weapons acquisition

process that took account of a far wider range of national goals by way

of criteria for major policy decisions and acquisition choices. He argued

that the lesson

derived from this quick overview of the past, is that more thorough-going analysis of possible consequences should be conducted as part of a decision process that involves weapons selection. The influence of weapons choice on strategy, tactics, and level of violence is far too important to be subordinated to questions of technical feasibility, general "weapons requirements, definitions, or institutional preferences. If national goals are to be dependent on weapons choices, then the interrelationship of the two must be properly acknowledged. Whatever the intentions or inclinations of military commanders, at any level, they are inhibited in their strategy and tactics alike by the necessity of employing the weapons they have on hand. If such weapons are suited only to a narrow range of applications, strategy and tactics alike will be limited. Technol­ogy alone, or its failure, has not yet been decisively important to the outcome of a war -- an accident that promises nothing for the future. A faulty reconciliation of technology with strategic goals, or disrespect for the strategy implications of weapons decisions, could have catastrophic effects. (40)

All of these assessments, by Feld, Perry, Long -- and fina]ly that of the

Congress -- saw secrecy in weapons decision making and the antecedent R&D

process as an impediment to a more competent and wide ranging assessment,

which might also include arms control goals. In the summer of 1969, as an

aftermath of the significant Congressional debate on the acquisition of a

US ABM system and in an effort to possibly stave off MIRV deployment,

there had been a Congressional Hearing entitled Diplomatic and Strategic

Impact of Multiple Warhead Missiles which to some degree served as a model

of what was desired. (41)

In the environment of the SALT agreements the US Congress legislated an

Arms Control Impact process for all nuclear weapon programs, and for

financial

criteria. was amended

to require

The new provisions required that

"a complete statement analyzing the impact on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations" accompany requests to the Congress for authorization or appropriations for the following programs:

- Programs of research, development, testing, engineering, construction, deployment, or modernization with respect to nuclear armaments, nuclear implements of war, military facilities, or military vehicles designed or intended primarily for delivery of nuclear ' weapons.

- Programs of research, development, testing, engineering, construction, deployment or modernization with respect to armaments, implements of war, or military facilities having an estimated total program cost in excess of $250 million or an estimated annual program cost in excess of $50 million.

- Any other program involving weapons systems or technology which the National Security Council believes, upon the advice and recommendation of the Director of ACDA, may have significant impact on arms control policy or negotiations.

The new section also required that the Director of ACDA be gLven "on a continuing basis ... full and timely access to detailed information" with respect to such programs that require arms control impact statements.

The underlying assumption of this new requirement was that the arms control implications of military programs, whether positive or negative, should be considered together with the merits of the programs' defense capabilities. Specifically, arms control impact statements were intended to tell how a given program might enhance or detract from attaining the primary objectives of arms control. According to ACDA, these objectives are to reduce the likelihood of armed conflicts, their severity and violence if they should occur, and the economic burden of military programs. (42)

Opposition to the act was severe within the administration even before it

came into law. Four of the six executive agencies concerned requested

President Ford to veto the bill, and the Dept. of Defense drafted a veto

message for the President to sign. (43) Nevertheless, President Ford did

sign the legislation.

The Ford administration did not however comply with the law. The first arms

control impact statements, sub,mitted to the Congress in August 1976 as part of

the fiscal year 1977 authorization/appropriation process, were a disaster. (44)

The statements were too few in number, too spars.e in cCtntent, and too late

to be of any use in Congressional deliberations over the funding of major

defense programs. Of an estimated 70 Defense programs that legally required

statements, only 16 were submitted. Most statements were not more than a

single paragraph and discussed overwhelmingly the positive aspects of the

programs. The statements were submitted after the Congress had authorized

the Defense budget for fiscal year 1977 and just before -the final vote on

military appropriations. Other objections were that the statements lacked

analysis, dealt only at the shallowest level with the impact on arms control

and disarmament negotiations, and not at all with the impact on policy.

