CO-OWNERSHIP

Jarantilla v. Jarantilla

“Acknowledgement of Participating Capital”

Distinction between partnership and co-

ownership

Sps. Jarantilla were survived by their 8 children. Petitioner Federico Jr. is their grandson. His brothers are Doroteo and Tomas.

The Jarantilla heirs extrajudicially partitioned amongst themselves the real properties of their deceased parents.

Sps. Remotigue and Sps. Deocampo agreed provide mutual assistance to each other by way of financial support to any commercial and agricultural activity on a joint business arrangement. This business relationship proved to be successful as they were able to establish a manufacturing and trading business.

There was an Acknowledgement of Participating Capital between Sps. Remotigue, Doroteo and Tomas, Federico Jr., and Antonienta Jarantilla (aunt).

This case was filed by Antonienta for the accounting of the assets and income of the co-ownership, for its partition and the delivery of her share of 8%

Federico Jr. asserts that he was part of the partnershipas evidenced by the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital

Both the petitioner and Antonieta Jarantilla characterize their relationship with the respondents as a co-ownership, but in the same breath, assert that a verbal partnership was formed

W/N there is co-ownership

(NO)

Under Article 1767 of the Civil Code, there are two essential elements in a contract of partnership:(a) an agreement to contribute money, property or industry to a common fund; and(b) intent to divide the profits among the contracting partiesThe first element is undoubtedly present in the case at bar, for, admittedly, all the parties in this case have agreed to, and did contribute money and property to a common fund.

Hence, the issue narrows down to their intent in acting as they didIt is not denied that all the parties in this case have agreed to contribute capital to a common fund to be able to later on share its profits. They have admitted this fact and even submitted evidence to prove such partnership - the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital.

The petitioner himself claims his share to be 6%, as stated in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. However, petitioner fails to realize that this document specifically enumerated the businesses covered by the partnership: Manila Athletic Supply, Remotigue Trading in Iloilo City and Remotigue Trading. Since there was a clear agreement that the capital the partners contributed went to the three businesses, then there is no reason to deviate from such agreement and go beyond the stipulations in the document. There is no evidence that the subject real properties were assets of the partnership referred to in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. Petition denied.

Difference between co-ownership and partnershipCo-ownership Partnership

an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons

two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves

1769: (2) Co-ownership or co-possession does not itself establish a partnership, whether such co-owners or co-possessors do or do not share any profits made by the use of the property; (3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint

1767 - In order to constitute a partnership inter sese there must be: (a) an agreement to contribute money, property or industry to a common fund; and (b) intent to divide the profits among the contracting parties.

or common right or interest in any property from which the returns are derived;

In this case, the first element is present since they did contribute money and property. As to the second element, they presented the Agreement of

Participating Capital which stated the respective businesses to which the capital went to.

Tuason v. Tuason

“MOA with Araneta”

Partnership, not co-ownership

There was a parcel of land with undivided portions belonging to siblings Tuason: 1/3 Angela, 1/3 Nieves, 1/3 Antonio. Nieves wanted

to partition and she offered the sale of the land to her siblings and mother but they declined to buy her share so she sold it to Araneta.

A MOA was executed. The co-owners agreed on subdivision into small parcels of land and the proceeds of the sale to be divided.

There was a provision to preserve the co-ownership till all the lots were sold.

Angela revoked the power of attorney to Araneta and she filed a complaint for partition but her brother Antonio disagreed

W/N there is co-ownership

(NO)

The provisions of Art. 494 of the Civil Code are not applicable. The contract far from violating the legal provision that forbids a co-owner being obliged to

remain a party to the community, precisely has for its purpose and object the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the community by selling the

parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-owners."

"The obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall have been sold, is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co-owners. By virtue of the document, the parties thereto practically and substantially entered into a contract of partnership as the

best and most expedient means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership, the life of said partnership to end when the object of its creation shall have

been attained."

Ining v. Vega

“Co-owner vs. son-in-law”

Repudiation by co-owner

Co-owners governed by Family Relations in

Family Code

Leon died without issue. His siblings Romana and Gregoria had heirs who are petitioners and respondents in this case.

Leonardo demanded partition as Romana’s heir. Gregoria’s heirs refused.

