cisco anyconnect secure mobility desktop client security target · 2016. 4. 18. · cisco...

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© 2015 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Desktop Client

Security Target

Version 1.1

March 24, 2016

Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Desktop Client Security Target

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Table of Contents

1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 7 1.1 ST and TOE Reference .................................................................................................. 7 1.2 TOE Overview .............................................................................................................. 7

1.2.1 TOE Product Type ..................................................................................................... 7

1.2.2 Required non-TOE Hardware and Software ............................................................. 8 1.3 TOE DESCRIPTION .................................................................................................... 8 1.4 TOE Evaluated Configuration ....................................................................................... 9 1.5 Physical Scope of the TOE ............................................................................................ 9 1.6 Logical Scope of the TOE ............................................................................................. 9

1.6.1 Cryptographic support ............................................................................................... 9

1.6.2 User Data Protection ............................................................................................... 10

1.6.3 Identification and Authentication ............................................................................ 10 1.6.4 Security Management .............................................................................................. 10

1.6.5 Protection of the TSF .............................................................................................. 10 1.6.6 Trusted Channels ..................................................................................................... 10

1.7 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................ 10 2 Conformance Claims ............................................................................................................. 11

2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim ....................................................................... 11 2.2 Protection Profile Conformance .................................................................................. 11

2.3 Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale ....................................................... 11 2.3.1 Appropriateness ....................................................................................................... 11

2.3.2 TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency ...................................................... 11

2.3.3 Statement of Security Requirements Consistency ................................................... 11 3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ................................................................................ 12

3.1 Assumptions ................................................................................................................ 12 3.2 Threats ......................................................................................................................... 12

4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................... 13 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ................................................................................. 13

4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment .................................................................... 14 5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................ 15

5.1 Conventions ................................................................................................................. 15 5.2 Security Functional Requirements .............................................................................. 15 5.3 SFRs Drawn from VPNv1.4 ........................................................................................ 16

5.3.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS) ................................................................................. 16

5.3.2 User data protection (FDP) ...................................................................................... 19

5.3.3 Identification and authentication (FIA) ................................................................... 20

5.3.4 Security management (FMT) .................................................................................. 20 5.3.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT) .................................................................................... 21 5.3.6 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) .................................................................................. 22

5.4 TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale for SFRs Found in VPNv1.4 ............................... 22 5.5 Security Assurance Requirements ............................................................................... 22

5.5.1 SAR Requirements .................................................................................................. 22 5.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale .......................................................... 22 5.5.3 Assurance Measures ................................................................................................ 22


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6 TOE Summary Specification ................................................................................................. 24 6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirement Measures ....................................................... 24

7 Annex A: References ............................................................................................................. 31


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List of Tables TABLE 1 ACRONYMS ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 TABLE 2: ST AND TOE IDENTIFICATION ...................................................................................................................................................... 7 TABLE 3: REQUIRED IT ENVIRONMENT COMPONENTS ............................................................................................................................... 8 TABLE 4: EXCLUDED FUNCTIONALITY ......................................................................................................................................................... 10 TABLE 5: PROTECTION PROFILES ................................................................................................................................................................. 11 TABLE 6 TOE ASSUMPTIONS ......................................................................................................................................................................... 12 TABLE 7 THREATS ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 12 TABLE 8 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE........................................................................................................................................... 13 TABLE 9 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................................................................ 14 TABLE 10 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................................................................. 15 TABLE 11: ASSURANCE MEASURES .............................................................................................................................................................. 22 TABLE 12: ASSURANCE MEASURES .............................................................................................................................................................. 23 TABLE 13 HOW TOE SFRS MEASURES ....................................................................................................................................................... 24 TABLE 14: REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................................................. 31

List of Figures

FIGURE 1 TOE DEPLOYMENT ......................................................................................................................................................................... 8


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List of Acronyms

The following acronyms and abbreviations are common and may be used in this Security

Target:

Table 1 Acronyms

Acronyms /

Abbreviations

Definition

AES Advanced Encryption Standard

CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation

CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security

CM Configuration Management

DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator

EAL Evaluation Assurance Level

EC-DH Elliptic Curve-Diffie-Hellman

ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm

ESP Encapsulating Security Payload

GCM Galois Counter Mode

HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code

IKE Internet Key Exchange

IPsec Internet Protocol Security

IT Information Technology

NGE Next Generation Encryption

OS Operating System

PP Protection Profile

PRF Pseudo-Random Functions

RFC Request For Comment

SHS Secure Hash Standard

SPD Security Policy Database

ST Security Target

TCP Transport Control Protocol

TOE Target of Evaluation

TSC TSF Scope of Control

TSF TOE Security Function

TSP TOE Security Policy

UDP User datagram protocol

VPN Virtual Private Network


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DOCUMENT INTRODUCTION

Prepared By:

Cisco Systems, Inc.

170 West Tasman Dr.

San Jose, CA 95134

This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE),

the Cisco AnyConnect Desktop (TOE). This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions

about the aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the product intends to counter, a set of

security objectives, a set of security requirements, and the IT security functions provided by the

TOE which meet the set of requirements. Administrators of the TOE will be referred to as

administrators, Authorized Administrators, TOE administrators, semi-privileged, privileged

administrators, and security administrators in this document. The Common Criteria Functional

Specification is met through the description of interfaces in this Security Target and the

parameters described within the Common Criteria Guidance Documentation as well as the

Cisco documentation for TOE.


