INTRODUCTION

On July 2010 newspapers in Toronto, Canada carried reports of Toronto

Police Officers involved in public order duties being chastised by the media, public

and members of the Police Authority for their concealment of their name tags whilst

on duty. It questioned the motive of the officers and the need for accountability for

their actions. This incident provides a similar context for the discussion of question

one (1) and interpreting the main issue of this phenomenon. What is the issue here?

Is it one of accountability of the officers to the public and by extension to his chief

constable? Is it a case of non-compliance of the police to any orders or regulations or

is it a case of defiance based on his own assessment of the situation?

In this essay I would try to determine which of these issues relate to the

phenomenon and use it to interpret the question. I would then use a relevant theory

to provide an explanation for this phenomenon. The second part of the essay will

look at the design of an evidence- based strategy for improving accountability in

light of the theory. This strategy will look at the empirical evidence and seek to

translate the findings into some form of policy or regulations to make the officers

more accountable. The third part of the essay will look at designing a simple

experiment to determine the effectiveness of the strategy. The fourth part would

comprise of the leadership plan for implementing the entire effort forward. The fifth

chapter will conclude with a summary of the essay; emphasizing on the main points

outlined.

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At the end of this essay, the relevant theory will be identified and a successful

strategy, field experiment and leadership plan will be implemented relying on an

evidence-based foundation.

APPLICATION OF A THEORECTICAL MODEL

During the G20 Summit in Toronto in July 2010, Toronto Police

spokeswoman Meaghan Cory in commenting on reports of police officers not

wearing nametags on public order duty stated, “ It’s a professional standards issue

and/or potentially an issue of misconduct…………” (McLean, 2010). This case bear

similar resemblance to the salient issue of the phenomenon being addressed in the

essay question and beg the query as to the exact nature of the problem to be

discussed. Is it an issue of defiance (Sherman 2010), lack of accountability (Reiner

and Spencer 1993); legitimacy (Tyler 1990) or non-compliance to regulations

(Scholz, 1997)?

I would like to focus on it as an issue of misconduct as suggested and

interpret it as a matter of non-compliance to rules and regulations and attempt to

place it within a theoretical context to explain its occurrence (Makkai & Braithwaite,

1991). This will require a broad applicability of understanding and application of

criminological theory. It also explores regulatory compliance for organisations and

extends that applicability to the individuals of the organisation also.

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Makkai and Braithwaite (1991) posits that the usefulness of regulatory compliance

in such an instance and go on to further explain that even if the issue is a distinct

case of regulatory compliance and not compliance with criminal law; the framework

of criminological theory is still useful in explaining regulatory compliance. (Bartrum

& Bryant, 1997; Walker, 2002).

Criminology offers many theories related to enforcement and compliance.

Among these are the social control theories that focus on the strategies and

techniques that help to regulate human behavior and leads to conformity and

compliance of rules and regulations. It addresses the general topic of how groups

control the behaviors of members and how more powerful individuals control less

powerful individuals (Klitzner & Sole-Brito, 2002). The most common application of

social control theory to compliance and enforcement is found in deterrence

research. Criminologists have long considered the relationship between the threat

of sanctions and crime and many have employed the perceptual model of the

deterrent process (Paternoster, 1987). Perceptual deterrence posits that the true

impact of criminal sanctions on offending depends on the individual perceptions of

the risks of his/her being caught and punished.

The main components of deterrence theory are certainty (how likely

sanctions are to occur), severity (the degree of consequences associated with the

sanctions), and celerity (how swiftly sanctions are imposed). Ross (1984) defines

the central postulate of deterrence theory this way “ Undesirable behavior will be

reduced to the extent that the relevant public perceives the threatened sanctions as

certain, severe, and promptly imposed”.

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Each of these components is hypothesized to negatively affect crime. i.e. when

sanctions are highly likely, swiftly imposed and punitive, criminal behavior will

abate. Nagin and Pogarsky (2001) in proposing a model for the integration of all

three components concluded in their findings “ the certainty of punishment was a

far more robust deterrent to offending than the severity of the punishment”:

The empirical validity of the deterrence perspective has been addressed by

the meta-analysis (Pratt & Cullen, 2005; Pratt et al, 2006) of over two hundred

studies. It argues that as originally conceived, deterrence theory is more focused on

the way individuals weigh or perceive the relative costs and benefits associated with

behavioral choices (Pratt et al 2006). One of the key findings of Pratt et al (2006)

meta- analysis review of deterrence studies was that there is a fairly consistent

evidence of a moderate inverse relationship between the certainty of punishment

and crime rates, which can be reasonably be attributed to deterrence.

Deterrence theory lays out a framework of compliance and corporate

behavior and how to manage it (Sherman, 2010); the concept being assumed here

that the police belong to an organization and their behavior is regulated by that

organization (Pearce & Tombs 1990). It is this premise that will be used to provide a

comprehensive strategy to enforce compliance of rules and regulations as desired.