RTC ruled that the action had PRESCRIBED because it was filed 30 years beyond Leonardo’s death in 1962. They had till 1992 but filed

it in 1997

CA held that the action had NOT PRESCRIBED because it ran not from Leonardo’s death but from Lucimo Sr.’s (husband of Gregoria’s heir) Affidavit of Ownership, which constituted an act of repudiation

by a co-owner (SC: NO)

W/N Leonardo can claim

partition (YES)

Gregoria and Romana’s heirs are co-owners

RIGHTS: Art. 486, 493, 494

FOR PRESCRIPTION TO SET IN, REPUDIATION must be done by CO-OWNER

REQUISITES:

1) unequivocal act of repudiation

2) made known to co-owner

3) evidence is clear and convincing

Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner because he is only a son-in-law and not Gregoria’s heir. He is excluded under the Family Code: Family Relations

are those between husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and

descendants

Lucimo Sr. cannot therefore repudiate because he is not a co-owner. Since there was no valid repudiation, Leonardo can claim partition

anytime

Del Banco v. IAC

“4 agreements to distribute”

Sale of co-owners portion, partition,

prescription

The brothers Pansacola: Benedicto, Jose, and Manuel (father) agreed to buy Cagbalite Island from the Spanish Government as

their common property. It included Manuel’s minor children Domingo and Baldomera (1859 agreement).

They modified the agreement to include the heirs of their brother Eustaquio dividing it four ways into ¼ portions (1868 agreement).

The heirs of the original owners entered into an agreement to partition the island (1907 agreement) supplemented by another

agreement (1908 agreement). Domingo Arce sold his portion of the land.

100 years, in 1968, respondents brought a special action for partition under Rule 69 including the heirs of the co-owners of Cagbalite

Island in the second contract of co-ownership.

W/N there was partition (NO)

There is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or physical partition of the Island had really been made by either the original owners or their heirs or successors-in-interest. There was merely an agreement to distribute the benefits.

With the distribution agreed upon, each of the co-owner is a co-owner of the whole, and in this sense, over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the sole owner of a portion, in the instant case, a 1/4 portion (for each group of co-owners) of the Island which is truly abstract, because until physical division is effected such portion is merely an Ideal share, not concretely determined

Definitely, there was no physical partition of the Island in 1859. Neither could there have been one in 1894 because the manner of subdividing the Island was only provided for in the later agreements entered into by the heirs in 1907 and 1908

DISTRIBUTION SUFFICIENT TO SELL PRO INDIVISO PORTION: While the agreements referred to “partition”, there need not be a physical partition; a distribution of the Island even in a state of indiviso or was sufficient in order that a co-owner may validly sell his portion of the co-owned property. The sale of part of a particular lot by one co-owner was within his right pro- indiviso is valid in its entirety . Thus, the fact that there was a distribution of the Island among the co-owners made the sale of Domingo Arce of the portion allocated to him though pro-indiviso, valid.

PARTITION: A co-owner cannot, without the conformity of the other co-owners or a judicial decree of partition issued pursuant to Rule 69, adjudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate portion of the lot owned in common, as his share therein, to the exclusion of other co-owners.

It is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual co- owner can claim any definite portion thereof.

It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a subdivision plan drawn. The mechanics of actual partition should follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

The actual possession and enjoyment of some portions of the Island by some of the petitioners cannot be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership

An action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co- owner

PRESCRIPTION: No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (There must be a clear repudiation communicated to the co-owners).

An action for partition does not prescribe

Article 494 provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property, a provision which implies that the action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches

Aguilar v. Aguilar

“Brother’s continued possession”

Partition terminates co-ownership and the

right to enjoy possession

Virgilio and Senen are brotherswho co-own a house and lot in Paranaque for the purpose of having their father live there.

They initially agreed on the following:Virgilio – 2/3 shareSenen – 1/3 share

But the executed an agreement amending their share to ½ each with Senen assuming the mortgage in exchange for allowing him to enjoy the house.

They also agreed that the title would be in Senen’s name since Virgilio was disqualified to obtain a loan from SSS.

After the death of their father, Virgilio demanded that Senen vacate the house and the property be sold so they can divide the proceeds.

Senen refused at first so Virgilio filed a complaint and prayed for 2/3 of the proceeds plus rent of Senen accruing after the death of his father.

