coercion and persuasion in coin approaches research appendix

The Effectiveness of Coercive and Persuasive Counterinsurgency Approaches since 1945

Stephen Pampinella

Based on the case selection discussed at the end of this document, 47 conflicts include the universe of relevant cases for this study. These are:

Case # Case Name Year Started

1 Afghanistan (antiSoviet) 1978

2 Algerian Independence 1954

3 Algeria (GIA) 1992

4 Angolan Independence 1961

5 Bangladesh 1971

6 Yugoslavia 1991

7 Burma/Myanmar 1948

8 Burundi 1991

9 Chechnya I 1994

10 Chechnya II 1999

11 Colombia (FARC) 1964

12 Zaire (antiMobutu) 1996

13 Cuba 1953

14 East Timor 1975

15 Eritrea 1974

16 Guatemala 1960

17 GuineaBissau Independence 1962

18 India (Naxalites) 1980

19 India (Kashmir) 1989

20 Indochina 1946

21 Indonesia (Aceh) 1976

22 Indonesia (Daru Islam) 1958

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Research Appendix – Coercion and Persuasion in Counterinsurgency Pampinella

23 Iraq (Kurdistan) 1961

24 Kenya (Mau Mau) 1952

25 Laos 1960

26 Malaya 1948

27 Mozambique (RENAMO) 1976

28 Mozambique Independence 1962

29 Namibia 1973

30 Nepal 1997

31 Nicaragua (Contras) 1981

32 Nicaragua (Somoza) 1978

33 Nigeria (Niger Delta) 1991

34 Papua New Guinea 1988

35 Peru 1980

36 Philippines (Huk Rebellion) 1950

37 Philippines (MNLF) 1971

38 Philippines (MILF) 1977

39 Senegal 1980

40 Somalia (antiBarre) 1980

41 Sri Lanka (LTTE) 1976

42 Sudan (SPLA) 1983

43 Tibet 1956

44 Turkey 1984

45 Uganda (LRA) 1987

46 Vietnam 1960

47 Zimbabwe 1972

Below, each of these cases is coded for six counterinsurgency practices. These are the Boolean conditions for QCA.

1. Afghanistan (antiSoviet), start = 1978

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Incumbent loss (ArreguinToft = loss; RAND = loss) ABcDEf

A – Massacres (present): Soviet military operations attempted to apply conventional maneuver warfare tactics to fix the locations of enemies and then apply massive firepower to destroy those positions (Grau 2002, 306307). Tried to drive Afghans from countryside in Panjshir, April 1980 (Feifer 2002, 102103),Helmand in Fall 1981 (Ibid. 166), Herat in April 1983, Helmand in 1983 (Zaeef 2009, 2324).

B – Exemplary Force (present): Regular use of intimidation, torture, and murder of ordinary Afghans (Feifer 2010, 104).

C – Resettlement (absent): no evidence of resettlement.

D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Soviet Union did negotiate with specific commanders (such as Massoud) to declare ceasefires in specific areas. While conducted in good faith initially, hostilities resumed over time and these negotiations did not ever lead to counterinsurgent victory. Soviets and DRA engaged in a reconciliation initiative after January 1987 that sought negotiations with the mujahideen during the Soviet withdrawal. These negotiations led to the Bilateral Agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which the US and Soviet Union signed as interested parties (Grau 2002, 304305).

E – Development Assistance (present): The Soviets provided significant economic assistance to the DRA in support of the military effort to suppress the mujahideen. These efforts at forced modernization were consistent with the socialist ideology of the Soviet Union and military. Soviet development personnel conducted mass projects aimed at improving infrastructure (Kalinovsky, 2010).

F – Elite Local Relationships (absent): no evidence found.

2. Algerian Independence, start = 1954

Incumbent loss (ArreguinToft = loss; RAND = loss) ABCDEF

A – Massacres (present): According to Horne, mass murder and the elimination of entire villagers did happen, although it wasn’t official government policy. When Soustelle comes to power, he says “To send in tank units, to destroy villages, to bombard certain zones, that is no longer the fine comb; it is using a sledgehammer to kill fleas.” (Quoted in Horne 1977, 107) The Sakiet massacre (February 1958) appears to be the worst case, where French bombers wiped out the village after a nearby ambush and then shots fired at overhead aircraft (Horne 1977, 249250). However, De Gaulle was adamantly opposed to all forms of such brutal oppression

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and reiterated in 1958 that no such atrocities were to take place. Retaliatory, not official policy, but no punishment appears to follow massacres.

B – Exemplary Force (present): ServanSchreiber (1957) discusses the killing of Algerians driving a truck suspected of supporting the FLN, and then covering up the murder by claiming selfdefense from their attack. French paratroopers commanded by Massu during the Battle of Algiers regularly used torture against suspected insurgents and employed summary execution against prisoners. Galula once approved of forcing a prisoner to stand in an oven to scare him into talking. Although Galula demonstrated some wariness with this type of ‘police work’, he felt it was nonetheless effective. This method effectively combatted the FLN’s indiscriminate terrorism with terrorism by the French army and was consistent with guerre revolutionairre.

C – Resettlement (present): The French Army did employ civilian resettlement to separate the people from insurgents during the Algerian war. This program was actively administered by SAS and monitored by the Inspection Générale des Regroupements de la Population (IGRP). Resettlement began under a program of recasement, in which isolated rural villages were consolidated into more defendable positions. Sutton’s description suggests this became widespread in the conflict’s second phase. A larger program of regroupement was first mentioned in late 1957 which sought to purposely deny the people interaction with insurgents. By late 1959, regroupement had been articulated as a fourstep model of resettlement that supported the maneuver operations of Plan Challe. Regroupement was employed into Phase Four when the largest number of civilians resettled peaked in late 1960.

D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): While the possibility of reconciliation and negotiation was broached by the civilian government in France, this was out of the question for the French Army and the colons. Negotiations are opened by De Gaulle in 1958 when he discusses a paix de braves, he opens the possibility of selfdetermination in late 1959, and the colons and Army resist bitterly, compromising the policy and leading to Barricades Week in January 1960 (Horne 1977).

E – Economic Development (present): Development assistance was common throughout the period. Soustelle developed the SAS to reconnect with the population after his appointment in 1955, also aimed to improve lives of Algerians by doubling schoolbuilding budget, initiating land ag reform, and starting public works projects (Horne 1977, 108) The French Army supplanted the state as a provider of services to the population. Galula himself opens schools and health clinics throughout his command, staffs them with soldiers from his own company who act at teachers and doctors for the people. (Galula 1963) The Constantine Plan is implemented starting in 1959, aims to improve lives of Algerians by starting industrial enterprises, giving land to Algerian farmers, increasing school attendance, build more housing to ease the struggles of

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regroupment. (Horne 1977, 340341)

F – Local Elite Relationships (present): French colonial administration was overstretched in Algeria at the start of the rebellion with “areas half as big as France were left in charge of one French administrator and a handful of genarmes (Horne 1977, 107108) Galula describes observing Kabyles paying the French tax collector out of custom, as he was the only enduring presence of the French state in Algerian villages. (Galula 1963) However, military presence does create more cooperative relationships. Galula also describes creating selfgovernment by holding elections for mayors and councilmen within villages. SAS was also intended to create more relationships with local populace and connect French state to Algerians. However, FLN attacks were intended to erode trust between French and loyalist Algerians – SAS officers were always a target of FLN (Horne 1977, 109) Combined with escalation of colons/Army alliance, Algerians lose faith in the French over time. While the protests calling for the end of the Fourth Republic in 1958 include loyalist Algerians, the riots at Barricades Week includes no Algierans (Horne 1977).

3. Algeria (GIA), start = 1992

Incumbent win (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = win) aBcDEF

A – Massacres (absent): while there are repeated largescale massacres during the 199697 period, these are attributed to GIA and the Islamist rebels (Kalyvas 2000). There is some suspicion that rebels committing massacres may in fact have been colluding with the regime since the military did not intervene. Yet there is no direct evidence that the regime did actually direct or commit such atrocities (Roberts 2003, 207, 311). For example, Kervyn and Gèze (2004, 43) discuss massacres committed by the army, but do not provide any specific examples. B – Exemplary Force (present): there are repeated instances of extrajudicial murder, torture, and intimidation by the regime (see Roberts 2003, 315 for an example). This repressive policy was pushed by one faction in the military known as 'the eradicators', they included smallerscale massacres of 10 to 14 people (Roberts 2003,150157).

C Resettlement (absent): no evidence of resettlement of civilians.

D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): President Zeroual and other moderates did seek to negotiate with the Islamist rebels and find some way to reincorporate FIS back into the political system. These talks and other initiatives lead to some openings for peace including the 1999

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Civil Discord Law which did allow for amnesty for GIA fighters (Roberts 2003, Khatib 2006). E – Development Assistance (present): the regime did use aid provided by the World Bank to launch economic development and job creation programs under the label 'public interest works' (Martinez 1998, 161). The regime also launched a construction policy to overcome its housing shortage, and again to provide servicesector jobs to reduce youth unemployment (Martinez 1998, 169).

F – Elite Local Relationships (present): the regime allied closely with veterans from the Algerian war of independence, who always supported national sovereignty and the decision to cancel the elections of 1992. These 'excombatants' were local leaders who formed militias to support the regime in fighting the rebels (Martinez 1998, 8491).

References

Martinez, Luis. 1998. The Algerian Civil War, 19901998. New York: Columbia University Press. Roberts, Hugh. 2003. The Battlefield Algeria, 19882002. London: Verso.

Kervyn, Jeanine and Francois Gèze. 2004. “The organization of the forces of repression,” extract from a report presented by Justice Commission for Algeria, at 32nd Session of the Permanent People's Tribunal on Human Rights Violations (19922004). Paris, France.

Khatib, Sofiane. 2005. “Spoiler Management During Algeria's Civil War.” Stanford Journal of International Relations 6(1): http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.06_khatib.html. Last accessed February 13, 2014.

Kalyvas, Stathis. 2000. “Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria.” Rationality and Society 11(3): 243285.

4. Angolan Independence, start = 1961

Incumbent loss (ArreguinToft = loss; RAND = loss) ABCdEf

A – Massacres (present): Reinforcements arriving in summer 1961, then bomb and strafe areas indiscriminately, even those unaffected by rebellion, destroy Portuguese credibility, create

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http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.06_khatib.html

refugees that flee to Congo. 20k die (Cann 1997, 28).

B – Exemplary Force (present): Gov’t forces respond indiscriminately after initial MPLA attacks in Feb 1961 in Luanda, killed several hundred Africas, bodies left in streets. (Cann 1997, 27) Sought to keep insurgents in rural areas through many means, including torture, curfews, dragnets, all to gain intelligence from detainees. (Pahlavi and Ali 2012, 48)

C – Resettlement (present): In 1967, Portugal regroups civilians in the east into strategic hamlets to prevent contact with insurgents. (Bender 1972, 334). Three types, aldeamentos (run by military in fighting zones), reordenamento rural (run by civilian gov’t in rural areas and promote socioeconomic development), and colonatos de soldados (settlements of exsoldiers in strategic areas). Rural resettlements began in 1962 but little done btwn 62 and 67, motivated by those with altruistic intentions who are very clear in distinguishing them from strategic resettlement. (Bender 1972, 335) But, in terms of ‘appearance and results’, rural and strategic settlements are not distinguishable. (Bender 1972, 336)

Within settlements, some civilians are coerced into being informers by intelligence police. (Bender 1972, 336) Settlements affect 20 percent of entire African population by 1972 (Bender 1972, 337). However, socioeconomic structures or locations never considered by program organizers. (Bender 1972, 337)

Settlements of the north unsuccessful, too disruptive of social/residential patterns, and not enough education/healthcare to “produce any marked change in the quality of life.” Africans are really cheap labor for coffee plantations. (Bender 1972, 338) In East, none of the services promised by the gov’t were provided, at least by 1970. (Bender 1972, 339)

D – Amnesty/Negotiations (absent): No evidence of negotiations. However, Portuguese sought to turn captured insurgents and recruit them into their military forces. This is offered as an alternative to punishment, not as a form of forgiveness following voluntary surrender, so I do not code this as amnesty.

E – Development Assistance (present): Portuguese seek to modernize Angola through resettlements and provide health and educational services. Army employed as teachers in many cases, supported building schools, health clinics. According to Cann (1997, XX), Portugal adopts WHO standards for doctor/population and meets them. However, according to Bender (1972; 1978, 167), economic development programs fail b/c of social disruptions to ordinary life. Africans living in settlements faced declining standards of living, not improvng. So, efforts at development were incomplete at best.

