civil cases compilation

7/25/2019 Civil Cases Compilation

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Batch 2014 2015 Compilation of Jurisprudence on Civil Law

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Ad maiorem Dei gloriam

Contents

GENERAL PRINCIPLES 10

Prejudicial question 10

Principle of Abuse of Rights 11Pure civil actions under the Civil Code 12

Article 26 and the declaration of nullity of marriage in a foreign judgment 14

Foreign Divorce 14Declaration of presumptive death 16

Declaration of Presumptive Death, what constitutes well-founded belief 17

Who are Juridical Persons 18

Distinctions between void and voidable marriage 19

Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages; real party in interest 20

Lack of Marriage License 21

Judicial decalration of nullity as requirement for remarriage 22Definition and scope of Psychological Incapacity 23Sexual promiscuity as psychological incapacity 23Factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations 23Collusion 24

Relevance of expert opinion 24

Other evidence for psychological incapacity must be presented 25

Interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code 26

Judgment must be based on evidence to establish the medical condition or disease 26

Other cases regarding Psychological Incapacity 27

Collateral attack on validity of marriage 31

Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 32

Article 49 of the Family Code granting visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children 33Abandonment as grounds for legal separation 35

Effects of the decree of legal separation 35

Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code 36

Conjugal Property 37

Joint Administration of Spouses of Conjugal Property 38Case citation: Manuel O. Fuentes, et al. vs. Conrado G. Roca, et al., G.R. No. 178902, Apr 21, 2010 39Charges to the conjugal partnership 39Dissolution of Conjugal Property 40

Article 160 of the Civil Code on conjugal partnership 40Sale of conjugal property without the spouses consent 41

Decree of absolute nullity of marriage, its effects 42

Judicial separation of property under Article 135 43Separation of property 45

Where the ground for nullity of marriage is Psychological Incapacity, properties acquired during the union ofthe parties 45Co-ownership in cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other] 47Post Marriage Modification 49Case citation: Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012 49Inapplicability of the rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman l iving exclusively with each other as husband and

wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other. 49


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Who are beneficiaries 51Exemption from Execution; Exceptions 53

DNA in paternity and filiation 54Proof in filiation 54Paternity and filiation of an accused in a criminal case 55

Article 164 of the Family Code 55

Proof of filiation 56Establishing Illegitimate Filiation 57

Permitting an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father 58

Joint adoption by Spouses 60

Mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption 60

When obligation to support starts 61Support by grandparents 62Parental authority over recognized natural child 63

Art 213 of the FC in custody of minor child 63Tender Age Presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code 64

Special Parental Authority 64

Habeas corpus vs judicial adjudication of custody 65

Rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code 66Entry in the civil register 67

PROPERTY 69Foreshore lands 69

Proof of ownership 70

Requisites for Recovery of Ownership of Real Property 70

Prescription period if based on Implied Trust 72

Laches 73Innocent purchaser for value 73Exception to the doctrine that accessory follows the principal 76Law on Accretion and P.D. 1529 77

Effect of improvements on property 78

Builder in good faith 78Builder in good faith is entitled to reimbursement of his necessary expenses 79

Reimbursement of improvements 79Accumulation of sediments along the river banks 80Old bed left to dry by the change of course 81Name/Class: ARENAJO, CHRISTIANExecutive class 86

Rights of a Co-owner 86

Legal redemption 87

Interest of a co-owner 87Oral patition 88Right of Possession 90

Protection over right of possession 92Remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name 93

Notice of Lis Pendens 93

Kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property 94

Accion Publiciana 95Name/Class: SAGARINO, ARIELExecutive class 96

Occupation by tolerance is not possession in good faith 96

Builder in Good Faith under Art 448 in relation to Art 546 97Art. 450. Owners option to sell his encroached property pegged at the current fair market value. 98


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Easement of Lateral and Subjacent Support 99Legal Easement of Right of Way 100

Kinds of nuisance 101Ownership by a purchaser 102Donation 103

Prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership 106

Indefeasibility of title 108A void title may become the root of a valid title if the derivative title was obtained in good faith and for value 110

Torrens Title as conclusive evidence 110

Free Patent over a private land 111

Prescriptive period for annulment of title 111Prescription for cancellation of title and reversion 112

The principle that the earlier title prevails over a subsequent one applies when there are two apparently valid titles over a

single property 112

Lands of Public Domain 113Application for Registration of Title 116

Application for registration of public lands 116Who may file for registration under Sec 14(1) of PD 1529 118

Registration of land under Sec 14(1) and Sec 48(b) of PD 1529 119Reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title 125Reconstitution of Transfer Certificates of Title under R.A. No. 26 125

Corrections or Insertions of Mistakes in Certificate of Title 126

Better right between previous and latest sale 128

Tenancy relations 128

Section 113 of PD 1529 129Application of Original Registration 129

Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title 130

Unregistered Sale of Land 131

PRESCRIPTION 136

I) Definition 136Land Registration Court's Jurisdiction and Principle of Estoppel 136

Estoppel in Pais 136

II) No prescription applicable 137

III) Prescription or limitation of actions 137Imprescriptibility of Quieting of Title 137

SUCCESSION 139

I) General Provisions 139Successional Rights Transmitted at the Moment of Death 139

Right of an heir accrues from the moment of the death of the decent 139What constitutes inheritance 139Hereditary succession as method in acquiring private lands by foreigners 140

Venue for the Settlement of Estate 141

Interested persons in a settlement of estate 142

Judicial declaration of presumptive death 142


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Case citation:Antonia Armas y Calisterio vs. Marietta Calistero, G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000. 143