Following the letter of the law the Congress could have postponed any vote

on the defense appropriation, but that was not done. The Congressional

response must however be considered to have been unusually strong. The

Chairmen of the two respective Congressional committees wrote to the President~

Assistent for National Security that

We were frankly appalled at the statements ••• The 16 statements are not, in any sense, complete. They certainly are not analytical. They dealt only at the shallowest level with i~pact on arms control and dis­armament negotiations and they do not deal at all with impact on policy. (45)

Senators Sparkman and Case in correspondence addressed to Defense Secretary

Rumsfeld and ERDA Administrator Seamans were a bit more to the point in their

language

The statements provided do not comply with the law and are unacceptable. Accordingly, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, we request that you take immediate steps to resubmit comprehensive statements meeting the requirements of law on each of the .•• programs covered in the initial submissions. (46)

However the results were only slightly improved.

Analysis implies an examination of such matters as causes, effects, purposes, accompanying circumstances, alternatives, reasons in favor or against, costs versus benefits, and historical evolution. To put it in other ways, an analysis of impact might explore historical, political, economic and military factors, or it could be concerned with long-range, or medium and short-term elements. These are some categories of information, among others, that are necessary for Congress to make its own appraisals and to participate meaningfully in formulation of arms control policy.

Most of the elements of analysis just mentioned are not reflected in the statements submitted. From the viewpoint of their completeness and analytical quality it is difficult to understand how Congress could rely upon them exclusively or even largely to make its own in­dependent appraisal or for assistance in making a Constitutional input to foreign policy relating to arms control.

We conclude that the latest statements still do not comply with the law and are unacceptable as a model for future submissions. The sub­mitted statements are neither complete nor adequately analytical. They do not deal in any comprehensive way with the impact of the programs covered upon arms control policy and negotiations. They clearly have not served the purpose envisioned in the legislation of being an integral part of the decisionmaking process within the executive branch, nor could they be of particular value to the Congress in making its own appraisals and in participating in the formulation of arms control policy.

A further problem with the statemen·ts is that of secrecy. When classifica­tion is necessary for full and detailed discuss.ion, as we noted in our response to the first submissions, specific statements should be provided in classified and unclassified form. Every effort should be made to provide unclassified information to the fullest extent possible. (47)

The Congressional committees published seven model impact statements of their

own, prepared by the Congressional Research Service, and the incoming Carter

administration promised to do a more thorough job.

In the succeeding years the Arms Control Impact Statements (ACIS) have been

issued in a substantial annual volume -- but to no real effect. (48) They

require a considerable amount of staff and time, but are Ln essence a

separate excercise to comply with the law -- a "sideshow" alongside the real

decisionmaking process. Perhaps it would be more accurate to sayan afterimage

following that process. Though much more competently written, in all cases they

justified administration decisions already taken. Having been produced within

the administration, it was impossible that there could be intraagency consensus

on a document disagreeing with or being sceptical of administration policy

in any significant way. Even if the ACIS had been written by the Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency alone, without any intraagency review, it is incon~eiv­

able that it -- or any other executive agency -- would openly take on the

role of contesting another agencies policies -- in this case the Dept. of ~e~~ ~~ C""'5G~' )

Defense~ Hence the ACIS were never critical enough of weapons programs to

form a basis for Congressional questioning or opposition to programs. There

was no evidence that they impacted on internal administration decision making,

or for that matter, on that of the Congress. In three particular examples

during this period which were very problematical weapon development programs

either on technical or political/arms control grounds, or both, the ACIS had

no di.scernable effect on administration or Congressional decisions. Secrecy

deletions remained a problem, particularly with politically sensitive programs

such as ASAT. There was no impact on R&D whatsoever.

It remained for several other Congressional organizations that were responsible

for their mandate and their operations only to the Congress to provide more

substantial analysis and critiques of US Dept. of Defense weapons programs:

- the Congressional Budget Office, in broadly based routine reports wich do

not however usually deal with an individual weapon system

- the Comptroller General, otherwise known as the General Accounting Office

- and most recently the Office of Technology Assessment, which has recently

prepared several very substantial, detailed and probing studies of major

weapon programs with far more impact on Congressional assessment. One of

these dealt with the MX ICBM and the second with space based directed

energy ABM defense. (49)

In short, the Arms Control Impact Statements have not succeeded to date in

their intended purpose, and they are not likely to. It would appear that

such restrictions as exist in the various bilateral or multilateral arms

control treaties (see the tables which follow regarding SALT qualitative

restrictions) have been the only substantial restraints -- if at all -- on

military R&D.