F – Local Elite Relationships (absent): Although Portuguese incorporate Africans into military

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forces, there is no evidence that they ally or support local indigenous leadership among tribes contested by insurgents. Heavyhanded tactics involving mass use of airpower as well as resettlements appear to prevent any move toward elite cooption.

5. Bangladesh, start = 1971

Incumbent loss (ArreguinToft = win[override]); RAND = loss) ABcdef

A – Massacres (present): Pakistani Army committed multiple massacres of unarmed civilians. These include massacres at Dhaka University and at villages which had been the site of insurgent attack. The latter involve the killing of all men from some villagers, whose bodies are then immolated. (Bose 2005). These acts of violence are considered genocide by some scholars (Akmam 2002).

B – Exemplary Force (present): Pakistani Army and sympathizers use extrajudicial murder, torture, and harassment against suspected proindependence Bengalis. These uses of exemplary force also include sexual violence against women (Mookherjee 2006).

C – Resettlement (absent): no clear policy of resettlement. D – Amnesty/Negotiations: (absent): no evidence during the conflict, although military and Awami League of Bangladesh are in negotiations before the war starts. Of course, these break down and war begins. E – Development Assistance (absent): no evidence of development assistance. F – Elite Local Relationships (absent): while there were Pakistani loyalists in Bangladesh, the Pakistani Army failed to cultivate these relationships amid the massacres of Bangali civilians and conventional combat with the Indian Army and Air Force. 6. Yugoslavia, start = 1991

incumbent loss (ArreguinToft [Serbian Rebellion] = loss; RAND [Bosnia] = mixed) ABcDef

A – Massacres (present): Yugoslavian military (JNA) and militias committed massacres and ethnically cleansed villages throughout the conflict, culminating with genocidal attack on Srebrenica, killing 8,000 Muslim men and boys (Maass 1997).

B – Exemplary Force (present): JNA and militias regularly intimidated and attacked attacked

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civilians from all three ethnic groups, including ethnic Serbs. Shelling cities like Sarajevo as a regular feature of the war (Maass 1997).

C – Resettlement (absent): Serbian forces drove Muslim and Croatian civilians away from villages and towns in Serbianheld territory, forcing them to resettle as refugees in other places. No plan for resettlement, just forced evacuation (Maass 1997).

D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Serbs engaged in negotiations throughout the conflict with Bosnia, Croatia, and the United Nations on different ceasefires, attempts at limiting violence. All of these eventually failed however (Maass 1997).

E – Development Assistance (absent): no development assistance offered to targeted populations.

F – Elite Local Relationships (absent): Serbians ally with other Serbs in Bosnia and Krajina, but never form any local alliances with Muslim and Croatian elites. Engage in total war.

References

Maass, Peter. 1997. Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War. New York: Vintage.

7. Burma/Myanmar, start = 1948 Incumbent win (ArreguinToft = NA; RAND = win) ABCDeF A = Massacres (present): Burmese military attacked villages and carried out largescale massacres early in the conflict, and this has continued into 1990s and 2000s.

B – Exemplary Force (present): Burmese forces have regularly pressed the population into service as porters. Beatings and intimidation of civilians are common, as well as rapes and sexual crimes against ethnic minorities.

C – Resettlement (present): Burmese military begins to forcibly resettle ethnic minorities in 1996 in its campaign against the Karenni National Progressive Party, continues for several years with thousands resettled.

D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Burmese military is constantly negotiating with different rebel groups, leading to many ceasefires. Yet, many of these fail (like the ceasefire prior to the 1996 offensive) and as a result, fighting recommences.

E – Development Assistance (absent): No evidence of development assistance or civic action to win over ethnic minorities.

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F – Elite Local Relationships (present): The Burmese military has coopted some rebel groups to fight others, like the 20,000 strong United Wa State Army.

References

Cline, Lawrence, E. 2009. “Insurgency in amber: ethnic opposition groups in Myanmar.” Small Wars and Insurgencies. 20(34), 574591.

8. Burundi, start = 1991 stalemate/draw (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = mixed)

A – Massacres (present): following Hutu massacres of Tutsis who were angry that the Tutsidominated army held a coup against the first democratically elected president in 1993 (a Hutu), the army killed between 50,000100,000 Hutus to restore order (Uvin 1999, 262).

B – Exemplary Force (present): likely to be present given extreme nature of violence in the civil war.

C – Resettlement (absent): no clear attempts at resettlement, both sides opt for very large massacres instead combined with ethnic cleansing, like the clearing out of Hutus by Tutsis around the capital.

D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Negotiations between loyalists of the elected Hutu president and the army continued following the postcoup massacres. But when new Hutu president dies in plane crash which also killed Habyarimana, negotations follow regarding a new government, and cabinet positions are split between Hutu and Tutsi factions (Uvin 1999, 262).

E – Development Assistance (absent): no evidence of development assistance.

F – Elite Local Relationships (absent): no evidence of elite local relationships, although elite factions of each ethnic group mobilize their own militias.

References

Uvin, Peter. 1999. “Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Violence.” Comparative Politics 31(3): 253271.

9. – Chechnya I, start = 1994 incumbent loss (ArreguinToft [RussoChechen] = loss; RAND = mixed) ABcDef A – Massacres (present): Russian used of heavy firepower (artillery) against Chechen

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communities, attacking civilian targets. Led to widespread civilian casualties, eventually alienated the civilian population as well (Kramer 2005, Renaud 2010).

B – Exemplary Force (present): Russian forces treated Chechen civilians harshly. MVD used cordonandsweep ops to harass Chechen civilians, even kidnapping some for ransom (Kramer 2005).

C – Resettlement (absent): No active policy of resettlement of entire regions, although refugees were created by the fighting.

D – Negotiations/Amnesty (present): KhasavYurt Accord signed between Russian and Chechen rebels in August 1996, providing for a ceasefire and the end of the war, but also allowed for de facto independence until new deliberations in 2001 (Renaud 2010).

E – Development Assistance (absent): No major policy of development assistance or civic action.

F – Local Elite Relationships (absent): 1994 Russian invasion of Chechnya alienates existing Chechen allies and leads all Chechens to turn against the government (Renaud 2010).

References

Kramer, Mark. 2005. “Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Terrorism in the North Caucasus: The Military Dimension of the RussianChechen Conflict,” EuropeAsia Studies 57(2), 209290. Renaud, Sean. 2010. “A View from Chechnya: An Assessment of Russian Counterinsurgency During the two Chechen Wars and Future Implications.” Massey University, unpublished Master's Thesis. 10. Chechnya II, start = 1999 incumbent win (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = ongoing [override = Russian state win]) ABcDEF

A – Massacres (present): Russian military attacks Grozny in Oct 1999 and nearly levels the entire city with air and artillery bombardments, takes full control in February 2000. Russian military regains control over most of Chechnya by mid2000, but causing immense destruction with indiscriminate violence (Renaud 2010). B – Exemplary Force (present): ProRussian Chechen government established after Russian invasion ruled mainly through violent coercion, regularly brutalized the population (Renaud

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2010).

C – Resettlement (absent): While refugees were created during the war, no evidence of a focused resettlement policy. D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Several amnesties occur during Russian attempts to establish governance. 7,000 take amnesty by 2005. E Development Assistance (present): Reconstruction occurred during the initial second invasion in 2000, but slowed after this. Areas in southern Chechnya that were destroyed in the fighting were necessarily rebuilt. So, this is incomplete reconstruction (Renaud 2010, Kramer 2005). F – Elite Local Relationships (present): Russia identifies new proRussian allies who successfully build local support, particularly the Kadyrov family. Despite the assassination of the father, the son took over as the region's proRussian leader and guided the end of the counterinsurSDgency (Renaud 2010). References Kramer, Mark. 2005. “Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Terrorism in the North Caucasus: The Military Dimension of the RussianChechen Conflict,” EuropeAsia Studies 57(2), 209290. Renaud, Sean. 2010. “A View from Chechnya: An Assessment of Russian Counterinsurgency During the two Chechen Wars and Future Implications.” Massey University, unpublished Master's Thesis.

11. Colombia, start = 1964 incumbent win (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = ongoing; override – by 2014, FARC is very weak) ABcDEF A – Massacres (present): Military does not purposely use mass firepower to wipe out villagers or population centers. However, airpower is used alongside military operations, and there are incidents where airpower is used on individual homes. Paramilitaries that work closely with the government do commit largescale massacres in the 1990s, including the Mapripian Massacre in

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1997 involving 30 civilian deaths, the Alto Naya massacre in 2001 involving at least 40 civilians deaths, and others. B – Exemplary Force (present): Exemplary force is common throughout the war. US military advisors instruct Colombian military to develop paramilitary organizations in late 1950s to intimidate suspected insurgents, including members of legal political parties, unions, other civil society organizations (Stokes 2005). Military or paramilitary forces regularly intimidate, torture, and murder civilians suspected of insurgent support. Again, growth of massacres due to paramilitaries. 12 deaths at La Rochela massacre by MAS in 1989 (Kirk 2003, 127). Multiple deaths at La Cristalinamassacre, including judges investigating paras by MAS in 1987 (Kirk 2003, 121; HRW 1996, 23). Para networks conduct targeted killings and massacres throughout Chucuri region in 1992, “detaining and killing suspects and threatening those they accused of harboring sympathies for guerrillas.” (HRW 1996, 34, 35) Targeted killings in 1992 of civil society organizers in Barrancabermeja (HRW 1996, 35). In Barrancabermeja, AUC paras force out the FARC through the use of exemplary force, indiscriminate violence against civilians. Wave of violence on city residents by paras starts in 1998, continues through 2002. May 16, 1998, 50man para unit raid city, kill 11, capture 25, they were later killed. Massacres like this occur throughout the year. (HRW 1996, 114) After late 1999, paras shift “from terrifying raids to silent, individual crimes” (HRW 1996, 115). Paras withdraw in 2004, killings drop dramatically (HRW 1996, 117). C – Resettlement (absent): while counterinsurgency forces regularly create refugees, they do not force them to resettlement in a particular geographic are controlled and maintained by the state. D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Multiple negotiations take place throughout the conflict with either the Colombian state or paramilitaries and different insurgent groups. FARC and the government opened negotiations in 1984, however violence from both sides continued throughout these talks and they eventually broke down. This period also saw the formation of the first paramilitaries tied to nacrotraffickers in response to insurgent kidnappings. Negotiations are opened again between the FARC and the Pastrana administration in 1999, leading to the granting of the demilitarized zone as a precondition for talks. However, it appears the FARC used these negotiations merely to buy time and growth its strength in the zona, and they were never conducted in good faith. While President Pastrana attended the opening of the peace talks, Marin sent a subordinate. These talks break down when Pastrana realizes he is making no headway in 2002 (Kirk 2003)

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E – Development Assistance (present): Development assistance was common during the counterinsurgency efforts spearheaded by Plan Lazo. Assistance and aid was provided to peasants to tie them to the Colombian government and provide incentives for their loyalty. This assistance was administered in tandem with military operations. These initiatives were derided by Marin as a bribe to trick peasants into forgetting the army’s past abuses (Kirk 2003). Development assistance is intended as a key part of Uribe’s Democratic Security plan, and I have found evidence suggesting that such assistance is provided to civilians in areas of counterinsurgency operations (Walker 2009, 2829). The National Consolidation Plan was one aspect of the Democratic Security policy that sought to provide social services to areas recently retaken from insurgent control and integrated into the Colombian state. With support for US military civil affairs officers, quickimpact projects and longerterm service delivery projects were implemented. (Spencer et al., 2010, 8788, 90). F – Elite Local Relationships (present): Relationships between provincial elites and counterinsurgency forces have been common throughout the conflict, but have intensified in the last 30 years to produce new counterinsurgent organizations. Elites (including nacrotraffickers) formed their own paramilitaries with assistance from the Army in the 1980s. These ties and relationships continued throughout the following years among liberal party elites led to stronger paramilitaries that provided security for landowners (some of whom were para leaders). As Richani (2005) notes, the nexus between regional elites, the military, and the paras contributes to the fragmented sovereignty of the Colombian state. References Kirk, Robin, 2003. More Terrible than Death: Drugs, Violence, and America's War in Colombia. New York: Public Affairs. Human Rights Watch. 1996. Colombia's Killer Networks: The MilitaryParamilitary Partnership and the United States. Washington, D.C: Human Rights Watch. Richani, Nazih. 2005. “Multinational Corporations, Rentier Capitalism, and the War System in Colombia.” Latin American Politics and Society. 47(3): 113144. . 2007. “Caudillos and the crisis of the Colombian state: fragmented sovereignty, the war system and the privatisation of counterinsurgency in Colombia.” Third World Quarterly. 27(2): Spencer, David. E., et. al. 2010. Colombia's Road to Recovery: Security and Governance

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19822010. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University. Walker, James A. 2009. A Comparison of the Democratic Security Policy in Colombia and provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq. Master's Thesis. Monterrey: Naval Postgraduate School. 12. Zaire (antiMobutu), start = 1996 incumbent loss (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = loss) aBcdef A Massacres (absent): massacres were committed by the RPA and AFDL against Hutu refugees who fled into Congo from Rwanda following RPF’s defeat of Hutu regime. Further, the Forces Armees Zairoises (FAR) is so bureaucratically inept that it is seen as not even fighting the war. Only composed of 75,000 troops. (108)

However, Mobutu does hire merceneries to fight that do commit atrocities. These include Serbian mercenaries who commit atrocities against civilians at Kisangani, but then they leave the country (no additional details provided) (Reyntjens 2009, 115). No other evidence. B – Exemplary Force (present): Zairean military does prey on civilians, engages in looting and harming civilians. In Goma at the end of October 1996, Tutsi were “victims of abuse by certain ‘autochthones’ with the approval, if not upon the incitement of, local authorities” (Reynjtens 2009, 131). C – Resettlement (absent): no evidence of resettlement by Zairean regime. Most IDPs created by AFDL and Rwandan military which attack Hutu refugees which had previously fled Rwanda after their defeat by RPF.

