christology.pdf philosophical

8/7/2019 Christology.pdf Philosophical

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Stand to Reason, Spring 20011

Philosoph ical Theology: ChristologyDr. Garry DeWeese

Talbot School of Theology, Spr ing 2001

1. The incoherence

1.1 The central Christian affirmation is that Jesus is God.1.1.1 This is an iden tity statement, not a pred ication. Somehow Jesus isnumerically identical to God.1.1.2 How d o we und erstand this iden tity statement?

1.2 The second issue is the cosmological one.1.2.1 If God is the creator, what w ould it mean for God H imself to become p artof that universe?1.2.2 Isnt it demean ing for the Creator to become par t of the creation?1.2.3 If theres a good reason , a reason in consonance with the Creator andcreation, then it can be explained.1.2.4 How is it an ontological possibility for the Creator to enter the creation? Ifall of creation is ontologically dep enden t on the Creator to sustain it, then howcould God leave His sup ernatu ral perspective and en ter wha t He is sustainingand still keep it in existence? Can He do this as a creature?1.2.5 The attributes of the Creator is such that they m ust be greater than H iscreation. So if the Creator assumes the na ture of wha t is made, doesnt thatnecessitate the Creator give up some of His attributes and n o longer be the beingHe was?

1.3 The epistemological issue1.3.1 If Jesus is fully man is tru e, then on w hat basis can we know the doctrineof incarnation is true? On what basis can we pred icate deity of Him? It may betrue, but how do w e know its true because what we encounter is a man .1.3.2 Theres a major role for natu ral theology to play in th is.

1.4 The Trinitarian qu estion--If the Trinity is true, how d o we u nderstand that if thesecond person of the Trinity becomes m an?

2. The nature of identity statements2.1 The is of predication (x is y): x is a part icular or a class, and y is a prop erty ora m etaphor (qualities, prop erties, attributes).

2.1.1 That necktie is stylish. Necktie is a part icular . Stylish is a prop erty.2.1.2 Neckties are torture. Torture is a metaph or.2.1.3 Analogical predication. That book is good . The book isnt good in the waythat God is good.2.1.4 Logic shorthand Fx F is the prop erty, x is the par ticular.

2.2 The is of iden tity: x is num erically identical to y. x is a particular or class, andy is a par ticular or class.

2.2.1 That animal is a dog.2.2.2 The statement should be mad e so that if x is a par ticular y is a particular, or

if x is a class then y is a class, too.2.2.3 Jesus is God could m ean that God is a class and Jesus instan tiates all of thequalities of God. But thats not what orthodoxy holds. This wou ld imply thatthe qualities of God could be mu ltiply instan tiated. Jesus is the only instance ofGod that w e can point to.2.2.4 Its better to say that both Jesus and God are particulars.2.2.5 The green necktie is Eds. They are numer ically identical.

2.3 Identity statements have certain prop erties.2.3.1 Reflexivity: a=a. Someth ing is ident ical to itself.


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2.3.2 Symmetry: (a=b) then (b=a)2.3.3 Transitivity: [(a=b) and (b=c) then (a=c)]2.3.4 Liebniz Law of the ind iscernability of identicals: Necessarily, for anyobjects a and b, if a is iden tical to b, then for any proper ty P, a exemp lifies P iff bexemplifies P. (a)(b)[(a=b) iff (Pa iff Pb)]

2.3.4.1 This creates a problem for the Trinity. If Jesus bears the prop erty of

dying for our sins, then the prop erty of dying for our sins is necessarily trueof anyth ing Jesus is identical to, i.e., God.2.3.4.2 This also creates a problem for the hypostatic un ion. If Jesus as man isidentical to Jesus as God, then th e attributes of man w ould be shared by Godand v isa versa. How can limited knowledge be comp atible withomniscience? How can limited location be compa tible with om nipresence?

2.3.5 Not Liebniz Law of the identity of indiscernibles: Necessarily, for anyobjects a and b if for any property P, a exemplifies P iff b exemp lifies P, then a isiden tical to b.

2.3.5.1 This is hotly debated w hether its true or not.2.3.5.2 If its true, its true for pu re proper ty is any thing that doesn t dep endon another for its identity. Relations are imp ure p roperties because there isanother involved.

3. Christology3.1 Chr istological d istinctions

3.1.1 Christology from above and Chr istology from below3.1.1.1 From above is Alexand rian Chr istology

3.1.1.1.1 Alexand ria was a center for Platonism and ph ilosophical stud y,so it tends to be more p hilosophical.3.1.1.1.2 Starts from Jesus d ivinity and w orks to His hu manity. It takesfor granted Jesus divinity and tries to work ou t His hum anity. How canGod H imself (taken as a p resupposition) can take on full human ity?3.1.1.1.3 Johns Gospel is Christology from above.

3.1.1.2 From below is Antiochene

3.1.1.2.1 Antioch was a center for theology in the Greek world ear ly on.3.1.1.2.2 The epistemology is from Jesus hu manity to His deity. Howcan a hum an being be God incarnate?3.1.1.2.3 This is the Christology of the synoptics.

3.1.1.3 You have to choose one of these starting points. Either starting pointcan yield a fully orthod ox Christology. This class is Chr istology from above,wh ich tend s to be the approach of ph ilosophical theology.

