DISINTERESTED BESEI'OLENT SENSlBILlTY IN tIEXUY MACKENZIE'S THE .CI.-I.V OF FEEL1.W:

RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF SH.4FTESBLrRI."S SENTIMENT.-\L PHILOSOPHY lN T H E RISE OF THE SENTlhlENTAL NOVEL

MATT MINTER. B.A.

.A thcsis submittcti to the Faculty of Grnduatr: Studies and Rcscnrch in partial fultilrnent of the rcquircmcnts for thc dcgrco of

Master o t' Arts Dcpartmcnt o f Enylish Literature

Carleton University Ottawa. Ontario August 16. 1990

C Copyright 1999. Matt Minter

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Abstract

Thc topic of this paper centres on thc role which feeling played in the popular British sentimental

literature of the late eightcmth-century. The representative text chasm for this discussion is

Henry Macken~ie's T ~ L J . k r u f ' f i chrg . Thc first chaptcr is intended to counter R. S. Cranc's

1934 thesis uhich argued that the sentimental movement was influenced primarily by rhc

Latitudinarian di1.inc.s. In opposition to Cmnc's thesis. this opening chaptcr offers an

cxplunation which stresses the intlucncu of Lurd Shaticsbury's moral philosophy on thc

mo\cInmt. The sccond chaptcr begins with a review of the scholarship cln Milckcnzic's The

. I h r o/'F;vli/rg and is followed by n rcvicw of the work done by John Dwycr on the Scurtish

moral context. In thc thinl chapter I offer a rcading of muck en zit.'^ text in ordcr to detcrminc to

what cxtcnt a Sha ticsburian rnord philosophy opcratcs within the scntimcntal nixcl.

I would like to offer my sincerest thanks to my advisor on this project. Dr. J. H. C. Reid. for his

culnments and suggestions. as well as Prof. Robert Hogy. my Graduate advisor at Carlcton

University. Thank-you as well to my colleague Lee Simons for her insight and encoura, wmcn t.

nntl my friend Warren Throop for many valuable discussions on the topic of Shaftcsbury's moral

philosophy and thc sentimental n o d Finally. I would also like to thank the adrninistrati\rc

stiifh at both the C'arlcton Cniwrsity Eny lish Depunment. as rvcll 3s the Carleton Uniw-shy

Li brary 's Intcr-Library Loan Department.

Tablc o f Contents

Acceptance Sheet Abstract

wncn ts .~cknowled, Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION: Sentimental Moral Philosophy and thc Eighteenth- 1 Ccntury Age of Feeling

CHAPTER 1:

CHAPTER 2 :

2.1

CHAPTER 3:

Shrftesbury's Scntimcntal Philosophy and the Rise of Scn timcntal Litcraturc

The Crane Thesis-An -4rgument for thc Importancc 1) t' 3 the Latitudinarian Varicty 1) t' Smtimcntul Bcncvolism Sh;lftcsbury's Disintcrcsted Variety of Scntimcntal 9 5cnt.wI ism Shaticsbury's Legacy in the European Enlightenment 17

Criticism of The. .Ltm of'Fwlirlg: Pathetic Hcro or 2 (3 Pathetic Foul'? John Dwyer on the Scottish blornlists of Retincment: 4 I Hcnry 4lackcnzie. Hugh Blair and James Mncpherson

Disinterested Benevolence and The .).fun of' Ferlittg

Disinterestedness Benevolent Sensibility

WORKS CITED

Minter I

Introduction - Sentimental Moral Philosophy and the Eighteenth-Century

Age of Feeling

This paper is concerned with the role which feeling played in popular British

literature during the period between approximately 1740 and the end of the eighteenth

ccntury. I t is commonly known that the stress upon reason as a moral and aesthetic guide

which dominated in the first halfofthe eighteenth century was eventually displaced by o

bclicf that fii.elings or affections were also to be seen us valid moral and aesthetic yuitlcs.

Since this change was concomitant with the growth of the novel as a literary form. 3

yenercd topic of literary study for this period centres on the risc of the novcl of

feclinp-the s~~~trimwrtrl rio\.cl. In his article cntitled "Sentimental No\vcls" ( 1900). Juhn

Llullan offers n rescnt assessment of the genre by considerin y Samuel Richardson's

C'ltrriss~tr. Laurence Sternr's .-I Scr~tinwzrcrl Jaw-irq. and Henry Mackenzie's T / J ~ .lltrli of'

F~-~l i t tg as his representative sentimental texts. In this article Mullan strcsscs the

importance of ~ ~ r n i b i l i h as it relates to thc sentimental novcl:

'Sensibility' began to stand for emotional responsiveness . . . and came to

desi pa t e a laudable delicacy in the second ha1 f of the century.

"'Sentimental.' by becoming a word for a type of text. promised an

ocnrsio~l for tine feeling. This tine feeling could be experienced by both

the characters in a narrative and the reader of that narrative. A sentimental

text depicted 'sensibility.' and appealed to it" (235).

Minter 2

Mullan also notes more spccitically that these "tine feelings" experienced by the reader o t'

the late eighteenth-century sentimental novel were to be seen as benevolent. since the text

"appealed to the benevolent instincts of a virtuous reader. who might be expected to

suffer tvith those of whom he or she rcnd" (238). Mullan. however. ends up dismissing

the crucial component of benevolent sensibility associated with the sentimental novel and

states instcad that "sentimentalism in eighteenth-century novels secms much morc like

the conscqucnce of an anxiety about the sociability of individuals. than the assertion u f ii

h i t h in human bencvolcncc" (250). In the following paper I will attempt ro dcmonstratc

that Mullan's dismissal of thc relcvancc o f benevolence constitutes a signi tiwnt crror in

the assessment of thc late eighteenth-ccntury age of feoling. In opposition to blullan's

argument. I wi l l attempt to demonstrate that the literature of the agc was h i ~ h l y indebted

to a moral philosophy bused on hcnevoltmt feelings.

bt inter 3

Chapter 1 - Shaftesburv's Sentimental Philosophy and the Rise of

Scntimcntal Literature

In order to both understand the precise nature of the -'sensibility" or feeling which

was being \~alorized during the late eighteenth century. as well to account for the rise and

growth in popularity of the literature ofscnsibility during this period. many scholars I w c . C

arsued over the possible intellectual heritage ofthe movement in an attempt to determine

the ideological intluences which gave credence to the "cult of sensibility" and helped

spur the movement fonvard. One of the most celebrated cxamplcs of this attempt is R. S

Cronc's "Suygcstions Toward a Genealogy of the 'Man of Feeling"' ( 1934). This essay

has had an ownvhelming influence on twcnticth-ccntury discussions of the rise of

sensibility and is still oRen mentioned in recent literary studies on the eighteenth-century

"age of sensibility" in England. A good indication ofjust how intluential Crane's article

has been throughout this century can be seen in the following remarks made by G . S

Rousseau in a I978 SEL article:

In 1934 Crane published an essay that became a "classic". . . . Crane's

essay has been required reading tbr four decades: when I was in graduate

Minter 4

school we called it "the Gospel according to Crane." . . . No one dared to

take qualiljk~g exams without memorizing Crane's key points. For years

every essay abort sentimental literature began by acknowledging Crane:

not to do so was heresy. ( 5 9 1 )

Crane's article discusses the possible intluence of what he considers to bc the four

principal distinguishing elements of the "moral doctrine" underlying the cighteenth-

century "cult ut' thc 'man of feeling"' (?Oh): " 1 . I i'rfrlc irs rriri\rrsd b c ~ i i ~ ~ ~ o l c ~ ~ r ~ ~ c . " -'1.

BC)IIC)\VIL~I~L*LJ /2~~ l i t l g ,~ - '-3. BL~CJ\*O/C~II / d i l t g ~ its 'trtlm~-d' IU rmul..' and "4. TIw 'SL)//'

~ i p p r o \ * i ~ ~ ~ y Jty." More succinct1 y. Crane describes the cighteenth century "cult u f the

'man of feeling"' as a -*moral doctrine" which stresses not on1 y the "identi ticotion of

virtue with acts of benwolencc" (206). but also thc identi tication of virtue with thc

"kclings of universal good-wil l which inspire and accompany thcse acts [of

bcnevolcnce]" (206). The third element idrntiticd by Crane is that these feelings o r

"'coed + Affections"' are to be seen as natural to mankind (106). Finally. this moral

doctrine also emphasizes "the 'pleasing Anguish. that . . . terminates in a Self-approving

Joy "'(Crane 206). Crane labels this doctrine "sentimental benevoi ism" (207) sincc. as his

tirst three elements indicate. there is a strong focus on benevolence as feeling and

benevolent feelings. both as natural to mankind and as appropriate moral guides leading

towards the attainment of virtue. Furthermore. Crane's tinal feature of this sentimental

bencvolism ensures pleasure or happiness since. by acting in accordance with these

benevolent feelings. one experiences the bbself-approving joy."

blintcr 5

Crane's thesis. which is concerned with the genealogy of this sentimental

benevolism. argues that i t was most directly intlumced by the sermons of Latitudinarian

preachers such as Isaac Barrow and John Tillotson. Crane 's thesis explicitly challenges

the earlier work done by Cecil bloore ( 1916) and William Alderman ( 193 1 ) who had

argued that Anthony Ashley Cooper. the third earl of Shatiesbury. should be seen as thc

dominant intluence in the mid to late eighteenth-century rise of sentiment. Althoueh

Crane agrecs with hloore and ..\Ideman that many. perhaps all. "of the distinctive

elcments of t l ~ c sentimental bencvoiism of the mid-eightwnth century already existed at

the beginning of thc ccntury in the writings o f . . . Shatiesbury" (207). for Crane. a more

prominent intlucncr can be traced back to the beginnings of the Latitudinarian

movement. .As Cranc puts it. the sentimental movement of this period owes a great deal

to

the combined influence of numerous Anglican divines of the

Latitudinarian tradition who from the Restoration onward into the

eighteenth century had preached to their congregations and. through their

books. to the larger public essentially the same ethics of bmevolence.

