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Todd Clark Philosophy 565/Wawrytko Spring/2014

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TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS OF A BUDDHIST ABSOLUTELY TRANSCENDENT SELF

BY TODD CLARK

PHILOSOPHY 565

SPRING 2014

ABSTRACT/INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I will provide the results of an ‘experiment in the laboratory of the mind’

whereby I have tested Joaquin Perez-Remon’s controversial ‘relative’ (rather than absolute)

interpretation of the Buddha’s doctrine of No-Self (Pal. Anatta; Skt. Anatman), as it appears in

the earliest Buddhist texts (the Nikayas). In part I of this paper, I will provide an essay

presenting and defending Perez-Remon’s argument for a positive yet wholly non-empirical Self

in early Buddhism. I will argue that, given the content of the early Pali texts, Perez-Remon’s

hypothesis of a ‘Buddhist-Absolute-Transcendent-Self’—a ‘BAT-Self’—is the most plausible

interpretation of the self (atta) of early Buddhism. In part II, I will place the Buddha’s doctrine

of Self (as interpreted by Perez-Remon) within Proclus’ ‘top down’ metaphysical structure, and

modify his concept of ‘the One in the soul’ so as to render it functionally equivalent to the BAT

Self. I will also present and, with the help of some ancient commentators, analyze material from


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Plato’s Phaedrus in order to help deal with certain metaphysical considerations that arise with

the conception of such a Self. In part III, I will test Proclus’ (modified) top-down theory of mind

and consciousness by comparing mind/body dualism (substance dualism) with other theories of

consciousness that are currently most popular in contemporary philosophers. Part III will also

include (1) an analysis of empirical arguments rooted in research into near-death experiences

(NDE’s) and reincarnation research, and (2) an analysis of the leading arguments for and against

the existence of God. The results of (1) and (2) will be used to either confirm or disconfirm the

BAT-Self hypothesis. This experiment will also include an appendix in which I will attempt to

show how BAT-Self coheres well with a particularly peculiar Samadhi state contemporary

scholars have called pure consciousness events, and then propose a definitive answer to the

“unanswered question” regarding the state (and ultimate fate) of the tathgata after death.

Assumptions

• . The Buddha’s enlightenment was a historical fact and marks the most profound psycho-

spiritual goal available to man. No man is happier than one who is enlightened in the way

that the Buddha was enlightened. This assumption allows me to not concern myself with

having to defend the Buddha’s teaching—and spiritual paths in general—from skeptics

who would require much more evidence and arguments than those who are open to this

assumption.

• It is reasonable to speculate on the Buddha’s metaphysical position regarding the Self.


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Some1 argue that the Buddha’s doctrine of anatta is a practical strategy, rather than a

metaphysical doctrine, and therefore speculation as to the Buddha’s metaphysical

position on the self is ungrounded. I believe this view deserves seriously consideration

(although I suspect it is ultimately false), but an adequate response to this objection is

beyond the scope of this project (which is already rather substantial).

• The Buddha’s first two sermons (The Setting in Motion of the Wheel of Dharma and The

Discourse on the Not-Self Characteristic) are reliable sources of the Buddha’s teaching. I

will also operate with the prima facie assumption that most of the material in the Nikayas

is also definitive of his teaching, although I’m open to arguments that any particular sutra

(other than his first two sermons) could be unreliable, altered, or not representative of the

Buddha’s teaching.

• . Solipism is false. We share a world with other sentient beings.

Key Terms

• Not-Self: Pali. Anatta; Skt. Anatman: Anything empirical (in the widest possible sense),

including the body, emotions, ideas, and all states of consciousness

• Metaphysical Self: the “true nature of the self.”

• Existential Self: Perez-Remon’s term for the “self in action.”

• Empirical Self: Harvey’s term for the impermanent illusory self that must be ‘built up’

before being seen as really non-existent.

• Pure Consciousness Event (PCE): Waking state of consciousness with no content 1 Thanissaro Bhikkhu, “No-self or Not-self?”, in Noble Strategy (2011, full citation unavailable) I found the article here: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/notself2.html


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whatsoever; that which obtains during ‘absolute samadhi.’”

• The One: The highest term in Neoplatonic metaphysics, identical to the Good Itself;

beyond all categories, wholly ineffable, cannot even be called a “One” lest such a

signification render it to be “two”.

• The One in the Soul: For Proclus, the ultimate identity of each person; the “ray of soul”

of Plato’s Republic 540a (according to Proclus). Beyond the mind (nous); associated with

one’s cognitive gaze and inner most desire; I will be modifying this concept to make ti

equivalent with the BAT Self, which I will situate within a slightly modified version of

Proclus’ metaphysical scheme

• The Hard Problem of Consciousness: The question of why certain physical processes are

correlated (and apparently share a causal relationship with) the subjective “feel” of

experience.

• Perrenialism: The view that mystical experiences share a common content that is

independent of any cognitive constructs.

• Constructivism: The view (popularized by Stephen Katz) that there is no unmediated

mystical/religious experience, but rater all experiences are dependent upon cognitive

constructs that shape and play a key role in determining the content of the experience.

I. PEREZ-REMON’S ‘RELATIVE ANATTA’ INTERPRETATION OF THE NIKAYAS

The Anatta Controversy

The Buddha has been widely held to have taught a doctrine of ‘absolute anatta’—that


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there is no real self (or ‘Self’) which constitutes our true identity. With few exceptions, most

Theravedan and Mahayanan Buddhist schools held that the Buddha taught such a doctrine.

However, over the past century there have been numerous challenges to this view from western

scholars who have noted how many passages from the early Buddhist texts seem to affirm, rather

than deny, the existence of a real self. In this essay, I will examine several key passages from the

Nikayas and evaluate the arguments from several leading scholars in order to determine whether

or not these passages indicate that the Buddha taught a relative or absolute doctrine of anatta.

Annata-lakkhana Sutta: Not-Self as a Soteriological Strategy

The Buddha’s teaching in the Annata-lakkhana Sutta2 is very straightforward—the body,

sense-datum, perceptions, thoughts, and consciousness are anatta, nor do they belong to the self,

nor are they worthy of being called “mine”. If the self is permanent and unchanging—as the

Buddha’s five interlocutors hold—then none of the kandhas can possibly be the self. Therefore,

once one sees the kandha’s are not the self, one becomes weary of them, and begins to cease to

identify with them. Eventually this weariness develops into a passion-free state, which then

blossoms into liberation or emancipation, which culminates in the knowledge that this one’s final

birth.

The Buddha makes no positive statement about what the self (atta) is in this sutra nor

does he explicitly deny or affirm the existence of the self, a fact that has rendered the anatta

doctrine open to multiple interpretations. Moreover, the contents of this passage—as well as

other key passages from the Nikayas—provide some measure of support for both views. That is,

2 Samyutta Nikaya III. 66


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reasonable text-based arguments have been marshaled forth that show the Buddha might have

either denied or affirmed the existence of such a self, or taken no metaphysical position on the

self whatsoever. However, there seems to be universal agreement amongst scholars on one

aspect of this sutra: moat agree that the Buddha’s anatta doctrine (as well as his general

teaching) is primarily a practical teaching. The controversy is then not only whether or not the

Buddha held an absolute or relative doctrine of annata, but also whether or not any metaphysical

atta/anatta doctrine can be attributed to the Buddha whatsoever (footnote guys who holds this

view). However, for the purposes of this project, I have assumed that that the fact that the anatta

doctrine is primarily a “soteriological strategy” does not preclude the possibility of investigating

the metaphysical status of the self in the Nikayas.

Perez-Remon’s Existential/Metaphysical Approach to Atta/Anatta

As a point of departure for his analysis, Perez-Remon distinguishes between two

categories of texts that bear on atta and annata. There are those that refer to the self in action,

which “describe how the self either succumbs to the onslaughts of evil or conquers and

suppresses it, attaining ultimate perfection and perfect freedom.”3 Other passages, however, he

says “refer to the very nature of the self” and “insist on what the self is not.” Perez-Remon says

the former passages refer to the “existential” self and the latter to the “metaphysical” self.

Regarding the existential self, he notes that there are many passages where the Buddha speaks of

an atta not only as if it were a reality, but as a reality of the greatest importance, such as,

“Going around all quarters with the mind, not a thing was found dearer than the self. In 3 Joaquin Perez-Remon, Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1980), p. 7.


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this way the self of everyone is dear to others.”4

“There is no love comparable to that of the self.”5

“One should not impair the good of the self, for the sake of the good of others, however great, having ascertained the good of the self, let him be ever intent on it.”6

“What should a man desirous of his own good never give up? What should mortal man never surrender? […] Man should never give up the self, he should never surrender the self.”7 8

At the very least, these passages should warrant some degree of caution against accepting

that the Buddha held an absolute anatta doctrine. Perez-Remon also considers the many passages

that refer to the metaphysical self (by indicating what is not, as in the Annata-lakkhana Sutta).

He ultimately concludes that these passages can be reconciled with the passages that seem to

indicate a “real” existential self, if only we take the metaphysical passages to be indicative of an

absolutely non-empirical self that defies all predication. In this way, he argues that the Buddha’s

anatta doctrine is relative, rather than absolute, concluding that if “one term of the opposition,

namely the non-self, is something real, so the other term, ie. the self, will also be real.”9

In what follows, I will test Perez-Remon’s thesis of self and no-self in the Nikayas by

analyzing his approach to key passages, and comparing his analysis of several key passages with

competing approaches from other scholars.

4 Sanyutta Nikaya I, Kolalasumyutta 8, translation by Perez-Remon (1980) p. 27. 5 Sanyutta Nikaya I, Devatasamyutta 13, translation by Perez-Remon (1980), p. 28. 6 Khuddaka Nikaya I. 33, translated by Perez-Remon (1980), p. 28; Dhp 12,166. 7 Sanyutta Nikaya I, Devatasamyutta 78, translated by Perez-Remon (1980), p. 31. 8 The Commentary states that this refers to not giving oneself up to slavery, but the context suggests a metaphorical sense of slavery, at best—it would be rather odd for the Buddha to intersperse a warning against literally pursuing a life of slavery alongside a directive to engage in gentle speech. It seems much more plausible that any oblique reference to slavery in this context (if there is any) should be read as metaphorical. 9 Perez-Remon (1980), p. 22.


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Passages Indicating the Reality of the Self: Perez-Remon vs Rahula

Perhaps the most famous passage offered in support of the view that the Buddha taught a

positive metaphysical atta doctrine is found in the Dingha Nikaya, where the Buddha declines

Ananda’s request to make a statement about the order of monks should proceed in his absence

(presumably an inquiry into leadership considerations), but instead says,

“Therefore, Ananda, stay as those who have the self as island, as those who have the self as refuge, as those who have no other refuge; as those who have dhamma as island, as those who have dhamma as refuge, as those who have no other refuge.”1011

Rahula argues that the Buddha in this passage should be understood as telling his

passages to be a refuge unto themselves—to make the community of monks a refuge—rather

than referring to a metaphysical atta a a refuge. He says,

What the Buddha wanted to convey to Ananda is quite clear. The latter was sad and depressed. He thought that they would all be lonely, helpless, without a refuge, without a leader after their great Teacher’s death. So the Buddha gave him consolation, courage, and confidence, saying that they should depend on themselves, and on the Dhamma he taught, and not on anyone else, or on anything else. Here the question of a metaphysical Atman, or Self, is quite beside the point.”12

On the face of it, this might seem reasonable, that the Buddha was simply telling Ananda

that the order should rely on one another, along with the dhamma. However, Perez-Remon

presents three considerations that caution strongly against this interpretation. Firstly, he argues

that translating attasarana as “be a refuge unto yourselves” would entail a translation of 10 Dingha Nikaya II, 102, translated by Perez-Remon (1980), p. 20. 11 The word dipa is often translated as “lamp”, but I I’ve used Perez-remon’s translation of dipa as “island”, agreeing with him that “island” fits better with “refuge”. However, the possibility that the Buddha intentionally implied both meaning cannot be ruled out—an island of light might be the most appropriate refuge for an aspiring Buddha. 12 Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (New York: Grove Press, 1959), p. 61.


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dhammasarana as “be a refuge unto the dhamma”( rather than “[be] as those who have dhamma

as refuge”), since it immediately follows attasarana as part of the same sentence. But this

translation of dhammasarana is a poor fit, if not completely absurd.13

Secondly, in the Buddha’s closing remarks to Ananda in this section he repeats these

respective admonitions to take refuge in the self and the dhamma in such a way as to suggest a

strong parallel between the two, so that Perez-Remon claims, “One might say that what the text

proposes is a self in which dhamma inheres as in its natural abode, practically identifying with

it.”14

Lastly, Perez-Remon notes that there is a parallel passage from the same sutra—where

the Buddha is about to die—where the Buddha tells the monks,

“My life is fully ripe, my life is at an end, I shall depart leaving you, I have made a refuge for the self.”15

It seems absurd to read the Buddha as using the same compound (attasarana) in a

fundamentally different sense in these two passages, especially in light of its parallel presentation

alongside the dhamma. Moreover, if the Buddha has made a refuge for the self, it seems

reasonable that he would advise the members of the order to make a refuge for the self as well. If

this is what he wanted them to do (which seems reasonable, since he’s done it himself), than the

context is a perfect fit in that he redirects Ananda’s attention from politics to practice, rather than

from politics to refuge in a sense of community.

Although these considerations don’t necessarily rule out Rahula’s interpretation of this

13 Perez-Remon (1980), p.21. 14 Perez-Remon (1980), p. 22. 15 Digha Nikaya II. 94, translation by Perez-Remon (1980), p. 24;.repeated at Khuddha Nikaya VIII. 260 by Theri Yasodhara.


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passage, they do seem to provide some degree of support for the opposing view. Nevertheless,

there is not enough support here to rule out an absolute anatta doctrine if strong support for it

should turn up elsewhere. I now turn to passages that have been purported to provide such

support.

Passages Indicating an Absolute Anatta Doctrine: Harvey vs. Perez-Remon (and Grimm)

Harvey (following Horner and Rahula16) argues that a consideration of two passages

reveals that the Buddha taught that nibbana is not-self. Here’s the first passage:

“All constructed things (sankahara) are impermanent […] all constructed things are dukkha […] all basic patterns (dhamma) are not-Self.”17

Harvey reasons that if nibbana is a dhamma, then it too is not- self, and then claims that

the following passage makes it clear that nibbana is a dhamma:

“As many compounded and uncompounded dhammas are there, freedom from attachment is proclaimed foremost, that is, the crushing of pride, the restraining of craving, the utter removal of attachment, the annihilation of becoming, cessation, nibbana.”18

Thus, Harvey reasons that since nibbana is identified by the Buddha as a dhamma, and

also says elsewhere that all dhammas are not-self, than its safe to conclude that nibbana is not-

self. The key inference he makes is that any reference to “all dhammas” must include nibbana.

As reasonable as this conclusion might seem, it faces a very powerful objection. Perez- 16 I.B. Horner, Majjhima Nikaya III. (Oxford:The Pali Text Society, 1959), p. 108n.1 and Rahula (1980), pp. 57-58. 17 Anguttara Nikaya I. 286 Tikanipato 14,4; also Dhp 277-288 and MN III. p. 127 Bahudhatusutta), translated by Peter Harvey, The Selfless Mind (Richmon Surrey: Curzon Press, 1995), p.23. 18 Anguttara Nikaya II. 34, translated by Perez-Remon (1980), p. 218.