3.1.2 High vs. Low Christology3.1.2.1 High Christology pu ts the emph asis on the divinity of Chr ist, butdoesn t necessarily result in the exclusion of His humanity.3.1.2.2 The danger is the docetic heresy , He app ears to be a man bu t is not.

3.1.2.2.1 Jesus d idnt experience real temp tation. If He could nt sin thenHe couldnt be temp ted.

3.1.2.2.2 It seems undign ified for God to live as a man .3.1.2.3 Low Christology pu ts the emph asis on Jesus hu manity to the virtualexclusion of Jesus d ivinity.

3.1.2.3.1 Because of antisupernatu ral presu pp ositions, this has been therecent trend in th eology.3.1.2.3.2 The danger is the Ebionite heresy, the beg inning of theadopt ionistic idea. There is no ontological d istinction between Jesus andevery other hu man being.


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3.1.2.3.3 This is a watershed w hether one w orks within an orthodox orliberal tradition.

3.1.2.4 Functional vs. ontological Chr istology3.1.2.4.1 Functional focuses on the sav ing w ork of Ch rist.3.1.2.4.2 The danger tend s to ignore or d ownplay the uniqueness ofChrist.

3.1.2.4.3 Bypasses the high/ low debate by focusing on what He d id3.1.2.4 Onto logical focuses on the divine and hum an natures of Christ.

4. Functional Ch ristology4.1 Functional Christology defines Jesus in terms of function rather than on tology,seeks to und erstand the p erson of Christ in terms of what H e did, not in terms ofwhat H e is.

4.1.1 The difficulty comes wh en a rigid form of Christology is worked ou t fromthis starting point. Tend s to declare certain aspects of orthodoxy to be withou tmerit or relevance.4.1.2 To know Chr ist means to know His benefits, and not to reflect upon Hisnatu res and the modes of His incarnation. (Philip Melancthon,Loci communestheologici) This is a functional view of Jesus, but Melancthon m eant it in a

different way. In order to benefit from the atonement, we don t need to par seout the philosoph ical and theological details of Chr istology. But that is not to saythat its not importan t to reflect on those issues.

4.2 Four claims4.2.1 The Bible reveals the work of Christ and not His natu re.4.2.2 The Hebrew w orldv iew of the biblical writers was relational, notmetaphysical. The Hebrews d idnt think in metaphysical terms; they had noworked out ph ilosophy.4.2.3 Ontological Chr istology is a prod uct of importing Greek ph ilosophicalcategories in the post-biblical per iod.4.2.4 A Christology that is relevant today mu st be fun ctional, not ontological.

4.3 The Biblical world view

4.3.1 Its alleged that form/ redaction criticism w hen ap plied to the NewTestament h elp u s disentangle the creedal affirmations about Jesus, wh ich arereflective of a d eveloped Christian commu nity of the 2nd c., from th e historicalJesus. This app roach reinforces the idea that the w orld view d idnt includ eph ilosophical specu lations. John was incapable of thinking in platonic term swh en d escribing th e logos.4.3.2 This view also p laces the synoptics over John because of their temporalpriority.4.3.3 Jesus made no clear claim to be divine. The I Am are Johan nine, notsynop tic. In the synop tics, Jesus u sed the title Son of Man as a reference to Hishuman ity, not a Messianic claim.4.3.4 Jewish m essiahship d oesnt yield a Christology of statu s in metaph ysicalterms of human or d ivine origin at all. The Old Testament gives us a hu man

picture of the Messiah. Messianic terms w ere app lied to some p roph ets, so to becalled Messiah doesnt entail divinity.4.3.5 Response

4.3.5.1 Function, not nature4.3.5.1.1 Texts with clear on tological statements: Jn. 1:1, 18; Ph. 2:6-11;Co. 1:15-20. The early d ating of these texts is on solid scholarsh ip.4.3.5.1.2 Titles: Son of Man, Son of God, Lord, Savior, God areall titles that have ontological implications.


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4.3.5.1.3 New Testamen t Christology was primar ily functional,indicating what role Jesus played in effecting Gods salvation of humanbeing, but in so d oing, it reflects much abou t what Jesus w as in H imself.(Raymond Brown,An Introduction to the New Testament) Though the focusis on function, it doesnt rule out ontology.

4.3.5.2 Hebrew thought

4.3.5.2.1 There are no implications from the Hebrew world view thatwou ld exclud e ontology. This says nothing about whether there wasspeculative though t.4.3.5.2.2 The Hebrew language uses very concrete terms to extendanalogously to other things. E.g., heavy is app lied to God for Hisglory.4.3.5.2.3 We cannot read metaph ysics off the lexical stock of anylanguage, and its dangerou s to do so.4.3.5.2.4 The reductionist fallacy: The emphasis becomes exclusive.Vocabulary d oesnt limit what the culture or individu als might know oruse in other contexts. The fact that they didn t do it doesnt mean theywerent capable of it.4.3.5.2.5 James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical LanguageThis approach is

seriously flawed .4.3.5.3 Post-biblical developments

4.3.5.3.1 Its assum ed that by historical accident Christianity developed inthe crad le of Greek ph ilosophy. But if we believe in Gods providen ce, itwasn t an accident. And wh y cant ph ilosophical categories be borrowedand d eveloped?4.3.5.3.2 There are very few argu men ts for this view, just asser tions.4.3.5.3.3 The claim is that H ebrew mythology w as replaced by Greekontology because it was found to be inaccurate. We need to do thesame thing because weve moved beyond Greek thought.4.3.5.3.4 The functional point of view was rep laced by static (ontic) pointof view and on tological definitions (e.g., ousia, prosopon, hypostasis.)