"cod C nature." and "tender sentimental feeling" [as did the writers of the

age of sensibility]. (207-205)

An often cited problem in critical discussions surrounding the doctrine of the man

of feeling is the fact that the doctrine's fourth element, the self-approving Joy, has the

Minter 6

effect of promoting a form of hedonism or egoistic pleasure associated with acts of

benevolence and benevolent kel ings. According to Crane. by 1 68 1 i t became curnmon

for Latitudinarian diiines to depict during their sermons "the exquisite pleasure which the

good man feels in contemplating his own benevolent deeds" (128) . Cranc also cites one

divine. Charles Brent. who. in 1704 preached to his congregation of the "'Divinc and

Heavenly Pleasurc in doing Good"' (229). This specificnlly religious interpretation of the

.'Self-approving joy" ivhich stresses the diiinc and heavenly rewards ussocinted with acts

of benevolence offers what Crane considers to be "a clear hieshadowing of that curious

type of hedonism-the often tianlily avowcd pursuit ofaltnristi~. emotions for egoistic

ends" which. Crane argues "was to characterize most of the rcprcscntative 'men of

feeling' of the next two yencrations" (129).

Although Crane's thesis has not gone unchallenged in the last h5 ycurs. its

perpetual presence in the footnotes and indexes of most discussions of the age of

sensibility has definitely s e n d to downplay the intlucncc of Lord Shaftesbury on the

period. an intluence once considered important by kloorc and Alderman. klorcovcr. in

recent years. G. S. Roussrau's work on this period has proven to be highly influential.

and has consequently further diminished scholarly interest in discussions concerning the

signiticance of Shaftesbury. Like Crane. Rousseau considers the roots of eishternth-

century sensibility to lie in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. However. unlike

Crane who considers sensibility to have developed within a context which is specifically

religious. Rousseau argues that the contextual roots of sensibility are more closely allied

with late seventeenth century scientitic advancements in the tield ofphysiology. As

b1 inter 7

Rousseau writes in a 1976 article:

Sensibility was not a mid eighteenth-century phenomenon. certain] y not in

philosophy or thc natural sciences. I t was a late seventeenth-century

development. owing its superlative paradigmatic debt to . . . books like

Thomas Willis's Pdzologi* o/'rlw B~uirr. and also to one unprecedented.

integrative work. Locke's Es-sq ( l6OJ). ( 142)

Rousseaii explains that Willis's revolutionizing theory was that the soul was cntirely

located within the brain and through this organ controlled all of the other orsans by

means of thc nerves. Thus. accurding to Rousseau. "no novel of sensibility could appear

until a rewlution in knowledge concerning thc brain. and consequently its slaws. the

ncrws, had uccurr?.cd" ( 1 52). It is clear then that Rousseau's thcsis. like that of Cr;~nc's,

ncyatcs the importance o E Shaftesbury's moral doctrine of hcnevolent sensibility in thvor

of a less proximate (late sevcnteenth century) influence-for Rousseau the scientific work

of Willis. and for Crane. the sermons of tho Latitudinarian divines. However, unlike

Crine. Rousseau presents a type of sensibility entirely grounded in the physiological

functioning of the body. a type of sensibility clearly different from the reliijous type

described by Crane. This raises an important point within the content of recent

investigations of the literature of sensibility. which has been noted by Susan Bourgeois

( 1986). According to Bourgeois it would be false to assume that there existed a

monolithic understanding of sensibility during this period (for example. one contined to a

bt inter S

moral. a religious. or a physiological context). Bourseois argues that certain writers-she

specifically focuses on Tobias Smollett-had a growing and changing understanding of

sensibility and. therefore. employed it in both a physiological and a moral sense. A s

Bourgeois puts it. "J'ust as Smollett created a vast world of satire in his five novels. he

also created o vast world ofsensihility" ( 165). Thus. not only is i t probably false to

assume. as Rousseau does. that all types of sensibility in the eighteenth century stem from

a physioloyicnl source. but it is also improper to assume that literary proponents of

riyhteenth-century sensibility wcre unaware of the distinction between the various types

of sensibility-i.e.: moral. religious or physiologicd. AS a result of tile influence of

scholars such as Crane and Rousseou. who havc placed the focus on the religious and

physiological typcs of sensibility rcspeotivcly. not only has Shafiesbury's contribution to

the :lye of sensibility in Britain been denied. but. furthermore. ather varieties of

sensibility such as. as we shall soon discover. moral sensibility. have consequent1 y been

marginalized. [n the remainder of this opening chapter I will. rhereforc. attempt to

demonstrate that the moral philosophy of Lord Shaftesbury not only constitutes a m~ijor

contribution to the movement which saw a valorization of moral sensibility in Britain. but

in Enlightenment Europe as well.

Minter 9

Prior to Crane's article. the two major literary critics to have argued that

Shaliesbury had a profound intluence on the eighteenth-century literature of sensibility

were Cecil bloorc ( 19 16) and William Alderman ( 193 I ). A more recent deknsc of

blwre's and .Mderrnan's position on the intluence of Shaftesbury in late eiphteenth-

century Britain has been provided by Chester Chapin. who. in his 1083 article.

"Shaftcsbury and the Classical view of Human Nature." writes that "Cranc admits that thc

in tluence of Shaftesbury (which he does not discuss) was very real and wry important"

( 3 ) . Simililrly. in another article of the same year. 5haftesbury and the Man of

Feeling." Chitpin states that although Crane acknowledges Moore's article. he argues

"that the intlucnct. of Shaftesbury began too late to haw been an important tiistor in 'the

popular triumph of "scntimcntalism" toward 1750"' (47). Chapin points out. ho\vcvcr.

that Crane nevertheless "admits that the intlucncr: of Shaftesbury in this 'popular

triumph' was very real and very important " (47).

Prior to the work done by Moore. the prevailing assumption had been that the

obvious shift which had occurred in eighteenth-century literature around mid-century-a

shift. according to Moore. characterized by a "'growth in altruism" as a literary theme-

was due mainly to the intluence of "French philosophy" (Moore 264). In his 19 16 article.

"Shaftesbury and the Ethical Poets in England. 1 700- 1760." however. Moore argued that

this mid-eighteenth-century shift in English literature should be properly traced "to the

Clu-waae~-isrics ( ! 7 1 i ) of Lord Shafiesbury. whose importance as a literary intluence in

Minter 10

England has never bcen duly recognized" (264). Although Moore limited his scope to the

English poets writing between 1700 and 1760. such as James Thomson (Scwsotls ( 1726)):

William Mclmoth ( 1735): Mark Xkenside ( Tlrc Pfetrswcs ul'tlrc hrczgitzntiorr ( 1 7-14)):

John Gilbert Cooper ( Tlw PUIWI. O / ' H W I K I I ~ ~ ( 1 744) ) : Edward Young (.Viy/it irlro~ights

( 1745): William Shenstone ( I2r:vc.s ICi-i/re/l io\twr/s rlrc close of' 17-15); and Jumcs Harris

(Cbtzc~ot.t/ ( 175 I )). he. ncw-thclcss. states in more gcnerd terms that the ldoption of

Shuftesbury's ideas "by popular writers in England was . . . widespread. and that . . . thc

C'lrrrt.rrc*rcr-isrics-isi.s had a large pan in determining the content of English li teraturtt" (265) .

According to Moore. the speci tic aspect of Shatlesbury 's moral philosophy which

most notably intluenced these poets of the period was its focus on bcnevoiencc. As

Moore states. "Various wri ten reproduced most of Sha tiesbury 's tenets. but collectively

thcy wcrc indebted to him chietly for a new standard u f morals. Their responsc . . . was

due primarily to his virtuoso theory of benevolence" (265). Thus. although lMoorc's

articlc was the impetus h r Crane's opposing thoughts on the subject 1 S years Iatcr. both

Cmnc m d bloore ayrcc that the intluential doctrinc is a type of sentimental

benevolism-albeit. for Crane one inspired by the sermons of the Latitudinarians. whercas

for Moore. by the writings of Lord Shaftesbury.

Moore explains that Shaftesbury's theory of benevolence (benevolism). was

formed in direct opposition to the "egoistic philosophy of Hobbes" as well as the "strict

orthodoxy of the Church" (266)! As William Alderman explains. Shatiesbury objected

I According to Moore, Shaftesbury's philosophy of benevoiism understood God as the "Spirit of Benevolence" (265).