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1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION

The Security Target contains the following sections:

Security Target Introduction [Section 1]

Conformance Claims [Section 2]

Security Problem Definition [Section 3]

Security Objectives [Section 4]

IT Security Requirements [Section 5]

TOE Summary Specification [Section 6]

References [Section 7]

The structure and content of this ST comply with the requirements specified in the Common

Criteria (CC), Part 1, Annex A, and Part 2.

1.1 ST and TOE Reference

This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its TOE.

Table 2: ST and TOE Identification

Name Description

ST Title AnyConnect Secure Mobility Desktop Client

ST Version 1.1

Publication Date March 24, 2016

Vendor and ST Author Cisco Systems, Inc.

TOE Reference AnyConnect Secure Mobility Desktop Client

TOE Software Version 4.1

Keywords IPsec, VPN Client

1.2 TOE Overview

The TOE is the core VPN component of the Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Desktop Client

(herein after referred to as the VPN client, or the TOE). The Cisco AnyConnect Secure

Mobility client is the next-generation VPN client, providing remote users with secure IPsec

(IKEv2) VPN connections to the Cisco 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) VPN

Gateway. The TOE is a software-only product running on Windows 8 or 8.1.

1.2.1 TOE Product Type

The TOE product type is a VPN client. A VPN client provides protection of data in transit

across a public network. The VPN client implements IPsec to establish a cryptographic tunnel

protecting the transmission of data between IPsec peers. The VPN client is intended to be

located outside an organization’s private network, protecting data flows between a host and the

Cisco 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) VPN Gateway.


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1.2.2 Required non-TOE Hardware and Software

The TOE requires the following IT Environment Components when the TOE is configured in its

evaluated configuration:

Table 3: Required IT Environment Components

Component Usage/Purpose Description

Certificate Authority A Certificate Authority is used to provide valid digital certificates.

OS Platform The TOE relies on the Microsoft Windows 8 or 8.1 Operating System

Platform.

VPN Gateway The Cisco ASA 5500-X functions as the head-end VPN Gateway.

1.3 TOE DESCRIPTION

This section provides an overview of the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The TOE is software-

only IPsec VPN client application that protects data in transit on both IPv4 and IPv6 networks.

The TOE provides IPsec to authenticate and encrypt network traffic travelling across an

unprotected public network. The TOE includes Cisco NGE (Next Generation Encryption),

providing support for Suite B algorithms. Additionally, the TOE provides for X.509 certificate-

based-authentication of the VPN Gateway.

The TOE allows a remote user to establish an IPsec tunnel across the public network to protect

an organization’s network resources and application communication from unauthorized

disclosure or modification.

The following figure provides a visual depiction of a TOE deployment. The TOE boundary is

surrounded with a hashed red line.

Figure 1 TOE Deployment


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1.4 TOE Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is a VPN client application and requires the following to run:

• Windows 8, 8.1, & 8.1 Update 1, x86(32-bit) and x64(64-bit)

• 100 MB hard disk space.

• x86 Pentium class processor or greater

1.5 Physical Scope of the TOE

The TOE is a software-only VPN client application. The underlying platform on which the

TOE resides is the Microsoft Windows operating system and is considered part of the IT

environment.

The underlying platform provides some of the security functionality required in the VPNv1.4

Client PP, which is denoted with the phrase “TOE Platform” in this Security Target. The

security functionality provided by the TOE platform is considered unevaluated.

1.6 Logical Scope of the TOE

The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified

above consists of several security functionalities, as identified below.

1. Cryptographic Support

2. User Data Protection

3. Identification and Authentication

4. Security Management

5. Protection of the TSF

6. Trusted Channels

These features are described in more detail in the subsections below.

1.6.1 Cryptographic support

The TOE authenticates and encrypts IPsec traffic using ESP symmetric cryptography for bulk

AES encryption/decryption and SHA-2 algorithm for hashing. In addition the TOE provides

the cryptography to support Diffie-Hellman key exchange and derivation function used in the

IKEv2 protocol. The TOE incorporates the FIPS Object Module (FOM) v4.1 in accordance

with the FIPS 140-2 standard. The Cisco FOM is a FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic

module, certificate #2100.

The TOE platform provides asymmetric cryptography, which is used by the TOE for IKE peer

authentication using digital signature and hashing services. In addition the TOE platform

provides a DRBG.


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1.6.2 User Data Protection

The TOE and TOE platform ensures that residual information from previously sent network

packets processed through the platform are protected from being passed into subsequent

network packets.

1.6.3 Identification and Authentication

The TOE and TOE platform perform device-level X.509 certificate-based authentication of the

VPN Gateway during IKE v2 key exchange. Device-level authentication allows the TOE to

establish a secure channel with a trusted VPN Gateway. The secure channel is established only

after each endpoint authenticates each other.

1.6.4 Security Management

The TOE, TOE platform, and VPN Gateway provide the management functions to configure the

security functionality provided by the TOE.

1.6.5 Protection of the TSF

The TOE performs a suite of self-tests during initial start-up to verify correct operation of its

FIPS 140-2 validated algorithms. Upon execution, the integrity of the TOEs software

executables is also verified.

The TOE and TOE Platform provide for verification of TOE software updates prior installation.

1.6.6 Trusted Channels

The TOE’s implementation of IPsec provides a trusted channel ensuring sensitive data is

protected from unauthorized disclosure or modification when transmitted from the host to a

VPN gateway.

1.7 Excluded Functionality

The following functionality is excluded from the evaluation.

Table 4: Excluded Functionality

Excluded Functionality Exclusion Rationale

Non-FIPS 140-2 mode of operation on the TOE This mode of operation allows cryptographic

operations that are not FIPS-approved.

These services will be disabled by configuration. The exclusion of this functionality does not

affect conformance to the Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients.


