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International Baccalaureate Extended

Essay

How did the ‘special

relationship’ of France with

Algeria allow only part, and not

all, of the French Maghreb tobe decolonized in 1956?

History , 3980 words

Elizabeth Davis

Notre Dame High School

2010-2012



Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

2

Abstract

This investigation identifies reasons for the nature of

French involvement in the important colony of Algeria post-

World War Two, and the effects this had on French decisions

leading to Moroccan and Tunisian decolonization in 1956. The

research question ‚How did the ‘special relationship’ of France

with Algeria allow only part, and not all, of the French

Maghreb to be decolonized in 1956?‛ was designed to explain

this relationship and why it meant that Algeria was prioritised

as a territory at a time when there were many difficulties

threatening the survival of the French Empire.The essay identifies two major ways in which the Franco-

Algerian relationship influenced decolonization in the

Maghreb. Firstly, the reasons for the importance of Algeria, the

significance of its European settler community and the internal

weaknesses of France are shown to have built up to cause

France to focus on its control of Algeria at the expense of its

other colonial territories. Secondly, it is argued that French

decisions regarding management of Algeria and other

territories in line with the policy of assimilation, linked to its

reluctance to adapt to a changing political world, fuelled the

spread of nationalistic movements across the Maghreb.




3

This essay concludes that although the use of violent

repression in Algeria against rising nationalism up to 1956 putFrance under economic and political pressure, the special

relationship between France and Algeria meant that it could

not be decolonized and Morocco and Tunisia were sacrificed

for its survival.

Words: 244




4

Contents

1. Introduction – page 5

Map – page 7

Timeline – page 8

2. The important special relationship – page 9

2.1 Metropolitan ties – page 9

2.2 The French community in Algeria – page 10

2.3 Politics in ‚l'hexagone ‛ – page 12

3. The Growth of Nationalism – page 14

3.1 Foreign policy of La Union Française – page 14

3.2 French methods of managing the Union – pg 17

4. Conclusion – page 23

5. Bibliography – page 24

6. Acknowledgements – page 25




5

1. Introduction

Algeria was part of the French Empire from 1830 until 1962. This

period of foreign rule in North Africa greatly influenced culture and

society in Algeria, and also in the other two French Maghreb

territories of Tunisia (occupied from 1881) and Morocco (from

1912). The effects of colonization and shared history can still be seen

today, most notably in the shared French language of these countries.

France made an impression on North Africa which was deep enoughto sustain through independence and which will continue to be

evident in the future of these states.

In the late nineteenth century Africa was claimed and divided

up by European powers as an addition to their empires, known as the

‘Scramble for Africa’. Despite believing that these empires would last

for hundreds of years, after the Second World War European leadersfound themselves losing many territories to native peoples, whose

struggle to claim back their ethnic lands was fought with more

determination than Europe could combat. The French-Algerian

relationship was an exception. France's two other Maghreb

territories, Tunisia and Morocco, gained independence in 1956; by

1960 all of North Africa other than Algeria was free of colonial rule.Its independence did not come until 1962 after a bloody and

infamous eight year guerrilla war between the Algerian Front de

Libération Nationale (FLN) and the French governments of 9

different Premiers Ministres (see Table 1, page 8). This leads a

historian to be curious about what was different in Algeria for it to

deserve such a fight compared to other seemingly similar countries in




6

terms of culture and geography (see Map, page 7).

Therefore the question ‚How did the ‘special relationship’ of

France with Algeria allow only part, and not all, of the French

Maghreb to be decolonized in 1956?‛ looks at the reasons why

Algeria was not decolonized in this year alongside its neighbouring

states, and how this relationship might have affected their

decolonization at this time. The majority of information and analysis

regarding post-World War Two colonized Algeria focuses on the

friction and later struggle between Algerian nationalists, European

settlers and French governments during the Algerian War (1954-

1962). This was one of the most violent struggles for independence in

Africa, and interest in this topic is not without reason: the war

directly caused the loss of at least 250,000 Algerian lives, 17,456

French deaths, the destruction of property in Algeria, the forcedmigration of millions, and a new French constitution.