;Minter 1 1

to these two schools of thought since he saw no indication of "virtue" in doctrines which

taught "to retiain tiom viciousness for fear of punishment. or to practice charity frcm a

hope of rcward" ( 137). Quoting ShaHesbury. Alderman explains that the problem with

this "'rod and sweetmeat' method" tbr S haftesbury was that i t "'presupposed some

disadvantage or benefit to accrue"' and this con tlicted with his belief that there can be

"'no vinue or goodness in acting from hope or tiear"' ( 137). Moreover. since S haftesbury

considered that to be human was to be a "naturally virtuous being. . . endowed with n

'moral sense' which distinguishes good tiom evil as spontaneously as the ear

distinguishes between harmony and discord" ( Moore 269). the idea of reward and

punishment was sccn as. not only contradictory. but also superfluous in regard to the

attainment of virtue. Thus, unlike the Hobbesian belid in tho sel f-interested motivation

o f huminkind. and contrary to thc o n h o d o ~ Christian practicc of playing into such a

bclicf by promising reward or punishment in Heaven. Shaftesbury be1 ieved that through

thc use and cultivation of the 'moral sense.' an individual becomes encoura~ed to seek

out and acquire Virtue. not for a seltish end. but rather. "for its own intrinsic beauty . . .

recardless I of all considerations of future reward and punishment" (Moore 269). As

Shaftesbury states in his Cho~*~~crer-isric~s. "If the love of doing good be not. of itself. a

good and right inclination. I know not how there can possibly be such a thing as goodness

or virtue" ( 1 : 66).

This aspect of Shaftesbury's sentimental moral philosophy which stresses

humanity's natural affection (as opposed to one coerced by reward) toward "goodness"

and "doing good." has been termed moral disinterestedness. Taken in this moral sense

Minter 12

(as opposed to its aesthetic sense which will be discussed later) disinterestedness implies

that the motivation of good acts such as acts of benevolence is not to be seen as fear or

hope of punishment or reward. or any similar type of selfish motivation. but rather. as a

natural affection toward the good. Jerome Stolnitz ( 196 1 ). in his article on Shaftesbury

and disinterestedness explains that. quoting Shatiesbury.

a man cannot be virtuous i f h e "[aims] at it through low of the reward.

But." Shaftesbury goes on to say. "as soon as he is some to have any

affection towards what is morally good. and can like or n t'fect such yood

tbr its own sake. as yood and clrniublc in itself. then hc is in some degree

uood and virtuous . . ." [ C % c r r ~ c t c ~ ~ ~ r ~ i s i . s 1 : 7 (Stolnitz 132) -

More recently. Emily Brady. in "Don't Eat the Daisies: Disintercstcdness and the

Situated Aestheticw( 1998). has pointed out that ShaHesbury opposcd this disinterested

moral action based on affection. to action based on desire and utility. According to

Brady. for Shaliesbury. moral disinterestedness indicates that "moral action is motivated

by affection for something for its own sake. and i t is therefore contrasted with desiring an

object as a means to an end for one's own pleasure. or for any other use" ( 103). Not only.

therefore. is Shaftesbury's moral doctrine of disintcrcstedness opposed to Hobbes's

doctrine of self-interest on the question of motivation for benevolent action. but. by

extension. both philosophies also contlict concerning the reality of benevolent feelings

and affections. such as compassion. As Moore puts it. Shaftesbury's moral philosophy

Minter 13

stands "in opposition to Hobbes's iiew that . . . compassion is a sign of weakness." since

it follows that. for Shatiesbury. "compassion or benevolence. is not only instinctive in

man. but is the highest virtue to which he attains" (270).'

Another important characteristic of Shatiesbury 's sentimental philosophy is its

strong aesthetic dimension.' necessitated by the fact that he equates the Good with the

Beautiful.' Shaftcsbur?, states in his Clrczr~cicro-isrics that "beauty . . . and good . . . are . . .

one and the same" (2: 123) and that "there is no real soor! bcsidc thc enjoyment of

beauty. . . . [and] no real cnjoymmt of beauty beside what is good" ( 2 : I41 ). According

to Moore. Shafttsbury's "identi tication of the Good and thc Beautiful" furthered his

bclief that "vinuc meant merely a pcrfect development ofi~esthctic sscnsibility" (270). It

is crucial to understand. then. that Shaftesbury's sentimental philosophy must be secn as

both moral and aesthetic since it stresses both beauty. whose virtue is naturally

appreciated by the 'moral sense.' and the beauty of virtue. appreciated by a developed. or

cultivated. aesthetic sensibility. Furthermore. this sentimental philosophy is said to bc

totally nun-scl fish. or disinterested in the moral sense. since virtue is sousht for its own

intrinsic beauty and worth. regardless of "divine" or "heavenly" pleasures and rewards.

Elsewhere Moore states that Shatiesbury continually depicted "the compassionate man as the perfection of human nature. and the selfish man as an unnatural monstei' (27 1 ).

Chester Chapin ("Human Nature") notes that "Shatiesbury. as Emst Cassirer said long ago. 'is the tirst great aesthetician that England produced" (33): and Stolnitz states that "Shatirsbury's ethical theory . . . turns out to be very nearly indistinguishable from an aesthetic theory" ( 133).

4 See Bernstdn. "Shaftesbury's Identification of the Good with the Beautihl." ( 1977).

Minter 14

When considered in light of Moore's distinct separation between Shaftesbury's moral

disinterestedness and the egoistic ethics of Hobbes. Crane's understanding of the fourth

criterion of the Latitudinarian variety of helln*olism-the sclflupproving jor which focuses

on "heaven1 y pleasures" and results in a "strange form of hedonism"-is not congruent

with the moral philosophy o f Shatiesbury. Thus. although both Crane and Lloore posit

the importance of benevolent feelings in understanding the age of sensibility. they each

have a di fkrent understanding ~ ) f the role played by the sclfkppruw'r~,~ j0.v associated

with the doctrine of sentimental benevolism. According to Crane. the Latitudinarian

~ w i c t y uf bcncwlism allows for scl fish motivation whereas. 11s Moore. Stolnitz and

Brady point out. the Shaftesburian variety. with its focus on moral disinterestedness. docs

not. Thus Shaftesbury's sentimental philosophy. with its insistt'ncc on moral

disinterestedness. can be scen in opposition to the ideas conveycd in the sermons of thc

Lr~titucfinrlrian divines. as we11 as in the ethical doctrine 0t'Hobbt.s.

Since Shaftrsbury's sentimental philosophy is both moral and aesthetic. it is

important to understand that the concept of disinterestedness is not to be confined to

morality. but must also be seen in its analogous aesthetic meaning. As Stolnitz explains.

Shaftesbury's use of the term "disinterestedness" only begins with his "polemic against

egoism in ethics and instrumentalism in religion" but necessarily extends into the realm

of aesthetics whcre the term takes on a "distinctly aesthetic meaning" ( 131). Accordiny

to Stolnitz. unlike its mom1 meaning where disinterestedness refers to "actions and the

motives to actions" ( 133). in its aesthetic meaning (for example. Shaftesbury's

description ofuthe virtuous man as a spectator" of the beauty and art of nature ( S tolnitz

Minter I5

133)). disinterestedness is something which is to be seen in opposition "to the desire to

possess or use the object" ( 134). As Stolnitz puts it. fir Shaftesbury.

disregard for possession or use is . . . an inference from . . . the broader

proposition that the aesthetic spcctntor does not relate the object to any

purpose that outrun the act of perception itself. . . . [To quote an exampic

of Shaticsbury's takcn from naiurc] The cnjoymcnt which would arisc

tiom "possessing" the ocean is "very dit'fcrent from that which should

naturdly follow from the contemplation of the ocean's beauty"

[C*l~~~r~~~cre~+isti~*s 2 : 1 261. (Stolnitz 134)

Stulnitz yocs on to explain how this conception of a "disintcr~.sted" relationship bctwren

the aesthetic object and the spectator was to become extremely influential in

Enlightenment aesthetic theory since i t transferred the "emphasis away from the objective

features of the situation to the attitude of the percipient" ( 136). Stolnitz declares that "wc

cannot understand modern aesthetic theory unless we understand the concept of

"disinterestedness" ( 13 I ). Contimation for Stolnitz's assertion can be seen in Brady's

more recent article ( 1998). in which. prior to her discussion of Shaliesbury. she describes

the concept of aesthetic disinterestedness. or "disinterested aesthetic appreciation" ( 103).

as "a way of appreciating an object apart tiom any 'interest"' ( 100).

As R. L. Brett ( 195 1 ) has noted. Shaftesbury's notion of aesthetic appreciation. or

aesthetic sensibility. is most aptly delineated in his discussion of the role of taste versus

Minter 16

the role of reason in the field of an criticism. According to Brett. although Shatiesbury's

conception of the "moral sense . . . partake[s] of both the reason and the feelings" ( 13 1 ).

the ti eld of art criticism "for ShaResbury was not a matter of philosophica

but rather "demanded sensibility" ( 130). Thus. ShaResbury "upheld taste

I speculation"

[and]

recognized that aesthetic pleasure is n feeling" (Brett 13 1 ). According to Brctt.

Shaftssbury therefore felt that the critic should be more like a "rirtuoso rather than a

systcmatii thinker" ( Brctt 1 30). Quoting ShaResbury. Brett explains that thc "rir-ttroso

;Ire the 'real tine gentleman. thc lovcrs of a n and ingenuity. . ." ( IN). In his

C'lz~r,.rictc~~.i.srics. Shatiesbury states that this "tine gentlemen [or] man o f scnse" h a w a

cultivated. refined. and. thcretbre. "just tastc" whish allows them "to lcarn whatevcr is

decent in company or bcautiful in arts" (2: 255). Thus. for Shaftesbury.

thc tastc ot'bcauty and thc relish of what is decent. just. and amiable

perfects the character ofthe gentleman . . . . .And the study of such LI tastc

ur relish will . . . be ever the great employment and concern of him who

covets as well to be wise and good as agreeable and polite.

(Cit~i~-~~~r~r.isri~.stisic*s 2: 256).