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2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS

2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim

The ST is compliant with the Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.

The ST is CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant.

2.2 Protection Profile Conformance

This ST is conformant to the following NIAP-approved Common Criteria validated Protection

Profile: Table 5: Protection Profiles

Protection Profile Version Date

Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients 1.4 12 October 2013

2.3 Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale

2.3.1 Appropriateness

The ST provides all of the functionality at a level of security commensurate with that identified

in the U.S. Government Protection Profile:

Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients v1.4, dated 12

October 2013 (VPNv1.4).

2.3.2 TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency

The Assumptions, Threats, and Organization Security Policies included in the Security Target

represent the Assumptions, Threats, and Organization Security Policies specified in the

VPNv1.4 for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection

Profile Security Problem Definition are included in the Security Target Statement of Security

Objectives Consistency.

The Security Objectives included in the Security Target represent the Security Objectives

specified in the VPNv1.4 for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in

the Protection Profile’s Statement of Security Objectives are included in the Security Target.

2.3.3 Statement of Security Requirements Consistency

The Security Functional Requirements included in the Security Target represent the Security

Functional Requirements specified in the VPNv1.4 for which conformance is claimed verbatim.

All concepts covered in the Protection Profile’s Statement of Security Requirements are

included in this Security Target. Additionally, the Security Assurance Requirements included

in this Security Target are identical to the Security Assurance Requirements included in section

4.3 of the VPNv1.4.


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3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION This section identifies the following:

Significant assumptions about the TOE’s operational environment.

IT related threats to the organization countered by the TOE.

Environmental threats requiring controls to provide sufficient protection.

Organizational security policies for the TOE as appropriate.

This document identifies assumptions as A.assumption with “assumption” specifying a unique

name. Threats are identified as T.threat with “threat” specifying a unique name.

3.1 Assumptions

The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s

environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE

security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.

Table 6 TOE Assumptions

3.2 Threats

The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The

assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.

Table 7 Threats

Threat Threat Definition

T.TSF_CONFIGURATION Failure to allow configuration of the TSF may prevent its users from being

able to adequately implement their particular security policy, leading to a

compromise of user information.

T.TSF_FAILURE Security mechanisms of the TOE may fail, leading to a compromise of the

TSF.

T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS A user may gain unauthorized access to the TOE data. A malicious user,

process, or external IT entity may masquerade as an authorized entity in order

to gain unauthorized access to data or TOE resources. A malicious user,

process, or external IT entity may misrepresent itself as the TOE to obtain

identification and authentication data.

T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE A malicious party attempts to supply the end user with an update to the

product that may compromise the security features of the TOE.

T.USER_DATA_REUSE User data may be inadvertently sent to a destination not intended by the

original sender because it is not rendered inaccessible after it is done being

used.

Assumption Assumption Definition

A.NO_TOE_BYPASS Information cannot flow onto the network to which the VPN client's host

is connected without passing through the TOE. A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data

it contains, is assumed to be provided by the environment.

A.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational environment will

follow the applicable security configuration guidance.


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4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES

This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and the IT Environment. The security

objectives identify the responsibilities of the TOE and the TOE’s IT environment in meeting the

security needs.

This document identifies objectives of the TOE as O.objective with objective specifying

a unique name. Objectives that apply to the IT environment are designated as

OE.objective with objective specifying a unique name.

4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

The following table, Security Objectives for the TOE, identifies the security objectives of the

TOE. These security objectives reflect the stated intent to counter identified threats and/or

comply with any security policies identified. An explanation of the relationship between the

objectives and the threats/policies is provided in the rationale section of this document.

Table 8 Security Objectives for the TOE

TOE Objective TOE Security Objective Definition

O.VPN_TUNNEL The TOE will provide a network communication channel

protected by encryption that ensures that the VPN client

communicates with an authenticated VPN gateway.

O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION_CLEARING The TOE will ensure that any data contained in a protected

resource is not available when the resource is reallocated.

O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION The TOE will provide mechanisms to allow administrators to

be able to configure the TOE.

O.TSF_SELF_TEST The TOE will provide the capability to test some subset of its

security functionality to ensure it is operating properly.

O.VERIFIABLE_UPDATES The TOE will provide the capability to help ensure that any

updates to the TOE can be verified by the administrator to be

unaltered and (optionally) from a trusted source.


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4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment

All of the assumptions stated in section 3.1 are considered to be security objectives for the

environment. The following are the Protection Profile non-IT security objectives, which, in

addition to those assumptions, are to be satisfied without imposing technical requirements on

the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE software.

Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or administrative

measures.

Table 9 Security Objectives for the Environment

Environment Security Objective IT Environment Security Objective Definition

OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS Information cannot flow onto the network to which the VPN

client's host is connected without passing through the TOE.

OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the

data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the operational

environment.

OE.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational environment

will follow the applicable security configuration guidance.


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5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The Security

Functional Requirements included in this section are derived from Part 2 of the Common

Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4, dated:

September 2012 and all international interpretations.

5.1 Conventions

The CC defines operations on Security Functional Requirements: assignments, selections,

assignments within selections and refinements. This document uses the following font

conventions to identify the operations defined by the CC:

Where operations were completed in the VPNv1.4 itself, the formatting used in the

VPNv1.4 has been retained;

Assignment: Indicated with italicized text, which may or may not be bracketed;

Refinement made by PP author: Indicated with bold text; may have Refinement: at the

beginning of the element for further clarification.

Selection: Indicated with underlined text, which may or may not be bracketed;

Iteration: Indicated by appending the iteration number in parenthesis, e.g., (1), (2), (3).