4.3.5.4 Jesus m ade no clear claim to be d ivine.4.3.5.4.1 Ontological notions are present in the Old Testam ent and NewTestament.4.3.5.4.2 You really cann ot separate the what from the who. Jesussaving work d epends up on His divine and hum an natures. Given Jesusjob description, wha t mu st be true about H is natures?4.3.5.4.3 Post-biblical developm ent is necessary for the ar ticulation anddefense of the Gospel. To articulate what was mean t by simp lestatements in the Bible, and to defend against the d eveloping h eresies,ph ilosophical developm ent w as necessary.

4.3.5.5 In order to be relevant we need a new Christology that aband onsontological categories and is defined in functional terms

4.3.5.5.1 The Greek metap hysical backgrou nd to Chalcedon is out of date.

We now have a richer un derstand ing of natu ral causation and a betterunderstand ing of cosmology. Things dont have essences and natu res.But its not clear how scientific und erstanding has to change ou rmetaphysics.4.3.5.5.2 The emp irical scientific poin t of view is dynamic, pragmatic, andrelational, not static, specu lative, ontological. This isnt an argu men t, butan assertion. Unless you assume th is claim, it doesnt ru le out thetrad itional view.


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4.3.5.5.3 Contem porary (postmodern) preaching cannot be logocentric.If we p reach the story of what Christ did, that entails who He was andclaimed to be. We don t preach a ph ilosophical Christology, we preachthe Gospel.4.3.5.5.4 Inadequ acies of logical positivism (self-refu ting), existent ialism(metaphysically bankrup t), and pragmatism are well known, and

therefore their attemp t to reject the trad itional m etaphysics is a failure.4.3.5.5.5 This pr imar ily stems from an antisup erna tural bias. There is nosolid objection to an ontological Christology.

4.3.5.6 Jesus could nt have accomplished a fun ction of a certain sor t if Hewerent a being of a certain sort.

5. Process Christo logy5.1 Process philosophy an d theology

5.1.1 God: principle of concretion5.1.1.1 Everything in the world is part of interconnected events. There are noind ividuals, just even ts. Every localized process can take different directionswith different p otentials.5.1.1.2 The pr inciple of concretion (of becoming a r eal process) is what

determines which direction an event goes. Concrete vs. abstract: concrete ifit is a possible term ination of a causal relation. Something is abstract becauseit cann ot be the termination of a causal relation (e.g., the nu mber 8).

5.1.2 God is the principle effect in the wor ld. This is not a per sonal conception ofGod. God actualizes some eternal, ideal forms. The process contained insometh ing is its teleological form. God can actualize that telos, bu t not throughcoercion, but persu asion. God lures (loves) the world toward s the perfectrealization of its natu re. God is the final cause, not the efficient cause.5.1.3 God is not actualized yet. God and the world are mu tually independen t.Things in the world are free and can choose which way they evolve, and in turnwill affect which way God changes. If God is the final goal and th e world is free,then as th ings in the world take different paths, God will change.

5.1.4 Panen theism: God is in all things, but not identical to them (notpantheism).5.1.5 God is developing with the world. Genuine freedom gives more value tothe things that are brought abou t by those choices. Aggregates can be coerced,but things that are considered individuals have comp lete freedom and cannot becoerced. The higher things evolve, the greater freedom they mu st have if theiractions are to have value. God therefore loves the world to the final effect.5.1.6 God is the sum of two natu res: primord ial (what he has been; fixed) andconsequent (what he will be; open). No fixed and immu table natu re.5.1.7 Major nam es: Whitehead , Bergson , Hartshorne, Pittenger, Ogden , Cobb,Griffin. Southern Meth odist University was a major center of process theologyfor a while.

5.2 Process Chr istology

5.2.1 It is said that p rocess theology takes seriously the hum anity of Chr ist. Thatis questionable.

5.2.1.1 Person is an eventa complex aggregate of past history, presentrelationships, and future influences and potentials. Persons are bund les.They cannot take Jesus human ity seriously wh en they redefine wha t it is tobe a person.5.2.1.2 The divinity of Christ is mod ified.

5.2.1.2.1 E.g., Cobb speaks of the Logos as Gods creative, tran sformativepower in culture.


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5.2.1.2.2 The Logos tends to be incarnate in all things because its Godstransformat ive power. Its just incarnate in a salient way in Jesus.5.2.1.2.3 The un iqueness of Jesus is one of degree, not kind . Jesus is anatu ral process in tu ne in a special way w ith Gods transformativeprocess.

