Alexander FischerHistory 600-CIA

The CIA in South Vietnam: “A great place to have a war”

Thesis:

Considered the best candidate able to fulfil the power void created by the United State’s

defeat of the corrupt French client State in Vietnam, President Diem was thought to be the answer

to the US’s attempts to battle communism in Vietnam; however, he lost favor during his persecution

of Vietnam’s Buddhist population, which impaired the war against the communists and worsened

relations with the nation which had brought him to power; as a result, the US neither warned, nor

stopped the ARVN general’s coup against Diem, which forced it to work with unstable and

unreliable subsequent military regimes which threw Vietnam into years of political and socio-

economic instability, further frustrating the war effort.

Introduction:

The First Indochina War, which lasted from 1946-1954, further exasperated underlying

problems within France’s subordinate, corrupt, and problematic client state in South Vietnam;

witnessing the increasingly corrupt and weak nature of the French client state, the United States’

goal was to supplant the pro-French regime, led by Bao Dai, with someone whom they believed was

a pro-American reformer, namely in Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem, in the beginning, would prove himself

to be a rather competent reformer considering the situation he was given; however, as he began to

attempt to increase his power and force his religious views onto others, he fell out of favor with the

US and the people of Vietnam, resulting in a coup against him that would destabilize Vietnam for

years to come.

Contextualizing the beginning of Diem’s Rule:

Vietnam as a subjugated, corrupt French client state (1950-1954):

To understand the context which allowed Diem to be installed in power, it is necessary to

understand how the corrupt French client state associated with, and was propped up by, crooked and

ethically questionable organizations. France had many economic interests in Southeast Asia and had

operated in Vietnam since the 19th century, apart from the interruption of French governance during

WWII. This interruption, in part, forced France to institute and rely on a French client state which

helped France maintain its rule over Vietnam. As communism rose in popularity and threatened

French interests, one such organization that was essential to France’s fight against the Viet Minh

was the Binh Xuyen.

A few years removed from being a divided and ragtag criminal gang, under their new leader

Bay Vien, the Binh Xuyen were able to turn their knowledge of urban counterintelligence and

security forces into a benefit for the French.1 Soon after, and in return, the French ceded policing

parts of Saigon-Cholon to the Binh Xuyen. To further the war effort and completely remove the

Viet Minh from Saigon, the French needed to increasingly cede control to the Binh Xuyen. For the

French, this alliance was especially troublesome as the Binh Xuyen had worked and were allies

with the Viet Minh only months earlier. Bao Dai, former emperor and then-current head of state,

complicated the matter further by authorizing the Binh Xuyen and other non-communist forces to

be incorporated into the struggling and thinly-spread French Army and Vietnamese National Army.

The Vietnamese National Army (VNA) was also known as and later called the Army of the

Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Similarly, Vietnamese religious sects, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao

were also incorporated into the VNA. The Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen comprised part of

the French United Front, and in the summer of 1954, the three organizations controlled

approximately one-third of the territory and population in South Vietnam.2

1 Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, 2nd rev ed., (Brooklyn, NY: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991), pp.152-153.2 Jessica Chapman, Cauldron of resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s southern Vietnam, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), pp. 74.

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The Bien Xuyen as a former crime organization was now legally legitimized, and the French

client state increasingly relied on organizations like the Bien Xuyen to further their political and

economic interests. In order to bring in more revenue to fund their multifaceted operations, in the

1950s the Binh Xuyen bribed and commandeered their way into being awarded “one of the most

profitable casinos in Asia and perhaps in the world.3”

The Binh Xuyen’s economic exploits were another example of the corrupt and problematic

client state the French ran. Included in the Binh Xuyen’s seedy economic exploits were prostitution

and the Saigon opium trade, the latter of which was originally controlled and operated by the French

government itself. World War II interrupted and ended official French government involvement in

the opium trade. In its place, the French covert intelligence organizations, the French elite in

Vietnam, and the Corsican Mafia took over where the French government left off and helped further

all of these economic interests. The opium trade helped to fund the French war effort and

clandestine operations against the pro-communist Viet Minh from North Vietnam. Some portion of

these economic exploits went to members of the French alliance including the Corsican Mafia, Bao

Dai, prominent cabinet members, and the French 2eme Bureau. The Binh Xuyen held up their end by

assisting the French and 2eme Bureau in “countering the growing power of the nationalist parties,

keeping the Viet Minh terrorists off the streets, and battling the American CIA for control of South

Vietnam.4”

After Mao Zedong’s communist takeover in China over US-supported Chiang Kai-shek,

China began sending aid to help their fellow communists in North Vietnam. As the US witnessed

France’s increasingly desperate situation, America saw fit to increase their own aid to France and

South Vietnam. However, in 1954 the French troops were defeated by Ho Chi Minh and his

Vietnamese army at the battle of Dien Bien Phu, which unofficially ended the war. With the French

3 McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, pp.154.4 Ibid., pp. 152.

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defeat came a slow understanding by the French government and French elite that their economic

interests in Southeast Asia would also need to come to an end. By increasingly relying on American

aid, and by authorizing criminal gangs and religious groups free reign politically, economically, and

militarily/policing, the French showed how fragmented and weak their control over Vietnam really

was. This allowed, or forced, the US to seize control of political power in Saigon, as the US

attempted to find a candidate to support who would further US interests and not allow communism

to spread.