Senen filed an answer saying that he agrees if the division would be 50-50 and said that he didn’t need to pay rent since he was a co-owner.

RTC ruled that they did have 50-50 share but also that Virgilio was deprived of enjoying the property by Senen’s continued enjoyment

W/N Virgilio can demand

partition (YES)

Art. 498 is resorted to

(1) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and

(b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners.

See Art. 494 and 498. Being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in common long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners.

Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot and respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the property by his continued occupancy of the premises, justice and equity demand that respondent and his family vacate the property so that the sale can be effected immediately

When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the

thereof and he can demand partition. Court also ordered Senen to pay rent from the time of complaint. (SC: YES)CA reversed.

co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.

Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his family in the house prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally between them. To this extent and from then on, respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate.

Caro v. CA

“Widow attempting to be co-owner”

Partition terminates co-ownership and the

right to enjoy possession

Right to redemption must be exercised

before partition

Co-owners governed by Family Relations in

Family Code

3 Brothers (Alfredo, Benjamin, and Mario) co-owned 2 lands. They each had 1/3 share. Mario died and was survived by his wife Basilia.

Benjamin executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner Caro of his 1/3 undivided portion. And with the consent of the other 2 co-owners, a subdivision title was issued to Caro.

Basilia learned that Caro acquired a 1/3 undivided share in each of the two parcels. Hence, she offered to redeem the 1/3 sold to Caro, which was ignored. She filed for annulment of sale and mortgage saying that she was not notified of the sale.

Caro interposed the defense that there were notices sent and that there was also an affidavit of the other co-owner’s consent.

RTC ruled in favor of Caro saying that there was notice and the widow didn’t have the power to exercise right of legal redemption

CA reversed the ruling for lack of notice since even the affidavit didn’t specify the terms of the sale. Thus, allowed redemption of the 1/3.

W/N legal redemption lies (NO)

As early as 1960, co-ownership of the parcels of land was terminated when Alfredo Benito, Luz Caro and the Intestate Estate of Mario Benito agreed to subdivide the property.

Once the property is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the community has terminated and there is no reason to sustain any right of legal redemption.

The right of redemption under Article 1067 may be exercised only before partition. In this case the right was asserted not only after partition but after the property inherited had actually been subdivided into several parcels

Respondent argues that petitioner Luz Caro acted in bad faith and in fraud of the rights of the heirs of deceased Mario Benito in obtaining a subdivision title over a one-third. Fraud was not proven in this case. The title is now indefeasible and its validity cannot be attacked.

Even on the assumption that there still is co-ownership here and that therefore, the right of legal redemption exists, private respondent as administratrix, has no personality to exercise said right

Redemptioner should tender payment of the redemption money within thirty (30) days from written notice of the sale by the co- owner. It has been held that this thirty-day period is peremptory because the policy of the law is not to leave the purchaser's title in uncertainty beyond the established 30-day period.

It is not a prescriptive period but is more a requisite or condition precedent to the exercise of the right of legal redemption.

The right of legal redemption does not exist nor apply in this case because admittedly a subdivision title has already been issued in the name of the petitioner on becomes moot and academic, if not unnecessary to decide whether private respondent complied with the notice requirements for the exercise of the right of legal redemption

Pardell v. Bartolome

“Two sisters fighting over a house”

Relative by affinity does not have co-

Vicenta and Matilde are the recognized natural daughters of spouses Ortiz (deceased).

Mrs. Ortiz made her four children Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde heirs of all her property. Manuel and Francisca died.

Vicenta and her husband filed a case against Matilde and her

W/N Matilde was entitled, with her husband, to reside in the house without paying to Vicenta one-

Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of each holder can not be determined and every one of the coowners exercises, together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership

Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the upper floor of the said

ownership rights husband Gaspar, a justice of the peace. Vicenta and her husband have been living abroad for several years.

They alleged that without judicial or extrajudicial agreement, Matilde and her husband took upon themselves the administration and

enjoyment of the properties, collecting the rents, fruits, and products. That notwithstanding demands to divide the property and deliver the

½ portion and its fruits and rents, they refused.

RTC held that Matilde and her husband did not cause damage to Vicenta and the expenses were compensated because Matilde and her husband had been living in the house for several years which

was pro indiviso of joint ownership

half of the rent

(YES, but her husband is not)

house, did not injure the interests of her coowner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as coowner of the property.