The French commitment to the war demonstrates the value of

the relationship with Algeria, which was undoubtedly unique and

special. The solid settler community in Algeria, unstable French

government, imperial policy and violent repression were all factors

contributing to political pressure in Algeria and France, resulting inthe decolonization of Tunisia and Morocco in 1956.




7

Map during the French colonial period

French departements (territory)

French controlled territories in the Maghreb

Other Maghreb North African countries

Mashrek (Middle Eastern) states

(<http://www.allcountries.org/maps/europe_middle_east_africa_maps.html>)

The Middle East and North Africa, including the Maghreb

region comprising of Mauritania, Western Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. This is simply intended to show the

region’s geographical relation to France, as the borders of many

countries changed through the twentieth century.




8

Timeline

Table 1 - Shows some factual context of the French-Algerian relationship

1830 Algeria is colonized by France

1841 37,374 colons in Algeria

1881 Tunisia forced to become a French

Protectorate

1912 Morocco becomes a French Protectorate1941 The Atlantic Charter agreement

1944 The Brazzaville Conference

1945 World War Two ends

1946 War for independence in Indochina begins

1951 Decolonization of Libya followed by many

other African states over the decade

1953 Anti-French riots intensify in Morocco

1954, May Indochina becomes independent of France

1954,

November

Attacks by the Front de Libération National

across Algeria begin the Algerian War

1956, March2nd

Morocco is decolonized

1956, March

20th

French protectorate in Tunisia ends

1962 Algeria becomes independent




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2. The important special relationship

2.1. Metropolitan ties

Algeria more than any other overseas territory was

politically integrated with metropolitan France, as its three

departements had political representation in the French parliament.

For a long time the colony ‚had been part of a larger French

ambition, dating back further still [than 1830] to dominate Saharan

Africa from the Atlantic to Suez‛ (Judt, 2005, page 285). In Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale (1921), Arthur Girault

states that the French colonies were considered as ‚a simple

extension to the soil of the mother country‛. In 1946 the Empire

Français was renamed the Union Française in an attempt to create a

greater feeling of collective community. Following this, in 1947 a

system was created to elect an Algerian assembly and a group of deputies to represent Algeria in Paris. This was a step to increasing

integration, although many Algerians were still angry about the

falsification of elections and the difficulties with gaining equal rights

as a French citizen. Moreover, France conducted most of its African

trade with Algeria and in 1957 extensive oilfields were discovered in

the south of the territory. Their continued domination by Frenchcompanies was to be an important aspect of the 1962 Evian Algerian

Peace Agreements. In the context of empire, Algeria ‚was dominated

by the French more than any of the other French colonies‛ (Rodgers

and Thomas, 2010, page 281). Another reason for this was the large

European settler community, which numbered 1 million by 1945.




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2.2. The French community in Algeria

Algeria had been claimed as French territory for over a century,

since 1830, and the settler community there was well established.

These European colonizers – 'colons ' – held a range of differing

political beliefs and were of varying degrees of wealth. Thousands of

them were second generation migrants for whom Algeria was their

home. Many would have never been to France, despite being of

European descent and practising French culture. It was generally in

the interest of the 1 million colons in Algeria to oppose complete

independence of the territory from France because of the affinity they

had with this culture and the benefits they had from living in a

colony. These included ownership of large amounts of land (Muslims

had been expropriated), access to well paid jobs, and continued

French citizenship. Compared to Tunisia and Morocco, Algeriashared a longer history with France and had a larger European

community (See Table 2 below).

Approximations for

comparison

Arab/Berber European

Algeria 1939 > 6,000,000 1,235,000Morocco circa 1950 < 6,000,000 1,000,000

Tunisia 1936 2,336,000 264,000

Table 2 - The value of these figures is limited because they are only approximations

spanning a decade. This has to be taken into consideration when comparing the figures,

for example realising that if Morocco had 1,000,000 Europeans in 1950 it would have

had significantly fewer than Algeria in 1939.