From one problem to the next: American involvement in Vietnam and Diem’s ascent to power

(1954-55):

In the months following the end of the war, the Geneva Conference of 1954 was signed,

ending official military conflict between France and North Vietnam. These proceedings formally

divided Vietnam between the communist North and anti-communist South temporarily, contingent

on the outcome of the 1956 elections. However, the United States only observed the proceedings,

and thus, did not sign the subsequent treaty or participate in negotiations. Oddly enough, the United

States’ involvement in the region would not decrease as a result of their abstention at Geneva;

rather, its involvement would slowly increase after the conference. Refusing to sign the treaty was

likely a strategic move by the US, as they would not be bound by any of the rules or promises

agreed to by the countries at the conference. Nonetheless, US involvement began by assisting the

French in switching their focus to the anti-communist South and by helping resettle many Catholic

and anti-communist refugees coming from the North.5 Although the two countries seemed peaceful

on the surface, as the French slowly decreased their involvement in Vietnam and the Americans

began to increase their involvement, a quiet battle was fought for influence over the newly

independent state.

5 Special to The New York Times, "Text of Eisenhower-Diem Statement," New York Times (1923-Current File), May 12, 1957. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/113929595?accountid=465.

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The problems between the French and the Americans began as the French wanted to adhere

to the conditions set at Geneva, but the Americans believed that doing so would allow the

communists in North Vietnam to seize control without a fight.6 The French had propped up their

client state, as previously mentioned, through its United Front. To secure their interests, the US

utilized the CIA, including agents like Colonel Edward Lansdale, in order to defeat this United

Front. Lansdale seized power from the French by offering large amounts of funding to the ARVN

which secured their loyalty and support during the incredibly violent proxy war against the United

Front in Saigon. After the proxy war in Saigon, the French United Front (consisting of the Binh

Xuyen in addition to the Hoa Hao and Cai Dao religious sects) was largely defeated. Afterwards,

Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem had a much clearer path to power, and did so through his regime’s

electoral fraud. During this election, the only political party allowed to actively campaign was

Diem’s own Can Lao party. Diem’s regime essentially criminalized dissent as well as alternative

options of other candidates like Bao Dai.

In October of 1955, Diem assumed the role of head of state and named himself President of

South Vietnam. The high hopes the US originally had were relatively short lived as Diem was not

as amenable to US interests and influence as originally thought. From the outset, Diem attempted to

make his nation self-sufficient and less reliant on foreign influence and aid. Diem attempted socio-

economic, educational, political, and land reform. However, at the same time, Diem attempted to

increase his own power, and was strongly biased towards his own Catholic and Confucian roots.

Diem’s biases were evident by an exceedingly disproportionate number of Catholic villages

receiving domestic and foreign aid, compared to Buddhist villages.7 However, the election fraud

and religious persecution did not immediately stop US support nor aid in the short-term. Although

6 "Focus on Diem," New York Times (1923-Current File), May 15, 1955. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/113436888?accountid=465. 7 Seth Jacobs, Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), pp.91.

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Diem caused headaches for the CIA and the White House; it was once progress in the war effort

slowed and as Diem seemed to be increasingly more concerned with antagonizing the non-Catholic

populace of South Vietnam, than fighting the war against the communists, that a coup of their once

ideal candidate seemed increasingly realistic.

In sum, both France and the United States contributed to the situation in Vietnam which led

to the creation of a problematic, morally and ethically questionable, and authoritarian governmental

regime.

Context:

Diem’s early rule and US & CIA aid (1955-1960):

Over a year after the Conference at Geneva, Col. Lansdale’s work in supplanting French

political power allowed Diem to be installed as the President of South Vietnam in October of 1955.

From 1955 to 1963 the US increased its presence and involvement more and more as the Diem

regime made slow progress towards the war effort and fight against communism. The United States

was optimistic and confident that the installation of Diem would begin to turn the tide against

communism in Vietnam.8 However, this mistaken hope was only amplified as the US funneled

military and civilian aid, personnel and advisors, and carried out covert and clandestine operations

organized by the CIA, all in an effort to improve the war against the communists.

In hopes of furthering the war effort and assisting Diem strengthen the ARVN, by 1956,

President Eisenhower provided Diem with over 900 US advisors. In 1957, “for the current fiscal

year fiscal aid from the United States to South Vietnam, exclusive of military assistance, is[was]

about $250,000,000” (equivalent to $2,142,436,594 in today’s USD).9 Similarly, the CIA provided

8 Special to The New York Times, "U.S. DISAVOWS AIM OF SAVING BAO DAI; AGAIN BACKS DIEM," New York Times (1923-Current File), May 07, 1955. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/113342139?accountid=465. 9 Russel Baker Special to The New York Times, "Eisenhower Greets Vietnam President, Extols Patriotism," New York Times (1923-Current File), May 09, 1957. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/113937521?accountid=465.

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financial, political, paramilitary, and police support and training; such as, millions of dollars in

financial aid, creating South Vietnam’s political parties and secret police, and producing popular

movies, and literature (including an astrological magazine which predicted that the stars were in

Diem’s favor).10 The CIA quite literally built, trained, and supported a new infrastructure for South

Vietnam and its government. Some of this was paid for through their collaboration with local

warlords; picking up where the French left off, by selling opium to fund their clandestine

operations. However, to the US, it seemed that the amount of aid had little effect on the conduct of

the Diem regime. Although Diem did usher in some reform under his rapidly increasing autocratic

rule, and while some failed, much of his reformist policies that were enacted were done so in self-

interest. Towards the end of Diem’s rule, his regime was plagued by continued domestic crises.

These crises were perpetuated by Diem and his brother, Vice President and Chief of the Secret

Police Ngo Dinh Nhu, seemingly out of the blue and without cause. Nevertheless, the brothers were

both quite culpable in antagonizing the non-Catholic populace. For example, in 1963 the New York

Times wrote, “visions of ultimate victory are obscured by the image of a secretive, suspicious,

dictatorial regime. American officers are frustrated and irritated by the constant whimsical meddling

of the President and his brother…11” Substantiating this further, the Times mentions that the

“President lacks peasant backing…President Ngo Dinh Diem is well aware of the importance of

securing the countryside…the Vietnamese President seems incapable of winning the loyalty of his

people.12” Nonetheless, as time went on, it became apparent that he would refuse outside assistance

as he believed he would win them over in his own way.