Matilde's husband, Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or a part of the lower floor of the same house on Calle Escolta, using it as an office for the justice of the peace. Justice requires that he pay his sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one half of the monthly rent which the said quarters could have produced

Even as the husband of the defendant co-owner of the property, he had no right to occupy and use the lower floor, where he lived with his wife, to the detriment of Vicenta

Any of the co-owners of a pro indiviso property, subject to division or sale, is entitled to petition for its valuation by competent expert appraisers.

Such valuation is not prejudicial to any of the joint owners, but is beneficial to their interests, considering that, as a general rule, the assessed value of a building or a parcel of realty is less than the actual real value.

The husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz is not entitled to any remuneration for the administration of the pro indiviso property belonging to both parties

Arambulo v. Nolasco

“Co-owner withholds consent, Art. 491”

Art. 493

Arambulo filed a petition alleging that all of the co–owners have authorized Arambulo to sell their respective shares but only the Nolascos are withholding their consent to the sale of their shares.

Arambulo cites Article 491 of the Civil Code, that if one or more co–owners shall withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing owned in common, the courts may afford adequate relief.

RTC ruled in favor of Arambulo and ordered the Nolascos to give their consent to the sale, holding that the act of withholding consent being prejudicial to the common interest constitutes alteration under Art. 491.

CA cited Art. 493 in holding that the Nolascos cannot be compelled to agree with the sale.

Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein as co–owners with full ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part. The

W/N Art. 491 applies (NO)

We have to remove the issue out of the coverage of Article 491. It does not apply to the problem arising out of the proposed sale of the property co–owned by the parties in this case.

Article 493 applies. Each one of the parties herein as co–owners with full ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part. The sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership by the respondents of the part that belongs to them. Even if a co–owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co–owners who did not consent to the sale.

Since a co–owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co–owner without the consent of the other co–owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co–owner–seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co–owner of the property.

Lopez case: Each co–owner is the same as an individual owner. The share of the co–owner, that is, the part which ideally belongs to him, is his and he may dispose of the same as he pleases, because it does not affect the right

sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership by the respondents of the part that belongs to them

of the others.

Bailon-Casilao v. CA

“Sister sold co-owned land without co-

owner’s consent”

Remedies of co-owners when sale made without their

consent: PARTITION, NOT RECOVERY OF

POSSESSION

The petitioners Bailon are co-owners, each with a 1/6 share.

Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon sold a portion of the land to Delgado.

Rosalia alone sold a portion to Lanuza. Lanuza acquired from Delgado the latter’s portion. Lanuza then sold the land to respondent Afable. Rosalia’s siblings filed a case to recover the property. The main issue before the lower courts was prescription and laches

CA affirmed the decision of the lower court insofar as it held that prescription does not lie against plaintiffs because they are co-owners of the original vendors. However, although registered property cannot be lost by prescription, nevertheless, an action to recover it may be barred by laches. It held the petitioners guilty of laches and dismissed the case.

W/N petitioners are

barred by laches (NO)

The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it

The appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69.

Neither recovery of possession nor restitution can be granted since the defendant buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the common property claimed. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

Prescription and laches:

Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co- heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."

Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessor- in-interest.

Laches is likewise unavailing as a shield against the action of herein petitioners.

The mere fact of delay is insufficient to constitute, laches. It is required that (1) complainant must have had knowledge of the conduct of defendant or of one under whom he claims and (2) he must have been afforded an opportunity to institute suit.

While there was delay in asserting petitioners' rights, such delay was not attended with any knowledge of the sale nor with any opportunity to bring suit. They were not afforded an opportunity to bring suit inasmuch as they

were kept in the dark about the transactions entered into by their sister.

Vda de Castro v. Atienza

“Widow refuses to cancel lease”

Art. 493

Tomas and Arsenio de Castro leased a fishpond to Atienza for a period of 5 years. They are co-owners of in equal shares of the

leased property. Tomas died.

Atienza and Arsenio agreed to annul the lease and they executed an agreement. Vda. De Castro, Tomas’s widow, refused to sign the

agreement

W/N Arsenio as co-owner of the fishpond owned pro-indiviso by him with his brother Tomas could validly lease his half- interest to a third party (respondent Atienza) independently of hisco-owner // W/N arsenio can cancel the lease without Vda. De Castro’s consent (YES)

The answer is given by appellant in his brief: it would result in a partnership between the lessee and the owner of the other undivided half.

