VIETNAM
0
Ln
Ln
1972-
1973
I
COMMAND
HISTORY'
licicbeu
objecttive
wa s to provide a complete, concise reference document covering the final 15 months of tile
conmn'
ltvtc
and programis-through its disestablishment on 29 March 1973, The Inclusive period varies
slightly with the
a calendar
late October, and was
may be of assistance
-OVtL'.VIEW
developing political
the
affecting
wats necessary to place considerable reliance (tn historical summaries written
within
documents
this
explaining the content an d
disptosition of the MACV historical library.
Throughout ithe final
recognize
Stilte
debt owed to those MACV staff and advisory personnel an d the Project Ci~l,,C(
personnel, who assisted us with their time
andi
* expertise.
Particular
%credit
Wrin. 11.
Seely, USA,
MAJ Will. j, l'rout, USAF,
MAJ James L, Tedrick, USA, and CPT Samuel 1i, Bailey III,
USA, who
completed the
writing, editinig. and preparation for printlogi SI15 IDennis W,Garrett, USA, anti 8114 M, Clifford Balach Jr., USA, whit prepared the-
copy and
Jose
N.
pttrtionis
Scott Dillard, who
Military Commission historian itt early Pebruaryj MAJ F'rederick
W.Scanlon Ill, USA,
Bertraind
F.
Ruggles,
to January;t
from mid-February
USA,
serviceaS
branch for many monthst
CINCIIAC Historical Branch:
Camp
tduring
Clever
their
nunttlroti4 people ott tlte CINCIIAC, USARI'AC,
I'ACAt anid I'ACF'LT staffs eased our task anti Is appreciated.
And finally, ito the'
WM K
Following Chapter
V are'
- A-72).,
'
PAGE
'4
*AUTH4OR(*
History Branch, Office of the Secretary, -*..,
Joint Staff,
REPORT DATE
Eq Department
Information Management Support
froms
been accessioned
into DTIC
uiider AD #~
17. DISYRIOU11ON
in lock 20,
unlimited.
IS.
SUr'PLEmffATARY
NOTES
.4.;
Jan 72
nineth
the
Unified Commands.
Jul-Oct72, Preparation for the Truce, Nov72-Jan73, The Last Sixty-one
Days,
Assistance
614%
-
Chapter II North Vietnamese Offensive & Stabilization.
(Pages 33-66),.
Opns:(Pages
Chapter
DD
P
is
Historical
Command.
2.
States
within
the
within
this
of his duties.
thereon.
Repro-
I thru 25
57 thru 61
....................................................... 64
RCOMUSIAPAN
81
LOMMANDhH, AIR UNitVE.RSI'rY ..
ý................................. 83 & 84
COM DT, L)SM C C&SC ............................................. 87
SUPER•INTENDENT, USMA ................... .................... H8
...................... ....... 90]
cG,
USACDC
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 /
CG , US FO IRSCOM
) .................
.............................
US
Iha
UNCLASSIFIE
.44~
~I.
a..
NOTE. Gencral ABRAMS departed Vietnain on 29 June 1972 to beco'men
Chief of Staff, US Army,
General
29 June to 12 October 1972,
UNCLASSIFIED
* '*5i
th,"
m)ili:ary*and civilian
to secure
ef fort
help to
agreement
for
ORGANIZATION
A
lo7:i
ENEMY
PEA
BUILDUP
LiNEBACKER
II
1:-14
ENEMY
AN D AITA('HED UNITS OF USMACV C'-0;
(', U1SARV 'MACV
SUPCOM C.-;
AIR FOR('E ADVISORY GROUP iAF(;PI ('.!I
MA('V SPECIAL. TROOPS 6MACST) ('-Io
52L'rH MILITARY INTELLI;ENCE (;GROUP' (1.
5tITl"H RADIO RESKARCH GROUP
RVNAF MANPOWER PROCUREMENT
C-I1
VNN
STRENGTH
TERRITORIAL
FORCES
STRENGTH
AND
F(ORCE
STRUC(TURE
C-21
('-23
C-24
RVNAF DESERTIONS ('-214
ARMY ADVISORY (;ROUI'
('C:.30
FORMATION
(OF
MOTIVATIONAL TRAINING
OFFINSIVE ON
C-41
"THE
MILITARY
PROJECTED FOREIGN AID
NT PROGRAM
LOCAL
SELF-GOVERNMENT
D-35
NATIONAL FUND
AND)
MILITARY
A-4
A-9l
I (SEP 72p A4Il
(DEC
A-Il NVA/VC ORDER OF BATTLE MILITARY REGION)1 (211JAN 7:11 A-13
A-4 NVA/VC
A-10 NVA/VC
A-11 NVAIVC ORDER
(JUL 72) A-I9;
A-13, NVA/VC
A-14... NVAiVC ORDER
7:1) ..... ... A-1e
A-16.
A-20 ..... NVA/VC OR~DER
A
721
A-10
RY N
...
.-
D-4
D 3 V I E T N A M E S E
ECONOMIC STUDIY
I-I0
SPECIAL
MISSION
FORCE
1-17
I1 MA Y 72
enemy to a degree
real, but
programs
regained
momentum.
tIons,
-The Overview Is based on maierial contained in the annexe. (U) It
is significant that the Republic withstood
pevreitor the iround
months mentioned In the text, overall goal---conplete domination of the
Republic
of Vietnam and establishment of
a sphere of In- tiatives, It also called for the defeat
of the Viet-
fluence throughout Indochina-remained.
expansioh
of Viet Cong control of
land areas, an d protection
well as a military avenue in
the
Hanoi's desire
to conquer
Vietnam v,&I the Khmer, and South Vietnam, Additional enemy
dictated both by the desire to expand its
area
of
objectives
were revealed in numerous documents and
political control and by the need to secur,, the rich agent reports which subsequently
were
summarized
enemy's activi-
and expanded the goals out.
and the
sity to control vital base areas and lines of com-
other aims which
(U) The
seizing major land areas
and
The
vast
bulk
of
arms
and
ammuition
Allied organizations condocted
road,
trail,
and water net- a variety of operations and programs in a coordi.
work
through
the total enemy system, Such opera.
the Laotian panhandle and its extension down the tions were derived from a combined campaign plan,
Mekong River corridor in the Khmer
Republic, written primarily by
the RVNAF Joint General
Staff
JG S and
his
supply
operations
to
protect (U) The coordinated
his
in.
campaign to prevent enemy infiltration
Khmer Republic, Although Allied air interdiction an d resupply efforts through Laos; coordinated
caused heavy losses to enemy materiel
in Laos and operations to
seek out
main
and local force units; and complemen. '
fensive wa s testimony to the effectiveness of the tary programs to neutralize
the Viet Cong infras-
combined interdiction
campaign inte-
in South Vietnam were supported with funds and grated Allied air, land, and sea assets in an
effort
locally
lifeline. The
the interdiction effort
was an intensive,
continued to infiltrate men and sustained air interdiction program, As
rede-
ployments continued, air power
and
enemy
the cap-
South Vietnam
allowed him
to rerupply openly, at ability to build, maintain, and use his logistics
a more rapid rate, system,
Air
believed
that
had developed a
Laotian logis-
required North Vietnamese
ties :orridor, as well as the road and trail network
and
Viet
strike hard in over which they moved, and thA
associated defenses,
Laos, the Khmer, and South Vietman to spread the This network provided prime
targets
and South diction operations and were hit with B-62, TACAIR,
Vietnamese
vulnerabilitics.
The
Republic
key theater of
wa r and actions (U) The second portion of the integrated inter-
there would
the fate of all of Indochina. diction campaign wa s
the land interdiction effort.
in
a
South Vietnam
unnumbered resolution in December 1971, which contributed to the land interdiction program;
how-
ever, those operations which were most directly
the
use
of
main
UNCLASSIFIED
Khmer Republic
US. TACAIR
battlefield,
Particularly
dramatic
the
rapid
other
fensive, US Army air,
proved
effective against enemy armor.
rier cutters, complemented by a radar network (U) The last American ground combat
troops were
forces, FWMAF
an preventing
the enemy's
action programs
namese port,
Military Region 2 and conducted
caused extensive modification of this plan as land limited offensive operations until
their redeploy.
against
enemy
ment.
the total
Paris accords
to
neutralize
Even
within
South
a
lation
NVA used the
Laos and
South Vietnam.
effort operations in
the
and sent
populous coastal
area, Air
mupply areas. The
RVNAF
effort.
enemy
iously
"-lependunt
as
Staff used
as
had the
to provide
increase
of seven
had
person-
required
expanding In
size and
this
.
forces
(RAMMS),
complex, large-scale, cross-border e
1971,
management organization, the National Materiel during
the offensive
showed that
able to move brigades
divisions between the military vdgions without
modern computerized
US
gaps, mainly
in the
management and
Forces,
of
mission
of
their
respective
province.
Their
objectives, The
forces, Their
Training
entrusted
administration,
foreign
aid,
participated in daylight patrols,
the local
were supplemented by National
their economic, Police and People's Self-Defense
Force (PSDF) in
internal security of
A Pepulge, Pei'co seldier
frim the I5th Isfentty Divieion tak.1e| m dwring a light coatett with the eivemy in the
Delta.
market, the Government of Vietnam
police functions
of upholding
order, and insuring
public safety, the National ing livestock, as well as feed grain, oil and tree
Police were charged with
into the
areas
and assist in
be applied to
terest, The
Village Self-Development
Program in
meet
received at least
self-development pro.
