Cloud Computing Note to AllThis is simply another version of the Tech Competitiveness Adv. While this fle contains Af and Neg there is additional Af and Neg in the 4 week fles section of the wiki.1AC1AC AdvantageMass Surveillance hurts global interest in US cloud companies. Kills the whole US tech sector. New Freedom Act doesnt solve. ang!o! "ost #1$!nternally "#oting $aniel Castro% The &ice 'resident !nformation Technology and !nnovation (o#ndationand $irector of the Center for $ata !nnovation. )r. Castro writes and speaks on a variety of iss#es related to information technology and internet policy% incl#ding privacy% sec#rity% intellect#al property% internet governance% e*government% and accessi+ility for people with disa+ilities. ,is work has +een "#oted and cited in n#mero#s media o#tlets% incl#ding The Washington 'ost% The Wall -treet .o#rnal% N'/% 0-A Today% 1loom+erg News% and 1#sinessweek. !n 2345% )r. Castro was named to (ed-coop6s list link is e7ternal8 of 9Top 2: most in;#ential people #nder 43 in government and tech.< !n 234:% 0.-.-ecretary of Commerce 'enny 'rit=ker appointed )r. Castro to the Commerce $ata Advisory Co#ncil. 1efore >oining !T!(% )r. Castro worked as an !T analyst at the ?overnment Acco#nta+ility @Ace ?A@8 where he a#dited !T sec#rity and management controls at vario#s government agencies. ,e has a 1.-. in (oreign -ervice from ?eorgetown 0niversity and an ).-. in !nformation -ec#rity Technology and )anagement from Carnegie )ellon 0niversity. 9-nowden revelations costly for 0- tech frmsB st#dy< * 1angkok 'ost .#ne 43th * httpBCCwww.+angkokpost.comCtechCworld*#pdatesC:DD43:Csnowden*revelations*costly*for*#s*tech*frms*st#dy80- technology companies are getting hit harder than anticipated +y revelations a+o#t s#rveillance programs led +y the National -ec#rity Agency% a st#dy showed T#esday.The st#dy +y the !nformation Technology and !nnovation (o#ndation% a Washington think tank% said the impact wo#ld +e greater than its estimate nearly two years ago of losses for the clo#d comp#ting sector. !n 2345% the think tank estimated that 0- clo#d comp#ting frms co#ld lose +etween E22 +illion and E5: +illionin overseas +#siness over three %ears. !t now appears impossi+le to "#antify the economic damage +eca#se the entire sector has +een tarnished +ythe scandal from revelations in doc#ments leaked +y former N-A contractor Fdward -nowden% the report said. GThese revelations have f#ndamentally shaken international tr#st in 0- tech companies and h#rt 0- +#siness prospects all over the world%G the report said. -t#dy co*a#thor $aniel Castro said the impact is now open*ended% with the N-A scandal having tarnished a wide range of 0- tech frms. -ince 2345% he said% Gwe havenHt t#rned this aro#ndB itHs not >#st clo#d companies. !tHs all tech frms implicated +y this%G he told A('. G!t doesnHt show any signs of stopping.G The report said foreign c#stomers are increasingly sh#nning 0- companies% and governments aro#nd the world Gare #sing 0- s#rveillance as an e7c#se to enact a new wave of protectionist policies.G @ne s#rvey cited +y the researchers fo#nd 2: percent of +#sinesses in 1ritain and Canada planned to p#ll company data o#t of the 0nited -tates as a res#lt of the N-A revelations. -ome companies in F#rope do not want their data hosted in North America d#e to these concerns% the researchers said. )eanwhile foreign companies have #sed the revelations as a marketing opport#nity. GThere is also an increasingly distressing trend of co#ntries% s#ch as A#stralia% China% /#ssia% and !ndia% passing laws that prevent their citi=ensH personal information from leaving the co#ntryHs +orders ** efectively mandating that clo#d comp#ting frms +#ild data centersin those co#ntries or risk losing access to their markets.G The report said several 0- tech frms incl#ding Apple and -alesforce have already started to +#ild data centers a+road Gto appease foreign watchdogs and privacy advocates.G While this Gdata nationalismG may create some >o+s in the short term% Castro said that co#ntries enacting these policies Gare h#rting themselves in the long term +y c#tting themselves of from the +est technology.G * New law ins#Acient * Castro said the passage of a reform meas#re last week called the 0-A (reedom Act is not s#Acient to repair the rep#tation of 0- tech frms.ul! surveillance will !ill investment in US cloud computing. &hat crushes the US tech sector.Mindoc! 1$ Clark )indock * /eporting (ellow at !nternational 1#siness Times !nternally "#oting The !nformation Technology and !nnovation (o#ndation. !T!( is a non*partisan research and ed#cational instit#te a think tank whose mission is to form#late and promote p#+lic policies to advance technological innovation and prod#ctivity internationally% in Washington% and in the states. 9N-A -#rveillance Co#ld Cost 1illions (or 0- !nternet Companies After Fdward -nowden /evelations< * !nternational 1#siness Times * .