D Amnesty/Negotiations (absent): UN and OAU seek to foster negotiations throughout the war, but these never really come to fruition. The March 27 negotiations that start following the Lome communique never started AFDL rejected any powersharing agreement after they took Kisangani, which the regime wanted to offer (Reyntjens 2009, 125). E – Development Assistance (absent): no evidence of development assistance. F – Elite Local Relationship (absent): no evidence of local relationships.

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References Reyntjens, Filip. 2009. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 19962006. Cambridge: Cambridge. Thom, William. 1999. “CongoZaire’s 199697 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence.” The Journal of Conflict Studies XIX(2). http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/viewArticle/4358/5015, last accessed February 10, 2014. McNulty, Mel. 1999. “The Collapse of Zaire: Implosion, Revolution or External Sabotage?” The Journal of Modern African Studies 37(1): 5382.

13. Cuba, start = 1953 incumbent loss (ArreguinToft = loss; RAND = loss) aBcDef A – Massacres (absent): No evidence of massacres, mass atrocities, destruction of population centers.

B Exemplary Force (present): Batistia's relatively unprofessional army regularly harassed and brutalized civilians, ultimately alienating them (Joes 2010, 141164).

C – Resettlement (absent): No evidence of resettlement, the insurgency was initially organized in the already depopulated Sierra Maestra mountain range.

D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Batista does offer an amnesty early on in his rule to rebels including Castro in 1955. He himself is pardoned, but then becomes an insurgent yet again (Joes 2010, 141164).

E Development Assistance (absent): No evidence that Batista government ever offers civic action or development aid to win over rural Cuban peasants.

F Elite Local Relationships (absent): Batista never wins the loyalty of peasant leadership in Cuba, leaving them to be coopted or controlled by Castro and the insurgency.

References

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http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/viewArticle/4358/5015

Joes, Anthony James. 2010. Victorious Insurgencies: Four Rebellions that Shaped Our World. Lexington, KY: Kentucky University Press. 14. East Timor, start = 1975 incumbent loss (ArreguinToft = loss; RAND = mixed) ABcDEF A – Massacres (present): Searchanddestroy operations kill thousands of civilians from 19771981. More than 100 killed in Santa Cruz massacre at funeral in 1991. Paramilitaries commit massacres leading up to vote for independence in 1999 and after.

B Exemplary Force (present): Intimidation, kidnapping, extrajudicial murder was common in the 1990s among progov't militias and paramilitaries against antiIndonesian activists, proFRETLIN supporters.

C – Resettlement (absent): Widespread resettlement of civilians by Indonesian military from 1983 1989. Major civilian displacement was common in period prior to 1983 as well. Largescale displacements after 1999 referendum on independence.

D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Ceasefire and negotiations between FRETLIN and TNI in 1983, but talks fail and Indonesian military attacks.

E Development Assistance (present): The military did enact a civil affairs program that improved sanitation, health, created infrastructure, enhanced local gov't control.

F Elite Relationships (present): Local Indonesian military leaders take political control in areas of operation, but do establish local allies and support elites like Tomas Goncalves, conservative groups like KOTA, Apodeti and the UDT. References

Kilcullen, David. 2000. The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia, 19451999. Dissertation. Syndey: University of New South Wales.

. 2006. “Globalisation and the Devleopment of Indonesian Counterinsurgency Tactics.” Small Wars and Insurgencies. 17(1). 4464.

. 2010. Counterinsurgency. London: Oxford University Press. 15. Eritrea, start = 1974

17


incumbent loss (ArreguinToft = loss; RAND = loss) ABCDef A Massacres (present): Town of Keren was bombed after local bridges were bombed by insurgents in 1970. Army committed many massacres, burned villages during 1967 and 19701 (Tareke 2002). B – Exemplary Force (present): Random arrests and arbitrary violence decreases after 1981, but exists in Ethiopian COIN prior (DeWaal 1991). C – Resettlement (present): Civilians were cleared from a sixmile area running alongside the KerenAsmara road in 1970 to reduce attacks, cleared from other areas as well (Tareke 2002). D – Negotiations/Amnesty (present): Ethiopian military government held talks with the EPLF in 1977 in Berlin, but then broke them off as they instead launched a new military offensive. Negotiations between midlevel officers guided by Jimmy Carter also begin in 1989 (Pateman 1990). E – Development Assistance (absent): no evidence of development assistance. F – Elite Local Relationships (absent): no evidence of local relationships. References

De Waal. Alexander. 1991. Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine In Ethiopia. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Pateman, Roy. 1990. “The Eritrean War.” Armed Forces and Society 17(1): 8198.

Tareke, Gebru. 2002. “From Lash to Red Star: the pitfalls of counterinsurgency in Ethiopia, 198082.” Journal of Modern Africa Studies 40(3), 465498.

16. Guatemala, start = 1960

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Incumbent win (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = win) ABCDEf A – Massacres (present): military resorted to annihilation of at least 450 villages and inhabitants in 19811983.

B Exemplary Force (present): Intimidation, harassment, torture, and murder of individual suspects was common practice by military.

C Resettlement (present): More than 1 million Gualemalans forcibly displaced during the period from 19811983 in a deliberate policy of removal and displacement, then reorganized in 'model villages' controlled by gov't (Streeter 2006).

D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Amnesty offered in 1982 for those returning from Mexico, or other insurgents, who had to sign an appeal for amnesty (Streeter 2006).

E Development Assistance (present): Much assistance available via USAID and the Alliance for Progress, but the Guatemalan gov't never adopts a firm policy of development to implement programs. Oligarchy always shirked from supporting socioeconomic reform. Military does implement its own civil affairs program known as the “National Plan for Security and Development”, offering both “guns and beans.”

Elite Relationships (absent): Military doesn't build new alliances among local elites, 'model villages' enable complete surveillance and monitoring of the population. No move to use local elites for control. More direct form of intervention in civil society (Streeter 2006).

References

Streeter, Stephen M. 2006. “NationBuilding in the Land of Eternal CounterInsurgency: Guatemala and the contradictions of the Alliance for Progress.” Third World Quarterly 27(1): 5768.

17. GuineaBissau Independence, start = 1962 Incumbent loss (ArreguinToft = loss; RAND = loss) ABCDEf A Massacres (present): Portuguese use heavy airpower in areas controlled by PAIGC, bombing villagers and using napalm against rebelheld villages (Dhada 1998, 582). Military under Spinola innovates heliborne attacks in freefire zones, killing scores of villagers and destroying villages, destroying livestock (Chabal 1980, 83).

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B Exemplary Force (present): Regular use of violence against civilians in raids and operations.

C – Resettlement (present): Like Portuguese COIN in other countries, Portugal uses aldeamentos to resettle population and distribute economic assistance and development. These were increased after Spinola came to power, but were used in the first phase as well (Dhada 1998, 584).

D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Military and PAIGC negotiate independence following the 1974 coup to end the conflict.

E Development Assistance (present): When Spinola becomes GovernorGeneral/military commander in 1969, he enacts a development program called 'A Better Guinea' by increasing food production, building infrastructures (hospitals, schools), etc. (Chabal 1981, 83).

F Elite Local Relationships (absent):

Although Africans are incorporated into Portuguese military forces, no evidence exists that the Portuguese form allies among local elites. This is consistent with direct rule throughout the colonial period. References

Dhada, M, 1998. “The Liberation War in GuineaBissau Reconsidered,” Journal of Military History.

Chabal, Partick. 1980. “National Liberation in Portuguese Guinea, 19561974.” African Affairs 80(318), 7599.

Cann III, John P. 1997. Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 19611974. Westport, CT: Praeger.

18. India (Naxalites), start = 1980 stalemate/draw (ArreguinToft = N/A; ongoing) aBcDEF A Massacres (absent): No evidence of massacres.

B Exemplary Force (pgresent): Military has used extrajudicial killings, promoted use of violence by civilians and vigilante groups against Naxalites in retaliation for their violence.

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C – Resettlement (absent): No evidence of resettlement.

D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Multiple rounds of negotiations have occurred between the many Naxalite groups and India's federal and state level governments.

E Development Assistance (present): The Indian government has implemented development plans at the state level. For example, Uttar Pradesh state provided electricity to rural villages as a means of meeting peasant grievances.

F Elite Relationships (present): Local governments in India formed cooperative relationships with vigilante groups comprised of upper case Indians to put down Naxalite rebellions in different regions.

References

Ahuja, Pratul and Rajat Ganguly. 2007. “The Fire Within: Naxalite Insurgency Violence in India.” Small Wars and Insurgencies. 18(2): 249274.

Misra, Amalendu. 2002. “Subaltern and the civil war: An assessment of leftwing insurgency in South Asia.” Civil Wars, 5(4): 5676.

“Andhra Pradesh/Naxalite.” GlobalSecurity.org, accessed December 12, 2012. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/naxalite.htm

19. India (Kashmir), start = 1989 stalemate/draw (ArreguinToft = N/A; ongoing) ABcdef A Massacres (present): multiple largescale massacres have been committed by Indian forces following attacks against them within populated areas. These include 50 deaths in Sopore town in January 6 1993, 31 deaths in Bijbehara town on October 22 1993, 35 Sikh deaths in Chattisinghpura on March 20,2000. However, BSF court of inquiries have held some of those responsible for these attacks. But not for all. Fire has also been directed at crowds of mourners at funerals of those slain by security forces. Thus, the gov’t just punish all instances of massacres leading to charges of state terrorism (Jafa 2005). B Exemplary Force (present): security forces have used intimidation, rape, torture and extrajudicial murder on civilians and suspected insurgents regularly (Jafa 2005, Bhatt 2005).

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http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/naxalite.htm



C Resettlement (absent): major displaced populations have included Pandits from Kashmir, driven out by Muslim militants. (Lama 2000). No evidence of forced resettlement by Indian Army. D Amnesty/Negotiations (absent): an attempt at peace talks occurs in July 2000, when Hizbul Mujahideen announces a ceasefire and the desire for negotiations with New Delhi. These talks are held, but collapse without any agreement because other insurgent groups reject them and begin to reject HM as well (Ganguly 2001). E Development Assistance (absent): No evidence of development assistance. Indian counterinsurgency is generally seen as overly reliant on force and has been apolitical. Inability to win hearts and minds supports this lack of evidence (Telford 2001). Some BSF units do establish medical centers in 1991 in two neighborhoods of Srinagar (Jafa 2005). But no evidence that this is a comprehensive policy of providing assistance to civilians. F Elite Local Relationships (absent): no evidence that India has formed relationships with local elites in Kashmir.