In some eases the Agricultural
bodies and
The offensive disrupted Development Bank lent funds to the village
people,
chiefs and village officials was removed from local step towards
the
eventual
control and
de. governments were
U) Vietnam's
Government
Improving urban living conditions,
10)72
with
continued
national elections
of the soldiers'
Aid and Savings
greatly affected
enemy
rubber
area, In
due tu sluggish
Vietnomn, the farmer was basik to tihe economy, deinind for both locally produced and imported
Rleogntlung this, the Government
, stituted a land
investors
evidenced
tunity to over one million Vietnhamese farm families, an unwillingness to take new risks, Unemployment
The goal to distribute
effsrts
' of
rice
land by March 197't was 80 percent accom- of national
tax
plished
to
by the offensive, Since
has
increased
in
The people of Vietnam have suffered great-
to
a quarter
of the
ever, the
mantling and redieploymlent of
far from
measure of
UNCLASSIFIE
 
in. clearly indicated Hanoi's
and ARVN troops were
Insure
enemy were complete,
with
from President
Nixon's China
VC in the
was to drop to
Royal
earlier
linking of the US troop withdrawal to the Headquarters and its
2d
namese
abandoning them,
Force withdrew
comnplete
withdrawal
and the
gency plans for the expansion of US air assets
and
had been hay-
nizationul
of the
standard negative
and the US
refugees
(U) In
the first
Impending
enemy offensive, expected to begin in (0) Subst~Antldl economic p)rogremN wait made dur-
early February, coincident with
the offensive did
development
Match,
giving US
and Vietnamese
officlials time to fund had been soet up, and the govertnment
had dis..
which had
threatened to
carried out; Tet bde
increased responsibility
fo r
the popu. aI supplies
local VC~used
attacks
program directed towurd miodernizing
In the Delta, enamy emphasis was on signal, and ordnancev
depots-with emphasis on the
armmunitioni depots. Turnover of POL dis-
Forces, The
undletway, with
the complete
tinemy threats
facilities tied] to the declining US
amibushes
counrty nrovemnett
a
ciutaifld
their
symtetir capaible or f supporting
IDefonme
Forcco
arm11ed
thanr
years. One notable and 1182, augmented
by KEYSTONE
where
to
to 1,392.
offs were
operations improved with the
(C) Within the ARVN, the newly activated 3d
In- to
experienced no changes in force structure.
Region 1 and was receiving further on-the-ground (B) During this period the major
influences
on
were the improvement in
deployed
force level reductions, In
with the Division, Tw o armor units, the 20th Tank the ground units advisors were assigned down
to the
regimental level except for the airborne and
marine
deployment
of
Territorial
teams
March MACV were withdrawn, AFGP
advisors
were
bases to
assist in the de-
signul battalions to support the Single Integrated velopment of VNAF combat capability;
as the
a particular area
the team was reduced and
anti signal
to
(C) The VNAF
Increased in
smie during this period of naval advisors included all functional areas of
to 44 flying
head-
squad- quarters,
and other
advisor support also
ran was activated on 1 March and by the end of the extended down to individual units including ship's
month was rated operationally ready, The total riders on
blue water ships,
AIR OPERATIONS IN
air war the visit
of China,
visual
craft located in-country were reduced, Some units gained
from prisoner interrogation and an obvious
were returned to CONUS but others, especially increase in enemy-initiated
incidents,
Enemy login-
USAF units, moved to bases in Thailand. For ex- tical activity
normally increased during
the increase in activity
crnft (fixed and
rotary wing) declined from 2,098 1072 seemed higher even than the usual seasonal
to 1,015,
During the
same period
air Interdic-
the enemy logistics
the
%vna n increase in the
number
of
F-4- (the primary progress, Information on what was happening in
tactical strike aircraft)
fleeted the roturn to CONUS of
some older aircraft, to severe restrictions imposed
by the Rules of
air- theless,
Vietnam-based MIGs against
in the number of
the
introduc-
US1
aircraft and US airmen in South Vietnam, the tion of SA-2 missile batteries
Into hitherto lightly
remained strong and
in fact had best- defended areas of Leos, the southern part of North
augmented by some tacticnl aircraft
on a temporary Vietnam, and
even
signaled
a recognition on the part of Construction work on the airfields in North Viet-
the responsible commanders that
the intelligence nam to make them MI G capable also was observed,
indicators pointed toward an
the
Tet
forces
by
the
enemy,
holiday
greater
ability
over
the
more
the
half of the total effort were sorties flown
by the
night and
were
used
the craft, Most of the USAF close
air support strikes
For example,
its sorties in close
IOC
JAN
5048
SORTIES AL L
304 306
t'7 1 49
VNAF * 90 94 95 94 97 $6 1 96 910 99
100 11 9 I?
JA N
FEB MA R AP R MA Y JUN JUL rAUG SE P OCT NO V
f)EC JAN
LiSAF (TACAIR)
13,460 12,164 11,031
7,446 6,573 7,625
61,15•
U8N
12
690
121
UIMC
0
0 0 0 0
142,12.0 036, g1
role,
689 in March-
directed primarily against troop
ing of enemy tanks within
South Vietnam for
Figure,
1.3
14
UNCLASSIFIED
4'
14j
•'I
s.***
**J*
killed,
In-
In use
tivities were proceeding
K-
Setisor
Rctivations
* (C) Although allied
tho
northern
light,
operations
borders of Military
7 Febuary the
3d ARVN Division conducted a
one-day,
three
bat-
talion raid into
attacks and harassment conducted against govern-
recently
abandoned
platoon
troops.
addition to various munitions and weapons, After together with captured documents and Interrogation
Tet,
on
21 Febuary,
the 2d ARVN Division began of prisoners, lent oupport to the belief
that a large
region
and adjacent arcas.
By the end of the month dents increased by about 30 percent
compared with
%killed
and
pected offeinsive
92d
Tni
Province
9Border Defense Battalion
capability
to
January,
was
and replacement activities,
and Popular Forccs
local forces lost
light a
concentrated
and was
by attacks-by-fire
rose to a moderate
divisions
patients in an enemy reedi- cperations
underway to relieve pressure;
and to •
or Route
conduct bomb damage assessment of
B-52 strikes
huted to
for increased activity
rapidly to the
observers, the
FSB Veghel
made a determined effort
to force the with-
(C) Beginnitiv on :10
March, the enemy Initiated
March,
the enemiy 1omt u he~avy attacks-hy-fire and~ ground attackit again!t
total
killed sill friendly lnatallationm
in the Gio
Linn, Cam Lo,
and 66 wounded. R3-82 mtrikekt were piartlc~ularly ef- and My Loo dittrietH
of
Quanst
Tri
Province,
The
killed, long-awaited
the 28th
(C) In Military Region 2 enemy initiated activity Korean Regiment began Operation JA E 640-1, End-
during January
generally remained at a low level ing on 16 January,
the operation reoulted In 63
in
killed, one
1-6),
In the enemy D-8 five crew-served weapons captured. Tw o Korean
Front (the
wounded,
Pleiku,
the South Viet-
weapons
tion regarding their regiment,
In
presence of four enemy Infantry
21
target would be Kontum City, creasmed tactical activity in the
tialat
Airborne
1
22
 
brigade, with three battalions, of the Joint General 110 enemly bodivm
in an airea where 70 structurem
Staff general
next da y
from Saigon on 4 and 5 March the 23d4 anger
Blattalion
and conovoed to
to conduct
battalion
ARVN
na, and
night and
eltments
320th
with
the
11th
operation,
i-1111y deadl with
cavalry elements mtid (12 wounlded, The month ended without the
on a bomb damalge asseasment mission diseovered aniticipatedi enemv offensive materializing,
0 'j.
,+.
DCI
O
3841
NUI'
NAMPO
G
TR
CH
D
DIN
1
LTM.N
Source,~'0
MAMN
Miii.
21)
anuay
ithl
o
dead, 34 detained, and
the
"shadow
However, continued
September
14
February
hours; the enemy's announced 96 hour cease-fire
intensity of his military, 'political, and proselyting started the same day at 0100
hours. Enemy activity
the
numerous reports
Vinh
Long,
Phong
Dinh,
and government
1 December
and eight crew-
rivers
after having
February occurred
59 friendly
casualties, 36
outpost,
On
20
Throughout
the
less
than
Xuynn
Provinces
had dispersed
border Into the
Khmer simed elements
The
cumula-
Phnom
Penh-bound
convoy.
12
government
in
wounded.
the
northern
the southern
upon preparations
by
light
attacks-by-firs
32 UCLASIFIE
the situation
unanticipated by the the battlefield had
stabilized, as the North
of
steam,
the
support and
never before
used in
South Vietnam,
trip to Moscow.
divisions
against
a decisive
stage
wa s Headquarters,
Royal Thai Forces,
Sphonul and Secretary
to save
detachment of US
"South Vietnamese and
Army aerial delivery
ANGLICO;
while
the
USAF
and
USMC
brought
decision
to
resume
antitank
belied the
n 1908, to
help the major
province
wan
government,
34
UNCLASSIFIED
ment program which had been
in
operation
for
years, Over six
billion dollars worth
transfer, the
met and the property redistributed
units,
The
performance
of
logistical
and RVNAF forces.
fired the
wa s initiated
affecting all of the Vietnamese services and result- Alth
agh required
able in number there were some problems associated
within
(9) The NGUYEN HUE Offensive brought about during
this period, These
of restoring the tin-
required manpower trade-off.s
"the services. In June it was proposed
that the space In spite
of these demands, the advisory
program,
increase
be
resolved
by
by a Jike
proved by
take-off dive, The marine and airborne divisions
retained
offensive,
which
was able
per' eight SA.T7 fired,
L,. -Z:thVietnam
same
period
reduced thin threat
to more roeaonable
April on, SA.2
sorties during
April, formation
In JTune the offensive
situa-
air controller and
in Naval Gunfire
20
percent
The incrunse In: South
economy of re.