#ne 43 234: httpBCCwww.i+times.comCnsa*s#rveillance*co#ld*cost*+illions*#s*internet*companies*after*edward*snowden*4I:IJ5J8(ail#re to reform N ational - ec#rity A dministrationspying programs revealed +y Fdward -nowden co#ld +e more economically ta7ing than previo#sly tho#ght% says a new st#dy p#+lished +y the !nformation Technology and !nnovation (o#ndation T#esday. The st#dy s#ggests the programs co#ld +e afecting the technologysector as a whole%not 'ust the cloud(computing sector% and that the costs co#ld soar m#ch higher than previo#sly e7pected.Fven modest declines in clo#dcomp#ting reven#es from the revealed s#rveillanceprograms% according to aprevio#s report% wo#ld cost +etween E24.: +illion and E5: +illion +y 234K. New estimates show that the toll 9will likely far e7ceed !T!(6s initial)*$ billion estimate.< 9The 0.-. government6s fail#re to reform many of the N-A6s s#rveillance programs has damaged the competitiveness of the 0.-. tech sector and cost it a portion of the glo+al market share%< a s#mmary of the report said. /evelations +y defense contractor -nowden in .#ne 2345 e7posed massive 0.-. government s#rveillance capa+ilities and showed the N-A collectedAmerican phone records in +#lk% and witho#t a warrant. The +#lk phone*record revelations%and many others in the same vein% incl#ding the re"#ired complacency of American telecom and+nternet companies in providing thedata, raised "#estions a+o#t the transparency of American s#rveillance programs and prompted o#trage from privacy advocates. The st#dy% p#+lished this week% arg#es thatunless the American government can vigorousl% re-orm how N-A s#rveillance is reg#lated and overseen% 0.-. companies will losecontracts and% #ltimately % their competitive edge in a glo+al market as cons#mers aro#nd the world choose clo#d comp#ting and technology options that do not have potential ties to American surveillance programs.The report comes amid a debate in Congress on what to do with the 'atriot Act% the law that provides m#ch of the a#thority for the s#rveillance programs. As of .#ne 4% a#thority to collect American phone data en masse e7pired% tho#gh "#estions remain as to whether letting thata#thority e7pireis enough to protect privac%. -#pporters of the programs arg#e that they provide the co#ntry with necessary capa+ilities to fght terrorism a+road. A f#rther reform made the phone records collection process illegal for the government% and instead gave that responsi+ility to the telecom companies.&ech competitiveness !e% to US hegemon%.Martino, #./occo% -enior (ellow at the (oreign 'olicy /esearch !nstit#te% A -trategy for -#ccessB !nnovation Will /enew American Leadership% @r+is% &ol#me :4% !ss#e 28 )#ch of the foreign policy disc#ssion in the 0nited -tates today is foc#sed #pon the dilemma posed +y the !ra" War and the threat posed +y !slamist terrorism. These pro+lems are% of co#rse% +oth immediate and important. ,owever%America also faces other challenges to its physical sec#rity and economic prosperity% and these are more long*term and pro+a+ly more profo#nd. There is% frst% the threat posed +y o#r declining competitiveness in the glo+al economy% a threat most o+vio#sly represented +y s#ch rising economic powers as China and !ndia.4 There is% second% the threat posed +y o#r increasing dependence on oil imports from the )iddle Fast. )oreover% these two threats are increasingly connected% as China and !ndia themselves are greatly increasing their demand for )iddle Fast oil.2 The 0nited -tates of co#rse faced great challenges to its sec#rity and economy in the past% most o+vio#sly from ?ermany and .apan in the frst half of the twentieth cent#ry and from the -oviet 0nion in the second half.Crucial to America/s abilit% to prevailover these past challenges was o#r technological and ind#strial leadership% and especially o#r a+ility to contin#o#sly recreate it. !ndeed% the 0nited -tates has +een #ni"#e among great powers in its a+ility to keep on creating and recreating new technologies and new ind#stries% generation after generation. 'erpet#al innovation and technological leadership might even +e said to +e the American way o- maintaining primac% in world a0airs. They are almost certainly what America will have to p#rs#e in order to prevail over the contemporary challenges involving economic competitiveness and energy dependence. There istherefore an #rgent need for America to res#me its historic emphasis on innovation. The 0nited -tates needs a national strategy foc#sed #pon developing new technologies and creating new ind#stries. Fvery s#ccessf#l strategy m#st defne an o+>ective or mission% determine a sol#tion% and assem+le the means of e7ec#tion. !n this case% the o+>ective is economic s#periorityM the sol#tion is new ind#stries which +#ild #pon the contemporary revol#tion in information technologyM and the means of e7ec#tion will have to incl#de a partnership of ind#stry% government% andpeople.5Failed US leadership causes e1tinction2no alternative to hegemon%r3e3ins!i #14 N+igniew O. 1r=e=inski * C-!