5.2.1.3 Process theology lacks both genu ine hum anity and d eity.

5.3 Evaluation5.3.1 Positive

5.3.1.1 Philosoph ically and scientifically informed5.3.1.2 Motivation is to take the humanity of Jesus seriously5.3.1.3 Emp hasis on Gods love

5.4 Negative5.4.1 Role of Scriptu ral authority is minimal5.4.2 Depend ent on process philosophy. To the degree process philosophy isflawed , so is process theology.5.4.3 Neglect of sin, atonemen t, resurrection5.4.4 Divinity of Jesus: same p roblems as the God of process theology

6. Epistemological Approach

6.1 Method ist approach: first define the method to arrive at justification orknowledge. How do w e know w hat constitutes knowledge unless we develop acriterion first?6.2 Particular ist approach: Iden tify cases of know ledge first, or at least justifiedbelief that coun ts as knowledge. Analyze these cases and synthesize what criteriathat gives us for identifying know ledge.6.3 Two ways of identifying know ledge

6.3.1 Coheren tism: Each item of knowledge receives its justification from otherbeliefs; a web of beliefs suppor t and lend justification to a belief.

6.3.1.1 No belief is justified ap art from its relation to oth er beliefs; each beliefhas d oxastic justification from other beliefs.6.3.1.2 This doesnt gua ran tee truth because many systems of belief may be

justified bu t not fit the world .6.3.2 Found ationalism: Trace beliefs back to the found ations of belief, whichhave a certainty to them given the best theory of reality.

6.3.2.1 Kind s of beliefs that fit in the found ation: perceptions, synthetic apr iori intu itions, introsp ective aw areness, mem ory beliefs, testimon ial beliefs6.3.2.2 These are non-doxastic eviden ce that m eet certain cond itions(prop erly basic evidence): e is a basic source of eviden ce iff the beliefsformed on the basic of that evidence are m ostly tru e in a cognitively idealsetting.6.3.2.3 Certainly these could be false. Defeasible found ationalism allows forproblems in the causal chain that m ay p rodu ce false beliefs.6.3.2.4 There are beliefs that supp ort beliefs that are mostly true. What arethe kinds of eviden ce that coun t as basic sorts of eviden ce? They are the

kinds of evidence that med iate to our mind evidence of un iversals in theworld.

6.4 How do w e incorporate Scripture into our ep istemology?6.4.1 Expert testimony has a higher standard to meet than ordinary testimony:competence and sincerity. These are the kinds of criteria that critics tend to test.

6.4.1.1 Coady Testimony examines the ep istemology of testimony.6.4.1.2 The Bible, and any w ork of history, is expert testimony. Conclusion:Exper t testimony is a basic sort of belief iff any belief formed un der idealcircumstances formed on the basis of expert testimony is mostly true.


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6.4.1.3 If expert testimon y asks for an un usu al level of comm itment of beliefor volition, it requ ires a higher epistemic status. The Bible as norm altestimony doesnt get u s there.6.4.1.4 This is where inerrancy is essential. Inerrancy is that p roperty ofScriptu re that m akes it sufficient for the formation of belief. Within acomprehensive scheme that includ es who God is and h ow H e might

communicate with us, because of the nature of Scripture, beliefs responsiblyformed are justified.

6.4.2 The Bible has evidential status as exper t testimony; it has authoritativestatus from its inerrancy. When it places a deman d on ou r volition, it must havea higher au thoritative status.

7. Christology of the Gospels (lecture by Dr. Mike Wilkens)7.1 We mu st look for a vigorou sly conten t for the Jesus in the Gospels.7.2 In Jesus earthly ministry what d id He d o and could d o only because He w asGod?

7.2.1 An absolute au thority to forgive sins, as opposed to delegated au thority7.2.2 Atonem ent for the worlds sins7.2.3 Almost every thing Jesus did in H is earthly life before His resu rrection can

be found as acts of prop hets or Apostles.7.3 What are the imp lications of Jesus self-consciousness? What is the source of Hisself-consciousness?

7.3.1 Hes limited by His hu manity.7.3.2 Kenotic theory: Jesus did nt emp ty Himself of His deity or His attribu tes.(Mt. 24)7.3.3 If Jesus didnt give up H is attributes, was He omn ipresent du ring Hisearth ly ministry? Yes. The men otholite controversies wrestled with these.There was a localization of Jesus consciousness that inhered in His humanity.7.3.4 He emptied H imself of His indepen den t exercise of His attribu tes as deity.He limited H imself to His human natu re.

7.4 Three theses are advanced by the synop tic Gospels:

7.4.1 An imp licit Christology that grow s from Jesus own self-consciousn ess7.4.2 Jesus acted ou t of an awareness of His deity and Messiahship throughoutHis m inistry.7.4.3 Jesus manifested aw areness of His deity specifically by three things:Exercising the functions, assuming the p rerogatives, and accepting the honor sthat belong only to God.7.4.4 Imp licit d ivine claims:

7.4.4.1 He claimed thee divine rights: jud ge mankind , forgive sins, gran teternal life.7.4.4.2 His presence was Gods presence.7.4.4.3 The attitud e people took toward H im wou ld determ ine their eternaldestiny.7.4.4.4 He identified His actions with Gods actions. His actions were Gods

actions.7.4.4.5 He taugh t the truth on His own au thority.7.4.4.6 He p erformed m iracles on H is own authority.7.4.4.7 He app eared to receive worship .7.4.4.8 He assumed that H is life was a pattern for others, a divinelyau thor itative form of life.7.4.4.9 He ap plied Old Testamen t texts that described God to Himself.In the Parables, He identified H imself with a father or king tha t representGod.


