Cipher Brief on Afghanistan, Pakistan, LeT, India

Lashkar-e-Taiba Wreaks Havoc in South Asia, Threatens the U.S. The Cipher Brief August 17, 2017 Bennett Seftel Deputy Director of Analysis

Photo: Lefteris Pitarakis/AP

While much of the United States’ attention in South Asia has centered on battling al Qaeda, ISIS, the Haqqani network, and the Afghan Taliban, several other militant organizations, most notably Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), consistently wreak havoc in the region and directly threaten U.S. interests and security. Although LeT does not have the notoriety of ISIS and al Qaeda, it has previously attempted to strike the U.S. homeland and continues to keep America squarely in sights.

“LeT is arguably the most capable South Asia-based group when it comes to international terrorism,” Stephen Tankel, assistant professor in the School of International Service at American University, told The Cipher Brief. “Its ability to threaten the U.S. homeland directly, i.e. to execute its own terrorist attack, is probably higher than any other group in South Asia.”

Cipher Brief on Afghanistan, Pakistan, LeT,India

Lashkar-e-Taiba Wreaks Havoc in SouthAsia, Threatens the U.S.The Cipher BriefAugust 17, 2017Bennett SeftelDeputy Director of Analysis

Photo: Lefteris Pitarakis/AP

While much of the United States' attention in South Asia has centered on battling al Qaeda, ISIS,the Haqqani network, and the Afghan Taliban, several other militant organizations, most notablyLashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), consistently wreak havoc in the region and directly threaten U.S.interests and security. Although LeT does not have the notoriety of ISIS and al Qaeda, it haspreviously attempted to strike the U.S. homeland and continues to keep America squarely insights.

"LeT is arguably the most capable South Asia-based group when it comes to internationalterrorism," Stephen Tankel, assistant professor in the School of International Service atAmerican University, told The Cipher Brief. "Its ability to threaten the U.S. homeland directly,i.e. to execute its own terrorist attack, is probably higher than any other group in South Asia."

Lashkar-e-Taiba, which literally translates to “army of the pure,” was formed in the early 1990s as the militant wing of the prominent Pakistani Islamist organization Markaz al-Dawa-Wal-Irshad – a group that was established in 1986 – and later sent fighters to aid the Taliban’s conquest of Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. Under the guidance of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, known as the ISI, LeT shifted its focus to attacking Indian targets both in the disputed Kashmir region and in India itself. In essence, LeT operates as an extension of the ISI and has evolved into Pakistan’s proxy in Kashmir, similar to the role that the Haqqani network has assumed in Afghanistan.

“What the group seeks is a liberation of Muslims from the heavy hand of Indian rule in Kashmir and the territory’s ultimate incorporation into Pakistan,” explains Dr. Marvin Weinbaum, Director for Pakistan studies at the Middle East Institute. “More broadly, LeT’s involvement in attacks mounted elsewhere in India indicate an agenda that seeks on the behalf of Indian Muslims the weakening and dismemberment of what is seen as an oppressive Hindu state.”

Beyond its militant agenda, LeT, under the banner of its charitable front, Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD), has also provided social services such as education and healthcare to many inside Pakistan and Kashmir. This has endeared the group to local citizens as LeT has filled a critical void where the Pakistani government has proven inadequate.

“These activities have given LeT local standing, which it can use for recruitment and fundraising,” explains Weinbaum. “Over time, it has allowed LeT to develop a popular support base that would make it difficult for the government to uproot, even should it be inclined to do so.”

In December 2001, LeT ascended onto the international stage when a number of its fighters, alongside those from another Pakistani-based militant organization that operates in Kashmir, Jaish el-Muhammad, attacked the Indian parliament in New Delhi killing nine people. The U.S. swiftly moved to designate LeT as a terrorist organization, and Pakistan followed suit one year later after facing mounting international pressure. In 2002 LeT attempted to rebrand itself under its charitable wing JuD, but it has nonetheless still been considered a terrorist organization by both the U.S. and India. JuD was eventually banned by Pakistan in 2015.

But what really identified LeT as a highly capable terrorist movement occurred in 2008 when ten LeT militants carried out a three-day shooting spree at multiple locations in Mumbai that left 166 dead and more than 300 wounded. The attack nearly imploded already tense Pakistan-Indian relations.

Today, LeT is led by one of its founders, Hafiz Saeed, who was placed under house arrest by Pakistan this January. Saeed is accused by India and others of orchestrating the Mumbai attacks and has been placed under house arrest in the past, but never for long for fear LeT would retaliate against the Pakistani state. He was allowed to travel freely around Pakistan and deliver highly-charged speeches against both Pakistan and India.

Operationally, LeT remains devoted to the Kashmir cause and frequently targets both civilians and security personnel in the area. In July, the group gunned down seven Hindu pilgrims visiting

Lashkar-e-Taiba, which literally translates to "army of the pure," was formed in the early 1990sas the militant wing of the prominent Pakistani Islamist organization Markaz al-Dawa-Wal-Irshad — a group that was established in 1986 — and later sent fighters to aid the Taliban'sconquest of Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. Under the guidance of Pakistan's intelligence agency,known as the 1ST, LeT shifted its focus to attacking Indian targets both in the disputed Kashmirregion and in India itself. In essence, LeT operates as an extension of the ISI and has evolvedinto Pakistan's proxy in Kashmir, similar to the role that the Haqqani network has assumed inAfghanistan.

"What the group seeks is a liberation of Muslims from the heavy hand of Indian rule in Kashmirand the territory's ultimate incorporation into Pakistan," explains Dr. Marvin Weinbaum,Director for Pakistan studies at the Middle East Institute. "More broadly, LeT's involvement inattacks mounted elsewhere in India indicate an agenda that seeks on the behalf of IndianMuslims the weakening and dismemberment of what is seen as an oppressive Hindu state."

Beyond its militant agenda, LeT, under the banner of its charitable front, Jamaat-ud-Dawah(JuD), has also provided social services such as education and healthcare to many inside Pakistanand Kashmir This has endeared the group to local citizens as LeT has filled a critical void wherethe Pakistani government has proven inadequate.

"These activities have given LeT local standing, which it can use for recruitment andfundraising," explains Weinbaum. "Over time, it has allowed LeT to develop a popular supportbase that would make it difficult for the government to uproot, even should it be inclined to doso."

