citations for fukushima: the story of a nuclear disaster
TRANSCRIPT
Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster | 1
Citations for Fukushima: The Story of a
Nuclear Disaster
Chapter 1. âA Situation That We Had Never Imaginedâ Page
1 uncertain where safety actually lay: The Guardian, âEarthquake shakes MPs in Japanâs parliament â video,â March 11, 2011.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2011/mar/11/earthquake-mps-japan-parliament-video
1 televising the Kan hearing: C21 Media, âNHKâs Rapid Response,â (no date).
http://www.nhk.or.jp/japan311/c21-01-nhks.html 1 along the northeastern coast: Hiroo Kanamori, âEarthquake Hazards: Putting seismic
research to the most effective use,â Nature 483, 147-148 (March 8, 2012). http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v483/n7388/full/483147a.html and Jean Kumagai, âIn Japan Earthquake, Early Warnings Helped,â IEEE Spectrum, posted
March 15, 2011. http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/computing/networks/japans-earthquake-earlywarning-system-worked
2 worldâs largest earthquakes: Richard Monastersky, âGiant shock rattles ideas about
quake behaviour,â Nature 471, 271 (2011). http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110315/full/471274a.html
3 seam of more than 180 miles: Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Special
Earthquake Report , âThe Japan Tohoku Tsunami of March 11, 2011â (November 2011). http://www.eqclearinghouse.org/2011-03-11-sendai/files/2011/11/Japan-eq-report-tsunami2.pdf
4 estimate its magnitude as fast: Kanomori, âEarthquake Hazards: Putting seismic research
to the most effective use.â http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v483/n7388/full/483147a.html
4 underestimate the size of an earthquake: David Cyranoski, âJapanâs earthquake warning
system fails again,â Nature, (May 14, 2008). http://www.nature.com/news/2008/080514/full/news.2008.824.html
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Chapter 1. âA Situation That We Had Never Imaginedâ Page
4 David Cyranoski, âJapan Faces Up to Failure of Its Earthquake Preparations,â Scientific
American (March 29, 2011). http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=japan-faces-up-to-failure-of-earthquake 4 Michael Reilly and Andy Coghlan, âA measured disaster: Following quakes in fine detail,â
New Scientist (March 16, 2011). http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20251-a-measured-disaster-following-quakes-in-
fine-detail.html 4 power a city the size of Los Angeles: CBS News, âJapan quake aftershocks could go on
`for years,ââ (March 12, 2011). http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-500188_162-20042429/japan-quake-aftershocks-could-go-on-for-years-/
5 shutdown done by the book: David Lochbaum, âFukushima Dai-Ichi Unit 1: The first 30
minutes,â Union of Concerned Scientists (May 24, 2011). http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/fukushima-daiichi-ucs-analysis-unit-1-first-30-minutes.pdf
9 natureâs first assault: A wide range of videos of the earthquake and tsunami are available
online. Among them is a collection of videos posted in April 2011 by the American Geophysical Union. (http://blogs.agu.org/tremblingearth/2011/04/18/japanese-videos-of-the-tohoku-earthquake-and-tsunami/)
9 swept away entire villages: Julyan H.E. Cartwright and Hisami Makamura, âTsunami: a
history of the term and of scientific understanding of the phenomenon in Japanese and Western culture,â Notes & Records of The Royal Society, vol. 62, no. 2, 151-166 (June 2008).
http://rsnr.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/62/2/151.full 9 twice the area of Manhattan: Joanna M. Foster, âJapanâs Tsunami Gave Birth to Faraway
Icebergs,â New York Times, August 10, 2011. http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/10/japans-tsunami-gave-birth-to-faraway-icebergs/
10 attributed to the tsunami: Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Special Earthquake
Report, âThe Japan Tohhoku Tsunami of March 11, 2011â (November 2011). http://www.eqclearinghouse.org/2011-03-11-sendai/files/2011/11/Japan-eq-report-tsunami2.pdf
13 Yoshida would say later: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima
Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Interim Report (December 26, 2011), p. 141.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html
Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster | 3
Chapter 1. âA Situation That We Had Never Imaginedâ Page 14 dangerous vulnerability: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, memo from S.H. Hanauer to
J.F. OâLeary, F.E. Kruesi, and L. Rogers, September 20, 1972, âPressure-Suppression Containments.â
16 clearly spelled out: Phred Dvorak and Peter Landers, âJapanese Plant Had Barebones Risk
Plan,â Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703712504576232961004646464.html 16 it is practically unthinkable: Phred Dvorak and Peter Landers, âJapanese Plant Had
Barebones Risk Plan,â Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703712504576232961004646464.html 18 TEPCO issued a press release: Tokyo Electric Power Company, âThe Effect of
Earthquake Occurred in the Northern Part of Japan (as of 4:30 pm today)â (March 11, 2011).
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11031101-e.html 18 TEPCO officially notified the government: Investigation Committee on the Accident at
the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 114-115.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html The Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of
the Tokyo Electric Power Company, established by the Cabinet in May, 2011, and chaired by Yotaro Hatamura, professor emeritus of the University of Tokyo, released two reports, an interim report, issued December 26, 2011, and a final report, issued July 23, 2012.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/final-report.html As noted in the final report (p. 4), the interim report reflects what was known to date and
should be regarded as complementary to the final, report, which includes additional information obtained after December, 2011.
20 without the benefit of training or instructions: Yoichi Funabashi and Kay Kitazawa,
âFukushima in review: A complex disaster, a disastrous response,â Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, 68:9-21 (March/April 2012). 22 no safety provisions remaining: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the
Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Interim Report, December 26, 2011, p. 407.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 22 There have been no confirmed radioactivity: Tokyo Electric Power Company,
âOccurrence of a Specific Incident Stipulated in Article 10, Clause 1 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Fukushima Daiichi)â (March 11, 2011).
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11031102-e.html
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Chapter 1. âA Situation That We Had Never Imaginedâ
Page 23 focus was on saving lives: âNaoto Kan: `Japan Was Invaded by an Invisible Enemy,â
Frontline, âInside Japanâs Nuclear Meltdown,â February 28, 2012. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/health-science-technology/japans-nuclear-
meltdown/naoto-kan-japan-was-invaded-by-an-invisible-enemy/ 23 there is no radiation leak: Eric Talmadge and Mari Yamaguchi, âHow first 24 hours
shaped Japanâs nuclear crisis,â Associated Press, July 3, 2011. http://news.yahoo.com/first-24-hours-shaped-japans-nuclear-crisis-060035933.html 24 core now was exposed and most likely melting: Investigation Committee on the Accident
at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 165.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 24 told to leave immediately: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima
Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 302.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 24 adequate time to decide a course of action: âYotaro Hatamura: Was Fukushima an
Accident Waiting to Happen?â Frontline, February 28, 2012. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/health-science-technology/japans-nuclear-meltdown/yotaro-hatamura-was-fukushima-an-accident-waiting-to-happen/
25 a scenario no accident drill had covered: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the
Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 163.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 26 choosing their words carefully: âNaoto Kan: `Japan was Invaded by an Invisible Enemy,â
Frontline, February 28, 2012. http://www.pbs.org/whttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110620a2.htmlgbh/pages/frontl
ine/health-science-technology/japans-nuclear-meltdown/naoto-kan-japan-was-invaded-by-an-invisible-enemy/
30 I donât know the reason: âNaoto Kan: `Japan was Invaded by an Invisible Enemy,â
Frontline, February 28, 2012. http://www.pbs.org/whttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110620a2.htmlgbh/pages/frontline/health-science-technology/japans-nuclear-meltdown/naoto-kan-japan-was-invaded-by-an-invisible-enemy/
31 venting could now begin: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima
Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 175-176.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html
Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster | 5
Chapter 1. âA Situation That We Had Never Imaginedâ
Page
33 not sure exactly what had blown up: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 244-246.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html Chapter 2. âThis may get really uglyâŠâ Page
34 Monitoring Mode: Gregory B. Jaczko, âCommunications Challenges and the Japan Response,â U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (January 10, 2012). http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1201/ML120110038.pdf
35 safe and lucky this time: Email from S. Lu to J. Donoghue, A. Ulses, A. Mendiola, F.
Asktulewicz, C. Ader, M. Lombard, W. Ruland, S. Bahadur, R. Landry, P. Clifford, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (March 11, 2011), p. 8.
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1123/ML11238A092.pdf 35 really big deal: Email from A. Hoffman to B. Wagner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (March 11, 2011), p. 25. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML11186A916.pdf 36 really ugly in the next few days: email from P. Qualls to E. McCann, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (March 11, 2011), p. 74. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1117/ML11175A278.pdf 36 Is this safety bad or economics bad? Email from M. Eddy to B. Wagner, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (March 11, 2011), p. 24. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML11186A916.pdf 36 Both: Email from B. Wagner to M. Eddy, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (March
11, 2011), p 24. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML11186A916 37 This wasnât the first time: There are several accounts of the 1999 accident in Tokaimura. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âNRC Review of the Tokai-Mura Criticality
Accidentâ (April 2000). (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2000/secy2000-0085/attachment1.pdf)
International Atomic Energy Agency, 1999, âReport on the preliminary fact finding
mission following the accident at the nuclear fuel processing facility in Tokaimura, Japanâ (1999). (http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/TOAC_web.pdf)
Edwin Lyman and Steven Dolley, âAccident Prone: The Trouble at Tokai-Muraâ Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, Issue 2 (March/April 2000), p. 42-46.