References

Bhatt, Shakti. 2003. “State Terrorism vs. Jihad in Kashmir.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 33(2): 215224. Telford, Hamish. 2001. “CounterInsurgency in India: Observations from Punjab and Kashmir.’ The Journal of Conflict Studies XXI(1): http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/4293/4888, last accessed February 14, 2014. Ganguly, Rajat. 2001. “India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Insurgency: Causes, Dynamics and Prospects for Resolution.” Asian Studies Review 25(3): 309334. Jafa, Yateendra Singh. 2005. “Defeating Terrorism: A Study of Operational Strategy and Tactics of Police Forces in Jammu & Kashmir (India).” Police Practice and Research 6(1): 141164. Lama, Mahendra P. 2000. “Internal displacement in India: causes, protection and dilemmas.” Forced Migration Review 8: 2426. 20. Indochina, start = 1946 Incumbent loss (ArreguinToft = loss; RAND = loss) ABCDeF

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http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/4293/4888

A – Massacres (present): Outbreak of conflict features French bombardment and occupation of the city of Haiphong in November 1946, causing six thousand civilian casualties (O'Ballance 1964, 77).

B Exemplary Force (present): French use punitive measures against the population including food seizures, cordonandsearch of villages (O'Ballance 1964, 8788).

C – Resettlement (present): Resettlement does occur in Cambodia in 19511952, when war goes conventional.

D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Negotiations were sought between the French and Ho Chi Minh, but these were not pursued forcefully because the Army saw such action as a sign of weakness and undermined any chance of military victory (Porch 2008, 91). Army rejects negotiations in 1947 (O'Ballance 1964, 8586).

E Development Assistance (absent): No evidence of development assistance found.

F Elite Local Relationships (present): French leadership sought to coopt Emperor Bao Dai of Annam to lead Vietnam in the French Union, However, Bao never fully agrees to French demands and a lack of full sovereignty, so he leaves Vietnam and never takes control of political events. No local elites were thus coopted who could rival the Viet Minh. French do form alliances with Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, they form militias to defend against Viet Minh. But no local elites in North Vietna. (O'Ballance 1964, 8384)

References O'Ballance, Edward. 1964. The Indochina War, 19451954. London: Faber and Fabcr, 1964

21. Indonesia (Aceh), start = 1976 incumbent win (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = win)

aBcDEf A Massacres (absent): No evidence of massacres by Indonesian military.

B Exemplary Force (present): Indonesian military used intimidation, rape, torture, murder against civilian population during 25 year conflict, about 20,000 civilian casualties.

C – Resettlement (absent): Indonesian military establishes 'black' and 'gray' zones that are cleared of civilians who are forcibly resettled in 20032004. Civilians given no warning, forced

23


to leave possessions, then become refugees.

D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Negotiated settlement concludes with peace agreement and disarmament provisions in 2000, some fluctuations in violence but lowered. Most fighting truly ends with 2005 tsunami. E Development Assistance (present): Indonesian gov't builds roads, television relay stations, but no other indications of civic action, development assistance, improvements in livelihood.

F Elite Relationships (absent): No evidence of local alliances with Muslim elites, local leadership.

References

Edward Aspinall, 2008. “Place and Displacement in the Aceh Conflict,” in Conflict, Violence, and Displacement in Indonesia, (ed.) Hedman, EvaLotta E. Ithaca, NY: SEAP Publications, 119146.

Gunawan, Novarin. 2005. “AntiGuerrilla Warfare in Aceh, Indonesia from 19802005.” Master's Thesis, Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University.

Ross, Michael. 2005. “Resources and Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesian,” in Understanding Civil War (eds.) Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 3558.

22. (Daru Islam), start = 1958 incumbent win (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = win aBCdef A – Massacres (absent): No evidence of massacres by Indonesian military.

B Exemplary Force (present): Indonesian military pressed civilians into militia service and participation in cordonandsweep operaitons known as pagar betis while under threat.

C – Resettlement (present): Indonesian military does evacuate and resettle villagers who live in Zone C, whose villages were then destroyed. D Amnesty/Negotiations (absent): No evidence of amnesty or negotiations, DI insurgency ends with decapitation. E Development Assistance (absent): No evidence found.

F Elite Relationships (absent): Few elite relationships, Kilcullen (2000) argues that local military commanders were the real powerbrokers and exercised de facto control over civil administration and civil society.

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References

Kilcullen, David. 2000. The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia, 19451999. Dissertation. Syndey: University of New South Wales.

. 2006. “Globalisation and the Devleopment of Indonesian Counterinsurgency Tactics.” Small Wars and Insurgencies. 17(1). 4464.

. 2010. Counterinsurgency. London: Oxford University Press.

23. Kurdistan, start = 1961 incumbent win (ArreguinToft = win; RAND = win) ABCDef A Massacres (present): Iraqi regime has a long history of indiscriminately attacking Kurdish civilians from 1961 onward. This includes bombing of Kurdish villages following 1961 uprising (O’Ballance 2002, 185). Later on, Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein repeatedly used largescale massacres on Kurdish civilian populations, including the Anfal campaign of 1988, in which chemical weapons were used to kill 300,000 civilians (O’Leary 2002, 1718). B Exemplary Force (present): torture and extrajudicial murder were regular features of Iraqi campaigns against Kurds. Coupled with massacres, civilians still experience profound psychological trauma (Bolton et. al. 2002). C Resettlement (present): Iraqi counterinsurgency against the Kurds created large refugee flows, some civilians relocated to settlements along highways in areas of Iraqicontrolled Kurdistan known as mujamma’at, or collectivities that Iraqis referred to as modern villages. (HRW 1992) D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Iraqi regime and Kurds sign a ceasefire in 1970 that grants Kurdish autonomy in four years. However, agreement doesn’t really hold as border disputes and conflicts are endemic. E Development Assistance (absent): no evidence of development assistance provided by Iraq to Kurdish populations. F Elite Local Relationships (absent): no evidence that Iraqi regime builds local Kurdish allies.

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References O’Leary, Carole A. 2002. “The Kurds of Iraq: Recent History, Future Prospects.” Middle East Review of International Affairs 6(4): 1729. Gunter, Michael M. 1993. “A de facto Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.” Third World Quarterly 14(2): 295319. O’Ballance, Edger. 2002. “Iraq.” In Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 19481991.” ed. by Kenneth O. Pollack. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Human Rights Watch. 1993. Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds. New York: Human Rights Watch. 24. Kenya (Mau Mau), start = 1952 incumbent win (ArreguinToft = win; RAND = win) ABCdEF A – Massacres (present): Mass killings were never part of the tactical repertoire of British counterinsurgency, but they did happen following Mau Mau atrocities. After the Lari massacre and the killing of 200 loyalist villagers, the local Home Guard retaliated by killing over 100 villagers also in Lari, March 1953 (Anderson 2005, 125139). Although other smaller group killings took place, these tended not to be against civilians but against suspected or captured insurgents. Either way, there were no largescale attempts at simply killing all the civilian population. Chappell shows how British airpower was never used to bomb civilian targets. (Chappell 2011)

B Exemplary Force (present): Bennett (2007a) argues that brutality was regularly used indiscriminately against the civilian population. These included beatings, torture, and murder. He argues that these practices were mostly committed by the Kenya Police Reserve (civilian settlers), King’s African Rifles, Home Guard. Former modeled on Army battalions, latter used in joint ops with the Army. (Ibid., 155) British strategy used punitive force, fear and intimidation. Less hearts and minds. (Ibid., 157) Even though common law still reigned, the result was ‘sham legalism’. (Ibid., 158) “Minimum force didn not prevail as often as is claimed; intimidation of the population, summary executions, torture and unrestrained violence were prevalent for at least eight months.” (Ibid., 158) This would be from 10/52 to 6/53. (Ibid.,, 153) The Mau Mau Lari massacre of Home Guard families at Lari and subsequent mass intimidation occurs in 3/53.

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Anderson confirms sham legalism and shows how sham legalism worked through the court system, with mass arrests of Kikuyu and confessions under duress resulted in mass executions. Intimidation was even used against suspected insurgent lawyers who were African or Asian. (Ibid., 156157) Intimidation continued through Operational Anvil, starting Phase 3 on April 24 1954. “Anvil epitomized an attitude of mind that pervaded the security forces” (Anderson 2005., 205), led to screening of Kikuyu in Nairobi (Ibid., 201). Screening commonly involved beatings and torture (Bennett 2007b, 648). Home Guard also regularly looted and pillaged Kikuyu (210211). Anvil becomes the turning point of the British campaign and disrupts Mau Mau bands (213214).

C – Resettlement (present): The British regularly used resettlement throughout the conflict. Villigization between 10/52 and 4/53 led to as much as 100,000 Kikuyu displaced from the Rift Valley and Central Provinces. Lancaster Rifles ‘evacuated’ Kikuyu throughout this phase (Bennett 652, 2007b; Bennett 153, 2007a) Policy reversed in mid1953 with overcrowding and realization of use of murder, torture, and beatings. (Bennett 2007a, 153) However, population is put through mass screening in Op Anvil in 4/54, and this results in detention and relocation of 70,000 Kikuyu. The camps were atrocious, and all Nairobi churches made outspoken criticism of gov’t policy (Anderson 207208). Resettlements of loyalist Kikuyu around European farms also took place through 19551956 (Branch 2007, 306), presumably for their security and for economic opportunities. They sought selfmastery, and criticized Mau Mau for their lack of it and use of violence against them. (Branch 2007, 307)

D Amnesty/Negotiation (absent): Two offers of negotiation are made to Mau Mau, first happening in 4/54 after capture of General China. This was not honored and rebels who aimed to surrender were instead ambushed, and those who went to trail were hanged. (Anderson 2005, 276277). The settlers always rejected negotiations as well (Ibid., 278), making British commitments difficult to uphold and caused preferences to diverge. Belief of Mau Mau as ‘subhuman’ blocked British from ever taking rebel preferences seriously or seeing them as legitimate, and instead they were just seen as crazed and bloodthirsty, a rejection of modernity (Ibid. 280281).

E Development Assistance (present): Development assistance appeared to be used selectively, and not all Kikuyu received the same benefits from new schools, infrastructure, and other new services. Again, patronage was used to build networks of clients, and British assistance was funneled through their loyalists.

F – Elite Local Relationships (present): British ties to Kenyan loyalists were deep, local chiefs had been incorporated into selfrule throughout the colonial period, they favored their clients. In fact, these relationships to local elites are what drove the rebellion, as many Africans were

27


excluded and became tenants who lost their land and suffered under low wages. Mau Mau led the cause of the dispossessed (Anderson 2003, 55) These loyalists were recruited into the Home Guard as well, they were the targets of Mau Mau. However, British respond by protecting and providing Kikuyu loyalists with resources to build their own patronage through new local institutions: “Although not usurped entirely, chiefs and headmen were demoted and replaced in the upper echelons of patronclient networks by African legislators and administrators appointed as Kenya began to prepare for decolonization.” (Branch 2007, 314) Thus, there is the erosion of the old network through Mau Mau attacks and the construction of a new one in the emerging edifice of the Kenyan state.

References

Anderson, David. 2005. Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire.

Bennett, Huw. 2007(a). “The Mau Mau Emergency as Part of the British Army's PostWar Counterinsurgency Experience.” Defense & Security Analysis. 23(2): 143163.

Bennett, Huw. 2007(b). “The OtherSide of the COIN: Minimum and Exemplary Force in British Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya.” 18(4): 638664.

Branch, Daniel. 2007. “The Enemy Within: Loyalists and the War Against Mau Mau in Kenya.” Journal of African History. 48: 291315.

Chappell, Stephen. 2011. “Airpower in the Mau Mau conflict: the government's chief weapon.” Small Wars and Insurgencies. 22(3): 495525.

Thornton, Rod. 2009. “Minimum Force': a reply to Huw Bennett,” Small Wars and Insurgencies. 20(1): 215226.

25. Laos, start = 1960 incumbent loss (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = loss) ABCDEF A Massacres (present): US support to Laotian regime after 1962 includes attacks on areas of Laos used by China and N. Vietnam for own operations, particularly those focused on S. Vietnam. US bombs these areas heavily, destroying entire villages (StuartFox 1997, 138142) B Exemplary Force (present): CIAfunded and trained ‘secret army’ of Hmong troops worked with CIA to neutralize Pathet Lao elements via assassination, torture to gain intelligence and information.