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7.5 The synop tics are m uch less explicit about Jesus claims to deity than the Gospelof John. But m uch of this has to do with the purp oses of the synoptics and John.

7.5.1 Up to 30 years transpired betw een the w riting of the synop tics and John.7.5.2 The synopt ics are a historical recounting of Jesus ministry. They allow usto enter into the experience of the disciples as they experienced recognizing Jesusas God.

7.5.3 We are too familiar with Jesus, and the imp act of the incarnation of Goddoesnt impress us. It was inconceivable and ter rifying for the Jews to ad justtheir concept of God as triun e. This was a h uge p arad igm shift. Thats what theGospels were w ritten to do. Their focus w as on persuading others of Jesusdeity. That was the d ifficult idea to absorb then.7.5.4 Acts and the Epistles: The Acts provid e an accoun t of the parad igm shiftand the Epistles the explanation of it. Paul is the leading Phar isee who makes theshift philosoph ically and th eologically.7.5.5 John w rites 30 years later to give a ph ilosophical sup plement to thesynoptics. But the battleground has now shifted from stru ggling to accept Jesusdeity. He writes freely of the Logos incarnation. By now gnosticism haschallenged the hu manity of Jesus. (1 John 4; 2 John 7)7.5.6 Both the deity of Christ and th e incarnation m ust be maintained to

understand the Gospels.7.6 Jesus couldnt fully accomplish His mission without being fully hum an. Denialwill lead to h eresy and practical blasphemy.

7.6.1 The purpose of the divine man: Matthew 1:18Fun ction of His deity: saveman from sin. Emmanu elontological deity. Jesus pu rpose was to intertw inethose.7.6.2 His job was to be what the first Adam failed to be and restore the image ofGod in man as God created man.7.6.3 Restoration of hum ans to d o wh at the first Adam failed to dosubdu e andrule the Earth. (Gen. 1; Psalm 8) Jesus was a fully hum an person in whom Godwas peculiarly active in fulfilling the hopes of the p rophet, priest, and king.Dont be lulled into a distinction between an ontological and functional deity.

Jesus couldnt fulfill His function withou t His un ique being.7.6.4 The restoration of hum ans to live in a way the first Adam failed to live.7.7 The real difference in wh at Jesus d id in H is earthly ministry is the authority H eclaimed for Himself.

7.7.1 Jesus performed miracles on His own authority by the power of the HolySpirit. The real difference in Jesus was that it was His will that accomplished themiracles. (Mt. 8)7.7.2 It is the dem onstration of the Spirit that Jesus is now the Messianicauthority. (Acts 10) Jesus was the anointed one that wou ld rule for God.7.7.3 Jesus limits Himself in the kenosis to live as a man and operates throu ghthe power of the Holy Spirit. That becomes the examp le of a spirit-filled life ofthe church today. He is an example of wh at we are, how we are to live, and w hatwe are to do. (2 Cor. 3; Rom. 8:29)

8. Chr istology of Colossians 1:15-20 (lecture b y Dr. Clint Arnold )8.1 Poetic structureapparent in the Greek. Not only poetic, but some scholarsconsider it to be a hymn that was used by chu rches in Western Asia Minor, whereColossi is.8.2 Affirms a high Chr istology

8.2.1 Jesus is creator of Heaven and Earth.8.2.2 Preexistence. Agrees with John 1 and Hebrews 1 that affirm this highChristology.


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8.2.3 Jesus is also characterized as the goal of creation, it was for Him.8.2.4 He also maintains all of creation.8.2.5 Jesus is celebrated a s Lord over the cosmic pow ers.

8.3 Authorship8.3.1 Continen tal scholarship believes that Pau l was not the auth or.

8.3.1.1 Instead it was a gn ostic author w ho w as wr iting against a strain of

gnosticism he d isagreed with.8.3.1.2 Bultmann believed that the hym n was used by gnostic group s. Itreflects the spirit world as sup erior to the material world. The thought formsindicate that the author has been influenced by gnostic ideas.8.3.1.3 This view also assum es an evolutionary Chr istology.

8.3.2 Recent scholarship recognizes that Chr istology developed ear ly in thechurch.

8.4 Historical background8.4.1 Colossi was a small country city 100 miles inland from Eph esus. It was aninsignificant city overshadow ed by the nearby cities of Laodicea and Hierapolis.It was known only for a technique of wool dying.8.4.2 There were probably a few house churches in the city.8.4.3 The chu rch was probably composed of Jews (many from Persia), Romans,

local indigenous p eoples.8.4.4 Pau l didn t plant the chu rch, but he felt responsible for it because it wasevangelized as a resu lt of Pauls preaching in Ephesus.

8.5 The Colossian heresy8.5.1 The problem Paul add ressed was emp ty ph ilosophy (2:8). The ph ilosoph yis inspired by the elemental spirits.8.5.2 They worshipped an gelic spirits.8.5.3 They practiced m utilation, but its not clear w hether this is circum cision orself-mutilation.8.5.4 Taboos8.5.5 There are extensive references to pr incipalities and powers.8.5.6 Celebrating the new moons and Sabbath is mentioned.