South.
In April, same team,
TACAIR,
to multiply
in some
to the
allied troops were always able
control of the
skies, In Military
count
on
,,as
estimated
of
atialircraft.
artillery were employed, To further use of all weather delivery systems made close
air
enemy in.
support more
readily available,
all alicraft, but especially arsenal was the use of laser
guided ordnanve-
the so called "smart" bombs, which
were especially
reason
needs
level when
the invasion
first
of
April the 27th and 31st
NVA
Independent
304B and 308th NV A Divisions, supported
by armor of
FSBs A-2, A-4,
C-1, and C-2
the
vicinity of the DM Z and of FSB Fuller in the
tarized Zone
below
Zone,
in
Thus
ordered
east
of
Cam
wa s
and 000
kilometers below
the Demilitarized
to establish defensive
down
lull
the 9th
by in .
the
203d
'rank
Regiment
had improved (C)
By the middle
"his armor defeating
On 27 April
base,
La
Vang,
the
objectives
of
Ha
Trn City led
tion
of the province capital, Quang Tri City (Fig, the South Vietnamese
to decide to withdraw from
2.1). The offensive
d,9(l',~&ni/
wthd'iwJ0n
tolnivdavly or
ver.
the InItVIdintud byN
niVI.mY fo i-C-0
Tacit'
II)II
Ol Il
volitil
if 'Aprl, ~dI
%i i.fI
fr 11
g:.t Io
 
Soldiors aiiist reftugLveooloii thre Lai Olog Riyer Iii Bong Son Disttrct
at they tie.c the oqooocim,; North Vistriorroso.
IWAVV
Lltt(' co(titact, WHunpt)IV of Bitstiigio itit King~
pv;Liii' fromui
tUoij~ of
Iot ARVN Dlvimlon
N VA Ovt~isi~tinod tith anid Gttt NVA Itidepend. foreet; vontinued
to be unable to ceawr Route 547,
rilt, leiglilluitii,
mtitiii'y lh'giol
III tilt teigre wal4 oil 14 April, Heanvy
VI i4-0 llti'ltMICTINIý'111111V- 4iiiiiif 1111ui 11u11t (ilt- Cltc.1ntiiii'it UtiItIt 25 April whon encvit preinnuru
1
I$
Ii
tuots
Ill
A
Aprit. Arun'i I~tVtIgliK(II ~I~t1TVi V4io~tiiiitd
thilt hUI
-I I motII1, 47 iiitmIoi
F811s lhtti onftr'sve. Htitt 5,17 IT111intI(inll n IlnIkts. fillt
togr' iaid
rrilINy cotrottnl, tilt vUppjlyI Sitouttlin Ii thu outlying bitse wats
iTSUPulY hY hti!vit1.
tl itt l~ivhyftri 11ut1 grotundt~itt.
t logmE Iili thuilidlghilhli killed hfll- 200t ojf 011.Iiiliinly t.iuukj fuIlfn tin- h' jdhit
t~n iuti011\I(ttilt Ittunixi ii-
])iIll\ llwii' or
Hit~ointuii vItwet
(huikjimito Iin Iti
position, wnitl it till nutie
e'tiitvtd. 'tI)(
established were 9 killed an d
38 wounded.
the reorganization
forces
along
Division immediately began to rebuild its forces ittar two regiments
of
ne w commander, BO Nguyen Duy clear the high ground
south
of
(('.) Although the
continued to find large caches
of
ammunition and
of FSB
had boen under Checkmate
increasing enemy pressure since
1 May. Ti.e division an hour, On 17 M ay
elements of the division air
operation wa s
zones in the
vicinity of FSB
against King an d Sirminghasm, an d to retake those Helen, using both Vietnamese and American heli-
bases to the west and southwest that had been lowt
copters, Elements
of this force moved overland to
to enemy action, Th e South Vietnamese forces were FS B Rakkasan, encountering only light resistance,
Immedliately
engaged,
three-pronged
at -
27th and 31st Regiments, B-5 Front and
marine area of opeartions since the fall
%
Nancy, although rocket an d Artillery attacks had support from the 202d Tank Regiment and
artillery
W.continued,
On
8
May
along the
coast toward FS B Nancy. The 304th
gunfire, an d artillery fires wa s directed aga~inst N(VA Division., with artillery, tanks, and
enemy units
enemy forces In southeastern Quang TrI Province, of the B- 8 front, attempted
to drive south down the
This
an d one
continued. On
9 May
tl~e 2d Brigade of the Vietnamese
Airborne Division
to
fivo3
do.-
practice
conducted
Tach
the North
Although the plan called for this battalion to link- Vietnamese renewed their attacks, apparently
in
an
the
haliborne
force
to the north, immediate effort to rescue the encircled forces, Heavy fighting
heavy contact with the enemy prevented it.
The
battalions In the north were Inserted without diffi. 304B Division
penetrating three to
9
culty,
effected t'cir link-up, and swept to the south, Into Thu& Thien
Province. T'he situation stabilized
in
mid-afternoon.
restored
the
enemy
supported
fight-
243
enemy
killed, six enemy soldiers ing were 302 enn'iy soldiers dead, 113 anks des-
*and
'109
weaponu
troyed, and two SA-7 missiles captured.
45Il
L
. . ~_'H
both
forces
were
(C)
unopposed
damaged
this operation Air
rocket hit the
rocket
Division
reported
heavy
three helicopters
I L
After
Division, Regiona) Forces, supported by hell. were brief, as the
enemy avoided decisive engage.
tack, On 27
June the
that
elements killed 42
My
(5) In northern
five battalions,
line, while
into Quang Trl
Province, The operation accounted for
181 enemy day the
end
SA-7
day,
The VNAF
level following this offensive enemy 105mm howitzere and ARVN
ground forces
number
attack the next day was spoiled,
to 100 rounds each were reported. Sporadic heavy contacts continued on
24
attacks-by-fire were significantly
fall
Province.
During the first day river and had restored the My Chanh
defense
line,
the
marines
gun destroyed.
"June. The operation terminated
i9 June,
enemy artillery attacks continued
throughout the Airborne
fire inflicted
moderate damage
well
heavily
damaged,
were
the
lost 71 (C) In the
Hue
area
the
killed
and
179
(C)
Activity
approaches
tored southwest of FSB Nancy during the first to Hue, The division also had
the
mission
of
con.
part
of June, in response to continued enemy pres. ducting limited offensive operations
to expand the
the southwest, adding
depth
of the month was light to moderate and foucused
control
to
along the fire support base
line of Birmingham,
moderate enemy resistance, Light ARVN casualties Checkmate, and Bastogne, Fire Support Base
King
and to the north
support
mortar
Occnsionally equipment damage wa s of the other bases, Ground contacts were brief, but
suffered.
intense,
red on 6 June eight kilometers
southwest of Nancy, first
The 9th
same
period
air and artillery,
soldiers in a tw o (C) A heavy contact developed
south of FSB
on 10 June as lot
Regiment elements
47 l
prob.
Bai
other
month were 267
enemy attack, The
the
Military
Region
fighting and Pislku, was blocked by the 95B
NV A Regi.
in Military Region g was confined to Kontum, ment at Kontum Pas. The I)ass was not reopened
Pleiku,
and
effort
commenced
April,
the
of 23.24
when his
armor attacks
activity wa s rcetricted to Kontum and 3tnh Dinh forced the evacuation of Dak To and Tan Canh,
Provinces and was almost entirely
initiated
friendly control
at Kontum,
R'ional and Popular Force units, and consisted of 42ti and
4'tLh
Regiments
from
the
Pro.
in 1972, vlnce) for reorpnlz•tlon and refittln•, The Com.