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Chapter 2. âThis may get really uglyâŠâ Page
Koichi Hasegawa and Yuko Takubo, Citizensâ Nuclear Information Center, âJCO Criticality Accident and Local Residents: Damages, Symptoms and Changing Attitudes,â The JCO Criticality Accident Comprehensive Assessment Committee (June 2001). (http://www.cnic.jp/english/publications/pdffiles/jco_residents_font.pdf)
38 safety of nuclear power: âPerils of inadequacies in safety regulation,â Nature, 401 Issue
no. 6753 (October 7, 1999), p. 513. 38 enormous sums from Treasury coffers: Laura E. Hein, âFuelling Growth: The Energy
Revolution and Economic Policy in Japan,â Harvard University Asia Center, (1990), p. 52. 39 too cheap to meter: Lewis Strauss, president, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, speech to
National Association of Science Writers, New York , New York (September 16, 1954). 39 lasting monument to our technology: âNuclear Reactor Urged for Japan,â New York
Times, September 22, 1954. 39 two manufacturers had loaned Japan $6.1 million: âInternational Bank to Lend Japan
$40,200,000 for Power Growth,â New York Times, October 16, 1953. 40 In 1958, the governor of Fukushima Prefecture: Hiroshi Onitsuka, âHooked on Nuclear
Power: Japanese State-Local Relations and the Vicious Cycle of Nuclear Dependence,â The
Asia Pacific Journal, Vol. 10, Issue 3 No. 1 (January 16, 2012). http://www.japanfocus.org/-Hiroshi-Onitsuka/3677 40 worldâs largest privately owned utility: Peter Pringle and James Spigelman, âThe
Nuclear Barons,â Holt, Rinehart & Winston (New York), 1981. 40 a financial bonanza: Hiroshi Onitsuka, âHooked on Nuclear Power: Japanese State-Local
Relations and the Vicious Cycle of Nuclear Dependence,â The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan
Focus, Vol. 10, Issue 3 No. 1 (January 16, 2012). http://www.japanfocus.org/-Hiroshi-Onitsuka/3677 41 lose their function simultaneously: Katsuhiko Ishibashi, âGenpatsu-Shinsai: Catastrophic
Multiple Disaster of Earthquake and Quake-induced Nuclear Accident Anticipated in the Japanese Islands,â presented to the 23rd General Assembly of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, 2003, Sapporo, Japan, p. 9. docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:03SSMZ241KIJ:historical.seismology.jp/ishibashi/opinion/0307IUGG_slides.pdf+&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESiWVzN3Rsi4Qb6mhuRiJb0USRBqc6CFE_4X0Mc2_WLASgtQ-gnKz592YVgZFx9rjcrNz3G-HxHy1ZkiZ5Gdfv7IS9ta4PIuMZ5potzNLU51wGivgl1f9Fp55jjWMQI9859pVxeD&sig=AHIEtbTZTpf1UE_c87bsl_zO96nN7RI_Rw&pli=1
Jason Clenfield, âVindicated Seismologist Says Japan Still Underestimates Threat to
Reactors,â Bloomberg News, November 21, 2011. (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-21/nuclear-regulator-dismissed-seismologist-
on-japan-quake-threat.html)
Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster | 7
Chapter 2. âThis may get really uglyâŠâ Page
42 make it impossible to ever build anything: Norimitsu Onishi and Martin Fackler,
âJapanese Officials Ignored or Concealed Dangers,â New York Times, May 16, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/world/asia/17japan.html?pagewanted=all 42 not be described as âunexpectedâ: Ishibashi Katsuhiko, âWhy Worry? Japanâs Nuclear
Plants at Grave Risk from Quake Damage,â published in the International Herald Tribune and Asahi Shimbun, August 11, 2007, posted on The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan
Focus, August 11, 2007. http://www.japanfocus.org/-Ishibashi-Katsuhiko/2495 42 decisions were overturned: Norimitsu Onishi and Martin Fackler, âJapanese Officials
Ignored or Concealed Dangers,â New York Times, May 16, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/world/asia/17japan.html?pagewanted=all 42 we could have prevented Fukushima: Hiroko Tabuchi, âJapan Asks Another Nuclear
Plant to Shut Down Its Reactors,â New York Times, May 6, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/07/world/asia/07japan.html?_r=1 42 Ever since seismology has been studied: Robert J. Geller, âEarthquake Prediction: A
critical review,â Geophysical Journal International, 131, 425-450 (1997), p. 425. 43 like hogs to a full trough: Letter from C.F. Richter, published in the Bulletin of the
Seismological Society of America, Vol. 67 (August, 1977), p. 1244-1247. 43 directed toward a single event: Kiyoo Mogi, âTwo grave issues concerning the expected
Tokai Earthquake,â Earth Planets Space, Vol. 56, li-lxvi (2004). http://www.terrapub.co.jp/journals/EPS/pdf/2004/5608/5608li.pdf 44 occur at predictable intervals: Johannis Nöggerath, Robert J. Geller, Viacheslav K.
Gusiakov, âFukushima: the myth of safety, the reality of geoscience,â Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, September 1, 2011. http://thebulletin.org/2011/september/fukushima-myth-safety-reality-geoscience 44 concept of hazard mapping: Joel Achenbach, âSeismic hazards: Japan earthquake and
other tectonic surprises challenge scientific assumptions,â by Joel Achenbach, Washington
Post, March 9, 2012. http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/seismic-hazards-japan-earthquake-
and-other-tectonic-surprises-challenge-scientific-assumptions/2012/03/09/gIQAoV291R_story.html
45 accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2: An account of events at Three Mile Island,
âBackgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident,â prepared by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, can be found here: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html (2013)
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Chapter 2. âThis may get really uglyâŠâ Page
45 safety test on the Unit 4 reactor: An account of events at the Chernobyl plant, âChernobyl Accident 1986,â prepared by the World Nuclear Association, can be found here: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Chernobyl-Accident/#.Ulf0OGRUMrg (2013)
Additional information, âBackgrounder on Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident,
prepared by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, can be found here: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/chernobyl-bg.html (2013)
46 no perfect technology: âLearn lessons from worldâs worse nuclear disaster,â Daily
Yomiuri, April 27, 2011. http://editorialscollections24.blogspot.com/2011/04/editorial-daily-yomiuri-japan_27.html 47 national policy run by the private sector: âNuclear Crisis: How It Happened: `Nuclear
power villageâ a cozy, closed community,â Daily Yomiuri, June 16, 2011. http://archive.is/niIyv 47 thirteen former officials: âNuclear Crisis: How It Happened: `Nuclear power villageâ a
cozy, closed community,â Daily Yomiuri, June 16, 2011. http://archive.is/niIyv 47 Japanâs Asahi Shimbun reported: âNuclear watchdog members received donations from
energy sector,â Asahi Shimbun, January 2, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201201020044 47 caught seismologists by surprise: Joel Achenback, âSeismic hazards: Japan earthquake
and other tectonic surprises challenge scientific assumptions,â Washington Post, March 9, 2012.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/seismic-hazards-japan-earthquake-and-other-tectonic-surprises-challenge-scientific-assumptions/2012/03/09/gIQAoV291R_story.html
48 guidelines were full of loopholes: Jason Clenfield and Shigeru Sato, âJapan Nuclear
Energy Drive Compromised by Conflicts of Interest,â Bloomberg News, December 12, 2007.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=awR8KsLlAcSo 48 Sugaoka was fired: Norimitsu Onishi and Ken Belson, âCulture of Complicity Tied to
Stricken Nuclear Plant,â New York Times, April 26, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/world/asia/27collusion.html?pagewanted=all 48 falsifying safety records for years: âRevelation of Endless N-damage Cover-ups: the
`TEPCO scandalâ and the adverse trend of easing inspection standards,â Citizensâ Nuclear Information Center, No. 92 (November/December, 2002).
http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/accidents/nit92.pdf
Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster | 9
Chapter 2. âThis may get really uglyâŠâ Page
48 gravest crisis since the company was established: âTepco admits leak tightness test falsification,â Nuclear Engineering International, November 3, 2002.
http://www.neimagazine.com/news/newstepco-admits-leaktightness-test-falsification 49 âNot again!â: â`Not againâ: Yet Another TEPCO Scandal,â Citizensâ Nuclear Information
Center, Tokyo (no date) http://www.cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nit117/nit117articles/nit117tepco.html 49 unreported safety problems: Jason Clenfield and Shigeru Sato, âJapan Nuclear Energy
Drive Compromised by Conflicts of Interest,â Bloomberg News, December 12, 2007. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=awR8KsLlAcSo 49 passing the inspections became the objective: â`Not againâ: Yet Another TEPCO
Scandal,â Citizensâ Nuclear Information Center, Tokyo (no date). http://www.cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nit117/nit117articles/nit117tepco.html 50 built to withstand a smaller quake: David Cyranoski, âJapanese nuclear reactor under-
designed for earthquake?â Nature, July 17, 2007. http://www.nature.com/news/2007/070716/full/news070716-3.html 50 Nuclear power can only operate: Martin Fackler, âJapan Shuts Nuclear Plant After
Leak,â New York Times, July 18, 2007. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F00E0DC1731F93BA25754C0A9619C8
B63 50 less than expected: IAEA Issues Report on Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Plant,
International Atomic Energy Agency, August 17, 2007. http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2007/kashiwazaki-kariwa_report.html (link to full report available here)
50 an earthquake large enough to threaten the reactors: âTEPCO: Active fault found in
seabed of nuclear plant,â Daily Yomiuri, December 7, 2007. 51 Reducing the frequency of inspections: Tokyo Electric Power Company Annual Report
2010. http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/corpinfo/ir/tool/annual/pdf/ar2010-e.pdf 51 lowered the height of the bluff: Chester Dawson and Yuka Hayashi, âFateful Move
Exposed Japan Plant,â Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303982504576425312941820794.html 51 This is all we saw: Yuri Kageyama and Justin Pritchard, âFukushima tsunami plan a single
page,â Associated Press, May 27, 2011. http://www.salon.com/2011/05/27/as_japan_earthquake_tsunami_risk/
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Chapter 2. âThis may get really uglyâŠâ Page
52 TEPCO paid no attention: David Nakamura and Chico Harlan, âJapanese nuclear plantâs safety analysts brushed off risk of tsunami,â Washington Post, March 23, 2011.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/japanese-nuclear-plants-evaluators-cast-aside-threat-of-tsunami/2011/03/22/AB7Rf2KB_story.html
53 socially acceptable: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear
Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Interim Report, (December 26, 2011) p. 469.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 54 This is not our event: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, March 11, 2011, p. 216. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A099.pdf 54 initial short duration pulse: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, March 12, 2011,
p. 32. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 54 My dog woke me up: Email from R. Hardies to M. Mitchell, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 94. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1117/ML11175A275.pdf
Chapter 3. âWhat the hell is going on?â Page
55 another earthquake: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, interim report, p. 244
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/120224Honbun04Eng.pdf 55 explosion replayed on TV screens: NHK World, âExplosion at Japanâs Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Plant,â March 12, 2011. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j1dHwc476SQ 55 The fuel had started melting: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima
Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, interim report, p. 169 http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/120224Honbun04Eng.pdf 57 finally reached safety: Eric Talmadge and Mari Yamaguchi, âAP Impact: Japan ignored
own radiation forecasts,â Associated Press, August 9, 2011. http://news.yahoo.com/ap-impact-japan-ignored-own-radiation-forecasts-045726583.html 58 ominous predictions about the danger: Yuka Hayashi, âHow Japan Stumbled in
Forecasting Fallout in One Town,â Wall Street Journal, August 16, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304567604576453342206030686.html
Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster | 11
Chapter 3. âWhat the hell is going on?â Page
58 a release of the predictions: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima
Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Interim Report, (December 26, 2011), p. 302.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 59 a mere weather report: Eric Talmadge and Mari Yamaguchi, âJapan ignored own
radiation forecasts,â Associated Press, August 8, 2011. http://news.yahoo.com/ap-impact-japan-ignored-own-radiation-forecasts-045726583.html 59 no inkling they were at risk: Yuka Hayashi, âHow Japan Stumbled in Forecasting Fallout
in One Town,â Wall Street Journal, August 16, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304567604576453342206030686.html
59 struggling to figure out what was happening: Investigation Committee on the Accident
at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 306.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 59 âunprecedented crisisâ: Prime Minister Naoto Kan, press conference (video), Tokyo,
March 12, 2011. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nE3j3FLeJxM&feature=relmfu 59 âPlease remain calmâ: Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano, press conference (video),
Tokyo March 12, 2011. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BOAywW6ODAc 59 Absent from this briefing: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima
Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Interim Report (December 26, 2011), p. 415-418.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 59 The condition of the core: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima
Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Interim Report (December 26, 2011), p. 417.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 60 The likelihood cannot be denied: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the
Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Interim Report (December 26, 2011), p. 417-418.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 60 the news never made it upstairs to Kanâs office: Investigation Committee on the
Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 194.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html
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61 do not stop it: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Interim Report (December 26, 2011), p. 198.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 61 laboring to learn more: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 12, p. 23. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 62 It was a significant detail: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 37. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 63 Nuclear power plants are built: âNRC continues to track earthquake and tsunami issues,â
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission press release No. 11-043, March 11, 2011. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1107/ML110700697.pdf 63 slippery slope: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 155. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 63 sanitize our Qâs and Aâs and keep it within the federal family: Japanâs Fukushima
Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 170. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 64 tell their labs to cool it: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 160. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 64 do more with the states: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 181. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 64 I thinkâŠitâs inevitable: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 182. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 64 [I]f weâre trying to restrict the information: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 205. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 64 And avoid answering questions: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 206. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 65 DonâtâŠscratch the itch: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 207. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf
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65 could not be restarted: INPO âSpecial Report on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,â November, 2011, p. 29. http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/filefolder/11_005_Special_Report_on_Fukushima_
Daiichi_MASTER_11_08_11_1.pdf 66 None of this was reported to Yoshida: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the
Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 204.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 66 pressures were rising fast: INPO âSpecial Report on the Nuclear Accident at the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,â November, 2011, p. 30. http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/filefolder/11_005_Special_Report_on_Fukushima_
Daiichi_MASTER_11_08_11_1.pdf 67 Another reactor now appeared to be doomed: Tokyo Electric Power Company,
Fukushima Nuclear Accident Analysis Report, June 20, 2012, p. 235 http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf 67 Three hours passed: INPO âSpecial Report on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,â November, 2011, p. 31. http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/filefolder/11_005_Special_Report_on_Fukushima_
Daiichi_MASTER_11_08_11_1.pdf 67 exceeded our expectations: Andrew Higgins, âVanishing act by Japanese executive during
nuclear crisis raises questions,â Washington Post, March 28, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/vanishing-act-by-japanese-executive-during-
nuclear-crisis-raises-questions/2011/03/28/AFDnHNpB_story.html 67 If anyone could lend us money: âInside Fukushima: How workers tried but failed to avert
a nuclear disaster,â Asahi Shimbun, October 14, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201210140034 68 Iâm a bit too beat: âInside Fukushima: How workers tried but failed to avert a nuclear
disaster,â Asahi Shimbun, October 14, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201210140034 68 picked up some activity: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 13, 2011, p. 81. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A107.pdf 68 readings two and a half times normal: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 13, 2011, p. 85, 88. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A107.pdf
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68 Radiation was also detected: Jon Rabiroff, â7th Fleet moves ships, aircraft away from stricken Fukushima plant,â Stars and Stripes, March 14, 2011.