- co#nselor and tr#stee and cochairs the C-!- Advisory 1oard% holds honorary degrees from ?eorgetown 0niversity% Williams College% (ordham 0niversity% College of the ,oly Cross% Alliance College% the Catholic 0niversity of L#+lin% Warsaw 0niversity% and &ilni#s 0niversity. ,e is the recipient of n#mero#s honors and awards8 (e+r#ary 2342 9After America< httpBCCwww.foreignpolicy.comCarticlesC2342C34C35CafterPamericaQpageR3%3(or if America falters% the world is #nlikely to +e dominated +y a single preeminent s#ccessor ** not even China. !nternational #ncertainty% increased tension among glo+al competitors% and even o#tright chaos wo#ld +e far more likely o#tcomes. While a s#dden% massive crisis of the American system ** for instance% another fnancial crisis ** wo#ld prod#ce a fast*moving chain reaction leading to glo+al political and economic disorder% a steady drift +y Americainto increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with !slam wo#ld +e #nlikely to prod#ce% even +y 232:% an efective glo+al s#ccessor. No single power will +e ready +y then to e7ercise the role that the world% #pon the fall of the -oviet 0nion in 4II4% e7pected the 0nited -tates to playB the leader of a new% glo+ally cooperative world order. )ore pro+a+le wo#ld +ea protracted phase of rather inconcl#siverealignments of+oth glo+al and regional power % with no grand winners and many more losers % in a setting of international #ncertaintyand even of potentially -atal ris!s to global well(being. /ather than a world where dreams of democracy ;o#rish% a ,o++esian world of enhanced national sec#rity +ased on varying f#sions of a#thoritarianism% nationalism% and religion co#ld ens#e. /FLATF$ D ?eopolitically Fndangered -pecies The leaders of the worldHs second*rank powers% among them !ndia% .apan% /#ssia% and some F#ropean co#ntries% are already assessing the potential impact of 0.-. decline on their respective national interests. The .apanese% fearf#l of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland% may +e thinking of closer links with F#rope. Leaders in !ndia and .apan may +e considering closer political and even militarycooperation in case America falters and China rises. /#ssia% while perhaps engaging in wishf#l thinking even schadenfre#de8 a+o#t AmericaHs #ncertain prospects% will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former -oviet 0nion. F#rope% not yet cohesive% wo#ld likely +e p#lled in several directionsB ?ermany and !taly toward /#ssia +eca#se of commercial interests% (rance and insec#re Central F#rope in favor of a politically tighter F#ropean 0nion% and 1ritain toward manip#lating a +alance within the F0 while preserving its special relationship with a declining 0nited -tates. @thers may move more rapidly to carve o#t their own regional spheresB T#rkey in the area of the old @ttoman Fmpire% 1ra=il in the -o#thern ,emisphere% and so forth. None of these co#ntries% however% will have the re"#isite com+ination of economic% fnancial% technological% and military power even to consider inheriting AmericaHs leading role. China% invaria+ly mentioned as AmericaHs prospective s#ccessor% has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of caref#lly cali+rated patience% +oth of which have +een critical to its overwhelmingly s#ccessf#l% several*tho#sand*year*long history. China th#s pr#dently accepts the e7isting international system% even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. !t recogni=es that s#ccess depends not on the systemHs dramatic collapse +#t onits evol#tion toward a grad#al redistri+#tion of power. )oreover% the +asic reality is that China is not yet ready to ass#me in f#ll AmericaHs role in the world. 1ei>ingHs leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasi=ed that on every important meas#re of development% wealth% and power% China will still +e a moderni=ing and developing state several decades from now% signifcantly +ehind not only the 0nited -tates +#t also F#rope and .apan in the ma>or per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly% Chinese leaders have +een restrained in laying any overt claims to glo+al leadership. At some stage% however% a more assertive Chinese nationalism co#ld arise and damage ChinaHs international interests. A swaggering% nationalistic 1ei>ing wo#ld #nintentionally mo+ili=e a powerf#l regional coalition against itself. None of ChinaHs key neigh+ors ** !ndia% .apan% and /#ssia ** is ready to acknowledge ChinaHs entitlement to AmericaHs place on the glo+al totem pole. They might even seek s#pport from a waning America to ofset an overly assertive China. Theres#lting regional scram+le co#ld +ecome intense % especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among ChinaHs neigh+ors.A phase of ac#te international tension in Asia co#ld ens#e . Asia ofthe 24st cent#rycould then begin to resemble 