28


C Resettlement (present): In 1960, Hmong commander relocated 200 villages deeper into the mountains south of the Plain of Jars to keep population from coming under control of the Pathet Lao. This population is then used to recruit irregulars for the ‘secret war’. (StuartFox 1997, 117). D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Tripartite negotiations occur after 1960 coup among neutralists, rightists, and leftists (including great powers) that leads to the Geneva Agreement of 1962 and the formation of a Second Coalition Government. However, this government does break down in 1964 and the war resumed. (StuartFox 1997) E Development Assistance (present): USAID was heavily involved in providing assistance to the Laotian government, so much so that a USAID advisor was assigned to each ministry (StuartFox 1997, 130) F Elite Local Relationships (present): Laotian government and CIA build strong ties to leaders of Hmong ethnic group (StuartFox 1997).

References StuartFox, Martin. 1997. A History of Laos. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 26. Malaya, start = 1948 incumbent win (ArreguinToft = win; RAND = win) aBCDEF A – Massacres (absent): no evidence that the British sought to destroy the Chinese population of Malaya. They appear to not have employed any heavy firepower or airpower against civilians. This is consistent with Nagl's discussion as the British as an imperial, nonconventional army (Nagl 2002, 3557). One massacre of note did occur at Batang Kali, but this was not official policy nor informally tolerated. Komer (1972, 5152) claims no bombings of population centers, very limited use of artillery at all.

B Exemplary Force (present): Bennett (2009) shows that the British regularly coerced Chinese civilians. Violence included shooting those civilians who fled counterinsurgents and destroyed their property. This was not halted by Far East Land Forces because it interpreted the intel it gathered as showing that these forms of coercion were successful. British used collective punishments against entire communities. Didn't codify this in directives, but “created a permissive environment by encouraging a hostile attitude towards an entire population, without

29


initially setting out specific guideliens on the use of force.” (Bennett 2009, 431). Forms of repression used describes suspects as 'shot whilst attempting to escape', like at the Batang Kali massacre in December 1948. Also mass arrests in cordonandsweep ops. (Bennett 2009, 436). Nonetheless,these actions alienated the population from counterinsurgents (Hack 2007). C – Resettlement (present): 18,500 resettled by March 1950. Done in an adhoc basis. Major resettlement programs begin after that (Bennett 2009, 4389). Generally occurred following insurgnt attacks pre1950, followed by burning of homes, property destruction (Bennett 2009, 439). Briggs Plan of April 1950 resettles over 500,000 squatters, regroups 600,000 laborers. Starts in June, done by 1951. Resettlements involve food controls, denying resources to population. By the end of the Emergency, almost onetenth of entire population were resettled in New Villages (Komer 1972, 5661). D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): A reward for defection program exists after 1948, offers payment to MNLAMCP members for defection, inforamtion about others. Nets over 2,000 defections during entire emergency. Negotiations do occur in 1955 as well. E Development Assistance (present): From late 1952 onward, New Villages (resettlements) receive more basic schools, town halls, medical facilities, and better infrastructure (Hack 2009). New Villages were “Malaya's greatest socioeconomic development project during 19481960.” (Komer 1972, 62) F Elite Relationships (present): Templer tries to win over Chinese after coming to power, improving infratstructure in New Villages, permits enhanced administrative powers by elected village councils in May 1952, citizenship conferred on Chinese. (Smith 2001, 66). Templer also shepherds through a new Public Service Commission in Nov 1953, which permits nonMalays (Chinese) to join administrative service, and encourages Chinese recruitment (Smith 2001, 6768). Alliance between United Malays National Organizaiton (UNMO) and Malayan Chinese Association (MCA, previously formed in 1949 with support from Gurney and MacDonald (Smith 2001, 65; Komer 1972, 65), while the alliance itself was formed in 1952 (Smith 2001, 71) wins elections in 1955. Demonstrates elite relationships formed amongst leaders of Chinese minority Hack (2009). Elections became an incentives for these groups, like MCA, to challenge MCP for popular support. (Smith 2001, 71). References

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Bennett, Huw. 2009. “A Very Salutary Effect: The CounterTerror Strategy in the Early Malayan Emergency, June 1948 to December 1949.” Journal of Strategic Studies. 32(9): 415444. Hack, Karl. 2009. “The Malayan Emergency as counterinsurgency paradigm.” Journal of Strategic Studies. 32(3): 383414. Komer, Robert W. 1972. The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect. Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation. Smith, Simon. 2001. “General templer and counterinsurgency in Malaya: hearts and minds, intelligence, and propaganda.” Defence and Intelligence Analysis. 16(3): 6078. Nagl, John A. 2002. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons for Malaya and Vietnam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 27. Mozambique (RENAMO), start = 1976 stalemate/draw (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = mixed) aBCDeF A Massacres (absent): while there are many cases of extrajudicial murder, no evidence found of largescale massacres. B Exemplary Force (present): once in power, FRELIMO built state power by identifying internal enemies to be repressed in the defense of the nation. This required the use of mass detention, torture, extrajudicial murder of targeted Mozambicans (Machava 2011). 7 C Resettlement (present): while FRELIMO did relocate individuals to prison or work camps who suspected of or were convicted of treason or some type of crime against the state (Machava 2011), it did not relocate entire civilian populations as a means of controlling them. While a villagization program was enacted by FRELIMO after the defeat of the Portuguese, it was later used as part of the response to RENAMO’s rebellion (Lundstrom 2009).

D Negotiations/Amnesty (present): FRELIMO negotiations with RENAMO culminate in the 1992 Rome Accords, a ceasefire which holds until 2013. E Development Assistance (absent): although development assistance and humanitarian aid was provided by the United Nations, FRELIMO did not provide development assistance to civilian populations as part of a counterinsurgency strategy to win the loyalty of the people.

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F Elite Local Relationships (present): FRELIMO establishes local militias throughout the country led by local chefes de quartierao (heads of residential units) to identify traitors of the state (Machava 2011). References Lunstrom, Elizabeth. 2009. “Terror, Territory, and Deterritorialization: Landscapes of Terror and the Unmaking of State Power in the Mozambican ‘Civil’ War.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 99(5): 884892.

Machava, Benedito Luis. 2011. “State Discourse on Internal Security and the Politics of Punishment in PostIndependence Mozambique (19751983).” Journal of Southern African Studies 37(1): 593609.

Human Rights Watch. 1990. Human Rights Watch World Report 1990. New York: NY. http://www.hrw.org/reports/1990/WR90/index.htm#TopOfPage, last accessed Feb. 21, 2014.

28. Mozambique Independence, start = 1962 incumbent loss (ArreguinToft = loss; RAND = loss) ABCDEf A – Massacres (present): Portuguese adopt a 'scorchedearth' party along Tanzanian border in Cabo Delgado with simultaneous regrouping in 1965. (Issacson and Issacson 1983, 100). References are made in historical sources to the use of defoliants and napalm Mozambique, but these are often mentioned without reference to specific incidents. Another example is the “systematic application of officially sanctioned violence against noncombatants consisted of the strafing of trails and water holes and the napalming of guerrilla forest bases.” (Henriksen 1983, 131). Missionaries leave Inhaminga Plateau to protest mass killings, 200 dead from August 1973 to March 1974 (Henriksen 1983, 131). “From the beginning of the conflict there existed a marked indifference toward Mozambican life.” (131) Torture, intimidation, and mass killings used to compel population into aldeamentos. (Ibid., 131). Although no specific incidents are mentioned, I assume these were commonplace among Portuguese COIN.

One noted massacre occurs in the village of Wiriyamu, south of Tete, where Portuguese forces killed 400 (Henriksen 1983, 120). Portuguese forces also attacked civilians out of frustration following insurgent attacks, with murders of suspected mine layers and supporters in

32


Mocumbura in May 1971 (Henriksen 1983, 129). Also threw grenades into crowded huts as retaliation for allowing insurgents to set up attacks (Henriksen 1983, 129).

B Exemplary Force (present): Torture, intimidation, and mass killings used to compel population into aldeamentos (Henriksen 1983, 131). Portuguese used civilians as human mine detectors, forcing them down suspect roads to clear them (Henriksen 1983, 132). Civilian huts and crops destroyed when they did not willingly move into resettlements (Henriksen 1983, 132). Portuguese police torture and use extrajudicial murder against detainees (Henriksen 1983, 136). Police also use wide dragnets and mass detention regularly, largest was in 1972 where 1800 were detained (Henriksen 1983, 137). Estimated 10,000 regime opponenets were arrested between 19671973, with PIDE using torture on prisoners (Issacson and Issacson 1983, 103). Flechas (native African special forces including turned insurgents) known to “treat with a a savage ruthlessness the villagers among whom they operated...to prove their new commitment” (Henriksen 1983, 107).

C – Resettlement (present): Resettlement schemes were modeled after British in Malaya (Henriksen 1983, 154). As Bender (1972) points out in Angola, Portuguese use three types of resettlements, including militaryrun aldeamentos, reordenamento rural for socioeconomic development, and colonatos de soldados But, reordenamentos are used less in Mozambique, and more colnatos used in areas with guerrilla activity. (Jundanian 1974,520)

Aldeamentos first proposed in 1965, implemented south of Tanzanian border in Cabo Delgado, using scorched earth policy (Issacson and Issacson 1983, 100; Jundanian 1974, 523). 1 million resettled by 1970. Officals admit that population not so involved in resettlement construction, and “the amenities of the villages are minimal.” Infrastructure and services to follow after rapid regrouping (526). (Jundanian 1974, 540) General Arriaga does too much too quickly, built all settlements fast, viewed negatively by the people . (Cann 1997, 157) Resettlements often done forcefully, had hardships on the people and didn’t account for Afrian desire to remain in their own lands. (Cann 1997, 161; Henriksen 1983, 161)

D Negotiations/Amnesty (present): Portuguese did support efforts to get FRELIMO personnel to defect, as military published offers of amnesty before, during, and after large campaigns, offering money for weapons. (Henriksen 1983, 103). When Arriagas comes to power, he orders that wounded FRELIMO troops get flown out for medical care first to encourage defection. (Henriksen 1983, 104)

Negotiations eventually leading to indepdence begin on 5 June 1974. Unofficial ceasefires emerge throughout the Portuguese Army. Portugual signs handover of power to FRELIMO on 7 September 1974 (Munslow 1983, 127).

33


E Development Assistance (present): Only sporadic development projects in the absence of major reordenamento rural projects (520). These programs “haven’t been well financed nor have they helped a significant number of Africans.” (521) Major development initiatives centered around construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam (Henriksen 1983, 165). But, the dam wasn't intended so much for Mozambican development, but to attract more settlers, foster mineral extraction in Tete, and provide electricity to South Africa (Issacon and Issacson 183, 104; Munslow 1983, 114).

Also, Portuguese settlers want to use Africans as a labor source, less emphasis on actually providing development for them as opposed to the Europeans. African crop purchases fell, indicating a declining standard of living, while statistics show higher economic gains for Europeans (Jundanian 536537 1974) Bishops also complain not enough schools, qualified teachers (Jundanian 1974, 538).

Social programs: Cann provides data suggesting increases in admitted students and teachers in Angola (5x), Guinea (2x), and Mozambique (1.8x). (Cann 1997, 147) Army played key role, building schools, became teachers if necessary. (Cann 1997 ,148) On health, Portuguese adopted WHO standards for proper health care regarding numbers of professionals / population, military became prime implementer. (Ibid., 149) Military worked to ensure doctors/nurses/hospitals were available to meet standards. (Ibid., 150). But military had to fill in a massive gap since not enough teachers were available. All these suggest a mixed approach toward development.

F Elite Local Relationships (absent): Portugal always sought to pit tribes against each other, suggested FRELIMO was dominated by the Makonde tribe and an enemy of the Makua tribe., all in Cabo Delgado (Munslow 1983, 121). In Niassa, Portuguese pit the Pao and Nyanja, the latter was FRELIMO (Issacson and Issacson 1983, 102). In aldeamentos, local chiefs are mobilized to raise a 1012 man militia, supervised by the army but paid by administration (Munslow 1983, 122). But over longterm, the Portuguese fail to develop a “moderate Mozambican constituency” (Hendriksen 1983, 47), limited efforts to include Africans in the colonial state but are never serious (Hendriksen 1983, 108). No programs to train local leaders and youth to lead local government (Hendriksen 1983, 109). IN the last phase, Portuguese do support the emergence of the Grupo Unido de Mozambique, which advocated for continued ties to metropole, but this is too little and too late to affect war. (Hendriksen 1983, 110).

References

Isaacman, Allen and Barbara Isaacman, 1983. Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900 – 1982. Boulder, CO: Wesview Press.