http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/earthquake-disaster-in-japan/7th-fleet-moves-ships-aircraft-away-from-stricken-fukushima-plant-1.137657
68 Approximately 160,000 U.S. citizens: Embassy of the United States, âFact Sheet on the
Current Situation,â March 13, 2011. http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20110313-72.html 69 specially equipped aircraft to identify and measure radiation in an emergency:
National Nuclear Security Administration âAerial Measuring System.â http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/emergencyoperationscounterterrorism/respondingtoemergencies/consequencemanagem-0
and http://www.flickr.com/photos/nnsanews/sets/72157626150030007/ 70 relatively âhotâ in terms of both temperature and radiation levels: David Wright,
âMore on Spent fuel Pools at Fukushima,â Union of Concerned Scientists, March 21, 2011. http://allthingsnuclear.org/more-on-spent-fuel-pools-at-fukushima/ 72 hours of painstaking work were undone: INPO âSpecial Report on the Nuclear Accident
at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,â November, 2011, p. 25. http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/filefolder/11_005_Special_Report_on_Fukushima_
Daiichi_MASTER_11_08_11_1.pdf 74 The water level continued to drop: INPO âSpecial Report on the Nuclear Accident at the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,â November, 2011, p. 26. http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/filefolder/11_005_Special_Report_on_Fukushima_
Daiichi_MASTER_11_08_11_1.pdf 76 exceed the existing exposure limit: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the
Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 337-339.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 76 an angry Kan summoned Shimuzu to his office: Investigation Committee on the
Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, July 23, 2012, p. 232
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/04IIIfinal.pdf 77 What the hell is going on?: âJapan PM to nuclear power firm: `What the hellâs going on?â
â Kyodo,â Reuters, March 15, 2011. http://www.trust.org/item/?map=japan-pm-to-nuclear-power-firm-what-the-hells-going-on-
kyodo
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77 he considered a worst-case scenario: âInside Japanâs Nuclear Meltdown,â interview with Naoto Kan, âJapan was invaded by an invisible enemy,â Frontline, February 28, 2012.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/health-science-technology/japans-nuclear-meltdown/naoto-kan-japan-was-invaded-by-an-invisible-enemy/
77 mass evacuations might have been necessary: Yoichi Funabashi and Kay Kitazawa,
âFukushima in review: A complex disaster, a disastrous response,â Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, Vol. 68, Issue 2, March 1, 2012. http://www.thebulletin.org/2012/march/fukushima-review-complex-disaster-disastrous-
response (abstract) 77 that changes the dynamic: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 14, 2011, p. 213. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A105.pdf 78 beginning to feel like an emergency drill: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 14, 2011, p. 242. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A105.pdf 78 breached the primary containment: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 14, 2011, p. 255. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A105.pdf 78 core went X-up: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, March 14, 2011, p. 276. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A105.pdf 78 weâre telling you the good news: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 14, 2011, p. 280. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A105.pdf 78 more bodies to have to get back out of here: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 14, 2011, p. 284. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A105.pdf
Chapter 4. âItâs Going to Get WorseâŠ.â Page
79 we thought we had a big problem: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 15, 2011, p. 64.
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A106.pdf
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80 U.S. citizens evacuate: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 15, 2011, p. 42. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A106.pdf 81 âkeep an eye onâ them: ET Chronology Descending, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, p. 7. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1212/ML12122A950.pdf 84 Itâs been extremely frustrating: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 15, 2011, p. 153. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A106.pdf 84 a huge benefit: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, March 15, 2011, p. 154. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A106.pdf 85 I donât anticipate a need for that: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 15, 2011, p. 157. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A106.pdf 85 Unit 4 is in shambles: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, March 15, 2011, p. 178. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A106.pdf 85 We just had an earthquake here: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 15, 2011, p. 182. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A106.pdf 85 I really felt we might die: Rick Wallace, âFukushima boss Masao Yoshida breaks silence
on disaster,â Australian, August 11, 2012. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/fukushima-boss-masao-yoshida-breaks-
silence-on-disaster/story-fnb1brze-1226448211757# 86 it was clear from the beginning that we couldnât run: Rich Wallace, âFukushima boss
Masao Yoshida breaks silence on disaster,â Australian, August 11, 2012. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/fukushima-boss-masao-yoshida-breaks-
silence-on-disaster/story-fnb1brze-1226448211757# 86 Tapes from the videoconference link: NHK World, âTEPCO Video Released,â August 6,
2012. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WCA8MYRuXR0 86 My people have been working day and night: Naoya Kon, âFukushima plant chief defied
TEPCO headquarters to protect workers,â Asahi Shimbun, December 1, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201212010043
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87 the communications channels are very limited: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio
File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, pp. 22-24. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 87 [T]he top priority: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 24. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 87 It was like trying to investigate a homicide: Author interview with Charles Casto,
September 24, 2012. 88 the worse one of all the containments we have: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio
File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 41. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 88 leveled the walls, leveled the structure: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 62. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 88 [I]f we end up losing one of these plants: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 115. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 88 follow the instructions: âA Message from Ambassador Roos to American Citizens in
Japan, Embassy of the United States, Tokyo Japan, March 13, 2011. http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20110313-71.html 89 There was significant concern: Author interview with Charles Casto, September 24,
2012. 89 [D]o we think this is going to get better or get worse: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET
Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 132-133. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 89 I agree with you: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 137. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 89 we would go out to fifty miles: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 140. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 89 I would still go with the fifty miles right now: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 157. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf
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90 I just want to make sure: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 216.
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 90 I donât know what theyâre waiting for: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 224. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 90 One thing, we went back and forth on: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 246. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 91 So the potential is solely to refill the pool: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 255. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 92 White House Press Secretary Jay Carney alerted reporters: Press Briefing by Press
Secretary Jay Carney, 3/16/2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/16/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-
carney-3162011 93 [J]ust to repeat, we believe pool No. 4 is dry: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 316. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 93 When Jaczko took his seat: Gregory Jaczko at the House Energy and Commerce
Subcommittee, March 16, 2011, as broadcast by C-Span. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/298523-5 94 The chairman was grilled: Full Committee Briefing on Nuclear Plant Crisis in Japan and
Implications for the United States, U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, March 16, 2011.
http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=bb6c78e6-802a-23ad-4c7b-9aa7a3bb0c31
94 I think I understand your concern: Full Committee Briefing on Nuclear Plant Crisis in
Japan and Implications for the United States, U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, March 16, 2011.
http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=bb6c78e6-802a-23ad-4c7b-9aa7a3bb0c31
94 We have plants that are just as old: Full Committee Briefing on Nuclear Plant Crisis in
Japan and Implications for the United States, U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, March 16, 2011.
http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=bb6c78e6-802a-23ad-4c7b-9aa7a3bb0c31
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95 We think the reason: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 389. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 95 You know, itâs not very clear: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 402. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 96 So, at this point: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 411. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 96 The best science person: Author interview with Charles Casto, September 24, 2012. 97 The pumping strategy may not be useful: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 17, 2011, p. 83. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A109.pdf
98 [Y]ou know there are lethal dose rates: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 17, 2011, p. 51. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A109.pdf
98 [I]tâs hell over here for that government: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 17, 2011, p. 77. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A109.pdf
98 We are not getting any takers: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 17, 2011, p. 141. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A109.pdf
99 Events have moved both Unit 4 and Unit 2 down the list of concerns: Japanâs
Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 17, 2011, p. 179. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A109.pdf
99 Weâre going to own this thing if we do: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 17, 2011, p. 438. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A109.pdf
99 The DOE was also running simulations to estimate possible doses to the public:
Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 17, 2011, p. 248. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A109.pdf
100 a pumping system the United States had proposed: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET
Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, pp. 189 ff. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf
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101 Weâre in such never-never land: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 252.
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 101 average Americans had no shortage of ideas: Email correspondence from the public and
among NRC staff has been collected here: http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1122/ML11229A100.pdf
102 That wasnât Beckâs only prop: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ps4285oykWg 102 Weâre going to start working through diplomatic channels: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi
ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 319. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf
Chapter 5. Interlude â Searching for Answers: âPeople are reaching the limit of anxiety and angerâ Page
103 marvels of nature: Tokyo Electric Power Company, âAssessment of INES (International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale on the incident at Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station,â March 18, 2011.
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11031808-e.html 104 level 7 ranking: International Atomic Energy Agency, Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Update Log, Updates of 12 April 2011. http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/fukushima120411.html
104 no âimmediate risk to healthâ: Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, March
19 at 04:00pm, 2011. http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/incident/110319_1600.html 105 âthe limit of anxiety and angerâ: Yuka Hayashi, âCritics Focus on Accuracy of Nuclear-
Plant Information, Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704360404576206444054284946 105 âstanding by Japanâ: International Atomic Energy Agency, âJapan Prime Minister
Assures IAEA Chief of Increased Information Exchange, March 29, 2011. http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/japan-visit.html
105 âexemplaryâ: IAEA International Fact Finding Expert Mission of the Nuclear Accident
Following the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, 24 May-1 June 2011, Preliminary Summary, p. 2. http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/missionsummary010611.pdf
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Chapter 5. Interlude â Searching for Answers: âPeople are reaching the limit of anxiety and angerâ Page
106 unavailable elsewhere: Nicola Liscutin, âIndignez-Vous! `Fukushima,â New Media and
Anti-Nuclear Activism in Japan,â The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, Vol. 9, Issue 46 No 1, November 21, 2011.