If the lease could be entered into partially by one of the co-owners, insofar as his interest is concerned, then the lease, can also be cancelled partially as between plaintiff and defendant.

Therefore, we conclude that the consent of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro is not essential for the cancellation of the lease of defendant's one-half undivided share in the fishpond to plaintiff.

This is fully supported by Art. 493 of the Civil Code

Extraordinary Development Corp

v. Samson Bico

“Heirs of Juan and Heirs of Irenea”

Sale of undivided physical portion of

property valid

Art. 493

Spouses Maria and Apolonio Ballesteros had 2 children. Juan (married to Leonarda) and Irenea (married to Santiago).

Apolonio owned a parcel of land. The property was inherited by Juan and Irenea. When the latter died, the Heirs of Juan and Irenea became co-owners of the property.

The heirs of Juan (without the consent of respondents, the heirs of

Irenea) executed in favor of EDC a Deed of Absolute Sale covering

the subject property.

Heirs of Irenea wrote EDC informing it of the co-ownership. EDC wrote back that it will look into the matter and asked respondents to further establish the basis of their claims.

EDC alleged that it is a buyer in good faith and for value of the subject property because it was of the honest belief that the heirs of Juan are the only heirs of the late Apolonio.

Heirs of Juan asserted that respondents were aware of and were

Would the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held in common be valid? (YES)

The right to sell part of an undivided interest in the co-owned property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoyment. (Art. 493)

We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners.

However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him.

Since the co- owner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction.

In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner

parties to the contract to sell entered into by them and EDC. The heirs of Juan claimed that respondents received their share in the downpayment.

RTC ruled that the heirs of Juan did not have the right to sell the one half share of the heirs of Irenea. EDC was not a buyer in good faith because it knew that respondents were co-owners of the subject property. CA held that the sale was valid only as to the ½ owned by heirs of Juan

and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common.

Mercado v. Liwanag

“New TCT”

Petitioners Ramon Mercado and his sister Basilia and her husband seek to annul a Deed of Sale on the ground of fraud based on Art.

493

Ramon and Liwanag executed a Deed of Sale over the subject land. The land is co-owned by Ramon and Basilia and the sale was made

without Basilia’s consent. The TCT states that Ramon and Basilia are co-owners pro indiviso

RTC held that the sale was valid under Art. 493.

W/N the trial court erred in ruling that the sale was valid

(NO)

What a co-owner may dispose of under Article 493 is only his undivided aliquot share, which shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him upon the termination of the co- ownership.

He has no right to divide the property into parts and then convey one part by metes and bounds.

Also, a new TCT was issued. It did not reproduce the description in the instrument but carried the names of appellee Pio D. Liwanag and Basilia Mercado as "co-owners pro-indiviso." There is no suggestion by any of the parties that this new certificate of title is invalid, irregular or inaccurate. As far as Basilia Mercado is concerned she retains in all their integrity her rights as co-owner which she had before the sale, and consequently, she has no cause to complain.

Since, according to this title, what Liwanag acquired by virtue of the sale is only an undivided half-share of the property, which under the law the vendor Ramon Mercado had the absolute right to dispose of, the trial court committed no error in dismissing the action.

Tomas Claudio Memorial HS v. CA

“Brother sold co-owned land to a High

School”

Sale of co-owned land only pertains to grantor’s share

Proper remedy:

Respondents De Castro filed an action for Partition

They alleged that their father owned a parcel of land and that without their knowledge and consent, said lot was sold by their brother Mariano to petitioner TCMHS. The sale was made possible when Mariano represented himself as the sole heir to the property.

It is the contention of private respondents that the sale made by Mariano affected only his undivided share to the lot in question but not the shares of the other co-owners equivalent to four fifths (4/5) of the property.

W/N prescription or

laches lies (NO)

Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.

Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other disposition affects only the sellers share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantors share in the partition of the property owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

The proper action in a case like this, is not for the nullification of the sale, or for the recovery of possession of the property owned in common from the

PARTITION

Partition imprescriptible unless expressly repudiated

by co-owner

TCMHS alleges prescription and laches. third person, but for division or partition of the entire property if it continued to remain in the possession of the co- owners who possessed and administered it. Such partition should result in segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to the buyer.