Crises under Diem (1960-1963):

10 Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, 1st ed., (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2007), pp. 243. 11 Homer Bigart, "Vietnam Victory Remote Despite U.S. Aid to Diem," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jul 25, 1962. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/116212290?accountid=465. 12 Ibid., Bigart, "Vietnam Victory Remote Despite U.S. Aid to Diem."

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Many US officials considered Diem, from the beginning of his rule, the best candidate to

lead South Vietnam over a coterie of corrupt or pro-French candidates. In fact, Diem must be

credited to some extent for his aptitude in solving the many difficulties facing South Vietnam when

his regime was brought to power. Diem was able to resolve the refugee crisis from the North,

establish and consolidate his regime’s control, pacify the problems with sects like the Binh Xuyen,

and remove the Viet Cong from major cities like Saigon. Diem must also be credited for bringing

security to South Vietnam to allow for economic stability and advances in education. Diem was

well aware of the importance of being less dependent on US aid. Less successful reforms included

his land reform, resettlement, and obviously, his religious policies. Over time, his regime was

responsible for the many crises which frustrated the US and forced US officials to look elsewhere

for candidates to lead Vietnam. Many of Diem’s reforms were based largely on winning over the

peasantry and those who lived in the countryside, even though those were the same people he

simultaneously antagonized during the crises.

Diem and his brother well understood the need to win over the peasantry in order to win the

war. At the same time, Diem considered himself Catholic along with the rest of the members of his

family, and as a result, there would always remain some sort of a disconnect between his regime

and the largely Buddhist populace of Vietnam. This disconnect was due to Vietnam having a

Buddhist majority estimated to be about “70 to 80 percent Buddhist.13” Therefore, it is difficult to

comprehend the reasoning for the atrocities committed against the Buddhists by Diem’s regime.

The crises began small enough. Diem’s regime occasionally exposed their Catholic biases; for

example, Diem had the distribution of weapons provided to village self-defense militias (intended to

13 "The Situation In South Vietnam – SNIE 53-2-63," The Pentagon Papers, Gravel ed. (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 729–733. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/doc125.htm

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repel communist forces) only given to village Catholics, and, similarly, other villages attempted to

convert en masse in order to receive aid or avoid being apart of Diem’s resettlement programs.14

Nothing was perfect during Diem’s regime. In 1960 there was an attempted coup on Diem,

and the New York Times reported in December of 1961 that the US was considering recalling its

ambassador in addition to withdrawing US aid.15 However, the major crises carried out under Diem

all occurred in 1963, as tensions with Buddhists reached their peak, so did tensions with the US. In

May 1963, the ARVN shot at and launched grenades into a crowd of protesting Buddhists in Hue.

They had been protesting against a rarely-enforced ban on flying the Buddhist flag, and wished to

fly their flag on Phat Dan day (the celebration of the birth of Gautama Buddha).16 Diem refused to

accept his government’s role in the incident, instead blaming the Viet Cong, even as the US and the

world refuted Diem’s refusal.

The protests against Diem would not end there. Later that month, over 500 monks protested

against such treatment at the National Assembly in Saigon. On June 3, Vietnamese police and

ARVN troops poured chemicals on the heads of praying Buddhist protestors in Hue; 67 people were

hospitalized. American officials did not believe a coup was necessary just yet. Still, the crisis

seemed like it could not get worse when, on June 11, the now-infamous event of the Buddhist monk

sitting down and immolating himself in the middle of Saigon occurred; an act of protest that drew

attention to the situation in Vietnam from around the world. In July 1963, the New York Times

wrote, that the protests “…have had a catalytic effect on the nation,” and that “since the Hue

incident a Buddhist priest and an eminent writer have committed suicide to protest Government

repression. Two weeks ago, Government police attacked American newsmen. This last week the

14 Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 993.15 Nathaniel Peffer, "To Save South Vietnam," New York Times (1923-Current File), Dec 06, 1961. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/115303420?accountid=465. 16 Hedrick Smith Special to The New York Times, "SAIGON UNREST STIRS U.S.," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jul 21, 1963. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/116430631?accountid=465.

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Saigon police clubbed and jailed hundreds of demonstrators.” America’s main worries were what

effect the protests might have on the war effort against the communists and the popularity of the

government in Saigon. As the article went onto state, “For 10 weeks, American diplomats have

urged President Diem to offer the Buddhist leaders a quick and generous peace. Instead he has

drawn ‘into the bosom of his family,’ as one official put it…Washington’s principal worry is that

the Buddhist crisis may upset the vital war against the Communists in which the United States has

invested 12,000 soldiers and roughly $500,000 a year…Washington is empathic in declaring that it

will not become involved in any string-pulling to change Governments in Saigon.17”

Finally, on August 18, the protests reached an arguable climax as the Buddhists held a mass

protest of about 15,000 people at Xa Loi Pagoda, Saigon’s largest Pagoda. Three days later, in

response to these protests Diem’s brother, Nhu, ordered ARVN Special Forces troops to execute a

series of synchronized attack on a number of Buddhist pagodas in South Vietnam. Over 1,400

Buddhists were arrested, and even more were killed or disappeared. Troops also confiscated the

charred heart of Thich Quang, the Buddhist monk who had immolated himself in Saigon. Diem and

his regime again denied responsibility but the US had grown tired of Diem’s constant headaches.

The US government believed “that the South Vietnamese Government had violated pledges

on the Buddhist crisis and that the Vietnamese military chiefs were innocent of responsibility for

assault on pagodas…the Buddhist protest movement is understood to affect deeply the Kennedy

Administration’s evolving policy of encouraging Vietnamese military chiefs to reach for power…

peace (is) out of the question as long as Ngo Dinh Nhu, chief of secret police..retains his vast

power.18” State (Cable) 243 from the Kennedy administration to the US Ambassador to South

Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr, furthered this sentenment: Nhu must be removed from power and

17 Ibid., Smith, "SAIGON UNREST STIRS U.S."18 Tad Szulc Special to The New York Times, "U.S. SPURNS DENIAL BY DIEM ON CRISIS," New York Times (1923-Current File), Aug 29, 1963. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/116552816?accountid=465.