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Nicola-Liscutin/3649 106 One of the most compelling accounts: âSOS from Mayor of Minami Soma City,â March
26, 2011 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=70ZHQ--cK40 107 cornerstone of corporate Japan: The Economist, âThe Troubles of TEPCO,â June 30,
2011. http://www.economist.com/node/18899008 107 building more reactors at home and overseas: K. Steiner-Dicks, Nuclear Energy Insider,
Weekly Intelligence Brief, 27 June-4 July 2012, July 4, 2012. http://analysis.nuclearenergyinsider.com/operations-maintenance/weekly-intelligence-brief-
27-june-%E2%80%93-4-july-2012 and Tokyo Electric Power Company, âTEPCO to Invest in South Texas Project expansion (STP
3&4) â First Japanese utility to invest in the overseas nuclear power project,â May 10, 2010.
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/10051001-e.html 107 causing inconvenience: David Pilling, âPublic patience wears thin at TEPCOâs bunglingâ
by David Pilling, Financial Times, March 15, 2011. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7d73a59a-4f2a-11e0-9038-00144feab49a.html#axzz2kSiRaRhS 107 a sophisticated and expensive public relations program: Norimitsu Onishi, â`Safety
Mythâ Left Japan Ripe for Nuclear Crisis,â New York Times, June 24, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/world/asia/25myth.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 107 TEPCO ranked alongside Japanâs internationally known corporations: Nikkei
Advertising Research Institute, Advertising Expenditure of Leading Corporations (FY 2010).
http://www.nikkei-koken.com/surveys/survey14.html 108 âunnecessary fear among the nationâ: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the
Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Executive Summary, p. 33.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/finalgaiyou.pdf 109 officials publicly acknowledged meltdowns: Norimitsu Onishi and Martin Fackler,
âJapan Held Nuclear Data, Leaving Evacuees in Peril,â New York Times, August 8, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/world/asia/09japan.html?pagewanted=all
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110 a system of press clubs: Martin Fackler, âNew Leaders in Japan Seek to End Cozy Ties to
Press Clubs,â New York Times, November 20, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/21/world/asia/21japan.html and Yoshio Sugimoto, âAn Introduction of Japanese Society,â Third Edition, Cambridge
University Press, New York (2010), pp. 245-246 110 âeffective at keeping nuclear news out of mainstream mediaâ: Gar Smith, âNuclear
Roulette, The Case Against a `Nuclear Renaissance,ââ publication No. 5 in the International Forum on Globalization series focused on False Solutions to the Global Climate Crisis, June 2011, p. x
http://ifg.org/pdf/Nuclear_Roulette_book.pdf 111 âThere is a sense of betrayalâ: Author interview with Dr. Evelyn Bromet, July 11, 2012. 111 â[T]he government chose to release information purely from a subjective
perspectiveâ: The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, Executive Summary, July 5, 2012, p. 36.
http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/NAIIC_report_lo_res10.pdf
111 Construction had resumed: World Nuclear Association, âNuclear Power in the USA,â
(updated November 2013) http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf41.html 111 NRC was well on its way: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âIssued Design
Certification â Advanced Passive 1000 (AP 1000)â (updated April 18, 2013). http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/design-cert/ap1000.html 112 âAlways interesting to wake upâ: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, internal emails
and correspondence. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf, p. 34 112 Thirty-one aging carbon copies: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. boiling-
water reactors with âMark 1â and Mark 2â containments. http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan/us-boiling-water-reactors.html 112 first set of talking points: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, internal emails and
correspondence, p. 30. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf 112 A list of likely questions and their answers: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
internal emails and correspondence, pp. 69, 75-76, 361. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf,
Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster | 23
Chapter 5. Interlude â Searching for Answers: âPeople are reaching the limit of anxiety and angerâ Page
113 âTalk from but do not distributeâ: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, internal emails
and correspondence, pp. 63, 193. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf 113 âadditional, technical non-public informationâ: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
internal emails and correspondence, pp. 359-361. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf 114 a nearly verbatim reassurance on risks: Nuclear Regulatory Commission, The Fiscal
Year 2012 Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Budget, testimony of Gregory B. Jaczko, chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 17, 2011 (appearance before the House Energy and Commerce Committee), p. 2.
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/organization/commission/comm-gregory-jaczko/0317nrc-transcript-jaczko.pdf
114 âThis is a marathon, not a 50-yard dashâ and âweâre sticking to this story for nowâ:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, internal emails and correspondence, pp. 51, 46. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf 114 âcould reduce available safety marginsâ: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
âResolution of Generic Safety Issues: Issue 199: Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and Eastern U.S. for Existing Plants (NUREG-0933, Main Report with Supplements 1-34) (updated March 29, 2012)
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0933/sec3/199.html 115 âFrankly, it is not a good story for usâ: Email from Annie Kammerer to Joseph Glitter
and Roger Rihm, March 15, 2011, p. 236. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf 115 Appendix D of the report: Appendix D Seismic Core-Damage Frequencies http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1002/ML100270756.pdf 115 Hearing nothing back from his initial e-mail inquiry: Correspondence and author
interview will Bill Dedman, November 16, 2012. 115 âWhat are the odds?â: Bill Dedman, âWhat are the odds? US Nuke plants ranked by
quake risk,â NBC News.com, March 17, 2011. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42103936/ 116 The NRCâs immediate reaction was to discredit Dedmanâs story: Email from Scott
Burnell to Annie Kammerer, Jon Ake and Kamal Manoly, March 16, 2011, p. 32. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A071.pdf
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116 âjaw-flappingâ: Email from Scott Burnell to Diane Screnci, Neil Sheehan, Roger Hannah,
Joey Ledford, Prema Chandrathil, Viktoria Mitlyng, Lara Uselding, Victor Dricks, Holly Harrington, David McIntyre, Ivonne Couret, Mindy Landau, Eliot Brenner, March 16, 2011, p. 453.
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf 116 âWe need a better response ASAP!â: Email from Scott Burnell to Kamal Manoly, Patrick
Hiland, David Skeen, Martin Stutzke, Benjamin Beasley, March 16, 2011, p. 447. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf 116 a safety review of the Indian Point plant: Bill Dedman, âGov. Cuomo orders review of
N.Y. reactor after report on quake data,â NBC News, March 17. 2011. http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/03/17/6285997-gov-cuomo-orders-review-
of-ny-reactor-after-report-on-quake-data 116 âI have received no concerns or correctionsâ: Email from Benjamin Beasley to Scott
Burnell, Kamal Manoly, Patrick Hiland, David Skeen, Martin Stutzke, March 26, 2011, p. 446
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf 116 âThatâs our jobâ: Email from Bill Dedman to Eliot Brenner, March 22, 2011.
(Correspondence from Bill Dedman). 117 âthey lost credibility for their organizationâ: Author interview with Bill Dedman, March
16, 2012. 117 crowded into makeshift quarters: Martin Fackler, âIn Japanâs Danger zone, the Stranded
Await the Merciful,â New York Times, March 18, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/world/asia/19stranded.html?pagewanted=all
118 preparations got under way to move the two hundred and nine ambulatory patients
and staff out of Futaba Hospital: Noriyoshi Otsuki, âGovernment Probe: Many Fukushima patients died during botched rescue operation,â Asahi Shimbun, July 24, 2012.
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/life_and_death/AJ201207240092 118 those left to fend for themselves: Hiroko Tabuchi, âInquiry Sees Chaos in Evacuations
After Japan Tsunami,â New York Tiimes, July 23, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/24/world/asia/inquiry-sees-chaos-in-evacuations-after-
japan-tsunami.html 118 dismissed the data as unreliable: Yuka Hayashi, âHow Japan Stumbled in Forecasting
Fallout in One Town,â Wall Street Journal, August 16, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304567604576453342206030686.html
Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster | 25
Chapter 5. Interlude â Searching for Answers: âPeople are reaching the limit of anxiety and angerâ Page
119 âWe have been sacrificedâ: Martin Fackler, âCrisis Saddles Village With Unwanted
Notoriety,â New York Times, April 5, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/world/asia/06village.html?pagewanted=all 120 âAnyone who thinks about the futureâ Koji Fujita, âNuclear Refugees, the people of
Iitate Village, one year later,â June 23, 2012. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YXocjiKU-Vk 120 Iitateâs farmers saw no choice: Shingo Ito, âNothing Stirs in Japanâs nuclear ghost town,â
Agence France Press, March 10, 2012. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iJF2jk7wuv9BuuFXnao3MeOqj5o
Q?docId=CNG.021643a1997cfcf12caab6cd2135bf41.31
Chapter 6. âGive me the worst caseâ Page
121 convinced that the poolâŠwas dry: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Transition report for March 19, 2011 7 a.m., p. 47.
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1212/ML12128A334.pdf 122 ten rem of radiation in just two minutes: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 240. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 124 trucks from China, Germany, and the United States: âConcrete pumps to Fukushima,â
World Nuclear News, April 1, 2011. http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Concrete_pumps_to_Fukushima_0104111.html 124 âWe donât see where the power thing is any solution at allâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi
ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 8. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 124 âRight now heâs basically a 24/7 individualâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 100. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 124 Casto was being pressured: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, pp. 75-80. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 125 âone of those pretty-face things againâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, pp. 9-10. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf
26 | UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
Chapter 6. âGive me the worst caseâ Page
125 â[T]hey said they didnât need any helpâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 159. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 125 âThey have one priority: Unit 3â: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 158. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 128 âWe do not expect harmful levels of radiationâ: The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Remarks by the President on the Situation in Japan, March 17, 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/17/remarks-president-situation-japan 128 experts were still debating the numbers: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, pp. 119ff. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 128 âthe minimal detectable activity levelâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 266. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 129 NRC was confident it had made the right call: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio
File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 266. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 129 the Nuclear Energy Institute contacted the NRC to complain: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ET Chronology Descending, p. 24. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1212/ML12122A950.pdf 129 âSo we eliminated that doseâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 220. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 130 âplan around the worst case possibilities,â: Email from Admiral Michael G. Mullen to
John P. Holdren, director, Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), April 1, 2011, 18:33 EDT.
130 The White House wanted the NRC to provide: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio
File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 223. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 130 âcertain things just cannot happenâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, pp. 223-226. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 131 âWe have a tremendous opportunity here nowâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio
File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 162. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf
Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster | 27
Chapter 6. âGive me the worst caseâ Page
131 âIt was a cordial meetingâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 280. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 131 âI think this is a major change in the missionâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio
File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 285. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 132 âItâs not a good situationâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 320. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 132 âIâm just trying to figure out who the power player is over hereâ: Japanâs Fukushima
Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 19-20, 2011, p. 3, p. 7.
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A110.pdf 132 he felt âblindsidedâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, March 19-20, 2011, p. 9. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A110.pdf 133 âweâre trying to do a worst-case that really makes senseâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March
19-20, 2011, pp. 15-16. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A110.pdf 133 âeven if the extreme happens â itâs safe to be in Tokyoâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET
Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 19-20, 2011, p. 14, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A110.pdf 133 âthereâs about five worst casesâ Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 14. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 134 âA post-accident evaluation.â Terry Kraus and Brian Hunt, Sandia National Laboratories,
âOverview of the Department of Energyâs Radiological Dose Assessment of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station Releases,â SAND Report 2012-1226C (Powerpoint presentation)
https://astarnmjss.nmcourts.gov/speakernotes/Japan_CM_Overview_Brief.pdf (accessed December 9, 2013.)
134 âHereâs todayâs crisisâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 19-20, 2011, pp. 241-242. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A110.pdf
28 | UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
Chapter 6. âGive me the worst caseâ Page
134 â[W]eâre not working the logistics stuffâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 19-20, 2011, p. 251.