Explicitly stated SFRs are identified by having a label ‘EXT’ after the requirement name for

TOE SFRs.

5.2 Security Functional Requirements

This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE/TOE platform. The

Security Functional Requirements that appear in the following table are described in more detail

in the following subsections.

Table 10 Security Functional Requirements

Class Name Component

Identification

Component Name

FCS: Cryptographic support FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)

FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)

FCS_CKM_EXT.2 Cryptographic Key Storage

FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Zeroization

FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation (for data

encryption/decryption)

FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic

signature)

FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic hashing)

FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message

authentication)

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Explicit: IPSEC

FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit

Generation)

FDP: User data protection FDP_RIP.2 Full Residual Information Protection

FIA: Identification and

authentication

FIA_X509_EXT.1 Extended: X.509 Certificates


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Class Name Component

Identification

Component Name

FMT: Security management FMT_SMF.1(1) Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMF.1(2) Specification of Management Functions

FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing

FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update

FTP: Trusted path/channels FTP_ITC.1 Trusted Channel

5.3 SFRs Drawn from VPNv1.4

5.3.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys) 5.3.1.1

FCS_CKM.1.1(1) Refinement: The TOE and TOE platform shall generate asymmetric

cryptographic keys used for key establishment in accordance with:

NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment

Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” for finite field-based key

establishment schemes;

NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment

Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” for elliptic curve-based key

establishment schemes and implementing “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [P-521] (as

defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”)

NIST Special Publication 800-56B, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment

Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography” for RSA-based key establishment

schemes

and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of

112 bits. See NIST Special Publication 800-57, “Recommendation for Key Management” for

information about equivalent key strengths.

FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys) 5.3.1.2

FCS_CKM.1.2(2) Refinement: The TOE platform shall generate asymmetric cryptographic

keys used for IKE peer authentication in accordance with a:

[

FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3 for RSA schemes;

FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4 for ECDSA

schemes and implementing “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [P-521]

]


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and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of

112 bits.

FCS_CKM_EXT.2 Cryptographic Key Storage 5.3.1.3

FCS_CKM_EXT.2.1 The TOE and TOE platform shall store persistent secrets and private

keys when not in use in platform-provided key storage.

FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Zeroization 5.3.1.4

FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The TOE and TOE platform shall zeroize all plaintext secret and private

cryptographic keys and CSPs when no longer required.

FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation (for data encryption/decryption) 5.3.1.5

FCS_COP.1.1(1) Refinement: The TOE shall perform [encryption and decryption] in

accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES operating in GCM and CBC mode

with cryptographic key sizes 128-bits and 256-bits that meets the following:

FIPS PUB 197, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)”

NIST SP 800-38D, NIST SP 800-38A.

FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic signature) 5.3.1.6

FCS_COP.1.1(2) Refinement: The TOE platform shall perform cryptographic signature

services in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm:

FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3 for RSA

scheme

FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4 for ECDSA

schemes and implementing “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and P-521

and cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of 112

bits.

FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic hashing) 5.3.1.7

FCS_COP.1.1(3) Refinement: The TOE and TOE platform shall perform [cryptographic

hashing services] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-256, SHA-384]

and message digest sizes 256, 384 bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-4, “Secure Hash

Standard.”


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FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication) 5.3.1.8

FCS_COP.1.1(4) Refinement: The TOE shall perform keyed-hash message authentication

in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC- SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384,

SHA-512, key size [160, 256, 384, 512 bits], and message digest size of 160, 256, 384, 512

bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 198-1, "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication

Code”, and FIPS Pub 180-4, “Secure Hash Standard.”

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Explicit: IPSEC 5.3.1.9

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 The TOE and TOE Platform shall implement the IPsec architecture as

specified in RFC 4301.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2 The TOE shall implement tunnel mode.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3 The TOE Platform shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that

matches anything that is otherwise unmatched, and discards it.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 The TOE shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC

4303 using the cryptographic algorithms AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC

4106, [AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 (both specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure

Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 The TOE shall implement the protocol IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 5996

(with mandatory support for NAT traversal as specified in section 2.23), 4307, and [no other

RFCs for hash functions].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 The TOE shall ensure the encrypted payload in the IKEv2 protocol uses

the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 as specified in RFC 6379 and

[AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 5282].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 The TOE shall ensure that IKEv1 Phase 1 exchanges use only main

mode.

Application Note: The TOE implements IKEv2 and does not support IKEv1. This is

permitted in [VPNv1.4].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 The TOE shall ensure that IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be configured by

VPN Gateway based on length of time, where the time values can be limited to: 24 hours for

Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9 The TOE shall generate the secret value x used in the IKE Diffie-

Hellman key exchange (“x” in gx mod p) using the random bit generator specified in

FCS_RBG_EXT.1, and having a length of at least 320 (for DH Group 14), 256 (for DH Group

19), 256 (for DH Group 24), 384 (for DH Group 20) bits.


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FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10 The TOE shall generate nonces used in IKE exchanges in a manner

such that the probability that a specific nonce value will be repeated during the life a specific

IPsec SA is less than 1 in 2^[256].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 The TOE shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement DH Groups 14

(2048-bit MODP), 19 (256-bit Random ECP), and 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), 20

(384-bit Random ECP).