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to look for alternatives to Diem’s rule if he did not initiate reforms.19 The Kennedy administration

had already begun to attempt to rid themselves of their Diem troubles; meanwhile, the CIA was

trying to ensure that the Diem regime would not see 1964.

Conduct:

The coup d’état against President Diem (October & November 1963):

The Kennedy administration was preparing and seriously discussing plans to remove Diem

as early as June 1963, while the Diem administration was beginning to carry out their religious

persecution against the Buddhists. On July 4, the ARVN generals notified Ambassador Lodge’s

trusted liaison officer and CIA operative, Lucien Conein, that they were beginning preparations for

their plot against Diem. Conein had infiltrated and worked with the South Vietnamese government,

and as such, he was trusted by the ARVN generals not to expose their plans. Moreover, Conein

provided (at least) $42,000 in cash to the ARVN generals plotting against Diem.20

In response to the repression of the Buddhists and attacks on the pagodas, the US imposed

sanctions and froze US aid to Diem’s regime in August. It was during this time, that the United

States was “almost…advocating a military coup d’état in Saigon.21” In fact, on August 23, President

Kennedy gave the initial go-ahead for the coup against Diem. Six days later, the ARVN generals

were signifying their readiness to move forward; Kennedy again approved and encouraged the plan.

However, Kennedy ordered was emphatic that US support was contingent on ensuring that the US’s

role would be concealed. Similarly, Kennedy believed US support could be concealed during the

Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba. Previously on vacation during the crises and approval of coup, CIA

director John McCone strongly advised Kennedy against supporting a coup. It was at this time the

19 “The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May–November, 1963,” The Pentagon Papers (Gravel ed.), pp. 201–276. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/pent6.htm.20 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, pp. 243. 21 Szulc, "U.S. SPURNS DENIAL BY DIEM ON CRISIS."

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White House and Kennedy administration began to reconsider its actions. Moreover, this change of

opinion was also due to the fact that the New York Times and other media outlets were beginning to

report on intimate details about the planning of the coup.22 The White House cabled Conein to learn

details about the generals’ plan, but not to encourage the plot further. Instead, the White House

ordered Conein to keep a low profile, which was almost impossible for Conein as he was well

known, even famous, in Vietnam by this time.23

The coup against Diem had finally reached the point of no-return, apart from the US to

inform Diem and lose deniability; the ARVN generals had their plan and were ready to strike. To

inform Diem now would mean to lose support of the military. On October 24, Conein met again

with the ARVN generals who informed him that the coup was no more than 10 days away. Conein

informed the generals that the US opposed assassination, but did not discourage the plot for fear of

being cut out of South Vietnam’s emerging power circle. In the last days of Diem’s regime, the

Kennedy administration, with little reform being seen in Vietnam, cut all remaining aid to Diem.

The stage for the coup was set.

A few days later, on November 1, 1963, the coup d’état against Diem’s regime began. The

ARVN generals behind the coup ordered that Saigon be completely shutdown: they halted flights

from the airport, cut telephone lines, stormed police headquarters and the government radio station,

and attacked the centers of political power in Saigon. Conein watched the progress anxiously with

the rest of the generals.24 The generals attempted to give Diem a way out by offering an ultimatum:

if he were to resign immediately they would guarantee his safety and safe departure of his family,

Diem refused. The next day, on November 2, rebel troops made their way into the presidential

palace only to find Diem and his family were no longer in the building but rather in a safe house

elsewhere. Finally, around 6am on November 2, Diem telephoned General Duong Van “Big” Minh,

22 Smith, "SAIGON UNREST STIRS U.S."23 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, pp. 250.24 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, pp. 252.

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and informed him of his regime’s readiness to resign. General Minh guaranteed Diem and Nhu’s

safety and sent a convoy, which included Minh’s own personal body guard, to arrest the brothers.

After they were arrested, the general signaled the convoy to kill Diem and Nhu. It was believed that

President Diem and his brother were executed in the back of an armored personnel vehicle by

ARVN officers on the way back to military headquarters at Tan Son Nhut Air base.

Through all of this, the White House was largely in the dark during the coup against Diem,

and Conein was once again ordered by the Kennedy administration to figure out what was

happening in Saigon. To better understand the situation, Conein went to meet with General Minh,

only to be told that the brothers committed suicide in a Catholic church--an obvious fabrication as

suicide for anyone professing themselves to be Roman Catholic is well aware that committing

suicide is a mortal sin, with the result being eternal damnation of the soul. Conein provided the

requested report to the White House that Diem had likely been killed, but did not provide the full

truth. “General Taylor recounted that the president leaped to his feet and ‘rushed from the room

with a look of shock and dismay on his face which I had never seen before.25’” Although their tacit-

support of the coup was in hoping a better regime would take Diem’s place, the White House

certainly did not want Diem killed. Later that day, the generals arrived at the American Embassy in

Saigon, with Conein in the back seat traveling along with them. “They walk[ed] up to the embassy,

as if to say, ‘Hey, boss, we did a good job, didn’t we?26’”

In the wake of the coup and as news spread that Diem and Nhu had been killed the

immediate question was who would assume responsibility for the coup, and who would assume

power in their place. The ARVN generals immediately attempted to diffuse responsibility for the

coup and there was no immediate apparent successor to rule. Conein asserted that “I have it on very

25 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, pp. 254.26 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, pp. 255.