8.5.7 Gnosticism and Jewish mysticism seem to be the problems addressed .There was a faction the encouraged mystical, experience-based w orship thatinclud ed visionary ascent to Heaven and w orshipped w ith the angels around thethrone. Jewish animistic mysticism was qu ite comm on.8.5.8 A philosoph ical system of thou ght and p ractice of the local area. Pau l usesa definite article before philosophy, so he is referring to a specific teaching in thechurch.

8.5.8.1 A num ber of suggestions have been mad e: neopythagoreanism,middle Platonism , cynicism. Most likely it was local Phrygian-Lydian folkbelief.8.5.8.2 The indigenou s religious practices best account for wh at the religiousinfluences might be.8.5.8.3 Gnosticism didn t surface as a religion until the mid-second century.

8.6 Colossians 2:188.6.1 insisting on8.6.2 humilityascetic practices8.6.3 worship of angelsThe angels are the objects of worship , not co-participan ts in the worship. They were invoking and calling on angels.8.6.4 enter ing what He has seenspiritual insight from initiation into amystery cult. This odd word usage and has been difficult to translate andinterpret, but it is found in an Ap ollo temp le regarding a m ystery initiation into amystical cult.


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8.7 Pau ls solution to the problems at Colossi is a correct un der stand ing ofChristology.

8.7.1 He is the head over all ru lers, pow ers, au thorities, and d ominions. This isvocabulary his aud ience wou ld be familiar with in the context of their mysticalpractices.8.7.2 He show s them how out of sync their practices are with Christianity. Why

fear these powers if your worship Christ. He is preeminent, He created allthings, and creat ion is for Him. He is exalted over all creation.8.7.3 He em phasizes Jesus sup remacy to prevent them from viewing Jesus asanother powerful being in their mystical beliefs.8.7.4. He emph asizes Jesus preexistence.8.7.5 Jesus is the firstborn of all creation . This is a reference to Psalm 89:27 thatthe Jewish aud ience would have und erstood. Firstborn is a status with rights.Jesus is the fu lfillment of the Davidic promise in Psalm 89; He is the most exaltedof the kings of the earth. It underscores the power and authority of Christ.8.7.6 Jesus deity can be inferred from the fact that He is said to be the creator.He is not an intermed iary figure.

8.8 Jesus function to answ er fears and need s is based on w ho He is.

9. Chr istology of the First Four Ecumen ical Coun cils (lecture by Dr. Fred Sand ers)9.1 How does God relate to the world? The Christian answer is Jesus Christ.

9.1.1 Incarnat ion: Am ong the heretics, you always search in vain for this onesentence: The Word of God has become flesh. Iranaeus of Lyons (ca. 180)9.1.2 Who is Jesus Chr ist? has imp lications for everyth ing you d o theologically.Systematic connections:

9.1.2.1 Who is God ?9.1.2.2 How is God revealed?9.1.2.3 What is the image of God?9.1.2.4 What is sin?9.1.2.5 What does it mean to be hum an?9.1.2.6 How are we saved?

9.1.2.7 What is the goal of my life?9.1.2.8 What is the chur ch?9.2 Ecum enical Councils: gathering of bishops from the entire Chr istian churchacross the inhabited world (oikomene).

9.2.1 Seven chu rch councils. Jeru salem Council in Acts isnt considered on e ofthese because it is un ique to itself because of the Apostolic author ity inheren t inthe pa rticipants.9.2.2 Tradition and its claims on us: The claim of the ecum enical council is thatnot only cant you be faithful to who Jesus Christ is without the N ew Testament,you also cant be faithful withou t the norm ative interpretation as d etermined bythe ecum enical coun cils.

9.2.2.1 Nicea and Chalcedon are widely agreed up on. How many councilsdo w e have to confirm in order to be orthodox?

9.2.2.2 Protestan tism sets the ecumenical councils at seven; the RomanCatholic church continues to have ecumenical councils.

9.2.3 The seven ecumen ical councils and their key teachings on Chr ist:9.2.3.1 Nicaea I (325) )truly God9.3.2.2 Constan tinop le I (381)tru ly hum an9.3.2.3 Ephesus (431)one per son9.3.2.4 Chalcedon (451)two natu res9.3.2.5 Constan tinop le II (553)Christs God-centered hu manity9.3.2.6 Constan tinople III (681)two wills


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9.3.2.7 Nicaea II (787)images9.4 History before Nicaea

9.4.1 persecution, martyrdom, etc.9.4.2 Constan tine makes the empire Christian.

9.4.2.1 A.D. 312: Battle of Milvian BridgeConstantine prevails and is on h isway to be the sole emperor.

9.4.2.2 A.D. 313: Ed ict of MilanChristian ity is mad e a legal religion.9.4.2.3 A.D. 325: Cou ncil of Nicaea9.4.2.4 Constan tine is held as a saint by the Eastern chu rch. His motherHelen was converted, became very pious, and was intent on find ing thehistorical sites of Jesus life in Palestine.9.4.2.5 Constan tine used Christianity as a unifying force for his unifiedemperor.