In December 2001, LeT ascended onto the international stage when a number of its fighters,alongside those from another Pakistani-based militant organization that operates in Kashmir,Jaish el-Muhammad, attacked the Indian parliament in New Delhi killing nine people. The U.S.swiftly moved to designate LeT as a terrorist organization, and Pakistan followed suit one yearlater after facing mounting international pressure. In 2002 LeT attempted to rebrand itself underits charitable wing JuD, but it has nonetheless still been considered a terrorist organization byboth the U.S. and India. JuD was eventually banned by Pakistan in 2015.

But what really identified LeT as a highly capable terrorist movement occurred in 2008 when tenLeT militants carried out a three-day shooting spree at multiple locations in Mumbai that left 166dead and more than 300 wounded. The attack nearly imploded already tense Pakistan-Indianrelations.

Today, LeT is led by one of its founders, Hafiz Saeed, who was placed under house arrest byPakistan this January. Saeed is accused by India and others of orchestrating the Mumbai attacksand has been placed under house arrest in the past, but never for long for fear LeT wouldretaliate against the Pakistani state. He was allowed to travel freely around Pakistan and deliverhighly-charged speeches against both Pakistan and India.

Operationally, LeT remains devoted to the Kashmir cause and frequently targets both civiliansand security personnel in the area. In July, the group gunned down seven Hindu pilgrims visiting

religious sites in Indian Kashmir. One month earlier, a LeT commander, Bashir Ahmad Wani, led an assault that killed six police officers in the area.

LeT also works alongside two other militant groups in Kashmir, the Pakistani-based Jaish-e-Mohammad and Hizbul Mujahideen, an indigenous Kashmiri militant group led by Yusuf Shah that was just designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. State Department. Although the three groups coordinate and cooperate, Tankel says there is also a certain element of competition between them, specifically when it comes to LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad, with the latter being seen as “more expendable” by the ISI.

This summer, Indian security forces have eliminated a number of key LeT leaders, including Ayub Lelhari and Abu Dujana. According to the Times of India, Indian security forces have killed a total of 134 militants in the region this year, including eight top LeT commanders. Yet LeT remains a significant threat in South Asia and continues to stage attacks on a regular basis.

The U.S. is not immune from the group. LeT operatives have fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan for years and are responsible for the deaths of U.S. troops in the country. Furthermore, it is believed that the perpetrator of the attempted Times Square Bombing in 2010, Faisal Shahzad, was directed by LeT. While LeT may not necessarily prioritize attacking the U.S., Tankel explains it is imperative for the U.S. Intelligence Community to remain vigilant in monitoring and ensuring that the situation stays that way.

“The United States fits within LeT’s ideological target set,” says Tankel. “However, from a strategic standpoint, executing an attack against the U.S. homeland would come with major costs for Pakistan and for the group.”

But he warns, “The danger is that this calculation could change at some point.”

Bennett Seftel is deputy director of analysis at The Cipher Brief. Follow him on Twitter @BennettSeftel.

Jihad in India, Kashmir and Afghanistan: A Boost to Pakistan? The Cipher Brief August 17, 2017

religious sites in Indian Kashmir One month earlier, a LeT commander, Bashir Ahmad Wani,led an assault that killed six police officers in the area.

LeT also works alongside two other militant groups in Kashmir, the Pakistani-based Jaish-e-Mohammad and Hizbul Mujahideen, an indigenous Kashmiri militant group led by Yusuf Shahthat was just designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. State Depaitment.Although the three groups coordinate and cooperate, Tankel says there is also a certain elementof competition between them, specifically when it comes to LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad, withthe latter being seen as "more expendable" by the ISI.

This summer, Indian security forces have eliminated a number of key LeT leaders, includingAyub Lelhari and Abu Dujana. According to the Times of India, Indian security forces havekilled a total of 134 militants in the region this year, including eight top LeT commanders. YetLeT remains a significant threat in South Asia and continues to stage attacks on a regular basis.

The U.S. is not immune from the group. LeT operatives have fought alongside the Taliban inAfghanistan for years and are responsible for the deaths of U.S. troops in the country.Furthermore, it is believed that the perpetrator of the attempted Times Square Bombing in 2010,Faisal Shahzad, was directed by LeT. While LeT may not necessarily prioritize attacking theU.S., Tankel explains it is imperative for the U.S. Intelligence Community to remain vigilant inmonitoring and ensuring that the situation stays that way.

"The United States fits within LeT's ideological target set," says Tankel. "However, from astrategic standpoint, executing an attack against the U.S. homeland would come with major costsfor Pakistan and for the group."

But he warns, "The danger is that this calculation could change at some point."

Bennett Seftel is deputy director of analysis at The Cipher Brief Follow him on Twitter@BennettSeftel.

Jihad in India, Kashmir and Afghanistan: ABoost to Pakistan?The Cipher BriefAugust 17, 2017

Marvin Weinbaum Director for Pakistan Studies, Middle East Institute

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a group designated by both the U.S. and Pakistan as a terrorist organization, continues to mount attacks against Indian forces in the disputed Kashmir region. It operates under the guidance of Pakistan’s intelligence service, known as the ISI, as part of the ISI’s regional “proxy” strategy. However, LeT’s objectives may not be limited to regional activities, as the group has previously expressed a desire to carry out international attacks and has been tied to the 2010 attempted Times Square bombing. The Cipher Brief’s Bennett Seftel sat down with Marvin Weinbaum, director for Pakistan Studies at The Middle East Institute, to discuss the relationship between Pakistan and LeT, Pakistan’s broader proxy strategy, and how the U.S. should view the LeT threat.

TCB: What are some of the factors that gave rise to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) as a movement?

Marvin Weinbaum: You can’t talk about LeT without seeing it in a broader context. It is a prime example of what has been Pakistan’s need to employ militant groups as proxies, where Pakistan, in an asymmetrical relationship with India, cannot engage its regular armed forces. In Afghanistan, Pakistan, under scrutiny of international actors, has long used organizations like LeT as enablers of favored forces in the country.

What also gives rise to a group such as LeT has been the failure of the Pakistan government to provide basic services at the local level. LeT, more than any other of the extremist groups in Pakistan, has built a social infrastructure – under the purported political wing Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD) – and provides a wide array of welfare services, such as running clinics and schools in Punjab Province and indirectly in Indian-held Kashmir. These activities have given LeT local standing, which it can use for recruitment and fundraising. Over time, it has allowed LeT to develop a popular support base that would make it difficult for the government to uproot, even should it be inclined to do so.

TCB: What are the group’s objectives?