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good authority of very many people, that Big Minh gave the order.27” William Colby, the director of

the CIA’s Far Eastern division reiterated this view.28 Regardless, it was clear that no direct order to

kill the brothers ever came from the White House nor from Conein. The White House and the US

did not want Diem outright killed, knowing the worldwide backlash they would receive, especially

after bringing Diem to power in the first place. As a result, as their reputation was increasingly

diminished over carrying out and result of the coup, the generals argued acrimoniously amongst

themselves. And as South Vietnam delved into a period of greater instability and in-fighting, the

war effort also began to falter. The White House and the CIA would be forced to wonder what

might have been, had they only acted differently.

Consequences:

The aftermath of the Diem coup, and the deepening American involvement under President Lyndon

B. Johnson in the wake of President Kennedy’s assassination (1963 and beyond):

The impact and effect of the Diem coup was not well thought out by the US government, or

at least, the consequences of a Diem regime change were not fully appreciated by the US. President

Kennedy and his administration was largely surprised, albeit not shocked, by Diem’s assassination.

Kennedy called the assassination “particularly abhorrent,” and blamed himself for the coup and

eventual assassination against Diem.29 Nonetheless, by not stopping the coup, the Kennedy

administration failed to understand or consider the lack of reasonable alternatives. Shortly after the

coup, US officials recognized the political and military setbacks which had already occurred due to

the coup and the new government’s actions.30

27 Howard Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War, (New York City, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.435.28 Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War, pp.435.29 Ibid., pp.425.30 Jacob Van Staaveren, “USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam 1961-1963,” United States Air Force Historical Liaison Office (June, 1965), pp. 73-80. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB248/usaf_61-63.pdf

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The only two organizations who had the sort of cohesive power structure necessary to

assume the power vacuum created by the Diem coup were either the Viet Cong or the ARVN

generals. The Buddhists, who had created the crisis through their protests which set the stage for

Diem’s removal, lacked the means, plans, or organizational hierarchy necessary to assume power.

The labor unions were urban-based and only appealed to the small segment of the populace that

lived in the cities. The political parties had been outlawed under Diem, were largely clandestine,

and were not prepared for immediate power. Similarly, the religious sects had been largely

decimated by Diem’s ascent and were small and diverse. The Viet Cong had some support and real

influence among the peasantry in the countryside, and they continued to present themselves as the

only realistic alternative to the ARVN. However, the ARVN possessed a large disciplined

organizational structure spanning through South Vietnam, an independent communication and

transportation system, and the bureaucratic tools left behind by Diem’s regime; as such, they were

the clear and obvious choice to fill the power vacuum in the wake of the coup.31

After the coup, the populace was largely ambivalent about Diem’s fate; the coup had

happened only a few months after the Buddhist crises and many were still unhappy with Diem’s

regime’s involvement. However, any hope of the government improving the general functions,

stability, or treatment of the populace by the government quickly evaporated as the ARVN generals

who led the coup, witnessing the worldwide backlash against them, attempted to diffuse their roles

in the coup. Meanwhile, as criticism was increasing, the generals were battling each other for

positions in the new government.

As the dust of the coup settled, distrust set in among the generals. As the State Department

reported in their Pentagon Papers report, “The U.S. military had failed to appreciate the deeply

corrosive effect on internal allegiance and discipline in the Army that Diem's loyalty based

31 “The Political Situation in South Vietnam,” Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. State Department, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB121/D-I.pdf.

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promotion and assignment policies had had. They did not foresee that in the wake of a coup senior

officers would lack the cohesiveness to hang together and that the temptations of power

would promote a divisive internal competition among ambitious men at the expense of the war

against the Viet Cong.32” “Nor was the US able to find effective formulas to strengthen the

government, or to make its own military action against the VC (Viet Cong) more effective without

diminishing South Vietnamese initiative.33”

Four days after the coup, on November 6, 1963, General Minh took over the government of

South Vietnam under a military junta consisting of himself and twelve other generals. Within three

days the US almost immediately recognized this new government, restored aid ($500 million),

added an additional $107 million in new programs aimed at fighting the Viet Cong, and removed

other sanctions imposed on the Diem regime.34 However, even as economic assistance resumed and

began to pour into Vietnam once again, General Minh could not sustain his regime; his rule would

only last three months.

On January 30, Minh’s regime was toppled in a coup by Nguyen Khanh, shooting Minh’s

body guard and causing small-scaled protests (both for and against Minh) throughout South

Vietnam. Soon after, Khanh attempted to put Minh and many of the ARVN generals on trial.

However, Khan was unable to substantiate his claims; instead, he reprimanded the officers and

confined them to desk jobs or forced them to retire. When Khan himself was disposed in 1965,

almost all of the claims he made against the officers were show to be false. The dependence and

impact of the United States’ economic involvement was relatively large, and South Vietnam’s

32 "The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May-November, 1963," The Pentagon Papers, Gravel ed. (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971), Section 1, pp. 201-232. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/pent6.htm.33 “Time of Decision: November 1963-March 1965,” Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. State Department. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB121/A-IV.pdf34 Special to The New York Times, "U.S. WILL RESUME KEY AID PROGRAM IN SOUTH VIETNAM." New York Times (1923-Current File), Nov 10, 1963. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/116344740?accountid=465.

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economies would not recover to their pre-US involvement GDP per capita by 1969 (indexed

through Japanese yen=100; South Vietnam, 1958: 50; South Vietnam, 1969: 12).35

Largely unscathed and unpunished in the wake of Diem’s assassination, the CIA would

come under greater scrutiny under President Johnson’s administration; as President Kennedy

himself was assassinated on November 22 in Dallas, Texas. Johnson inherited the wealth of

problems and instability that came after the coup. Some of the problems President Johnson faced

included: concerns about being associated with the subsequent regimes (considering the world

opinion regarding the violence of the coup), recurring coups and regime changes in Saigon, a secret

insurgency killing South Vietnamese and Americans alike, and an untrustworthy intelligence

agency operating outside their charter in the CIA. The latter was especially troublesome for Johnson

as he had been concerned about Robert Kennedy and the CIA’s roles in political murder games and

their clandestine operations. In President Kennedy’s administration, his brother Robert had been

Attorney General and had worked on National Security Council problems, counterinsurgency

matters, and other general intelligence work. President Johnson would take matters into his own

hands, as he removed his non-Attorney General roles and requested Robert to resign on December

13th; Robert Kennedy would indeed resign seven months later.