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12 The TOE shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform peer

authentication using a RSA, ECDSA that use X.509v3 certificates that conform to RFC 4945

and no other method.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13 The TOE shall not establish an SA if the distinguished name (DN)

contained in a certificate does not match the expected DN for the entity attempting to establish a

connection.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 Refinement: The TOE configured by VPN Gateway shall be able to

ensure by default that the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in

the key) negotiated to protect the IKEv2 IKE_SA connection is greater than or equal to the

strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to

protect the IKEv2 CHILD_SA connection.

FCS_RBG_(EXT).1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) 5.3.1.10

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TOE platform shall perform all deterministic random bit generation

(RBG) services in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90A using [CTR_DRBG

(AES)].

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that

accumulates entropy from a platform-based RBG with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy at least

equal to the greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and hashes

that it will generate.

5.3.2 User data protection (FDP)

FDP_RIP.2 Full Residual Information Protection 5.3.2.1

FDP_RIP.2.1 The TOE platform shall enforce that any previous information content of a

resource is made unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to all objects.


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5.3.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)

FIA_X509_EXT.1 Extended: X.509 Certificates 5.3.3.1

FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 The TOE and TOE platform shall validate certificates in accordance with

the following rules:

Perform RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.

Validate the revocation status of the certificate using the Online Certificate Status

Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 2560, a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as

specified in RFC 5759.

Validate the certificate path by ensuring the basicConstraints extension is present

and the cA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates.

Validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:

o Certificates used for trusted updates, integrity verification shall have the Code

Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3).

FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 The TOE shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the following

is met: the basicConstraints extension is present and the cA flag is set to TRUE.

FIA_X509_EXT.2 Extended: X.509 Certificate Use and Management 5.3.3.2

FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support

authentication for IPsec exchanges, and integrity checks for FPT_TST_EXT.1.2.

FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When a connection to determine the validity of a certificate cannot be

established, the TOE shall allow the administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate in

these cases.

FIA_X509_EXT.2.3 The TOE shall not establish an SA if a certificate or certificate path is

deemed invalid.

5.3.4 Security management (FMT)

FMT_SMF.1(1) Specification of Management Functions 5.3.4.1

FMT_SMF.1.1(1) The TOE shall be capable of performing the following management

functions:

Specify VPN gateways to use for connections,

Specify client credentials to be used for connections,

[no additional management functions].


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FMT_SMF.1(2) Specification of Management Functions 5.3.4.2

FMT_SMF.1.1(2) The TOE, TOE platform, and VPN Gateway shall be capable of performing

the following management functions:

Configuration of IKE protocol version(s) used,

Configure IKE authentication techniques used,

Configure the cryptoperiod for the established session keys. The unit of measure

for configuring the cryptoperiod shall be no greater than an hour,

Configure certificate revocation check,

Specify the algorithm suites that may be proposed and accepted during the IPsec

exchanges,

load X.509v3 certificates used by the security functions in this PP,

ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates,

ability to configure all security management functions identified in other sections

of this PP,

allow the administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate when a

connection to determine the validity of a certificate cannot be established, no

other actions.

5.3.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing 5.3.5.1

FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TOE shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up (on power on)

to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.

FPT_TST_EXT.1.2 The TOE platform shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of

stored TSF executable code when it is loaded for execution through the use of the

[cryptographic signature verification].

FPT_TUD_(EXT).1 Extended: Trusted Update 5.3.5.2

FPT_TUD_(EXT).1.1 The TOE shall provide the ability to query the current version of the

TOE firmware/software.

FPT_TUD_(EXT).1.2 The TOE shall provide the ability to initiate updates to TOE

firmware/software.

FPT_TUD_(EXT).1.3 The TOE platform shall provide a means to verify firmware/software

updates to the TOE using a digital signature mechanism and [no other functions] prior to

installing those updates.


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5.3.6 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel 5.3.6.1

FTP_ITC.1.1 Refinement: The TOE shall use IPsec to provide a trusted communication

channel between itself and a VPN Gateway that is logically distinct from other communication

channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data

from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.

FTP_ITC.1.2 The TOE shall permit the TSF to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ ITC.1.3 The TOE shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for all traffic

traversing that connection.

5.4 TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale for SFRs Found in VPNv1.4

The VPNv1.4 contains all the requirements claimed in this Security Target. As such the

dependencies are not applicable since the PP itself has been approved.

5.5 Security Assurance Requirements

5.5.1 SAR Requirements

The TOE assurance requirements for this ST are taken directly from the Common Criteria

Version 3.1, Revision 4. The assurance requirements are summarized in the table below.

Table 11: Assurance Measures

Assurance Class Components Components Description

Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification

Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance

AGD_PRE.1 Preparative User guidance

Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE

ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage

Test ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance

Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability analysis

5.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

The Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in this Security Target represent the SARs

identified in the VPNv1.4 PP. As such, the VPNv1.4 SAR rationale is deemed acceptable since

the PP itself has been validated.

5.5.3 Assurance Measures

The TOE satisfies the identified assurance requirements. This section identifies the Assurance

Measures applied by Cisco to satisfy the assurance requirements. The table below lists the

details.


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Table 12: Assurance Measures

Component How requirement will be met

ADV_FSP.1 The functional specification is comprised of the information contained in the AGD_OPR and

AGD_PRE documentation, coupled with the information provided in the TSS of the ST.

AGD_OPE.1 The Administrative Guide provides operational user guidance.

AGD_PRE.1 The preparative procedures describes all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE

and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security

objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

ALC_CMC.1

ALC_CMS.1 Cisco will provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.

ATE_IND.1 Cisco will provide the TOE for testing.

AVA_VAN.1 Cisco will provide the TOE for testing.


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6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION

6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirement Measures

Table 13 identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified in

section 5 of this ST are met.