Shaftesbury's philosophy. therefore. can be seen as attempting to consistently

integrate an aesthetic morality with a moral aesthetics. the t imer being a moral doctrine

which stresses the role of moral sensibility in the discernment of the good as

beautihl-the latter being an aesthetic theory which stresses the importance of the

Minter I7

cultivation of taste. or aesthetic sensibility. in the discernment of the beautiful as good.

Furthermore. aesthetic morality. unlike utilitarian morality. employs a moral

disinterestedness whereby the good is admired only for its own intrinsic beauty and not

its utility. Similarly. according to the moral aesthetic approach. unlike an amoral

aesthetics. aesthetic disinterestedness implies that the beautiful is admired h r its own

intrinsic gootinrss and is not merely appreciated for thc pleasure which it provides.

Onc way of gauging the impact of Shatiesbury's writings is to consider thc

intellectual rebuttals which they inspired. Just as Shaftcsbury's (%cmcrerisri~~ was

meant to counter the egoism of Hobbes. so too Bernard Mandeville. in his second edition

of the Fcrbkp u#'rhs Bees. revised the self-centered moral philosophy of Hobbes in an

attempt to refute the benevolent moral philosophy of Shatiesburq.. Although it is true that

Mandeville's work can also be seen as a direct attempt to reprove the doctrines of the

Latitudinarian divines. Phillip Harth ( 1970) notes that Mandeville's chief intellectual

opponent. especially atter 17 14. is undoubtably Lord Shaftesbury. [n his investigation of

Mandeville. Hanh. while acknowledging Crane's thesis. has noted how the Dutch

,Minter IS

physician's view of humanity as eternally subject to selfish appetites and passions which

cannot be controlled by reason. stands in stark contrast to the view o f natural benevolent

emotions preached by the Latitudinarian divines. A s Hanh points out. however.

following his reading of Shaftesbury somerimc afier the first publication of TJw F d h ~ of

rlrc Bccs in 17 14. it becomes clear that Mandeville is specifically writing against the

benevol ism of Shatiesbury. As Hanh states.

>landeville did not respond to bencvolism at first. His attention in 1 7 14

was wholly taken up by his crusade against rigorism tor exalting reason

and emphasizing the conquest o f the passions. .A few years latcr. howevcr.

he read Shaftesbury's Cluzrcrcrer-isrics. and when he added new essays and

remarks to the Firbl~~ in 1 723 it was clear that he had fbund a new rilrect.

(32)

On the topic of bencvolism. therefore. 4Iandeville was not solely concerned with

countering the Latitudinarian version of benevolism. but was equally interested in

debunking the disintrrestcd bcncvolism of Lord Shaftesbury.

By mid-century. the writings of Shaftesbury continued to be highly influentid in

promoting a speci tically disinterested type of moral sensibility. In France. for example.

as Linda Walsh ( 1994) has recently pointed out. the French wti ter. art critique. and

defender of moral sensibility. Diderot, relied heavily on the aesthetic theory of

Shaftesbury. whose Essay 011 Met-ir a id C.'ir?ue he translated he 1 715. Similarly. in

Minter 1 C)

Germany. the influence of Shatiesbury had a profound intluence on many major aesthetic

theorists. such as Johann Georg Sulzer. As will be shown. Diderot and Sulzcr defended a

moral and aesthetic theory based on feeling which was both similar to and influenced by

Shuttesbury's sentimental mom1 and aesthetic theory. Furthermore. all three of these

theorists di t'ferentiated between types of feeling and stressed the primacy of moral. non-

selfish. bcrw~vlort scrisibiiiir over those feelings which were more strictly associated

with phy siologicnl processes.

As in England. France in the second half of the century also experienced il

ialorization of feeling-what Linda Walsh terms France's "Eighteenth-century cult of

moral sensibility" ( 17 1 ). As Walsh points out. in French society during this pcriod it

'*becant. fashionable for both men and women to exhibit the keenness oftheir t'moticms

and the readiness of their tears in public" ( 165-66). According to Walsh. however. thc

mere display of feclin~ by means of a physiological process was. on its own. in no way a

true indicator of moral or benew lent sensibility. As Walsh explains. critics like Didrrot

upheld a sharp distinction between those feelings which were closely aligned with

physiological functions. and those of a higher nature-more retined and innately moral.

Walsh points out that Diderot uses the French word smsnrio,l to indicate the former kind

of feeling. and sarrimeit to indicate the later. As Walsh states.

The competing demands of licentiousness and moral feeling are those of

se,~satiorr on the one hand and sentinteizt on the other. In accordance with

contemporary usage the term serrsnriort is often used by Diderot in

Minter 3 1

reference to cruder modes of feeling. more closely related to thc impulses

of the senses. including lust. an agent of physical gratitication. Like the

term pmsiorr. swscuiorr evoked notions of an immediate and powerful

p hysiologicnl experience. an experience o l pain or pleasure automatically

tripgered by the stimulation of the senses. ( 166-67)

Walsh funher explains that unlike these smlnrrbrw. which were considered to be

.rounded in physiological stimulation. the term "serrrinrerlr. on the other hand. was oftcn t

used in reference to the more retinrd and noble kind of feeling." which. for Ditlerot.

operated in accordance with the functioning of reason ( 167). .As Walsh puts it. moral

feeling for Diderot.

u ~ d d not often tind itself in contlict with the workings of reason. Its

linguistic contexts often underline its close semantic relationship with

notions of moral beauty. honour. probity. justicu. equity. noble love.

heroism. friendship. modesty. respect. tenderness. virtue. generosity. tilial

and paternal love. sincerity and gentleness. . . . This is the kind of ttelinp

which Diderot encountered in his early reading of Shaftesbury. ( 167)

According to Walsh. as a result of the intluence of Shaftesbury. Diderot held "contempt

for emotion which does not rise above the level of physiological riot" and he developed

"ideas which differentiate carefully between the basic physical impulses inherent in

kl inter 2 1

feeling and more refined kinds of feeling which admit the controlling intluence of reason

or thought" ( 1 78). Thus. in his art criticism. Diderot downplay ed the importance of what

he considered to be lower forms of aesthetic expression such as Rococo art-a lower form

of expression since it concentrated on physiological responses such as sexual desire. .As

LValsh puts it. Didrrot developed a "hierarchy of feeling in which mere physical sensation

(such as lust) achieves a low rating" ( 178). Walsh further points out that this hierarchy

of feeling is also in accordance with tho moral aesthetics Diderot had encountered in

Shaftesbury: "Gratification of the senses did not rare wry highly in Shaftesbury's view of

happiness: temperance and moral sentimcnt were advocated as 3 more relii~ble means to

that end" (Walsh 167).

In 3 more recent article "The Expressive Face: Manifestations of Sensibility in

Eighteenth-century French An" ( 1996). Walsh furthers her investigation of scnsibiliiy in

eighteenth-century France by looking at how the French artists of thc age of sensibility

wcrc able to confront the problem of distinyuishiny between higher and I w c r typcs of

feeling in their visual representation of feeling in yenmi. Accordins to Walsh. during

this period.

The view that painting could and should inspire us all to lead a better life

and to experience a higher sensibility was prevalent in the eighteenth

century. But how was virtuous emotion to be expressed in the faces of

figures*? This was. I believe. a significant dilemma for eighteenth-century

artists. Faced with a different social code. that of moral sensibility. they

Minter 22

had no easy or obvious precedent to follow. . . . Few esplicit facial

schemata could sene as appropriate models (535-36)

Wolsh argues that sentiments such as benevolence were differentiated from sensations or

passions and this made them even more diRcult to convey through the visual subjects'

hcial expressions. .As Walsh puts it. "moral sensibility in\.uivt.tl the expcriencc of

.. . t r t z ~ r r ~ . fecli ngs which. unli kc "either soistrrio~rs or ptrssioiu . . . lent themselves lcss

easi! y to physiological expression. even within thc conventionully cxpressi\.e site of the

face (536). As a result. artists interested in representing more virtuous fonns of w t r r O ~ z o r r

would oRrn depict their subjects in a contemplative or absorptive state. a technique

which. according to Walsh. was "entirely suited to the representation of scrrrinrcwr. ur thc

thinking person's kind of fc'eeling. with all that it implied about the moral staturc of the

tigurc concerned" (536-3 7).

The important role which Shaftesbury played in shaping eighteenth-contury

European Enlightenment aesthetics is also evident through his prominent in tlucncc in

Germany during the eighteenth-century. most notably on the aesthetic and morai

phi losophies of Mendelssohn. Winckelrnann. Wieland. as well as those of Sulzer. who

will be looked at here in more detail. In his 1985 article. "Feeling in Enlightenment

Aesthetics." Jeffrey Bamouw notes that Sulzer's philosophy. with its stress on subjective

feelings. has its roots in the writings of the AbbC Dubos' who. in his Ct.iricci1 R

Minter 33

otl Poenl.. Pnirrtitrg nrld :\hsic ( 17 19). argued "that only feeling can judge of the extent

to which we are touched and moved by a work" (Bamouw 329). Bamouw also notes

how the aesthetic theories of Shaliesbury. Dubos. Diderot. and Sulzer are all linked by

their stress on feeling in their aesthetic and moral theories. .According to Barnouw.

Sulzer, one of the first theorists of the "tine arts." falls into this tradition since he was

concerned both with the "moral role of feeling." and with the ability of works of an to

. . "stimulate feelings" (337). Furthermore, Sulzer was also conccmed with exarnmny thc

role played by the tine arts in "forming or educating sensibility" (Bamouw 337). As

Johan van der Zande ( 1995) has pointed out. this distinguishing characteristic of Sulzcr's

aesthetic philosophy (his moral aesthetics). and one which agoin he shares with

Shaftesbury. results from the bcliof that the tine arts senre a civilizing function through

their ability to ( in Barnouw 's words) "bm" or "educate sensibility." .As Zandt. puts it.