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Remon points out that the above passage is one of only two (with a possible third) in the Nikayas

that refer to uncompounded dhammas, whereas there are many passages where dhamma can only

be understood as referring to compounded things. Moreover, it seems as though in every other

passage in the Nikayas where the phrase “all dhammas” (sabbam dhammam) appears, the word

dhamma clearly does not refer to anything uncompounded, much less nibbana. Perez-Remon

provides a number of examples of the phrase “all dhamma(s)” referring to the khandas in various

ways, such as,

“’No dhamma is worthy to be adhered to.’ That bhikkhu, having learnt that no dhamma is worthy to be adhered to, fully knows all dhammas (sabbam dhammam), and fully knowing all dhammas, having comprehended all dhammas, he regards all phenomenon as alien.” 19

“Bhikkhus, if a bhikkhu perceives six advantages, he will be able to establish the awareness of non-self as regards all dhammas without exception. What six? I shall not become immerged in any part of the world, all kinds of conceit will be destroyed in me, I shall attain an uncommon knowledge, all conditions will be well seen by me, and also that [all] dhammas are dependent on conditions.”20

“When all dhammas have been swept away, all the ways of talking have been removed.”21

“Having transcended all dhammas, free from clinging he has attained nibbana.22

The presence of numerous passages in the Nikayas where the phrase “all dhammas” is

used in such a way as to clearly not count nibbana as a dhamma utterly undermines Harvey’s

inference that any reference to “all dhammas” must include nibbana. Furthermore, the presence

of numerous passages that refer to “all dhammas” in such a way as to not include nibbana as a

dhamma provides a significant degree of support for the opposite view—that nibbana is not to be

19 Samyutta Nikaya IV, Salayatanasamyutta 80, translated by Perez-Remon p. 212. 20 Anguttara Nikaya III 143, Chakkanipato 10,9, translated by Perez-Remon (1980), p. 212. 21 Khuddaka Nikaya I,30, translated by Perez-Remon (1980), p. 214. 22 Anguttara Nikaya II, Panakanipato 18,9,7, translated by Perez-Remon (1980), p. 215.


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conceived of as “no-self.” Perez-Remon defends this view, stating,

“In the spirit of the Nikayas, to say that nibbana is anatta is a mere piece of speculative doctrine with no apparent soteriological value. The labeling of something as anatta in the authentic Nikayan spirit has its purpose the development of disgust for it, the consequent detachment from it, this detachment leading to liberation. Does it makes sense to say in this context, ‘nibbana is anatta, therefore the learned ariyan disciple develops disgust for it, feeling disgust for it he loses all attachment to it, losing all attachment to it he is liberated, he knows, “Destroyed is birth, etc.”?’ Is it not kind of blasphemous to say that nibbana should inspire one with disgust as if it were an asubha (loathsome) thing?”23

Of course, Harvey doesn’t argue that the Buddha wanted to encourage asubha towards

nibbana. Harvey is well aware that the not-self doctrine is a soteriological strategy wherein the

“deep rooted idea of ‘Self’[…] is not to be attacked, but used as a measuring-rod against which

all phenomena should be compared: so as to see them as falling short of the perfections implied

in the idea of Self.”24 However, Harvey argues that this strategic use of the self is a mere

strategy, and rejects Perez-Remon’s (and Grimm’s) hypothesis of a Nikayan metaphysical self

that is beyond ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’. In his attempt to do so, Harvey turns to two of the

“undetermined questions” (questions the Buddha refused to answer) asked by Vacchagotta.

There are several conversations between Vacchagotta and the Buddha in the Nikayas, but

Harvey focuses on one story where the Buddha actually explains to Ananda why he refused to

answer Vacchagotta’s questions concerning whether or not the self existed.

“If I, Ananda, on being questioned by the wanderer Vacchagotta whether the self exists, would have answered that the self exists, this would have coincided with what is professed by those samanas and brahmanas who are eternalists. And if I, Ananda, on being questioned by the wanderer Vacchagotta whether the self does not exist, would have answered that the self does not exists, this would have coincided with what is professed by those samanas and brahmanas whoa are annihilationists. And if I, Ananda,

23 Perez-Remon (1980), pp. 220-21. 24 Harvey (1995), p. 44.


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on being questioned by the wanderer Vacchagotta whether the self exits, would have answered that the self exists, would have this been suitable for the arisal of the knowledge that ‘all dhammas are non-self?” “Not so, Lord.” “And if I, Ananda, on being questioned by the wanderer Vacchagotta whether the self does not exist would have answered that the self does not exist, this would have resulted in a greater bewilderment for the already bewildered Vacchagotta, the wanderer, who he would have thought, ‘Formerly there was a self for me, which now does not exist.’”25

Perez-Remon argues that Vacchagotta “subscribed single-mindedly to the belief that the

self is identified with the khandhas” and therefore dialogue between Vacchagotta and the

Buddha was impossible, the term ‘self’ had an entirely different meaning for both parties

involved.”26 Thus, according to this line of reasoning, Vacchagotta would have taken an

affirmative answer as an affirmation of the eternalists doctrine “who attribute perpetuity to the

self of the sakkayaditthi (i.e. identify the self with the khandhas), which would have the

consequence of making “impossible the arisal in Vacchagott’a mind of the knowledge that all

those empirical factors are non-self.”27 On the other hand, Perez-Remon claims that a negative

answer would have been understood by Vacchagotta as an affirmation of the annihilationists or

nihilists view, which would have increased Vacchagotta’s confusion.

Harvey argues that “the wording of the passage does not allow for such an

interpretation.”28 He claims that since Indian logic allows for meaningful statements to be made

about something being ‘neither x nor not-x’ and ‘neither is nor is not’, the Buddha could have

responded negatively to both of Vacchagotta’s questions. Moreover, Harvey argues that the

Buddha “set aside” other questions, and said others were “not a proper question”, which “implies

that they were wrongly put, misconceived, with a mistake built into them […] like the question

25 Samyutta Nikaya IV, Abyakatasamyutta 10, translated by Perez-Remon (1980), p. 257. 26 Perez-Remon (1980), pp. 257-258. 27 Perez-Remon (1980, p. 258. 28 Harvey (1995), p. 29.


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‘have you stopped beating your wife.’”29

Harvey then argues that an empirical self ‘neither exists nor does not exist’, in the same

way that the world is said to ‘neither exist nor not exist’30, which he claims would have allowed

the Buddha to unambiguously say that “s/Self neither exists nor does not exists.”31 Harvey

concludes this section by stating (i) that “if there was a Self beyond existence and non-existence

the Buddha could have said so”, and (ii) that “the only self which is beyond existence and non-

existence is the empirical self, which is not-Self.”32

There are two major problems with Harvey’s analysis. Firstly, even if one accepts

Harvey’s argument (which I did not include) that (according to S.II.17) an empirical self can

rightfully said to ‘neither exists nor does not exist’ in the same sense that the world ‘neither

exists nor does not exist’, it’s not clear that all things that ‘neither exists nor not exist’ are also

‘beyond existence and non-existence.’ Perez-Remon obviously does not argue that the Buddha

thought of the self as ‘neither existing nor not existing’ in the same sense as Harvey describes the

world as something that ‘neither exists nor does not exist’. Harvey says that the world ‘neither

exists nor does not exist’ in that “it neither totally lacks existence, nor exists in a substantial,

unchanging way.”33 Does such an account of the world imply that it transcends ‘existence and

non-existence’? It seems it does not transcend these categories, but rather participates in both and

therefore cannot be said to exist absolutely, although it is also not entirely non-existent. Thus,

Harvey equivocates on the meaning between something that ‘neither exists nor does not exist’

29 Harvey (1995), p. 29. 30 Samyutta Nikaya II. 17 31 Harvey (1980), p. 30. The‘s’here denoting an empirical illusory self, with ‘S’ referring to a real metaphysical self. 32 Harvey (1995), p. 30. 33 Harvey (1995), p. 30.


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and something that is ‘beyond existence and non-existence.’

Another problem with Harvey’s analysis is his assertion that the Buddha could have

“safely” said the self was beyond existence and non-existence seems to miss the point of the

Buddha’s silence. Even if Harvey is correct in asserting that it would have been logically

consistent for the Buddha to answer both questions negatively, in the context of the dialogue the

Buddha receives one question at a time. At any time, an affirmative or negative answer to either

question would give Vacchagotta a reason to walk away thinking he knew something about the

self other than ‘all dhammas are not-self’. For example, the first question Vacchagotta asked of

the Buddha was “is there a self?” Harvey seems to assume that if the Buddha had answered the

first question negatively, Vacchagotta would have (i) still asked the next question (“is there not a

self?), received the Buddha’s negative answer, and (ii) walked away in the exact same (or better)

condition as he was in after having received no answer. But what makes Harvey think that

Vacchagotta would have asked a follow-up question if he received a negative answer to his first

question? Perhaps he would have walked away, and missed the other half of the answer Harvey

claims the Buddha could have given. Harvey might respond by suggesting that had Vacchagotta

not offered the follow-up question, the Buddha would have posed it and answered it himself; but

how would this be any less confusing or otherwise beneficial for Vacchagotta than the Buddha’s

simply remaining silent? Without such an explanation, the mere fact that the Buddha could have

said no to both questions without contradicting himself is hardly a decisive reason to think he

would have answered as such.

Is the Self is a Contradictory Concept? Harvey vs. Perez-Remon (and Grimm)


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Harvey’s strongest challenge to the BAT Self thesis is his attempt to prove the

impossibility of such a self from a passage where three views of self are examined by the

Buddha:

(1)“Feeling is my self’, (2), ‘Feeling is not myself, my self is impercipient’, and (3) ‘feeling is not my self, but my self is not impercipient, it is of a nature to feel.’”34

The first view (1) is refuted by the Buddha on account of the fleeting and impermanent

nature of feeling (vedana) being a poor match for the (presumably) impermanent nature of the

self, which should come as no big surprise. However, the Buddha’s refutations of the latter two

views fuels Harvey’s argument that a metaphysical self is impossible. Here’s how the Buddha

refutes (2) and (3), respectively:

“If, friend, no feelings at all were to be experienced, would there be the thought: ‘I am’?” […] “No, Lord.” “Therefore it is not fitting to maintain: ‘Feeling is not my self, my self is impercipient.’”35

“Well, friend, if all feelings absolutely and totally ceased, could there be the thought: ‘I am this?’”[…]”No, Lord.” Therefore it is not fitting to maintain: Feeling is not my self, but my self is not impercipient, my self is of a nature to feel.”36

Harvey claims that these passages show that a “real Self” (for the Buddha of the early

Suttas) must have self-awareness, “having a sense of ‘I am’ or ‘I am this’, which this passage

shows is dependent upon feeling, which is obviously not-self. Since such a dependency on

conditions is not consistent with an impermanent not self, Harvey surmises,

“The ’I’ that is Self would thus turn out to be Not-Self, which is a contradictory situation […] if there can only be a Self under conditions which would make it not-Self, then it is clearly impossible for there to be such a thing as the Self. While the above passage may

34 Digha Nikaya II. 66-68, translated by MauriceWalshe, The Long Discourses of the Buddha (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1987), pp. 226-27. 35 Digha Nikaya II. 66-68, translated by Walshe (1987), p. 227. 36 Digha Nikaya II. 66-68, translated by Walshe (1987), p. 227.


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not be intended to ‘refute’ Self, but only deny certain views on Self, it clearly has the effect of showing that the concept itself is self-contradictory”37 (Harvey’s italics)

However, Perez-Remon argues that the Buddha’s refutation in (2) should be understood

as referring to the absurdity of saying both “my self is not feeling” and “ my self is

unperceiving”; the very saying of this involves feeling and perceiving, and therefore “nullifies

itself, since the supposition here is that feeling and perception are entirely absent.”38 The

Buddha’s refutation of (3), on the other hand, can be understood as referring to the view that

feeling or ‘perceiving’39is part of the self’s nature, an interpretation well-supported by the

Buddha’s concluding remarks about these three views:

“Now when a bhikkhu, Ananda, does not regard felling as the self, does not regard the self as unperceiving, does not hold the opinion that,’My self perceives, because my self is perceiving by nature.’ He, abstaining from such opinions, is not attached to anything in the world. Being detached he is not troubled. Being untroubled, he attains nibbana as regards his very self. He knows, ‘Destroyed is birth, lived is the brahmalife, done is what was to be done, there will be no more living in such conditions.’”40

Harvey himself acknowledges that Grimm provides a possible way out of this conclusion

that is “worthy of a careful assessment.”41 Grimm argues that the Buddha is not here denying the

self, but rather denying that one can attribute any predicates to the self. Grimm states,

“The copula “to be” is the widest conception abstracted from experience, formed by reason for the purpose of giving or denying a predicate to the subject. Its application is therefore not permitted from the moment when a subject destitute of all predicates, that is, free from all seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, and thinking, comes into question. Because here is no predicate at all that might be attributed to this mere

37 Harvey (1995), p. 31. 38 Perez-Remon (1980), p. 282. 39 Perez-Remon’s translates vedana as ‘perceiving’, rather than ‘feeling’. 40 Digha Nikaya II. 68, translated by Perez-Remon (1980), pp. 282-83. 41 Harvey (1995), p. 33.


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subjective, even the copula “to be” […] has no longer any meaning.”42

Grimm argues that as a consequence of the self’s predicate-defying nature it is

problematic to assert that the “self is” anything, be it impercipient, percipient, or of a nature to

perceive. He argues in a footnote that while it is wrong to say “I am without sensations” it is

alright to say “I must become without sensations”, or that the “Saint has made himself free from

sensations.”43

Perez-Remon provides a simpler way (that also compliments Grimm’s thesis) to show

that the Buddha’s refutations of (2) and (3) do not entail that the suggestion that a metaphysical

self is self-contradictory. It still seems someone might be allowed to say “Perceiving (or feeling)

is not my self, but my self is not impercipient, although my self is not perceiving by nature.”

That is, the self does in fact perceive, but perceiving is not an essential property of the self.

Nothing the Buddha says here rules that scenario out. Nevertheless, if the BAT Self thesis is to

be confirmed, Grimm would have to at least be right about it being inappropriate to use the

copula “to be” to attribute any positive characteristics to the self. That is, the self would have to

be beyond designation. Interestingly enough, potential support for this view in the lines that

immediately follow the passage in question:

“And regarding the bhikkhu, Ananda, whose mind is thus released, if anyone should say, ‘the Tathgata exists after death, such is his view’, that is not proper; ‘The Tathagata does not exist after death, such is his view’, that is not proper; ‘The Tathagata both neither exists nor does not exist after death, such is his view’, that is not proper. What is the reason for that? Whatever expression or ways of verbal expression are there, whatever designation or ways of verbal designation are there, whatever knowledge or sphere of knowledge are there, whatever round of existence goes on, from all that the bhikkhu is set

42 George Grimm, The Doctrine of the Buddha (Delhi: Motilal Banatsidass Publishers, 1973, first published in Berlin, 1958), pp. 148-49. 43 Grimm (1973), p. 150.


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free by insight.”44

Perez-Remon claims that this passage shows “a teaching that it would not be proper to

attribute the assertions contained in the unanswered questions to one who refuses to regard the

self either as feeling or unperceiving and is therefore emancipated.”45 That is, just as one whose

“mind is thus released” does not make any assertions about the Tathgata’s existence, so too one

who has become liberated does not make any assertions about the self’s existence, having

himself become beyond designation. Perez-Remon calls this the “indefinable character of the

self”, and provides several quotes that equate enlightenment with becoming “beyond

designation”, such as,

“A deliberate practitioner staunch in dhamma, a sage, is no more a subject of designation.” 46

In this way, Perez-Remon equates the becoming of one who is ‘beyond designation’ with

the realization of the reality of the self as absolutely transcendent. Returning to the issue at hand,

Harvey argues that “the context of DII. 66 does not fit” Grimm’s suggestion that the Buddha’s

refutation of (2) and (3) is based on his disapproval of predicating anything whatsoever to the

self. However, the context is not, as Harvey claims, one in which “the Buddha is simply asked

whether Self can be identified in certain ways.” In fact, the Buddha is never asked any question

about the self in the Mahanidana Sutta; rather, he is the one who initiates the discussion of the

self by asking Ananda in what ways do people explain the nature of the self—a question the

Buddha answers himself, without receiving any input whatsoever from Ananda. The Buddha

asks,

44 Digha Nikaya II. 69, translated by Perez-Remon (1980), p. 283. 45 Perez-Remon (1980), p. 282. 46 Khuddaka Nikaya I., Magandiyasutta 9, translated by Perez-Remon (1980), p. 283.