(<http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007310>)




11

Because of the significance of the territory, this community included

within it many influential Frenchmen. This meant that Algerian

colons had a greater influence on the governments in Paris than their

Tunisian and Moroccan counterparts. An example is Edmond

Jouhard who was a general in the French Air Force in the Second

World War and in Indochina and was one of the most decorated

officers in the military, prior to his involvement in the attempted

coup of Algeria in 1961. These colons were better positioned to claim

the importance of Algeria and be listened to by politicians in Paris,

therefore persuading them that it should not be given up for

independence. Mansfield (1981) was led to conclude that this

community ‚prevented the application of the principles of social and

political equality to the Muslim Algerians‛ (page 314), which

therefore increased friction and intensified the resolve of thosefighting for rights.

2.3. Politics in ‚l'hexagone‛

The interests of the Algerian pied-noirs ('black-feet', an

alternative name for the colons referring to the black sandals many

wore) were helped to prevail by the weak nature of internal Frenchpolitics and governance in l’hexagone (France-in-Europe). The period

of focus is the French Fourth Republic, which existed from 1946 to

1958. This era of politics came to be defined by the Algerian War

which not only brought about the end of the Fourth Republic with

the involvement of the popular Premier Ministre and later Président

Charles de Gaulle, but plagued governments with problems which




12

required uncomfortable solutions. The revolt of nationalists across

the Union and the subsequent loss of colonial territories caused

increased upset in a country which was already struggling to redefine

its national identity in a rapidly changed and changing world post-

World War Two. The Fourth Republic only lasted for 12 years, but

consisted of 21 Premiers Ministres and their governments.

There are many reasons why the governments were too weak to

hold sustained office. France was recovering from having been

occupied for four years of the Second World War. This had been an

insult to its national pride and this hurt was coupled with the

realisation that France had emerged from the war no longer the same

leading power in international politics and relations. There were

economic problems with government spending due to the huge cost

of the War. The possibility of civil unrest, encouraged by the War,created an insecure situation regarding the colonies and the strain of

managing these in order to retain control was tough. At a time of

economic hardship, spreading effective resources around the world to

protect the Union was difficult because it was so vast. Despite this,

France felt forced to continue to grow and fund its armed forces at a

time when other countries were scaling back after the settlement of World War Two. From 1946 the French were fighting for Indochina,

a historically important trading territory formally controlled since

1887, but were defeated and forced to leave in 1954. In 1953 a survey

of the French population in Europe had shown that the majority of

people did not wish for the Indochina War to continue, no matter

what the outcome, and similarly in the following year ‚few in France




13

were sorry to see Indo-China go‛ (Judt, 2010, page 285). Many

French people were tired with their country being involved in conflict

and so a lot of them also did not like the increased occurrence of

repression of protest in North Africa. An extra 20,000 French soldiers

were sent to Algeria in 1954.

The governments were short lived partly because of the

changing and divided opinion of the electorate which was in part due

to the increasingly unstable situation of the Union. The decisions of

these weak coalitions, seeking to please to gain long term support,

were influenced by people of powerful status all over the Union.

Governors and decision-makers were in many cases very unrestricted

in their choices which, in reflecting their interests, implemented

repression and subsequently caused increased nationalist opposition

and pressure. Because the ‚settler community in Algeria *...+ waspolitically more powerful in Paris than those in Morocco and

Tunisia‛ (according to Mansfield, 1981, page 314), any influence of

pied-noirs concerning the situation in the North African territories

was led by Algerian settler interests.

The territories of the Maghreb might seem to have been of equal value to an empire due to their obvious similarities. But Algeria was

held in high regard as a territory by French governments for decades

and was considered to be an important piece of the jigsaw of Empire.

When political pressure and economic strain were mounting on

France concerning their colonies in the 1950s, Algeria was prioritised

over Tunisia and Morocco to be kept as the territory of most worth.