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A110.pdf 135 âThe bottom line is get waterâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 19-20, 2011, p. 258. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A110.pdf 135 âlet me make it clearâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 19-20, 2011, p. 274. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A110.pdf 135 â100 hours of sleepâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 198. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 135 same design and vintage as those at Fukushima Daiichi: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET
Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 12, 2011, pp. 147, 198-199. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 135 this information did not prove very useful: Untitled document, âWhat do we know as of
10 am 3/12/2011,â p. 36. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1209/ML12096A068.pdf 136 access to valuable information the NRC didnât have: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET
Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, pp. 123-124. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 136 âItâs amazing how people know this stuff and we canât seem to get itâ: Japanâs
Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 188.
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 136 The status of the Unit 4 spent fuel pool: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 71. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 136 âit isnât really that effectiveâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 82. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 136 âWeâve got to be very careful with thatâ Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 114. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf
Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster | 29
Chapter 6. âGive me the worst caseâ Page
136 A computer simulation the next day: Email from Jennifer Uhle to Gregory Jaczko,
March 21, 2011, pp. 221-222. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1123/ML11235A560.pdf 136 âThis place was massiveâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 92. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 136 âThereâs huge [numbers of] protestersâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 101. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 137 âOne of the concerns is they turn the site into a swampâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET
Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 113. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 138 ânose to noseâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 148. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 138 âbang their headsâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 151. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 138 âprobably what youâre going to findâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 162. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 138 âDOD wants to know where to move their shipsâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio
File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 150. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 139 âDo we have any idea how we got it in there?â: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio
File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 21, 2011, p. 92. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1300/ML13008A108.pdf 139 âIt took two days to negotiate this source termâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio
File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 23, 2011, p. 145. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1300/ML13008A112.pdf 139 one disturbing finding: E-mail message from Steve Fetter to John Holdren, March 31,
2011. Subject: West Coast Summary. OSTP FOIA 13-03, Union of Concerned Scientistsâ Freedom of Information Act request,
October 23, 2012.
30 | UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
Chapter 6. âGive me the worst caseâ Page
139 âYouâve got to evacuate [Tokyo} and everything elseâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 26, 2011, p. 121.
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1300/ML13008A115.pdf 139 â[W]e ought to just have realistic modelsâ: Japanâs Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 26, 2011, p. 122. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1300/ML13008A115.pdf 140 Its âplausibleâ source term was too low, even for the ârealisticâ case: Japanâs
Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 27, 2011, p. 8.
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1300/ML13008A116.pdf
Chapter 7. âAnother March, Another Nation, Another Meltdownâ Page
141 a series of regulatory reforms, with varying degrees of effectiveness: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âBackgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident,â (updated February 11, 2013)
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html 142 just thirty-six minutes shy of its first birthday: Report prepared by the Subcommittee on
Nuclear Regulation for the Committee on Environment and Public works, U.S. Senate, âNuclear Accident and Recovery at Three Mile Island, A Special Investigation,â June, 1980, pp. 63ff
http://archive.org/stream/nuclearaccidentr00unitrich/nuclearaccidentr00unitrich_djvu.txt and Union of Concerned Scientists, âCleanup Lessons from TMI for Fukushima?â by David
Lochbaum, April 15, 2011. http://allthingsnuclear.org/cleanup-lessons-from-tmi-for-fukushima/
143 This was not a scenario without precedent: Report of the Presidentâs Commission on the
Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, p. 29. http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf 144 Design weaknesses further impaired the operatorsâ response to the unfolding
calamity: Report of the Presidentâs Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, p. 30.
http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf 144 one hundred alarms were sounding in the control room: Report of the Presidentâs
Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, pp. 91-93.
http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf
Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster | 31
Chapter 7. âAnother March, Another Nation, Another Meltdownâ Page
145 âlike a couple of blind men staggering around making decisionsâ: The Presidentâs
Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Response, 1979, p. 117.
http://books.google.com/books/about/Reports_of_the_Office_of_Chief_Counsel_o.html?id=ccFYf4tNdnIC
145 They were too late to prevent about half the core from melting: U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, âBackgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident,â updated February 11, 2013.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html 147 âI canât talk now, weâve got a problemâ: Report of the Presidentâs Commission on the
Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, p. 103. http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf 147 a âred tapeâ type of thing: Report of the Presidentâs Commission on the Accident at
Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, p. 103. http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf 147 Met Ed issued a brief press release: Kemeny Commission Report of Publicâs right to
Information, p. 90. http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//192.pdf 147 âWhat emergency?â: Report of the Presidentâs Commission on the Accident at Three
Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, p. 104. http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf 147 âThe response to the emergency was dominated by an atmosphere of almost total
confusionâ: Report of the Presidentâs Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, p. 17.
http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf 148 âThe situation is more complex than the company first led us to believeâ: Report of the
Presidentâs Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, p. 109.
http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf 149 eager to put distance between themselves and the troubled reactor: The American
Experience, âMeltdown at Three Mile Island,â 1999. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/three/peopleevents/pandeAMEX97.html 150 â[T]he fundamental problems are people-related problemsâ: Report of the Presidentâs
Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, p. 8.
http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf
32 | UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
Chapter 7. âAnother March, Another Nation, Another Meltdownâ Page
150 âan accident like Three Mile Island was eventually inevitableâ: Report of the
Presidentâs Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, p. 11.
http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf 151 U.S. nuclear plants operate on average at about a 90 percent capacity factor: Nuclear
Energy Institute: US Nuclear Capacity Factors, 2012. http://www.nei.org/Knowledge-Center/Nuclear-Statistics/US-Nuclear-Power-Plants/US-
Nuclear-Capacity-Factors 152 confidential INPO safety reports for all U.S. nuclear plants: H. Josef Hebert,
âGovernment nuclear plant reports too rosy, group charges,â Associated Press, December 15, 1993.
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1993/Government-Nuclear-Plant-Reports-Too-Rosy-Group-Charges/id-9ccd61cc6b3c2c32516fa31c277c9fd6
153 if Class 9 accidents are considered `credible,â this may preclude the construction of
reactors in the Northeast United States: David Okrent, âOn the History of the Evolution of Light Water Reactor Safety in the United States,â 1975, p 2-464 to 2-466.
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0906/ML090630275.pdf 153 âThe lessons learned from the TMI accident should be viewed in a broader
perspectiveâ: Hossein P. Nourbakhsh,âInsights and Perspectives on Severe Accident Regulatory Decisions,â American Nuclear Society International Meeting on Severe Accident Assessment and Management, Lessons Learned from Fukushima Daiichi,â San Diego, CA, November 11-15, 2012, p.3.
Chapter 8. âThe Safety MeasuresâŠAre Inadequateâ Page
155 âYou need that middle layer of peopleâ: Author interview with Charles Casto, September 24, 2012.
155 a troubling sign that the plant had sprung a new leak: Tokyo Electric Power Company,
âStatus of TEPCOâs facilities and its services after Tohoku-Taiheiyo-Oki Earthquake (as of 0:00 PM),â March 22, 2011.
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11032204-e.html 157 Fears that the nationâs food supply and its agricultural regions might be threatened:
Ken Belson and Hiroko Tabuchi, âJapan Finds Tainted Food Up to 90 Miles from Nuclear Sites,â New York Times, March 19, 2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/world/asia/20japan.html?pagewanted=all
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157 âThe levels are not high enough to have an effect on humansâ: âRadiation checks stepped up on Japanese food imports,â Asahi Shimbun, March 17, 2011.
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201103173026 158 -159 Contaminated water was also found in trenches outside both Units 1 and 3:
International Atomic Energy Agency, Fukushima Nuclear Accident Update Log, updates of 29 March 2011.
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/fukushima290311.html 160 âan adequate explanation to convince the general publicâ: Investigation Committee on
the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 392-395.
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 162 âI cannot possibly accept such a [dose] level to be applied to babies, infants and
primary school studentsâ: â20 Millisieverts for Children and Kosako Toshisoâs Resignation,â The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, May 1, 2011.
http://www.japanfocus.org/events/view/83 163 TEPCO announced a recovery plan: Tokyo Electric Power Company, âRoadmap
towards Restoration from the Accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,â April 17, 2011.
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11041707-e.html 163 âIt served so many purposes to get that roadmapâ: Author interview with Charles
Casto, September 24, 2012. 164 The cleanup at Three Mile Island Unit 2 took fourteen years: â14-year Cleanup at
Three Mile Island Concludes,â New York Times, August 15, 1993. http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/15/us/14-year-cleanup-at-three-mile-island-
concludes.html 165 âexclusion zoneâ: International Atomic Energy Agency, âIn Focus Chernobylâ (undated)
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/chernobyl/ see: Feature Stories: Frequently Asked Chernobyl Questionsâ
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/features/chernobyl-15/cherno-faq.shtml 165 TEPCO announced it would pay âtemporary compensationâ: Tokyo Electric Power
Company, âPayment of Temporary Compensation for damages caused by evacuation,â April 15, 2011.
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11041501-e.html 165 âThis is just the startâ: Hiroko Tabuchi, âHead of Japanese Utility Steps down After
Nuclear Crisis,â New York Times, May 20, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/21/business/global/21iht-tepco21.html?pagewanted=all
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166 âjump into a nuclear reactor and dieâ: Hiroko Tabuchi, âTepco Quells Push by Shareholders to End Nuclear Program,â New York Times, June 28, 2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/business/global/29tepco.html?pagewanted=all 168 `Is it really only four hours that nuclear power plants have to cope?â: U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, âBriefing on the Status of NRC Response to Events in Japan and Briefing on Station Blackout,â transcript, April 28, 2011, p. 36.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2011/20110428a.pdf 168 â[H]ow Iâve answered is that weâve only had one station blackout in the United
Statesâ: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âBriefing on the Status of NRC Response to Events in Japan and Briefing on Station Blackout,â transcript, April 28, 2011, p. 37.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2011/20110428a.pdf 168 the NTTF turned over its first findings: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
âRecommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century, The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,â July 12, 2011
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf 168 the commission gave its task force a very specific scope of inquiry: U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, âRecommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century, The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,â July 12, 2011, p. 1
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf 170 âpatchwork of regulatory requirementsâ: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
âNRCâs Japan Task Force Recommends Changes to Defense in Depth Measures at Nuclear Plants; Cites Station Blackout, Seismic, Flooding and Spent Fuel Pools as Areas for Improvement,â July 13, 2011.
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1119/ML11194A079.pdf 170 âenhanced regulatory framework intended to establish a coherent and transparent
basis for treatment of Fukushima insightsâ: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âRecommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century, The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,â July 12, 2011, p. viii.
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf 170 âcontinued operation and continued licensing activities [for new reactors] do not pose
an imminent risk to public health and safetyâ: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âRecommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century, The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,â July 12, 2011, p. vii.
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf 170 the most dangerous plant site in Japan: Daniel Cressey, âJapan to shut down `dangerousâ
Hamaoka nuclear reactors,â Nature.com Newsblog, May 9, 2011. http://blogs.nature.com/news/2011/05/japan_to_shut_down_dangerous_h_1.html
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171 âJapan should aim for a society that does not depend on nuclear energy,â: Hiroko
Tabuchi, âJapan Premier Wants Shift Away from Nuclear Power,â New York Times, July 13, 2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/world/asia/14japan.html?_r=0 171 nuclear power âworked for a while, until, of course, it no longer workedâ: âA less
nuclear future,â Japan Times, May 22, 2011. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2011/05/22/editorials/a-less-nuclear-
future/#.Uo5vamRUMrg 172 âItâs still too early to say if we can get to that stageâ: Yuka Hayashi, George Nishiyama
and Toko Sekiguchi, âNoda Pushes for Nuclear-Plant Restarts,â Wall Street Journal, 9/21/11.