(C)
The
offensive
Province in mender, 21hi ARVN Division, with hi• tactical com.
the middle of April when frindly positlon• along mancl poet
at Kontum,
Canh area
lid Airborne
?let
and
by the llth
Seang,
Border
g2
Foil
Province defense allowed
Route
blocked by
An Khe the city,
After three dlays ot heavy fighting the
Pan$s Th e highway remained closed until 28 April enemy attacks submidted, As the
month ended ARYN
Korea Cavalry forces were concentrating on eliminating the
enemy
stroligpolnits
enemy
centered
the Kontumn Pass
evacuated Hail An an d Hoal Nhon district capitals, raaogRue1,Nmru. tak-y f r
n
On
Pass for
Pass
district
capital,
tacked
north, an d
attaked from the
*Kontum
-f re, in opening Route
14,
forces, conslisting
at Boen Hot, Rainger
activity wa s commenced
Pass
Route 14, Th e first phase of the operation
tom, City,
plan an d met only light resis-
as the
Ath Ranger
Group replaced
brigade (moved to Military
Region :1) and the
14
(C) On
9 May,
teney
and progress
wa s
slowed, Fighting
econtinued in
:
and lien Het, Th e battalion at Polel Kleng wa s pass area for
the remainder
the
enemy
Landing Zone English
-l
t '
soeo
with
11
ovorland
to
the
heavy attacks-by-firs
province, as
tho
southeast
portiont
of
the,
usltIII uiIllo
nothtti uOtt c1(1tul tti etttivi ptittIt t iIrootu Koltittito Oil
S
lit. love't
tlestroycd II
tApermd
the
re- ,
'
value
the
an d
materiel.
successful
conducted into the Tan Canh area. A reconnsim- taerd
around the
14,
ARVN
muulted Into
anti Kuntum
seizing
forcesi, the introduction of additional
rangor
border defensev
resulting in one ARVN wounded and 24 enemy battalions, There were 14 maneuver battalions inl-
killed. In addition, five Molatova trucks and two valved in the oporatlon under
control
Corps Tactical Command Post,
cun-
-longc
with nine soldiers from thle 22 d D~ivision andi
tacts
artillery provided
to re. and many significant body finds veere reported,
l'
4
-d4
indicuting heavy
vasualties suffered
enemy
harassed
ARVN
ARYN
and territorial units
of the highway. The highway was opened
on 30 sporudlk attackt.by-fire an d
occasional ground
beg~an rein.
fire support base
The feint forcing immediately
Loc, fought
into the city and
the Tiny Ninh
area, and it further
the main effort
of An Loc on 16 April. The 81st Airborne
Ranger
Binh
Long
list
of
ers withstood
security operations
decreased, The ad
the enemy
of C'ion
to conduct ground operations up to four
defensive
from An Loc. Resupply
with
limited
heli-
vines,~
4
and
US
-
stroyed or captured,
the
after
ordered destroyed by
followed by
block. After
south,
the
column
was
ambushed
alties, About 850 men
arrived at An
from tactical
air, gunships,
the
h
intensity~~
~~~~~~~~P
ivso rm elvn
forcetA nLOcnutda radfnefo h nLc al n2 a O thte1t n
emaCndeCAf the
moth ReImetseeldtn
ouho n1,klig8 nm
nemypresure ontnuBdwithKpHOadS
8 ~~ ~ ~ C
eimn
atinietfradgoud
 
on the
and captured
wounded,
in operations against
the
six
of
companies
moved
to
Phuoc
Tuy
Province
to
counter
the
month
was
characterised
forces expanded
wa s
detached from
on 24 June,
III Corps area in
contacts. In
south of An Loc, Sporadic contact was made as the Hsu Nghia Province
on 4 June Territorial
Vietnamese Ac.
uorebyA riaanSutVenmsea-
on 11 June In
reported killed by air strikes, In Phuoc
Tu y Pro-
Province,
ten
During the kilometers east of Dat Do,
the 52d Regiment en.
astride
61UNCLASSIFIEDp,
!•J
I'
(C) Enemy and friendly
activity in the lush
area of Military Region
out of the encirclement
An
killed against
more significantly,
ARVN losses of
log,
while the
As low level for several days until,
an 12 April, ARVN
j andling
the problems
of
ew
mreu:
was
(C)
up
with
armored
cavalry
unit
contacts,
most
of
weapons
lost.
Enemy
initiated
activity
in -
to
Souith
Vietnam,
creased sharply on 8 April, The reduction of troop (C) During May friendly initiated Incidents
density as a result of
21st
of 17 on 1 May
to
and 11th ARVN Divisions shifted areas of reopon- wounded, andi
435 missing.
sibility to
(C) at the beginning
the tri-border area of
Kien Tuong - Dinh Tuong
also
Kien
incidents increased,
Kien
T.jong-
ducting mobile operations,
On
the remainder of the
month, On 26 April
ment, 5th NVA
losses of two killed
con-
ducted ground and
By to
support, and several mignifi-
area (Fig, 2-10(), O, • 4 April a ra,•ger battalion
rant engagements,
"L,," " t~. ......
* .Il fl,01 Nillitary
Region I for
I(oiuto 1:1
ainy Ii('
1*ublir douring Apr'il, Market
places were fo
used lin N
orthern K en
encounters with the
.
:ii May, ranger elemeiints surround-
1,
Rg,14nemy
engagement which reslultod in 1:13
0 Hr lily oeliniy killed. Hr i ger lossesI' were Nix killod Anid 17
'V ~w wvgtr
as
caused A RV N to
deploy iL
mortargc
and
ta k
Divitilon
onl
the
ropii
hail (lit riet
20
w i oointedl throuighout the rest of thi! the 811101
t me0hle 12th Roegini
Tuoo g
i l'11hiwin tilt Koinpoli
'luoni
1
i-
(it :i) Aprili. Finll resuits of that Provilil, Rvesils onl tll, 110Li wueiL (05
cneniy killed
A-)'Pi 1,11W LT'IVi~I. iillid huh 224 friendily with no ARlVN
viisiilti(ew Accuse
i
1201i
o reports
o toIii l oviii\ nitiici. will tiii
Ow Ist
I iiti~iiifliWit' teiftodinto111 tie
P ot itroll
(iliy thrue tiiii'iillitai5 11ii Lii'iiiy Will' IdiI~led
IAI.
aA
L
allieS. 0laims
Of Victory
ARVN
fought
were supplemented with warnings that the North
lost territory, diplomatic moves raised hopos for Vietnamese wouldi be forcedi to undergo more (liffi-
pelace, and
Quang Tri and Dinh
tionsi to rally their
for mix months,
propaganda
were favorably received
the peace agreement and set ill October
felt that
dlate ignored
intensive air
offensive directed
months
ment, assilit the
substantially,
fire. In August the last US ground combat elements,
an forces
a US force
Alexander June,
Kis-
singer
Iin
Prosident Thied. kept
nlive speculation that.a cease- MACV continued to support UIVNAF operationsi
fire
slowly
pushed
the
aviation
City onl
tonmlier. and seeking to
hard
on
deletedl. Ini Implementing the
the
p~replaredl to fully suppiort President Thieu, who then force structure
be reviewed and
most
gency powersi Thieu suppended hamlet chief elve- to diestruction of the enemy, to
the' assistance of
the combatt per-.
thle press in
an effort to solidify the fornaiane of the RVNAF, and to the oeceipt and
government
a cease-
andI
functions and units. Ini-
press began
Nix~on would not
frinl Joih1chr'ough Oeto
slowly h'gRi nninc retornvery for tle' people of
* ~~ fIre.
Southb
V letina. The en,' my was Itos y trying to
IIU) 'I'llQ Comm onl
rebul1Id his shialttered
hadl
In V1otniell,.
there were continued rumors of a cease-fire played Phu Yen, as the rest of the region
was quiet, Mili.
up in the
Thien Province,
population had stabilized,
Cong Provinces
northern
Delta,
Kimminger's late October announcement (U) The National Police and continued
to
Join with
On balance, the Territorials
months from July through
and
a
tions, In Military Reigion
degree
the
enemy
interest
was
villagers
tivity
and village self-development projects moved formed in August 1972 to
identify trade-off spaces
to
resulted in
though industrial
to super.
by
the
exports, In addi- RVNAF units. In October MACV made several
tion, a
offing. recommendations
per-
Navy
to the RVNAF,
Center (VNNSC) was completed in late August, A (C) During this period
the
the and one EC-47 squadron, The formation of
a
C-119
VNNSC,
initially
planning, awaiting Installation of neces-
a
radar equipment
by US
contract personnel,
(8) With reag'A
to the VNMC force structure
p'erts which were then In.country awaiting placement JOS responded favorably to a MACV proposal
that
Port
subsequently
"September,
sent
training
for
TOW
and
XM
202
flare
rockets;
"(U)
As
of
the
28 June I Corps
plans for a counteroff',, marines launched another combat assault into a
sive to regain control
the wake of the North Vietnamese (C) The Airborne Division
had
pushed into
launching a coordinated attack northward with the Quang Tr i City and during most of
the rest of the
in
and around the
elements and units of the lt and 2d ARVN Divi- city. Enemy resistance in the provincial capital was
sions, The Marine
On
bounded by the
west
(Fig, 3-2). Th e Trn Citadel, After constant heavy fighting inside
Marine attan4k began
fortress airborne elements withdrew as a
Corps
LAng with
airlifted met l,.ht to
resistance. The Air- borne Brigade assumed a Corps reserve mission,
orne Division attacked
participat.
f
eotenDivision
attihayd
1torth
hnighone
roun
n
ing
in
some
targeted
to break
the enemy
during the
first three
130mm gun and two tanks were destroyed, and one days of the mouth, while marine casualties were
tank was
stroyed
secondary explosions, in.
to destroy
a large
tamese marine artillery providing support. The building being used as a
fortified position, As
re.