Weinbaum: LeT is part of the jihadi movement that was initially formed in Afghanistan in 1989. But very soon following the Soviet withdrawal from the country, at the direction of Pakistan’s leading intelligent service, the ISI, shifted its focus of operation to Kashmir. Together with other

Marvin WeinbaumDirector for Pakistan Studies, Middle East Institute

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a group designated by both the U.S. and Pakistan as a terroristorganization, continues to mount attacks against Indian forces in the disputed Kashmir region.It operates under the guidance of Pakistan's intelligence service, known as the ISI, as part of theISI's regional "proxy" strategy. However, LeT's objectives may not be limited to regionalactivities, as the group has previously expressed a desire to carry out international attacks andhas been tied to the 2010 attempted Times Square bombing. The Cipher Brief's Bennett Seftel satdown with Marvin Weinbaum, director for Pakistan Studies at The Middle East Institute, todiscuss the relationship between Pakistan and LeT, Pakistan's broader proxy strategy, and howthe U.S. should view the LeT threat.

TCB: What are some of the factors that gave rise to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) as amovement?

Marvin Weinbaum: You can't talk about LeT without seeing it in a broader context. It is aprime example of what has been Pakistan's need to employ militant groups as proxies, wherePakistan, in an asymmetrical relationship with India, cannot engage its regular armed forces. InAfghanistan, Pakistan, under scrutiny of international actors, has long used organizations likeLeT as enablers of favored forces in the country.

What also gives rise to a group such as LeT has been the failure of the Pakistan government toprovide basic services at the local level. LeT, more than any other of the extremist groups inPakistan, has built a social infrastructure — under the purported political wing Jamaat-ud-Dawah(JuD) — and provides a wide array of welfare services, such as running clinics and schools inPunjab Province and indirectly in Indian-held Kashmir These activities have given LeT localstanding, which it can use for recruitment and fundraising. Over time, it has allowed LeT todevelop a popular support base that would make it difficult for the government to uproot, evenshould it be inclined to do so.

TCB: What are the group's objectives?

Weinbaum: LeT is part of the jihadi movement that was initially formed in Afghanistan in 1989.But very soon following the Soviet withdrawal from the country, at the direction of Pakistan'sleading intelligent service, the ISI, shifted its focus of operation to Kashmir. Together with other

jihadi groups, mainly Jaish-e-Mohammad, LeT has played a leading role in that insurgency through the infiltration of fighters and various forms of material support.

What the group seeks is a liberation of Muslims from the heavy hand of Indian rule in Kashmir and the territory’s ultimate incorporation into Pakistan. More broadly, LeT’s involvement in attacks mounted elsewhere in India indicate an agenda that seeks on the behalf of Indian Muslims the weakening and dismemberment of what is seen as an oppressive Hindu state.

TCB: How has India dealt with this threat?

Weinbaum: India sees LeT as the poster boy of Pakistan’s campaign to export terrorism. Two of the most prominent attacks on the country, against the India parliament in 2002 and the raid in Mumbai in 2008, are directly linked to LeT. The failure of Pakistan to bring to justice those identified as involved in the Mumbai attack continues to be an impediment to any improvement in relations between the two countries.

Pakistan claims that it is willing to cooperate in investigating Mumbai. Early this year, authorities arrested Hafiz Saeed, the head of JuD who is widely believed to still be directing LeT. (LeT has been on the Pakistani list of terrorist groups since 2002.) He has been held under house arrest since January 2017. But prior to that, Saeed was, for a long period, free to move around the country delivering incendiary speeches that would normally have landed anybody else in the courts and prison.

For many, the immunity that Saeed has enjoyed is taken as evidence of his deep ties with military intelligence. India sees this is as confirmation that Pakistan is not serious in its promises to address terrorism. It’s worth noting that in the event that Pakistan was to become politically destabilized or threatened with attack by India, the legitimacy and influence of LeT and similar groups would soar.

TCB: What is the level of cooperation between LeT and other terrorist groups in the region, namely the Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban.

Weinbaum: There are links between them that sometimes make it very difficult to distinguish among the various extremist groups in Pakistan that are engaged in terrorism. They have in common converging ideologies and objectives, even while their priorities and immediate goals may differ. All seek to transform Pakistan’s constitutional democratic government into what they would consider a government that is fully compliant with sharia law. Not infrequently, they cooperate operationally and have been know to share both fighters and intelligence. LeT is thought to have facilitated the actions of the Haqqani network and both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban in Afghanistan.

TCB: How has Pakistan and its intelligence service, the ISI, implemented its “proxy” strategy by using groups such as LeT and the Haqqani network? Are these groups primarily used when Pakistan does not want to use its army to conduct certain operations?

jihadi groups, mainly Jaish-e-Mohammad, LeT has played a leading role in that insurgencythrough the infiltration of fighters and various forms of material support.

What the group seeks is a liberation of Muslims from the heavy hand of Indian rule in Kashmirand the territory's ultimate incorporation into Pakistan. More broadly, LeT's involvement inattacks mounted elsewhere in India indicate an agenda that seeks on the behalf of IndianMuslims the weakening and dismemberment of what is seen as an oppressive Hindu state.

TCB: How has India dealt with this threat?

Weinbaum: India sees LeT as the poster boy of Pakistan's campaign to export terrorism. Two ofthe most prominent attacks on the country, against the India parliament in 2002 and the raid inMumbai in 2008, are directly linked to LeT. The failure of Pakistan to bring to justice thoseidentified as involved in the Mumbai attack continues to be an impediment to any improvementin relations between the two countries.

Pakistan claims that it is willing to cooperate in investigating Mumbai. Early this year,authorities arrested Hafiz Saeed, the head of JuD who is widely believed to still be directing LeT.(LeT has been on the Pakistani list of terrorist groups since 2002.) He has been held under housearrest since January 2017. But prior to that, Saeed was, for a long period, free to move around thecountry delivering incendiary speeches that would normally have landed anybody else in thecourts and prison.

For many, the immunity that Saeed has enjoyed is taken as evidence of his deep ties withmilitary intelligence. India sees this is as confirmation that Pakistan is not serious in its promisesto address terrorism. It's worth noting that in the event that Pakistan was to become politicallydestabilized or threatened with attack by India, the legitimacy and influence of LeT and similargroups would soar.

TCB: What is the level of cooperation between LeT and other terrorist groups in theregion, namely the Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban.