Sulzcr understood the "proper function of art us a cultural force" (206). Funhermorc.

Amy Simowitz ( I%3) has noted that this particular feature of Suizcr's aesthetic

philosophy stood in stark contrast with the contemporary philosophy of Jean Jacques

Rousseau. since Sulzer's understanding of the "civilizing function" of "the arts" openly

opposed "Rousseau's wish for a return to basic nature" (61 ).

As mentioned previously Sulzer is most often celebrated for being one of the first

of the early aesthetic theorists to attempt an inclusive theory of what he called "der-

sclriitlrtl Kiinste" or "the fine arts" ( 175). Suizer adopted Shafiesbury's concept of the

Minter 24

moral sense. and. according to Zande. "absorbed" his aesthetic theory. especially his

"close relationship between the good and the beautiful" ( 179). Furthermore. Sulzer's

(reneral theory of the "tine arts" was based on the fact that each one of these arts had the 3

unique capacity for inspiring Feelings or sentiments." Sulzer's theory of the "tine arts."

therefore. is similar to the sentimental morality of Shaftcsbury in as much as it stresses

the role of feeling in morality while simultaneously advocating thc positivc rolc of ;m in

refining those moral feelings. Thus. although he was tint ofall concerned with inspiring

qreeable feelings-"The tirst goal of the polite [tine] arts was to present and generate

sensations [feelings] insohr as they have an agreeable ttffect"(Zandr 198)-Sulzer was

adamant that thc tinal goal of the "tine arts" be understood as moral: The "highest p a l

[of the tine arts] was to dispose man to moral conduct" (Zande 198 ). Sulzer. thcrcfurc.

with his Shaftesburian equation o t' the beautiful cmd the good. understood "Aesthetic

pleasure" as "the fccling for beauty" and "moral sense" as *'the affection fbr thc good"

(Zandr 1% ). With this understanding. Sulzer could argue. in opposition to the rational

philosophy uf Kant. that aesthetic pleasure and morality were not to be sccn as in

opposition but. rather. as complementary. As Zande states. Sulzer took a stance which

argued "against those who." like Kant. "thought that . . . moral duty and [aesthetic]

pleasure. were opposites" and instead. "aryed for their essential union" (207). In light of

this ideological conflict between the sentimental moral philosophy of Sulzer and the

rationai moral philosophy of Kant. it is not surprising to learn that Kant was also opposed

Sulzer's writings on the tine arts appear in the French Dzcyhpedie where he uses the term sell tirnerrf.

bf inter 25

to the increasingly popular sentimental novel of the period. As David Hensley points our

in a recent article ( 1995). Kant. in his Cviriqlre of'Jlrdgcmcrlr. argues against the

"sentimental novel" using the speci tic example o f Richardson's Clwisso which Kant

dismissed "as both theory and an" ( ! 27) and. therefore. something which "cannot be an

object of aesthetic judgement" ( 130).

Minter 26

Chapter 2 - hlrckenzie's The Murt ofFeelitrg as Sentimental Novel

It has long been acknowlcdgcd by critics of literary history that Henry

hlackenzie's 7 % ~ .\ltrrt of'Fc~eliug ( 1 77 1 ) can be scrn as the epi tomization of the period's

novel of sensibility. ,As one recent critic ( 1995) has stated. "blackenzie's novcl.

immediately popular. has become the literary historian's representative sentimental text"

(Skinner 1). Likewise. the nowl's hero. Harley. has also bucn said to reprcscnt thc

standard traits and characteristics of the novel of sensibility's protagonist: the man of

sensibility. .As was discussed in chapter one. however. confusion prevails in twentieth-

century scholarly discussions of late-cighteenth century sensibility. Not only has this

confusion spread into recent discussions of the period's literature of sensibility. but. as

Timothy Dybstal ( 1994) points out. there is also confusion surrounding the very

relationship between sentimental moral philosophy and literature. .As a result. therefore.

there is not only a lack of consensus concerning what type of moral philosophy. i f any. is

to be seen as operating within the various novels of sensibility. but there is also a lack of

consensus concerning the nature of the relationship between the moral philosophy of

sentimental benecolism and the literature of sensibility.

In light of this conhsion it is not surprising to discover that there is also much

confusion within the scholarship centering on Mackenzie's representative text. Scholars

Minter 27

interested in Mackenzie's :Clo,l oj'Feelirzg tend to disagee over the most basic of

interpretive assumptions: is Harley. the man of sensibility. to be interpreted as an heroic

and exemplary character or foolish and naive pilrody? This disagreement has resulted in

rt further controversy which centres on whether or not Mackenzie considered the role of

literature to be moral or arnord. and if he did endorse a moral approach to literature. was

it compatible with or opposed to the moral doctrine of sentimental benevolism:'

Funhennore. if Mackenzie's novel does actual1 y endorse a doctrine of sentimental

bentxolisrn. was i t the Latitudinarian variety. or the disinterested S ha tiesburian variety'!

The result of this lack of consensus among scholars concerning such questions has been

put most aptly by William J. Burling. who in his I988 article on T j ~ c .Mra of ' F ~ d i q

points out that "outright contradiction now pervades critical discussion of the nowl. with

interpretation splitting on two central questions: [ s Harley. the hero. an ideal man or a

fool7 ,And is thc novel sympathetic to scntirncntalism or opposcd to it*?" ( I 36). E lewn

years latcr. not only is therc is still no consensus among scholars concerning how

blackenzie might have regarded his own man of feeling. there is also still no agreement

on the question of how Mackcnzie viewed the relationship between literature and

morality. or the moral role played by sentimental benevolism in his novel.

The traditional critical interpretation of Harley is that he is to be seen as a pathetic

hero. and the novel itself a showcase for the moral and aesthetic triumph of literary

sensibility which was intended to inspire feelings of sympathy and compassion in the

reader. Since the mid- 1 960's. this once standard interpretation has been superseded by

scholarly attempts to investigate both the alleged difticulties or contradictions suggested

Minter 28

by the novel's protagonist. as well as what those problems might reveal about

Mackenzie's understanding of the function of literature in relation to a morality involving

benevolent sensibility. Such critical attempts often end up imposing ironic readings on

the novel which. as Jenkins ( 197 1 ) arsues. is not a productive approach to Mackenzie's

novel. .According to Jmkins. many modem readers haw been unable to deal with the

novel's lack of irony which they have bccomr used to ( 5 ) . and this explains not only the

critical tendency to treat the novel as an inferior piece of work. but also the current

trndcnsy to offer an ironic interpretation of blackenzie's use of literary sensibility at the

cxpcnsc of :lIcwing for an undcrstandiny of the manner in which the novel was intcndctl

tu scrve a moral purpose specifically through its use of a disinterested typc of litcrxy

sentimental bencvolism. .As Jenkins states.

the book should not be considered primarily as a feeble novel. but as u

throrctical description of the man of feeling. enlivened by narrative but

designed primad y to educate thc public in the virtues of sentiment and to

hold up Harley as a model for emulation. . . . His original audience was

easily won over. but modem readers. with a preference for irony. have not

been persuaded. ( 5 )

This modem dismissal. or. at least. misconstrua1 of the moral focus of the

navel-exhibited by a misunderstanding of its intended moral effect on the reader-has

resulted in the fact that the novel is now studied mostly for its "historical importance"

Minter 29

(Jenkins 3). Furthermore. as mentioned earlier. when scholars do focus on the sensibility

operating within the novel they otien interpret btackenzie's intention as bring ironic: or.

if they believe Mackenzie is being sincere. they usual!y end up attempting to expose

w-ious tlaws in Mackenzir's smtimentul philosophy by revealing its neptive

implications in relation to the actual world. Suftice it to say. therefore. that hlackenzie's

no id is no longer persuasively interpreted as a row ~ic /lotcs presentation of how the rolc

of literature in the late eighteenth-ccntury was intricately connected to its ability to

culti\ratc n moral sensibility (benevolent feelings) within the reader.

By the mid-seventies. the more popular of the two critical approaches described

above by Burling was. clcarl y. to vicw both the noid and its hero. Harley. as

4lackrnzic's condemnation or. at least. his questioning of both the "man of fceling" and

the moral doctrine underlying the literature of sensibility. Burling himscl f in that same

article reasserts an ironic rcading of the text. and explicitly criticizes Jenkins for

interpreting both Harley and his doctrine of sentimental benevolism at hce value. As

Burling puts it. "whereas Jenkins believes that Harley is a model for the reader to admire.