August,
15,000 rounds
be rotated
uly
riouteheare
northeast
o prtoswsbree
range in the Ha l
Lang
During
ARVN defenses held
The
remaining in the NV A shifted the
majority
city.
marine units
(roup
remained
positions on the
",pogressed
preparation for
a planned
S.77
,,o
S
the rear July lot Division elements were
forced to withdraw
on
the division was
to
the 2d Brigade's attack
ill October.
the vicinity
of Bastogne,
the other Military Region I ammunition storage area received attacks-by-fire
provinces,
NVA Regiment) resulting in 2,850
southwestern
rounds of artillery ammunition
Division
August in Quang
the next week oneny unitUi continued to threaten, Nam Province focused on the Qu e
Son
began the 3d Division
units
located
mountain range
the northwest, also known as Tiger Ridge, During
I)leted TOW
the first week
level;
however,
maintained the Battalion and resulted in five killed
(one Ameri.
offensive operations can) and 21 wounded
(20 Americans).
The Marble
of 20
fire, wounding six, three
- of whom were Americans, On 6 August the 2d
Checkmate
to conduct opera-
tions in the
from the 270th 711th
offensive operations to retake Checkmate
and ex- to
pand the
killed with
pre-emptive
(C)
of artillery and
on 13 August 50
were two 105nm howitzers
destroyed, In addition, 25
found the following (lay,
The
operations
in momen- which
Thr
24th
20 tons
support further penetrationms
into enemy defenses,
virtually all friendly
4:3
rounds
of
122mm
artil- rockets,
resulting In
aircraft were destroyed
(C) As August ended 1st Division elements the day against
Ross and Que Son District head.
conducted
in small units and
up to three "hugged" closely to
friendly forces, hindering
the 57th Regiment, use ol airpower,
Ross and
hitp
a
defensive line midway between Que Son and FS B mappers from the 91st Sapper Battalion attacked
Baldy,
the Route I bridge at Cau Lau, dropping one span.
(C) By 20 August the
situation had
with cosusitles for
enemy
killed, 31 ARVN killed and 195 wounded, (C) The ls t
Division
conducted
search
and destroy
mostly from the 6th Regiment. An unknown number operations south and southwest of FSBes
Bastogne
21 tember, targeted against logistics complexes of the
August the 2d Division had repositioned forces and 124B Division. These operations,
supported by B-62
District head-
strikes and
but
his base area. Enemy fire
on the
Route 535
the center.
joined and
Division ex-
control by establishing platoon
along Route 535 with
dominating terrain
Ross, features, During the first half of the month, ap-
(C) On 24 August BG Phan Hoa Hiep
was re-
were
captured,
of
the 2d ARVN Division, Late the next day the 60th
tember to
departure to
the 2d
Son District
Headquarters, although
enemy strong Division in the Que Son Valley operation. The Slst
points were reported still
the
drawal
Van Paos and Hue,
air and B-152 (C)
Atrikes supported
FSB Veghel and
FBB Ross, The enemy
driven from Que Son except for a
small pocket
the northwest edge
to extend control
in
August,
Van Pass area, the
of ducted operations in Phu Lo c
District.
Although
these operations did not result in significant en.
ground attacks against outposts,
tacks, Territorial Forces reacted well
to each situas
regiments in the Veghel
tion and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. For area continued to discover small caches of enemy
example,
west of Binh Son in Quang Ngai Province before southwest.
dawn on 8
Nam
Province
area, and
af,6er the
gun- of the district headquarters on 31 August, The town
ships supported
was completely retaken on A September against
losses were 24 killed and 89 wounded, while the moderate resistance from the 13th Regiment, 711th
enemy lost 68 killed.
end of the
month Territorial south of the town toward FSB Ross, and by
3
southern part of the
southeast of Hoi An, During the operation, 116 base, Meanwhile 2d Regiment troops attacked
enemy
secure Nui Loc Son and cut the enemy
were IS killed
houses
withdrawing
tive
was
made limited progress
Phuoc.in
against
light
711th Division and the 5th Sapper Battalion. On enemy resistance on two separate approaches,
14 September
4th Regiment began
for operations in the Que Son Valley, locating its an operation to retake Hill 211, the
key terrain
Operational feature
in the
3d Divi. progress, As
6th attacks.by-fire of mortar and 130mm artillery.
Regiments,
lowlands,
increased
Phuoc were ag'ain inter-
a shift of division goundaries, which
of the
gave
incidents, The
Nang
Air
Base
was hit on 23 September with 33 Quang Ngai Province, This resulted in the with-
122mm rockets,
wounding three
minor
structural and aircraft damage, the Tien Phuoc operation before Hill 211 wa s
re-
Rockets
which
landed
(C) On 29 September
the 3d Division finalised
6th Regiment was
(C) In September
the level of enemy activity to seize the key terrain west and gouth of the town
. that had been experienced in-the
north
struck
were to
aouthern areas
of the district
through
capital
was expected to begin on 1 October and to last
City
in
pres'sure
against Quang
villages
and
Reglonsi
killed 50
deployed to the light losses, Ranger border defense battalions at
area, but
from their
air base
less
against district towns, outposts and opeiating bases,
of the 572d Artillery-Tank Regiment, was success-
but these caused
was
a
in
(C) The 2d Division
rocket
the Tien Phuoc area of operations on 12 September. attacks, followed by ground attacks,
An American
was among the killed.
between Mo Due
Division
gen-
eeally from 753
committed south-
borne Division, commenced operations In the Binh~ east of Hue durfint the mor'th and
conducted opera-
Son and So n Tinh Districts of nort~hern Quang Nel'J Lions
the
during October the
(CC In the Quo So n Valley, Quang Nanm Pro.
lot Division conducted search alid destroy
operations vince,
valley
were
the
old
district
as well
force from
lery, For example, 1,400 rounds of mortar ammunli- the Slast Regiment, 711th Division. Territorial Forces
tMon, plus
other supplies, were found south of were forced to withdraw from the old headquarters
Veghel on I October. The lot and 54th Regriments complex.
eng,,iged
activity in
lowlands.
by positioning ably
the 70th NVA Battalion an d a Quang Nam VC
company
small villages on
operations
Barrier
were then conducted outward
from these positions, by the enemy' the next day, Territorial Forces com-
As the search operaitions continued, the damage t~o bat assaulted
Into th e area an d returned the villagers
enemy forces
an example, on 6 October an hi t on 25
an d 28 September
light,
with
two
killed
new nearby. Approximately 200 rounds of (1 American an d 1 Vietnamese civilian) an 10
122mm ammunition were alsio found.
As the mon. wiounded (nine Americans and one Vietnamese).
41*1
and naval
the South
opera-
of the
operation began
2d Ranger Group
was airlifted to
Town,
which
conducted clearing
was dispatched
On 28
activity wa s at
delayed significant contacts were reported northwest of
by the enemy
The
Route
14
from
Pleiku
to
Kontum
interdiction
continued
by-fire
north
wide.
spread harassing attacks-by-fire, interdiction of
*
central Pleiku Province,
% deployment to northern
the threat to Thanh
Ranger
Squadron
were
deployed
were employed
B-52, tactical air, and naval gunfire preparations, in the Kontum Pass area, releasing the 45th Regi-
.. r...... 871
trike in Keoturm Prevince,
Pleiku operations to the west along Route 19 with an
* City. The 23d Division Commander,
BG Ly Tong Ba, entire regiment, two of the battalions were
employed
established the following command posts: the main in areas of operations to the south
and
southeast
*" CP at Konturn, controlling operations in Kontum of the district capital. US air cavalry screened
to
Province; the forward CP under the Assistant Divi. the west and
south, Little contact was made for the
sion Commander in
Plilku, controlling Pleiku
vinve operations; and the rear CP
at
Binh
Dinh
under
wa s characterized by
.
(C) On 17 August the 45th Regiment began a attacks-by-firs; and ground probes against ARVN
search operation west-southwest of Pleiku City. and
Regional
Objectives
of the operation were to clear both sides 22d Division conducted multi-battalion operations
of Highway L.•509 west from Pleiku for approxi. throughout the
month, capitalizing on its mobility
mately 20
south
toward
Thanh An to clear and destroy the balance, On 10 August units of the division began
- enemy In the zone, The
first significant
For two
was made Ln 24 August, seven kilometers west- days, a
two regiment task force moved west into
4 northwe.,t
of
Thanh An , BU Ba then revised his lower An Lao River
Valley. A battalion conducted
ground northwest uf
attack aLainot Thanh
An. Instead of continuing Hoal Nhon, while a regimental-sized force attacked
I'"
were two regimentai
eight-
the
August
the
division
operating on
Quan,
supported
Province. Th e only signi-
and one wounded.
ficant contacts occurred northwest of
Kontum
City
These
contacts
destroying
August ended
An area,
Numerous daily contact, occurred in this the 41st Regiment was operating
on
the
as 213d Division units to
the sas'. of Landing
by the 2d Ranger
the
and north-
munications, Light
occurred
as
of
an
opera-
Ca
Valley, wept-southwiet
Djereng unopposed, Activity in the northern portion of Phu My, Theme
operations during
produce
emall
metors
centered
In
of
characterized by
small unit contacts of the 23 d Division, The fighting lasted for three
and scattered attacks-by-fire against ARVN and days.
In thin
Regional Force units along Route 1, The 22d Divi-
accounted for over 25 0 of the enemy killed, Govern.
sion continued to conduct multi-battalion operations ment casualties were reported as 40 dead and 172
throughout the
week of Border Camp came under heavy attacks-by-fire
the month,
tion south-southeast of Heai An, At the same time,
namese tactical air and gunships supported the
:W..
ED,.1%-
90
IV%
A
days.