Weinbaum: There are links between them that sometimes make it very difficult to distinguishamong the various extremist groups in Pakistan that are engaged in terrorism. They have incommon converging ideologies and objectives, even while their priorities and immediate goalsmay differ. A l l seek to transform Pakistan's constitutional democratic government into whatthey would consider a government that is fully compliant with sharia law. Not infrequently, theycooperate operationally and have been know to share both fighters and intelligence. LeT isthought to have facilitated the actions of the Haqqani network and both the Afghan and PakistaniTaliban in Afghanistan.

TCB: How has Pakistan and its intelligence service, the IS!, implemented its "proxy"strategy by using groups such as LeT and the Haqqani network? Are these groupsprimarily used when Pakistan does not want to use its army to conduct certainoperations?

Weinbaum: These groups are instruments of the ISI and are seen as assets in both Kashmir and Afghanistan. They provide plausible deniability. Importantly, LeT is an example of a jihadi organization that even while having a close relationship with Pakistan’s Tehrik e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has never joined TTP attacks against the Pakistani state. This reciprocates the ISI’s refusal to bow to domestic and foreign pressures to come down hard on LeT’s military and political wings.

At this point in time, considering the growing tensions in Kashmir, the ISI has every reason to hold close a jihadi group such as LeT. Pakistan also cannot give up on its proxies in an Afghanistan that is seen as very possibly fracturing. Should the situation further deteriorate, Pakistan believes that it will need friendly Afghan Pashtun forces and trusted jihadi groups to ensure that Pakistan’s interests are secured across the border. These groups, by providing insurance, seem more relevant than ever.

TCB: Is the threat from LeT getting enough attention in the U.S.? Should this threat be higher on the U.S. radar?

Weinbaum: The U.S. officially designated LeT as a terrorist group in 2001, which means it qualifies as a group that has directly targeted Americans. LeT has attracted particular attention not only for its actions in South Asia, but because of its believed connections with terrorist organizations elsewhere. LeT has in the past proclaimed its global ambitions. That it may be more than rhetoric is indicated by the link found between the LeT and the would-be Times Square bomber in 2010. Of course, at this point at least, we cannot put LeT in the category of groups such as ISIS or al Qaeda that U.S. intelligence sources consider to be actively seeking to launch attacks against the American homeland. Nevertheless, LeT remains a group to be watched.

The Author is Marvin Weinbaum

Marvin G. Weinbaum is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and served as analyst for Pakistan and Afghanistan in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 1999 to 2003. He is currently director for Pakistan Studies at The Middle East Institute. At Illinois, Dr. Weinbaum served for fifteen years as the director of the Program in South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. His research, teaching, and... Read More

Militants and Missionaries: LeT’s Dual Role in South Asia The Cipher Brief August 17, 2017

Weinbaum: These groups are instruments of the 1ST and are seen as assets in both Kashmir andAfghanistan. They provide plausible deniability. Importantly, LeT is an example of a jihadiorganization that even while having a close relationship with Pakistan's Tehrik e-TalibanPakistan (TTP), has never joined TTP attacks against the Pakistani state. This reciprocates theISI's refusal to bow to domestic and foreign pressures to come down hard on LeT's military andpolitical wings.

At this point in time, considering the growing tensions in Kashmir, the ISI has every reason tohold close a jihadi group such as LeT. Pakistan also cannot give up on its proxies in anAfghanistan that is seen as very possibly fracturing. Should the situation further deteriorate,Pakistan believes that it will need friendly Afghan Pashtun forces and trusted jihadi groups toensure that Pakistan's interests are secured across the border. These groups, by providinginsurance, seem more relevant than ever.

TCB: Is the threat from LeT getting enough attention in the U.S.? Should this threat behigher on the U.S. radar?

Weinbaum: The U.S. officially designated LeT as a terrorist group in 2001, which means itqualifies as a group that has directly targeted Americans. LeT has attracted particular attentionnot only for its actions in South Asia, but because of its believed connections with terroristorganizations elsewhere. LeT has in the past proclaimed its global ambitions. That it may bemore than rhetoric is indicated by the link found between the LeT and the would-be TimesSquare bomber in 2010. Of course, at this point at least, we cannot put LeT in the category ofgroups such as ISIS or al Qaeda that U.S. intelligence sources consider to be actively seeking tolaunch attacks against the American homeland. Nevertheless, LeT remains a group to bewatched.

The Author is Marvin Weinbaum

Marvin G. Weinbaum is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Illinois atUrbana-Champaign, and served as analyst for Pakistan and Afghanistan in the U.S. Depaitmentof State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 1999 to 2003. He is currently director forPakistan Studies at The Middle East Institute. At Illinois, Dr. Weinbaum served for fifteen yearsas the director of the Program in South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. His research, teaching,and... Read More

Militants and Missionaries: LeT's Dual Rolein South AsiaThe Cipher BriefAugust 17, 2017

Stephen Tankel Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University

In South Asia, most of the U.S. attention is focused on Afghanistan where it is combatting terrorist and insurgent groups such as al Qaeda, ISIS, the Haqqani network, and the Taliban. But another prominent, Pakistani-based militant group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), continues to carry out attacks against Indian forces in the disputed Kashmir region and is even known to launch anti-American raids in Afghanistan. Although the U.S. State Department designated LeT as a terrorist organization in 2001, the group’s activities do not garner as much U.S. media coverage as those carried out by other regional militant groups.

The Cipher Brief’s Bennett Seftel spoke with Stephen Tankel, assistant professor in the School of International Service at American University, about LeT’s role in Pakistani society and in the broader conflict between Pakistan and India, as well as how the U.S. should view the threat posed by group.

The Cipher Brief: How was Lashkar-e-Taiba formed?

Stephen Tankel: Lashkar-e-Taiba was created around 1990 as the militant wing of the Markaz al-Dawa-Wal-Irshad (MDI) – a group formed in the mid-1980s to organize Ahl-e-Hadith Pakistanis participating in the anti-Soviet jihad. Most of the major Islamist militant groups in the region identify with the Deobandi tradition of Islam. (Deobandism began as a religious revivalist movement and is associated with the Hanafi school of Sunni jurisprudence). MDI was an exception; it belonged to the Ahl-e-Hadith sect of Islam, which is associated with the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence. Adherents are frequently described as “Salafists.”

MDI rebranded itself as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) in late 2001. As was the case before the rebrand, LeT and JuD are one-and-the-same – LeT is the militant face of the organization, whereas JuD is the above ground wing. It runs schools, mosques, and madrassas, provides other social services, and remains legal in Pakistan. Some JuD members have contested elections and the group recently announced plans to create a political party. JuD has also spun off other entities, including a relief organization. The United States has designated all of these entities as terrorist organizations and rightly pointed to the fact that they all fall under the same organizational umbrella. Keeping this in mind, I’ll use LeT hereafter when referring to the group in order to avoid confusion.