II) Testamentary Succession 143Testator's intention must be respected 143Donation Mortis Causa 144

Donation mortis causa purporting to be inter vivos 145

Testamentary Capacity 146Feeble-minded person's capacity to make a will 146

Formalities of a will 147

Attestation clause 148Attestation and acknowledgment 149Lack of authority of the Notary Public invalidates the will executed before him 150

Holographic Will and number of witnesses required if will is contested 150Holographic Will and Preterition 151Blind under Article 808 of the Civil Code 151Doctrine of liberal interpretation / substantial compliance 152

Strict Compliance vis-a-vis Substantial Compliance in relation to non-entry of the number of pages in theAttestation Clause. 154

Jurisdiction of Probate Court 154Petition of allowance of the will by the testator himself 155

Probate of a will executed by a foreigner abroad 155

Partition before probate of will 156

Last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void 156Absence of probate proceedings, its effect 157

Interested persons in a settlement of estate 157

Prohibition of alienation under Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code 157

Prohibition of alienation in a will 158Compulsory Heirs 159

Decedents compulsory heirs in whose favor the law reserves a part of the decedents estate are exclusively the person

enumerated in Article 887 160

Reserva Troncal 160

Legitime 161

Division of a decedents Estate 162

Rights of an illegitimate child 163

Rule of Proximity 163

Determination of Relationship under Art. 962, NCC 164

Preterition /Article 1104 of the Civil Code 164

Extrajudicial Settlement resulting to preterition 165

Institution Sub Modo 166

Who may accept or repudiate an inheritance, legacy or devise 166

Repudiation of Co-ownership 167

Collation 168

Collation between compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs 168

Collation and Advancement of Legitime 169Inoffious donation and rights of heirs to contest donation 170

Period of reimbursement under Article 1008 170

III) Legal or Intestate Succession 171Intestate succession 171

Share of surviving spouse and collateral relative (sister) in intestate succession 172


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IV) Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession 172Contracts entered into by predecessors-in-interest 172

Remedies of Creditors against Estate 173

Necessity of partition to be contained in a public instrument 173

Requisites for Partition by act inter vivos 173

Appointment of administrator 174

Authority of an Encargado 175Removal of an Administrator may be done at the discretion of Probate Court 175

Oral partition 175

Partition inter vivos 176

Indispensable parties to be impleaded in partition 176Unregistered Deed of Partition 177

Allowance of widowed spouse 178

Rescission and Nullity of Partition 178

OBLIGATIONS 180

I)

Elements of an Obligation 180

Fraud 180

Simulated Contracts 180

Contract as law between the parties 181

II) Different Kinds of Prestations 181Force Majeure 182

III) Classification of Obligations 183Solidary Obligation 183

Option Contracts 183

Action for Reconveyance vis-a-vis fraud 184

IV) Sources of Obligations 184Principle of Unjust Enrichment 184

V) Nature and Effect of Obligations 185Presumption of payment (installments) 185

VI) Kinds of Civil Obligations 186Rescission under Article 1191 186Rescission on Reciprocal Obligations 186Default 187

VII)

Joint and Solidary Obligation 187

Guaranty and Solidary Obligations 188

VIII) Extinguishment of Obligations 188Recoupment 188

Novation 189

Consignation 190

Acceptance of payment by creditor from a third person 190


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CONTRACTS 193

I) Essential Requisites 193Mutuality of Contracts 193Right of first refusal 194Deed of Sale entered into upon future inheritance 194

3) Kinds of Contracts 195Exception to the Doctrine of In Pari Delicto 195

Ratification of a voidable contract 196

4) Defective Contracts 196Void and inexistent contracts 196

SALES 198

I) Definition and Essential Requisites of a Contract of Sale 198

Absence of the owners consent 198Contract to sell 198

II) Parties to a Contract of Sale 200

III) Formation of Contract of Sale 200Nature of contract of sale 200Double Sale 200

Dragnet Clause 201

IV) Remedies of an Unpaid Seller 201

V) Warranties 201

VI) The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree (P.D. 957) 202Twin requirements under the Maceda Law 202Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act 202

TRUST 204

I) Definition and Nature 204Implied resulting trust 204

Instance where implied trust can exist 204

PARTNERSHIP 205

I) Contract of Partnership 205

II) Dissolution 205Purchase of a Partners Interest 205


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AGENCY 206Buyer in Good faith negated by failure to verify extent and nature of seller's authority 206

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS 207

I) Guaranty and Suretyship 207Continuing Suretyship 207Continuing guaranty 207

II) Real Mortgage 208Principal to be held liable when indicated in Real Estate Mortgage 208

Application of Writ of Possession 209Mortgagee in good faith 209

Accessory follows the principal 210

Notice in Contracts 211

III) Antichresis 212

LEASE 213

I) Lease of Work or Services 213Recovery of Additional Costs in Contracts 213

II) Rights and Obligations of Lessor and Lessee 213Renewal of Lease 213

III) Special Rules for Lease of Rural/Urban Lands 214Privity of contracts and sublease 214

TORTS AND DAMAGES 216

I) Principles 216Elements of Quasi-Delict 216

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance 216

II) The Tortfeasor 217

III) Proximate Cause 217

IV)

Negligence 218

Presumption of Negligence of a person who was violating any traffic regulation at the time of the mishap 218

V) Special Liability in Particular Activities 218Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur 218Medical Negligence 219