9.4.3 Pre-Nicene heresies9.4.3.1 Docetism: God only appeared (dokeo) to become hum an. Relatedheresies are m odalism, gnosticism, Sabellianism.9.4.3.2 Adoption ism: the opposite heresy. Jesus was only a man, exalted toGodhood by grace. Related heresies: ebionitism.9.4.3.3 Arianism : nam ed for Arius, an Alexand rian pr iest ca. 318.

9.4.3.3.1 If Jesus is the Son, he mu st have been begotten. If he wasbegotten, there was a time before he was begotten. Jesus is the greatestcreature of Gods.9.4.3.3.2 Christ is the med iator between God and man , but part of thecreation.9.4.3.3.3 Chr ist was begotten, bu t before time. Then God created timethrough Jesus. This is how Arius thou ght he could get out of the idea thatJesus is a creature.9.4.3.3.4 Jesus was high enough to redeem us, but low enou gh to sufferand be an example.

9.5 Nicaea9.5.1 Athanasius conclud ed th at this view of Jesus would n ot achieve salvation.

Jesus med iates between God and m an by pa rtaking of both natu res.9.5.2 Soteriological axiom: Only God can save us. Jesus is not created . Christ isfully God; homoousius with the Father.9.5.3 The Arians kept affirming the orthodox statements withou t meaning thesame thing. Finally, they u sed a n on-biblical term (hom oousius) to make thedifference clear.9.5.4 Athanasius is a youn g man in 325 bu t lived nearly to the next coun cilfighting the controversies. He w as exiled five times, was in mortal danger,slandered.9.5.5 After Nicaea the political trends changed in favor of Arius. The Creed wasrediscovered at Constantinople.

9.6 Constan tinople (381)9.6.1 Headed by the Cappadocians: Basil of Caesarea , Gregory of Nyssa,

Gregory of Nazianatu s.9.6.2 The first Council of Constantinople

9.6.2.1 Confirmed the defeat of Arain ism9.6.2.2 Affirmed th e Creed of Nicaea9.6.2.3 Confirmed the deity of the Spirit

9.6.3 Apollinarianism9.6.3.1 Jesus is a hu man body, but has a divine sou l.


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9.6.3.2 Soteriological axiom: What is not assum ed is not healed. Jesuscannot save wh at He is not. Christ saves by assum ing, taking on hum anity.Jesus cannot save hum an souls if He d idnt have a hum an soul.

9.7 Summary9.7.1 True Word: adoptionism, Arianism9.7.2 True Flesh: docetism, Arianism, Apollinar ianism

9.7.3 Only God can save us; what is not assumed is not healed.9.7.4 Jesus is homoousios with the Father and h omoousios with hu man ity.

9.8 Ephesus9.8.1 The major doctrine from Ephesu s is that Jesus is one person.9.8.2 Refutes Nestorian ism.9.8.3 Nestor ius, bishop of Constant inople, objects to theotokos, Mary is the God-bearer.

9.8.3.1 Its impossible to do someth ing to just one of the two natu res.Therefore, Mary gave birth to God. The hyp ostatic un ion is affirm ed: oneperson, two natures.9.8.3.2 Jesus gives life, yet is born . He is everywhere, yet grows. He knowsall, yet learn s. He ru les in glory, yet suffers. He is eternal, yet dies. They sortthrough these and assign them to one of His two natu res.

9.8.3.3 Its imp ortan t to be able to distinguish between the two natu res, butalso affirm that what happ ens to one nature happ ens to the other. So Godsuffers and dies. This is the communicatoidiomatum. Therefore, Mary is themoth er of God. If this isnt affirm ed, you are a Nestor ian.

9.8.4 Nestorianism divided the natu res in the one person as wholly independent.The nature is equivocated w ith person and the terms arent well-defined .9.8.5 Ephesu s affirms tha t Jesus is the mother of God, wh ich is a statement abou tJesus not Mary. Its an affirmation of the unity of Jesus per son and natu res. Itspossible to affirm the doctrine, yet not use the terminology because its beeninvested w ith Maryology of Catholicism in the intervening time.9.8.6 There is still a sma ll Nestorian chu rch in Syria.

9.9 Chalcedon (451)

9.9.1 Heresy in question: monophysitism--one nature9.9.1.1 Jesus is from tw o natu res, but only one natu re after the incarnation.Hybrid n ature. It affirms that the hu man n ature is still in tact, but isoverpowered by the d ivine nature.9.9.1.2 Orthodoxy is that Jesus is from one natu re and took on a secondnature.

9.9.2 How are the two natures unified?9.9.2.1 Monophysite: They become one the human absorbed in the divine.One person/ one nature. Opposite of nestorianism.9.9.2.2 Nestorianism: They are distinct. Two person/ two natu res.9.9.2.3 Christ is one person w ith two natu res, unconfused, unchanged ,undivided , and u nseparated . Note that Chalcdeon defines the two natures inthe negative (i.e., error ), not by giving a positive description of how it is true.

9.9.2.4 The Chalcedon box sets the bou nd aries, the conceptual field, fororthodoxy. Bound aries: two natu res, one person, fully God, fully man.9.9.2.5 Within orthodoxy, there is a range of und erstanding th e balancebetween Jesus natu res. Lutherans tend closer to monophysism, andReformed tend closer to nestorianism. The Coptic Orthod ox Church ismonophysite today.