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APPLYING AN APPROPIATE STRATEGY

The question of what is the best strategy for compliance has always been the

main focus of regulatory research (Hopkins, 1994). The issue of whether to punish

or persuade (Braithwaite, 1985) will often dictate what strategy will be used to

bring about compliance. Advocates of the persuasive approach argue that the

instant prosecution for every violation is counter-productive since it places the

employee on the defensive and limits communications about compliance problems

with the employer (Rees, 1988; Bardach & Kagan, 1982). The advocates for the

punishment approach also argue that this approach is the only way to get

employees to obey the rules and regulations of the organization (Rees, 1988). They

adopt a “ deterrence “ strategy with enforcement “ going by the book” to apply

“ sanctions” for regulatory violations (Grabowski & Braithwaite, 1986). This may

foster a subculture of resistance, particularly if a regulation/rule is felt to be

unreasonable (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). In such cases punitive sanctions are apt

to backfire, leading to defiance (Sherman, 1993).

An escalating series of options must be available and the organization must

be prepared to enforce those options where officers are behaving culpably. These

options have been described as an enforcement pyramid (Ayres & Braithwaite,

1992) , flexible regulatory enforcement ( Rees 1988), and the graduated

enforcement response ( Carson & Johnstone, 1990). All these model after Ayres and

Braithwaite’s 1992 enforcement pyramid, which is called the “ benign big gun

strategy”.

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This model is built around persuasion and cooperation and will only be effective

when more punitive sanctions are also available (the “big gun in a hierarchy of

increasing punitive measures). In designing effective evidence based strategy to

ensure accountability based on the deterrent theory, the question is which one of its

components to base my strategy upon; certainty or severity of the punishment? I

propose a combination approach to the strategy; as evidenced by Ayres and

Braithwaite (1992) enforcement pyramid and the empirical evidence and findings

of general crime data (Eide, 2000). This supports the general theory of deterrence;

that probability of detection and conviction, along with increases in sanctions tend

to reduce crime.

Firstly there needs to be developed a set of policies, standards and

procedures capable of preventing any further misconduct. This is an accountability

procedure that involves the direction and control of police through formal agency

policies such as specifying approved and forbidden actions in written policies

(Davis, 1975).

Next would be the oversight of the standards by a high level of command

staff. This is to ensure that the routine supervision of personnel not complying with

the required standards by means of inspections and audits and that deterrence

decay (Sherman 1990) does not occur.

Effective communications of the standards and procedures must be relayed

to the police officers. This would ensure that the officers are knowledgeable of the

component parts of the rules and regulations and their sanctions. Ross (1984) also

notes that publicity of increased enforcement leads to increase perception of the

certainty of punishment.

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Lastly there must be the enforcement of disciplinary mechanisms when

violations or non-compliance occurs. The offender must believe that the celerity and

severity of the disciplinary actions will be imposed (Ross, 1984). Compliance

strategy depends upon the expected penalty facing the police officers and the

probability of the detection being communicated and the severity of punishment, if

caught. A key question is whether the probability of punishment is a more effective

deterrent than the severity of the punishment and how to test the effectiveness of

the proposed strategy.

COMPLIANCE AND EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY

Sherman (2009) notes that experiments are elegant in their simplicity and there is

a need to be also simple in their analysis. This simplicity allows for people to be able to

easily grasp the meaning of the results. It is with this tenet in mind that I will design a

protocol or blue print of a randomized control trial (RCT) for a police field experiment.

The protocol will consist of the research problem, literature review, aim, hypothesis and

method of investigation (O’Brien & Wright, 2002).

The purpose of the experiment is to test the effectiveness of the compliance

strategy and the deterrent effects of punishment. It will focus on and assess the effects of

the certainty of a sanction threat on the incidence of hiding nametags and to compare this

to the severity of such a sanction in deterring such misconduct (Charles & Rowe, 1973).

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A review of literature on criminal deterrence (von Hirsch et al, 1999) concentrated on the

issue of ‘marginal deterrence’, i.e. the effects of making changes to the certainty, severity

and celerity of punishment. This research confirmed earlier deterrence studies, and found

substantial negative correlations between the likelihood of conviction

(a "certainty" measure) and crime rates. (A "negative correlation" meaning that increased

likelihood of conviction is statistically associated with declining crime rates, or vice-

versa.).

Therefore the aim of the experiment is to determine the effectiveness of the

compliance strategy and seeks to reject the null hypothesis “ that the perceived severity of

sanction will increase compliance of rules and regulations as compared to perceived

certainty of sanction “

The method of investigation will be to select three police divisions within the

country. These police division coded A, B & C will have to represent the highest

percentage of public order incidents in the country. In addition there must be a

corresponding number of reported incidents of misconduct in relation to not wearing

nametags on duty for the past year to allow for research design.

Police division A would be designated the control group and there would be a pre

recording of the amount of reported incidents of misconduct of not adhering to policy of

wearing nametags. In this group the supervisors would ensure that the rules and

regulations about wearing nametags would be daily briefed at the beginning of any shift.

No specific mention would be made to either the severity of sanctions or measures to

ensure certainty (probability) of detection of violators.