DAMAGES 220


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I) Nominal Damages 220

II) Temperate or Moderate Damages 221

III) Liquidated Damages 221Loss of Earning Capacity 221

Subrogation of rights; Common carriers; Liability of Quasi-Delict 222

IV) Miscellaneous Rules 223Quantum Meruit 223

Vicarious Liability 224Negligence 224

Attorney's fees 225

Damages in breach of contract of carriage 225Case citation:AIR FRANCE vs. GILLEGO G.R. No. 165266, December 15, 2010 226Civil liability in case of acquittal 226


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GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Prejudicial question

PROBLEM: Petitioner AA who is engaged in the business of buying and selling beer and softdrinks products, purchased beerproducts from San Miguel Corporation (SMC). Petitioner paid through a check signed by AA and drawn against Argovans AsiaTrust Bank Current Account. When said check was presented for payment , the check was dishonored for having been drawnagainst insufficient funds. Despite three (3) written demands, petitioner failed to make good of the check. This prompted SMCto file a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa against petitioners.

Petitioners maintained that their checking account was funded under an automatic transfer arrangement, whereby funds fromtheir joint savings account with AsiaTrust Bank were automatically transferred to their checking account with said bankwhenever a check they issued was presented for payment.

Petitioner claimed that on 7 April 2000, the date when they issued the check to SMC, their joint savings account had a balanceof P330,353.17. As of 13 April 2000, petitioners balance even amounted to P412,513.17.3

On 13 April 2000, Gregorio Guevarra (Guevarra), the Bank Manager of AsiaTrust Bank, advised AA that the Allied Bank CheckNo. 82813 for P378,000.00, which was issued for other transactions of AA was not cleared due to some alterations. AsiaTrustBank then garnished the P378,000.00 from the joint savings account of petitioners without any court order. Consequently, thecheck issued by petitioners to SMC was dishonored having been drawn against insufficient funds

Petitioner filed an action for specific performance and damages against AsiaTrust Bank and SMC. Petitioners alleged thatAsiaTrust Bank unlawfully garnished and debited their bank accounts; that their obligation to SMC had been extinguished bypayment.

Petitioners assert that the issues they have raised in the civil action constitute a bar to the prosecution of the criminal case forviolation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa. Should the criminal case be suspended on the grounds of prejudicial question?Decide.

ANSWER: NO. A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are bothpending and there exists in the former an issue which must be pre-emptively resolved before the latter may proceed, becausehowsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of theaccused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure states the two elements necessary for a civil case to be considereda prejudicial question, to wit:

Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously institutedcivil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b)the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, thena prejudicial question would likely exist, provided that the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not onlythat the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution ofthe issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolutionof the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on thesame facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil casedoes not involve a prejudicial question.

The issue in the criminal case is whether the petitioner is guilty of estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, while in thecivil case, it is whether AsiaTrust Bank had lawfully garnished the P378,000.00 from petitioners savings account.

The subject of the civil case is the garnishment by AsiaTrust Bank of petitioners savings account.

The material facts surrounding the civil case bear no relation to the criminal investigation being conducted by the prosecutor.The prejudicial question in the civil case involves the dishonor of another check. SMC is not privy to the nature of the allegedmaterially altered check leading to its dishonor and the eventual garnishment of petitioners savings account. The source of thefunds of petitioners savings account is no longer SMCs concern. The matter is between petitioners and Asia Trust Bank. On the


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other hand, the issue in the preliminary investigation is whether petitioners issued a bad check to SMC for the payment of beerproducts. Therefore, a suspension of the criminal case on the grounds of prejudicial question is not proper.

Case citation: SPOUSES ARGOVAN AND FLORIDA GADITANO, vs. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION. G.R. No. 188767 July 24, 2013Name/Class: CLEMENCIO, REUVILLERegular Class

PERSONS

I) Persons and Personality (Civil Code)

Principle of Abuse of Rights

PROBLEM:Ardy owned a piece of property, which was subsequently sold and conveyed to Pastor, however, the connection ofwater supply as well as other utilities remained in the name of Ardy which was never questioned, until such time that Pastorbecame delinquent in paying the water bill. Ardy, without notification to Pastor, then requested the MCWD to cut off the watersupply, which the latter did on the basis that the water supply was under his name. Is Ardy liable to Pastor?

ANSWER:Yes. Ardys acts which violated Article 19 of the Civil Code is his unjustifiable act of having the Pastors water supplydisconnected, coupled with his failure to warn or at least notify Pastor of such intention. The principle of abuse of Rights in theenshrined Article 19 of the civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of hisduties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. It recognizes a primordial limitation on allrights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itselflegal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right isexercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legalwrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

Case citation: JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, VS. SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE ORO WATERDISTRICT AND GASPAR GONZALEZ, JR., G.R. NO. 161921 JULY 17, 2013)Name/Class: ESCOBER, PAULORegular Class

Article 19, also known as theprinciple of abuse of right,prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustlyor contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or thetendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.

There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must be inaccordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must beno intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.

In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners instance was not only attended by bad faithbut also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement,petitioners exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent.On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be inaccordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitionersactions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in anexcessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage torespondent. Hence, they should indemnify him. (Ernesto Ramas Uypitching vs. Ernesto Quiamco - G.R. No. 146322.December 6, 2006)

The elements of abuse of rights are the following:

a)

the existence of a legal right or duty;b)

which is exercised in bad faith; andc)

for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Malice or bad faith is at the core of the said provision. The law always presumes good faith and any person who seeksto be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill-motive. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. Itconsists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faithdoes not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious


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doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature offraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior andunjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.