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“’In what ways, Ananda, do people explain the nature of the self? Some declare the self to be material and limited.”47

Moreover, just before the Buddha brings up views on the self in this section, he raises

the issue of verbal expression and how its arising is dependent upon name and form, along with

consciousness. Thus, the discussion of views of self is bracketed by an account by the Buddha

on the arising of verbal designations, and closes with a description of one who “attains nibbana

as regards his very self”. Therefore, contrary to Harvey’s position, the context of this passage

suggests a contrast between those who subscribe to (2) and (3) with those who do not make

statements about the existence of the Tathgata—and are thereby “set free” from all explanations,

designations, and conceptual knowledge. This in turn suggests a context where Grimm’s

suggestions that the real lesson here is that the self cannot bear predication would seem right at

home.

Self or No-Self: Harvey vs. Perez-Remon Continued

Harvey and Perez-Remon ultimately agree that the soteriological nature of the Buddha’s

doctrine of anatta depends upon students of the Buddha valuing the self above all other things.

Perez-Remon has shown that there a collection of passages that overwhelmingly demonstrate a

Nikayan conception of self as man’s highest ideal, a moral agent, and the subject of rebirth and

liberation. Harvey is aware that there a collection of passages that overwhelmingly demonstrate a

Nikayan conception of self as man’s highest ideal, a moral agent, and the subject of rebirth and

liberation. He argues that these passages can be reconciled with the Buddha’s denial of a

metaphysical self by distinguishing between an ‘empirical self’ and a ‘metaphysical Self.’

47 Digha Nikaya II. 66, translated by Walshe (1987), p. 226.


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According to Harvey, the reason the Buddha did not deny the existence of the ‘s/Self’ is that he

“accepted an empirical self which was not destroyed at death, but flowed on into a future

rebirth.”48 He reasons that since the Buddha regarded the world as an “experienced reality

[…that] could not be said to be totally non-existent”, the same could be said for the ‘empirical

self.’”49 A metaphysical Self, according to Harvey, would be considered by the Buddha one of

the “views on Self […that is] rooted in the ‘I am’ attitude.”50

Harvey claims that Grimm “runs into a number of problems” in his book Doctrine of the

Buddha, one of which51 is that Grimm has to attribute craving to the self (in order to explain why

it is not liberated), which leads Grimm to see craving as an “inessential quality”. 52 However,

Harvey does not tell us why this is a problem. Eating tacos is a ‘quality’ that can be attributed to

me in the past; but I’m not an “essentially taco eating” being. Furthermore, whatever problems

that arise from attributing craving as a non-essential quality of the self are surely matched—if

not exceeded—by the ontological difficulties entailed by conceiving of craving (or ignorance, or

birth, for that matter) as arising in the absence of a self.

In Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism, Perez-Remon’s distinct approach to the anatta

controversy is to distinguish between passages that refer to the self in an existential sense (i.e.

refer to the “self-in-action”) and in a metaphysical sense (i.e. refer to the “very nature of the

self”).53 As part of his analysis of the existential self, he includes as real the self on a “moral

level", and insists that this is a different approach than the opposition of a “real and conventional

48 Harvey (1995), p. 38. 49 Harvey (1995), pp. 39-40. 50 Harvey (1995), p. 40. 51 Harvey only tells us one problem, He does mention Grimm later, saying his thesis that the self is “worthy of careful assessment”, but as I argued above, his assessment wasn’t careful enough. 52 Grimm (1973), p. 223, quoted from Harvey (1995), p. 18. 53 Perez-Remon (1980), p. 7.


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[self’].”54 (Perez-Remon 79). He provides an analogy with refracted light to illustrate how the

self on the “moral level” and “metaphysical level” can be reconciled:

“Both of them are real in their own right and at their proper sphere.[…] All this may be illustrated by the phenomenon of the defraction of light. In it the uniform light is deflected and decomposed into bands of different colours. The incidence of the light on the object which is the cause of the deflection and decomposition of the light will stand for the involvement of the self in the samsaric process. On the yonder side of the process we have the ontologically pure light of the self. On this side of the process we have the light of the self decomposed into different ‘moral’ hues. The purpose of all moral training it to ‘integrate’ the decomposed moral self into the colourless simplicity of the original light were all ambivalence ceases.”

The assimilation to the ontologically pure light of the self would then be the process of

unbinding and detachment from all that is not-self. Harvey seems to almost agree with this kind

of scenario, when he says,

“Nibbana might thus be the virtual attainment of Self-hood. It is everything that Self might be except that it is empty of I-ness, controllability, and agency.”55

According to the BAT Self hypothesis, the self in its pure condition is empty of I-ness,

controllability, and agency, which means that the features Harvey isolates as the basis for a

distinction between nibbana and the “Self-ideal” don’t apply. Ultimately, Harvey’s justifies his

rejection of the BAT Self by claiming that the passage analyzed above (source and footnote)

demonstrate that nibbana is not-self and that the concept of a real metaphysical self is

contradictory. If my analysis is correct, the text-based arguments Harvey levels against the

Perez-Remon/Grimm BAT Self hypothesis have all failed. While this alone does not rule out the

possibility that the Buddha did hold an absolute anatta doctrine, Perez-Remon offers some

important considerations that I think tip the scale against the likelihood that the Buddha denied

54 Perez-Remon (1980), p. 79. 55 Harvey (1995), p. 53.


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the reality of a metaphysical self:

“When we make a distinction between moral and metaphysical self (by the way, distinction does not necessarily mean division and separation of entities, it may only be indicative of different aspects of the same reality), when on top of that, we can prove that the anatta doctrine taught in the Nikayas has no absolute value, that is to say, it does not deny the reality of the self in an absolute way but limits itself to the denial of selfhood regarding the empirical factors as a motive for their rejection, then they synthesis of both the doctrines becomes possible, even necessary. This synthesis has the advantage that it stands in no need to distinguish between primary and secondary texts, between earlier and later doctrine. It stands in no need to assert one side of the teaching and to explain away the other, but gives equal prominence to both, as complementary aspects of the same system. (Perez-Remon 302)

Perez-Remon’s analysis has the advantage of reconciling the Buddha’s practical teaching

of anatta with a metaphysical doctrine of self that is coherent with the reality of a real self that

suffers, reincarnates, accumulates karma, and is released. Thus, there is no need to posit a

‘substrate consciousness’ (a seemingly troublesome supposition given the Buddha’s admonition

that consciousness or vinnana is not-self) in place of a self in regards to these factors, and also

no grounds for arguing that the Buddha did not believe in reincarnation at all. Rather, the BAT-

Self hypothesis allows us to take the Buddha at his word when he says speaks of the self as that

which matters most; no tricks, no secret doctrine, simply a practical doctrine rooted in the

assumption of a metaphysical self that is never questioned. Of course, there remains the

possibility that the Buddha neither denied nor affirmed a metaphysical self—that the

soteriological nature of his statements regarding the self and not-self preclude one from drawing

metaphysical conclusions from them.56 However, if this possibility is set aside and we are forced

to choose whether or not the Buddha denied or affirmed a metaphysical self, an affirmation of a

Perez-Remon/Grimm BAT-Self is the most plausible option on the table.

56 Thanissaro Bhikkhu, “No-self or Not-self?”


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II. PUTTING THE BAT-SELF IN A NEO-PLATONIC METAPHYSICAL STRUCTURE

Why the BAT-Self Needs Help Metaphysically

Whether or not the Perez-Remon/Grimm BAT-Self thesis is a correct interpretation of the

atta of the Nikayas (or of the historical Buddha’s teaching, for that matter), the above analysis

should show, at the very least, that such a thesis is consistent with not only the Buddha’s

practical doctrine of anatta, but also several key passages that contemporary scholars have

claimed as evidence for an absolute anatta doctrine. However, the Buddha’s “noble silence”

regarding the fate of the self after death leaves a gaping hole in any potential Nikayan

cosmological/metaphysical theory. By borrowing a couple of metaphysical items from Proclus

and Plato, I hope to show it is possible to understand the Buddha’s enlightenment within a

Neoplatonic metaphysical structure. There are two advantages I seek in doing this. One is that,

with Proclus’ help, in the appendix to this experiment I hope to provide an answer to the

Buddha’s unanswered question of what happens to the Tathgata after death that would well

explain the Buddha’s silence on the matter. The main advantage, however, I seek by placing the

BAT Self within Proclus’ metaphysical scheme, is that arguments concerning the existence of

God and the origin of the universe become relevant to the discussion, which will help me either

confirm or disconfirm the BAT-Self hypothesis in part III.

The One in Us’ and the ‘BAT Self’: Why Proclus?


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Neoplatonism and Buddhism intersect in that the highest concepts (and corresponding

highest spiritual attainments) in both systems—respectively, the One and nibbana—are

conceived in radically non-dual terms. However, Proclus clearly did not share the Buddha’s

reservations about offering up metaphysical speculations, although he clearly demarked a point

where he thought metaphysical speculation—and all forms of thought and intellection—must

cease if one aspires to reach the highest spiritual goal, the One Itself. This is not to say that

Proclus and the Buddha had the same doctrine of enlightenment (there are actually quite different

in many respects); rather, Proclus’ metaphysical system provides a structure that can

accommodate the Buddha’s doctrine of nibbana so as to pave the way for positive answers to the

“undetermined question” of the fate of the Tathgata after death—answers that very much affirm

the intrinsic value of human life (and all sentient beings).

Siorvanes provides a succinct summary of Neo-Platonic metaphysics:

“From the interpretation of Plato’s Republic VI [509d] and the Parmenides 137ff. (and other Platonic dialogues), Neo-Platonists thought that philosophy has for its object a graded reality. It is graded according to the degree of unity in beings. This ranges from the level of least unity (or, for someone like Plotinus, no unity at all), which is matter and the bitty, transient, physical domain, to that of maximum unity, which to them was the essential character of divinity.”57

The One is what is referred to here by Siorvanes as “maximum unity”, and as he

indicates, it is rooted in large part in the dialectical exploration of the One in the first hypothesis

of Plato’s Parmenides-- where the all predicates (including existence and a name) are denied of

the One (Parmenides 137-142) The supreme spiritual goal of this mystical brand of philosophy is

henosis, which is absolute union with the One. According to Proclus such an achievement is not

possible unless one first “rouses up the One of the soul, which is in us as a kind of image of the

57 Lucan Siorvanes, Proclus (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 49.


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One.”585960 Proclus’ response to the paradox of our referring to the One with the name “One”

when it conceived of as unnameable, Proclus says,

“The question arises, however, how it is that we call it ‘one’ when the thing itself is altogether unnameable? We should rather say that it is not the One that we call ’one’ when we use this name, but the understanding of unity which is in ourselves. For everything that exists—beings with intellect, with soul, with life, and inaminate objects and the very matter that goes with these—all long for the first cause and have a natural striving towards it. And this fact shows us that the predilection for the One does not come from knowledge, since if it did, what has no share in knowledge could not seek it; but everything has a natural striving after the One, as also has the soul.” 61

This passage is reminiscent of Harvey’s analysis of the soteriological role of the Self-idea

in early Buddhism, the “understanding of the unity which is in ourselves” standing analogously

to the Self-idea. However, for Proclus not only does this “understanding of unity” play a similar

soteriological role as in early Buddhism, it also provides a metaphysical explanation of the

source of craving in the soul as originating as a desire to return to a non-dual condition. This

explanation paves the way for arriving at desire that is the very source of the soul’s

understanding of the One. Proclus states,

“Since there are two activities in us, the one appetitive and the other reflective […] that abiding activity that is common to all may not be absent from our own souls, but these must be responsive to the energies that concern the first principle, and so the love of the One must be inextinguishable. This is indeed why this love is real even thought the One is incomprehensible and unknowable. But consciousness labours and falls short when it encounters the unknown. So silent understanding is before that which is put into language. And desire is before any understanding, before that which is inexpressible as

58 Proclus, In. Parm. 1071. 59 Proclus interprets the “ray of soul” of Plato’s Republic 540a as the “One that is in the soul.” Proclus, In Parm. 54-55K (Marrow and Dillon pp. 593-594 60 Dillon states that Iamblchus came up with ‘the One within us’ as the highest part of the human soul, beyond even intellect (nous). See Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, translated by Marrow and John Dillon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 425 n. 49. 61 Proclus, In. Parm. 55K.


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well as before that which is analyzable.” 62

Proclus describes how this desire can only be fulfilled with the cessation of the dialectic

regarding the One (which involves discursive reasoning), but also the cessation of the “strain”

towards the One as well:

“These dialectical operations are the preparation for the strain towards the One, but are not themselves the strain. Or rather, not only must it [the dialectical activity] be eliminated, but the strain as well. Finally, when it has completed its course, the soul may rightly abide with the One.”63

Thus, for Proclus, the One in the soul is a mental construct of the One Itself, rooted in the

natural desire for a non-dual condition that can only be reached with the abandonment of all

“strain” towards it. Not only is this consistent with the Buddha’s soteriological strategy of anatta

(which is dependent upon a strong pre-existing interest in the self), it paints a metaphysical

scenario that is compatible to the Buddha’s doctrine of enlightenment and the BAT Self

hypothesis. The path to the realization of the One entails first arousing the soul’s natural

yearning for it, followed by the dropping of all images, thoughts, ideas of it, as well all strain

towards it. Similarly, the path to the realization of nibbana entails first arousing one’s natural

interest in the self, followed by the dropping of all images, thoughts, ideas of the self, as well as

the strain towards it. The difference is that the Buddha’s way involves concern oneself with only

one thing—oneself—whereas Proclus’ method involves cultivating concern for a metaphysical

first principle that doubles as a longing in the soul for a non-dual condition.

What would the Buddha think of Proclus’ metaphysics? The Greeks are known for the

famous maxim “know thyself”, but no Greek philosopher directs the attention of his students

exclusively to the investigation of the self as strongly as does the Buddha does in the Nikayas. 62 Proclus, In. Parm. 55K. 63 Proclus, in. Parm. 65K.


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He would likely think it a mistake root one’s highest identity with a desire for a condition (non-

duality) or metaphysical principle (the One) if such things are construed as something other than

one’s natural state. For this reason, the realization of the One seems to differ considerably from

nibbana insofar as the two realizations are understood metaphysically and psychologically.

However, for the purposes of this project I propose a way to reconcile the Neo-Platonic One with

nibbana and the BAT-Self hypothesis: what if ‘the One in the Soul’ is construed as the BAT-

Self? And the desire, images, and thoughts in the soul of the One is the craving of the BAT-Self

for a return to its non-ignorant condition—nibbana? The One would then still remain as the

ineffable metaphysical non-dual source of all things, including BAT-Selves like us.64

Are the BAT Self and the Platonic Soul Compatible?

Early Buddhism (unlike Plato and the Neo-Platonists) does not include a doctrine of an

immortal soul that is responsible for animating the body. Moreover, according to Proclus’

metaphysical scheme, the soul is immortal yet always animates a body (including various astral

bodies, beginning with a perpetual, non-decaying, and non-temporal body and ending with our

earthly corporeal bodies.)65 This might seem to render a synthesis between Proclus’ soul-doctrine

and the BAT-Self, since the latter clearly cannot be construed an essentially body-animating

entity. However, with the construal of the Neo-Platonic doctrine of ‘the One in the Soul’—the

‘most divine’ part of the soul—to fit the BAT-Self hypothesis, such a synthesis remains possible.