5urope o- the 46th centur% (( violent and bloodthirst%. At the same time% the sec#rity of a n#m+er ofweakerstates located geographically ne7t to ma>or regional powers also depends on the international stat#s "#o reinforced +y AmericaHs glo+al preeminence ** and wo#ld +e made signifcantly more v#lnera+le in proportion to AmericaHs decline. The states in that e7posed position ** incl#ding ?eorgia% Taiwan% -o#th Oorea% 1elar#s% 0kraine% Afghanistan% 'akistan% !srael% and the greater )iddle Fast ** are todayHs geopolitical e"#ivalents of nat#reHs most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nat#re of the international environment left +ehind +y a waning America% +e it ordered and restrained or% m#ch more likely% self*serving and e7pansionist. A faltering 0nited -tates co#ld also fnd its strategic partnership with )e7ico in >eopardy. AmericaHs economic resilience and political sta+ility have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed +y s#ch sensitive neigh+orhood iss#es as economic dependence% immigration% and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power% however% wo#ld likely #ndermine the health and good >#dgment of the 0.-. economic and political systems.A waning 0 nited- tateswo#ld likely +e more nationalistic % more defensive a+o#t its national identity% more paranoid a+o#t its homeland sec#rity% and less willing to sacrifce reso#rces for the sake of othersH development. The worsening of relations +etween a declining America and an internally tro#+led )e7ico co#ld even give rise to a partic#larly omino#s phenomenonB the emergence% as a ma>or iss#e in nationalistically aro#sed )e7ican politics% of territorial claims >#stifed +y history and ignited +y cross*+order incidents. Another conse"#enceof American declineco#ld +e a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the glo+al commons ** shared interestss#ch as sea lanes % space% cy+erspace%and the environment % whose protection is imperativeto the long*term growth of the glo+al economy and the contin#ation of +asic geopolitical sta+ility. !n almost every case% the potential absence o- a constructiveand in7uential U .S. role would -atall% underminethe essential communalit% o-the global commons +eca#se the s#periority and #+i"#ity of American power creates order where there wo#ld normally +e con;ict. None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that AmericaHs decline wo#ld generate glo+al insec#rity% endanger some v#lnera+le states% and prod#ce a more tro#+led North American neigh+orhood an arg#ment for 0.-. glo+al s#premacy. !n fact% the strategic comple7ities of the world in the 24st cent#ry make s#ch s#premacy #nattaina+le. 1#t those dreaming today of AmericaHs collapse wo#ld pro+a+ly come to regret it. And as the world after America wo#ld +e increasingly complicated and chaotic% it is imperative that the 0nited -tates p#rs#e a new% timely strategic vision for its foreign policy ** or start +racing itself for a dangero#s slide into glo+al t#rmoil."lan solves 8 New Freedom Act onl% applied to phones. roaderinternet protections are needed to help non(US cloud users. o%le #1$Oevin 1oyle former attorney at Latham S Watkins LL'. )r. 1oyle has represented a +road range of clients on information sec#rity and privacy matters. )r. 1oyle has spoken fre"#ently on information sec#rity and privacy iss#es incl#ding as a g#est lect#rer at ?eorgetown 0niversity6s )c$ono#gh -chool of 1#siness 9The 0-A (reedom ActB What it Changes and )ostly8 $oesnHt for Clo#d -ervices**And is it /eally the !ss#e< .$ -#pra 1#siness AdvisorB Legal News * K*4J*234: * httpBCCwww.>ds#pra.comClegalnewsCthe*#sa*freedom*act*what*it*changes*and*II2JKC8The recent showdown over renewal of certain provisions of the 0-A 'atriot Act often called simply the 'atriot Act8 and the s#+se"#ent enactment of the0-A (reedom Act have raised a n#m+er of "#estions a+o#t the ongoing impact of these laws on data traversing or +eing stored in the 0nited -tates. While the new law takes the N-A o#t of the direct +#siness of maintaining metadata which incl#des phone n#m+er called% the time and d#ration of the call% and location information8onallphone calls originating or terminating in the 0- with a declared intent of transitioning instead to a program that will allow co#rt*moderated access to phone company data8 and reinstates provisions that ena+le so*called9roving wiretaps< and monitoring of 9lone wolves%< it essentially leaves #nchanged the #nderlying lawsthat governthe 0- a#thoritiesaccess to data stored in the cloud. A look +ack at the history of the'atriot Act and then the specifcs of the 0-A (reedom Act are helpf#l in eval#ating the impact of recent events. (irst% the 'atriot Act. /ather than create new means of access to data% the 'atriot Act primarily streamlined and consolidated vario#s processes that had long +een in placeTprocesses similar to those fo#nd% it is worth noting% in the laws of many other co#ntries. The 'atriot Act made many changes to e7isting laws% incl#ding the (oreign !ntelligence -#rveillance Act of 4IJD (!