The facts, as found by the court a quoand the appellate court, do not establish that, in the exercise of this right,petitioner bank committed an abuse thereof. Specifically, the second and third elements for abuse of rights are notattendant in the present case. The evidence presented by petitioner bank negates the existence of bad faith or malice

on its part in closing the respondents account on April 4, 1988 because on the said date the same was alreadyoverdrawn. The respondent issued four checks, all due on April 4, 1988, amounting to P7,410.00 when the balance ofhis current account deposit was only P6,981.43. Thus, he incurred an overdraft of P428.57 which resulted in thedishonor of his Check No. 2434886. Further, petitioner bank showed that in 1986, the current account of therespondent was overdrawn 156 times due to his issuance of checks against insufficient funds. In 1987, the saidaccount was overdrawn 117 times for the same reason. Again, in 1988, 26 times. There were also several instanceswhen the respondent issued checks deliberately using a signature different from his specimen signature on file withpetitioner bank. All these circumstances taken together justified the petitioner banks closure of the respondentsaccount on April 4, 1988 for improper handling. (Far East Bank and Trust Company Vs.Themistocles Pacilan, Jr. -G.R. No. 157314, July 29, 2005)

Pure civil actions under the Civil Code

Despite being defined in the Revised Penal Code, libel can also be instituted, like in the case at bar, as a purely civilaction, the cause of action for which is provided by Article 33 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separateand distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceedindependently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

The above elements of libel were adopted as well in a purely civil action for damages. As held by this Court in GMANetwork, Inc. v. Bustos:

An award of damages under the premises presupposes the commission of an act amounting todefamatory imputation or libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice. Libel is the public and maliciousimputation to another of a discreditable act or condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, orcontempt of a natural or juridical person. Liability for libel attaches present the following elements:

(a) an allegation or imputation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publicationof the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.

Of these four elements, the most apparent in the case at bar would be the publication of the alleged imputation. Libelis published not only when it is widely circulated, but also when it is made known or brought to the attention or noticeof another person other than its author and the offended party. The circulation of an allegedly libelous matter in anewspaper is certainly sufficient publication.

Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage toanother shall indemnify the latter for the same. It speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law whichdo not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to thestandards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed forwhich the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an actionfor damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.

The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. In the present case, it was foundthat Coyiuto, Jr. indeed abused his rights as Chairman of The Manila Chronicle, which led to the publication of thelibelous articles in the said newspaper, thus, entitling petitioner to damages under Article 19, in relation to Article 20.

Consequently, the trial court and the CA correctly awarded moral damages to petitioner. Such damages may beawarded when the transgression is the cause of petitioners anguish. Further, converse to Coyiuto, Jr.s argument,although petitioner is claiming damages for violation of Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, still such violations directlyresulted in the publication of the libelous articles in the newspaper, which, by analogy, is one of the ground for the


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recovery of moral damages under (7) of Article 2219. (Alfonso T. Yuchengco Vs. The Manila Chronicle PublishingCorporation, et al. - G.R. No. 184315. November 28, 2011)

A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on thepart of the offender (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently ofthe criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act or

omission complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or fortort). It may also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independentlyfrom the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and physicalinjuries").

The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminaloffense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto isimpliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to orsubsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminalaction. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that "theact or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist."

On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursuedindependently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:

ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of asa felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the resultof the latter. (Emphasis supplied.)

ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate anddistinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceedindependently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offendedparty may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forumshopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata. (Lily Lim Vs. Kou Co Ping a.k.a. Charlie Co/Kou Co Ping a.k.a. Charlie Co -G.R. Nos. 175256. Agust 23, 2012)

Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could have extinguished the civil liability if the samearose directly from the crime committed. However, in this case, the civil liability is based on another source ofobligation, the law on human relations. The pertinent articles follow: Art. 31 of the Civil Code states:

When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civilaction may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

And, Art. 32(6) states:

Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in anymanner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter fordamages:

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

x x x x

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminaloffense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and forother relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), andmay be proved by a preponderance of evidence. (Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. Vs. People of the Philippines, et al. - G.R. No.159017-18. March 9, 2011)


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Article 26 and the declaration of nullity of marriage in a foreign judgment

PROBLEM:Anna married Kristoff, a citizen of Japan. Because of an issue with Kristoffs parents not approving of Anna, Kristoffcould not bring Anna back with him to Japan. They soon lost all contact with each other. Thereafter, Anna met Hans, also fromJapan. They eventually got married, without Annas first marriage to Kristoff being dissolved. Hans was able to bring Anna to Japan. There, she fell victim to physical abuse at the hands of Hans and so she left him and contacted Kristoff. Kristoff and Annarekindled their relationship. Kristoff helped Anna obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan, declaring the marriagebetween Anna and Hans void on the ground of bigamy. Subsequently, Kristoff filed a petition in the RTC for the Decree of

Absolute Nullity of Marriage.Does the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of VoidableMarriages apply to foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreigncountry, necessitating a relitigation of the matters already decided in the aforesaid judgment?

ANSWER: No, it does not. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where oneof the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rulesof Court. To rule otherwise would be to defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is to limit repetitivelitigation on claims and issues. Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of aforeign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides, where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner isvalidly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, theFilipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. The principle in Article 26 applies to a marriage between aFilipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino

spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraphof Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, iscapacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, theFilipino spouse will be discriminated the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry. Moreover,notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign

judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A criticaldifference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy,as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the FamilyCode and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition fordeclaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippinecourts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminalprosecution for bigamy.