Division counteroffensive
mission
to destroy
of enemy
48th
Loc
Regiment supported
by tactical
air strikes
the
th sion as redue
Province
month
had closed,
and
losing
four
and
ground
The operation
One significant
annihila&Ld
* ~~~
Ealyinth
h
'hnThnho
conducting
surveillance
Ninh under
In a reermnaissance
ARVN
-other
hattalions
while losing two friendly
of the
inl-
and
one
of
Ill Corps and began
53
wounded,
determined later
of
On 8 security
by the ranger
of leaders and lack
of training and ex-
tble E nts Foothe271st
3-11), Th e division (C)
On 25 July
forces to meet the increased enemy activity in
made steadyprog
the division
to disengage because
sumed command
Klan Tuong
9th Division
lary Region
of clear.
of the
Kampong Trabek,
Tw o
Luong astride
on 29
of difficulties in coordinating between the South July In a three day battle that
accounted for 100
toward
the
began
moving
trent, while exploiting
tw o north
Also
withdraw
10th Regiment
contact August, the 14th Regiment mrde heavy
contact and
onl
14 July killiag 18, On 18 July the 67th and 70th lust
35 government soldiers
killed. On 10
killed,
corn-
6H Individual weapons, eight machine guns, and panies entered Kanipong T'i~bek from south
an(]
focsrtne to iltr Rgon4Kapn
August Trabek was secured by Kh-mor
units,
release four ranger
for deployment
killed by air. On the same day the 14th Regi.
(C7)At
the Delts, were
Heiriment near
the Dinh Tuong -Kien Moa Pro- the infiltration of the 1st NVA Dilvision Into the
Vince
boi-dersi
I, (C)
initiated
%m~all contacts too',, -i toll of in I the central and southern
Delta, The 21st. Dlvi-
Ithe enemy, urim-ng a
initiated contacts south of
was
well
rtipre-
battalions deployed
and
an
ARVN
additional ranger
L.ay. When the convoy battalion that air assaulted
into the area, Th e
44th
made
ongagred
Special Tactical Zone forward Command Post at
the enemny using the supporting artillery In a direct Chi Lang, Chau Do e Province, controlled the opera.
fire role. After a
engagement
W() In the Khmer
tion 22 kilometers northeast of Cal Cai on 4 August.
Division, with two organic battalions
and two
A battalion air ahsaulted into the area, in cooi Junc-
Regional
Doe
were rein- Special
was
forced
to allow a concentration of
tact was mnade oil 6 and 0 August with elements force"
in
of the 207th
~Seven Mountains area and that elemenits of the
* ~ ~ M o v Hlon in the Elephant's Foot area. The contact dv ionhdardy ioe ito ha fo r-
with the
tltedifurtwodayn
the 7th Division
contact, significrant supply caches
fromn tho south
Two danys
14 wid
15 September.
la~teri significant contact was made eight kilomneters (C.) On 1:1 September the IV Carps mobile force
south of Kampong Trabeok, which resulted In 66 miade on e
of Its nlliot successful contacts and killed
enwwv lilfled and
nemy of
Dinh
Tuong
August.
Pr~ovince
units southwest.
and
quick
tactical
LA1
field
as the
207th NVA
Special
made
800 picks,
were the
the cache, Casualties were 49 enemy
Seven
Mountains
VA atclar
air cavalry, Giting
l',sse:j
were
On
S
ber the same ARVN
battalion made contact in
Division,
manle area and killed 69 enemy, while losing nine continued to harass in the
Samn. Giang area, Ele-
48 wounded, Documents
from the battle. ments of the 9th Division converged on Sam Giang
S1
It'am
100-
p2
te
Mii*yRgo
oldersr
.nfoc.
to establish a stronghold in that
on the town, area, On 24
and 25 Outober thM 14th Regiment made
(C) On 24 October IV Corps
began to deploy
NVA
border to
the Dinh Tuong - Go Cong Province border Friendly losses were 82
killed and
13 6
wounded, On
area to
30
Cal Lay, a
Regional
6th
Regiment,
Province to
of five wounded,
b *~
4
failure and Joined with
shipments. However,
of the US bombing
the intensive
bombing (5)
impending cease-fire in late
October to the im.
period of
withdrawal and prisoner
or
a
by
Nixon's
the changing assumptions
Saigon heartened
much
to ox-
hope for peace, and uncertainty
about the
Thieu. Technical
January,
mili.
near,
and
attacks of
the
(U)
Associated with Project ENHANCE
and
contractors.
On
I
*until
of-
106
UNCLASSIFIED
VNMC force
structure. Also
VNAF
provide the VNMC capability in these areas. There
PLUS.
the
addition
of
inventory necessitated a revision to the VNAF during this period,
force structure in order to incorporate,
as much as (SN
existence,
of older model
(S) Concerning the
ai•craft, initiation
were
further
reduced
ground
15i
spaces
tion program to bring the VNAF from a
force down continued,
the VNN was
field elements
piled or issued as neuded; there were no new units and resulted in advisors operating at progressively
created
in
to provide the VNMC a one bat. (C) With the
large influx of ENHANCE PLUS
talion
added
within the
structor crews
TACAIR
TACAIR
the
first
time
totals for
LIUHT sorties were flown in South Vietnam,
uFed
during
periods
off a series of ground actions to secure key
offficially assuming that committm~ent
on 16•Novem- Ipointm and consolidate control prior to a ceaste-fire. .
bet, The addition of the A4.? resourcois plus the
North These, In turn, increased
the
demand
attacks"
the period from Octobr.
in
Route
occasions,
damage. The last of these attacks occurred
from Mien Hoa AB and flew mostly in South Viet- at Tan Son Nhut AD exactly 1
14
107
107-
Division
launched
Divi.
a
Quang
(Fig,
by-fire
Battalion, nearest
made
good
progrena,
A
air
after suffer.
B-52
Ing
moderate
casualties,
s~outh
Indications were that attacks-by-fire as well as causing numerous sec-
thu enemy was
did
not
rocetandartillery
daily,
In
progress,
sonristhroughout
hampered ground (C) On 1'7 November, in an effoet to
increase
mvmnsand
limited
air
SOL MtCb
and obe~ndoned
Ilha area, Naval
inately :3,000 rounds which
day,
The
determined
swolleni
streams
and
ex.
Division madec
Lang
Marine
mitted
the
258th
Thach Han And VWih Dinh Rivers, The 147th Bri- materiel
wore discovered,
previously
damaged
30 Molo
Quant; Tri City. tova trucks were discovered, twn In good
condition,
force in the
the
western
be
tactical
positions and
for
Mountains,
Brigade exchanged
borne
losses
Forces
DDM
CUA
VIET
RIVER
F S L
Activity
Charlie Ridge
the following
sporadically
Duc area of Quang
month heavy
rains caused
tions it
the Hau
Du e
area resulted
killed and two captured, while friendly losses
were San Juan Hill was forced to rely on aerial resupply.
15
killed and 20 wounded, The security of Hau Du% (C)
Although activity in eastern
interdicted
the
road
Forces continually
village was retaken
were
however,
6th
Regiment
hlghways,
high
began an
continued at
the group headquarters at Mo Duc,
for
the
approximately
friendly control.
The rangers
met only
light enemy
Ranger
res
beas17
units
commanded
by
the
11th
Ranger
Uroup
Tac-
Nvme-
tical
Headquarters secured thr
Ba To area. The 6tb (C) On 16 November the 6th Regiment assumed
Regiment operated around
Batangan area and
Chanht
began, Following
again ov Th e oth wh en reacte were
talion was
forced to
withdrew to
for the Ba
(C) During Decmber
ing techniques,
Division area
consisted of
former ranger compound
the South tnrce, The only significant
contact reported by the
headquarters, marines
the 5th Bat.
forced the taliun
ia
B-52
strike
was
toward the Thach
of the 312th and
The tered
unit was then moved
to Due Pho to rest and refit, coordinated attacks cut enemy
escape routes and
fins allow the
bombing
run,
Individual
and the Nul Da 1Ham area. Adverse weather
tanlks'
and
7K killed and
4:12 woundeui.
(M)
Ini 1)cember thi' Airborne livibilon intitiatedi ftene was tsupported hy 11-62 strikem, tactical air
it battalion
training -oi-i gra
eonitisting of s hat. strikes, andi ARiVN artillery, Bly nild-nonth the 2d
Italian being moved to it rear areas
for training Regiment reported light enemy
reciditance In thep
vlasses;
in smail unit tacticst and command and Dl~aLoc D~istrict, and Itm
attack wait shifted mouth
period toward Que So n with
tno significant contacts re-
thyo?attalion
mnoved to the field and applied the ported. Oil 27 flevoembor the Aid Division initiated
techniques learned Iin the~ classroomi, Part of the a two axis attack Iin the Que Son Valley with the
m
ccemm
the
hoth Reghuient on the north and the 2d Regiment
lbe attributed to thin trainling
program and
the Onlhe
rotation (if
time
s' he wer ri'eported oln
DIlececmbe r the
3id Battalion, 5th
Van Pass. supported by artiliery against
enemy positions
the ARVN Puf
viexerted, On
110 ~ecember-
a cotii
Barrier Island
20 Jan.
uary the
of the year
remained
fire
the position
posts. This
units.