Furthermore, a slightly reworked version of the soul/chariot analogy of Plato’s Phaedrus that

64 Within Proclus’ metaphysical hierarchy this would effectively render our true identity us henads—divine super-essential unities that subsist between the One and the Intelligible Being. See Siorvantes (1996), pp. 167-175. 65 Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 196.


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includes a BAT-Self (symbolized by a “helmsman” who rides alongside the “charioteer”)

illustrates how a BAT-Self could be compatible with an immortal Neo-Platonic soul. Curiously

enough, Hermeias tells us that Iamblichus had already interpreted the charioteer (which

represents intellect or nous) in the Phaedrus as playing a subsidiary role to the “helmsman”,

which he interpreted as ‘the One of the soul’:

“The divine lamblichus takes the "helmsman" as being the one of the soul; its intellect is the charioteer; the expression "visible" is used not to signify that it directs its gaze on the object of intellection as being other than it, but that it is united with it and appreciates it on that level; for this shows that the "helmsman" is a more perfect entity than the charioteer and the horses; for it is the essential nature of the one of the soul to be united with the gods.”6667 (My italics) Iamblichus interpretation of the helmsman allows the vision beyond the heaven to be

experienced as anatta, although presumably (for Iamblichus) if it were the mind or intellect

alone that had this experience, this would not be the case. Setting aside the question of whether

or not Iamblichus’ interpretation of the helmsmen of the Phaedrus as the “One of the soul’ is

plausible,68 it remains an option for us to merely adapt the myth to have this meaning. In this

way we could improve upon Plato’s chariot analogy and use it to illustrate how a BAT-Self

could be compatible with an immortal soul (which is consistent with the fact that chariot

66 Iamblichus, In Phaedrum, frg. 6 = Hermeias, In Phaedrum 150.33ff.; quoted from R. M. van den Berg, Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarü 3.333.28ff.: The Myth of the Winged Charioteer according to lamblichus and Proclus”, Syllecta Classica 8 (1997) 152). 67 Our texts of the Phaedrus have mind or intellect (noo) as that organ of vision that beholds the vision beyond the heavens in the Phaedrus 247c9, but there is reason to think this was not in the original version: “Dillon is without doubt right to reject vu as a later gloss. It is, of course, out of the question that it was in lamblichus' text, because it would have ruined his interpretation of the helmsman as the one of the soul.” Van den Berg (1997), p. 153. 68 There is certainly no explicit mention of a second person in the chariot anywhere in the Phaedrus, nor any explicit mention of ‘a One in the soul’ anywhere in the dialogues; however, if the Neo-Platonic interpretation of the “ray of soul” in Rep 540 as a higher principle than nous is correct, a subtle distinction between a helmsman and charioteer in the Phaedrus might be plausible.


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analogies are also prominent in the Nikayas.69

The advantage I seek by adapting the Phaedrus chariot/soul myth to accommodate a

BAT-Self is to take advantage of a feature of the story that provides a response to the (supposed)

problem of inessential qualities raised by Harvey against the BAT-Self. After providing a

description of a successful soul-flight to the “top of the vault of the heaven”, at the end of the

descent Socrates describes how the charioteer deals with his horses:

“Passing down again within the heaven, it [the soul] goes home, and there the charioteer puts up the horses at the manger and feeds them with ambrosia and then gives them nectar to drink.”70 Here the charioteer is described separating himself from both his chariot and horses, with

the horses (which roughly symbolize the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul of Plato’s

Republic) continuing to live a life of their own, in their own proper resting place (the manger),

with the charioteer providing each with some kind of ‘soul-food’ (and drink). This feature of the

Phaedrus’ soul/chariot analogy illustrates how the self could have qualities such as spirit and

appetite (as symbolized by the horses) that are necessary for the soul to engage in certain

activities (such as entering the various jnanas in meditation) that require it make use of qualities

that are non-essential to it, yet nevertheless continue to have a life of their own even in the

absence of the charioteer. In this way, qualities such as spirit, appetite, or even reason (if we

separate the helmsmen from the charioteer, ala Iamblichus) need not be essential qualities of the

self, although they are essential qualities of the whole soul.

The adaptation of the BAT-Self to the Neo-Platonic soul also paves the way for a

possible answer to the ‘unanswered question’ of the fate of the tathgata after death. Both Proclus

69 See Perez-Remon (1980), pp. 57-63. 70 Pl. Phaedrus 247e.


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and Iamblichus hold that the souls of the good and wise descend for the sake of others.

Iamblichus provides three reasons why a soul might descend:

“From Stobaeus' Anthology stems an interesting passage from lamblichus' De Anima (l .379-80, frg. 40). It deals with the different causes of the soul's descent. Some, perfect, souls descend in a pure way for the preservation, purification and perfection of the things here. Other souls return for the sake of exercising and correcting their own characters. They are not so perfect as the first group, because they are not completely impassible nor do they enjoy their own independence. A third category of souls is made to descend by means of violence for punishment here.”71 Proclus agrees with Iamblichus on the existence of these “pure” souls that descend for the

salvation of others, but disagrees with Iamlichus’ claim that these perfect souls are “unaffected in

their thinking”. Proclus insists that that all souls must drink the river of forgetfulness (lethe) upon

descending into bodies, which seems to be a reasonable assumption. In any case, Proclus and

Iamblichus provide a potential answer to the post-mortem fate of the tathgata—an eventual

descent to earth (or some other comparable embodied life) for the sake of helping others. This

notion, of course, has a parallel in Buddhism as well (although not in the Nikayas) in the

Bodhisattva who postpones entering parinibbana in order to return to help liberate others. In the

appendix, I will propose an alternative scenario that proposes a Buddha to descend for the sake

of others (the compassionate/enlightenment model) and enter parinibbana too—for a spell, yet

(paradoxically) without leaving.

Having constructed a slightly reworked Neo-Platonic ever ascending and descending soul

to compliment the BAT-Self, the remainder of the Buddha’s cosmology can remain as it is. I

shall make no attempt here to make a complete synthesis of Proclus’ metaphysical hierarchy and

the realms (lokāḥ) spoken of by the Buddha in the Nikayas. Nevertheless, with the soul principle

71 Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarü 3.333.28ff.: The Myth of the Winged Charioteer according to lamblichus and Proclus, in R. M. van den Berg (1997), p. 156-57.


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inserted into a Nikayan Buddhist cosmology, along with the One, the One in the Soul, and the

helsman’s (One in the Soul’s) and charioteer’s (mind’s) ability to separate from their horses

(spirit and appetite), the overall metaphysical picture looks more Neo-Platonic than it does

Buddhist. On the other hand, the model of enlightenment in play here—all dhammas are not-

self—remains decidedly Buddhist. Thus, going forward I will be assuming a primarily Neo-

Platonic metaphysical picture, with the single modification of identifying the BAT-Self as the

One in the soul. This essentially renders the One in the soul a “henad”—an indeterminate set of

super-essential unities that stand between the One and Intelligible Being in Proclus’

metaphysical hierarchy.72 Moreover, arriving at the “pure abodes”—the non-returner plane

(locah) beyond the formless realms where enlightenment becomes eminently inevitable—could

be understood as equivalent to arriving at the henadic realm, the home of the true self.

III TESTING THE ‘BAT-SELF/ONE IN US’ HYPOTHESIS

Testing Proclus’ Metaphysical System

Moving from the ancient world to the contemporary world, the next question to consider

is whether or not a ‘BAT Self/Neo-Platonic Soul’ hypothesis is plausible in light of all the

available evidence. Of course, it would be absurd to expect to confirm the whole of Proclus’

metaphysics (which he himself treated as a map that should not be mistaken for the territory).

Moreover, much of Proclus’ speculations might be unfalsifiable. For example, how can one ever

show that the One and the Good really are really not identical? However, I will explore two 72 Lucas Siorvanes, Proclus (New Haven and London: 1996), pp. 167-175.


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ways in which something like Proclus’ metaphysics can be shown to plausible. One is to

establish the plausibility of some kind of mind/body interactive dualism (or substance dualism);

the other is to show that there is good reason to believe that a Creator God exists. In the next four

sub-sections I will explore the plausibility of substance dualism, before turning my attention to

the plausibility of the existence of God.

The BAT-Self and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind

Since philosophy of mind emerged as a distinct branch of academic philosophy in the

middle of the 20th century, most philosophers have favored some form of materialist position

such as the mind/brain identity theory,73 functionalism,74 or biological naturalism.75 Furthermore,

although property dualism has remained a popular view76, substance dualism has not, which

means that there has been a consensus amongst both materialist and dualist philosophers of mind

that there is no soul, mind, or spirit that survives the death of the body. Without souls or minds

that are sustained by something other than brain function, the possibility for an afterlife seems

especially bleak.

However, if these same contemporary philosophers of mind were to suddenly have good

reason to believe that at least one incorporeal spirit (i.e. God) exists, many of them would likely

73 David Lewis, “An Argument for the Identity Theory,” The Journal of Philosophy (1966), pp. 17-25. 74 Hilary Putnam, “Minds and Machines,” Dimensions of Mind (1960), pp. 148-180. 75 John Searle, “Biological Naturalism”, in S. Scheider and M. Velmans, Editors, The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness (Chicester: John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 2007), pp. 325-334. 76 Donald Davidson, "Mental events." Readings in Philosophy of Psychology 1 (1980), pp. 107-119.


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be compelled to take substance dualism more seriously. One reason for this is that the existence

of such a spirit would overturn the presumption of causal closure of the physical that guides

many leading contemporary philosophers’ analysis of the mind/body problem. For example,

Chalmers states,

“The best evidence of contemporary science tells us that the physical world is causally

closed; for every physical event, there is a physical sufficient cause. If so, there is not

room for a mental ‘ghost in the machine’ to do any extra causal work.”77

Chalmers here expresses his commitment to the view that every physical event must have

a causal explanation that sufficiently explains the event. Chalmers’ point is that, given the

assumption that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, any “extra causal work” by

a non-physical entity would entail certain physical events to be overdetermined, a consequence

that is unparsimonious, if not absurd. If Chalmers is right, not only is there no room for a ‘ghost

in the machine’, there is no room for an incorporeal spirit that facilitated the emergence of

human life on earth and continuously attempts to persuade us to live justly. In this way, causal

closure could be appealed to as a potential challenge the existence of the God.

There are a number of objections to causal closure. One obvious problem is that it seems

to render it impossible for the physical universe to have come into existence due to a cause,

which would seem to entail a commitment to either a view that the physical universe always

existed (which may or may not be true) or just popped into existence uncaused (which seems

intuitively implausible). Although one of these two options could be true, the adoption of either

one of them in order to preserve a commitment to causal closure seems rather ad hoc. Another

77 David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 125.


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problem with causal closure is that it requires the adoption of either epiphenomenalism (the view

that mental phenomenon plays no causal role in the physical world) or reductive materialism (the

view that mental phenomena are reducible to physical states). Again, although perhaps one of

these two (seemingly problematic) views might be true, it seems ad hoc to adopt a problematic

view in order to preserve a commitment to causal closure, especially given the incomplete status

of our physical theories (i.e. the lack of a ‘theory of everything’ or ‘grand unified theory’) and

the inexplicable nature of consciousness (i.e. the ‘hard problem’).

\

Top-down vs. Bottom-up Theories of Consciousness

As a counterpoint to Chalmers’ enthusiasm towards causal closure, others have argued

that the problematic status of naturalistic explanations for consciousness provides justification

for belief in the existence of God as an explanation for our own consciousness.78 Such a ‘top-

down’ approach to the mind/body problem has a long history: Mackie cites Cicero and Locke as

two well-known examples of philosophers who were skeptical towards the possibility that matter

alone could account for consciousness.79 Thus, there seems to be an intuitive pull against both

top-down and bottom-up theories of consciousness. In fact, according to one source, the very

founder of Christianity once made this very point:

“If the flesh came into being because of spirit, it is a marvel, but if spirit came into being

because of the body, it is a marvel of marvels. Yet I marvel at how this great wealth has

78 Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 192-218. 79 Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, p. 119.


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come to dwell in this poverty.”80

In this passage, Jesus not only succinctly bears in on the nature of the mind/body

problem, but also suggests that the ‘wealthy’ nature of spirit renders the top-down theory more

plausible than a bottom-up theory. Of course, the wealthier one finds the nature of spirit, the

more plausible Jesus’ implicit argument for the top-down theory is likely to be received.

Nevertheless, even those who remain skeptical towards the possibility that religious experience

can tell us anything relevant about the mind/body problem would be hard-pressed to deny it is a

marvel that we find such intrinsically valuable ‘wealth’ (i.e. persons) dwelling in such poverty

(i.e. mortal bodies composed of matter). That is to say, the mystery (i.e. ‘hard problem’) of

consciousness is very much still very much a ‘wonder’.

On the other hand, as the above passage from the Gospel of Thomas implies, if we have

good reason to believe in the existence of God, then a top-down theory of consciousness (such as

Proclus’ metaphysical system) would seem more intuitively plausible than a bottom-up

naturalistic account. Therefore, if philosophers like Chalmers were compelled to abandon causal

closure on account of persuasive arguments for the existence of God (such as the science-

friendly versions of the teleological, cosmological, and ontological arguments Corlett suggests

might be plausible81), substance dualism would likely re-emerge as a popular view amongst

contemporary philosophers of mind.

Smythies Extended Materialism

80 The Gospel of Thomas, Marvin Myers,Translator (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1992), p. 37. 81 J. Angelo Corlett, The Errors of Atheism (New York: Continuum, 2010), pp. 125-26.


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Another objection to causal closure of the physical relates to the representational theory

of perception, often called the “sense-datum” theory. According to the indirect realist version of

this theory (as opposed to the idealist version), our perceptions are not of physical objects, at

least in the ordinary sense. Rather, sense-data are considered to be non-physical representations

of the represented objects that exist in the physical world. The reason for considering sense-

datum to be non-physical is that the fact that they are representations of objects in physical space

suggests that they do not exist in physical space, but rather phenomenal space. Crane notes how

this feature of the sense-datum theory has contributed to its lack of popularity in recent decades:

“Another influential objection to sense-data, rarely explicitly stated, but present in the background of much discussion, comes from the prevailing naturalism of contemporary philosophy. Naturalism (or physicalism) says that the world is entirely physical in its nature: everything there is supervenes on the physical, and is governed by physical law. Most sense-data theorists are committed to the claim that sense-data are mind-dependent: objects whose existence depends on the existence of states of mind. If the sense-data theory is to be consistent with naturalism, then it has to explain how an object can be brought into existence by the existence of an experience, and how this is supposed to be governed by physical law. These entities not only seem to be an unnecessary addition to the naturalistic world picture, but from a naturalistic perspective the mechanisms which determine how these entities behave are obscure. Naturalists may concede that there is nothing actually incoherent in the very idea of these objects, but they will insist that their existence is incompatible with other things we have learned from science about the natural world. Many contemporary sense-data theorists, however, will not be moved by this kind of criticism, since they are happy to accept the rejection of naturalism as a consequence of their sense-data theory”82

Smythies argues that we don’t have to consider sense-datum to be non-physical, if we are

willing to expand our notion of the physical to include a phenomenal space that causally interacts

with “normal” physical space. Smythies argues that the best way to approach the mind/body

82Tim Crane, "The Problem of Perception", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/perception-problem/>.


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problem is through science.

“I myself hold that there are no problems of substance in the areas of mind/brain and brain/consciousness relations that cannot be solved by scientific means. But the relevant sciences are not just neuroscience and cognitive science alone—introspection psychology is also essential—and, as we will see, so are physics and cosmology. As a part of this effort, of course, we need to pay close attention to conceptual clarity and sound logic.”83

After reading this passage, it occurred to me that if Smythies is right about these diverse

fields of knowledge being essential to an attaining an adequate understanding the mind/body

problem, I had little chance of confirming or disconfirming the BAT-Self hypothesis in this life,

let alone in a single semester. In fact, it appears that perhaps the only way I might be able to

confirm or disconfirm the BAT-Self is to be reincarnated to sometime in the future, where

science may have potentially solved the mind/body problem once and for all!