Case citation: Minoru Fujiki vs. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, et al. - G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013Name/Class: CORBITA, JOHN KEVINExecutive class

Foreign Divorce

PROBLEM: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano married Lady. Their marriage was blessed with a son and daughter Kristopher andKimberly. In1986, Lady left for the US bringing along their son Kristopher. A few years later, Lady became a naturalized as an

American citizen. In 2000, Cipriano learned that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married an American.Thereafter, Cipriano filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the FamilyCode. Rule on the petition.

ANSWER: The petition shall be granted. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that:

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validlyobtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacityto remarry under the Philippine law.

The said provision of law seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties areFilipino citizen and a foreigner. It however also applies to the instant case where at the time the marriage was solemnized, theparties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained adivorce granting her capacity to remarry.

Thus, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but the citizenshipof the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.


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Case citation: Republic of the Philippines vs. Cipriano Orbecido GR. 154380 October 05, 2005Name/Class: CRISTAL, MARIA GRETELExecutive class

Facts: First wife divorced with husband, subsequently filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against husband andsecond wife alleging that marriage was bigamous because second wife has prior existing marriage.

Held: Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different

types. The two basic ones are

1)

absolute divorce ora vinculo matrimonii;and2)

limited divorce or a mensa et thoro.

The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. A divorce obtainedabroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of theforeigner. However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact anddemonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicialnotice of foreign laws.

Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of whether petitioner has thepersonality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition ifthe divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro;or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the

divorce decree becomes absolute. Under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married,or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage;however, only a party who can demonstrateproper interestcan file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage,like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a causeof action. hus, in Nial v. Bayadog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullityof the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights. (F. Amor-Catalan Vs. CA, etal. - G.R. No. 167109. February 6, 2007)

The spouses frequent squabbles and respondents refusal to sleep with petitioner and be supportive to him do not constitutepsychological incapacity. The records show that petitioner and respondent were living in harmony in the first few years of theirmarriage, which bore them four children. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect inthe performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to somepsychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. (Narciso S. Navarro, Jr. Vs. Cynthia Cecilio-Navarro.- G.R. No. 162049. April 13, 2007)

Facts: Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November2000. On January 2005, Gerbert married Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professionalcommitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 tosurprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed,Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada grantedGerberts petition for divorce onDecember 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his newFilipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decreeon his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National StatisticsOffice (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to beenforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSOCircular No. 4, series of 1982.

In its decision, the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper partyto institute theaction for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipinospouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be ableto remarry under Philippine law.

Ruling:As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipinospouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. Thelegislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by thedivorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a


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substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or herto remarry.Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree ofdivorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be ofno significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreigncountry. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule andserves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of theforeign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare thatthe Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make asimilar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity aregenerally governed by his national law. Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the secondparagraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of theFilipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; thealien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

On the other hand, while Act No 3753 requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submissionof the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with therequirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of thepresent case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office

acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylynsmarriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. (Gerbert Corpuz Vs. Daisylyn Tirol Sto.Tomas and the Solicitor General - G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010)

Declaration of presumptive death

PROBLEM:In January 5, 1971, Angel Andemons married Luis Wiskawayan. She gave birth to a baby girl named Jenelyn. Theirmarriage turned sour, and they argued constantly because Luis was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March1972, the latter left their house. Angel and her child waited for him, until May 1972 when they decided to go back to herparents home.3 years have passed without any word from Luis until in October 1975 when he showed up, and they agreed toseparate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of from eachother ever since. Believing that Luis was already dead, petitioner married Phil Ty in June 1985. Phils application fornaturalization in US was denied because Angels marriage with Luis was still subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, Angel filed a

petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Luis. Is marriage of Angel to Phil valid despite lack of declaration ofpresumptive death of Luis?

ANSWER:YES, Angel was capacitated to marry Phil at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the saidmarriage is legal and valid.

For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. Thedeclaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking ofthe necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however,the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage,that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be l iving, that such former spouse is generally reputed to bedead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

The law that will apply in this case is the Civil Code. The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83, which provides that,Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any personother than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless (2 ndpar.) The first spouse had been absentfor seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee beingalive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed tobe so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed deadaccording to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null andvoid by a competent court.Article 390 of the Civil Code states thatafter an absence of seven years, it being unknown whetheror not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption toarise.


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Case citation: ANGELITA VALDEZ vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 180863, September 8, 2009Name/Class: MACASA, JOSEPH PAULRegular Class

Declaration of Presumptive Death, what constitutes well-founded belief

PROBLEM:Sometime in January 1998, Husband and Wife had a violent quarrel brought about by Husbands inability to reach"sexual climax" whenever they would have intimate moments. After their quarrel, Husband left their conjugal dwelling and thiswas the last time Wife ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from him or about hiswhereabouts.

On May 21, 2002, Wife filed a petition for her husbands declaration of presumptive death. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that he was already dead and alleged "earnest efforts" to locate him by (1) making inquiries about hiswhereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and friends, but to no avail; and (2) whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to itthat she looked through the patients directory, hoping to find Husband.

If you were the Judge, will you grant the petition of Wife based on her well-founded belief to justify the declaration of herhusbands presumptive death?

ANSWER:The petition should not be granted. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be

shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief thatthe prior spouse was already dead.

Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringentrequirement of "well-founded belief". To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/herbelief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these effortsand inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of activeeffort (not a mere passive one).

The case at bar however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence. In sum, Wifemerely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. Shefailed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husbandwas already dead.

Hence, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any news that such absentee is stillalive, failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.