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Henriksen, Thomas H. 1983. Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence, 19641974. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Cann III, John P. 1997. Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 19611974. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Munslow, Barry. 1NA983. Mozambique: the Revolution and its Origins. London: Longman.

Jundanian, Brendan F. 1974. “Resettlement Programs: Counterinsurgency in Mozambique.” Comparative Politics.

29. Namibia, start = 1973 incumbent loss (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = loss) aBcdEf A – Massacres (absent): Violence used against civilians, but no evidence of mass killings or massacres.

B Exemplary Force (present): Police tortured captured insurgents, responsible for COIN from 19661974 (Richard 2007, 10). Then South African Defence Forces become involved. Mistreatment of prisoners and civilians continues by SADF post1974 (Ibid., 14).

C – Resettlement (absent): No evidence of resettlement.

D Amnesty/Negotiations (absent): No evidence of amnesty/negotiations.

E Development Assistance (present) SADF does employ civic action programs supplying public goods, indicating provision of development assistance, social services (Ibid., 14).

F – Local Elite Relationships (absent): No evidence of elite relationships.

References

Baines, Gary. 2007. “Breaking Rank: Secrets, Silences and Stories of South Africa's Border War.” Grahamstown: Rhodes University.

Dale, Richard. 1993. “Melding War and Politics in Namibia: South Africa's Counterinsurgency Campaign, 19661989.” Armed Forces and Society. 20(1): 724.

30. Nepal, start = 1997 stalemate/draw (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = mixed) ABcDef A Massacres (present): in later phase, state violence was more intense than insurgents. After failure of 2001 ceasefire and use of military, more indiscriminate violence against civilians

35


occur. In August 2003, RPA kills twenty Maoist suspects near the village of Doramba (Norris 2011, 14). B Exemplary Force (present): Royal Nepalese Army regularly killed civilians as part of repressive strategy against insurgency. Caused more casualties than insurgents throughout most of the conflict (Battacharya 2013). C Resettlement (absent): no evidence of use of resettlements. D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): negotiations and successful ceasefire held after death of royal family in 2001, but fail later on as state pushes more violence. 3,000 deaths in 2002. Most ceasefires thus lead to failed negotiations, except for last negotiated settlement that leads to the dissolution of the monarchy (Battarcharya 2013). E Development Assistance (absent): no evidence that development assistance was used by Nepalese regime as part of counterinsurgency strategy. F Elite Local Relationships (absent): state did try to coopt local patrons/elites by protecting their own economic interests (Joshi 2013). But the Nepalese regime gradually alienated most segments of the population with violence as Maoists rose in power, eventually forcing dissolution of the monarchy. No relationships present or sustained. References Norris, John. 2011. “How not to Wage a CounterInsurgency: Nepal, the Maoists, and Human Rights.” Human Rights Bulletin, 11(2): 1315. Joshi, Madhav. 2013. “Livelihood Coping Mechanisms, Local Intelligence, and the Pattern of Violence During the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal.” Terrorism and Political Violence 25(5): 820839. Bhattacharya, Srobana. 2013. “Strategic Interaction Between Rebels and the State: A Study of the Maoist Conflict in Nepal.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 36(7): 573587. 31. Nicaragua (Contras), start = 1981 stalemate/draw (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = mixed) aBCDEF A Massacres (absent): No clear evidence of massacres, more extrajudicial killing of small numbers of suspected Contra supporters.

36


B Exemplary Force (present): Extrajudicial execution was common among suspected Contras and dissidents.

C – Resettlement (present): After outbreak of conflict in 1980, regime removes 80 percent of Miskito population and resettles them in strategic hamlets.

D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): negotiations in 1989 lead to peace agreement in which Contras disarm and elections are held in 1990. Sandinistas lose elections but remain strong party. E – Development Assistance (present): regime initiates broad land reform that redistributes land to peasants. F – Elite Local Relationships (present): In 1985, regime begins to incorporate Miskito leadership into FSLN party and government through decentralizaiton, creation of two new departments in the east. References Close, David. 1989. “Responding to Low Intensity Conflict: Counterinsurgency in Nicaragua.” Presented to the XV Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, San Juan, Puerto Rico. Blake, Samuel W. 1992. “Totalitarianism in Sandinista Nicaragua.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 15: 201223. West, W. Gordon. 1992. “The Sandinista Record on Human Rights in Nicaragua.” Droit et Societe. 22: 393408. 32, Nicaragua (Somoza), start = 1978 Incumbent loss (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = loss) ABcDef A – Massacres (present): Somoza regime repressed civilians more than fought Sandinistas by bombing villages, bombing Managua during last battles of the regime in 1979.

B – Exemplary Force (present): regime regularly used torture, extrajudicial murder, and assassination to repress dissent and supporters of Sandinistas. C – Resettlement (absent): no evidence of forced resettlement of civilians, although refugees

37


are created through conflict.

D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): USsponsored mediation of the conflict takes place in late 1978 through 1979. These negotiations are ultimately unsuccessful as Somoza refuses to agree to a plebiscite to decide his rule.

E Development Assistance (absent): No evidence that Somoza's regime provides development assistance or civic action programs to increase the benefits of cooperation to the population. US aid to Nicaragua is also cut during this period by the Carter administration in protest of human rights violations, further limiting resources that could be provided to the regime, and then to civilians.

F Elite Relationships (absent): No evidence that Somoza wins over rural elites or political moderates. Rather, polarization driven by the war tends to pull away potential allies and drives them toward the Sandinistas and the broadbased opposition.

References

Montgomery, Robin Navarro. 1980. “The Fall of Somoza: Anatomy of a revolution,” Parameters X(1), 4757. Weathers, Bynum, E. 1983. “Guerrilla Warfare in Nicaragua,” Air University Documentary Research Study. Montgomery, AL: Maxwell Air Force Base, US Air Force.

Seligson, Mitchell A. and Vincent McElhinny. 1996. “LowIntensity Warfare, HighIntensity Death: the Demographic Impact of the Wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua.” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 21: 211241. 33. Nigeria (Niger Delta), start = 1991 Incumbent stalemate/draw (ArreguinToft = N/A; ongoing) ABcDEF A Massacres (present): Nigerian state security forces kill dozens and burn villages following Kaiama Declaration protests in Dec. 1998Jan. 1999 (Frynas 2001, 49) Mobile Police responds to antiShell protests in 1990 by killing 80 and burning hundreds of homes (Frynas 2001, 51).

B Exemplary Force (present): Ogoni antioil protests are met with eight extrajudicial executions in 1995 (Frynas 2001, 49).

C Resettlement (absent): no evidence of resettlement.

38


D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): amnesty granted in 2009 to all militants ever involved in Delta insurgency in exchange for handing over arms (Egwemi 2010).

E Development Assistance (present): in 1992, the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission is established to launch agricultural developments in areas while oil is extracted, mostly using oil revenues. Replaced by Niger Delta Development Commission (Frynas 2001, 43). F Local Elite Relationships (present): Nigerian government seeks to coopt local actors in the Delta by devolving local governmental responsibilities, enabling access to state patronage.

References Frynas, George Jedrjej. 2001. “Corporate and state responses to antioil protests in the Niger Delta.” African Affairs. 100: 2754. Egwemi, V. 2010. “From Militancy to Amnesty: Some Thoughts on President Yar’adua’s Approach to the Niger Delta Crisis.” Current Research Journal of Economic Theory 2(3): 136141.

34. Papua New Guinea, start = 1988 stalemate/draw (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = mixed) ABCDEf A Massacres (present): PNG military forces fired grenades into villages, indiscriminately shot up villages with machine guns, fired mortars at civilian areas using white phosporous rounds (Lasslett 2012, 714).

B Exemplary Force (present): PNG did use extrajudicial murder and torture on suspected members of Bougainville rebellion, as well as sexual assaults of weapon in ‘care centers’ (Lasslett 2012, 714). C Resettlement (present): PNG forces drove civilians from conflict areas and held them in ‘care centers’, which nominally were created to provide them with basic good but functioned as concentration camps (Lasslett 2012, 714).

39


D Amnesty/Negotations: (present): peace agreement signed in 2001 relying on local reconciliation traditions E Development Assistance (present): PNG government withheld food deliveries to Bougainville instead (Lasslett 2012), it did initiate the Bougainville Development Package in 1989, providing K47,000 per landowner to compensate for past creation of a copper mine which adversely affected the population (Smith 1991). F Elite Local Relationships (absent): although some civilians are progovernment and form Bougainville Resistance Force to counter rebels, no evidence of any leadership from specific preexisting social groups.

References Lasslett, Kristian. 2012. “State Crime by Proxy: Australia and the Bougainville Conflict.” British Journal of Criminology. 52: 705723.

Carl, Andy and Sr. Lorriane Garasu. 2002. Weaving Consensus: The Papua New Guinea – Bougainville peace process. London: Conciliation Resources. Kerr, Katherine S. 2000. “Papua New Guinea in 1999: Stepping Back from the Brink.” Asian Survey. 40(1): 6166.

WelseySmith, Terence. 1991. “Papua New Guinea in 1990: A Year in Crisis.” Asian Survey. 31(2): 188195.

35. Peru, start = 1980 Incumbent win (ArreguinToft = win; RAND = win) ABcdEF A – Massacres (present): In 1988, massacre at Cayara by Peruvian army kills 60 civilians (Amnesty International, 1988). At Accomarca in 1985, 69 civilians killed (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2003, 653). Other massacres by the Army and death squads are suspected although less hard evidence exists to demonstrate proof they happened.

B – Exemplary Force (present): Intimidation, torture, and harassment of civilians by Peruvian military and police was common throughout the conflict.

C – Resettlement (absent): While refugees were created by COIN and insurgent operations, no

40


systematic policy of resettlement.

D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): amnesty is offered to Sendero fights after the capture of Guzman in 1992. Thousands respond positively.

E Development Assistance (present): Although no detailed development plan was adopted, Peru successfully uses smallscale projects

F Elite Local Relationships (present): in 1990s, Peru wins support of village leaders of Peruvian peasants to encourage formation of campesinos, local village militias. Occurs after brutal violence of Sendero and earlier indiscriminate violence by the Peruvian state.

References

Taylor, Lewis. 1997. “Counterinsurgency strategy, the PCPSendero Luminoso and the civil war in Peru, 19801996.” Bulletin of Latin American Research. 17(1): 3558.

KocMenard, Sergio. 2006. “Switching from Indiscriminate to Selective Violence: The Case of the Peruvian Military.” Civil Wars 8(34), 332354. Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 2003. Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume VI. Lima: Government of Peru. http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ifinal/conclusiones.php last accessed March 1, 2014. Amnesty International. 1994. “The Cayara Massacre: the coverup.” http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/asset/AMR46/015/1994/es/6fc3d61febeb11dd8cf149437baee106/amr460151994en.pdf last accessed March 1, 2014.

36. Philippines (Huk Rebellion), start =1950 Incumbent win (ArreguinToft = win; RAND = win) ABcDEf A – Massacres (present): In 1950, Philippines Army kills 100 civilians in Bacalor, Pampanga and burn over 100 homes in retaliation for death of one of their officers by guerrillas (Douglas 1953, 118). 50 farmers killed in Laguna same year as suspected Huks (McCarren 1966, 28).

B Exemplary Force (present): Philippine forces, especially the Militar Police Command, absued villagers, intimidation and harassment, beatings were common. Some political opponents

41


http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/asset/AMR46/015/1994/es/6fc3d61f-ebeb-11dd-8cf1-49437baee106/amr460151994en.pdf

http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/asset/AMR46/015/1994/es/6fc3d61f-ebeb-11dd-8cf1-49437baee106/amr460151994en.pdf

were summarily executed individually.

C – Resettlement (absent): No evidence of resettlement of civilians in new locations to enable separation from insurgents.

D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Economic Development Corps used to encourage Huk rebels to defect under amnesty. Rebels were promised land in exchange for turning to the government. However, less than 1,000 rebels took up EDC offer.

E Development Assistance (present): When Magsaysay becomes Defense head, he creates an Economic Development Corps within the military that performs civic action programs and provides aid to civilians to reduce dependence on Huks and increase ties with the government.

F Elite Relationships (absent): No evidence that local peasant leadership joins against Huk rebellion and with government.

References

Douglas, William O. 1953. North from Malaya: Adventure on Five Fronts. New York: Doubleday.

McCarren, Edwin J. 1966. Personal Leadership: An Element of National Power. Carlisle: US Army War College.