However, a less ambitious approach is to examine all the relevant evidence and

arguments, and determine whether or not the BAT-Self hypothesis (as described in parts I and II)

is a plausible candidate to explain the relevant data. In this spirit, I will outline the central feature

of Smythies’ theory, which is a novel attempt to expand physics in order to account for mental

phenomenon that dovetails nicely with the BAT-Self hypothesis and Proclus’ top-down

metaphysical scheme.

Smythies argues that a major problem with Cartesian dualism is that it “does not lend

itself to any kind of mathematical development.”84 This contrasts with the physics and chemistry

that underlies the physical sciences, including evolutionary biology. Smythies explains the

undesirable consequences this has for Cartesian dualism. He states,

83 John Smythies, The Walls of Plato’s Cave (Brookfield: Avebury, 1994), p.2. 84 Smythies (1994), p. 142.


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“The unitary scientific account of the evolution of organisms and behavior provides a most powerful, internally coherent, and continually expanding account of the physical basis of mind relatively free from irritating paradox. To be asked to graft external ‘minds’ onto this elegant and satisfying system is felt by many neuroscientists to represent a return to demonology to be resisted at all costs.”85

Smythies’ theory has roots in a letter from Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia (1618-1680) to

Descartes, where she stated that it would be easier for her “to attribute matter and extension to

the soul, than to attribute to an immaterial thing the capacity to move and be moved by the

body.”86 Henry More (1614-1687) argued that spirit must have extension and therefore posited a

spiritual fourth dimension he called “essential spissitude”87 that was largely ignored for centuries

until being later resurrected by C.D. Broad as the fourth (or higher) dimensional home of

“individual consciousness, made up of their constituent sensory and image fields.”88

Here’s how Smythies describes his extended materialsm theory:

“The new theory of extension postulates that phenomenal consciousness is constructed by a material mechanism located in a higher-dimensional space (relative to brain space). This is postulated to consist of two parts: (i) a TV-like raster mechanism that builds up the visual field (and […] the other sensory and image fields): we can name this HM (hyperspace mechanism) for short—and (ii) higher-dimensional vectors or tensors by which HM interacts with its brain.”89

Smythies’ postulates that brain is “located at the dimensional interface” between two 3D

space systems, this higher-dimensional space and the ‘physical world’ that is subject to the laws

of relativity. He also posits an Ego (which he calls “subjective consciousness”) that exists in an

even yet higher dimension than phenomenal consciousness, yet interacts with it analogously to

85 Smythies (1994), p. 142. 86 Smythies (1994), p. 147. 87 Smythies (1994), p. 148. 88 Smythies (1994), p. 148. 89Smythies (1994), p. 150.


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the interaction between phenomenal consciousness and the “physical” world. However, the Ego

can only indirectly interact with the physical world through the phenomena dimension, which in

turn interacts with the physical world through the higher-dimensional tensor forces Smythies

postulates.90

Smythies also postulates a distinction between the space-time of special relativity and

“real-time” understood in terms of the flow of time in the “specious present.” Smythies theorizes

that our brains could be connected to the world lines of the block universe of special relativity,

while the Ego is “in relative motion, in t2 [real-time] along t1 [ fourth dimensional space], to the

world lines of his brain. Smythies summarizes this scheme, stating,

“So the new formulation of reality might consist of the following ontologically equal partners — (A) physical space-time (10 or more dimensions) containing physical matter (protons, electrons, etc.); (B) phenomenal space (3 more dimensions of a parallel universe) containing mind stuff (sensations and images); and (C) real time (time 2). A and B are in relative motion along the time 1 axis in time 2. Their contents are in causal relations via the brain. The psychological ‘now’ of time marks the point of contact of the two systems.”91

Some have complained that the block universe of special relativity entails complete

physical determinism on account of its inclusion of a prefigured four-dimensional geometry.

This seems to presuppose an eternalism view of time, which treats the complete history of the

universe is existing all at once.92 Smythies addresses this objection, stating that it seems to make

“Calvinistic determinism inevitable, even if we bring in concepts like quantum indeterminacy

90 Smythies (1994), p. 161. 91 John Smythies, “Space, Time, and Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10, No. 3 (2003) p. 55. 92 This objection was raised by a student in class during the question and answer period of my penultimate report for this project.


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and chaos theory.”93 He responds to this objection by showing how his theory might reconcile

special relativity with the existence of free-will, stating,

But world lines might be more like ropes than tramlines and so moveable by HTe94

forces. So the past may be fixed but the future only probable and subject to voluntary

intervention.”95

Thus, Smythies shows how his theory is not only consistent with relativity theory, but is

also capable of rescuing it from questionable philosophical commitments that the theory

potentially entails. Smythies provides physical explanations for both the sense of the flow of

time and a compatibilist solution to the problem of free-will.

The main problem that arises in trying to assess Smythies’ theory is attaining the

technical knowledge from the various fields he draws on in constructing his theory, such as

neuroscience, introspection psychology, cognitive science, theoretical physics, and philosophy. It

would take most people decades to learn enough about these fields to evaluate the ‘nuts and

bolts’ of extended materialism. Nevertheless, I see no fatal philosophical problems with

Smythies theory, and several advantages, not the least of which is that his theory attempts to

incorporate problems relating to consciousness and the mind/body problem into a physical

theory. Another advantage is that his theory might be testable, although this might not happen

anytime soon.96 In order to accommodate the BAT-Self hypothesis, Smythies theory might need

even higher dimensions to account for the higher stages of consciousness beyond the Ego or 93 Smythies (1994), p. 180. 94 HTe standing for “efferent higher-dimensional tensor”, the force (for Smythies) by which the Ego transmits information to the brain via the phenomenal dimension. See Smythies (1994), p. 150-51. 95 Smythies (1994), p. 180. 96 Smythies (1994), pp. 193-197.


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subjective consciousness, such as the pure abodes (suddhāvāsa) and the higher formless realms

(arūpaloka); it remains to be determined if he will need to accommodate the wholly non-

empirical BAT-Self.

Empirical Arguments for the Afterlife

Smythies also touts the way in which his theory can explain life after death. He does this

in a recent online essay, where he also suggests extended materialism could be developed in

terms of M-theory (which posits multi-dimensional entities called “branes”). He states,

In this view the physical world becomes a communication device between individual consciousness modules located in different branes. Therefore, on the death of the physical body, most of the consciousness module would become redundant, as there would now be no brain for it to interact with. However, the Self could remain, and perhaps the sensations, that used to be organized by the brain via the visual and other sensory fields, could rearrange themselves, or be reorganized by something else, into new forms of experience.”97

Smythies’ touting an explanation for life after death as a benefit to his theory drew

negative attention from a blogger named “Strange Loop”:

“Seriously? Sure, it [Smythies extended materialism] *could* potentially account for […] consciousness after death […] but that assumes these things even exist in the first place! I’m sure lots of interesting speculation can come out of brane theory […] But it makes no sense to argue for brane-based dualism on the basis of its alleged ‘advantages’ over the old paradigm, when those advantages are things like explaining hypothetical phenomena that don’t even directly follow out of the new paradigm unless they’re first assumed.”98

97 John Smythies, “Consciousness and its Brain: a New Paradigm,” http://www.thepsychologicalchannel.com/blogs/blog4.php/2008/08/07/3-consciousness-and-its-brain-a-new-para 98 Strange Loops (blog), http://www.strange-loops.com/blog/?p=54


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“Strange Loop” assumes it was a mere assumption that led Smythies to consider it an

advantage of his theory that it could accommodate the continuation of consciousness after death.

However, Smythies is not the only intellectual who thinks that there might be a need for an

explanation for life after death; the evidence is actually much stronger than most people might

think. In much of the contemporary literature on empirical evidence for life after death, the

emphasis has shifted from evidence drawn from psychic mediums to near death experiences

(NDE’s) and cases suggestive of reincarnation. In the following brief analysis of the subject, I

will present separate arguments for life after death that respectively draw from research into

NDE’s and reincarnation research, and argue that the cumulative force of these two lines of

arguments provide sufficient justification for rational belief in life after death.

Near-Death Experiences

Unsurprisingly, scholars who examine the near-death experience phenomenon are often

guided by competing intuitions. For example Long states,

“As far as I’m concerned, it makes perfect sense that the best evidence for understanding what happens when we die would come from those who actually did nearly die or even experienced clinical death.”99

On the other hand, there are others (some of whom are sympathetic to the possibility of

life after death) who would rate near death experiences as poor evidence for anything more than

something resembling a fart:

“OBE’s [out of body experiences, a prominent feature of many NDE’s] provide no justification for assuming that mental activity could persist independently of the body for

99 Jeffrey Long, Evidence for the Afterlife (New York: Harper Collins, 2010), p. 18.


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periods longer than an OBE. Analogies are easy to come by. For example, a person’s last breath may linger briefly after bodily death. But it will dissipate quickly, and certainly it won’t persist indefinitely. Similarly, my fart can leave my body.”100

Long and Braude both provide important considerations, but there is a less ambitious

approach to the NDE phenomenon as it pertains to the possibility of an afterlife that focuses

specifically on the relationship of the mind and brain. This line of argumentation draws on the

fact that many NDE’s seem to take place under anesthesia and during cardiac arrest—at a time in

which the brain is not behaving in the way that prominent neuroscientific theories tell us it must

function in order for one to have conscious experience. Here’s a brief technical description of a

common feature of these theories:

“Despite the differences of detail and interpretation, all of these theories have in common the view that the essential substrate for conscious experience—the neuroelectric activities that make it possible and that constitute or directly reflect the necessary and sufficient conditions for its occurrence—consist of synchronous or at least coherent high-frequency (gamma-band, roughly 30-70Hz) EEG oscillations linking widely separated, computationally specialized, regions of the brain. An enormous amount of empirical evidence supports the existence of these mind-brain correlations under normal conditions of mental life.”101

Many NDE’s include reports out-of-body experiences that include details of events that

were confirmed to have taken place during a time in which the brain lacked the requisite

neuroelectric activity (described above) for conscious experience to occur. One famous case

involves a woman (Pam Reynolds) who reported having had an out-of-body experience while

under anesthesia for an operation that involved the draining of all the blood from her brain (in

order to surgically remove a blood clot from her brain). One of the most impressive features of

this case is that Pam provided an accurate description of a conversation that took place in the 100 Stephen Braude, Immortal Remains (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 275. 101 Edward F. Kelly and Emily Williams Kelly, Adam Crabtree, Alan Gauld, MIcheal Grosso, Bruce Greyson, Irreducible mind ( Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), p. 416.


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operating room, in spite of her having been under heavy anesthesia and having the responsivity

of her brain stem “repeatedly tested by 100-decibel clicks emitted from small, moulded

speakers.”102

Pam also accurately described the case of the drill used to open her skull, which she

correctly stated contained interchangeable blades.103 She also correctly described the sound of

the drill, although she incorrectly described the drill itself as having a “groove at the top where

the saw goes into the handle”. However, as Sabom points out,104 the drill would have been in the

surgeon’s hand and in motion, so she might not have got as clear a look at it as she did at the

stationary case and blades.105

Although there’s no way of knowing if any part of her NDE took place while her brain

was drained of all blood and shut down entirely, the timeline of events (along with her

description of a continuous experience) does seem to triangulate around part of her NDE taking

place during that period. Of course, there’s always the question of whether or not she learned

these accurate details in some other way, or just made a few lucky guesses. Furthermore, there is

some experimental evidence of ‘subliminal’ awareness during anesthesia (where patients under

hypnosis accurately remember comments made while they were anesthesia106), which could

possibly account for Pam’s accurate report of the conversation that took place in the operating

room (i.e. perhaps her ‘subliminal’ awareness was unhindered by the anesthesia and molded ear

102 Micheal Sabom, Light and Death (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1998), pp. 184-185. 103 Sabom, Light and Death, pp. 186-89. 104 Sabom, Light and Death, p. 189. 105 These details occurred in the first two stages of Pam’s NDE; in the second stage, she left the operating room and had an encounter in bright light with deceased loved ones that fed her “something sparkly. Sabom, Light of Death, pp. 44-5. 106B.W. Levinson, “States of Awareness during General Anaesthesia,” British Jounal of Anaesthesia, 37 (1965), pp. 544-46.


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speakers emitting 100-decibel clicks). Nevertheless, even if we set aside the veridical details,

Pam did seem to have an experience at some time during a period in which she was under

anesthesia that would seem to require the type of brain activity that would been detected by the

EEG. Moreover, the rich visual nature of her experience throughout the NDE makes it hard to

dismiss the suggestion that “her heavily anesthetized state throughout the entire procedure casts

serious doubt on any view of mind or consciousness as unilaterally and totally depending on

intact physiological functioning.”107

Simply put, it would be a lot easier to defend the view that the mind cannot function

without the brain if NDE’s such as Pam Reynolds’ never happened. It would also be a lot easier

to be skeptical about the details of her NDE if such witnessing of veridical details was an

isolated case.108 If we abandon the assumption that brain function is a necessary condition for all

states of consciousness, the simplest explanation for this case seems to be that Pam’s mind,

consciousness, or soul left her body, she saw and heard the details she reported of the operating

room, and then perhaps had a brief (sparkly) taste of what lies beyond. However, the strongest

aspect of the evidence for survival that NDE’s provide is not that they necessarily provide a

glimpse of the next life, but rather that they seem to provide examples of conscious experience

occurring without the physiological mechanisms that has been shown to be requisite for it to

occur under normal circumstances. Nevertheless, the point behind Braude’s use of the fart

analogy is not without merit in that NDE’s do not provide evidence for “personal survival over

many years.”109 Therefore, such evidence must be found by way of another line of paranormal

107 Kelly, Kelly, Crabtree, Gauld, Grosso, Greyson, Irreducible mind, p. 416. 108 Kenneth Ring and Madelain Lawrence, “Further Evidence for Veridical Perception During Near-Death Experiences,”Journal of Near-Death Studies. 11,4 (1993), pp. 223-29. 109 Braude, Immortal Remains, p. 129.


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evidence.

Reincarnation Research: An Overview

Tucker states that there are 2500 cases suggestive of reincarnation on file in the Division

of Personality Studies at the University of Virginia.110 A typical case involves a child who at

around the age of two or three begins to speak of a previous life, and eventually expresses

detailed knowledge of a specific deceased person’s life that are later confirmed to be accurate.

However, some cases provide additional information, such as case involving a boy named

Corliss Chotkin Jr., who at the age of thirteen months reportedly said to his mother,

“Don’t you know me? I’m Kahkody.”111

“Kahkody” was the tribal name of Victor Vincent, the deceased uncle of Corliss’ mother,

a man who not only told his niece he would be reborn as her next son, but also appears to have

accurately predicted the location of two birthmarks her future son would have when he told her

that her son would have the two same scars he had on his back and nose, respectively.112

Stevenson provides a number of details that suggest Corliss was psychologically continuous with

Vincent, such as Corliss’ enthusiastic recognition at the age of two of Vincent’s stepdaughter

Susie (he reportedly jumped up and down and said “There’s my Susie”113); his picking out

Vincent’s widow from a crowd( and calling her by bother her name, “Rose”, and Vincent’s

110 Tucker, Life Before Life, p. xiv. 111Ian Stevenson, Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation (Charlottesvile: University of Virginia Press, 1966), p. 260. 112 Stevenson, Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation, p. 258. 113Stevenson, Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation, p. 261.