Table 13 How TOE SFRs Measures

TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met

Security Functional Requirements Drawn from VPNv1.4

FCS_CKM.1 (1)

FCS_CKM.1 (2)

The TOE incorporates a FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic module, CMVP #2100, that

provides public-private key establishment for Diffie-Hellman and Diffie-Hellman Elliptic

Curve key exchange conformant to NIST SP 800-56A.

The TOE platform incorporates Cryptographic Service Providers (CSPs) which generate

the public/private key pairs below:

Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) key establishment scheme with P-256, P-384, and

P-521 prime curves;

RSA key establishment scheme with 4096 bit key size.

A CSP is invoked on the TOE platform by an Application Programming Interface -

Cryptography API: Next Generation (CNG). The CSPs provided by the TOE platform are

FIPS 140 validated. The relevant FIPS certificate numbers are listed below:

TOE Platform Certificate Numbers

Windows 8 CMVP# 1892, 1893, 1894

Windows 8.1 CMVP# 2355, 2356, 2357

FCS_CKM_EXT.2 Persistent key, secret, or credentials manipulated by the TOE are stored when not in use

on TOE platform-provided storage as follows:

Key, Secret, or Credential Purpose Stored In

Device identity certificates IPsec peer authentication Windows Certificate

Store

CA certificate IPsec peer authentication Windows Certificate

Store

The TOE does not use pre-shared keys for IPsec, making any possibility of storing it

unencrypted on the TOE platform non-existent.

Persistent key, secret, or credentials manipulated by the TOE platform are stored when not

in use on the TOE platform as follows:

Key, Secret, or Credential Purpose Stored In

Asymmetric ECDSA

Private Key

ECDSA digital

signature generation

Windows Key Storage

Provider (KSP)

Asymmetric RSA Private

Key

RSA digital signature

generation

Windows Key Storage

Provider (KSP)

Asymmetric ECDSA

Public Key

ECDSA digital

signature verification

Windows Key Storage

Provider (KSP)


25


Asymmetric RSA Public

Key


verification

Windows Key Storage

Provider (KSP)

FCS_CKM_EXT.4 The TOE ensures volatile memory areas containing plaintext private keys, secrets, and

critical security parameters it manipulates are cleared by invoking a function on the TOE

platform to perform zeroization as follows:

Key, Secret, or CSP Purpose Zeroization Method

Diffie-Hellman Shared

Secret

IKE v2 SA setup Overwritten with zeros

when no longer in use

by the IPsec VPN

trusted channel.

SKEYID_d

IKEv2 SA key from

which child IPsec keys

are derived.

Overwritten with zeros


by the IPsec VPN

trusted channel.

IPsec child SA keys:

o Initiator encryption

and integrity key

o Responder

encryption and

integrity key

ESP SA - encrypts and

authenticates outgoing

traffic

ESP SA - decrypts and

authenticates incoming

traffic

Overwritten with zeros


by the IPsec VPN

trusted channel.

The TOE platform zeroizes private keys it manipulates and stores on the TOE platform:

Key, Secret, or CSP Purpose Zeroization Method

Asymmetric ECDSA

Private Key stored on the

TOE platform

ECDSA digital signature

generation

Performed exclusively

by the TOE Platform.

Asymmetric RSA Private

Key stored on the TOE

platform


generation

Performed exclusively

by the TOE Platform.

FCS_COP.1(1) The TOE provides symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using AES in CBC

and GCM mode (128, 256 bits) as described in NIST SP 800-38A and NIST SP 800-38D.

The relevant FIPS certificate numbers are listed below:

Cryptographic Operation Mode NIST CAVP Cert #

AES CBC (128, 256)

GCM (128, 256)

2685, 2678

FCS_COP.1(2) The TOE platform provides cryptographic signature services for the TOE to verify the

VPN Gateway X.509 certificate during the IKEv2 authentication phase of IPsec.


26


The TOE also relies upon the TOE platform to provide cryptographic signature

verification services for the TOE software during the trusted update process.

This operation is invoked by the TOE via a programmatic call to a cryptographic function

(Cryptography API: Next Generation (CNG) provided by the TOE platform.


TOE Platform Cryptographic Operation NIST CAVP #

Windows 8 Digital Signature – ECDSA 341

Windows 8 Digital Signature - RSA 1134, 1133

Windows 8.1 Digital Signature – ECDSA 505

Windows 8.1 Digital Signature - RSA 1519, 1494,

1493, 1487

FCS_COP.1(3) When performing AES cryptographic operations in CBC mode, the TOE provides

cryptographic hashing to ensure data integrity for the ESP protocol using SHA-256 and

SHA-384 as specified in FIPS Pub 180-4 “Secure Hash Standard.”


Cryptographic Operation Mode NIST CAVP Cert #

SHS SHA-256, SHA-384 2256, 2247

The TOE platform provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-256, and SHA-

384 as specified in FIPS Pub 180-4 “Secure Hash Standard.” The TOE relies upon the

TOE platform for cryptographic hash functions required to verify the integrity of a

certificate during the IKEv2 authentication phase of IPsec. This operation is invoked by

the TOE via a programmatic call to a cryptographic function (Cryptography API: Next

Generation (CNG) provided by the TOE platform.


TOE Platform Cryptographic Operation NIST CAVP #

Windows 8 Hashing (SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) 1903

Windows 8.1 Hashing (SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) 2396

FCS_COP.1(4) To verify the data integrity and authentication of IPsec bulk traffic the TOE provides

keyed-hashing message authentication services within the encryption of IKEv2 payloads.