Case Citation:Rep. of the Phils. vs. Ma. Fe Espinosa Cantor, G.R. No. 184621. December 10, 2013Name/Class:ALOCILLO, CARMEL BENITARegular Class

PROBLEM: Cyrus and Yolanda Granada got married in 1993. Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed thatfrom that time, she did not receive any communication from her husband. Her brother testified that he had asked the relativesof Cyrus regarding the latters whereabouts, tono avail.

After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. The RTC rendered aDecision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner arguedthat Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he wasalready dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Yolanda filed a

Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration ofPresumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment isimmediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.

Questions:1)

Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediatelyfinal and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal.

2)

Did the CA erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the petition for declaration of presumptive death based on evidencethat respondent had presented?


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ANSWER:

1)

Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is final and immediately executory. A petition for declaration of presumptivedeath of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code isa summary proceeding as provided for under the Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253of theFamily Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgmentof the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.

2) Yes, RTC erred in granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed.

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded beliefthat the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The belief ofthe present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain thewhereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not thespouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawnfrom a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the natureand extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate adiligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about thewhereabouts of Cyrus from the latters relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdados

testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband.

Case citation: Philippines vs. Yolanda Cadacio Granada - G.R. No. 187512. June 13, 2012.Name/Class:ARENAJO, CHRISTIANExecutive class

Who are Juridical Persons

PROBLEM: Sunrise Corporation, bought lighting materials from Z Company, a sole proprietorship owned by EZ. Despiterepeated demands, Sunshine Corporation defaulted in its payment. EZ filed a suit in the RTC to collect the outstanding balanceof P90,000. Sunrise Corporation filed a motion to implead Z Company, alleging that Z company is the real party in interest ofthe case filed by EZ.

Is Z Company a real party in interest to be impleaded as a party-plaintiff?

ANSWER: No. Section 1 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized bylaw may be parties in a civil case. Article 44 of the New Civil Code enumerates who are juridical persons:

Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality beginsas soon as they have been constituted according to law;(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridicalpersonality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.

Z Company is merely the DTI-registered trade name or style of the respondent by which he conducted his business. As such, itdoes not exist as a separate entity apart from its owner, and therefore it has no separate juridical personality to sue or be sued.

As the sole proprietor of Z Company, there is no question that the respondent is the real party in interest who stood to bedirectly benefited or injured by the judgment in the complaint. There is then no necessity for Z Company to be impleaded as aparty-plaintiff, since the complaint was already filed in the name of its proprietor, EZ. To heed the petitioners sophisticreasoning is to permit a dubious technicality to frustrate the ends of substantial justice.

Case Citation: S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation vs. Engr. Leonardo A. Parada of Genlite Industries,G.R. No. 183804, September 11, 2013Name/Class: ENRIQUEZ, GREMARIERegular Class


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II) Marriage (Family Code)

Distinctions between void and voidable marriage

PROBLEM:Penelope and Ralph were sweethearts. On April 13, 1988 they got married in Sugar Rush, Palawan. On November17, 1992, Ralph filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress

forced him into marrying Penelope. He further alleged that a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New Peoples Army,whom he claimed that was hired by Penelope, accompanied him during their marriage to harass him. He also denied that heimpregnated Penelope. In her answer, Penelope prayed the dismissal of the case arguing that Ralph freely and voluntarilymarried her and that they stayed together in Sugar Rush after their marriage as husband and wife. She also alleged that Ralphknew that she was pregnant of their son at the time of their marriage.

Questions:

a)

Give at least 3 distinctions between a void and voidable marriage.b)

If you were the judge how will you decide the case?

ANSWER:

a)

Void and voidable marriages may be distinguished from each other in the following ways:

As to the nature: A void marriage is inexistent from the time of its performance, whereas a voidable marriage is validand binding until it is annulled by a competent court.

As to the convalidation: A void marriage is not susceptible of convalidation, whereas a voidable marriage may beconvalidated either be prescription or by cohabitation.

As to the effect upon the property: In a void marriage, the property relations between the parties are governed by therules on co-ownership, whereas in a voidable marriage, the property relations are, as general rule, governed by therule on absolute community of property unless other system is agreed upon in marriage settlement.

b)

If I were the judge I will uphold the validity of the marriage between Ralph and Penelope. The law provides that amarriage may be annulled on the ground that the consent of either party was obtained by force and intimidation orundue influence which exists at the time of the marriage unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party

thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. In the case at bar, while there may be indicators thatthe consent of Ralph was obtained through fraud, violence or duress at the time of the celebration of their marriage,but because of his continued cohabitation with Penelope for almost 4 years and 8 months from the time of theirmarriage, the same was already ratified. Therefore, the marriage of Penelope and Ralph shall be uphold.

Case Citation: Villanueva vs. Hon. CA and Villanueva, G.R. No. 132955, 27 October 2006Name/Class: PAYOPANIN, ANGELINE CHISKARegular Class

Grounds to declare marriage void is exclusive

QUESTION: L, a Filipina, married F, an American. She then filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage allegingthat they got married for her to obtain American citizenship, that in consideration thereof, she would pay F. L contends thatimmediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never had the intention ofentering into a married state or complying with any of the essential marital obligations. The judge declared that the marriage

between the parties was akin to a marriage in jest and that such is void ab initio for lack of consent. Is the judge correct?

ANSWER:No, the judge is not correct. Under the New Civil Code, a marriage may only be declared void or voidable under thegrounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what theConstitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.

In the case at bar consent was not lacking, in fact there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective byany vice of consent. Such consent freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenshipthrough marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with therequirements of an application for citizenship. Said marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest for the parties had an


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undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow L to acquire American citizenship. Only agenuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properlysupport an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and tocreate a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.