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familiar name for her, “the old lady”114); Corliss accurately retelling a story about a fishing trip

Vincent once went on where his engine broke and he had to change into his Salvation Army

uniform in order to attract attention from a passing ship.115

Reincarnation is very common among the Tlingits, which is likely why such predictions

of rebirth are not uncommon. According to Tucker, ten of the forty-six cases that involved a

member of the Tlingtis tribe included a prediction by the previous personality, eight of which

involved the names of the parents to whom they wanted to be reborn. One might argue that it’s

the collective cultural belief that is somehow responsible for these cases, since the majority of

strong cases have come from cultures were belief in reincarnation is common. However, one

factor that counts against this suggestion is that, amongst those strong cases that come from

regions of the world where belief in reincarnation is not uncommon (such as India), some

involve families that did not believe in reincarnation (including the Swarnlata case analyzed

below).

Furthermore, there are some strong cases from Europe and America, such as Carl Edon,

who at the age of two began to speak of a previous life as a German Air Force pilot that died in a

plane crash in World War II.116 According to his parents, Carl began sketching airplanes and

German badges and insignias at the age of two or three, and at the age of six drew a sketch of an

airplane’s cockpit and described the functions of the gauges. Carl displayed an unusual amount

of both knowledge and interest in German culture; his father confirmed at least one historical

114 Stevenson, Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation, p. 261. 115 Stevenson, Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation, pp.261-62. 116 Ian Stevenson, European Cases of the Reincarnation Type (City: Publisher, year), pp. 68-73.


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detail Carl had given about his previous life by borrowing a book from a local library.117 In

addition, his parents had little knowledge of reincarnation and were “initially baffled by Carl’s

statements, sketches, and behavior.”118

Moreover, even though the strongest individual cases from America and Europe have not

yet matched the strength of the strongest cases in places like India (where belief in reincarnation

is not uncommon), this has more to do with the remarkable strength of some of the cases that

have come from India (and other regions where belief in reincarnation is not uncommon) than it

does with the weaknesses of the cases from Europe and America. Pratt suggests the reason for

the lack of ‘remarkably strong’ cases in America and Europe is not that cases suggestive of

reincarnation are less common in those regions than in other parts of the world. He states,

“As of July 1974 the Files on reincarnation cases in the University of Virginia, Division of Parapsychology, contained a total of 1,339 distinct instances of persons claiming such memories […] although it is commonly supposed that most of these cases come from the East where belief in reincarnation is strong, most of the cases come from the United States. In the West there is a strong tendency to ignore and suppress statements from children about the time previous to birth.”119

Thus, although the strongest cases—those most difficult to account for by ways other

than reincarnation—have come from regions where belief in reincarnation is more common than

in America and Europe, there is plenty of evidence that shows the phenomenon permeates all

cultures. Moreover, the fact that the strongest cases come from regions of the world where

beliefs about reincarnation are not uncommon is well explained by the lack of a taboo in such

cultures in regards to belief in reincarnation. For centuries, American and European societies

117 Stevenson, European Cases of the Reincarnation Type, p. 71.

118 Stevenson, European Cases of the Reincarnation Type, p. 71. 119Joseph Pratt, “Memories of Another Life” in Naomi Hinzte and Joseph Pratt, Editors, The Psychic Realm: What Can You Believe? (New York, Random House, 1975), p. 253.


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have been, for the most part, dominated by orthodox forms of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam,

all of whom deny the reality of reincarnation. Factor in scientism and the general distrust towards

all paranormal phenomena amongst contemporary western intellectuals, and it should be no

surprise to learn that the strongest cases suggestive of reincarnation tend to come from

elsewhere.

Almeder’s Analysis of Reincarnation Research

In spite of the highly controversial nature of Stevenson’s research, the quality of the

evidence he and other researchers have accumulated has not gone unnoticed by all scientifically-

minded skeptics. For example, Carl Sagan wrote,

“At the time of writing there are three claims in the ESP field which, in my opinion,

deserve serious study: (1) that by thought alone humans can (barely) affect random

number generators in computers; (2) that people under mild sensory deprivation can

receive thoughts or images "projected" at them; and (3) that young children sometimes

report the details of a previous life, which upon checking turn out to be accurate and

which they could not have known about in any way other than reincarnation. I pick these

claims not because I think they're likely to be valid (I don't), but as examples of

contentions that might be true.”120

Just how strong of evidence do these cases provide for reincarnation? Almeder argues

that the evidence is very strong—in fact, compelling. In Beyond Death, Almeder focuses on four

particularly strong cases in reaching the conclusion that there is strong justification for belief in 120 Carl Sagan, The Demon-Haunted World, (New York: Random House, 1996), p. 300.


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reincarnation. One such case121 analyzed by Almeder involves Bishen Chand, a boy from

Bareilly, India who claimed to be Laxmi Narain, a man from Philbhit (a town fifty miles away

from Bareilly) who died a little over two years before Bishen was born. Word of Bishen’s case

reached a lawyer by the name of K.K.N. Sahay, who investigated the case and eventally took

Bishen (and his father and older brother) to Philbhit. Here are some of the stronger points of this

case noted by Almeder:

• In Philbhit, Bishen was taken to Laxmi’ school where he recognized which classroom

had been his and accurately described Laxmi’s old teacher as a “fat, bearded man”.122

• Bishen was taken to a house in Laxmi’s neighborhood that he had described as having

belonged to a man named Sander Lal, which was confirmed to have a “green gate” as

Bishen had previously claimed (before he was taken to Philbhit).123

• At Sander Lal’s place, Bishen pointed to the courtyard where he claimed the Nauch girls

used to entertain guests with song and dance, a fact confirmed by merchant’s who lived

in the area.124

• Bishen was asked about a treasure Laxmi’s father was thought to have hidden some time

before his death only to lead the way to a room in the family’s home that indeed

contained a “treasure of gold coins.”125

• Laxmi Narain’s mother met Bishen, questioned him, and became convinced he was the

reincarnation of her son. Bishen told her about the time he had thrown out her pickles and

121 Ian Stevenson, “Some New Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation II: The Case of Bishen Chand,” The Journal of the American Society of Psychic Research, 16 (1972), pp. 375-400. 122 Robert Almeder, Beyond Death (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1987), p. 10. 123 Almeder, Beyond Death, p. 10. 124 Almeder, Beyond Death, p. 10. 125 Almeder, Beyond Death, p. 10.


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also provided the correct name and an accurate description of Laxmi’s personal

servant.126

• Bishen often displayed adult-like behavior highly consistent with the aristocratic Laxmi,

such as drinking brandy, claiming to have had a mistress (and suggesting to his father that

he might think about getting one for himself), giving his father advice on purchasing a

watch (providing the name of a Muslim watch dealer in Philbhit), and demanding to be

dressed in silk rather than cotton clothes.127 Braude also notes that Bishen was said to

have “wept bitterly” upon seeing Laxmi’s former home, a description that, if accurate, is

“clearly distinguishable from childlike crying.”128

Another case from India129 Almeder analyzes is the case of a girl from named Swarnlata,

who spoke of a previous life as a member of the Pathak family from the town of Kanti. An

investigator (Sri H.N. Banerjee) discovered that the statements Swarnlata made about her past

life corresponded closely with the details of the life of a girl named Biya, a deceased Pathak

family member who died eight years before Swarnlata was born. In 1959, several Pathak family

members visited Swarnlata, who recognized each person, calling them all by their correct name.

Almeder states,

“[Swarnlata] related personal incidents and events in their various lives with Biya, events that, according to these relatives, only Biya could have known […] The Pathaks eventually accepted Swarnlata as Biya reincarnated even though they had never previously believed in the possibility of reincarnation.”130

Almeder notes that Swarnlata not only recognized twenty different people, but that most

126 Almeder, Beyond Death, p. 10. 127 Almeder, Beyond Death, p. 9. 128 Braude, Immortal Remains, p. 187. 129Stevenson, Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation, pp. 67-91. 130 Almeder, Beyond Death, p. 5.


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of these people she recognized by actually giving a name or describing a relation between Biya

and the person in question.131 He also notes how attempts were made to mislead her or to

convince her she gave the wrong answer, but they were never successful.132

Almeder considers several possible alternative explanations for strong cases like the ones

involving Swarnlata and Bishen Chand, and concludes that none of them are satisfactory. Firstly,

he considers the possibility of a hoax, such as a conspiracy involving the Pathaks and/or

Swarnlata’s family. He argues that neither family had anything to gain by participating in such a

hoax (except potential ridicule) and notes that the girl’s father was not pleased with the attention

he received and made no attempt to verify his daughter’s statements for a number of years.

Almeder also raises the question of how someone could have gone about preparing Swarnlata to

accurately recall details of her marriage and wedding. Moreover, Almeder suggests one

additional aspect of this case that counts against fraud—there are many cases like it. In other

words, how many cases can we explain away as extremely clever examples of fraud, all of which

somehow went undetected?

Similarly, Almeder argues that fraud is unlikely in the case of Bishen Chand, noting that

the Narains had become poor in the aftermath of Laxmi’s death, so that Bishen Chand’s family

had little to gain by associating with the Narain family.133 Almeder also mentions a point

Stevenson made about this case being especially strong because of the early statements recorded

by Sahay that he confirmed upon visiting Philbhit.134

After dismissing the possibility that these cases were hoaxes, Almeder then considers a

131 Almeder, Beyond Death, p. 5. 132 Almeder, Beyond Death, p. 5. 133 Almeder, Beyond Death, p. 11. 134 Almeder, Beyond Death, pp. 10-11.


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possible “clairvoyance plus subconscious impersonation” explanation. He argues that this would

require attributing “super-psi” (or “super-ESP”) to these children “in order to acquire such a

large number of correct details about the life, relatives, and circumstances of a dead person.”135

A problem with this supposition, according to Almeder, is that clairvoyance or ESP seems to be

a general ability, but in these cases the children only show knowledge with respect to a single

person’s past life. Furthermore, Almeder claims that the type of clairvoyance these children

would be attributed to in order to have given such a large number of confirmed details is of a

special kind ( super-psi or super-ESP) that takes a great deal of practice to develop.136 He also

argues that the accuracy of the claims made by these children far surpass the accuracy of any

clairvoyants, stating,

“The very best of clairvoyants make a predictable number of mistakes, whereas Swarnlata Bishen Chand made virtually no mistakes in their memory claims.”137

In addition, Almeder points out that none of the children in the cases he analyzes showed

any signs of having such a general ability for impersonation. He argues that the

clairvoyance/subconscious impersonation thesis entails these young children have a specialized

ability to imitate exactly one person, without having a general ability to imitate traits of other

personalities as well. Almeder concludes that, apart from confirming the skeptic’s bias against

reincarnation, “there is no reason to think that such a specialized ability exists.”138

Almeder also considers the possibility that genetic memory somehow facilitated these

memories. According to this line of argument, the skeptic claims that “the memories of our

ancestors are coded in our genes […and] under certain circumstances the inhibitors of these traits

135 Almeder, Beyond Death, p. 13. 136 Almeder, Beyond Death, pp. 13-14. 137 Almeder, Beyond Death, p. 14. 138 Almeder, Beyond Death, p. 14.


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are relaxed and the memories of our ancestors emerge.”139 Almeder concedes that this

explanation might work to explain the remembering of how to do certain things (such as

speaking in a foreign language or playing a musical instrument), but rejects it as applicable to the

cases he analyzes, which show no genetic line between the child and the person whose past life

he or she remembers.140

Almeder concludes that the failure of the skeptic’s alternative explanations for the strong

cases he examines justifies a very strong conclusion. While acknowledging the virtue of being

somewhat cautious due to the extraordinary nature of the proposal, he says that “it seems

excessively cautious to think that the belief in reincarnation is not established […and that] the

only conclusion we should endorse is that it is unreasonable to accept any belief other than

reincarnation in order to explain the above cases.”141

However, in his conclusion to Beyond Death, Almeder suggests that the evidence from

reincarnation research alone might be insufficient for the justification of a robust belief in life

after death were it not for all the other lines of evidence-based arguments. He states,

“The force of the case for life after death rests on the whole body of evidence viewed as a set of arguments. Each argument is like a thread which, of itself, would be incapable of carrying the full weight of the belief in life after death. Bound together, however, they make a strong cord that can lift that belief from the realm of superstition and thoughtless commitment.”142

The other lines of evidence Almeder refers to includes research into cases of apparitions

of the dead, possessions, mediumship, and out-of-body experiences (including NDE’s).

However, even without taking into account these other lines of evidence, Almeder’s analysis of 139 Almeder, Beyond Death, p. 15. 140 Almeder, Beyond Death, p. 16. 141 Almeder, Beyond Death, p. 17. 142 Almeder, Beyond Death, p. 75.


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reincarnation research alone poses a challenge to the skeptic to show how any alternative

explanation can possibly explain these cases as well as the reincarnation hypothesis. An appeal

to the principle of causal closure only begs the question in favor of a materialist or naturalist

worldview at the expense of ignoring highly pertinent evidence to the debate. At some point, an

inference to the best explanation must carry the day; thus, barring either another plausible

explanation for these cases or a good independent argument that shows reincarnation to be either

an incoherent explanation and/or inconsistent with all relevant evidence, the most reasonable

position on the table seems to be that some souls reincarnate. Agnosticism towards reincarnation

remains an option, of course, although this position would only be justified if one can provide an

independent argument for the virtue of skepticism over the acceptance the most plausible

available explanation.

Paranormal Evidence for the Afterlife: A Tentative Conclusion

I submit that contemporary research into NDE’s and children’s memories of past lives

provides sufficient justification for the belief in life after death. These two fields of research

present independent lines of evidence for an afterlife that includes, at least for some, a process of

rebirth into a new life on earth. NDE research has provided evidence of conscious experience

occurring in the absence of the neurophysiological activity that is typically required for waking

states to occur. Reincarnation research, on the other hand, provides powerful evidence that some

souls reincarnate. Taken together, these two lines of research pose a challenge to central

underlying assumptions of orthodox western approaches to both science and religion.

An intriguing convergence point between these two lines of evidence comes from


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research into rare cases of children who remember intermediary stages between their previous

life and their birth into their current life. Sharma and Tucker found that these children who

reported an intermediary stage tended to make more verifiable statements about their past lives

than children who claimed to remember a past life but had no memory of an intermediary

stage.143 Furthermore, they also discovered significant overlap between details of these

intermediary stage reports and universal features of NDE’s (such as entering another world or

dimension, encountering beings of light, the presence of a guide).144 Sharma and Tucker argue

that these similarities suggest the intermediary reports “need to be considered as part of the same

overall phenomenon—reports of the afterlife—that encompasses NDE’s.”145 They also show

how these findings seem to undermine a common objection to survivalist interpretations of

NDE’s:

“In fact, the argument that NDErs create their fantasies of an afterlife as a defense against the confrontation with death is weakened by the similar intermission reports. The subjects in these cases are young children who have not been close to death and in fact would not be thought able to comprehend the concept of death; yet their reports bear many similarities to NDE reports, thus posing a problem for psychological explanations offered for NDEs. Likewise, the neurophysiological explanations [such as the ‘dying brain’ hypothesis] that have been offered cannot explain the similar reports from healthy, young children.”146 The convergence of these two quite different types of evidence for life after death adds to

the ‘coherence-of-all-evidence’ argument Almeder finds decisive. There’s no doubt that good

evidence–based arguments drawing from other paranormal phenomena would only strengthen 143Poonam Sharma and Jim Tucker, "Cases of the Reincarnation Type with Memories from the Intermission between Lives," Journal of Near-Death Studies 23.2 (2004), pp.101-118. 144 Sharma and Tucker, "Cases of the Reincarnation Type with Memories from the Intermission between Lives,” pp. 110-11. 145 Sharma and Tucker, "Cases of the Reincarnation Type with Memories from the Intermission between Lives,” p. 116. 146 Sharma and Tucker, "Cases of the Reincarnation Type with Memories from the Intermission between Lives,” p. 117.