The Diem coup had clearly had an effect on the agency, at least in the short term. In late

December, CIA director John McCone and President Johnson began to discuss the possibility of a

change in the role of the agency from the covert, clandestine operations it was currently conducting,

to its original and (more importantly) legal role to organize, gather, and report intelligence to the

President. Others took a more moderate view, as one US official said, “If the agency is going to

survive, it has to be limited to clandestine operations-small, high-caliber, short-term, high-

35 Bassino, Jean-Pascal, and Pierre Van Der Eng, "Economic Divergence in East Asia: New Benchmark Estimates of Levels of Wages and GDP, 1913-1970," ResearchGate, Accessed April 03, 2016.

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concentration efforts with a minimum of visibility.36” Regardless, even at the time, many agreed

that the CIA should concentrate on intelligence information gathering and analyzing functions,

“where they have their best work in Vietnam…The agency has been successful, sources say, in its

analysis of enemy strength and capability and usually more correct in its assessments than the

military service’s intelligence agencies. However, by moving in-to ‘open’ programs, critics say, the

agency stretched itself too thin.37”

However, President Johnson also needed the CIA to keep conducting its cover operations to

solve the problems his administration inherited. Johnson did not want American troops to die in

Vietnam; but he also did not want America to pull out of Vietnam, admit failure, or be seen as

weak. He believed, correctly, then, that covert operations were his only real option, and the CIA

was the only organization with the capabilities of carrying covert action out.38 When McCone

himself left the agency shortly before Johnson’s election in November of 1964, he left with a

hauntingly prophetic quote, “We will find ourselves mired down in combat in the jungle in a

military effort that we cannot win, and from which we will have extreme difficulty extracting

ourselves.39”

Surprisingly enough, the Diem coup and aftermath were nowhere near the end of US

involvement in the region. On August 4, 1964 the Gulf of Tonkin incident was alleged to occur

(discovered in 2005 to be an outright fabrication procured through “intelligence” gathered by the

NSA).40 However, this “attack” was more than enough to allow the Gulf of Tonkin resolution to be

passed through Congress six days later. The resolution marked the first time the President was

36 William Tuouhy, "CIA in Vietnam Shifting Toward Old Role: Spying," Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File), Oct 13, 1968. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/156083642?accountid=465. 37 Tuouhy, "CIA in Vietnam Shifting Toward Old Role: Spying."38 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, pp. 272-276.39 “The Air War in North Vietnam: Rolling Thunder Begins, February-June, 1965,” The Pentagon Papers (Gravel ed.), pp. 332-388. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon3/pent6.htm.40 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, pp. 276.

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allowed to authorize the use of conventional military force without a formal declaration of war. This

act fully committed the US to the war in Vietnam. The war would last until April 1975.

Conclusion:

Through the US’s decision neither to warn, nor stop the ARVN general’s coup against

President Diem, the US was forced to work with the unstable and unreliable subsequent military

regimes which threw Vietnam and its government into years of political and socio-economic

instability. Due to the US and the CIA’s concealment and unwillingness to share their knowledge of

an impending coup on South Vietnamese President Diem, the CIA and the US government were

equally complicit through their tacit support of the coup as they would have been by outright

encouragement. In their actions, the CIA, fully supported by the US government, immersed itself in

Vietnamese society and forced the US to assume responsibility over the fate of South Vietnam. A

path to instability began with the problems created by the French United Front and was further

exacerbated by the US’s installation of Diem. Furthermore, America’s continued direct involvement

further exacerbated problems. Increasingly, after decades of conflict and war, South Vietnam was

forced to be reliant on American support which brought further socio-economic and political

instability. As American aid tried to solve these problems, they were only amplified, driving the

US’s increased involvement in the region and charting a new era in US foreign policy particularly

within the region of Southeast Asia and the State of Vietnam.

As General Maxwell Taylor, Chair of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted while remembering

US involvement in Vietnam, "there was the memory of Diem to haunt those of us who were aware

of the circumstances of his downfall. By our complicity, we Americans were responsible for the

plight in which the South Vietnamese found themselves.41"

From 1955 to1964, and even before, a clear pattern emerged when looking at Vietnam from

a lens some 60 years later: imperialist forces from outside and authoritarian forces from within 41 Ellen J. Hammer, A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963, (New York City, NY: E. P. Dutton, 1987), pp. 315.

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dominated and controlled a largely peasant populace doing its best to make a living. As with many

wars, political grandstanding, clandestine operations, and general government meddling, the only

people that lose in the long-term are the everyday, peaceful citizen trying to support themselves and

their families. President Diem and his brother Nhu were both killed, and as a result they felt the

effects of their rule, but for the few governmental officials that are killed or imprisoned, there are

thousands more people nowhere near complicit in their government’s actions that are economically

distressed or destroyed, forced to uproot their lives, tortured, killed, imprisoned, or some

combination of these and others. They are dragged into conflicts that largely do not matter to them,

but they are forced to face adversity and adapt to problems regardless.

Governments are certainly capable of improving lives of citizens, but as in Vietnam when

Diem was attempting to institute reforms, those reforms were always in the context of improving

his own political reputation or increasing his own power; they are almost always put on the

backburner when the reforms are no longer convenient. To the peasant rice farmer at the time, why

does it matter if their ruler is pro-American, pro-French, or a communist? Largely, the war forced

the average citizen to take sides unnecessarily and forced their involvement into a conflict that they

had nothing to do with. If they chose the wrong side, their whole life would be impacted, possibly

destroyed. Both the communists and non-communists alike demanded support for their side, and the

farmer, villager, or factory worker would pay the price for their lack of support depending on who

was sweeping through their area.