TCB: What are the organization’s objectives?

Stephen TankelAssistant Professor, School of International Service, American University

In South Asia, most of the US. attention is focused on Afghanistan where it is combattingterrorist and insurgent groups such as al Qaeda, ISIS, the Haqqani network, and theTaliban. But another prominent, Pakistani-based militant group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),continues to carry out attacks against Indian forces in the disputed Kashmir region and is evenknown to launch anti-American raids in Afghanistan. Although the US. State Departmentdesignated LeT as a terrorist organization in 2001, the group's activities do not garner as muchUS. media coverage as those carried out by other regional militant groups.

The Cipher Brief's Bennett Seftel spoke with Stephen Tankel, assistant professor in the School ofInternational Service at American University, about LeT's role in Pakistani society and in thebroader conflict between Pakistan and India, as well as how the US. should view the threatposed by group.

The Cipher Brief: How was Lashkar-e-Taiba formed?

Stephen Tankel: Lashkar-e-Taiba was created around 1990 as the militant wing of the Markazal-Dawa-Wal-Irshad (MDI) — a group formed in the mid-1980s to organize Ahl-e-HadithPakistanis participating in the anti-Soviet jihad. Most of the major Islamist militant groups in theregion identify with the Deobandi tradition of Islam. (Deobandism began as a religious revivalistmovement and is associated with the Hanafi school of Sunni jurisprudence). MDI was anexception; it belonged to the Ahl-e-Hadith sect of Islam, which is associated with the Hanbalischool of Islamic jurisprudence. Adherents are frequently described as "Salafists."

MDI rebranded itself as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) in late 2001. As was the case before the rebrand,LeT and JuD are one-and-the-same — LeT is the militant face of the organization, whereas JuD isthe above ground wing. It runs schools, mosques, and madrassas, provides other social services,and remains legal in Pakistan. Some JuD members have contested elections and the grouprecently announced plans to create a political party. JuD has also spun off other entities,including a relief organization. The United States has designated all of these entities as terroristorganizations and rightly pointed to the fact that they all fall under the same organizationalumbrella. Keeping this in mind, I'l l use LeT hereafter when referring to the group in order toavoid confusion.

TCB: What are the organization's objectives?

Tankel: LeT is defined by two dualities: the first is its identity as a militant group and as a missionary organization; the second concerns its military activities, namely that it is both a pan-Islamist group dedicated to waging jihad against all enemies of Islam and Pakistan’s most trusted and reliable militant ally.

Pakistani state support has helped LeT pursue two overarching objectives – one violently and one non-violently – in different theatres with near equal vigor. In Pakistan, the group pursues non-violent reformism through proselytizing, social welfare activities, and increasing participation in politics. Although a small number of LeT members have been involved in anti-state violence, the group eschews revolutionary jihad in Pakistan.

Outside Pakistan, LeT has engaged in pan-Islamic jihad to defend Muslims against non-believers and to liberate what it perceives to be occupied Muslim lands. The group has fixated on India (especially Indian-administered Kashmir) since the mid-1990s but also has sent fighters to Afghanistan and even as far as Iraq in the years since 9/11.

TCB: It has been reported that LeT received funding from Osama bin Laden during its formative years. Does LeT maintain ties to other regional terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, the Haqqani network, ISIS, or even to the Taliban?

Tankel: LeT may have received funding from bin Laden. The group claims that two Saudis made large financial contributions to help build its compound at Muridke, a city outside Lahore. According to the research I’ve done, both Saudis were acquainted with Osama bin Laden. He may have provided some seed money for the group as well, but there is no definitive evidence he contributed funding. Either way, LeT certainly had access to other Saudi donors during the 1990s.

Today, LeT and al Qaeda probably have some ties at the operational level in Afghanistan, but on balance, the two groups are ideological and strategic competitors. This is especially true in Pakistan, where the two groups are on opposite sides of the line in terms of how they view the state. Al Qaeda considers the Pakistani government and military to be apostates and has therefore executed or abetted attacks in Pakistan. LeT, on the other hand, is the military’s closest non-state ally and has helped beat back the challenge by al Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, and others waging jihad against the Pakistani state.

LeT and al Qaeda also differ over their views of Saudi Arabia. On balance, LeT is supportive of the Saudi government and ulema, whereas al Qaeda views them as apostates. The two groups are increasingly competing in India as well, with al Qaeda attempting to encroach on LeT’s turf in Indian-administered Kashmir. Competition between al Qaeda and LeT can be especially intense because they are both Salafist organizations that put a premium on recruiting highly capable individuals more so than other groups that are often more interested in numbers than quality when it comes to recruitment.

LeT opposes ISIS for many of the same reasons it differs with al Qaeda. Its relationships with the Taliban and Haqqani Network, however, are more complex. The latter two groups are Afghan and Deobandi, whereas LeT is a Pakistani Ahl-e-Hadith organization. The sectarian divide was

Tankel: LeT is defined by two dualities: the first is its identity as a militant group and as amissionary organization; the second concerns its military activities, namely that it is both a pan-Islamist group dedicated to waging jihad against all enemies of Islam and Pakistan's most trustedand reliable militant ally.

Pakistani state support has helped LeT pursue two overarching objectives — one violently andone non-violently — in different theatres with near equal vigor. In Pakistan, the group pursuesnon-violent reformism through proselytizing, social welfare activities, and increasingparticipation in politics. Although a small number of LeT members have been involved in anti-state violence, the group eschews revolutionary jihad in Pakistan.

Outside Pakistan, LeT has engaged in pan-Islamic jihad to defend Muslims against non-believersand to liberate what it perceives to be occupied Muslim lands. The group has fixated on India(especially Indian-administered Kashmir) since the mid-1990s but also has sent fighters toAfghanistan and even as far as Iraq in the years since 9/11.

TCB: It has been reported that LeT received funding from Osama bin Laden during itsformative years. Does LeT maintain ties to other regional terrorist groups such as alQaeda, the Haqqani network, ISIS, or even to the Taliban?

Tankel: LeT may have received funding from bin Laden. The group claims that two Saudismade large financial contributions to help build its compound at Muridke, a city outside Lahore.According to the research I've done, both Saudis were acquainted with Osama bin Laden. Hemay have provided some seed money for the group as well, but there is no definitive evidence hecontributed funding. Either way, LeT certainly had access to other Saudi donors during the1990s.