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3. The Growth of Nationalism

3.1. Foreign policy of La Union Française

French foreign policy with regard to its colonies was one of

'assimilation' and integration. Another name for this policy was the

mission civilatrice , which encapsulates the idea of a duty to spread

superior French culture around the world. It was described in 1921

by Arthur Girault as existing to create ‚an increasingly intimate

union between the colonial and metropolitan territory‛ (Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale ). The date of this source also

demonstrates to some extent the consistency of the French attitude

over decades of colonial history. In the 19th

century France had seen

the advantages of close links within the Empire which brought it

economic benefits and in this way, power. The French colonial

minister of the post-World War One era, Albert Sarraut, wanted theFrench European and colonial economies to be interdependent

through investing for development. France had every intention of

continuing the process of consolidating the imperial 'community':

during the 1940s plans were being made by the Vichy government to

develop industry in the colonies to increase economic output in these

areas, to give more support for la mere patrie , and to be of moreusefulness and value. ‚The universalist assumptions of French

republican philosophy ‛ is how Howard and Louis (1998) described

the ideas behind the mission civilatrice, which was the basis of the

French desire to hold onto its overseas territories.

It is argued that nationalists in colonies all over the world

found their cause strengthened by an agreement signed between




15

Britain and the USA in 1942. The Atlantic Charter was negotiated

between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt to secure

vital American supplies to the Allies at a critical point in World War

Two. However, Roosevelt would not sign unless it included Clause

Three which said that the two countries ‚respect the right of all

peoples to choose the form of government under which they will

live‛ (quoted by Reader, 1998, page 632). Although the event could

be judged to not directly affect France or North Africa, Muhammed

Harbi specified that it had an impact on Algerian nationalism. He

argued that ‚recognition of the right of people to liberty and self -

determination gave to nationalism the sanction of the Great Powers‛

(quoted by Mazrui, 1986, page 280). This is because no matter how

reluctant Churchill was to sign the charter including this statement,

it set down principles which the two countries agreed to holdregarding self-determination in all colonies. This new attitude to

imperialism was symbolic of a changing world and although the

Empires did not like it or act to promote it, it gave new life to

nationalist movements in colonies everywhere. It had an effect across

the whole world because of the importance of the US as a world

power and the influence Britain had through its empire.The French reaction, to this new ideological opposition which

later came to be supported by the 20th

century superpowers and the

newly founded UN, was revealed at the Brazzaville Conference of

French colonial administrators in 1944. Whilst intending to ‚abolish

the worst aspects of colonialism‛ (Rodgers and Thomas, 2010, page

281), for many people the reaffirmation at the conference of the




16

policy of assimilation was certainly not progressive reform. Austin

(1978) quotes its conclusion made on this issue:

‚The aim of the civilising labours of France in the colonies excludes

all possibilities of development outside of the French imperial system;

the eventual formation even in the distant future of self-

government in the colonies must be dismissed.‛ (page 13)

The conference did pre-empt some changes in rights for Algerian

Muslims. In 1947 regional elections were introduced for an Algerian

assembly with some autonomous powers. Algerian Muslims could

now become full French citizens without having to renounce their

religion. However, as with other attempts of the mission civilatrice ,

this restricted reform did not make much difference to the lives of

the six million Arab/Berber Algerians other than to further inspire

nationalism. Furthermore, by doing this France was actually helping

to equip Algeria with knowledge it needed to become independent:

through the closer links, Algerian politicians had increased

understanding and experience of French power and legal structures.

Mazrui (1989) says that ‚The West has, albeit unintentionally,

inspired African resistance through [...] alliance with metropolitan

political parties‛ (page 288).

On the other hand, ‘The West’ had in some ways also been

supporting the French imperial campaign: in the years after the

Second World War, ‚the French economy could never have sustained

a long drawn out war in a far flung colony without significant

external aid‛. Judt (2010, page 284) is here referring to the Indochina

War and the economic support the USA had provided which allowed




17

France to fight it. He is highlighting the issue France had during the

decade of the prioritisation of lacking resources. If France was going

to hold on to Algeria from 1954, it could not afford to fight a similar

war in Morocco or Tunisia as well.

In addition to restricting political freedoms, in aiming for total

assimilation, France unknowingly nurtured the nationalist movement

by its use of colonial soldiers in its wars. In World War One France

sent 450,000 soldiers, including 50,000 from Algeria, to fight in

Europe. Between 1939 and 1945 too, over 160,000 troops were

recruited from French African colonies. These men were coming

home having been trained in European methods of armed combat

and with experience of fighting. Ironically they had been risking their

lives for the Allies' cause for democracy and 'the free world', and yet

saw that within their own country these freedoms had not beenallowed. This use of Algeria made it possible for ordinary men to see

the outside world, the effects of which are summed up by Best et al

(2008) by explaining that these travellers ‚returned home more

politically conscious than before and keen to achieve European

standards of living‛ (page 405). Thus the nature of the close French

links to their colonies, particularly Algeria, conversely helped thegrowth of nationalism.