From the average American’s perspective, how was hundreds of millions of dollars in aid

and funding given yearly to the war effort and economy in Vietnam helpful to their everyday lives?

Could there be a better use of all that tax revenue that could be put towards helping American

citizens? The Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress reports that the total

military cost of the Vietnam War was $111 billion (roughly $491 billion today).42 This figure likely 42 Stephen Dagget, “Cost of Major U.S. Wars,” CRS Report for Congress, Library of Congress, (July, 2008), pp. 2. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/108054.pdf.

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does not include non-military costs nor the value of human life loss during the course of the war. It

is hard to say exactly what effect this money could have had on the average American’s life, but it

is not hard to say that some positive effect of $111 billion could have been had and that the money

could have been put to better use.

The CIA and the US would not be forced to consider for very long what might have been in

Vietnam. An unfortunate aspect of the US’s democracy is the revolving door of leaders and

personnel which comprise it. They are rarely forced to learn lessons from history and see how their

government failed. This is certainly true of the Diem coup. Those who comprised the CIA or the US

government during the Diem coup was likely promoted, left, or died by the end of the war a decade

later. Kennedy himself did not learn all the lessons he should have previously from the Bay of Pigs

in Cuba. Considering the similarities: an aggressive foreign policy, getting cold feet, and then the

subsequent half-effort defeat; Kennedy should have learned previously to go all in or not at all.

Although the CIA, from time to time, considers changing its role to what its original charter

intended it to be, it never lasts. The CIA is too useful, and too stubborn to admit its failures. The US

government’s foreign policy would not appear to change as it continued to interfere in a plethora of

countries around the world (Chile, Afghanistan, Iraq, and many others), and if there were lessons

learned it was not in Vietnam as the US doubled down in their support of South Vietnam and

increased our involvement even more after the Diem coup.

As others have said, evil only triumphs when good men and women fail to act. That is

certainly true in Vietnam, and it is definitely true in the United States. A truly good United States

does not torture, wage unjust wars, and definitely does not play political murder games, all of which

it did in Vietnam. The US government did not change its long-term foreign policy after the coup

against Diem, nor did it change when the Vietnam War ended. The only way it will change is when

enough knowledgeable citizens take notice and vote accordingly. But to the millions who lost their

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lives in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere the US invokes its foreign policy, it will not matter when the

US changes, as it’s already too late.

Annotated Bibliography:

1 Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, 2nd rev ed. (Brooklyn, NY: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991), pp.152-153.Used Professor McCoy’s book for information on the background of the French client-state and the different groups they supported/used to support their rule.

2 Jessica Chapman, Cauldron of resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s southern Vietnam, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), pp. 74.Used Mrs. Champman’s book for the statistic of how much land organizations like the Bien Xuyen were controlling at the time.

3 McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, pp.154.Used Professor McCoy’s book for the information on opium and the quote on casinos.

4 Ibid., pp. 152Used Professor McCoy’s book for the quote.

5 Special to The New York Times, "Text of Eisenhower-Diem Statement." New York Times (1923-Current File), May 12, 1957. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/113929595?accountid=465. Used this article printed in the New York Times to support my statement about the US assisting in moving refugees and the increased US involvement in partnership with Diem.

6 "Focus on Diem", New York Times (1923-Current File), May 15, 1955. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/113436888?accountid=465.Used this article printed in the New York Times to support my statement about the US not wanting the communist regime to annex South Vietnam

7 Seth Jacobs. Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), pp.91.Used Mr. Jacobs book for my statement that Buddhist villages were receiving a disproportionate amount of aid compared to Catholic villages.

8 Special to The New York Times, "U.S. DISAVOWS AIM OF SAVING BAO DAI; AGAIN BACKS DIEM," New York Times (1923-Current File), May 07, 1955. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/113342139?accountid=465. Used this article printed in the New York Times to support my statement about the US believing Diem was the key to the war effort in Vietnam.

9 Russel Baker Special to The New York Times, "Eisenhower Greets Vietnam President, Extols Patriotism," New York Times (1923-Current File), May 09, 1957. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/113937521?accountid=465.

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Used this article printed in the New York Times to support my statistics about US aid to Vietnam.

10 Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2007), pp. 243. Used Mr. Weiner’s book to support my information on how the CIA assisted Diem’s regime.

11 Homer Bigart, "Vietnam Victory Remote Despite U.S. Aid to Diem," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jul 25, 1962. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/116212290?accountid=465. Used this quote in an article printed in the New York Times to support my view of Diem’s inability to further the war effort in the view of the Americans.

12 Ibid., Bigart, "Vietnam Victory Remote Despite U.S. Aid to Diem."Used this quote in an article printed in the New York Times to support my view that Diem is unable to gain support of the rural people in the countryside and the populace in general.

13 "The Situation In South Vietnam – SNIE 53-2-63," The Pentagon Papers, Gravel ed. (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 729–733. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/doc125.htmUsed the Pentagon Papers to support my statistic about the number of Buddhists in Vietnam.

14 Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 993.Used Mr. Buttinger’s book to support my information about Diem’s biases in providing governmental aid to Catholics.

15 Nathaniel Peffer, "To Save South Vietnam," New York Times (1923-Current File), Dec 06, 1961. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/115303420?accountid=465. Used this article printed in the New York Times to support my statement about withdrawing US aid and the American ambassador.

16 Hedrick Smith Special to The New York Times, "SAIGON UNREST STIRS U.S.," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jul 21, 1963. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/116430631?accountid=465. Used this article printed in the New York Times to better understand and discuss the protests in Saigon.