Today, LeT and al Qaeda probably have some ties at the operational level in Afghanistan, but onbalance, the two groups are ideological and strategic competitors. This is especially true inPakistan, where the two groups are on opposite sides of the line in terms of how they view thestate. Al Qaeda considers the Pakistani government and military to be apostates and has thereforeexecuted or abetted attacks in Pakistan. LeT, on the other hand, is the military's closest non-stateally and has helped beat back the challenge by al Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, and otherswaging jihad against the Pakistani state.

LeT and al Qaeda also differ over their views of Saudi Arabia. On balance, LeT is supportive ofthe Saudi government and ulema, whereas al Qaeda views them as apostates. The two groups areincreasingly competing in India as well, with al Qaeda attempting to encroach on LeT's turf inIndian-administered Kashmir. Competition between al Qaeda and LeT can be especially intensebecause they are both Salafist organizations that put a premium on recruiting highly capableindividuals more so than other groups that are often more interested in numbers than qualitywhen it comes to recruitment.

LeT opposes ISIS for many of the same reasons it differs with al Qaeda. Its relationships with theTaliban and Haqqani Network, however, are more complex. The latter two groups are Afghanand Deobandi, whereas LeT is a Pakistani Ahl-e-Hadith organization. The sectarian divide was

historically a barrier to close relations. LeT was the only major Pakistani jihadist group that did not regularly contribute fighters to the Taliban’s campaign against the Northern Alliance during the 1990s.

Although the sectarian divide has not disappeared, it has shrunk since 9/11 thanks to a shared interest in fighting against coalition forces in Afghanistan and a similar position vis-à-vis the Pakistani state. All three are state-allied organizations that receive Pakistani state support. LeT is probably closer with the Haqqani Network, largely as a result of the fact that the Haqqani Network is a more trusted and reliable ally of the Pakistan military than the Taliban is. However, LeT has also coordinated with the Taliban when fighting in Afghanistan.

TCB: The organization carried out the horrific Mumbai attacks in 2008, but it does not seem to have captured much international attention since then. What is the threat level that the group currently poses in South Asia?

Tankel: LeT definitely laid low for a little while after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, but it still has the capabilities to pose a major threat in South Asia. The group has also shown itself capable of calibrating its violence and holding its fire when directed to by Pakistan’s intelligence agency known as the ISI.

LeT has been increasing its activities in Indian-administered Kashmir since 2013. Members of the group, along with militants from another Pakistani organization (Jaish-e-Mohammad), executed three high-profile attacks against hard targets in India between July 2015 and September 2016. These operations were not nearly as lethal or dramatic as the Mumbai attacks, and this was probably on purpose. The Pakistani security establishment is undoubtedly wary of catalyzing a conflict with India. Nevertheless, New Delhi has responded with increasing tactical assertiveness. After the third attack, the Indian government decided to launch and then to publicize commando raids across the Line of Control (LoC) dividing Kashmir. Both sides increased crossline firing, including the use of artillery, but neither has escalated further. However, the potential for escalation still exists, especially if LeT were to execute another terrorist attack along the lines of Mumbai.

TCB: How will the recent death of LeT leader Abu Dujana impact the group?

Tankel: I’m not sure his death will have a huge impact. Open source reporting indicates he had been compromised by Indian intelligence and was on the outs with LeT by the time he left the group to try to start up an al Qaeda affiliate in Kashmir. He probably hoped his initiative would appeal to some of the Kashmiri youth who are more drawn to al Qaeda’s global jihadist cause than to establishment organizations such as LeT, which are sometimes seen as compromised because of their long association with the Pakistani state. LeT leaders may be somewhat concerned about losing high-end talent and they need to maintain a baseline level of support in Kashmir, but the group has proved highly adaptive in the past and still has more than enough recruits. It is also savvy about working through indigenous actors.

TCB: LeT’s above ground organization (Jamaat-ud-Dawa) recently announced it was launching a political party. What do you make of this?

historically a barrier to close relations. LeT was the only major Pakistani jihadist group that didnot regularly contribute fighters to the Taliban's campaign against the Northern Alliance duringthe 1990s.

Although the sectarian divide has not disappeared, it has shrunk since 9/11 thanks to a sharedinterest in fighting against coalition forces in Afghanistan and a similar position vis-à-vis thePakistani state. All three are state-allied organizations that receive Pakistani state support. LeT isprobably closer with the Haqqani Network, largely as a result of the fact that the HaqqaniNetwork is a more trusted and reliable ally of the Pakistan military than the Taliban is. However,LeT has also coordinated with the Taliban when fighting in Afghanistan.

TCB: The organization carried out the horrific Mumbai attacks in 2008, but it does notseem to have captured much international attention since then. What is the threat level thatthe group currently poses in South Asia?

Tankel: LeT definitely laid low for a little while after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, but it still hasthe capabilities to pose a major threat in South Asia. The group has also shown itself capable ofcalibrating its violence and holding its fire when directed to by Pakistan's intelligence agencyknown as the ISI.

LeT has been increasing its activities in Indian-administered Kashmir since 2013. Members ofthe group, along with militants from another Pakistani organization (Jaish-e-Mohammad),executed three high-profile attacks against hard targets in India between July 2015 andSeptember 2016. These operations were not nearly as lethal or dramatic as the Mumbai attacks,and this was probably on purpose. The Pakistani security establishment is undoubtedly wary ofcatalyzing a conflict with India. Nevertheless, New Delhi has responded with increasing tacticalassertiveness. After the third attack, the Indian government decided to launch and then topublicize commando raids across the Line of Control (LoC) dividing Kashmir Both sidesincreased crossline firing, including the use of artillery, but neither has escalated further.However, the potential for escalation still exists, especially if LeT were to execute anotherterrorist attack along the lines of Mumbai.

TCB: How will the recent death of LeT leader Abu Dujana impact the group?

Tankel: I 'm not sure his death will have a huge impact. Open source reporting indicates he hadbeen compromised by Indian intelligence and was on the outs with LeT by the time he left thegroup to try to start up an al Qaeda affiliate in Kashmir He probably hoped his initiative wouldappeal to some of the Kashmiri youth who are more drawn to al Qaeda's global jihadist causethan to establishment organizations such as LeT, which are sometimes seen as compromisedbecause of their long association with the Pakistani state. LeT leaders may be somewhatconcerned about losing high-end talent and they need to maintain a baseline level of support inKashmir, but the group has proved highly adaptive in the past and still has more than enoughrecruits. It is also savvy about working through indigenous actors.