Therefore, the judge is not correct.

Case Citation: Republic v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013Name/Class: TESALONA, JAYME MARIE- Regular Class

Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages; real party in interest

PROBLEM:X and Y were married in the Philippines on June 4, 1950. They later migrated to the United States of America andbecame naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, X and Y divorced in April 1988, while they were still Americancitizens. Two months after the divorce, X married A in the Philippines. Y now files a petition for declaration of nullity ofmarriage against X and A on the ground that A has a prior subsisting marriage with another man.

Will the petition prosper?

ANSWER: No. It is true that under the New Civil Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare

the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare thenullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interestand must bebased on a cause of action.

Further, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,now specifically provides, that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husbandor the wife.

Case citation:FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPEE. BRAGANZA, Respondents. G.R. No. 167109. February 6, 2007Name/Class: COMENDADOR, JONA MAERegular Class

While it is true that in the case of Nial, the Court in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition forthe declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its

ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the FamilyCode. The Court in Nial recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involvedtherein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. What we have before us belongsto a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the FamilyCode. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained inA.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:

Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute null ity of voidmarriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to thosemarriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988. Hence, inresolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filedsolely by the husband or the wife.(LOLITA D. ENRICO vs. HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI

AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO - GR. No. 173614. September28, 2007)


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Lack of Marriage License

PROBLEM:X, a foreigner, was invited to the house of Y, mother of Z. X was asked to participate in a ceremony to welcomehim in the Philippines. X did not know that the ceremony was his marriage with Z. Later Z filed a Bigamy Case against X for hewas allegedly married to W. To avoid the Bigamy case, X filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage to Z. To prove thevalidity of their marriage, Z presented the marriage contract signed by X as well as the solemnizing officer which contained thealleged marriage license issued to X. X presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar that the marriage license,based on its number indicated in the marriage contract was never issued to X but to someone else. Is the marriage between Xand Z valid or void ab initio?

ANSWER: The marriage is void ab initio for their marriage lacked one essential requisited of marriage which is the issuance ofa valid marriage license. The fact that X did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that the re was in fact a validmarriage license issued to him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was issued. Art. 4 of the Family Code is clearwhen it says, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio. Art. 35(3) furtherstates that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void from the beginning.

Case Citation:Syed Abbas Vs. Gloria Abbas, January 30, 2013Name/Class: TORREFIEL, ERIC JOHNRegular Class

Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and

Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and thatMarriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of PasigCity for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriagevoid ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void orinexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are"inexistent and void from the beginning." (Sally Go-Bangayan Vs. Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. - G.R. No. 201061. July 3,2013)

A marriage solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the CivilCode which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under

Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void abinitio pursuant to Article 80(3) inrelation to Article 58 of the same Code. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the Statesdemonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public isinterested.

In a line of cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, thelaw requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the veryleast, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to theparties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage licensenumber. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certificationmoreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namelyRestituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the partiesherein.

The certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of themarriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. The presumption of regularity of official acts maybe rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevailsuntil it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is

rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, incase of doubt as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.(RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA vs.ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS - G.R. No. 167746. August 28,2007)

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void abinitio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it isclear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when theycontracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for morethan five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during


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cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites ofmarriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived togetherand exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years beforethe marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassmentconcomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of everyapplicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact,there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push

through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from themarriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void abinitio. (REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO vs. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 160172. February 13, 2008)

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate thelogbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of performance ofofficial function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted. The presumption ofregularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at barwhere the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications. Moreover, theabsence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, aswe believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligentefforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence orfalsity of entries therein. (Jaime O. Sevilla vs. Carmelita N. Cardenas - G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006)

Judicial decalration of nullity as requirement for remarriage

PROBLEM:On November 23, 2002, Hakuri Shinagawa, a Japanese national married Juliet Alonzo in Pasay City, Philippines.Thereafter, the couple resided in Japan. Sometime in August 2008, Hakuri noticed the depression of his wife Juliet. Suspectingthat something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife. To his shock, Juliet confessed to him that thelatter received news of her previous husbands demise.

Upon further inquiry, Hakuri discovered that indeed, Juliet was married to one Dennis Alcantara on July 20, 1994. Thisprompted Hakuri to file a petition for declaration of his marriage to Juliet as null and void on the ground that their marriage is abigamous one, based on Article 35 (4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

If you were the Judge, will you grant the petition of Hakuri? Decide with reasons.

ANSWER:Yes, I will grant the petition of Hakuri.

It has been consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can becontracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of theFamily Code of the Philippines. And this is what transpired in the instant case.

The documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of Hakuri to Juliet on the ground thattheir marriage is bigamous. The following facts directly prove that the marriage is bigamous: (1) that Juliet married Dennis onJuly 20, 1994; (2) that Juliet contracted a second marriage this time with Hakuri on November 23, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) thatthere was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of Juliet with Dennis at the time she married Hakuri; (3) that Dennisdied sometime on August 2008 and that it was only on said date that Juliets marriage with Dennis was deemed to have beendissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of Juliet to Hakuri is bigamous, hence null and void, since the first marriage wasstill valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.