I contend that the reader is being asked to differentiate the 'usable' components ut*

Harley's sensibility from the faulty ones . . . " ( 143). Burling is not the only scholar to

oppose Jenkins's positive. exemplary. and non-ironic understanding of the function of

Harley. Similarly. in 1975. Dereck Rymer argued that Harley's refined sensibility is not

to be seen as a positive trait. but rather. as a tlaw in his character which impedes his

activities in the everyday world. According to Rymer's interpretation. "[Harley's]

delicacy of feeling preys upon him like some baleful vulture. incapacitating him tbr the

Minter 30

most ordinary processes of life. . . . Such principles as he has are of little use to him

because he lacks the hardness of resoiution to carry them into action" (62); Rymer

further argues that Mackenzie's explicit intention is to guard the reader against u

humourless (non-ironic) rending of the text: he warns us against "taking Mackenzie's

sentimentalism at its face value." since hc interprets Harley to he "more of a fool than

Hcnry Brooke's H i m y .Llorelnnd [from Thr fiol o/ '@rdih ' ] and there is much humour in

the way Mackenzie signals this to us" (68). By interpreting Harley in such a way. critics

likc Rymer assume that Mackmzie is offering an all-out assault on thc entire literature of

sensibility. especially a type of literature based on disinterested benevolence. since. as

Rymer concludes. hlackenzie is actually criticizing Harley's seltish motivation. as well as

:hat of the reader who deliphts in getting fooled into tears:

Therc is very little altruism in his nature. for thcrc is a melancholy

pleasure in pity to which he returns agein and again. deliberately sccking

out situations which will evoke delicious tears and this is a crhicism which

can cquall y be applied to the weeping reader of the novel. ( 6 7 )

Not all readings of Mackenzie's novel overtly conclude. in the fashion of Rymer.

This argument has more recent1 y been made by Timothy Dykstal in his article "The sentimental Novel as Moral Philosophy: The Case of Henry Mackenzie" ( 1994). in this article Dykstai argues that Mackenzie's novel denies the inevitable moral issues of "action and choice" (72). and this "finally explains the inadequacy of the sentimental novel" (76).

Minter 3 I

that the novel represents Mackenzie's condemnation of the sel f-serving function of a type

of literature grounded in sentimental benevolism. Many critics hwr concluded more

subtly that. while blackmzie probably saw some positive implications in creating a

literary philosophy based on the doctrine of sentimental benevolism. he. nevertheless.

was aware that it had an rxtrcmely negatiw potential. An indication ofjust how populiir

this type of critical approach is within Mackcnzir scholarship can be seen in Gerrard A.

Barker's 1975 Twayne edition on Henry Mackenzie. In his chapter on The .lltr~r of '

F ~ ~ ~ l f i z g Barker argues that. although Mackmzir may have enjvyed writing sentimsntai

litcrnture for an audience which "had learned to prize sensibility as a sign ofrefincment"

(49). he did not necessarily whole-heartedly endorse sensibility as a moral philosophy.

.According to Barker. blackenzir was merely hirnsclf "temperamentally inclined toward

pathetic literature" and he. thercforc. consequcntl y. "exposed his readers to an array of

tender scenes that exercised and taxed their sensibility" (49). Nevertheless. Barkrr states

that. while Mackenzic's presentation of Harley to "an audience that rcads novels in order

to cultivate and give testtmony of their own emotional susceptibility" ( 5 2 ) is most

definitely his attempt at presenting "an idealized characterization" worthy i~femulation

(39). Mackenzie in no way saw that ideal as briny attainable. ;\cuording to Barker. by

consistently "adhering to his own principles. [and] refusing to compromise with an

egotistical world." Harley. without question "represents for Mackenzir a highly attractive

way of life" (39)- way of life which. as Barker argues. Mackenzie considered to be

tngically and tbrever in contlict with a selfish and corrupt world. As Barker puts it.

Minter 32

Harley represents for him the ideal self. unfettered by worldly or selfish

considerations and free to follow and perfect his own nature. But while

blackenzit. could admire and even envy such a figure. he was at the same

time mough of a pragnatist to recognize its unf tness t'or life. . . . He

could revere his hero's sensibility. pity his excessive humanity in rm

unfeeling world. but also sense (I comic element in his quixotic nature.

(39)

Thus the subtlety of Barker's argument is that he is not attempting to "deny Harley's

intense sensibility" but. rather. that he is attempting. as he puts it. "to see it in its proper

perspective" ( 2 5 ) . .A perspective which. for Barker. indicates the ways in which the

literatiirc of sensibility senres to indulge both the author for his ability to elicit emotions

within the reader. and the reader for his ability to experience the ilppropriatc cmotion. .As

Barkcr puts it. "viewed tiom such a perspective. the novelist and his reader timm a

relationship . . . in which the reader's emotional response Hatters both the author's artistic:

skill and the reader's own sensibility" (50). According to Barker. therefore. although

klackenzie may have believed that "sensibility can become a benrticial and moral

quality." he nevertheless understood that "it can also be perverted for egotistical ends"

(28). M a t Barker is describing. then. is an amoral type of sensibility. which. in his

words. is based on the "reader's emotional response" and the novelist's ability to elicit

such a response. In describing what he considers to be "The Dangers of Sensibility."

Barker states that

Minter 33

The risk always exists . . . that a reader will contiise the idealized world of

such novels with reality and that pride in his own emotional

responsiveness will make him as vulnerable to manipulation by the

designing individual as by the novclist. In this case. sensibility. the basis

tijr human sympathy and goodness. becomes a liability rather than an

asset . . . . (52)

I f we recall from chapter one the concept a f a "hierarchy of feeling" endorscd by

late eighteenth-century European Enl ightcnment thinkers which placed moral scnsibi 1 it?

at the highest extreme and passion or desire at the lowcst. Barkcr's term "emotional

responsi~mess" is. clearly. too general. This generalization on the part of Barker is

indicative of the general hilure of scholars to take into account the late eightcmth-

century distinction between moral feelings and those emotions based on passion and

desire. As a result. there has been a general misunderstanding cis to where sensibility

(Crane's second feature of the doctrine of sentin~ental benevolism: "bmevolence as

feeling"). as understood by authors like Mackenzie. tits into this hierarchy of keiing.

This misunderstanding is made evident by the fact that certain scholars actually consider

biackenzict to be critical of sensibility. when. in effect. he may be only making the same

moral demands of literature that Diderot was making of painting. and. thereby bring

critical of a type of literature which merely focuses on the lower emotions at the expense

of the higher. moral feelings.

Minter 34

Barker's intluence has been significant in the scholarship on Mackenzie in

general. as well as Tlrc .Clm of .Fdi , lg in particular. .A similar view of illackmzie's

understanding of the role of sensibility in his fiction. as described by Barker. can be seen

in many of the critical examinations of Tllc .Llm of 'F~eliri~y. For example. Peter

Bumham. in "The Social Ethos of Mackcnzie's The .11m1 of ' f ic l i~rg ( 1983). argues that

"Mackenzic does not wholehearted1 y identi @ with or agrcc with his man of t'celing"

( 123-24) since thc novel actually stresses the inevitable conflict between ideclistic

benevolence and pragmatic prudence. .According to Bumharn. in Harley's world. "co Id

logic interferes with one's true duty to humanity. Prudence. . . likewise interferes with

true benevolence" (Burnhurn 175). Bumham also argues that it is important to

understand that while illockenzie docs not idcntify with his "man of feeling." hc also does

not identify with Thlrc .Iltrrr ot'tlrc. !Cbrh/. the protagonist of his second novel. .-\wording

to Bumham. "in contrast to thc man of feeling. . . the characteristic pose of thc man of

the world is selfish calculation: even in charity we see that it is by such devices . . . that

worldi y men rationalize their sel tishness" (Burnham 1 25). Thus. like Burling. Burnham

sees blackenzic as advocating a kind of golden mean between the sensitive Man of

Feeling and the calculating Man of the World. These critics. therefore. share with Rymer

the belief that Harley's sensibility is. at least in part. a negative characteristic. Similarly.

in 1 i'r-lur iii Disri-ess ( 1 971). R. F. Brissenden describes Harley in terms which reiterate

this idea: that the sentimental benevolence of Harley is. actually. incapacitating since i t

somehow inhibits his ability to function in society:

Minter 35

The .Wm o/'Feeliizg. . . is essentially a mannered. artificial piece of work.

And its arti ticialities. like the pathetic figure of Harley himself. constitute

a retreat from reality. They are an admission of despair on the pan of the

author. n way of rscapiny from what he clearly felt to be the apparently

insoluble moral problems posed by the nature of the society in which he

had to live. ( 2 5 5 )

Thus Brissenden's criticism of Harley is that hc is "an epicene. impotent. passkc. almost

completely ineffectual character-a set of tcnder susceptibilities and conventional moral

attitudes rather than a living individual" (25 1 ). What is more. for Brissenden. bhckenzic

is intentionally parodying. through the character of Harley. the hero of sensibility. as well

as thc novel of sensibility itsel t .According to Brissenden. Mackenzie's message is that.

to be a man of fccling is to invite disaster: and in the spherc of ordinary

human activity it is a distinct disadvantage to possess the sentimental

virtues. . . . The only consolation is to know that one is capable of being

moved to tears by the pity of it all. for this means that although one may

be powerless to alter an evil situation one at least knows that i t is evil: one

has a 'feeling heart' and 'a mind of sensibility'. (259)

Brissenden thus offers a mixed assessment of the sentimental virtues, such as

benevolence. arguing that in one sense they provide an obvious disadvantage. while

Minter 36

simultaneously providing a "consolation" in the form of an increase in self-approval.

Brissenden's description of a retined sensibility in terms of such a "consolation" recalls

the "curious form of hedonism" associated with the doctrine of sentimental benevolism as

understood by Crane. Brissendm ' s understanding of Mackenzie's intention is. thercforc.

obviously not congruent with a ShaHesburian type of disinterested sentimental

henevolism. but an attempt to assure the reader of the self-interested rewards provitlcd by

a "fceliny heon" or a "mind of sensibility ."

In his book on Henry Fielding. Tire Good- .V~tnu~t i .Iltru ( I OS?). John Sheriffs

chapter which deals with Henry Mackrnzie reenforces the assertions made by Brisscndcn.