TCB: LeT's above ground organization (Jamaat-ud-Dawa) recently announced it waslaunching a political party. What do you make of this?

Tankel: This issue has been kicking around for some time. It’s interesting because LeT historically has been opposed to elections on theological grounds. Yet this position was not uniformly shared within the organization – some of its above ground leaders have been interested in contesting elections independently.

Strategically, there are also questions as to whether the party will be able to win many seats. These organizational dynamics need to be considered alongside concerns in Pakistan about how to handle the group over the long term, with some officials pushing for mainstreaming as a way to move LeT away from militancy.

I’ve thought for some time that this is the most likely way that the Pakistani establishment would deal with the group if it ever wanted to. However, there are two outstanding issues. First, it is unclear whether LeT leaders can bring most of the group’s militants with them into politics. Second, it is also unclear whether the Pakistan military and ISI are ready to reduce and one day to end support for LeT as a militant organization. There’s no evidence as of yet that this is the case. So it is true that mainstreaming offers a potential way to decommission militants. However, as of yet, the authorities have not forced the group to choose between domestic political involvement and pan-Islamic jihad.

TCB: In your 2013 testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee, you mention that LeT “has been actively attacking U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan since 2004-2005.” How much of a presence does LeT maintain in Afghanistan? Has the group inflicted significant casualties on U.S. forces there?

Tankel: LeT has a small, but highly capable cadre operating in Afghanistan. It has inflicted casualties on U.S. forces, although nowhere near on the scale of the Taliban or Haqqani Network.

TCB: In your testimony, you also discussed the Pakistani intelligence service’s (ISI) level of influence over LeT, saying “Pakistan’s security services are believed …. to put pressure on LeT to refrain from striking Western interests abroad.” Do you think ISI could use this same leverage to pressure the Taliban and the Haqqani network to refrain from striking Western interests? If so, why have they not? If not, what are the differences between the ISI’s relationship with the different groups?

Tankel: In my testimony, I was referring to ISI pressure on LeT not to launch terrorist attacks in Europe or the United States. This is a red line that the ISI recognizes and that LeT appears to respect for the reasons I outlined earlier. It is probably a safe bet that if the Taliban or Haqqani network were to consider out-of-area attacks against the United States, the ISI would restrain them too.

Supporting the Taliban-led insurgency against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan is unfortunately a different animal. The Pakistan military remains committed to shaping the future Afghan government in order to make it friendly to Pakistan and reduce India’s presence and influence in Afghanistan. Widespread Pakistani perceptions of Indian and Afghan support for anti-Pakistan groups based in Afghanistan reinforce the military’s policy of backing the Taliban

Tankel: This issue has been kicking around for some time. It's interesting because LeThistorically has been opposed to elections on theological grounds. Yet this position was notuniformly shared within the organization — some of its above ground leaders have been interestedin contesting elections independently.

Strategically, there are also questions as to whether the party will be able to win many seats.These organizational dynamics need to be considered alongside concerns in Pakistan about howto handle the group over the long term, with some officials pushing for mainstreaming as a wayto move LeT away from militancy.

I've thought for some time that this is the most likely way that the Pakistani establishment woulddeal with the group i f it ever wanted to. However, there are two outstanding issues. First, it isunclear whether LeT leaders can bring most of the group's militants with them into politics.Second, it is also unclear whether the Pakistan military and ISI are ready to reduce and one dayto end support for LeT as a militant organization. There's no evidence as of yet that this is thecase. So it is true that mainstreaming offers a potential way to decommission militants. However,as of yet, the authorities have not forced the group to choose between domestic politicalinvolvement and pan-Islamic jihad.

TCB: In your 2013 testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee, youmention that LeT "has been actively attacking U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistansince 2004-2005." How much of a presence does LeT maintain in Afghanistan? Has thegroup inflicted significant casualties on U.S. forces there?

Tankel: LeT has a small, but highly capable cadre operating in Afghanistan. It has inflictedcasualties on U.S. forces, although nowhere near on the scale of the Taliban or HaqqaniNetwork.

TCB: In your testimony, you also discussed the Pakistani intelligence service's (ISI) level ofinfluence over LeT, saying "Pakistan's security services are believed .... to put pressure onLeT to refrain from striking Western interests abroad." Do you think ISI could use thissame leverage to pressure the Taliban and the Haqqani network to refrain from strikingWestern interests? If so, why have they not? If not, what are the differences between theISI's relationship with the different groups?

Tankel: In my testimony, I was referring to ISI pressure on LeT not to launch terrorist attacks inEurope or the United States. This is a red line that the ISI recognizes and that LeT appears torespect for the reasons I outlined earlier. It is probably a safe bet that if the Taliban or Haqqaninetwork were to consider out-of-area attacks against the United States, the ISI would restrainthem too.

Supporting the Taliban-led insurgency against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan isunfortunately a different animal. The Pakistan military remains committed to shaping the futureAfghan government in order to make it friendly to Pakistan and reduce India's presence andinfluence in Afghanistan. Widespread Pakistani perceptions of Indian and Afghan support foranti-Pakistan groups based in Afghanistan reinforce the military's policy of backing the Taliban

and Haqqani Network. Ending support and safe haven for them would not only sacrifice a powerful instrument for shaping the endgame in Afghanistan, but could also lead to increased attacks in Pakistan. In other words, this is not merely a question of the ISI’s relationships with the groups, it is about Pakistan objectives, which are existential in Afghanistan.

TCB: How much of a threat does LeT pose to the U.S.?

Tankel: LeT is arguably the most capable South Asia-based group when it comes to international terrorism. Its ability to threaten the U.S. homeland directly, i.e. to execute its own terrorist attack, is probably higher than any other group in South Asia. The question that continues to be debated is LeT’s intent. The United States fits within LeT’s ideological target set. However, from a strategic standpoint, executing an attack against the U.S. homeland would come with major costs for Pakistan and for the group. LeT not only benefits from state support in terms of its ability to wage jihad against India and in Afghanistan, but it is also able to operate relatively openly when it comes to pursuing its mission of non-violent reformism. LeT leaders also enjoy the freedom of movement and protection that other jihadists do not. For all these reasons, the group has calculated that attacking the United States is not worth the potential costs. The danger is that this calculation could change at some point.