Additionally, the TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services for

Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs) in IKEv2. Both use HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-

256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512 as specified in FIPS Pub 198-1," The Keyed-

Hash Message Authentication Code,” and FIPS 180-4, “Secure Hash Standard.”

The TOE does not implement any truncation of the hash for data integrity and

authentication. Truncation does not apply to Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs) in IKEv2.


Algorithm Mode NIST CAVP Cert #

HMAC SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-

384, SHA-512

1672, 1664


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FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 The TOE’s implementation of the IPsec standard (in accordance with RFC 4301) uses the

Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol to provide authentication, encryption and

anti-replay services. By default ESP operates in tunnel mode. No configuration is

required by the user or administrator for the TOE to operate in tunnel mode.

Remote access policies on the ASA VPN Gateway provide an interface for the

administrator to create ACL(s), defining network segment(s) requiring IPsec protection.

An XML format of the policy on client defines the remote access policy the TOE will use.

After successful client authentication to the ASA VPN Gateway, a “Cisco AnyConnect

Secure Mobility Client” virtual interface is created and assigned an IP address from the

Gateway’s VPN address pool. The TOE’s virtual interface includes a kernel mode driver

digitally signed by Cisco Systems, Inc.

The Security Policy Database (SPD) is implemented by the underlying TOE Platform and

the TOE interacts with the SPD through insertions of entries to the routing table on the

host OS platform. This enforces what traffic is protected with IPsec by the TOE and what

traffic isn’t. Traffic that is protected is processed by ESP and tunneled through the TOE’s

virtual interface.

The default behavior of the remote access policy on the VPN Gateway is for the TOE to

protect all traffic with IPsec. When all traffic is tunneled, a new default route is added to

the host OS platform with a lower metric directing all host network traffic through the

“Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client” virtual interface. The TOE uses active SA

settings or creates new SAs for initial connections with the ASA VPN Gateway peer. All

ESP processing to authenticate, encrypt, and tunnel the traffic is performed by the TOE.

If an organization explicitly permits use of split-tunneling, a remote access policy on the

ASA VPN Gateway allows the administrator to define IPsec protection for the

organization’s network(s) but bypass protection for other traffic. When a portion of traffic

is tunneled, a route is added to the host OS platform corresponding to the network

segment requiring IPsec protection, directing that portion of host network traffic for ESP

processing and tunneling through the “Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client” virtual

interface.

Network(s) and subnet(s) not subjected to the remote access policy, but reachable from

the host platform, such as Internet traffic, travels outbound from the host without being

protected with IPsec by the TOE.

TOE Platform provides an interface where an administrator configures firewall rules to

block bypass traffic not permitted to traverse the network. Traffic that does not match

network segments that bypass IPsec protection can be configured by the platform

administrator to be dropped. A drop rule results in discarded network traffic. This

applies only when split-tunneling is enabled; when split tunneling is not configured all

traffic is tunneled.

The TOE implements IKEv2 and does not support IKEv1.

IPsec Internet Key Exchange is the negotiation protocol that lets the TOE and a VPN

Gateway agree on how to build an IPsec Security Association (SA). IKE separates

negotiation into two phases: phase 1 and phase 2.

During IKE Phase 1, the TOE authenticates the remote VPN Gateway using device-level

authentication with ECDSA or RSA X.509v3 certificates provided by the TOE platform.


28


Phase 1 creates the first tunnel, which protects later IKE negotiation messages. The key

negotiated in phase 1 enables IKE to communicate securely in phase 2.

The TOE supports only IKEv2 session establishment. As part of this support, the TOE by

default does not support aggressive mode used in IKEv1 exchanges.

The TOE supports Diffie-Hellman Group 14 (2048-bit keys), 19 (256-bit Random ECP),

24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), and 20 (384-bit Random ECP) in support of IKE

Key Establishment negotiated in phase 1. These keys are generated using the DRBG

specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 having 256 bits of entropy.

The administrator is instructed in the AGD to select a supported DH group using one of

the following corresponding key sizes (in bits): 320 (for DH Group 14), 256 (for DH

Group 19), 256 (for DH Group 24), and 384 (for DH Group 20) bits.

For each DH Group, the TOE generates the secret value 'x' used in the IKEv2 Diffie-

Hellman key exchange ('x' in gx mod p) using its DH private key, the IPsec peer’s public

key and a nonce. When a random number is needed for a nonce, the probability that a

specific nonce value will be repeated during the life a specific IPsec SA is less than 1 in

2256

. The nonce is likewise generated using the DRBG specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1.

During Phase 2, IKE negotiates the IPsec SA and includes:

The negotiation of mutually acceptable IPsec SA parameters;

The Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) is used for the construction of keying

material for cryptographic algorithms used in the SA.

The establishment of IPsec Security Associations to protect packet flows using

Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP).

The resulting potential strength of the symmetric key will be 128, 192, or 256 bits of

security depending on the algorithms negotiated between the two IPsec peers.

The TOE ensures by default the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the

number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the IKEv2 IKE_SA connection is greater

than or equal to the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in

the key) negotiated to protect the IKEv2 CHILD_SA connection.

After IKE phase 2 completes, the IPsec SA is established, providing a secure tunnel to a

remote VPN Gateway. The VPN Gateway allows the administrator to configure AES-

GCM-128, AES_GCM-256, AES-CBC-128, and AES-CBC-256 for the TOE to perform

bulk IPsec encryption.

The TOE supports administratively configured lifetimes for both Phase 1 SAs and Phase 2

SAs. The default time value for Phase 1 SAs is 24 hours. The value for Phase 2 SAs is

configurable to 8 hours. Both values are configurable using management functions

provided by the VPN Gateway.