19 M.41 tanks, and 94
M-118
Nhu Le hamlet
Group
operated
area, which controlled
operations in
10 December
uary Airborne
withdraw, which
Han
Regiment
Reconnaissance
month
operations
plan called for
the last
four days
in January
the Airborne
Thach
Han
Regiment
although only minor
elm.
of
rallied
to
was light in early January 1978, as enemy
counter. made by
were
toward
On 24 January the
the cease-fire,
•,f.••J'
.* * -.
24
Irthe
in
ruginents
to hold these
on e regiment an a
outposts and repulse
flit, o liati( nol vontrol of
the 0d Division, (C) Significant
activity
Province
of onvimy Initiacted uttuckm-by-fiire against elements of the Is t
Hanger Glioup
Ilth
DocMing
area and attavko-by-fire an l ground mont eaictu ring larwo amounts
of
On 22 January the let
Ranger Group
the responsibility for tha western por.
prior to the (oise-fire, Throughout the remainder tion of the Binh
Son-Son
ild
Division units and Territorial of the (Ith Regiment, The rangers moved south to
F~orces were enigagedi in
clearing enemy elements 1assUIIe the responsibility for operations
to retake
the month the Ba
only one hunmlut
was to begin on 23 Jan.
WC)in Qjong Tin
enemy ac-
in the Quo
remained In enemny hands
on 2B January,
lcs;itioccs north of Tien Phuoc, Territorial Fores (C) Far-ther south on the
25th
the 6th lask force from the 4th Regiment
Initiated an opera-
ileginwrnt in blocking onemy
escape routes south thIn to reoupen Route I between So . Huynh and the
of the
Qu o
So n Valley.
Over a ltklay
period the Military Regions 1 and 2 boundary, where# a link-up
5ith Itogiment accounted for 143i enemy
killed, 41 wmis planned
The
operation
weaponp
capitured,
tccett,
strccyed, On
enemy
to the
mion elements were reported in the vicinity of Tam
iotrtvd by 28 sorties
of Bong Soni,
completed
an
11
com. the Tam Quan area,
Total enemy losses during the
nmnd
ipost
had
moved
to
Thanh
and five prisoners cap-
operation,
and on :10 November an infantry com. tured, Friendly Pnaualtion wert 15
killed and
to Route I end
to secure the
of Hoai An,
atitckidng battalions, The
arca selected was to servw vomnber with the combat assault of
two 40th Raei-
as
a fire support bane for the continuation of the ment battalions into
a
combat
activity
in northern Binh
•inh Province was
22
same low level that had been experienced during the November the 41st
RegIment
from Binh Dinh
":"I.[
OLII
KLING
VOAN
sance
ended, In
Ocoe
a
oebr
nm
combat assaulted into
tloinlly
of (:1Ilt
di t
by the
tactical air-
to Kontuni
to reinforce
by the
I~iIiii
A IN an iillorv
(lhe relocatiloll
tlu,
1.11It vIII It t and renIIe.wedi
tilt, u1ttaub north oft to uutiligth l ctt lnuiutiII [%tililonltrol or the(.
torvkus
kilometers
unfit
and
04th
ltegimentit
confnifiseltoe
Corn
ound and asmaultnd 3d NVA Divi-
Il
killed, and
bat operaftions
af; mporarlieconiitatm
re-
light and spot-adii entomy
tand west of
in the region combat operationsi
were
raids on
enemy locationa west and southwest of controlled population centers. Territorial Forcts re-
Hoaf An
during the
enaemy activity; how.
December, killing 12
to
the 19th, 41th Regiment elements,
supported by
the
artillery
casualties
reported
contacts onl th'e
to
18th
and
prior to the
Between 20 and 26
contacts were reported by
Korean
good
elements of the 47th
8.52 program wa s
of
flicted
B-52 etrikes flown probably
for the low level of enemy activity which
followed,
the re- After
in friendly
probably
10th NV A Dlvi.
(C') In the southern
provinces throughout Do - sicn, destroyed a culvert. Quick reaction by ARVN
camiber Tarit~orial Forces conducted operations. On elements
restored the route within tbo day, and
(1December
Popu. military convoys
In Forces, combat activity Wa s at
a very low level.
I-oal An, in th~e Crescent Mountain area, ei.-
until
of the 22d1
killed
over
southern portion of
enemny In two
no
friendly
re- por'tedl
Securivy fully
regular
(C)
units
forces
its the eunne-fire appeared Imminent, The Corps
following the Clhrisitmasi
situation
around
population
centers
ghlands, Iin case tile
the area from th(emle arleas himmedintely precueding the Anticipate 11
thle vicinity of 'rhanh An Ini Pleiku Province.
The cuume-flre.
The mosmt
drIve north to plau'e
Vo Dinh under government the deploymient of urost of the ARVN
forces
fromn
c'ontrol naind little
progress beeause the A tVN the D~ue Co , Border Hanger ('amnp area
to i'hanh
ulii s appeared uinablea to o rganiz'ie and miu tan ell An ,and P1 lkiaC(it y. By veek ' eonl only
on e ranger
remained Iin the
Due
Co
,I P1 lk u remainedi Interdic ted until Ai Jan uary, area,~& One
of tile co01M a ale WAS
Iin the eamp proper
to lissimt
battalion
10 pw-,i EDMOW-L
the
Crescent
Regiment, renmained in the Thanh An area with Mountain area
anid located a
elementa positioned along Route 14 mouth
of Camp
con- ARVN
tinueci to
traffic; however, vehicles traveling the route
were dettected u threat developing
in the Phan Thict
off the southern coast to
provide naval gunfire
Korea.
Since
elements
the
area north of Kontum City as the cease-fire ()A h es-ieapoce
h nm c
45th Rel ground
ment which
In the 23 d Division
area the
forces north
northeast of Vo Dinh on 24 January. The same of
Kontuin City were
nine kilometers riorth
and traffic
disrupted 2
the Kontuin-
of
122mm
rockets
kilometers
vity
along
Ci
II s
ancrd Tlain
withdrew
matelIy ncine kilo-
eaxi.
1)(14. 20
wvic hicterdicted
near
an additional
any poss
ibis encemiy
all of tihs
oen llY cc
dci yes farnther
locginccsrt
126 O~~.
soldier
tt
an
Old
1ftatOn,
(C) In November,
elements of
when
response to
Duong Province,
"return of
the 25th
follin
were captured, and several
25th Division
December
vinces
relief
5th Division
forces were
the
northeast
of
contact
with
the enemy (Fig. 4-9), On the same Trang Born, near Bien
Hos,
25th Division
The
on 9
51st Regional Force Group, acting on information to reach Phuoc
Vinh
from
a
Hol
ele- supplies
nients
killed 79 enemy, US and VNAF tactical air support tagged
along, carrying miscellaneous
iecurity mis-
402s
'his cont"ct
resulted enemy
killed, 86
Rangeor
lportingi
Mlitairy
Sthe
month,
operations
battalions, 8lth RegilmenL
331 22mm rockets
So n of the month
violations
CU)
ter.
voriAt actlvity known
the night of
violations unill the
end of the
Duoing Provinces,
an d
(C) On I
deployed
to counter the increased (C) Combat activity reached a low level by mid.
enemy activity
concentrated in
com-
of sporadic
pared to
thure at contacts with the
52d
NVA
The
., within
Vietnam
Re.
sise
only one significant Province suffering 26 killed, 20 misaing, and
four
wounded, and 56 weapons lost. Ther
were
the remainder of
the
majority
(0)
in the Khmer,
high in the Delta proper during the first part of The IV
Corps
concept
Joint
and
of over 180 enemy
tions between regulars and
of
the
month
tions for moat of the month.
Near
to in.
November, elements
On
id Battalion, .15th
25 enemy
and captured
the samp
area and
been
Regional
Force
battalions
engaged
possible
ele.
killed
in Dinh
Tuono Division,
killed in action, 14
wa s
exploited by
activity declined,
for the
killed in Province
of the
how-
number
of
within one day.
the Vietnamese
contact with an
respon. next several
23.d of December
and provided
area socurity
because of
the major vines,
enemy activity and
to
During the night of 3 January four bridges were enemy initiatives, Just prior
to
Binh
Province
the preponderance of
enemy activity occurred
along the Khmer border
Phong
the last day of
enemy killed averuge
and with
the same
period were
comparatively light,
interdictions,
all
going DONG KHOI operation also produced small, roads and conuls remained open to traffic,.
i15
(U) On 27
was established
in the
Gilbert H,
US delegate, Th e
the vehicle fo r establishing effective
the countdown begar,
MACV
was to
the US
tatned
its
established
(U)
an
effective
men and oroanisationi however,
the field structure, intended
in.
US fully developed,
troop redeployment
of withdrawal was tied directly to
ho. release
facilities and the lack
China, With
to deploy
field teams.
the exception of those US personnel comprising the (U) A final FPJMC
task was
the establishment
pleted on 29 March-.-on the 61st day
after the
in the recovery of the
the
redeployment
within
60
fourth and redeploying during the last week
in March
29 March, as
the US Delogation was
(B) The
Free World
releases, their command arranrements
outside o: Vietnam to
residual US missions and responsibilities
the
departure
In Southeast
Amia, including
the capability
to re-
from Nha Tranr , Ph u Cat, and Saigon by 14 March; sunie
nir
and
remained in and
March,
John W.
Deputy COMUSMACV.
Th,. headquarters
manairt-
organ
maintenance fields.