-A8 and the Flectronic Comm#nications'rivacy Act of 4IDK FC'A8% with the stated intent of allowing investigators to 9connect the dots< to stop terrorists. (rom the perspective of a non*0- person #sing a clo#d service r#n +y an entity s#+>ect to 0- >#risdiction% perhaps the most signifcant changes made concerned vario#s thresholds of proof or ne7#s to gain access to data.These changes +roadened the scope of e7isting a#thority and lowered the +#rden on the government to show the need for access. $espite +eing passed in the wake of IC44% the 'atriot Act6s enactment was not witho#t controversy and among the compromises made was the incl#sion of a#tomatic s#n*set for some provisions in the a+sence of Congressional rea#thori=ation8% incl#ding the changes to (!-A a#thori=ing enhanced data collection and access. These changes% in -ection 24: of the 'atriot Act% were largely the +asis for the telephone metadata collection program disclosed +y Fdward -nowden% +#t are also relevant to access to other data. -o% with the e7piration of the most recent e7tension to -ection 24:% the changes it made to (!-A were swept away% leaving the prior provisions of the #nderlying stat#tes in place. As noted a+ove% the 0-A (reedom Act e7tended the efectiveness of the otherwise s#n*setting provisions of the 'atriot Act% +#t with nota+le changes to the collection of phone metadata. The 0-A (reedom Act% which passed the ,o#se of /epresentatives prior to the e7piration of the 'atriot Act provisions it replaces% was drafted with the intent of amending and e7tending the e7piring programs. !nstead% the relevant 'atriot Act provision s#n*set +efore the -enate passed 0-A (reedom and% not wanting to risk passage or delay implementation of the collection programs% the -enate passed an #namended version of 0-A (reedom. As a res#lt% 0-A (reedom does not e7pressly reinstate the changes made +y -ection 24: of the 'atriot Act% +#t instead p#rports to amend the law as it was in place prior to e7piration. Therefore% there is some m#rkiness as to e7actly what the new law is% +#t either way% the #nderlying +asic laws that e7isted prior to the 'atriot Act remain essentially in placeand provide for access to information incl#ding data in clo#d services8 s#+>ect to vario#s proced#res and levels of review. 4AC loc!sA(to 9&ech Sector Strong now:;< =oesnt assume -uture declines ( >ur ang!o! "ost ev sa%s the sector will lose *$ billion over three %ears.4ac 8 surveillance bad -or the industr% 8 polls ;< "olls prove 8 the NSA revelations wrec!ed con?dence in theindustr%@i'a%an 1A .aik#mar% writer for Comp#ter World who speciali=es in privacy topics% formerly worked as a contri+#tor to the Fconomic Times% 9-nowden leaks erode tr#st in !nternet companies% governmentor tech nology companies **and in the +nternet% a ,arris !nteractive s#rvey fo#nd. ,arris polled over 2%333 0.-. ad#lts for their opinions on s#rveillance% data gathering% !nternet privacy and tr#st in a post*-nowden era. A+o#t D:U of those polled were at least somewhat familiar with -nowdenHs leaks a+o#t government s#rveillance and someB6C wanted Congress to implement new laws-or curbing the NSA. $espite that% over half +elieved that mass s#rveillance helps prevent terrorism and an almost e"#al n#m+er felt that !nternet companies sho#ld cooperate with the governmentHs eforts in this regard. -omewhat parado7ically tho#gh% two o#t of three s#rvey respondents also felt +etrayed +eca#se !-'s and other online companies are working secretly with the government to collect and monitor the comm#nications of private citi=ens. A+o#t D6C are less trusting of !-'s and other tech nology companies than +efore the revelations. The res#lts re;ect mi7ed emotions among !nternet #sers said -tephen Co++% a senior sec#rity researcher at sec#rity vendor Fset% which commissioned the ,arris !nteractive s#rvey. G'eople clearly are thinking more a+o#t the relationship +etween privacy and sec#rity. What the -nowden revelations have done is to s#rface the #nresolved tension over this iss#e%G he said. G'eople wo#ld like% on the one hand% to think the s#rveillance is necessary. 1#t there is p#sh +ack against #nnecessary s#rveillance.G There is little do#+t that -nowdenHs revelations a+o#t ma>or !nternet companies like ?oogle % )icrosoft and Vahoo secretly handing over c#stomer data to intelligence agencieshave sha!en consumer con?dence. GThe feeling of +etrayal is considera+leand #nderstanda+le%G Co++ said. @ne res#lt is thatpeople appear to be scaling bac! their +nternet use. Nearly half of the respondents have +ecome more ca#tio#s a+o#t what they say% where they go and what they do on the !nternet. A+o#t 2:U are less inclined to #se email these days +eca#se of the same reason. Tho#gh the s#rvey sample is relatively modest% the res#lts are signifcant% Co++ said. 1#sinesses wo#ld do well to pay attention to the res#lts% he said. G! donHt know if +anks or online retailers are noticing the same thing%G he said. Eeg good;< Eeg is good 8 prevents great power wars.roo!s et al 1*, -tephen ?. 