172 âWell, weâll seeâ: Gregory Jaczko, speech to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C.,
July 18, 2011. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/300563-1 173 ârepudiationâ of the NRCâs increasing reliance on ârisk-informed regulationâ: U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Briefing on the Task Force Review of NRC Processes and Regulations Following the Events in Japan,â July 19, 2011, p. 42.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2011/20110719.pdf 173 âI personally do not believe that our exiting regulatory framework is brokenâ: U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Briefing on the Task Force Review of NRC Processes and Regulations Following the Events in Japan,â July 19, 2011, p. 8.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2011/20110719.pdf 173 The industryâs answer to Fukushima was a plan it called FLEX: NEI Nuclear Notes,
âIndustry Presents New Strategy to Increase Safety, Address NRCâs Post-Fukushima Recommendations,â January 13, 2013.
http://neinuclearnotes.blogspot.com/2012/01/industry-presents-new-strategy-to.html 173 âB.5.b on steroidsâ: David Lochbaum and Edwin Lyman, âU.S. Nuclear Power Safety
One Year After Fukushima,â Union of Concerned Scientists, March 2012, p. 15. http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/fukushima-anniversary-report-3-5-
12.pdf 174 âitâs going to cheaper to buy three [pumps] than one and a heckuva big building [to
put it in]â: David Lochbaum and Edwin Lyman, âU.S. Nuclear Power Safety One Year After Fukushima,â Union of Concerned Scientists, March 2012, p. 16.
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/fukushima-anniversary-report-3-5-12.pdf
36 | UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
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175 The Fort Calhoun Nuclear Generating Station: David Lochbaum, âThe NRC and Nuclear Power Plant Safety in 2011: Living on Borrowed Time,â Union of Concerned Scientists, March 2012, p. 36.
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/nrc-nuclear-safety-2011-full-report.pdf
175 The North Anna Power Station: David Lochbaum, âThe NRC and Nuclear Power Plant
Safety in 2011: Living on Borrowed Time,â Union of Concerned Scientists, March 2012, p. 19.
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/nrc-nuclear-safety-2011-full-report.pdf
176 âhazard limits just above recorded human experience is turning out to be really
shortsightedâ: Steven Mufson, âExperts, activists debate nuclear power safety following earthquake,â Washington Post, August 24, 2011.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/experts-activists-debate-nuclear-power-safety-following-earthquake/2011/08/24/gIQAUG7OcJ_story.html
177 the infighting at the NRC became public: Ed OâKeefe, âHearing exposes conflict at
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,â Washington Post, December 14, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/hearing-exposes-conflict-at-nuclear-regulatory-
commission/2011/12/14/gIQAGBNquO_story.html and George Jornick, âMeltdown at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,â The Nation,
December 12, 2011. http://www.thenation.com/blog/165109/meltdown-nuclear-regulatory-commission 177 âintimidated and bulliedâ staff: Letter to William L. Daley, chief of staff, The White
House, from Darrell Issa, chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, December 9, 2011.
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2011/12/12/document_daily_02.pdf 177 âcooperative and collegial mannerâ: Kasia Klimasinska, âNew NRC Chief Tells
Congress Sheâll run Agency in Collegial Way, Bloomberg News, July 23, 2013. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-23/new-nrc-chief-tells-congress-she-ll-run-
agency-in-collegial-way.html 177 â[W]ith enough government funding and effort, it can be doneâ: Shinichi Saoshiro,
âJapan aims to halve radiation in affected areas in 2 years,â Reuters, August 26, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/26/us-japan-nuclear-idUSTRE77P1CD20110826 178 âSome places may have to be kept off-limits to residents for a long period of timeâ:
Mitsuru Obe, âTokyo Says Evacuations Near Plant to Be Extended,â Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2011.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903327904576524122257910948.html
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Chapter 8. âThe Safety MeasuresâŠAre Inadequateâ Page
178 $6,500 bathtub: Yoree Koh, âRadiation worries spur `quackeryâ cures; contamination fears have led many Japanese to turn to questionable products for detection and treatment,â Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2012.
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204062704577222500350096534 179 âOnly the government can save TEPCO from bankruptcyâ: âThe troubles of TEPCO,â
The Economist, June 30, 2011. http://www.economist.com/node/18899008 179 âbelong to the landowners and not TEPCOâ: James Simms, âTepco Swings and
Misses,â Wall Street Journal, November 30, 2011. http://blogs.wsj.com/overheard/2011/11/30/tepco-swings-and-misses/ 179 âWe are flabbergasted at TEPCOâs argumentâ: Asahi Shimbun, âTepco: Radioactive
substances belong to landowners, not us,â by Tomohiro Iwata, November 24, 2011. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201111240030 179 joked to reporters that communities near Fukushima Daiichi were âdead townsâ:
âEconomy minister Hachiro resigns over joke about radiation,â Asahi Shimbun, September 10, 2011.
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201109109987 179 Using computer simulations, TEPCO estimated: Tokyo Electric Power Company, âThe
Evaluation Status of Reactor Core Damage at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Units 1 to 3,â November 30, 2011.
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_111130_04-e.pdf 180 the utility released its own assessment of its performance during the disaster: The
Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc., âFukushima Nuclear accident Analysis Report (Interim Report), December 2, 2011.
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/111202e14.pdf 180 the situation at Fukushima Daiichi was âunder controlâ: âPrime minister declares
nuclear crisis under control,â Asahi Shimbun, December 16, 2011. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201112160059 180 âThe plant is like a black boxâ: Hiroko Tabuchi, âJapanâs Prime Minister Declares
Fukushima Plant Stable,â New York Times, December 16, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/17/world/asia/japans-prime-minister-declares-
fukushima-plant-stable.html?_r=0
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Chapter 9. Unreasonable Assurances Page
182 âLessons from Fukushima: One Year Later:â Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate.
Full and Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety joint hearing entitled, âLessons from Fukushima One Year Later: NRCâs Implementation of Recommendations for Enhancing Nuclear Reactor Safety in the 21st Century.â Thursday, March 15, 2012. Hearing transcript.
183 It could happen here: Richard H. Perkins et al., âScreening Analysis Report for the
Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures,â U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, July 2011. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1218/ML12188A239.pdf
185 Five days after the tsunami struck: e-mail from J. Mitman to E. Riggs, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 258. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1121/ML11216A196.pdf 186 Back in 1989, the NRC staff: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âMark I Containment
Performance Improvement Program,â SECY-89-017, January 1989. 187 Chairman Joseph Hendrie said in a speech: as quoted in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, âChairman Jaczkoâs Comments on SECY-11-0032, âConsideration of the Cumulative Effects of Regulation in the Rulemaking Process,ââ August 29, 2011.
187 In a 2011 speech, Commissioner Ostendorff: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Commissioner William C. Ostendorff, âNRC Report Recommendations and the Path Forward for Nuclear Energy Regulatory Reform,â December 6, 2011.
187 series of highly stylized events: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âA Proposed Risk
Management Regulatory Framework,â NUREG-2150, April 2012, p. xvi. 188 ânot necessary for public safetyâ: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Advance Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, âSevere Accident Design Criteria,â Federal Register, 45 FR 65474 (1980).
188 âWe have come far beyond the pointâ: J. Samuel Walker, Three Mile Island, A Nuclear
Crisis in Historical Perspective. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA (2004) 217-218.
188 To set that process in motion: U.S. NRC, âSevere Accident Design Criteriaâ (1980), op
cit. 189 installation of costly new systems: C.L. Herzenberg, J.R. Ball and D. Ramaswami,
âSource-Term Reevaluation for U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors: A Status Report,â Argonne National Laboratory, ANL/EES-TM-275, December 1984, p. 32.
189 âwould be acceptable to the nuclear industryâ: Herzenberg, Ball and Ramaswami,
(1984) p. 32.
Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster | 39
Chapter 9. Unreasonable Assurances Page
189 marched towards its foregone conclusion: Margaret L. Ryan, âIDCOR Chooses
ENERGEX Over TEC to Lead Fight to Lower Source Terms,â Nucleonics Week, January 31, 1985.
189 would not be released to the environment: Margaret L. Ryan, âNew Project Manager
Considered as IDCOR Stays in Business Another Year,â Nucleonics Week, December 20, 1984.
190 âsnake oil salesmenâ: Corie Brown, âBattle Grows Over Industry Clamor to Reduce
Source Term,â Inside N.R.C., September 5, 1983. 190 no basis for the âsweeping generalizationâ: R. Wilson et al., "Report to The American
Physical Society of the Study Group on Radionuclide Release from Severe Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants," Reviews of Modern Physics, Vol. 57, No. 3, Part II, July 1985.
190 issuing a Severe Accident Policy Statement: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
âPolicy Statement on Severe Reactor Accidents Regarding Future Designs and Existing Plants,â Federal Register, 50 FR 32138 (1985).
191 When the smoke cleared: . U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âIndividual Plant
Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities,â Generic Letter 88-20. November 23, 1988.
191 recently revised backfit rule: A âbackfitâ is a modification of or addition to systems,
structures, components, or the design of an existing nuclear plant resulting from changes in the NRCâs rules or re-interpretations of old ones. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/part050-0109.html.
191 a majority of commissioners: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âRegulatory
Analysis Guidelines of the U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission,â NUREG/BR-0058, Revision 4, September 2004, p.1.
191 the resultant backfits were costly. U.S. General Accounting Office, âProcess for
Backfitting Changes in Nuclear Plants Has Improved,â GAO/RCED-86-27, December 1985, p 16.
191 ârisks that are real and significantâ: Congressional Research Service, Risk Analysis and
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Regulations, Report 94-961 ENR (1994). 192 struck by a meteor: Frank von Hippel, Citizen Scientist. Touchstone/Simon and Schuster,
New York, 1991, p. 19-21. 192 âso uncertain as to be virtually meaninglessâ. Frank von Hippel (1991), op cit. 192 an independent review panel: Harold Lewis et al., âRisk Assessment Review Group
Report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,â NUREG/CR-0400, September 1978, p. xi.
40 | UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
Chapter 9. Unreasonable Assurances Page
193 the monetary value of a human life: E. Lyman, âThe NRC and the Value of Life,â All
Things Nuclear (blog), February 28, 2011. http://allthingsnuclear.org/the-nrc-and-the-value-of-life/
193 the NRC revised its rules: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âRevision of Backfitting
Process for Power Reactors,â Final Rule, Federal Register, 50 FR 38097 (1985). 194 wrote a withering dissent: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, op. cit, 50 FR 38106
(1985). 194 threw out the backfit rule: Union of Concerned Scientists vs. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Nos. 85-1757; 86-1219 (824 F.2d 108) (D.C. Cir. August 4, 1987). 196 âthe total risk from severe core melt accidentsâ: âNUMARC Says Plant-Specific Studies
Needed to Identify Potential Fixes,â Inside N.R.C., February 29, 1988, p.13. 196 âjob security and research funding:: Brian Jordan, âStello, Senior Staff Retreat in Effort
to End Mark I Impasse,â Inside N.R.C. February 15, 1988, p.1. 197 blocked by the backfit rule: Brian Jordan, âBackfit Rule Likely to Prevent Mark I Fixes,
Internal Memo Says,â Inside N.R.C., March 14, 1988, p 13. 198 opposed the staff and supported the industry: âNRC Staff, ACRS At Odds Over Mark I
Venting Need,â Nuclear News, March 1989, p 31. 198 put off for another five years: Brian Jordan, âIndustry One Vote Short of Delaying Mark I
Fixes for Five Years,â Inside NRC, May 22, 1989, p.1. 199 âdo not identify the recommendations as commitmentsâ: U.S. NRC, âIndependent Plant
Examination Program: Perspectives on Reactor Safety and Plant Performance,â NUREG-1560, Draft Report, Volume 2, December 1996, p. 9-32.