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the case for survival, but even without making use of such evidence, NDE’s and reincarnation

research provide enough evidence to justify rational belief in life after death. However, there are

a few considerations render agnosticism towards an afterlife a viable option. Firstly, Almeder’s

strong conclusion regarding reincarnation (that reincarnation is the only reasonable explanation

of the strongest cases) fails to confirm an afterlife for all since it is still possible that only some

souls—perhaps even a small percentage— actually reincarnate. Moreover, Braude’s fart analogy

can be extended to cases suggestive of reincarnation; perhaps there is no soul, self, or individual

that survives in these cases, but rather the elements of the human personality (such as memory,

character traits, likes and dislikes, beliefs, passions, etc.) continue to have an existence of their

own for some time after the death of the organism that produced them and somehow young

children gain access to them. Although this quasi-Buddhist/Humean explanation might not

ultimately be as plausible as reincarnation, it does avoid Almeder’s criticisms of the super psi

and genetic memory hypotheses.

Nevertheless, the establishment of sufficient, if not overwhelming, rational justification

for rational belief in the afterlife is all that is needed if there is also good reason to believe in the

existence of God. This follows not only from the establishment of rational justification for belief

in the afterlife, but also from the fact that the existence of God would rule out causal closure of

the physical, which in turn renders top-down theories of consciousness (such as substance

dualism) more plausible than the bottom-up physicalist theories that are currently in vogue in

contemporary philosophy of mind. Moreover, the plausibility of substance dualism renders life

after death a less extraordinary claim than it otherwise might seem, which means there would be

less justification for skepticism towards empirical evidence that suggests that a soul, spirit, or

mind survives the death of the body.


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Arguments For and Against the Existence of a Creator-God: An Introduction

Traditionally, there have been four main arguments put forth for the existence of God—

the cosmological, design, ontological, and moral arguments—and one main argument against the

existence of God—the problem of evil. I will be setting aside the moral argument on account of

the Euthyphro dilemma—the problem of whether or not moral and ethical principles are good

because they match God’s will or if God approves of these ethical principles because they are

good—and focusing on the other three. But first, I will examine the problem of evil and

introduce a solution to the problem from process theology response that also can be applied to

Proclus Creator-God.

The problem of evil, widely considered to be the most powerful objection to orthodox

forms of Christianity, is succinctly stated by Hick:

“If God is perfectly loving, God must wish to abolish all evil; and if God is all-powerful,

God must be able to abolish all evil. But evil exists; therefore God cannot be both

omnipotent and perfectly loving.”147

Orthodox theists can attempt to neutralize this objection by (a) placing limits on God’s

power and knowledge, or (b) making room for free-will (often as part of a soul-building

hypothesis that entails the enduring of hardships in this life as part of preparation for the

afterlife148). However, as Corlett notes149, (b) seems rather ad hoc. Furthermore, even if there is

good reason to believe in an afterlife, the wide discrepancy between the ‘have’s’ and ‘have not’s’ 147 John Hick, Philosophy of Religion (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, 1990), p. 40. 148 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: Harper &Row Publishing, 1978), pp. 46-7. 149 Corlett (2010) p. 130.


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throughout human history renders the problem of evil relevant. Why should soul-building for an

afterlife require such wide inequality in this life? Moreover, it’s not at all clear why soul-building

for the next world should require the amount150 of evil and suffering that has existed throughout

human history, both natural and non-natural. Of course, due to the existence of non-natural evil,

free-will most likely play a vital role in any plausible theodicy. Nevertheless, the weakness of

the soul-building argument shows how traditional responses rooted in orthodox theologies often

lead to a highly problematic application of the concept of free-will.

Regarding (a), as Mackie acknowledges151, if one is willing to place greater limits than

orthodox theologies typically place on either God’s power or goodness, than the problem of evil

can be neutralized. Process theology seeks to neutralize the problem of evil by placing greater

restrictions on God’s power (and knowledge) in order to preserve God’s status as

omnibenevolent. [Introduce Hick quote describing process theism]:

“God is subject to the limitations imposed by the basic laws of the universe, for God has not created the universe ex nihilo, thereby establishing its structure, but rather the universe is an uncreated process which includes the deity.”152

Because of these limitations, God cannot directly control the entire cosmos and its

creatures, which means he can’t be held accountable for all the evil in the world. Since the

creation entails a “struggle with the primordial chaos” the cause of the evil in the world can be

attributed to “eternal necessities, not matters of divine fiat.”153

150 Not to mention kinds of evil, such as the abuse of children; see Corlett, The Errors of Atheism, pp. 130-31. 151 J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 151. 152 Hick (1990), p. 49. 153 Hick (1990), p. 49


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Proclus Creator-God

Proclus’ Creator God is subject to similar limitations in that he inherits disorderly matter

which he furnishes with “definition and form”.154 Proclus’ Creator-God is a contemplative mind

that is situated at the “tail-end of the timeless intelligible domain”155 who, like the Platonic

demiurge of the Timaeus, creates “by appealing to a paradigm, or pattern, which for Proclus lies

at the highest intelligible level.”156 In this way, Proclus’ Creator-God is simultaneously

contemplative and creative.

Unlike the God of process theology, the Creator-God is situated within a hierarchical

metaphysical structure that (with perhaps a few modifications) is capable of accounting for the

full range of human religious experience. This feature of Proclus’ Creator-God allows for a

response to Hick’s ‘risk’ objection that affirms the suffering and (so-called) evil that ensued from

creation was worth the risk on account of allowing Buddha’s to come into existence—BAT-

Selves that are awake and leading “innkeepers and fishmongers in the way of the Buddha” (add

reference). Later, in the appendix, I will show how Proclus’ Creator God can be used as a model

for an ongoing state of enlightenment in the everyday world.

Arguments for the Existence of God

The ontological argument originates with Anselm, who argued that the conceivability of

God as a perfect being (or “maximally great”) leads to the conclusion that God exists. In his

154 Siorvanes (1996), p. 148. 155 Siorvanes (1996), p. 148. 156 Siorvanes (1996), p. 151.


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second (and stronger) version of the argument, Anselm refers to God’s unique status as

necessarily existent. He states,

“For something can be thought to exist that cannot be thought not to exist. Hence, if that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought can be thought not to exist, then that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought is not the same as that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, which is absurd. Something-than-which-a-grater-cannot-be-thought exists so truly then, that it cannot be even thought not to exist.”157

Gaunilon provided a famous reductio absurdum objection to Anselm’s argument, arguing

that this same argument could be used as a proof that a perfect island could be said to exist.

Anslem’s replied to Gaunilon by arguing that necessary existence could not apply to an island.

Hick explains Anselm’s defense, stating,

“The element in the idea of God which is lacking in the notion of the most perfect island is necessary existence. Descartes formulated a more popular An island […] is by definition part of the contingent world. The most perfect island, so long as it is genuinely an island—‘a piece of land surrounded by water’ and thus part of the physical globe—is by definition a dependent reality, which can without contradiction be thought not to exist; and therefore Anselm’s principle does not apply to it.”158

Descartes provided his own version of the ontological argument in which he asserted

existence to be a predicate or property that either belonged or didn’t belong to subjects, which in

turn fueled Kant’s159 famous objection that the idea of existence is not a predicate like other

attributes in that it does not “add anything to the concept of a particular thing or kind of

thing.”160 This means that in order the assertion “God exists” involves more than merely

157 Anselm, Proslogion translated by M.J. Charlesworth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965, and University of Notre Dame Press), ch. 3. Quoted from Hick (1990), p. 16. 158 Hick (1990), p. 17. 159 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan & Company Ltd., 1933, and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1969), “Transcendental Dialectic,” Book II, Chap. 3, Sec. 4. 160 Hick (1990), p. 18.


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referring to the concept of God, but rather demands one goes “outside that concept in order to

ascribe existence to the object.”161

Thus, the ontological argument suffers from an objection that essentially states that it’s

inappropriately circular to define God into existence. However, Corlett argues that this charge of

circularity can “softened” if it turns out that that the argument is “more virtuous than vicious

[…in that it is] explanatorily powerful.”162 Circularity, then, might not be an ultimately decisive

reason to reject the ontological argument. However, in order for the ontological arguments for

the existence of God to have explanatory power, it will be necessary to provide further

arguments for God’s existence to establish the explanatory power of the God’s existence.

The cosmological argument for the existence of God has many forms, but the basic idea

behind them all is that the existence of the existence of the universe seems to have required a

cause, and then posits God as that first cause. Leibniz provides one popular form of this

argument that relies on the distinction between contingency and necessity, as well as the

principle of sufficient reason, which states that nothing happens without a sufficient reason for it

to have happened. Thus, according to this argument, God exists as the necessarily existing being

that brought the world into existence.

Mackie presents two lines of criticisms against this argument. The first questions the

principle of sufficient reason as well as the notion of a necessarily existing being. The difficulty

with asserting the latter undermines the intuition behind the former. Mackie states,

“These challenges are related: if the second question cannot be answered satisfactorily, it will follow that things as a whole cannot have a sufficient reason, not merely that we do

161 Macke (1982), p. 49. 162 Corlett (2010), p. 126.


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not know that they must have one.”163

The second line of criticism against Leibniz’ version of the cosmological argument

comes from Kant, who argues that the idea of a “necessarily existing being” presupposes that

existence can be an essential feature or predicate of an object, which means that Leibniz’

cosmological argument depends upon a key assumption of the ontological argument challenged

by Kant. If Kant’s criticism is successful, than Leibniz might need to provide a way of

establishing how something can contain its own sufficient reason for existing without having

existence built into the concept itself. However, this might not be necessary, depending upon

how one accounts for the success of Kant’s criticism of the ontological argument, as Mackie

explains, when he states,

“But if the outcome of the successful criticism of the ontological proof were merely that we cannot validly start from a mere concept and thence derive actual existence—if we allowed that there was nothing illegitimate about the concept of a being whose essence includes existence, and insisted only that whatever a concept contains, it is always a further question whether there is something that instantiates it—then the cosmological proof would be unaffected by this criticism.”164

Leibniz is not merely defining God into existence (as Anselm and Descartes have been

accused of doing in their ontological arguments) but is providing an argument for postulating a

necessarily existing being. Thus, in order to refute Leibniz’s version of the cosmological

argument, it is necessary to undermine the principle of sufficient reason. Mackie argues that that

this principle demands that the universe be “intelligible through and through,”165 which goes

beyond the intelligibility of the universe presupposed by science, where certain brute facts are

acceptable. Mackie argues that a principle that “every occurrence has a preceding sufficient

163 Mackie (1982), p. 82. 164 Mackie (1982), p. 83. 165 Mackie (1982), p. 85.


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cause” is consistent with an infinite series of events going back in time. Thus, if the universe had

no beginning, the principle of sufficient reason is not required to explain all that has occurred in

the history of the universe.

The cosmological argument is a much stronger argument than the ontological argument,

but nevertheless still faces strong objections. Ultimately, the plausibility of the argument depends

on whether or not one finds a need to terminate the regress (Buddhists, for example, could just

accept the regress in the name of dependent origination), and furthermore whether or not one

finds “God” to be an adequate entity in which to terminate the regress. Mackie, in rejecting the

“first cause” argument, argues that this latter point is decisive. He states,

“But the greatest weakness of this otherwise attractive argument is that some reason is required for making God the one exception to the supposed need for something else to depend on: why should God, rather than anything else, be taken as the only satisfactory termination of the regress?”166

Mackie raises an important objection to orthodox Christian theology, which asserts a

creation ex nihilo, unlike Proclus’ Creator God and the God of process theology. Proclus’ Neo-

Platonic metaphysics provides an answer to the first cause in the form of a higher metaphysical

principle than the Creator-God, which sets the stage for metaphysical arguments that unity and

oneness are the fundamental starting point of reality. This line of argumentation, however, is not

only complicated and controversial, but also unnecessary to establish the plausibility of a limited

Creator-God such as in Proclus’s hierarchical system or process theology. All that is needed is to

establish the plausibility of some kind of first cause that is not subject to the laws of nature,

along with additional reasons for thinking that intelligent design played a role in the unfolding of

the universe. This follows if we agree (setting aside any premature conclusions drawn from our

166 Mackie (1982), p. 92.


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incomplete physical theories) that the physical universe may or may not have had a beginning—

that both possibilities seem to be relatively equally plausible. If this is agreed upon, then if we

had good reason to believe some kind of intelligent design played a role in the development of

the universe, than the hypothesis that was likely some kind of first cause responsible for the

beginning or setting in motion of the unfolding of the cosmos. In this way, the cosmological

argument can be used to establish a weak conclusion that there is good reason to believe in the

existence of some kind of first cause that sufficiently explains the existence of the universe, in

there were another good argument (the design or teleological argument) for the existence of a

Creator-God. Thus, the existence of God seems to turn on the final argument for the existence of

God I will examine, the teleological argument.

The design argument has ancient roots (it’s as least as old as Plato’s Timaeus), but was

popularized in the modern period by Haley167 and his famous watchmaker analogy. The basic

idea is that if one were to find a watch and examine the way its parts are fitted together they

would naturally assume it was the product of an intelligent creator—that someone with a mind

made the watch. Paley says the same inference can be drawn by noting the similarity between the

watch and the machine-like features of living creatures. This argument was largely considered to

be persuasive until Darwin’s On the Origin of Species provided a naturalistic explanation for the

complicated mechanisms of living creatures. For this reason, many fundamentalists refuse to

accept evolutionary theory and even try to prevent it from being taught in schools.

However, weaker version of the design argument can be made that accept evolutionary

theory. For example, one could deny that the process was unguided or argue that intelligent

167 William Paley, Natural Theology: or Evidences of the Existence and Attribtes of the Deity Collected from the Appearances of Nature (1802).


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design is a better explanation for the origin of life than abiogenesis. But perhaps a stronger

approach is to argue that evidence for intelligent design can be found in the very existence of

solar systems with life permitting conditions. The strength of this argument in found in evidence

from contemporary cosmology that suggests the universe was “finely-tuned” to allow such life-

permitting conditions. Bradley succinctly summarizes this evidence, when he states,

“The fundamental constants that are involved in the laws of physics which describe our universe are finely tuned for life, in the sense that if some of the constants had slightly different values life could not exist.”168

The idea is that it seems implausible that all these constants happened to have such

remarkably precise values by chance, so an inference to an intelligent designer who

(metaphorically speaking) “hand his hands on the dials” of the constants and tuned them so that

suns and solar systems would eventually come into existence, which in turn allowed for life-

permitting conditions to emerge in the universe. Theists argue that it’s up to the atheist to explain

the precise value of such constants, which include things like “the masses of the fundamental

particles and the strength ratios between the fundamental forces.”169 Atheists have offered many

objections to the fine-tuning arguments, such as positing the existence of an infinite number of

multiple universes, which means that it was inevitable that one with all these constants would

emerge.170 If nothing else, the popularity of this response shows the force of the fine-tuning

argument—positing an infinite amount of universes in order to explain away evidence for 168 Bradley Monton, “God, Fine-tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57.2 (2006), p. 405. 169 Monton (2006), p. 405.

170 J.J.C. Smart, “Atheism and Theism”, in J. J. C. Smart and J. J. Haldane (eds), Atheism and Theism, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 164-67. Eliot Sober, “The Design Argument,” in N. Manson, God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science (London: Routledge 2003), pp. 27-54.


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intelligent design seem an ad hoc maneuver, even if it turns out to be true?

Ultimately, the strength of the fine-tuning argument would seem to depend on the

strength of the replies to the objections that have been put forward (and will likely continue to be

put forward). Monton argues that, although the fine-tuning presents a “powerful argument”, it

nevertheless remains “reasonable to not be surprised” by evidence for fine-tuning since we

“already knew that there are many possible universes that are not life-permitting.”171

Unfortunately, I am currently unable to assess his “probabilistic” argument due to his use of

Bayes’ theorum (and other formal procedures I do not understand). Thus, I am inclined to

commit myself to agnosticism in regards to the fine-tuning argument, and by extension the

teleological argument, cosmological argument. Therefore, I cannot at this time confirm the

existence of Proclus’ Creator-God by means of the traditional arguments for the existence of

God.