REFERENCES

1. Solly Zuckerman, Nuclear Illusion and Reality, London, Collins, 1982 pp. 103, 105.

Ulrich Albrecht has written the most diametrically opposed to that of Zuckerman:

explicit position

Two other groupings which have little or no influence in forming the basic patterns of interaction that recreate the military R&D establishment may be neglected. They are the R&D community at large, which has little or nothing to say about military affairs or about the national ministries for scientific research and development, and the scientific and technical personnel within military R&D.

Ulrich Albrecht, "Military R&D Communities", International Social Science Journal, 35:1,( 1983): 7-23

2. Ettiene Bauer, "Irresistable, Irrational, Indomitable Military Technology", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 40:5 (May 1984) 4-5.

Another author, Gerard Piel (the editor of the journal Scientific American) attempted by a great exageration to exonerate "science" by placing all of weapon development in "technology" and establishing a distirl.ction between the two. "!icience is concerned wi th the discovery of the unknown. Technology is the exploitation of the already known •.. Contemporary weaponeering is essentially a process of miniaturization, of packing more devastation into a smaller and more portable warhead ... This is not Science. It is Technology of a high order, and it is exploiting whole regions of knowledge only recently won from the unknown ..• (Quoted by Philip Noel-Baker, in "Science and Disarmament", Impact, 15:4 (1965): 221. In contra~t a major proponent of military R&D argued the exact opposite,(C.S.Draper, "Interdependence of Civilian and Military Science", in Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 485-489) but in a second article was not above another kind of gross obfuscation. In a description of the laboratory that he headed; the Instrumentation Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which produced the inertial navigation guidance systems for many American strategic missiles and space systems, he wrote "The primary function of the laboratory is education!' (C.S.Draper, "The Inertial Gyro - An Example of Basic and Applieq. Research", American Scientist, 48:1, (March 1960): 9-19.

3. Kosta Tsipis, "The Building Blocks of Weapons Development", Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, 33:4 (April 1977), 41

This was a brief editorial commentary to a series of articles on Mili tary R&D which Tsipis had edited for the Bulletin. In its entirety the series consisted of the following articles:

- Kosta Tsipis, "Science and the Military, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 33:1 (January 1977): 10-11.

- H.F .York and G.A. GC,:-b ,"MilitaryResearch and Development: A Postwar History", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 33:1 (January 1977): 13-26. M.A.Milshtein and L.S.Semeyko, "US Military R&D Through Soviet Eyes", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 33:2 (February 1977): 32-38.

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.. -.------.---------------.. -----. ------ ----._ .. _........ _.- ---- -.-... 2 No cI4oltheralt! d"nl.,, Inc1.,d1ntJ by f'l1CrYl'IIon. of tl"I'tIIf'try durlnq tp~tlnq wh .. n It IlI1f'/'rlp\ VI" Iflr .. tllln

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110 f1lght-teltlng or St.04 or Q..04 with _.Itlple wnht'3ds ----- -- .. - ... - ------- -_ ....... -.-.- ------- -_ ... _--- ... --_ ......... _._ ..... -- -_.- ..... - -. -- _ ........... _. __ .. _ ..