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Police division B would be designated experimental group #1. There will be pre

test recording of all recorded past reports of misconduct for the last 12 months. In this

group, supervisors will brief officers daily at the beginning of each shift about the rules

and regulations and specifically about the severity of the sanctions for violations.

Police division C would be designated experimental group #2. There will be pre

test recording of all reports of misconduct over the last 12 months. In this group the

supervisors will brief the officers daily on the rules and regulations and specifically the

systems in place (certainty) for detecting non-compliance of the rules.

The methods used to collect data will be social observation by undercover teams

unknown to the units in the jurisdictions. There would be an amalgamation of data

received from reported incidents from the public or media. The statistical analysis will

look at the mean difference between the pre and post test findings of the groups over a

one-year period of public order incidents. The outcome measure for this experiment

should be a statistical reduction in reported incidents in the experimental division # 2

based on the findings of von Hirsch et al, (1999).

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CONCEPT OF LEADERSHIP PLAN

“Controlling police behavior is a management problem” (Skogan and Meares,

2004; p.78); the concern being how the chief constable influences the behavior of

his officers. In their review of police literature, Brogden et al (1988) notes that

there are two forms of police reforms; the first being “rule-tightening “ as a means of

controlling police discretion and “changing the informal culture of the police

organization” It is within these two broad context that I would base my leadership

plan to carry my strategy forward. In rule tightening; I would briefly look at

processes I can provide leadership direction for increasing accountability,

procedural fairness and the legitimacy of the strategy. In addition I will look at a

way of trying to change “the code of silence” one of the informal cultural norms of

the police service in regards to breaches of conduct.

Tyler (2007) posits that people comply with the law for normative reasons

and that preparedness to obey the law is a function of the perceived institutional

legitimacy. The preparedness to comply is a function of the perceived fairness of

procedures and the personal style of the officials carrying out the procedures and

much as the perceived fairness of the outcomes (Tyler and Huo, 2002). The drafting

of the rules and regulations for the compliance strategy will be committee based

with representation and input by the officers association. This directive will ensure

that it is a participatory process and “ buy in” is gotten across the organization.

10

Effective accountability is vital to the achievement of the goals of policing.

Many experts argue that police agencies that reduce problematic officer behavior

will enjoy greater trust among citizens and will receive greater cooperation from

citizens (Bayley, 2002, Harris, 2005). It is with this in mind that specific

accountability measures will be put in place to ensure the accountability of the

officers on duty and their supervisors with respect to wearing of nametags. It is an

established principle in policing that first line supervisors (sergeants) plays a

critical role in directing and controlling office behavior in police- citizen interactions

(Walker 2007). Additionally they play a critical role in most policing accountability

functions. I would establish policy for the ratio of sergeants to officer (the span of

control); set at one sergeant to eight officers. Investigations have found that

misconduct problems occur where departments fail to meet adequate span of

control standards (Bobb, 2002).

Punch (1983) has suggested that police culture has as its primary allegiance

not the organization; but the job and the peer groups that make up the organization.

This allegiance also has its own informal rules and regulations about how things are

done; what should or should not be done in certain situations and why things are

done the way they are (Chan, 1996). One of the major concerns is the apparent code

of silence and solidarity among police officers when faced with allegations of

misconduct and the manipulation of records to protect themselves against

supervisors (Manning, 1977).

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Training in ethics and ethical behavior must be an important component of

my leadership plan to take this strategy forward. This training must resonate from

top to bottom within the service and ethical conduct and standards established as

an integral component of police operations and behavior. Officers must constantly

be reminded of what’s right and what’s wrong. Several types of evidence suggest

that ethical values may shape rule adherence behavior and ethical concerns

motivate self-regulatory behavior in organisations (King & Lennox, 2000;

Rechtschaffen, 1998).

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CONCLUSION

Was it a question of accountability or non–compliance in the introduction of

the essay to the phenomenon of police officers not wearing nametags? As identified

in the example (Insidethestar.com, 2010); misconduct and non-compliance was

determined as the main issue and the deterrence theory was applied as the

criminological theoretical framework. The applicability of other economic models of

deterrence was integrated and the components of certainty, celerity and severity of

punishment used as the core discussions factors (Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001).

Using this model, a strategy of persuasion versus punishment was explored

and a modified enforcement pyramid model espoused by Braithwaite and Ayres

(1992) selected. A simple experiment protocol (O’Brien& Wright, 2002) was then

designed to test the effectiveness of the strategy. This RCT experiment used a

control group and two experimental groups to test the hypothesis of certainty of

punishment will result in increased compliance as compared to severity of

punishment. A statistical analysis of mean difference being proposed to produce the

findings. Finally a leadership plan for the way forward was developed. It focused on

devising processes of legitimacy, procedural fairness, accountability and ethics

training to change ingrained cultural norms (Chan, 1996).

Police officers must be held accountable for their actions and the chief

constable is responsible for the controlling of his officers behavior (Skogan and

Meares, 2004). The systems and procedures the chief constable put in place will

reflect on the professional conduct of the agency and accountability of his officers as

required by law.

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