200 the future of the containment improvement program: Kenneth D. Bergeron, Tritium on
Ice. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002, p. 58. This book provides an excellent account of the history of the NRCâs severe accident research programs at that time.
200 stubborn issues under the rug: Kenneth Bergeron (2002) op cit., p 57. 202 adoption in Japanâs own safety regulations: Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO),
Fukushima Nuclear Accident Analysis Report, June 20, 2012, p. 48. http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf
202 loss of DC power: TEPCO (2012), op cit., p. 48-50 http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf
Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster | 41
Chapter 10. âThis is a closed meeting. Right?â Page 204 more than three thousand people: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission blog, February 16,
2011. http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov/2011/02/16/nrc%E2%80%99s-upcoming-regulatory-conference-expected-to-draw-3000-attendees/
205 Interest remained high among many: Dave Levinthal, Open Secrets (blog), March 14,
2011. http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/03/nuclear-primed-for-fight.html
205 The goal was to supplant: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âState-of-the-Art Reactor
Consequence Analyses (SOARCA).â http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/research/soar.html
206 for every nuclear power plant site: Milton R. Benjamin, âNuclear Study Raises Estimates
of Accident Tolls,â Washington Post, November 1, 1982. 208 âless than the possibility of a jumbo jetâ: Milton R. Benjamin, âNRC Issues Report,
Withholds Worst-Case Estimates,â Washington Post, November 2, 1982. 208 also had to refer to probabilities: Edwin S. Lyman, Union of Concerned Scientists,
âChernobyl-on-the-Hudson?â report commissioned by Riverkeeper, Inc., September 2004, p. 15. http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/indianpointhealthstudy.pdf
209 no credible way to calculate the probability: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
âProtection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants,â final rule, Federal Register, 59 FR 38889 (1994).
209 the NRC also had to concede: Cat Lazaroff, âNuclear Plants Called Vulnerable to Terrorist
Attack,â Environment News Service, September 26, 2011. 211 the respected journal Science and Global Security: R. Alvarez et al., âReducing the
Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States,â Science and Global
Security 11 (2003) 1-51. One of us (Lyman), and current NRC Chairman Allison Macfarlane, were among the several co-authors of this study.
211 inappropriate influence on the research staff: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Office of the Inspector General, âImproper Communications by NRC Commissioner to NRC Staff and Licensees,â Case No. 04-14I, April 15, 2004. Greenpeace FOIA/PA-2008-0312.
212 presenting the âcomplexâ results: Brian Sheron, âState-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence
AnalysesâPeach Bottom and Surry Results,âSECY-09-0045, March 25, 2009, p 2. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1122/ML11228A233.pdf
212 performed by its contractor personnel: Kenneth Bergeron, Tritium on Ice. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA, 2002.
42 | UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
Chapter 10. âThis is a closed meeting. Right?â Page 214 staff had carried out such calculations: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âThe
Evolution of Mitigating Measures for Large Fires and Explosions,â p. 53. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1117/ML11179A120.pdf
214 damage estimates were unrealistically high: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
âConsideration of Economic Consequences Within the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissionâs Regulatory Framework,â SECY-12-0110, August 14, 2012, p. 49. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2012/2012-0110scy.pdf
215 âchanges in the scope of the calculationâ: William J. Shack, Chairman, NRC Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards, letter to Luis A. Reyes, April 21, 2008. 215 conclusions its bosses wanted: Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, US. NRC, âState-of-
the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses,â Briefing for the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, November 16, 2007.
216 âThis is a closed meeting. Right?â NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards,
Meeting of the Subcommittee on Regulatory Policies and Practices (closed meeting), November 16, 2007, p. 83. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1136/11363A102.pdf
217 â[I]f we miss this dateâ: Brian Sheron, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, e-mail,
Tuesday, January 25, 2011. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1131/ML11312A108
217 a rather prescient letter: Letter from Shawn Burns, Sandia National Laboratories, to R.
Prato, NRC Office of Research, November 6, 2007. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1212/ML12124A080.pdf
218 The committee asked whether the project staff: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, e-
mail exchange, June 3-4, 2010. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1203/ML12033A232.pdf 218 Internal dissent continued U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, e-mail exchange, K.
Gibson and J. Uhle, June 30, 2010. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1131/ML11313A136
219 Within fifty miles of Peach Bottom: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of
Nuclear Regulatory Research, âState-of-the-Art Reactor Consequences Project Volume 1: Peach Bottom Integrated Analysis,â May 2013, Table 7-15, p. 7-25.
220 Two years earlier: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/conference-
symposia/ric/past/2009/slides/presentations/wed-400-530-state-of-art-reactor/handout-format/tinkler-joint-slides-handout.pdf
220 The statement had subtly changed: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/conference-
symposia/ric/past/2011/docs/abstracts/santiagop-h.pdf
Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster | 43
Chapter 10. âThis is a closed meeting. Right?â Page 220 âthey said no releaseâ: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, e-mail exchange, J.
Schaperow and P. Santiago, p. 1. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1121/ML11216A196.pdf
Chapter 11. âThe Government Owes the Public a Clear and Convincing Answerâ Page
222 arrived to quell the scuffle: âNISA approves results of stress tests for 2 Oi reactors,â Asahi Shimbun, January 19, 2012.
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201201190035 222 Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda had made his views clear: Policy Speech by Prime
Minister Yoshihiko Noda to the 178th Session of the Diet, September 13, 2011. http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/statement/201109/13syosin_e.html 223 protestors took to the streets of Tokyo: Justin McCurry, âFukushima protesters urge
Japan to abandon nuclear power,â The Guardian, September 19, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/19/fukushima-protesters-japan-nuclear-power 224 Noda and several of his cabinet members would have the final say: Mitsuru Obe and
Chester Dawson, âNuclear-Restart Plans Divide Japan,â Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2012.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303444204577460272545747302.html 224 the IAEA reported: Hiroko Tabuchi, âAtomic Agency Backs Safety Tests for Japanâs
Reactors,â New York Times, January 31, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/world/asia/united-nations-tentatively-backs-japans-
nuclear-stress-tests.html 225 ânothing but an optimistic desk simulationâ: Yurly Humber, âJapan Post-Fukushima
Reactor Checks `Insufficient,â Advisers Say,â Bloomberg News, January 27, 2012. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-27/japan-post-fukushima-reactor-checks-
insufficient-advisers-say.html 225 accused the IAEA of simply rubberstamping: Sophie Knight, âNuclear safety advisers
slam stress tests,â Asahi Shimbun, February 1, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201202010057 225 Madarame asserted forcefully: Mari Yamaguchi, âJapanâs nuclear safety standards called
flawed,â AP, February 15, 2012. http://news.yahoo.com/japans-nuclear-safety-standards-called-flawed-104604884.html
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225 Japan had become overly confident: Hiroko Tabuchi, âJapan Ignored Nuclear Risks,
Official Says,â New York Times, February 16, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/world/asia/japanese-official-says-nations-atomic-
rules-are-flawed.html 225 âI hope there is an evaluation of more realistic actual figuresâ: âNoda to put full weight
behind campaign for Oi nuclear restart,â Asahi Shimbun, March 24, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201203240040 226 âwillingness to acknowledge that accidents can happenâ: Mitsuru Obe, âNuclear
Experts Examine Japanâs Lax Safety Culture,â Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2012. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203918304577244810322327428.html 226 The plunge in the companyâs stock price: Tsuyoshi Inajima and Yuji Okada, âTepco
Goes to Government for $12 Billion in Rescue Funds,â Bloomberg News, March 29, 2012. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-29/tepco-requests-12-billion-in-public-funds-
to-avert-insolvency 226 almost certainly would collapse: Tsuyoshi Inajima and Yuji Okada, âTepco Plunges to
Lowest Since 1974 as Edano Suggests Government Takeover,â Bloomberg News, December 28, 2011.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-28/tepco-shares-plunge-as-edano-suggests-japan-should-take-control-of-company.html
and Mitsuru Obe and Phred Dvorak, âTepco Chairmanâs Power Posts Test for Tokyo,â Wall
Street Journal, March 21, 2012. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303863404577283073123016712.html 226 rebuffed by Trade Minister Yukio Edano: âJapanâs Yukio Edano rebuffs Tepco bailout
claim,â BBC News, December 8, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16082349 227 corporate culture âhasnât changed at allâ: Mitsuru Obe and Phred Dvorak, âTepco
Chairmanâs Power Posts Test for Tokyo,â Wall Street Journal, March 21, 2012. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303863404577283073123016712.html 227 âSince the 1980s the utilities have lookedâ: âState Power,â The Economist, May 11,
2012. http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2012/05/tepco%E2%80%99s-nationalisation 227 An analysis by Bloomberg News: Tsuyoshi Inajima and Yuji Okada, âTepco Goes to
Government for $12 Billion in Rescue Funds,â Bloomberg News, March 29, 2012. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-29/tepco-requests-12-billion-in-public-funds-to-avert-insolvency
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Chapter 11. âThe Government Owes the Public a Clear and Convincing Answerâ Page
227 night baseball games were switched to daytime: Ken Belson, âDelaying First Pitch Debated in Baseball-Loving Japan,â New York Times, March 20, 2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/world/asia/21nippon.html?_r=0 227 TEPCO requested $12 billion: Tsuyoshi Inajima and Yuji Okada, âTepco Goes to
Government for $12 Billion in Rescue Funds,â Bloomberg News, March 29, 2012. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-29/tepco-requests-12-billion-in-public-funds-
to-avert-insolvency 228 âThis is the last chance to restore TEPCOâ: Tsuyoshi Inajima, âJapan to Seize Tepco on
Same Terms as 2003 Resona Rescue,â Bloomberg News, April 29, 2012. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-28/japan-to-model-trillion-yen-tepco-bailout-
on-2003-bank-rescue.html 228 âpie-in-the-sky blueprintâ: âTEPCO faces major challenges in avoiding bankruptcy,â
Asahi Shimbun, May 10, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201205100046 228 âmade to pay the price for their own mistakesâ: âTEPCO bailout plan riddled with
problems,â Asahi Shimbun, May 10, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201205100061 228 International Energy Agency estimates: Jacob Adelman, âJapanâs Use of Oil May Surge
by 300,000 Barrels a Day,â Bloomberg News, April 12, 2012. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-12/japan-s-use-of-oil-may-surge-by-300-000-
barrels-a-day-1-.html 229 â[I]s it really possible to ensure the safety of operating these reactorsâ: âGovernment
must answer nuclear risk questions,â Asahi Shimbun, July 23, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201207230070 230 catapulted him into the national spotlight: Martin Fackler, âJapanâs Leaders, Pressed by
Public, Fret as Nuclear Shutdown Nears,â New York Times, May 3, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/05/world/asia/japans-leaders-fret-as-nuclear-shutdown-
nears.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 231 âJapanese society cannot surviveâ: Linda Sieg and Aaron Sheldrick, âJapan PM says two
reactors must restart for âsurvival of society,â Reuters, June 8, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/08/us-japan-nuclear-reactors-idUSBRE8570GO20120608
231 âWe understand that we have not obtained all of the nationâs understandingâ: Linda
Seig and Kiyoshi Takenaka, âJapan approves two reactor restarts, more seen ahead,â Reuters, June 16, 2012.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/16/us-japan-nuclear-idUSBRE85F02720120616
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231 âTheyâre making lots of noiseâ: Martin Fackler,âIn Tokyo, thousands Protest the
Restarting of a Nuclear Power Plant,â New York Times, June 29, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/30/world/asia/thousands-in-tokyo-protest-the-restarting-of-a-nuclear-plant.html?_r=1
231 âItâs just a big step forward to start raising our voicesâ: Martin Fackler, âIn Tokyo,
thousands Protest the Restarting of a Nuclear Power Plant,â New York Times, June 29, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/30/world/asia/thousands-in-tokyo-protest-the-restarting-of-a-nuclear-plant.html?_r=1
232 âI used to say the one thing that kept me up at nightâ: âDeparting NRC chief fears
safety focus could fade,â Platts Inside Energy, July 9, 2012. 232 âthe industry agrees with many of the issuesâ: Letter from Marvin Fertel, Nuclear
Energy Institute, to Gregory Jaczko, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 15, 2011. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1120/ML11208C469.pdf 234 âshould be started without unnecessary delayâ: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
âPrioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,â SECY-11-0037, October 3, 2011, p. 9
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2011/2011-0137scy.pdf 234 âassuring or redefining the level of protectionâ: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
op cit., p. 6 http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cmmission/secys/2011/2011-0137scy.pdf 234 âswimming in the waters of backfitâ: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âBriefing on
the Progress of the Task Force Review of NRC Processes and Regulations Following the Events in Japan,â June 15, 2011, p. 24.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2011/20110615.pdf 234 âdecisions on adequate protectionâ: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Commission
Voting Record, âPrioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken In Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,â December 15, 2011. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/cvr/2011/2011-0137vtr.pdf
235 âperformance-basedâ: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Commission Voting
Record, âRecommended Actions To Be Taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report,â October 18, 2011.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/cvr/2011/2011-0124vtr.pdf 236 shortcomings of the FLEX approach: Exelon Generation, âOverall Integrated Plan in
Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,â February 28, 2013.