Dillon, Dana R. 1995. “Comparative Counterinsurgency Strategies in the Philippines.” 6(3): 281303.

Johnson, Wray R. and Paul J. Dimech. “Foreign internal defense and the Hukbalahap: A model counterinsurgency.” Small Wars and Insurgencies. 4(1): 2952.

37. Philippines (MNLF), start = 1971 incumbent win (ArreguinToft = win; RAND = win) aBcDEf

A Massacres (absent): massacre of protesters by Civilian Home Defense Corps unit does happen in Escalante in 1985, but they are tried for murder. Nonetheless, government retains CHDCs (van der Kroef 1986).

B Exemplary Force (present): Philippine forces, especially the Military Police Command, absued villagers, intimidation and harassment, beatings were common. Many political opponents

42


were summarily executed individually. Paramilitary forces and gangs allied with regular military and police engaged in regular extrajudicial murder, extortion, and intimidation (van der Kroef 1986)

C Resettlement (absent): No evidence of resettlement of civilians in new locations to enable separation from insurgents.

D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Negotiations occur throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, including the prospect of substantial autonomy for Muslim areas. Leads to agreement in 1996 between MNLF and gov't leading to creation of Muslim Mindanao Autonomous region but not MILF which continues armed opposition, although gov't doesn't bother them if they do not launch attacks.

E Development Assistance (present): Army does initiate development programs, building roads, improving Mindinao's airport, building mosques for Muslims, construction of schools, health facilities, support for rural electric service.

F Elite Relationships (absent): after signing peace treaty, leader of MNLF, Nur Misuari, becomes head of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development, regional governor. However, I consider this after the end of the conflict, so this is absent.

References

Sales, Peter M. 2009. “State terror in the Philippines: the Alston Report, human rights and counterinsurgency under the Arroyo administration.” Contemporary Politics 15(3): 321336.

Cline, Lawrence. 2007. “The Islamic insurgency in the Philippines.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 11(3): 115138.

Van der Kroef, J. M. 1986. Private Armies and Extrajudicial Violence in the Philippines. Asian Affairs: An American Review 13(4): 121.

Islam, Syed Serajul. 1998. “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines.” Asian Survey 38(5): 441456.

38. Philippines (MILF), start = 1977 incumbent win (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = win) A – Massacres (absent): while there are cases of extrajudicial murder, no cases found of

43


largescale massacres. B – Exemplary Force (present): arbitrary arrests and torture of civilians occur on several occasions in late 2000s (Amnesty International 2009). C – Resettlement (absent): while IDPs are created by fighting between military and MILF, no evidence of resettlement of civilians in locations controlled by the government. D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Malaysianbrokered negotiations between government and MILF begin in 2006 seeking creation of new autonomous region called the Bangsamoro Entity (Coronel 2007). Talks are successful in early 2014. These follow from earlier peace negotiations in 2002, which lead to relative ceasefire and set stage for greater cooperation in 2005. E – Development Assistance (present): aid is provided to develop Mindanao throughout 1990s, especially in 1997 when projects are launched with support from UNDP but in conjunction with the government to foster economic revival. Government creates a Bangsamoro Development Plan in March 2014, but this is after the negotiated peace treaty in signed in January. Unless fighting resumes, this will occur after the conflict. F – Elite Local Relationships (present): government had coopted from MNLF leadership into political institutions. Aalthough MILF does provide support to Philippine Armed Forces to defeat Jemaah Islamiyah. However, considered separate conflict.

References Stark. Jan. 2003. “Muslims in the Philippines.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 23(1): 195209. World Bank. March 5, 2014. “Philippines: Bangsamoro Development Plan Formulation Kicks off Today.” http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2014/03/05/philippinesbangsamorodevelopmentplanformulationkicksoff. Last accessed March 12, 2014. Hedman, EvaLotta E. “The Philippines in 2005: Old Dynamics, New Conjecture.” Asian Survey 46(1): 187193.

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http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/05/philippines-bangsamoro-development-plan-formulation-kicks-off

http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/05/philippines-bangsamoro-development-plan-formulation-kicks-off

Bertrand, Jacques. 2000. “Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace Agreement is Fragile.” Pacific Affairs 73(1): 3754.

39. Senegal, start = 1980 incumbent stalemate/draw (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = mixed) ABcDeF A Massacres (present): military violently disperses two 19xx82 protests by firing indiscriminately into crowds, in killing many civilians (Humphreys and Ag Mohamad 2005, 250). B Exemplary Force (present): violence and harassment used against civilians as part of extortion for economic goods (Evans 2003). Torture was also common through the late 1980s (Humphreys and Ag Mohamad 2005). C Resettlement (absent): no evidence of resettlement found.

D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): multiple negotiations throughout conflict, including the Bissau Accord of 1991, resulting in shaky peace treaty signed on 2005 between Casamance rebels and state representatives (de Jong and Gasser 2005).

E Development Assistance (absent): no evidence found. F Elite Local Relationships (present): Bissau Accords led the Front Nord wing of the rebellion to maintain peace but keep weapons, engage in elicit trade, but ultimately support the government. (Mumphreys and Ag Mohamad 2005). They were effectively coopted by permitting their own access to the war economy. References

Humphreys, Macartan and Habaye Ah Mohamed. 2005. “Senegal and Mali.” In Understanding Civil War, Vol I. Ed. by Nicholas Sambanis and David Collier. Washington, D.C.: The World

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Bank, 247302. Evans, Martin. 2002. “Ni paix ni guerre: the political economy of lowlevel conflict in Casamance.” HPG Background Paper. London: Kings College London. http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/22670/1/Ni%20paix%20ni%20guerre%20the%20political%20economy%20of%20low%20level%20conflict%20in%20the%20Casamance.pdf?1, last accessed February 23, 2014.

40. Somalia (antiBarre), start = 1980 Incumbent loss (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = loss) ABcdeF A Massacres (present): in fighting over the towns of Hargeisa, Burao, and Berbera, government forces bomb areas of the towns held by rebels and kill 50,000, many were civilians. Government forces were widely known for such brutal acts. The Isaq clan was a specific target of such massacres (Bongartz 1991, 23). B Exemplary Force (present): government forces regularly engaged in extrajudicial murder, torture, and rape of civilians in conflict areas (Bongartz 1991, 23; Compagnon 1992). C Resettlement (absent): no evidence of resettlement. D Amnesty/Negotiations (absent): no evidence of amnesty or negotiations. E Development Assistance (absent): no evidence of development assistance. F Elite Local Relationships (present): the regime empowered allied clans in refugee camps to attack rival clans, namely the Isaq, (Bongartz 1991, 23; Compagnon 1992) thereby cementing local ties with tribal leaders. References Bongartz, Maria. 1991. The Civil War in Somalia: its genesis and dynamics. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Compagnon, Daniel. 1992. “ Political Decay in Somalia: From Personal Rule to Warlordism.”

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http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/22670/1/Ni%20paix%20ni%20guerre%20the%20political%20economy%20of%20low%20level%20conflict%20in%20the%20Casamance.pdf?1



Refuge 12(5): 813. 41. Sri Lanka (LTTE), start = 1971 Incumbent win (ArreguinToft = loss [paper published before war ends with incumbent win]; RAND = ongoing [war ends in 2010]) ABCDef

A – Massacres (present): Government forces shelled densely populated areas in Northern Sri Lanka during the last months of the conflict in 2009. Targets included hospitals. Munitions included cluster bombs, white phosphorous. Civilians had burn marks from phosphorous and napalm. (Shahnewaz 2010, 67). Large civilian massacres have been common thoroughout the war, including 53 Tamil detaintees at Welikade Prison and 60 civilians in Jaffna in July 1983, 70 at a church in April 1984 in Jaffna, 100 Tamil civilians at Iraperiyakulam army camp and 100 Tamil civilians at Mannar, both in Dec 1984. Attacks common except for 19861989, but large massacres again in 1989 and 1990 of Tamils (Ibid., 78). Fewer attacks in mid90s, couple in late90s, mid200s, and then the final assault with massive numbers of civilians, in 10s thousands (Ibid., 89).

B Exemplary Force (present): Intimidation, torture, and summary execution have been common throughout the conflict. Intimidation occurred through arbitrary arrest, and disappearances of insurgents or civilians suspected of supporting the insurgency. From 19881994, at least 20,000 disappeared. (Shahnewaz 2010, 9) “Extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, torture, forced recruitment and other human rights violations are persistent and widespread.’ (Ibid., 10)

C – Resettlement (present): Over 100,000 Tamils were displaced from the country post1983, starting with a mass displacement at the outbreak of the conflict in 1983. Areas around Trincomalee have been depopulated of Tamils. Same happened to Manal aru Tamils in 1985, and in Vanni in 2009. COIN strategy appears to keep Tamil civilians out of some areas to prevent LTTE infiltration Sri Lankan military forces created internment camps called ‘welfare centers’ in March 2008 for civilians fleeing conflicted areas, these were still used in late 2009 after the final offensive crushing the LTTE had ended despite mass overcrowding (Shahnewaz 2010, 78).

D Amnesty and Negotiations (present): Peace treaties and ceasefires were common thoroughout the conflict. The first led to the introduction of the Indian Peacekeeping Force in 1987, but this collapsed in renewed violence in 1990, 1995, and 2002. However, In 2004,

47


Colonel Karuna, commander of 6,000 troops, defected with his forces to the Sinhalese military. This greatly diminished LTTE forces and reduced recruitment in Sri Lanka’s Eastern Provinces, increasing its vulnerability. (Jalal 56, 2011). DeSilva says it was 3,000 troops that defected, and then 500600 became gov’t troops (DeSilva 2010, 3).

E Development Assistance (absent): No evidence of the provision of development assistance to civilians. Instead, the origins of the conflict are due the denial of social services to Tamils. After the 20045 tsunami, aid was actually prevented from reaching civilians in LTTE areas.

F Elite Relationships (absent): None, this appears to be total war.

References

DeSilvaRanasinghe, Sergei. 2010. “Strategic Analysis of Sri Lankan Military's CounterInsurgency Operations.” Strategic Analysis Paper, Future Directions International.

Jalal, Malik Ahmad. 2011. “Think Like a Guerrlla: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Sri Lanka.” Harvard Law School National Security Journal. June: 110.

Shahnewaz, Abdullah. 2010. “Military Solution of Political Crisis in Sri Lanka: Questions to be Asked.” Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs Working Paper.”

Smith, Neil. 2010. “Understanding Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers.” Joint Force Quarterly. 59(4): 4044. 42. Sudan (SPLA), start = 1982 incumbent loss (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = loss) ABCDef A – Massacres (present): Sudanese military seeks to destroy much of civilian population by attacking villages, bombing civilian targets like schools with airpower, repeated massacres.

B Exemplary Force (present): Brutality against civilians is common, including rape, forced conscription, mass arrests, assassination of Nuba intellectuals (Meyer 2005).

C – Resettlement (present): Population was relocated en masse using 'peace villages' which were nominally protected by the government (Meyer 2005).

D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Multiple rounds of negotiations occur, which end in a

2005 peace treaty that promises a future referendum on the status of South Sudan.

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E Development Assistance (absent): Development assistance is made available and promoted by the United Nations, but it is not clear that these development efforts are tied to Sudan’s government or its counterinsurgency. Generally, development assistance provided by multilateral institutions would strive for neutrality. Also, development assistnace provided to Nuba who moved to 'peace villages' was offered conditionally in exchange for converting to Islam (Meyer 2005).

F Elite Local Relationships (absent): No evidence of any relationships with local elite allies.

References

Meyer, Gabriel. 2005. War and Faith in Sudan. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

43. Tibet, start = 1956 Incumbent win (ArreguinToft = win; RAND = win) ABcDef

A – Massacres (present): Chinese bombed villages and monasteries to suppress rebellions from 19561959 (Thapa 1982, 89). Repeated mentions of atrocities leading up to and during the mass uprising in 1959. Chinese then shell and assault Lhasa on March 20, 1959 to put down uprising, fire on demonstrators (Ibid., 100101).

B Exemplary Force (present): Chinese used coercion and intimidation of civilians regularly to deter cooperation with insurgents (Thapa 1982).

C – Resettlement (absent): No evidence of resettlement found.

D – Negotiations/Amnesty (present): Chinese are in constant discussions with Dalai Lama about Chinese rule in first phase, counts as negotiations (although forceful) (Thapa 1982).