17 Ibid., Smith, "SAIGON UNREST STIRS U.S."Used this article printed in the New York Times to better understand and discuss the protests in Saigon, and to describe American feelings about Diem during the protests

18 Tad Szulc Special to The New York Times, "U.S. SPURNS DENIAL BY DIEM ON CRISIS," New York Times (1923-Current File), Aug 29, 1963. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/116552816?accountid=465.Used this quote in an article printed in the New York Times to discuss the furtherance of US frustrations with Diem and the need to remove Nhu.

19 “The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May–November, 1963,” The Pentagon Papers (Gravel ed.), pp. 201–276. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/pent6.htm.Used the Pentagon Papers to better support my information about what Cable 243 consisted of.

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20 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, pp. 243. Used Mr. Weiner’s book to support my information on how the CIA assisted the coup against Diem.

21 Szulc, "U.S. SPURNS DENIAL BY DIEM ON CRISIS."Used this quote in an article printed in the New York Times to discuss the furtherance of US attempts to encourage regime change in Saigon.

22 Smith, "SAIGON UNREST STIRS U.S."Used this article printed in the New York Times to help support my view that the Times and other media outlets knew about US involvement in the coup.

23 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, pp. 250.Used this quote to show how impossible it was for Conein to keep a “low-profile, as Mr. Weiner wrote about the US’s directions, “Find out the generals’ plans, don’t encourage them, keep a low profile. Too late: the line between espionage and covert action had already been crossed. Conein was far too famous work undercover; ‘I had a very high profile in Vietnam,’ Conein said.”

24 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, pp. 252.Used Mr. Weiner’s book to support that Conein was quite literally in the room during the coup’s progression.

25 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, pp. 254.Used a quote in Mr. Weiner’s book to show how shocked and upset JFK was that Diem was killed.

26 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, pp. 255.Used a quote in Mr. Weiner’s book to show both how involved Conein and the CIA were in the coup, and how complicit the US was by inviting them immediately after the coup to meet with Amb. Lodge.

27 Howard Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War, (New York City, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.435.Used Mr. Jones’ book to help substantiate that Minh gave the order to kill Diem.

28 Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War, pp.435.Used Mr. Jones’ book to help substantiate that Minh gave the order to kill Diem.

29 Ibid., pp.425.Used Mr. Jones’ book to discuss JFK’s feelings about the coup and his regret in being involved.

30 Jacob Van Staaveren, “USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam 1961-1963,” United States Air Force Historical Liaison Office (June, 1965), pp. 73-80. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB248/usaf_61-63.pdfUsed the Air Force’s historical office report to discuss how the coup affected the war effort.

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31 “The Political Situation in South Vietnam,” Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. State Department, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB121/D-I.pdf.Used the Bureau of Intelligence and Research’s report as a general history for the paragraph to discuss how the coup was not well thought out by the US, and how the Viet Cong and ARVN were the two main organizations able to improve their stakes in the wake of the coup.

32 "The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May-November, 1963," The Pentagon Papers, Gravel ed. (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971), Section 1, pp. 201-232. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/pent6.htmUsed this quote in the Pentagon Papers to discuss how the coup was not well thought out by the US, in the opinion of the US.

33 “Time of Decision: November 1963-March 1965,” Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. State Department, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB121/A-IV.pdfUsed this quote in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research’s report to discuss how, after the coup, the US could not improve the government or the war effort against the Viet Cong.

34 Special to The New York Times, "U.S. WILL RESUME KEY AID PROGRAM IN SOUTH VIETNAM," New York Times (1923-Current File), Nov 10, 1963. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/116344740?accountid=465. Used this statistic posted in an article printed in the New York Times to show the resumption of aid to Vietnam from the US.

35 Bassino, Jean-Pascal, and Pierre Van Der Eng, "Economic Divergence in East Asia: New Benchmark Estimates of Levels of Wages and GDP, 1913-1970," ResearchGate, Accessed April 03, 2016. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242771349_Economic_Divergence_in_East_Asia_New_Benchmark_Estimates_of_Levels_of_Wages_and_GDP_1913-1970.Used this research paper on the economies of Southeast Asia during the 20th century to show the dependence of South Vietnam on US aid.

36 William Tuouhy, "CIA in Vietnam Shifting Toward Old Role: Spying," Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File), Oct 13, 1968. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/156083642?accountid=465. Used this quote printed in the LA Times to show the diverse opinions regarding what the CIA should do, at the time the US was involved in Vietnam.

37 Tuouhy, "CIA in Vietnam Shifting Toward Old Role: Spying."Used this quote printed in the LA Times to show that many agreed the CIA should focus on intelligence gathering, as also shown in the Mr. Weiner’s book.38 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, pp. 272-276.Used Mr. Weiner’s book to show that a President has only a few options when trying to resolve military conflict, LBJ chose the one he felt had the best chance of working with fewest casualties.

39 “The Air War in North Vietnam: Rolling Thunder Begins, February-June, 1965,” The Pentagon Papers (Gravel ed.), pp. 332-388. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon3/pent6.htm.Used former CIA Director McCone’s quote in the Pentagon Papers predicting the outcome of the Vietnam War exactly.

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40 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, pp. 276.Used Mr. Weiner’s book to support the statement that the Golf of Tonkin incident was fabricated, or at least, never happened.

41 Ellen J. Hammer, A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963, (New York City, NY: E. P. Dutton, 1987), pp. 315.Used this quote from Gen. Taylor to show the American understanding of how the US had messed up Vietnam both for the people and the government of South Vietnam.

42 Stephen Dagget, “Cost of Major U.S. Wars,” CRS Report for Congress, Library of Congress, (July, 2008), pp. 2. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/108054.pdfUsed Mr. Dagget’s report to allow the reader to fully understand the cost of wars, in particular, the Vietnam War.

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