1rooks% ?. .ohn !ken+erry% and William C. Wohlforth% -tephen ?. 1rooks is Associate 'rofessor of ?overnment at $artmo#th College. ?. .ohn !ken+erry is the Al+ert ?. )il+ank 'rofessor of 'olitics and !nternational Afairs at 'rinceton 0niversity in the $epartment of 'olitics and the Woodrow Wilson -chool of '#+lic and !nternational Afairs * also a ?lo+al Fminence -cholar at Oy#ng ,ee 0niversity. William C. Wohlforth is the $aniel We+ster 'rofessor in the $epartment of ?overnment at $artmo#th College. 9$on6t Come ,ome AmericaB The Case against /etrenchmentor sec#rity +eneftsM in the ne7t section% we take #p the wider pa%o0s o- the United States securit% role -or its interests in other realms, notabl% the global econom%Tan interactionrelatively #ne7plored +y international relations scholars. A core premise of deep engagementis that it prevents the emergence o- a -ar more dangerous global securit% environment. (or one thing% as noted a+ove% the U nited S tates overseaspresence gives it the leverage to restrain partners -rom ta!ing provocative action. 'erhaps more important% its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating e7pansion and make its partners more sec#re% red#cing their incentive to adopt sol#tions to their sec#rity pro+lems that threaten others and th#s stoke sec#rity dilemmas. The contention that engaged 0.-. power dampensthe +alef#l efects of anarchy is consistent with in;#ential variants of realist theory. !ndeed% arg#a+ly the scariest portrayal of the war*prone world that wo#ld emerge a+sent the 9American 'acifer< is provided in the works of .ohn )earsheimer% who forecasts dangero#s m#ltipolar regions repletewith sec#rity competition % arms races% n#clear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations% regional rivalries% and even r#ns at regional hegemony and f#ll*scale great power war.J2 ,ow do retrenchment advocates% the +#lk of whom are realists% disco#nt this +ene ftQ Their arg#ments are complicated% +#t two capt#re most of the variationB 48 0.-. sec#rity g#arantees are not necessary to prevent dangero#s rivalries and con;ict in F#rasiaM or 28 prevention of rivalry and con;ict in F#rasia is not a 0.-. interest. Fach response is connected to a diferent theory or set of theories% which makes sense given that the whole de+ate hinges on a comple7 f#t#re co#nterfact#al what wo#ld happen to F#rasia6s sec#rity setting if the 0nited -tates tr#ly disengagedQ8. Altho#gh a certain answer is impossi+le% each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker arg#ment for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The frst response ;ows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that disco#nt the con;ict*generating potential of anarchy #nder contemporary conditions.J5 $efensive realists maintain that the high e7pected costs of territorial con"#est% defense dominance% and an array of policies and practices that can +e #sed credi+ly to signal +enign intent% mean that F#rasia6s ma>or states co#ld manage regional m#ltipolarity peacef#lly witho#t the American pacifer. /etrenchment wo#ld +e a +et on this scholarship% partic#larly in regions where the kinds of sta+ili=ers that nonrealistic theories point toTs#ch as democratic governance or dense instit#tional linkagesTare either a+sent or weakly present. There are three other ma>or +odies of scholarship% however% that might give decision makers pa#se +efore making this +et. (irst is regional e7pertise. Needless to say% there is no consens#s on the net sec#rity efects of 0.-. withdrawal. /egarding each region% there are optimists and pessimists.(ew e7perts e7pect a ret#rn of intense great power competition in a post*American F#rope% +#t many do#+t F#ropean governments will pay the political costs of increased F0 defense cooperation and the +#dgetary costs of increasing military o#tlays.J4 The res#lt might +e a F#rope that is incapa+le of sec#ring itself fromvario#s threats that co#ld +e desta+ili=ing within the region and +eyond e.g.% a regional con;ict akin to the 4II3s 1alkan wars8% lacks capacity for glo+al sec#rity missions in which 0.-.leaders might want F#ropean participation% and is v#lnera+le to the in;#ence of o#tside rising powers. What a+o#t the other parts of F#rasia where the 0nited -tates has a s#+stantial military presenceQ /egarding the )iddle Fast% the +alance +egins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states c#rrently +acked +y WashingtonT nota+ly !srael% Fgypt% and -a#di Ara+iaTmight take actions#pon 0.