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In addition to the major cases reviewed by the study, a larger list of cases in which the Soviets eventually accepted limitations on

the extent that Articles I and II of toe Treaty leave i which is debatable) was resolved to some degree in Statement 0, which called for discussion and agree" specific limitations on systems based on "other pI principles".

technology appl ications during the SAL: negot iat ions was com~i~~~~: ~~ This list is shown in Figure 3. 2 .:""n}i""7.'~'Of;;.;these'''';l1mftat lO'M ; were \

"'~rr'-':"on':f1i ght-test 1 n9 and deployment" Of fhtef'cont' -cruise missiles (ICCMs). Proposed by the United Sta 1970, a 10n9 with the proposa 1 to 1 imit SLCM 1 aunch those most currently deployed, the Soviets claimed t~ ban was irrelevant because all of those system! obsolete. The proposal was dropped when the Soviets ( their proposals to limit FBS. Soviet representation ( issue appears to be straightforward. This tends to ! the earlier contention that there was little interest Soviet Union in cruite missiles at this time; intere sparked only by the seriousness the U.S. progr3m took ( later.

fnlt-odueed' info" the'negot iat10nf primai'i1y to elan'theoreltc!l;""tmr"1if" p'radice unattractive, means to circumvent the intent of the' major'" lfmftatio~'s. ~c:ce-Ptancr'Of'thern'teprellntea'Htt'€! ltI(jr'e that'l'·~ wil­lfnij~iis to accept the logical consequences of the major limitations.

More interesting, perhaps, are several cases in which the Soviets \(:'j:iiM limitations on the ar;pl1cation of technology. The most important, of these are discussed below.

~lHfWd~'§'omnt of 'hnd'"mm'l'ff:;JCB"~fitf6e"-et"~;~ Proposed by the Unite States at a time when the Soviets were developing, but not yet flight-testing. land-mobile ICBMs, the Soviets rejected the proposal, arguing that limiting mobile ICBMs should be a subject for discussion in a future negotiation. This position reflected the fact that the SS-16/SS-20 was in an advanced state of development, but not yet in the testing ph!!»e. The technol",;! involved in making a mobile missi le was not profound, n~ever. The United States already had one -- the Pershing -- and Soviet momentum was well beyond the threshold. Nevertheless, tile Soviets did in the end accept an effective delay in the deployment of a Soviet land-mobile ICBM by agreeing to Article IV.S of the SALT II agreement, which prohibited the deployment of the 55-16 and to Article I of the Protocol, which prohibited flight-testing and deploy­ment of mobile ICBMs until December 19S1, though the precise reasons for this dec1sion (whether unhappiness with the sys~ tern or a real sacrifice made in order to reach an agreement) are unclear.

'~~~B"'in?~orf'deplo,yment of "Elfo1:1cfl~·ABM"'~yn@mr: Proposed by the United States in 1971, the Soviets argued that it was not appropriate or reasonable to include provisions on undefined systems. and that the provisions for ABM T.reaty review and amendment were sufficient. Since many of these prospective techno logies were not even paper, ,ere was a strong incentive tQ reject limits. H9wever, in 1972, this issue (to

".~'~ , ...... :-~- ... ~ . , .. - ."", -. -

lO,~' 'gn On'testing and deployment of MIRVed heavy ICBMS. posed by the Un1tedStates in 1973-74, it was rE because the Soviets were developing, but had not yet 1 tested a MIRVed version of the 55-18.

f\'l'>~ Ban on~velopment, test i ng, and"1ep1Oy'fnerit";'df~'nel;j'tl 'ICBMs. Proposed by the Unfted States as part of Marct

package, and subsequently proposed for the limited per the Protocol. The Soviets countered initially with a pr to ban any new MIRVed missiles, and then to ban any reI except for one new non-MIRV type. The Soviets state they wished to replace some obsolete light ICBMs single RVs (presumably S5-11s) with a more modern nc system. As the U.S. coomitment to the MX grew strongE Soviets proposed (in May 1978) a ban on any new ICBM 1 enUre treaty period. but the United States reject When the IOC date for MX slipped to 1986, the United proposed in July 1975. ,a ban on the deployment, b testing, of any new ICBM for the entire treaty period, their follow-on ICBM evidently nearer to deploymcn this, the Soviets rejected the U.S. proposal. The sidl agreed to permit flight-testing Clnd deployment of c type of light ICBM, either MIRVed' or non-MIRVed. The! sought to limit the number of RVs on a MIRVed type to s number on their light $$-19, but accepted 10. correSI to their S5-1S and the U.S. MX, when the United insisted.

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