Case citation:Yasuo Iwasawa Vs. Felisa Custodio Gangan (a.k.a. "Felisa Gangan Arambulo" and "Felisa Gangan Iwasawa"), et

al. - G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013Name/Class: LOR, REMFELRegular Class

At the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet beenlegally dissolved. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that shecontracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged ofthe crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged. (Merlinda CiprianoMontaez Vs. Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano - G.R. No. 181089. October 22, 2012)


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Definition and scope of Psychological Incapacity

PROBLEM:Arabelle and Dominic had been next-door neighbors in the appartelle they were renting while they were still incollege. After a month of courtship, they became intimate which led to their marriage in civil rites. Dominic remained joblessand dependent upon his father for support until he finished college. Being the one with the fixed income, Arabelle shouldered allof the familys expenses.

Dominic spent his first sales commission on a celebratory bash with his friends inasmuch as Arabelle shouldered all thehousehold expenses and their childs schooling because his irregular income could not be depended upon. She later ondiscovered her husbands illicit relationship with a co-employee. Furthermore, Dominic was subsequently fired from hisemployment after he ran away an amount belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of BP 22 andestafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated.

Feeling frustrated, Arabelle approached a psychiatrist and intimated the behavior of Dominic and the status of their maritalrelationship. Dr. Samson concluded that Dominic was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his role as husband and father. Inview of the development, Arabelle decided to file a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the RTC.

If you are the judge, will you grant the petition? Explain.

ANSWER:As the judge, I will deny the petition. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychologicalincapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an inability to give meaning and

significance to the marriage. Although expert opinions are afforded great weight, it cannot bind the court from basing itsjudgment on the totality of the evidence presented.

In the case at bar, although Dominics inability to take responsibility, or to feel remorse for his misbehavior, or even to share hisearnings with his family, are indicative of an immature mind, it is not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction thatcannot be cured. The affliction must also be shown to exist at the time of marriage.

Case Citation:Arabelle J. Mendoza vs. Republic of the Phil ippines, GR No. 157649. November 12, 2012.Name/Class:YEE, JEDD ALDRICHRegular Class

Sexual promiscuity as psychological incapacity

PROBLEM: R, husband and N, wife were married sometime in 1969. However, in 1998, R filed a complaint for declaration ofnullity of marriage alleging that N was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. R furthered

that he was just forced to marry her in light of her accidental pregnancy; that she left the conjugal abode to live with anotherman, and married a third man. Dr. Z found both R and N to be psychologically incapacitated suffering from emotionalimmaturity. As the judge, would you grant the petition?

ANSWER: SA: No. Psychological incapacity must be proven within the parameters set by jurisprudence. Mere allegation ofsexual promiscuity and emotional immaturity won't suffice. In the case given, the facts are insufficient to conclude that N'semotional immaturity, irresponsibility or even sexual promiscuity cant be equated with psychological incapacity. Dr. Z's findingdoes not explain in reasonable detail how N's condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted and incurable within theparameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence.

Case citation: Republic vs De Gracia, GR 171557, Feb. 12, 2014Name/Class: LITUAAS, MARY ROSEExecutive class

Factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations

PROBLEM: X filed a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Y on the ground of the latters psychologicalincapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC granted the petition based solely on the Psychiatric Report of Dr.

Villegas which she derived from a 7-hour interview with the Xs employee, and Y. Is the RTC decision proper?

ANSWER: No, it is not proper. Three (3) factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential maritalobligations: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, (3) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the partywould be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. In the instant case, the expert opinion of apsychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests,cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. Dr.


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Villegas sparse testimony does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the parties were psychologically incapacitated tocomply with the essential marital obligations

Case citation: Edward N. Lim vs. Ma. Cheryl Sta. Cruz-Lim - G.R. No. 176464, February 2, 2010Name/Class: CAMINERO, MEESHELExecutive class

Collusion

PROBLEM:Sometime in 1977, H and W were married in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. The couple was notblessed with a child due to Ws hysterectomy following her second miscarriage.

On April 6, 1998, H filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Ws psychological incapacity to complywith her essential marital obligations. W did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in theconjugal house and lot located in Pangasinan.

H testified that W always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him; that sheconstantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing thehousehold chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an overseasworker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with P, her paramour.

H presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on the tests sheadministered on W, Dr. Reyes opined that W exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that was no longer treatable. Dr.Reyes found that Ws disorder was mainly characterized by her immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated tomeet her marital obligations.

If you are the judge, will you grant the petition? Explain.Was there collusion between H and W, because W did not interpose any objection to the petition?

ANSWER: If I were the judge, I will deny the petition. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Codecontemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely thedifficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commitoneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugalact, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) theinability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and

duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to somepsychological illness.

To start with, Ws supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent gossiping with neighbors, leaving the house without Hs consent, refusalto do the household chores and to take care of their adopted daughter, and gambling), were not even established. H presentedno other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on such behavior. At best, his testimony was self-serving and would have noserious value as evidence upon such a serious matter that was submitted to a court of law.

No, there was no collusion between H and W. Verily, the payment to W could not be a manifest sign of a collusion between herand H. To recall, she did not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of conceding her psychological incapacity, butshe nonetheless made it clear enough that she was unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The probability that Hwillingly gave her an amount as her share in the conjugal asset out of his recognition of her unquestionable legal entitlement tosuch share was very high, so that whether or not he did so also to encourage her to stick to her previously announced stance ofnot opposing the petition for nullity of the marriage should by no means be of any consequence determining the issue ofcollusion between the spouses.

Case citation:Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Eduardo De Quintos Jr. G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012Name/Class:YU, RALPH MARTINRegular Class

Relevance of expert opinion

PROBLEM:In January 1996, Edward Kenneth Ngo-Te and Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te met. In March 1996, they eloped tocebu, but as soon as their survival money was depleted they returned to Manila. In April 23, 1996, Rowena's uncle brought bot

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