http://pbadpws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1305/ML13059A305.pdf
Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster | 47
Chapter 11. âThe Government Owes the Public a Clear and Convincing Answerâ Page
239 âTime is of the essenceâ: âNEI: FLEX Fukushima Response Strategy Requires reactor
Operators to buy Emergency Equipment,â Power, March 14, 2012. http://www.powermag.com/nei-flex-fukushima-response-strategy-requires-reactor-
operators-to-buy-emergency-equipment/ 239 NRC largely endorsed NEIâs approach: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âJapan
Lessons-Learned Project Directorate,â Interim Staff Guidance, August 29, 2012. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1222/ML12229A174.pdf 239 âWe can say with certainty: âGovernment acknowledges most Japanese favor nuclear-
free society,â Japan Times, August 29, 2012. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/08/29/news/government-acknowledges-most-
japanese-favor-nuclear-free-society/#.Uo_m1WRUMrg 240 âa somewhat messy compromise that will delight nobodyâ: âNodaâs nuclear phase-out
is decisive â but not final,â Financial Times, September 17, 2012. 240 âIt is highly regrettableâ: âJapanâs no-nuke pledge is already fraying at the edges,â Asahi
Shimbun, September 19, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201209190076
240 âNo matter how difficult it isâ: Mari Yamaguchi, âCabinet panel wants Japan to end
nuclear power use,â AP, September 14, 2012. http://finance.yahoo.com/news/cabinet-panel-wants-japan-end-nuclear-power-123350767--
finance.html 240 âtake it into considerationâ: Hiroko Tabuchi, âJapan, Under Pressure, Backs Off Goal to
Phase Out Nuclear Power by 2040,â New York Times, September 19, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/world/asia/japan-backs-off-of-goal-to-phase-out-
nuclear-power-by-2040.html 240 âThe governmentâs commitment to abandon nuclear powerâ: âJapanâs no-nuke pledge
is already fraying at the edges,â Asahi Shimbun, September 19, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201209190076 243 âWe have been living there for 1,000 yearsâ Martin Fackler, âHopes of Home Fade
Among Japanâs Displaced,â New York Times, November 25, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/world/asia/hopes-of-home-fade-among-japans-
displaced.html?_r=0 243 âMany [people] view us as the perpetratorsâ: âQuiet heroes speak of Japanâs nuclear
tragedy,â The Economist (reprinted in the Chronicle Herald, Halifax, Nova Scotia), October 28, 2012. http://thechronicleherald.ca/business/156024-quiet-heroes-speak-of-japan-s-nuclear-tragedy
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243 âI had no intention of dyingâ: Reiji Yoshida, â`Fukushima 50â recount quiet heroism,â Japan Times, October 11, 2012.
http://info.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20121011f2.html Chapter 12. A Rapidly Closing Window of Opportunity Page
244 the utility also blamed Japanese government regulators: See, e.g.,
https://www.kiviniria.net/media/Techniekpromotie/Thema_sKIVINIRIA/Energie/kivi_rooijen_20121123.pdf, p. 20
244 âan extremely massive earthquakeâ: Government of Japan Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters, âReport of Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, The Accident at TEPCOâs Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations,â June 2011, p. XIII-1
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1117/ML11178A383.pdf 244 no nuclear plant design could have survived: Matt Smith, âU.S. nuclear plants similar to
Fukushima spark concerns,â CNN, February 17, 2012. http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/17/us/us-nuclear-reactor-concerns/ 244 The Japanese Diet Independent Investigation Commission laid blame: The National
Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (executive summary), July 5, 2012.
http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/blog/reports/es-1/#toc-conclusions (full report is available here: http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/)
245 Soon after Fukushima, Aris Candris said: ABC News, âCould New Nuclear Reactor
Have Prevented Fukushima?â http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2011/12/could-new-nuclear-reactor-have-
prevented-fukushima/ 245 NRC commissioners voted 4-1: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âNRC Concludes
Hearing on Vogtle New Reactors, First-ever Combined Licenses to be Issued,â February 9, 2012.
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1204/ML120410133.pdf 245 âI cannot support issuing this license as if Fukushima had never happenedâ: U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, affirmation session, February 9, 2012. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2012/20120209b.pdf
Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster | 49
Chapter 12. A Rapidly Closing Window of Opportunity Page
245 Advocates are also promoting development of small modular reactors: Wendy Koch,
âNuclear industry looks toward smaller reactors,â USA Today, November 27, 2012. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/11/26/nuclear-small-modular-
reactors/1727001/ E. Lyman, âSmall Isnât Always Beautiful: Safety, Security and Cost Concerns About Small
Modular Reactors,â Union of Concerned Scientists report, September 2013. http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/small-isnt-always-beautiful.pdf 246 the vendors in 2003 successfully lobbied Congress: United States Senate,
Reauthorization of the Price-Anderson Act, December 9, 2003. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108srpt218/html/CRPT-108srpt218.htm and http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientissues_spec.php?id=D000000555&year=2001&spe
c=ENG 247 Senator Al Franken joked: Hearing of Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources, Subject: âS. 512, the Nuclear Power 2021 Act,â June 7, 2011. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/S51 248 The threat of fires remains a major contributor to the risk of core damage: U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Briefing on Fire Protection Issues, July 17, 2008, pp. 58-59.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2008/20080717.pdf 249 a severe tornado disconnected the Browns Ferry plant from the electrical grid:
Tennessee Valley Authority, Power Restoration Updates, April 27, 2011-May 20, 2011. http://www.tva.gov/news/releases/aprjun11/storm_past.htm 252 The NTTF started its report with a recommendation for fundamental change: U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âRecommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century.â http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf
252 redefine its historical safety threshold of âadequate protectionâ: U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, âRecommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century,â p. ix. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf
253 order for mitigation strategies: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âIssuance of Order
to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,â March 12, 2012.
http://pbadupnws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12054A735.pdf 254 the NRC staff recommended that filters be installed: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, âConsideration of Additional Requirements for Containment Venting Systems for Boiling Water Reactors With Mark I And Mark II Containments, SECY-12-0157, November 26, 2012.
http://nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2012/2012-0157scy.pdf
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255 In March 2013, they voted 3-2 to delay a requirement that filters be installed: U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âStaff Requirements: SECY-12-0157,â March 19, 2013. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/srm/2012/2012-0157srm.pdf 255 The NRC later notified Congress: Allison Macfarlane, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, letter to the Honorable Fred Upton, February 15, 2013. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/congress-docs/correspondence/2013/upton-
02-15-2013.pdf 257 âit is acceptable, from the standpoint of safety, to maintain the existing regulatory
processesâ: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, âNRC Staff Working Group Evaluation of Alternatives for the Disposition of Recommendation 1 of the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Report,â draft, February 15, 2013.
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1305/ML13053A142.pdf 258 regulatory âskepticismâ: Author interview with Peter Bradford, December 19, 2012. 261 Casto was eager to offer some words of advice: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
RIC 2012 âRegional Administratorsâ Session on Current Regional Issues,â March 14, 2012. http://video.nrc.gov/ Appendix. The Fukushima Postmortem: What Happened? Page 263 a meeting of the American Nuclear Society: Proceedings of the American Nuclear
Society International Meeting on Severe Accident Assessment and Management: Lessons Learned from Fukushima Dai-ichi,â November 11-15, 2012, San Diego, California.
264 the computer code called MELCOR: Randall Gauntt et al., âFukushima Daiichi Accident
Study (Status as of April 2012), SAND2012-6173, Sandia National Laboratories, August 2012. http://melcor.sandia.gov/docs/Fukushima_SAND_Report_final.pdf
264 For Unit 1: Randall Gauntt et al., âMELCOR Simulations of the Severe Accident at the
Fukushima 1F1 Reactor,â Proceedings of the American Nuclear Society International Meeting,â op cit. p. 212.
264 But even a straightforward âhands-offâ blackout: Gauntt et al., âMELCOR
Simulations,â op cit. p. 219. 264 A U.S. industry consultant: D.L. Luxat et al., âEPRI Fukushima Technical Evaluation
Project MAAP5 Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident Simulations,â Proceedings of the American Nuclear Society, op cit.,p. 243.
Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster | 51
Appendix. The Fukushima Postmortem: What Happened? Page 265 In the final analysis: K. Robb, M. Francis and L. Ott, âFukushima Daiichi Unit 3
MELCOR Investigation,â Proceedings of the American Nuclear Society, op cit., http://info.ornl.gov/sites/publications/files/Pub37640.pdf
265 The analysis of Unit 2: K. Ross et al., âInterim Melcor Simulation of the Fukushima
Daiichi Unit 2 Accident Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Operation,â SAND2013-9956, Sandia National Laboratories, November 2013.
266 As for the Unit 4 explosion: TEPCO (2012), op cit., p. 344-352.
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf 267 The Unit 2 spent fuel pool: E-mail from Steve Fetter to John Holdren,et al, âHigh
Concentration of Cs-137 Found in Unit 2 Pool,â April 11, 2011, OSTP FOIA. 267 TEPCO has argued that the venting operations: TEPCO (2012), op cit., p. 367-368.
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf 267 However, other analysts have looked: M. Hirano, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety
Organization, âPost-Fukushima Research in Japan,â U.S. NRC Regulatory Information Conference, March 12, 2011.
268 released to the atmosphere: H. Hoshi, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization,
âSource Term Analysis Using the MELCOR Code,â Technical Workshop on TEPCOâs Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident, July 23-24, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. http://www.nsr.go.jp/archive/nisa/shingikai/700/14/240723/AM-3-1.pdf.