-. retrenchment that wo#ld intensify sec#rity dilemmas. And concerning Fast Asia% pessimism regarding the region6s prospects witho#t the American paciferis prono#nced. Arg#a+ly the principal concern e7pressed +y area e7perts is that Fapan and South Korea are li!el% to obtain a nuclear capacit% and increase their militar% commitments, which could sto!e a destabili3ing reaction -rom China. !t is nota+le that d#ring the Cold War% +oth -o#th Oorea and Taiwan moved to o+tain a n#clear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so +y a still*engaged 0nited -tates.J: The second +ody of scholarship casting do#+t on the +et on defensive realism6s sang#ine portrayal is all of the research that #ndermines its conception of state preferences. $efensive realism6s optimism a+o#t what wo#ld happen if the 0nited -tates retrenched is very m#ch dependent on its partic#larTand highly restrictiveTass#mption a+o#t state preferencesM once we rela7 this ass#mption% then m#ch of its +asis for optimismvanishes. -pecifcally% the prediction of post*American tran"#ility thro#gho#t F#rasia restson the ass#mption that sec#rity is the only relevant state preference% with sec#rity de fned narrowly in terms of protection from violent e7ternal attacks on the homeland. 0nder that ass#mption% the sec#rity pro+lem is largely solved as soon as ofense and defense are clearly disting#isha+le% and ofense is e7tremely e7pensive relative to defense. 1#rgeoning research across the social and other sciences% however% #ndermines that core ass#mptionB states have preferences not only for sec#rity +#t also for prestige% stat#s% and other aims% and they engage in trade*ofs among the vario#s o+>ectives.JK !n addition% they defne sec#rity not >#st in terms of territorial protection +#t in view of many and varied milie# goals. !t follows that even states that are relatively sec#re may nevertheless engage in highly competitive +ehavior. Fmpirical st#dies show that this is indeed sometimes the case.JJ !n s#m% a +et on a +enign postretrenchment F#rasia is a +et that leaders of ma>or co#ntries will never allow these nonsec#rity preferences to in;#ence their strategic choices. To the degree that these +odies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage% U.S. retrenchment would result in a signi?cant deterioration in the securit% environment in at least some o- the worlds !e% regions. We have already mentioned the third% even more alarming +ody of scholarship. @fensive realism predicts that the withdrawal o- the American pacifer will %ield either a competitive regional multipolarit% complete with associated insecurit%, arms racing, crisis instabilit%, nuclear proli-eration, and the li!e, or bids -or regional hegemon%, which ma% be be%ond the capacit% o- local great powers to contain and which in an% case would generate intensel% competitive behavior, possibl% including regional great power war8. ,ence it is #ns#rprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to foc#s on the second arg#ment noted a+oveB that avoiding wars and sec#rity dilemmas in the world6s core regions is not a 0.-. national interest. (ew do#+t that the 0nited -tates co#ld s#rvive the ret#rn of insec#rity and con;ict among F#rasian powers% +#t at what costQ )#ch of the work in this area has foc#sed on the economic e7ternalities of a renewed threat of insec#rity and war% which we disc#ss +elow. (oc#sing on the p#re sec#rity rami fctions% there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may +e rationally rel#ctant to r#n the retrenchment e7periment. (irst% overall higher levels of con;ict make the world a more dangero#s place. Were F#rasia to ret#rn to higher levels of interstate military competition% one wo#ld see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional pro7y wars and arming of client statesTall of which wo#ld +e concerning% in part +eca#se it wo#ld promote a faster dif#sion of military power away from the 0nited -tates. ?reater regional insec#rity co#ld well feed proliferation cascades% as states s#ch as Fgypt% .apan% -o#th Oorea% Taiwan% and -a#di Ara+ia all might choose to create n#clear forces.JD !t is #nlikely that proliferation decisions +y any of these actors wo#ld +e the end of the gameB they wo#ld likely generate press#re locally for more proliferation. (ollowing Oenneth Walt=% many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists% ass#ming that n#clear deterrence solves the sec#rity pro+lem.JI 0s#ally carried o#t in dyadic terms% the debate over the stabilit% o- proli-eration changes as the numbers go up . 