LeT certainly poses a threat to U.S. citizens in India and to U.S. forces in Afghanistan. It’s important to put these threats in context. LeT members are among the most capable fighters operating in Afghanistan, but they are also there in much smaller numbers than the Taliban and Haqqani Network. The group might pursue more blended attacks like Mumbai, where it targeted Westerners as part of a larger operation against India. We cannot ignore this possibility. However, the greater threat may be to U.S. interests because LeT is more likely than any other group to spark an India-Pakistan war that could cross the nuclear threshold.

TCB: How should the U.S. fashion its counterterrorism approach vis-à-vis LeT?

Tankel: The United States should do four things. First, continue working with India to deepen counterterrorism cooperation. The U.S.-India Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative and establishment of the Homeland Security Dialogue in 2010 provided a solid foundation and there’s been some good progress made since. There’s still more to be done. Continuing efforts to increase information sharing, joint training programs, and cooperation on terrorist designations, for example, could help reduce the utility LeT provides to Pakistan and put pressure on Pakistan regarding its ongoing support for the group.

Second, no realistic incentives are likely to convince Pakistan to stop supporting LeT. It’s questionable whether coercion would work either, especially given other U.S. interests in the region. This does not mean accepting the status quo. Current assistance packages are too large and the conditions placed on them are unrealistic. Congress should transition to the more targeted use of positive conditionality on smaller aid packages in order to encourage Pakistan counterterrorism efforts that, although do not target LeT directly, could create conditions for future action against the group. If U.S. policymakers want to impose costs, they should consider escalatory coercion tied to specific demands regarding LeT.

and Haqqani Network. Ending support and safe haven for them would not only sacrifice apowerful instrument for shaping the endgame in Afghanistan, but could also lead to increasedattacks in Pakistan. In other words, this is not merely a question of the ISI's relationships withthe groups, it is about Pakistan objectives, which are existential in Afghanistan.

TCB: How much of a threat does LeT pose to the U.S.?

Tankel: LeT is arguably the most capable South Asia-based group when it comes tointernational terrorism. Its ability to threaten the U.S. homeland directly, i.e. to execute its ownterrorist attack, is probably higher than any other group in South Asia. The question thatcontinues to be debated is LeT's intent. The United States fits within LeT's ideological target set.However, from a strategic standpoint, executing an attack against the U.S. homeland wouldcome with major costs for Pakistan and for the group. LeT not only benefits from state support interms of its ability to wage jihad against India and in Afghanistan, but it is also able to operaterelatively openly when it comes to pursuing its mission of non-violent reformism. LeT leadersalso enjoy the freedom of movement and protection that other jihadists do not. For all thesereasons, the group has calculated that attacking the United States is not worth the potential costs.The danger is that this calculation could change at some point.

LeT certainly poses a threat to U.S. citizens in India and to U.S. forces in Afghanistan. It'simportant to put these threats in context. LeT members are among the most capable fightersoperating in Afghanistan, but they are also there in much smaller numbers than the Taliban andHaqqani Network. The group might pursue more blended attacks like Mumbai, where it targetedWesterners as part of a larger operation against India. We cannot ignore this possibility.However, the greater threat may be to U.S. interests because LeT is more likely than any othergroup to spark an India-Pakistan war that could cross the nuclear threshold.

TCB: How should the U.S. fashion its counterterrorism approach vis-à-vis LeT?

Tankel: The United States should do four things. First, continue working with India to deepencounterterrorism cooperation. The U.S.-India Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative andestablishment of the Homeland Security Dialogue in 2010 provided a solid foundation andthere's been some good progress made since. There's still more to be done. Continuing efforts toincrease information sharing, joint training programs, and cooperation on terrorist designations,for example, could help reduce the utility LeT provides to Pakistan and put pressure on Pakistanregarding its ongoing support for the group.

Second, no realistic incentives are likely to convince Pakistan to stop supporting LeT. It'squestionable whether coercion would work either, especially given other U.S. interests in theregion. This does not mean accepting the status quo. Current assistance packages are too largeand the conditions placed on them are unrealistic. Congress should transition to the moretargeted use of positive conditionality on smaller aid packages in order to encourage Pakistancounterterrorism efforts that, although do not target LeT directly, could create conditions forfuture action against the group. I f U.S. policymakers want to impose costs, they should considerescalatory coercion tied to specific demands regarding LeT.

Third, the United States should continue to pursue actions necessary to degrade LeT’s international networks and contain its operations outside of South Asia. This includes engaging in counterterrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing vis-à-vis LeT with allies in Europe and also working with partners in the Persian Gulf where the group also has important networks.

Fourth, the United States must ensure it is deploying the necessary intelligence resources to track any possible LeT plots against the U.S. homeland and to be on the lookout for warning signals that the group’s calculus with regard to executing an attack here has shifted. Where resources permit, exploring different ways in which the group might evolve would be prudent. For example, it could move away from jihad and toward armed politics in Pakistan, or splinter with some members pursuing a more global orientation and others remaining locally focused. There are various permutations, and the United States would do well to consider these different pathways and their implications.

The Author is Stephen Tankel

Stephen Tankel is an assistant professor in the School of International Service at American University and a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Professor Tankel specializes in international security with a focus on terrorism and counterterrorism, political and military affairs in South Asia, and U.S. foreign and defense policies related to these issues. He has published widely on these topics and conducted field research on conflicts and militancy in... Read More

Third, the United States should continue to pursue actions necessary to degrade LeT'sinternational networks and contain its operations outside of South Asia. This includes engagingin counterterrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing vis-à-vis LeT with allies in Europe andalso working with partners in the Persian Gulf where the group also has important networks.

Fourth, the United States must ensure it is deploying the necessary intelligence resources to trackany possible LeT plots against the U.S. homeland and to be on the lookout for warning signalsthat the group's calculus with regard to executing an attack here has shifted. Where resourcespermit, exploring different ways in which the group might evolve would be prudent. Forexample, it could move away from jihad and toward armed politics in Pakistan, or splinter withsome members pursuing a more global orientation and others remaining locally focused. Thereare various permutations, and the United States would do well to consider these differentpathways and their implications.

The Author is Stephen Tankel

Stephen Tankel is an assistant professor in the School of International Service at AmericanUniversity and a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.Professor Tankel specializes in international security with a focus on terrorism andcounterterrorism, political and military affairs in South Asia, and U.S. foreign and defensepolicies related to these issues. He has published widely on these topics and conducted fieldresearch on conflicts and militancy in... Read More