In the light of the foregoing, petitioners defense of prescription against an action for partition is a vain proposition.

Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. This Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

Roque v. IAC

“Deceased bachelor; Brothers sold share to

half sister”

2 principal issues in partition

Co-owners asserting adverse title

A parcel of land was registered in the name of Januario Avendaño a bachelor who died without children.

His heirs executed an extrajudicial partition:

a) (1/4) undivided portion to Illuminada Avendaño.

b) (1/4) undivided portion to Gregorio Avendafio and Miguel Avendaño.

c) (1/4) undivided portion to Bernardino, Bienvenido, Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed Avendaño.

d) (1/4) undivided portion to respondent Emesto Roque and Victor Roque.

The co-owners Avendano transferred their ¾ portion to the co-owners Roque vesting full ownership in the latter. 2 Deeds of Sale were executed. The latter sold the ¾ portion to their half sister Concepcion but the land remained registered in Januario Avendano’s name.

A Subdivison Plan was made identifying ¼ portion belong to Victor and Ernesto and the ¾ portion belonging to Concepcion.

Partition was allegedly agreed upon but Ernesto and the heirs of

W/N partition can prosper

when co-owners assert adverse title

(YES)

PARTITION: An action for partition has two principal issues.

(1) whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned.

(2) assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue; how the property is to be divided between plaintiff and defendant(s) — i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner.

If the IAC finds that the defendants do not dispute the status of the plaintiff as co-owner, the court can proceed to the actual partitioning.

In case the defendants assert exclusive title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff, the court should not dismiss the action for partition but, on the contrary and in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, resolve the question of whether the plaintiff is co- owner or not.

Should the trial court find that the plaintiff was unable to sustain his claimed status as co-owner, or that the defendants are the exclusive owners of the property involved, the court will necessarily have to dismiss the action for partition.

If, upon the other hand, the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties litigant, the court may and should order the partition of the property in the same action.

Victor refused to acknowledge Concepcion’s ownership. Concepcion filed an Action for Partition alleging her ¾ share.

IAC held that an action for partition will not prosper as such from the moment an alleged co- owner asserts an adverse title.

It is unnecessary to require the plaintiff to file another action, separate and independent from that for partition originally instituted.

PRESCRIPTION: While the action for partition does not prescribe, the co-ownership does not last forever since it may be repudiated by a co-owner In such a case, the action for partition does not lie. What may be brought by the aggrieved co-owner is an accion reivindicatoria or action for recovery of title and possession. That action may be barred by prescription.

An entirely different situation, however, obtains in the case at bar. First of all, petitioner Concepcion Roque- the co-owner seeking partition — has been and is presently in open and continuous possession of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of the property owned in common. Respondents do not dispute this finding of fact

Neither of the parties involved had asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over the whole of Lot No. 1549 adverse to that of any of the other co-owners: in other words, co-ownership of the property had continued to be recognized by all the owners. Consequently, the action for partition could not have and, as a matter of fact, had not yet prescribed at the time of institution by Concepcion of the action below.

Arriola v. Arriola

“Brothers from another mother;

Partition of house separate from land”

Family home protected from

partition

Respondent John Arriola filed for judicial partition of the properties of his father Fidel Arriola; he is the son from the first wife. Petitioner

Anthony Arriola is the son from the second wife.

The brothers failed to agree on how to partition so John sought a sale via public auction to which Anthony agreed. RTC set the

auction but reset it when Anthony and his wife refused to include the house.

RTC excluded the subject house because respondent never alleged its existence in his complaint for partition or established his co-

ownership thereof.

CA held that any decision in the action for partition of said estate should cover not just the subject land but also the subject house.

W/N the house can be

partitioned (NO)

As correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the subject house is deemed part of the subject land. The right to accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no prior act on the part of the owner or the principal. So that even if the improvements including the house were not alleged in the complaint for partition, they are deemed included in the lot on which they stand, following the principle of accession.

While we treat the subject house as part of the co-ownership, we stop short of authorizing its actual partition by public auction at this time.

It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family Code

Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted

the family home.

Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership.

This signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law.

The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home.

Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the co- ownership of his heirs, the parties herein.

Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10 years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the partition of the property.