'roliferation optimism rests on ass#mptions of rationality andnarrow sec#rity preferences. !n social science% however% s#ch ass#mptions are inevita+ly pro+a+ilistic. >ptimists assume that most states are led b% rationalleaders, most will overcome organi3ational problems and resist the temptation to preempt be-ore -eared neighbors nucleari3e, and most pursue onl% securit% and are ris! averse. Con?dence in such probabilistic assumptions declines i- the world were to move -rom nine to twent%, thirt%, or -ort% nuclear states. !n addition% man% o- the other dangers noted b% anal%sts who are concerned about the destabili3ing e0ects o- nuclear proli-eration2including the ris! o- accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have trul% survivable -orces2seem prone to go up as the number o- nuclear powers grows.D3 )oreover% the risk of 9#nforeseen crisis dynamics< that co#ld spin o#t of control is also higher as the n#m+er of n#clear powers increases. (inally% add to these concerns the enhanced danger of n#clear leakage% and a world with overall higher levels of sec#rity competition +ecomes yet more worrisome The pro+lem is that China6s rise p#ts the possi+ility of its attaining regional hegemony on the ta+le% at least in the medi#m tolong term. As )earsheimer notes% 9&he United States will have to pla% a !e% role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to doit b% themselves.M" &+A #1AComp T!A is the voice of the world6s information technology !T8 ind#stry. As a non*proft trade association% we advance the glo+al interests of !T professionals and !T channel organi=ations. 90.- Tech !nd#stry Adds Nearly 44I%333 .o+s in (irst ,alf of 2344% TechAmerica (o#ndation Analysis /eveals< C@)'T!A * @ct 4:% 2344 * httpsBCCwww.comptia.orgCa+o#t*#sCnewsroomCpress*releasesC2344C43C4:C#.s*tech*ind#stry*adds*nearly*44I*333*>o+s*in*frst*half*of*2344*techamerica*fo#ndation*analysis*reveals8The 0nited -tates technology ind#stry added nearly 44I%333 net >o+s d#ring the frst half of 2344% a new analysis +y the TechAmerica (o#ndation reveals. The ind#stry employed some K.5 million workers as of .#ne 2344. $#ring the frst si7 months of the year ind#stry employment increased +y 4.I percent. This growth rate was slightly higher than the 4.D percent growth d#ring the same period in 2345% +#t slower than the 5.: percent growth in employment for the overall private sector. The latest edition of the TechAmerica (o#ndation6s Competitiveness -eries e7amines national tech employment trends for the past 4D months in fve sectorsB technology man#fact#ring% telecomm#nications% software p#+lishing% !T services and /S$% testing and engineering services. Fach of the fve categories recorded >o+ growth d#ring the frst si7 months of 2344. The !T services category% for e7ample% added 5K%333 >o+s. 9This is a re;ection of one of the most signifcant macro trends shaping the ind#stry right now the on*going shift to an agile% on*demand% as*a*service model%< said Todd Thi+odea#7% president and chief e7ec#tive oAcer% CompT!A. ;< No impact to hegFettweis #16 Christopher .. 'rofessor of 'olitical -cience at T#lane% $angero#s Times*The !nternational 'olitics of ?reat 'ower 'eace% pg. 4J:*K8!f the only thing standing +etween the world and chaos is the 0- military presence% then an ad>#stment in grand strategy wo#ld +e e7ceptionally co#nter*prod#ctive.1#t it is worth recalling that none of the other e7planations for the decline of war n#clear weapons% comple7 economic interdependence% international and domestic political institutions% evol#tion in ideas andnorms necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity . Were American to +ecome more restrained% n#clear weapons wo#ld still afect the calc#lations of the wo#ld +e aggressorM the process of glo+ali=ation wo#ld contin#e% deepening the comple7ity of economic interdependenceM the 0nited Nations co#ld still deploy peacekeepers where necessaryM and democracy wo#ld not shrivel where it c#rrently e7ists. )ore importantly% the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve con;ict wo#ld have noreason to ret#rn. As was arg#ed in chapter 2% normative evol#tion is typically #nidirectional. -trategic restraint in s#ch a world +e virt#ally risk free. ac!linesCurrent Freedom Act Solves;< Status Iuo Freedom Act suGcientC5A 1$ .#ne 2% 234:% 9WashingtonB CFA 'raises -enate 'assage of 0-A (/FF$@)Act< httpBCCwww.ce.orgCNewsCNews*/eleasesC'ress*/eleasesC234:*'ress*/eleasesCCFA*'raises*-enate*'assage*of*0-A*(/FF$@)*Act.asp7% ekr8The Cons#mer Flectronics Association has iss#ed the following news releaseB The following statement is attri+#ted to )ichael 'etricone% senior vice president of government and reg#latory afairs% Cons#mer Flectronics Association CFA8X% regarding the 0.-. -enate6s passage of ,./. 234D% the 0niting and -trengthening America +y (#lflling /ights and Fns#ring Ffective $iscipline @ver )onitoring 0-A (/FF$@)8 Act of 234:B 9We welcome this important reform to 0.-. intelligence gathering which takes critical stepsto increase transparenc% and restore trust in American businesses% all while maintaining o#r commitment to preserving o#r national sec#rity. The +ipartisan 0-A (/FF$@) Act is common*sense reform to o#r nation6s intelligence gathering programs% which will preserve American +#sinesses6 competitivenessworldwide% while contin#ing to protect o#r national sec#rity. 9(ollowing the -enate passage% the legislation now heads to the White ,o#se% where we anticipate swift action +y 'resident @+ama to sign this legislation into law.