S heri ff compares btackenzie's hero with Fielding's concept of the "Good-Natured Man"

and argues that. unlike Mackenzie's Man of Feeliny. Fielding's Good-Natured Man

prcscnts a hcro with a more prudential and rational understanding of morality. as opposcci

to a morality solely understood as sentimental bencvolism. .-Iccording to Sheriff, in rot11

./oms Fielding attempts "to rcach prudence to the Good-Natured Man." partially through

stressing "the in~pulsivc goodness versus prudential goodness theme" (03 ). To Shcri ff.

therefore. Harley. whom he labels the "Man of Sttnsibiiity." is seen as a degcncrate

"Good-Natured Man." since he is the victim of a false sense of what good nature is. His

lack of prudence reduces him to a "humour character whose obsession or hobbyhorse is

his conception of benevolent good nature" (Sheriff 73). For Sheri K not only does Harley

lack the value of prudence prized in the Good-Natured Man. but his attempt to cultivate

his "responsiveness to sensibility" is said to be motivated by "his own egocentricity. selt'

concerns. and self-love" As Sheriff puts it.

Minter 3 7

The Man of Sensibility has little in common with genuinely good-natured

characters. He consciously aspires to discover good nature in himself and

others. but his conception of good nature is hlse. Hc craves feelings of

benevolence and sympathy both for the pieasure that arises from them and

the assurance of his own good nature that he gets by testing his emotional

.Another similar approach to Brissenden's work on Mockenzie can bo seen in John

blullan's investigation into the connection bctwcen sentiment and an elitist or limitcd

type of sociability in Enlightenment Scotland. In "The Language of Sentiment: Hume.

Smith. and Henry Mackenzie" ( 1957). Mullan. like Brisscnden. provides a mixed

assessment ofthc virtue associittctl with brnevolcnt sensibility: in this case "both the

protagonist and the narrator of Mackenzie's novel lament the rarity of virtue. which is

made a matter of visceral. specialized sensation-unappreciated in a world of misanthropy

and self-interest" ( R/[ullan 274). However. what is of interest tbr Mullan is not the hct

that Mackenzie in The .Ih u/'Feelirlg "equates virtue with an exemplary susceptibility to

bfecling"' (kIullan 27-11' but the hct that this susceptibility is supposedly intricately tied

to the concept of sociability. Sociability. which according to Mullan "remained a

problem" despite the "apparent complacencies of polite society in the urban Scotland of

the Enlightenment." was intricately connected to the sentimental movement (275).

According to Mullan. Mackenzie's use of sensibility in his novels clear1 y demonstrates

the point that sociability was a very real problem during this period since "it is just this

,Minter 38

elusive capacity [sociability] which they attempted to describe. Their men and women of

virtue are typically victims. and most of all victims of sympathetic thsulties which cannot

be practised in the world" ( 2 7 5 ) . Thus Mullan's argument is that the "social instinct.

justified in tearful acts of benevolence. is what is crlebratcd and worried over in the novel

of sentiment: 'feeling' is discovered to be the raw expression of this instinct" ( 2 7 5 ) . In

Tlz'lre .llr,u o/'Fc>cjli~r.q. Mullan equates "sensibility" with "the submission to rhr powcr of

sentiment." and states that it is this submission which "produces sociability" (277) .

According to blullon. therehre. "the Man of Feeling is he who can enjoy sympathetic

relations with others" through submission to the power of feeling (277).

bli~llnn points out that this notion o f 3 sociability based on sensibility can bc seen

as a reaction against "Hume's scepticism." which "isolntes him from the bcnelits of

feeling. [and consequently] the privileges of socii~bility" (277). blullan goes on tu notc.

however. much like the critics before him. that although "Mackenzie's novels attempt to

imagine a virtue experienced in sociability [and based on sensibility 1. they penasel y

demonstrate such sociability at odds with 'the world"' (280). Thus. axording to Mullan

"the idea of sociability may be what the paragon of feeling aspires to in the tiction ofthe

period. but unusually this capacity of the individual is shown to be incompatible with the

larger society to which this character belongs" (Mullan 280). A sociability at odds with

the practical considerations of the world. therefore. indicates for Mullan. an elitist system

adopted by the Scottish lirmzii uof the period. that locates "the essential experience of

society in the particular. exclusive contacts of 'select companions'- in a limited exercise

of sensibility" (283). Furthermore. this also indicates. for Mullan. an exposure of the

Minter 39

obvious contradiction between this elitist form of sociability. and the actual demands of

society. According to Mullan. "if the literati of the Scottish Enlightenment were self-

consciously committed to the explication o h kind of virtue practicable in a commercially

progressi\*r. politically dependent province. . . . the novel of sentiment fails to tit the

model ( 2 8 3 .

lf we recall the concept of "~noral disintrrestedness" discussed in chapter one. this

tvpe of rending proviticd by Brissendcn. Sherri tt: and Mullan. which stresses the

ineffecti~-enrss or impracticality of moral sensibility. seems dubious. since moml

disinterestedness in the context of morrtl sensibility stresses the intrinsic value of morn1

feeling for having value in and of itself. regardless of its conscquential practicality or

utility. Whcn seen in this light. the recurring charges of egoism and hedonism against

Harley me also disputable. The assertion of Harley's egoism or hedonism can bc seen to

be. ut least in part. the result of the influence of Crme's presentation of a specifically

Latitudinarian type of sensibility since Cranc's thesis allows scholars the occasion to

criticize Harley for the alleged hedonism associated with the fourth clement of

sentimental benevolism-the ~e/j4ppt*o\~Olg j?.. The prominence of such an assertion on

Harley's character can be seen in the work of Kenneth Simpson. who in "The Limits of

Sentiment: The Works of Henry Mackmzie." in The Proreutl Scot ( 1988). highlights the

distinction associated with the acquisition of sensibility and its alleged inseparability

from sources of self-interested or egotistical motivation. According to Simpson.

"sensibility is a distinction. and its possessor can relish it. but it seems to be inseparable

from a dangerously heightened and egotistical self-consciousness" ( 1 53). Immediately

Minter -I0

following a description of Crane's notion of the "distinctly hedonistic and egotistical

element" associated with the notion of the seffkppm\*itlg juy. Simpson goes on to state

that. in certain episodes "the egotistical and self-conscious aspects of Harley's behaviour

are evident" and that "Mackenzie is detached from his creation" ( 1-18): Simpson ends up

arguing. therefore. that Mackenzie is actually questioning the merits of sensibility us w l l

as the belief that humanity has the potential to be properly guided by n benewlent

sensibility or benew lent feelings. -4s Simpson puts it. "blackrnzie is realistic in

recognising the limitations of sensibility. Complete empathy can never be achieved. just

as pure and absolute altruism is beyond the accomplishment of human nature" ( 152).

From the scholarship discussd so fir on 7 % ~ . L f m o l 'Fd i~ ig . 1 contend that the

two main critical problems are: a) a failure to take into consideration the late eighteenth

ccntury notion of a hierarchy of keliny which stresses the primacy of moral feeling. and

b) the hilure to allow for the possible conceptual inclusion of moral disinterestedness.

While both of these problems stem from a Fiilurc to fully acknowledge the moral

dimension of what Cnne describes as a general theory of sentimental benevolism. the

tirst of these two contentions specifically applies to the doctrine's second element.

semi bili ty. or what Crane calls b e ~ x w / m c e ~s/2rli1zg-and has resulted in the critical

tendency to interpret Mackenzie as presenting an amoral type of sensibility. Furthermore.

the latter critical problem retlects the faiiure to adequate1 y understand the fourth element

associated with the doctrine of sentimental benevolism-what Crane calls the seu:

2 Simpson also finds evidence ot'this "egotistical aspect of . . . sensibility" in Mackenzie's other two novels ( 173).

Minter 41

npprovBrg jq-in terms which take into account the concept of a disinterested

benevolence or a disinterested moral sensibility. It is this hilure that has led scholars to

provide a fallacious description of Mackenzie as having n critical view of sensibility for

either being inevitably in perpetual sontlict with pragmatic or worldly interests. or a

source of self-interested or egoistic motivation.

Despite the general contentions with the Mackenzie scholarship outlined in the

previous section. there are a few Mackenzie scholars who do indeed recognize thc

importance of taking into consideration the moral dimension necessitated by discussions

of Mackenzie and sensibility. For cxample. Elaine Ware ( 1987) in reaction to a critic'

who had argued "that Henry Mackenzie supported the ideals of his age in order to suit

audience taste rather than out of fervor of belief.'' states that "I believe that he wrotc out

of a sincere concern for rnan's moral duty towards man. Mackenzie's treatment of

benevolence is not superficial" ( 131). Although Ware does not go into detail on the role

David Spencer. "Henry Mackenzie. a Practical Smtimentalist," Papers on Lntrgmgc arzd Liter-crtrrre 3 ( 1 967): 3 i 4-26.

Minter 42

of moral feeling. she. nevertheless. stresses the importance of recognizing that "the

eighteenth century's moral philosophy was based on the innate benevolence of man" and

that *.one of the most important tenets of the ethics of the period was the notion of

charity. or benrvolencc" ( 1 33).