FCS_RBG_EXT.1 The TOE invokes RBG functionality provided by the TOE platform through the

CryptGenRandom function. The CryptGenRandom function provides the TOE with

cryptographically random bytes.

FDP_RIP.2 The processing of network packets for residual information is handled by the TOE

platform. The TOE platform ensures that packets transmitted from the TOE platform do

not contain residual information from previous network packets. Buffers allocated for a

network packet are not reused for subsequent network packets. The TOE platform

ensures the memory allocated to the buffer once it’s no longer needed is released back to

the Windows Operating System.

FIA_X509_EXT.1

FIA_X509_EXT.2

The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 for device level

authentication of the VPN Gateway. Portions of the certificate validation are performed

on both the TOE and TOE platform.

The user is provided with an X.509v3 certificate which is loaded into the Windows OS

certificate store. Upon initiation of an IPsec connection, the TOE will validate the VPN


29


Gateway certificate and CA issued certificate as follows:

The TOE checks Basic Constraint by met by ensuring the CA for the certificate

of VPN Gateway is an issuer for certificates (cA flag is TRUE). It also checks

VPN Gateway certificate is an end-certificate.

The TOE check the issuer field of the VPN Gateway certificate matches that of

the CA certificate, as well as any intermediate CAs that are identified in the chain

below the root. The root certificates are provided in the Windows OS certificate

store.

The TOE relies upon the TOE platform to check the revocation status of the VPN

Gateway certificate. The TOE invokes the Crypto API function provided by the

Windows OS, which in turn uses OCSP or CRL to check if the certificate has

been revoked.

By performing the checks described above, the TOE ensures certificate validation results

in a trusted root certificate.

At any point if a certificate cannot be successfully validated, the AGD guidance instructs

the administrator to configure the TOE to not allow the user an option for continuing the

connection. In all cases, if a certificate or certificate path cannot be validated, the TOE

will not establish an IPsec connection to an untrusted VPN Gateway.

FMT_SMF.1(1) Security management functions are provided by the TOE as specified below:

The TOE is capable of specifying VPN gateways to use for connections,

The TOE is capable of prompting the user to select the authentication certificate

to use as well as specifying the location to search. Certificates are used for

device-level authentication of the VPN Gateway.

The TOE is capable of specifying Username/password credentials used to

authenticate remote VPN users to an authentication server.

FMT_SMF.1(2) Security management functions are provided by the TOE, the TOE platform, or the VPN

Gateway as specified below:

The VPN Gateway is capable of configuring IKEv2 IPsec proposals

The VPN Gateway is capable of configuring IKEv2 authentication

The VPN Gateway is capable of configuring the cryptoperiod for the established

session keys. The unit of measure for configuring the cryptoperiod shall be no

greater than an hour,

The TOE is capable of configuring certificate revocation check,

The VPN Gateway is capable of specifying the algorithm suites that may be

proposed and accepted during the IPsec exchanges,

The TOE platform is capable of loading an X.509v3 certificate used by the TOE

to authenticate the VPN gateway during IPsec authentication.

The TOE platform is capable of updating the TOE, and capable of verifying the

updates,

The TOE is capable of configuring all security management functions identified

in FMT_SMF.1(1),

The TOE is capable of allowing the administrator to choose whether to accept

the certificate when a connection to determine the validity of a certificate cannot

be established.

FPT_TST_EXT.1 As a software product incorporating a FIPS 140-2 validated module, the TOE runs a suite

of self-tests during start-up to verify its correct operation.


30


These tests include:

AES Known Answer Test

RSA Signature Known Answer Test (both signature/verification)

FIPS 186-3 ECDSA Sign/Verify Test

KAS ECC Primitive “Z” KAT

HMAC Known Answer Test

SHA-1/256/512 Known Answer Test

Software Integrity Test

If any self-test fails subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls is

prevented. If all components of the power-up self-test are successful then the product is in

FIPS mode.

Upon launch, the TOE platform performs an executable code integrity verification check,

invoking the TOE platform to perform digital signature verification operations on

executable files.

These tests are sufficient to verify that the TOE software is operating correctly as well as

the cryptographic operations are all performing as expected.

FPT_TUD_EXT.1 The TOE has specific versions that can be queried by a user. Updates are a new version of

the TOE. When updates are made available by Cisco, an administrator can obtain and

install those updates. The updates can be downloaded from the Cisco.com web site.

Administrators can download the software update from Cisco.com onto the TOE platform.

Software updates are available from Cisco.com at the following:

http://www.cisco.com/cisco/software/navigator.html

The authorized source for the digitally signed updates is "Cisco Systems, Inc."

Upon installation of a TOE update, a digital signature verification check will

automatically be performed. The authorized source for the digitally signed updates is

"Cisco Systems, Inc.". Verification includes a check that the certificate is valid and has a

Code Signing Value of 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3 in the EKU field. Updates are a new version of

the TOE.

The TOE performs digital signature verification prior to update installation, invoking

cryptographic services provided by the TOE platform.

FTP_ITC.1 The TOE implements IPsec to protect all communication transmitted from the host

destined for a VPN gateway.


31

7 ANNEX A: REFERENCES

The following documentation was used to prepare this ST:

Table 14: References

Identifier Description

[CC_PART1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and

general model, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-20012-09-001

[CC_PART2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security

functional components, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-002

[CC_PART3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security

assurance components, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-20012-09-003

[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Evaluation

Methodology, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-004

[VPNv1.4] Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, 1.4, 12 October 2013

cisco anyconnect secure mobility desktop client security target · 2016. 4. 18. · cisco...

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