A ~~quarters
system
advance
echelon
from
10
hwav enid
merit of MACV on 211 arch,
operational
responsive logistical
of the
Defensa Attache
(S)
Effective
quarters in
p~roblems~ aggravated
unique,
compared
typical attache element, Composed
of 1,2001 civilian tensive
The VNN logistics mystemi had been developed
Ing in iicluding
supervision of continued
regupply, malintenance, viii"!
and contractor support,
(U I The procurement of
US
a dlifficult task, which
remained at
*assignment personnel
atid launch ships sailed
onl 28 March. Cutrgo totalling approximattely
151,00(11
mniel departed, Throughout February an d March, nieasuHreiiiont toins WAS retrogrndcdi
hy bea.
Anl addi.
tioiial (I,000) short, tonls of cargo WAS Airlifted
from lit
And, Nang An d
the inst. nirevolt departing
function.,, As the military drawdown progtressed, (in 24 March. ROKFV cargo
retrogradle proeededi~
ele- from
merits, Onl
29 March, with the MACV disestablish- Runh Buy, Cargo Approximating 80t,000( measure-
merit, complete respionsibility for i'esidual support ment tons
was redenloyed to Korean ports between
of
211 Januatry An d 14 March. The IUSARV/rNIAkV
time,
the
Korean forceo,
MACV apenicies were involved inl
responslibility for
raianese military
rains, Throughout
and familiarization to In-
ciVil Service tactical ass) S- cominng
civiliinns finwi)A0. An i
imp~ortannt upIlanneoi
tants hail Assumed an increasing portioni of the support fum.-tion aiu'ue wiivii
the Soc 11
 
failed to support tile FPJMC with facilities, equip- beaten back, but incidents continued
at
ment,
and food. At GEN Weyand's direction, these through February and March despite FPJMC
and
tasks were assumed by MACV staff and field ale. ICCS protests, Presidsnt
Thieu made
appeals to the
ments, Similar support was provided the ICCS. South Vietnamese to guard
againat Communist ef-
(U) On 27
February, CORDS stood uuwn, The forts to seize control of villhges in the face of
Territnrinl Forces and National
Police advisory ef- increased enemy infiltration Th e mood of the South
forts had terminated on 27 January, on 1 Februury Vietnamese was one of caution and hope, tempered
the war victims and
community development efforts with the realization that hostilities had not eided.
had been transferred to USAID. The staff manage-
(U) At the
mild as Hanoi and the PRG
retained were transferred to the Office of
the
for Field the NLF asked for observer status at the
United
Operations.
(U) With the
the advisory groups
ceased their training and ad- by the US, Hanoi's continued buildup in Laos, the
visory functions, with
not
terminated,
tenance and
remove
missiles
"transferred
economy
cease-fire period as investors and consumers re.
influence,
prices
rose
just
before the Tat holiday, but did not decline substan-
Embassy assumed the reporting
had not brought
of
require.
measures, restricting imports in
with the need to maintain
reporting and reduced March, On balance, the wait and see attitude ovi.
operational capabilities,
caused the
operational with minimal staffing until
the final vestment
(U) The cease-fire
economic revival through expanded credit, renewed
"end to hostilities in South Vietnam, An enemy investment, stock and inventory replenishment, in-
attempt to
grab population andi territory just be . vreased import licensing, mnd resurgent
consumer
when the
tie country By tical situation clarified and tb- business community
Tet,
willing
AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(C) US air operntions
these
strikes, which included B-52 and TACAIR,
at Uo() hours 2S January 1973 when the cease-fire included close air support and an interdiction effort,
begun, US operations continued on a limited scale principally
in Laos, On 15
MACV re-
in L-.. ,and the Khmer Republic in response to linquished the
control
"" ecifiv requeLst of those governments., Targeting
east Asia to U3SAG.
Airborne units rnacted with
areas were
harasoinji at-
Divi.
operations
the
con-
were opened. The
ieharacter
of
Four
wihr t adQuHn
both
enemy
and exchange attacks-by-tire
which resulted in spn-s~jdic! contacts.
After clearing
in the Dal 1,oc
3d Divimion
attacks-by-fire and
to
retake terrain
Quang Nirai 2d Division
and 1st Ranger Group
oenemy attacks, forces recaptured
mid
defensive
positions were recvdtablished to the. to the military region border, and
began returning
along the Marine Division front, Enemy units did
(U) In the final weeks of
Marci,
Minor
a
Rttac
contactki occurred
enomy units launched heavy ind~lrect fire and grounud in fuur
areas, In the Son
Ho 4iver valley, south
Lo
lished
bank
agrainst ARYN attempts
areas, Minor contactiH terrain, reverted to a defensive posturie, but
con-
Veghel
area,
ARVN
forces in the tiniued to receive enemy attacIks.by-fire an d limited
(Que Soul Valleyj, which regained some of the lost ground attacks,
4;1
* -mg
14,.
a
Military Two days later the HIuon Ho
nrea was
cleared and
west
of were cleared on Route 19 near An Khe, In Phu Yen
Kontum,
southwest of
nd Khanh
prior to
from Tuy
After the
Hoa
Bay, By the
and all
of Ban
northern Binh
Dinh and
which gen-
On the
enemy
a fire support
several days later
cease-fire, Th e
activities,
open
lines
Military Region 2
Pleiku, Binh Dinh, and Binh Thuan Provinces, with
Darlac
contacts west of Thanh
Hoal Nhon In Binh Dinh Province,
the
(U) Immediately following the cease-fire, one.-N,
to the Four
forces attempted
Tay Ninh,
Hall
reopen
the
efforts were
gongc
siuccessful, although
andi Inter- It resulted in minor
contacts in
the vicinity
and Minor contactm
Route '22 in Tay Ninh. After the first 24 hours
the the route
number of contested
enemy began to
In.
to government control, an all interdicted routes tlicating atdesire to tighten his control
in
were
tile
to
Bali-Ban Cat
tion, and reacted
ARVN security opera.
Territorial tions in
in minor contacts
Andi
attacks-by-fire
the Hobo Woods And
the central Jron Triangle
government presence
continued, with yeurs, By the
end of the
fire, buohy traps, ground probeA, and ground
to Air
1i47
U7.
forces crossed
the Khmer
all land and
and a rocket
forces renewed
their attacks,
with heavy
ernment control,
the 61 day
Provinces with continuinir
Mekong River in the
Vietnam.
4I#,
of
(8)
from
the balance
power through
meveral
In-
to strengthen
Indochina, Enemy
com-
disruption
munication between North and
1972
peace
analysts felt this
was due to the breakthrough in the Paris peace talks. Numerous
failure of the North
be signed on 31 October
and wam
the Paris making
plans to utilize
policy
the cease-fire until
further his
minds
N an
cease-
other disagreements notwIthatanding.Y
tif
time
made the decision to move from
the guerrilla phase anti agent reports
in late November indicated that
to the
in 1908. The
day transi.
1908
Tet offensive resulted from this decision. With tion period between the
signing of an
the enemy
at last realized the futility of
this strategy,
and mission,
was
to
areas
'*
to the guerrilla warfare phase of insurgenry, This offe~nsive antd later recaptured by
the
and retain
presence,"
A-I
so
the
USR
reoplying
heavbiy
on
hira
asst
ande
chev
were
improving
their
relations
ports
in
May
until
mentablt,
ciose
relations
for
peace, and
the criteria
By September
i'ed:lng stepped up Its (fforts to hpln Hanoi counter ECONOMIC SITUATION
the effects
Party
dia,iy
NhliAt
Dan,
The effects of intensive
bombing 'an a Hanoi
barge facility an 25 December 1972 Illustrate the US effort to cripple North
Vietnamese communications,
Comnitunist, Party officials and in Party-sponsua'ed
dica~ted particular
publicationsflh
sufficient
fuodt
supplies
'7 I)espitt, fr~equent
admisis~ons of by the Chinese, Iturcsians, andi East Bloc vountriew
hardships creat~ed
Viet,
in
naniest' leadership appeared
cornniltted to pursuing tary add included APCs, tanks, M G-110 jet. fighter~,,
its aimii to fitial
4tatem
en i to this effect were nmadl repeated Iy by tionna info n
Ly
E~ast.
stee pruducto, $on,
Iin )ate 10i72 there were Indications that neither Due to the blockaude kind disruption of rail Wllns
the People'sl Repiublic of China iio, the USSRI would
which forced shipiments
balk
actuailly identified
to provideQ 11ignificanlt amounts of
hieconomic
(Si
TACTICS
Armhed Forces
in he orterar o
te Rpubic r hrogh he of North and South Vietnam under Communist
Central
Office.
trol
over
the
northern
Ttepuiblic
Vietnam,
to
strategy culminated
('ISVN
(8)
niiind wils
(S)
push
Central Highlands
(2 divisions),
north
whose mulin hig vne th e yea
hcisi nmyhwhidle
not operate farl continued
the us e of
Vch.010lii with the political aspects
of thle struggle to spread IIVNA F hy att
hicklig IinSouth Vietnalm's
wa s tile
Vilet Congi lriframtructurvý
then striking Ini the
deployed
north-
enemwy mih aiyN activity. Through its" hard core ward. Co n ventionial military victories would then
ca1dre, matny of whow
delitruction of the IIVN
to weaken the Republic
areas
within
Vletnameve uvernment,
Prior to the cease-fire, enemy strategy for
failed to achieve either his military
or political the Priod D ecemb
er 7troh April 1 oa
objectlv,)