3.2. French methods of managing the Union

French governments caused problems for their Union because

they did not adapt its colonial policy to keep up with the changing

world. The reasons for the repressive methods used in Algeria up to




18

1956, including during the Algerian War from 1954, are explained

below. Repression sped up the growth of nationalism and influenced

the timing of decolonization in the Maghreb.

France felt that it needed to manage its colonies with military

strength. This is because this was the best way it thought it could

retain power and hold the Empire - and later Union - together and

strong. It was desperate to keep this extended empire: Howard and

Louis (1998) described an empire as having ability to ‚enrich

national power and to encapsulate national glory‛ as well as to

represent ‚national power, prestige, and destiny‛ (page 91). An

empire was representative of France when it had been a 19th

century

world power and of the time before the physical and mental damage

of the two World Wars. Along with many other historians, Howard

and Louis (1998) believe that ‚The demise of France as a MiddleEastern power was a result of the Second World War‛ (page 98).

After 1945, ‚France reimposed its full authority‛ (Mansfield,

1981, page 310) with the intention of a return to pre-war power

structures and political order. It used its power in an attempt to bring

it more power, by oppressing any political, usually nationalist,

opposition using military force and violence. Even before theoutbreak of war in 1954 this was often bloody, over the top and

unjustifiable: after nationalists committed murder and vandalism in

Algeria on Victory in Europe day in 1945, the French carried out a

campaign in retaliation in which 40,000 – 50,000 Muslims were

claimed to have died; according to the French, this figure was 1,005.

This willingness by ministers, governors and the military to continue




19

with these types of actions demonstrated what Best et al (2008)

described as France's ‚efforts to win back its esteem‛ (page 408),

which it felt it had lost after occupation during World War Two and

later in mid-1954 with imperial losses in Indochina. The influential

professional officer corps ‚harboured continuing grievances‛

according to Judt (2010, page 285) and ‚some younger officers began

to nourish inchoate but dangerous resentments‛ as breaking up the

empire showed to the international community that France’s power

was declining and it did not want further reason to appear weak.

France had no wish to allow the risk of the repetition of war

and subsequent decolonization in Algeria. Many politicians were also

trying to win back support from sections of the French public for

whom their country's international decline was an affront to their

national values. Furthermore, the French showed themselves thatthey could be successful in continuing to manage the Union with

violence. Their experience of violently repressing protest as early as

1945 in Algeria and suppressing an armed rebellion in Madagascar in

1947 showed that they could keep order in this way and gave them

confidence in the way they continually chose to act.

Repression in North Africa caused a 'domino effect' of nationalism due to pan-Arabism across the region, a reaction

demonstrated today in the 'Arab Spring' popular uprisings of 2011.

In particular, the overthrow of King Faroukh of Egypt in 1952 by

Colonel Nasser encouraged nationalism to increase in the Maghreb.

Mazrui (1986) says that ‚In North Africa opposition to European

imperial rule was often reinforced by some Pan-Islamic sentiment‛




20

(page 285). This adds weight to the claim that as a result of protest in

Algeria and the French attempts to disperse it, nationalist movements

became more popular and widespread.

Violent repression continually used by French governments in

their colonies characterised the Algerian relationship and stretched

France’s power and resources across the three North African

territories. Contrary to the success with which French officials

believed their foreign policy to be working, according to Mansfield

(1981) in many territories over many years ‚the forces of nationalism

only grew under French repression‛(page 310). This meant an

increase of native rebellion and protest, discontent with the ongoing

imperialist campaign in a growing section of the French public, and

the outbreak of war in Algeria. The continued abuse of power

polarized the argument for independence because there became a'good' and a 'bad' side, particularly in the eyes of international

observers. Although both the nationalists and the French committed

illegal and horrific acts of violence, when justification was sought

there seemed to be more sense in the Algerians' campaign for self

rule over their ethnic land. The ugly struggle, from 1954 a war, not

only helped to form stronger and more emotionally chargedopposition to the French. Vadney (1991) states that it caused