However, not only can I not disconfirm the existence of Proclus’ Creator-God at this

time, there are a few considerations that suggest it might be able to confirm it. Firstly, science

cannot tell us why there something instead of nothing, if God exists, or (most likely) whether or

not the idea of beauty is a fundamental reality or a mere construct. That’s not to say that the

results of science should in no way influence the philosophical arguments over these issues, but

rather merely to point out that these questions are metaphysical and therefore cannot be wholly

determined by way of the scientific method. Secondly, in spite of evolution having had a very

significant negative impact on the teleological argument for God’s existence (which many hold

would be persuasive were it not for the development of evolutionary theory), the results of

contemporary science have not rendered the traditional arguments for the existence of God more 171 Monton (2006), p. 420.


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implausible than they were at the beginning of the 20th Century; in fact, the teleological

argument may have been significantly strengthened by the discovery of the “finely-tuned”

cosmological arguments. Lastly, the evidence of the survival of a soul, mind, or spirit after the

death of the body is strong enough to render the possible existence of an immaterial mind such as

Proclus’ Creator-God, which in turn undermines justification for atheism (viz. the undermining

materialism).

CONCLUSION

Concerns Regarding Confirmation Bias

Any responsible scientist needs to be aware of the possibility that there bias might be pre-

determining their results. This project certainly entails such a risk, so it’s worth making a few

comments about my own bias and the effect it may have had on my experiment.

Firstly, regarding Perez-Remon’s “relative anatta” interpretation of the Nikayas, I first

heard of this book from an online source, a blog I think, where some very arrogant blogger was

claiming that the Buddha was not a “soul-denying” humanist, but actually affirmed the reality of

a Self. This source mentioned Perez-Remon as a scholar who had argued this point, leading me

to look for (and find) Perez-Remon’s book in the SDSU library. I was expecting to find some

major errors in his book, as I was a firm believer that the Buddha denied any reality to a self.

Thus, I had a bias against Perez-Remon’s interpretation before reading his book. However, I

quickly came to respect his work, and even more so when I picked up Harvey’s book and noticed


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a couple of inadequate attempts to refute Perez-Remon’s interpretation. In this way, my bias

shifted in that I was initially hoping to disprove Perez-Remon’s interpretation, although the

quality of his exegetical work eventually led me to want to confirm his interpretation. However,

towards the end of my experiment, I began to feel somewhat apathetic about the results of this

part of the experiment, at times almost sad for all those Buddhists who deeply believed in the

absolute anatta doctrine. So many Buddhists believed in a chain of interpretation going back

through the Zen and Ch’an traditions, to Indian Buddhism and Nagarjuna, and even some of the

early Theravada commentators, all of whom were sorely mistaken if indeed Perez-Remon’s

interpretation turned out to be correct. In class, as I presented the results of part I of my

experiment in my penultimate report, I found myself much more nervous than I usually get when

presenting in front of a class, even shaking a little. This nervousness abided when I moved on to

parts II and III, although that could be because I simply became comfortable as time went on.

Nevertheless, it’s fair to say that I have mixed feelings about the results of part I of this

experiment; hopefully this kept any confirmation bias from skewing the results.

As for part II of this experiment, I am indeed sympathetic to Proclus’ metaphysical

scheme, which I have long felt is the most impressive attempt in the history of philosophy to

formulate a complete metaphysical system that shows that we live in an intelligible and caring

cosmos. I’m also a big fan of Proclus’ exegetical work on Homer, which I feel is seriously

underrated. However, it’s not clear how this bias influenced this part of the experiment, since I

made a firm commitment to keep the Buddha’s model of enlightenment at all costs, which meant

modifying one of Proclus’ key concepts to accommodate the BAT-Self hypothesis.

Part III is where confirmation bias might have skewed the results of my experiment, since

(like most people) I would be very pleased to learn that there exists both a God and an afterlife.


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However, as a former “true-believer” in orthodox Christianity, I also have long been suspicious

of anthropomorphic and anti-scientific approaches to theology, and even somewhat

uncomfortable with the work “God”, preferring terms like “the One” and “Contemplative-

Creative Intellect”. Some years ago, I also had a pre-existing bias against belief in reincarnation,

which is perhaps why in recent years I had paid much more attention to NDE research than to

reincarnation studies, in spite of being well-aware of the shocking results and reputable methods

used by Stevenson. Still, I find reviewing cases suggestive of reincarnation provide me far less

“comfort” than NDE cases do, even though the former provides significantly stronger evidence

for survival than does the latter.

Mackie is regarded as one of the strongest atheist apologists from the 20th Century

(Corlett has said that Mackie had a huge influence on his leaving the church), so making him a

major source was an effective move to counter any risks incurred by confirmation bias. I was

unable to find any comparably competent skeptics regarding research into NDE’s and cases

suggestive of reincarnation, so the risk of confirmation bias in those sections might be greater.

Still, overall I hope to have looked at the data objectively and reached the most reasonable

conclusions given all available evidence.

The Results of this Experiment

This experiment consisted of several separate experiments, all of which were needed to

confirm the BAT-Self hypothesis. In Part I, I found tentative confirmation for the Perez-Remon

interpretation of a relative anatta doctrine which affirms the reality of a wholly non-empirical

self. This conclusion presumes that the Buddha indeed had a metaphysical doctrine of self, which


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has been challenged by some who argue that the practical nature of the Buddha’s anatta doctrine

precludes attributing any metaphysical position to the Buddha in regards to a self whatsoever.

Furthermore, although Harvey (and Rahula) failed to adequately defend the absolute anatta

interpretation, someone else still might come along with better text-based arguments that might

force me to reconsider my conclusion.

Part II was more of a preparatory stage for testing of the BAT-Self, but none the less a

central part of the experiment in that its success made possible a way of testing the BAT-Self

hypothesis by testing Proclus’ Neo-Platonic metaphysical system. This is the stage where

confirmation bias might have played a very significant role, so it will behoove me in going

forward to subject this “marriage” between Proclus’ metaphysics and the Buddha’s model of

enlightenment to greater scrutiny. Nevertheless, I think this part of the experiment was

successful in at least showing that it’s possible to reconcile the Buddha’s model of enlightenment

with a Neo-Platonic metaphysical scheme, with a few modifications.

In part III, I (surprisingly) was able to confirm (however tentatively) the existence of an

afterlife, although I was not able to confirm the existence of God. However, I came away

believing that the existence of a Creator-God was more likely than I previously believed, largely

because of the strength of the evidence for life after death. Furthermore, there is a line of

argumentation (the fine-tuning argument) that has developed in recent years that appears as if it

may present stronger support for the existence of a Creator-God than was previously available.

All this points towards the need for further experimentation, into NDE’s and reincarnation

research, as well as other fields of paranormal research; further experimentation with arguments

for and against the existence of God are needed, especially in regard to the issue of fine-tuning.


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Therefore, this experiment provides a foundation for further experimentation on all

fronts. The several mini-experiments needed to confirm the BAT-Self need to be repeated

numerous times if the hypothesis is going to attain the reliable status of a good scientific theory.

Moreover, further experiments will need to be devised to test this hypothesis from all angles.

Nevertheless, with the groundwork for a BAT-Self hypothesis in place, this experiment has

finally come to an end.

APPENDIX: ANSWERING THE BUDDHA’S “UNANSWERED QUESTION”

Pure Consciousness Events and Parinibbana

Finally, I will now attempt to provide an answer to the “unanswered question” regarding

the fate of the tathgata after death. Part of this answer has already been provided by Proclus’

doctrine of the perpetual descent of the wise and enlightened to help others, but that’s only half

of the story. The other half involves providing an answer to the question “what’s it like to enter

parinibbana?” In this way, I provide an answer to the question of what it’s like for the BAT-Self

to do nothing but what is essential to it.

The answer for this question comes from contemporary scholarship on mystical

experience, where a debate ensued in the late 20th Century over whether or not all mystical or

religious experience was in some way constructed. Perrentialists (such as James, Stace, and

Forman) hold that there is an unmediated experience that is universal and occurs independently

of any beliefs, expectations, or cultural influences. Contructivists (such as Katz and Gimello), on


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the other hand, argue that there are “no pure (i.e. unmediated) experiences.”172 Katz argues that

language shapes all our experiences, stating,

“Neither mystical nor more ordinary forms of experience give any indication, nor any grounds for believing, that they are unmediated. That is to say, all experience is processed through, organized by, and makes itself available to us in extremely complex epistemological ways. The notion of unmediated experience seems, if not self-contradictory, at best absurd.”173

In an attempt to show that Katz is wrong and that there are unmediated experiences, some

scholars have made use of the concept of pure consciousness events (PCE’s)—purported

samadhi states that involve no content whatsoever. The possible existence of pure consciousness

events (PCE’s) has been a hot topic of de-bate amongst contemporary scholars of

religious/mystical experiences the past several decades. Robert Forman, a preeminent supporter

of PCE’s in peer-reviewed religious studies literature, defines these states as ‘wakeful

contentless consciousness’174, and claims they are relatively common and mark a ‘rudimentary’

stage, in contrast to ‘more advanced mystical phenomenon.’175 In Mysticism, Mind,

Consciousness, Forman provides interviews with two subjects who reported having PCE’s, as

well as an autobiographical account.176 All of these accounts describe a time in which the

subject has no memory, yet nevertheless each person is certain they were not asleep during that

time, but wide awake. In fact, the fundamental claim that Forman and those he interviewed made

about their PCE’s was not that they were conscious or aware, but that they were awake. For

example, in his account of his own experience, Forman states, 172 Steven Katz, Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 26. 173 Katz (1978), p. 26. 174 R.K. Forman, ‘Introduction: mysticism, constructivism, and forgetting’, in R.K. Forman (ed.), The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy (1990): pp. 3-49, at 21. 175 R.K. Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness (New York, 1999), p. 7. 176Forman (1999), 20-30


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‘I am driven to say I am awake for two reasons. First, I emerge with a quiet, intuited certainty that I was continually present, that there was an unbroken continuity of experience or of consciousness throughout the meditation period, even if there were period from which I had no particular memories…The second reason I am driven to say I am awake therein is that there is a difference in how I feel after a meditation in which this occurs and after a meditation in which I fall asleep. After a sleep in meditation I wake up groggy, and it takes a good while for my mind to clear full alertness. On the other hand, after one of these experiences I am clearheaded, and indeed my perceptions have more clarity and vibrancy than usual. I also feel especially calm.’177

Forman interviews one man (a Zen Abbot) who man describes sitting for 6 hours only to

emerge with absolutely no memory of anything that happened, but also with supreme confidence

that he was awake the throughout the event.(Forman p22-23) In fact, the fundamental claim that

Forman and those he interviewed made about their PCE’s was not that they were conscious or

aware, but that they were awake. Indeed, if we are to take the Zen Abbot Forman interviewed at

his word we couldn’t even call the PCE an experience, since he remembers nothing of it in spite

of being awake. However, we can ask him about the experience of what it’s like to come out of

the PCE, to which he has already given a response, stating,

“I was feeling just feeling totally elated, just wonderful. All my questions and my

problems had dissolved. All my problems I tried to bring them up and they just weren’t

there anymore.”178(p. 27)

So although there is no answer to the question of what it’s like to have a PCE, there is an

answer to what it’s like to come out of a PCE, and the answer is that it is not only quite different

than awakening from sleep, but more like becoming aware of being in a supremely wakeful state.

This state, I hypothesize, provides a partial answer to the “unanswered question” of the state of

the tathgata after death—he goes into a PCE, a state of pure wakefulness from which nothing can 177 Forman (1999), pp. 20-21 178 Forman (1999), p. 27.


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be remembered. If this is what parinibbana is like, then there would be good reason for the

Buddha to have kept his silence on the matter, not only because no words could do it justice, but

because the notion of a desirable yet wholly content-free experience would likely have been a

tough sell. Moreover, if the Buddha acknowledged the need to return as did Proclus and

Iamblichus, he would have a further reason to keep his silence, since a straightforward answer

would mean saying that parinibbana is something one can never remember, but also not a state

one can stay in forever. That is, it’s not really final nibbana after all.

Of course, this is all speculation and any hope of discovering whether or not this was the

Buddha’s doctrine is very remote, but the coherence of this model makes it rather appealing as a

doctrine that might very well be worth adopting for its own merits. The BAT-Self cannot have

any intrinsic nature that can be positively identified as “that” or “this”. But a waking condition in

which there is no experiential content to even be remembered is consistent with the notion of a

BAT-Self. Moreover, this scenario identifies one intrinsic property as belonging to the BAT-

SELF—wakefulness. This suggests that we are by nature “awake” already, but just not yet aware

of it.

A Wakeful Descent: Forman’s “Dualistic” Model of Enlightenment

According to the BAT-Self hypothesis, in coming out of a PCE one realizes the empty

yet wakeful nature of the self, reflects on it, and thus attains knowledge of enlightenment.

Forman examines cases wherein apprehension of the self as empty continues for the rest of one’s

life in an ongoing state of enlightenment. He provides four examples of this, one of which


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includes a description of an experience of an American named Bernadette Roberts, who

described the following experience:

“On previous occasions, I had come upon a pervasive silence of the faculties so total as to give rise to subtle apprehensions of fear. It was a fear of being engulfed forever, of being lost, annihilated or blacking out and, possibly, never returning […On one particular afternoon, as I was concluding a meditation,] once again there was a pervasive silence and once again I waited for the onset of fear to break it up. But this time the fear never came[…]Within, all was still, silent and motionless. In the stillness, I was not aware of the moment when the fear and tension left.[…] Once outside, I fully expected to return to my ordinary energies and thinking mind, but this day I had a difficult time because I was continually falling back into the great silence.”179

Roberts continued to remain aware of this great silence—it became a permanent feature

of her conscious life. Even while “walking, talking, laughing, crying, and even […] cutting

carrots.”180 Forman calls this a “Dualistic Mystical State” and defines it as “an unchanging

interior silence that is maintained concurrently with intentional experience in a long-term or

permanent way.”181 Later, he equates this awareness of interior silence with “a knowledge-by-

identity of an empty (nonintentional) consciousness along with an intentional knowledge of the

world.”182 Forman argues that this permanent dualistic enlightenment state coheres with Ramana

Maharshi’s sahajua samadhi183 and is what Hui-Neng was talking about when he said “no

thought [wu-nien] is not to think even when involved in thought.”184

Thus, Forman provides a model for an ongoing state of enlightenment which consists in

the continuous awareness of the emptiness of a nonintentional self without abandoning the world

179 Forman (1999), p. 134. Quoted from Bernadette Roberts, The Experience of No-Self (Boston: Shambala, 1984), p. 20. 180 Forman (1999), p. 134. 181 Forman (1999), p. 151. 182 Forman (1999), p. 167. 183 Forman (1999), p. 6. 184 Hui Neng, Platform Sutra, Forman (1999), p. 137.


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of intentional thoughts, actions, behavior, and worldly knowledge. This dualist model mirrors the

contemplative and creative aspects of Proclus’ Creator-God, who simultaneously contemplates

and creates. Forman’s model therefore can be adapted or fitted to explain Proclus’ Creator-God’s

state of mind in His continuous creation of the cosmos, which would essentially make Proclus’

Creator-God a Buddha too, and hence a God whose continuous activity and state of mind serves

as a model for enlightenment. Whether or not these features are true to the experience Proclus

and other Neo-Platonists associated with divine contemplation is another matter (and worthy of

its own separate experiment), since my project is to adapt the Buddha’s model of enlightenment

to Proclus’ Neo-Platonic metaphysical system.

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