More importantly. John Dwyer in I i'r.rrrorrs Discorwse: SL*~-ibi l ih wrd C'ommrrtiil-

i l l Eiglrte~vrrlz-~rlt~i~~* Sc~~tklrrtl ( 1957) states. in n manner similar to the argu~nent

pressntcd in this paper. that. although recent scholarly in~atigations o f Macken~ie's

novels haw "rightly pointed to the importance which this popular author attached to thc

concept o f sensibility." they haw. ncvenheless. rnisconstrucd what sensibility xtuall y

meant for blackenzie. and haw. thus. "not only obscured Mackenzie's message in the

novels." but have also created "a misleading dichotomy between Mackenzie as novclist

and us moralist" ( 112). Dwyer. therefore. states that his purposc in this chapter. which is

on Mackenzic and entitlcd "The Novel as Moral Preceptor." is to "affirm thc csscntial

unity of hckenzie 's writings and to undcriine their moral message" ( 142). Dwycr

places Mackenzie within the context of other Scottish moralists of the period. especiuily

his "colleagues in the Mirror Club." and argues that. although members of the Scottish

literrrri may have otien condemned certain novels as being morally damaging. they.

nevertheless. felt that the novel could serve a moral purpose. According to Dwyer.

although blackenzitt's essays in the periodicals Tlw .Llirr*or and The Lororgel. indicate that

"Mackenzie bemoaned the fact that novel writing had become the occupation of the

'narrow' and the 'vain."' who. ' ~ i t h o u t any genius or knowledge. had set themselves up

as dictators of the public taste" ( 144). he. as well as "the Scottish moralists." nevertheless

Minter 43

"recognized the potential of the [novel]. especially as a too! for the inculcation of

sensibility" ( 1-12}. ..\ccording to Dwyer. when Mackcnzie and the Mirror Club are

properly understood as "promoters of the novel as a vehicle for the cultivation of the

moral sentiments" ( I -I I ). blaskenzie's critical comments in The .Wirnw and Thr Loznzg~v.

concerning certain novels of sensibility should not be misconstrued as a yneral

condemnation of the literature ofsensibility. but rather to be (I critique ofonly those

novels which. while they may succeed in eliciting certain types of feelings or emotions.

ultimately work against the cultivntion of a rnoral sensibility by ubscuring the distinction

betwvcen vice and virtue. .As Dwyer puts it. while

Mackenzie's criticism of these works was subtle and carefully wnsidcreti.

the major problem with writings of the 'scntimcntal stm' w a s their

inability to distinguish vice from virtue. While Muckenzit: thought that

the novel should retlcct thc more cxtcnsive and polite feelings of a rctincd

asc . . . he disapproved of the tendency of many of thcsc works to bring

into play a *rivalry of virtues and duties' and thereby to obscure moral

distinctions. ( 144)

According to Dwvyer. therefore. the fact that Mackenzie in his .Clir*rvr and Lo~rrrg~r

essays was "concerned about the negative eff'ests of the novel . . . especially in

connection with the moral cultivation of the young" should not be taken "to mean that he

did not appreciate their utility and necessity in a cormpt age*' ( 147). Similar to the way in

Minter 44

which Linda WaIsh describes moral feeling for Diderot as operating harmoniously with

the function of reason. Dwyer explains that the type of moral sensibility promoted in

Mackenzie's works was one in which "Reason was never brought into contlict with

feeling." since "Mac kenzir 's virtuous characters were clearly worthy of the spectntorial

sympathy which the author attempted to elicit" ( 147). As Dwyer puts it. Harley's ability

to "discriminate between genuine and undcsening objects of fellow-feeling grows during

the novel" ( 1 j2) . Furthermore. Dwyer argues that there is no contlict "betwccn scnsc and

sensibility," since although "emotion i s given priority over syllogism . . . reason is

demonstrably not thrown out the window" ( 152). Thus. according to Dwyer "the \.inuous

characters' tears most certainly tlow. but they are strictly rationed in terms of the mcrit of

the sympathetic object" ( 1 52) . Unli kt. Mullan and Brissenden. thcrcfore. as well as othcr

critics who idopt a defeatist position which pessimistisully interprets Harley's moral

sensibility as being in perpetual contlict with the alleged prudence demanded by the rcal

world. Dwyer argues that "Mxkenzie's nowls allowed the author to delineate and

advenize the proper cultivation of sensibility in a hostile and corrupting social aren;~"

( 1.17). Rather than seeins virtuous sensibility as something which was at odds with the

"social arena." Mackenzie felt that it was imperative to promote and enhance such a

sensibility through literature to combat existing vices: "This moral function [of literature]

was imperative in the present age in which the primary 'virtues' were 'indifference' and

gselfishness"' (Dwyer 147). Thus. according to Dwyer. in contrast to the novelists he

criticized in his essays. Mackenzie as a novelist was careful to ensure that "setting. plot

and characterization all contributed to one very focused end-the careful cultivation of the

Minter 45

rnoral sentiments" (Dwyer 147).

Mackcnzie's comments on the novel. as Dwyer also points out. are congruent with

his similar comments on the function of drama in Thlre .\.fir-rur and Tlrc Lolr~zgc~~..

rlccording to Dwyer. although "Mackenzie was worried about the effect of drama upon

the moral sentiments of the spectator" ( 1-16), he. nevertheless. optimisticdly states in one

essay on dramatic comedy that "people would always prct'er those comedies which were

'true to virtue. and open to the impressions of virtuous sentirncnt"' ( 145). As Dulycr puts

it. Mackcnzie. as "an accomplished playwright himself' ( 146) inevitably saw the

potential ofthe ability of drama to achieve -'the transportation of thc spectator to 'a rcgiun

of exalted virtue and dignitied sentiment' which might act as an antidote to the 'unfeeling

temperament of worldly minds"' ( 1-17), It is likely that Muckenzit. saw the extension of

this idea in all of the arts. for. as Dwyer states. gbklackcnzic's comments on comic drama

and the novel were equal1 y applicable to other literary forms" ( 1-15).

With such an understanding of the importance of the moral dimension within

bfackenzie's writings. Dwyer provides a reading of Tlrc . l h r ql'fielitlg which

consistently stresses the h c t that "the reader is constantly reminded of the moral. rather

than mimetic. purpose of the work" ( 137). Rather than considering Mackenzie's text in

terms of a representation of an objective reality. Dwyer's reading of the text focuses on

its intended moral effect on the reader. since. as Dwyer states. Harley is to be seen as "the

embodiment of Mackenzie's ideal of virtuous sensibility" and "not a realistic human

being" ( 1-18). According to Dwyer's reading of the text. therefore, Mackenzie

successhlly elicits within his late eighteenth-century readers. not just any type of feeling

Minter 46

or emotion (as many critics have wrongly argued). but only those moral and disinterested

kelings associated with sentimental benevolisrn:

[illackenzie's] particular talent lies in forcing his readers to participate

actively in the 'symphony of sympathy'. . . . But Milackenzie did not want

to extract tiam his readers an extreme e m d o n that was temporary or

narcissistic: instead. he skillfully tensed out that 'gentle tear' which was

conducive to moral refonnation rind active virtue. ( i 4s)

Furthermore. unlike those critics who interpret T'I~lrr .lfm o f f i d i ~ i g as indicating

Mackenzie's call for a more prudential or utilitarian type ofmorality which is clearly

rcmovod from the sensibility of Harley. Dwycr's rcadiny of the novel concludes that "For

Llnckenzic. it was the world that was wrong in its judgement. not the man who trusted to

his gentler feelings" ( 149). Dwyer further states that the now1 "attempts to illustrate thc

operation of the moral and social feelings in the ordinary afhin of life" since we "witncss

Harley's affections developing and being retined through intimate encounters dependent

upon his senuinr and sympathetic character" ( 148). Dwyrr. therefore. concludes that

Harley "was demonstrably not the inactive creature of feeling that some literary scholars

have caricatured him as being. He did all that he could to alleviate the distresses of

others" ( 153).

More recently, in "Clio and Ethics: Practical Morality in Enlightened Scotland"

( 1989) Dwyer investigates the "moral discourse" of "sensibility." which he detines as

Minter 47

"that polite and controlled fellow feeling" in the writings of "ignored yet intluential"

Scottish writers such as Hugh Blair. as well as "Henry Mackrnzie and his colleagues in

the . L l i r i w and the Luir~igm-" (45). Dwyer stresses the importance of properly

understanding how the sermons of Moderate preachers such as Hugh Blair. as well as the

no\ els and essays produced by Henry Mackenzie and his Mirror Club asserted the

popular conception of a "retined system u f identification with one's fellow man" (17).

According to Dwyer. "enlightened modems" such as Hugh Blair "understoutl the true

nature of man. in his solitary state. as a zentle and sociable animal" ( 5 5 ) and. they also

believed that "manners should be tirmly grounded in a basic human sensibility" (58).

Quoting Blair from one of his most popular sermons. "On Gentleness." Dwycr explains

that Blair

defined sensibility as 'that unatl'rctcd civility which springs from a gentle

mind' and which was very different from the 'studicd manners of the most

finished courtier.' Indeed. he argued. it was 'native feeling heightened and

improved by principle. It is the heart which easily relents: which feels for

every thing that is human.' ( 5 8 )

According to Dwyer. although Scottish moralists such as Blair and Mackenzie

considered this sensibility to be "based upon native sentiment." they also considered it to

be "capable of a considerable degree of cultivation" (58). Dwyer hrther explains that

Blair felt that this native moral sensibility was also to be seen as a natural social affection.

Minter 48

and he thus criticized the popular notion that human society at large depends upon a

system of unfeeling legalism which stood in opposition to a moral philosophy of

sentiment. As Dwyer. again quoting Blair. puts it. Blair's sermons made a "distinction

between a nzcc~i~cz~licrrl and an orgrulic society. 'Mere law among men.' he wrote. 'is

rigid and inflexible.' Not only did it bil to take into account the subtle fcel