E Development Assistance (absent): No evidence of development assistance.

F Elite Local Relationships (absent): No evidence of elite relationships.

References

Thapa, Gyan Jung. 1982. “The Chinese Invasion of Tibet and SinoIndian Relations.” Master's Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth.

44. Turkey, start = 1984 Incumbent win (ArreguinToft = N/A [war continues after publication, PKK is mostly

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defeated, so incumbent win]; RAND = win) aBCDEF A – Massacres (absent): Many small scale killings, but no hard evidence of largescale massacres.

B Exemplary Force (present): Government forces would sweep through villages and beat and torture civilians to extract confessions about PKK collaboration. Military sought to intimidate the population to gain loyalty, thereby countering PKK intimidation and terror with that of the state (McDowall 2000, 425). In the early 1990s, targeted assassinations were conducted against leaders of newlyformed Kurdish political parties (HEP, DEP, HADEP), journalists, and human rights workers. These murders peaked in 1993 when 510 persons were killed that year. (van Bruinessen 1996, 20).

C – Resettlement (present): Military embarked on a campaign of forced evacuation and village destruction at the end of the 1980s through the mid90s, leading to 1,779 villages/hamlets and 6,153 hamlets evacuated or destroyed by the military(Jongerden 2001, 80). Systematic ‘cleansing and evaculation’ occurred after 1991, leading to 2664 villages emptied by July 1995 (McDowall 2000, 440). Civilians were expected to be resettled in villagetowns, which were constructed along urban planning models but did not accommodate the agricultural/pastoral lifestyle of the Kurds. These were mostly rejected. (Jongerden 2001, 8084).

D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Turkish military adopts purely military approaches toward dealing with the PKK and never considers real political reforms of alleviate causes of the rebellion. Army was seen as the only means of suppressing the rebellion, and negotiations were never considered, but government of AKP announces a new Kurdish initiative in 2009, which presumes civilian negotiations not dominated by military influence (Bacik and Coskun 2011, 251252). Government brings home exiled Kurds, restores Kurdish names of villages and cities, has amnesty for lowmiddle ranked PKK fights, allows for Kurdish language in education, campaigns. (Bacik and Coskun 2011, 252).

E Development Assistance (present): Military controlled all large constructed projects and military enterprises by 1990 employing 40,000, but no overall plan for implementation. MGK declares itself as lead agent for development in SE through the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP), to bring hydroelectric power to the region but no consideration was given about how to connect it to the Kurdish peasant capacity (Morgado 2006, 56; McDowall 2000, 434). In the course of resettlement of displaced Kurds into villagetowns, hospitals and clinics were constructed alongside new homes for civilians. However, few civilians returned to live in such

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villagetowns and utilize the available social services.

F Elite Local Relationships (present): Following the initial PKK offensives, the government passed the Village Law in 1985 to organize militias in each Kurdish village in SE Turkey. These militias were organized against tribal clans led by elders, these tended to identify with the rightwing parties and were in conflict with PKK already. Also, aghas (local landowners) collected salaries for village guards and controlled distribution, took a cut of the pay. (McDowall 2000, 422). Aghas also had close relationships with security forces, these were used to obtain construction contracts to build things like police complexes and schools.

References

Bacik, Gokhan, and Bezen Balamir Coskun. 2011. “The PKK Problem: Explaining Turkey's Failure to Develop a Political Solution.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 34(3): 248265.

McDowall, David. 2000. A Modern History of the Kurds. New York: I.B. Tauris.

Morgado, Andrew. 2006. Turkish Culture and its Influence on the Counterinusrgency Campaign Against the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). Thesis manuscript, US Army Command and General Staff College. Leavenworth, KS: Department of Defense.

Jongerden, Joost. 2001. “Resettlement and Reconstruction of Identity: The case of the Kurds in Turkey.” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics. 1(1): 8086.

Jongerden, Joost, Jacob van Etten, and Hugo de Vos. “Forst burning as a counterinsurgency strategy in Eastern Turkey.” Paper presented at the Kurdish Studies Conference, organized by the Kurdish Instite of Paris and Salahaddin University, Arbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, September 6 to September 9, 2006.

Van Bruinessen, Martin. 1996. “Turkey's Death Squards.” Middle East Report. AprilJune: 2023.

45. Uganda (LRA), start = 1986 incumbent win (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = ongoing [override, LRA driven out of Uganda) ABCDEF A – Massacres (present) During resettlement pushes, Ugandan military forces fired artillery at villagers and villages that did not leave their homes (Branch 2005, Finnström 2008). Many deaths follow from such attacks and other massacres, including 40 civilian deaths at Namokora

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in 1986 (Otunnu 1998, 6).

B Exemplary Force (present): Acholi were regularly harrassed intimidated by Ugandan forces, leading to human rights violations, tortured, extrajudicial murder (Branch 2005, Finnström 2008).

C – Resettlement (present) Ugandan military forced the Acholi to leave their homes for “protection camps” in late 1980s (Utunnu 1998, 6). In 2002, forces civilians into IDP camps, eventually leading to 95 percent of Acholi population becoming IDPs (Branch 2005).

D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): LRA and Ugandan government engage in negotiations from 2006 – 2008, which end with LRA agreeing to leave Uganda for safe areas in the DRC, however, these are then attacked by Ugandan, the DRC, and South Sudan (Finnström 2008).

E Development Assistance (present): Ugandan government under Museveni initiates Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan in northern Uganda to provide new livelihoods and opportunities for reconstruction. This is widely supported and coordinated with bilateral and multilateral donors (Finnström 2008).

F – Elite Local Relationships (present): Acholi are incorporated into the Ugandan government, including as members of parliament. The lack of a political program by the LRA has driven many Acholi civilians and leaders into finding supportive arrangements with the government.

References

Otunnu, Ogenga. 1998. “The Path to Genocide in Northern Uganda.” Refuge 17(3): 413.

Branch, Adam. 2005. “Neither Peace nor Justice: Political Violence and the Peasantry in Northern: Uganda, 19861998,” African Studies Quarterly 8(2): 131.

Finnström, Sverker. 2008. Living with Bad Surroundings: War, History, and Everyday Moments in Northern Uganda. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 46. Vietnam, start = 1960 incumbent loss (ArreguinToft = loss; RAND = loss) ABCDEf A – Massacres (present): US Army concept of achieving victory through firepower is dominant, saw the conflict as a Koreastyle conventional war. This creates many opportunities for the destruction of population centers, civilians. Firepower was used 'as a crutch' for a counterinsurgency strategy and alienated the people from the army (Krepenevitch 1986, 198). Army destroys hamlets to remove VC from population (Krepenevitch 1986, 199). B52 bombers

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made available in Operation Arc Light in 1965, flew 1320 sorties in that year, (ibid., 200). Desire to run up body counts to show quantitative evidence of the destruction of the enemy (meet quotas), led to looser ROEs. (Ibid., 201202). “On occasion, the gunships mistook civilians for the enemy.” (ibid, 204). Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas (2011) show that US military did use airpower against civilian targets, often resulting in mass civilian casualties. ROE for air bombing permitted attack of civilian targets if deemed necessary: “even direct bombardment of populated areas was not prohibited, although restricted” (Kocher et. al. 2011, 5) They quote Race (1972, 233), who states “despite these rules, however, heavy casualties still occurred.” (Kocher et. al. 2011, 5). Further, their highly specific data show that areas which were targeted of air bombing later turned to insurgent control.

B Exemplary Force (present): US Army repeatedly used indiscriminate force against the population. Emphasis on heavy firepower in fight insurgents and body counts leads to widespread attacks on civilians. These were part of standard operating procedures (Turse 2013).

C – Resettlement (present): Based upon Thompson's advice and British example in Malaya, 'strategic hamlet' program of resettlement began in January 1962 by Diem, but influenced by MAAG, and its desire to fight the enemy. But military was used inside hamlets, not to surround them (Hunt 191, 21) Diem and MACV choose Ben Cat and resettle many civilians and alienated them. Diem's brother tries to exploit the peasants through the resettlement program, Operation Sunrise (Krepenevitch 1986, 68). 8,000 hamlets created in two years, but “no attention was paid to their purpose; their creation became the purpose in itself.” (Krepenevitch 1986, 68). According to Thompson's own work (1965), the Hamlet program was expanded too quickly by Diem's brother, which made each hamlet difficult to defend, poorly located, and failed to adequately develop them over time and spread successfully.

D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Alongside Strategic Hamlets was an anmesty program called 'Open Arms', or Chieu Hoi, but it had a small budget, and money wasn't actively spent, but organized under ARVN. 11,000 communist defecting in 1963. But, South Vietnamese leadership never expressed any interest, only “draining enemy manpower,” didn't see the political potential of the program. (Hunt 1991, 24) not interested in sharing power, including former enemies into political system.

E Development Assistance (present): US policymakers conceived of development as a tool to use in COIN and drive forward the modernization of South Vietnam (Latham 2006). In 1966, Westmoreland adopts pacification, creates Office of Civil Operations (OCO) led by Dep. Amb. William Porter, unties all civilian agencies under one chain of command but still doesn't include military (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 13). Komer pushes for a single manager, and CORDS is created in May 1967 with Westmoreland as commander with three deputies (Andrade et. al.

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2006, 14). Integration of development and military operations occurs with AB 143, combined campaign plan for 1968 (Hunt 1991, 101). But, SVN didn't integrate with new Ministry of Revolutionary Development and CORDS advisers, and Ministry of RD never has any capacity to implement to address development priorities or implement USprovided aid programs (Hunt 1991, 103). Lack of ownership of development and state building initiatives by SVN. But, US creates more destruction than development: “The alleviation of social and political dislocations which were the inevitable result of military operations in populated areas was impossible” (Cable 1991, 130).

F Elite Local Relationships (absent): From 1961 to 1962, Special Forces and CIA do close popcentric COIN in Buon Enao, two hundred villages participating in (Krepenevitch 1986, 7071). Army takes over from CIA in April 1962, Gens. Rosson and Yarborough reform Special Forces program. New Armyled Special Forces execute Operation Switchback in 1962 for offensive operations against VC, no longer building local militias (Krepenevitch 1986,72)Elite relationships are also hard to form after Diem's coup in the political instability following it. Each time a new ruler came into power, adminstrative turnover was the result as they promoted their own loyaltists (Ibid., 37). Over time, no experience could develop among SVN pacification cadres.

References

Cable, Larry. 1991. Unholy Grail: The US and the wars in Vietnam, 19658. New York: Routledge.

Hunt, Richard A. 1991. Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Kocher, Matthew Adam; Thomas B. Pepinsky, and Stathis N. Kalyvas, 2011. “Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War,” American Journal of Political Science.

Latham, Michael E., 2006. “Redirecting the Revolution? The USA and the failure of nationbuilding in South Vietnam.” Third World Quarterly. 27(1): 2746.

Krepenevitch, Andrew F. 1986. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Turse, Nick. 2013. Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam. New York: Metropolitan Books.

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47. Zimbabwe, start = 1972 Incumbent loss (ArreguinToft = N/A; RAND = loss) ABCdef A – Massacres (present): Rhodesian military forces regularly committed atrocities, focused exclusively on an enemycentric COIN strategy that prioritized 'highbody counts' at the tactical level (Cilliers 1985).

B Exemplary Force (present): Rhodesian military forces regularly beat and intimidated civilians, regularly executed prisoners (Cilliers 1985, De Boer 2011).

C Resettlement (present): In July 1973, Rhodesian government initiates Protected Village programme, resettling Africans in new locations, eventually becomes key part of Rhodesian COIN, leads to establishment of the Guard Force, local militias to police Protected Villages (De Boer 2011).

D Amnesty/Negotiations (absent): Amnesty was announced twice in 1979, about 6,500 insurgents accept, but not fully implemented by Rhodesian military. Rhodesian military was worried that the war effort would be undermined by amnesty for rebels and this drove executions of prisoners, which ultimately cancelled any amnesty policy at the tactical level (Cilliers 1985).

E Development Assistance (absent): Proposals for farms, bakeries, even a national pension plan for Africans were floated but never funded. (Cilliers 1985).

F Elite Local Relationships (absent): No evidence of elite relationships.

References

Cilliers, J.K. 1985. CounterInsurgency in Rhodesia. London: Croom Helm.

De Boer, Marno. 2011. “Rhodesia's Approach to Counterinsurgency: A Preference for Killing.” MilitaryReview NovemberDecember 2011, 3545.

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coercion and persuasion in coin approaches research appendix

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