‚widespread dissatisfaction with the war in North Africa‛. This was

internally in France as well as internationally, helped by what Best et

al (2008) describes as the Front de Libération Nationale 's ability to be

‚very effective in presenting its cause to international opinion‛ (page

408) and the following success of its campaign for international




21

support. To preserve France's international standing and to not

become isolated in the fight, Premier Ministre Mendes-France had to

give way somewhere in order to appease the opposition of the actions

being used to retain Algeria. This distraction was found in Morocco

and Tunisia.

Initially, alternatives were sought: in 1953 the popular Sultan

Mohammed V of Morocco was deposed by the French authorities

and deported to Madagascar in an attempt to reinstate their ultimate

control and to show their power over a state in which political

protest was mounting. However, the nationalists were not deterred

and were instead united behind a common symbol of Moroccan

colonial defiance. In 1954 autonomy was offered but as protest and

fighting became more intense, the following occurred in 1955:

‚Faced with a united Moroccan demand f or the sultan's return, rising violence in Morocco, and the deteriorating situation in Algeria, the

French government brought Mohammed V back to Morocco.‛

(<http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/berbers.htm>)

France declared it relinquished as a Protectorate not long after and

1956 saw Moroccan and Tunisian decolonization, and a loss for

French imperialists and the Union.

In August 1954 the struggle of Premier Ministre Mendes-France

was reported by a British newspaper as ‚desperately trying to steer a

middle course between African nationalists, demanding

independence, and French conservatives, afraid he will give away

valuable colonial interests‛ (Mercer, 1995, page 762). Colonized




22

peoples had realised that it was possible to achieve freedom for

themselves and by 1956 there had been a rise in nationalist support

and protest. French actions exacerbated this growth in Algeria, which

also affected other North African territories. Without the rise in

nationalism, Tunisia and Morocco would not have been decolonized

in 1956 as an act to protect the special relationship with Algeria.




23

4. Conclusion

The violent repression used to try to stop the growth of

nationalism was the most significant factor contributing to the partial

decolonization of the French Maghreb in 1956. These methods which

so stoked the nationalist movement were used as a result of the

interests of the strong settler community in Algeria, which was able

to influence the short-term Paris governments, and the aims of

France’s traditional imperial policy. France could not afford politically or economically to sustain

control over all three of its North African territories by 1956, as the

difficulty of the imperialist campaigns and international and public

opposition increased.

Algeria was symbolic by being the closest to fulfilling an old

French dream of assimilation of the world’s peoples into Frenchculture. That the ideology of many French conservatives, imperialists

and colonists found the loss of Algeria an inconceivable idea allowed

France’s abandonment of continued resistance in Tunisia and

Morocco in order to retain this special relationship. The struggling

governments and aged policies of France and the building of strong

nationalist movements in the colonies combined to create a situationin which tradition and ideals had to make way for practical politics.

Words: 3980




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Bibliography - Works Cited

Arabic German Consulting, 2011. [online] Available at:

<http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/berbers.htm> [Accessed 15 May 2011]

Austin, D., 1978. Politics in Africa. Manchester: Manchester

University Press.

Best, A. Hanhimäki, J.M. Maiolo, J.A. and Schulze, K.E., 2008.

International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond. 2nd

ed.

Oxon: Routledge.

Howard, M. and Louis, W.R., 1998. The Oxford History of the

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Judt, T., 2010. Postwar: a History of Europe Since 1945. London:

Vintage. (First published 2005).

Mansfield, P., 1981. The Arabs. 2nd

ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin

Books Ltd.

Mazrui, A.A., 1986. The Africans: A Triple Heritage. London: BBC

Publications.

Mercer, D., 1995. Chronicle of the 20 th

Century. London: Dorling

Kindersley.

http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/berbers.htm

http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/berbers.htm




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[Accessed 3 August 2011]

Acknowledgements

Horne, A., 2004. Friend or Foe: A History of France. Weidenfield &

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