10. Christology of the Last Three Ecumen ical Coun cils (lecture by Dr. Fred Sand ers)10.1 Constantinople II


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10.1.1 A.D. 553. Heresy refuted: nestorian ism. There are no living heretics theyopp ose, but they respond to written teachings.10.1.2 Key teaching: Christs God-centered h um anity. Who is Jesus Christ?Requires a Trinitarian answer. Key ph rase: One of the Trinity suffered in theflesh.10.1.3 The Father is God, the Son is God, the Spirit is God; the Father is not the

Son or the Spirit, etc.10.1.4 Who suffered in the flesh? The Trinitarian and Christological debatescome together at this council.10.1.5 The one person is God the Son. The natures come from God an d fromman.10.1.6 Hyp ostatic un ion

10.1.6.1 anhypostatic Chr istology: Chr ists hu man natu re is not person al ifconsidered by itself. If it were personal by itself, then there w ould be twopersons or a hum an person adop ted by the Logos.10.1.6.2 enhypostatic Chr istology: Christs hu man nature is personal whenconsidered with the second person of the Trinity.10.1.6.3 How a re the two natu res unified?

10.1.6.3.1 They become one new na ture: mon oph ysitism

10.1.6.3.2 They choose to remain together: Nestor ianism10.1.6.3.3 They are joined in one person without confusion, chan ge,division, or separation: orthodox

10.1.6.3.3.1 Hum an nature is sort of annexed to the second person ofthe Trinity.10.1.6.3.3.2 Chr ists human nature is personalized by the eternal Sonof God.10.1.6.3.3.3 Our human natu re is per sonalized by createdpersonhood.

10.2 Constan tinople III10.2.1 A.D. 681 Heresy refuted: monothelytism10.2.2 Key teaching: Christ has two wills.

10.2.3 Hero: Maximu s the Confessor maintained the faith against the Emperorand was martyred.10.2.4 Key ph rase: Keep the economy free of fantasy. Maintain the maximu mintegrity of the natu res.

10.2.4.1 Economy is the dispen sation of salvation in wh ich God becomesincarnate; the incarnate life of Jesus Christ.10.2.4.2 If it app ears that Jesus is doing something then its real; Hes notpretending. He was tempted; He didnt know wh ere Lazarus was.10.2.4.3 Affirm s the full integr ity of the hu man and d ivine natures.

10.2.5 The crux of the council is Jesus prayer in Gethsemene: Not m y will, bu tYours.

10.2.5.1 If Hes God, wh y is His will d ifferent?10.2.5.2 Does Jesus have two wills?

10.2.6 If the hum an natu re includes a hu man will, and the d ivine natu re includesa d ivine w ill, then Jesus had to have tw o wills.

10.2.6.1 Natures have wills, natu ral wills. Wills dont belong to persons.10.2.6.2 God has one will.10.2.6.3 What is a will?

10.2.6.3.1 Choosinggnomic will: deliberative, person-centered will.Maximus thought this was from the Fall. He explicitly denies that Jesushad this kind of will.


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10.2.6.3.2 DesiringThis is the d efinition Maximus uses for w ill.Desiring is of the nature. The natural w ill is the desires and energies thatare par t of your natu re. If the will is in the nature, Jesus had two w ills.

10.2.7 Not m y will, but Yours. Not the desires of my hum an natu re, but thedesires of our common d ivine natu rethats what I choose with m y deliberativewill.

10.3 Necaea II10.3.1 This is the capstone of the councils; they all come together u nd er this one.10.3.2 H eresy refuted : iconoclasm10.3.3 Key teaching: Christ is the image of the invisible God.10.3.4 Its debatable whether th is council is Christological in the same was as theothers.10.3.5 Iconoclasm occurs over a long period of time. Iconoclasts vs. iconod oules:

10.3.5.1 Iconoclasts held that you cannot m ake a p icture of Jesus divinenatu re. Its invalid to m ake an image of Christ.10.3.5.2 The reply was tha t it wasnt the nature being p ortrayed in thepicture, it is the person who combines the two n atures.

10.2.6 Du lia vs. Latr ia10.2.6.1 Dulia is proper reverence to holy things. The reverence is to the

type, not to the object.10.2.6.2 Latria is worsh ip, prop er only to God.

11. Why stud y the seven councils?11.1 Keeps you from re-inventing the wh eel.11.2 Help s you read the Bible better.11.3 Enables you to take a d istinctively Christian view toward the world.11.4 Summary:

Heresy Humanity Deity CorrectionDocetic denied affirmed 1 John 4:1-3Ebionite affirmed denied IrenaeusArian affirmed reduced Nicaea (325)

Apollinarian reduced affirmed Constantinople I (381)Nestorian split split Ephesus (431)(consolidation) Chalcedon (451)Monophysite mixed mixed Constantinople II (553)

(Eutychian)Monothelite mixed mixed Constantinople III (681)Iconoclasm reduced affirmed Nicaea II (787)

11.5 What becom es clear from the Patristic per iod is the deity of Christ is absoluteand cannot be tinkered w ith; but the hu man n ature is what is worked on d uring themedieval period.

12. Med ieval Christology (app rox. A.D. 787 after the seventh ecum enical coun cil)12.1 Scholastic ph ilosophical theology

12.1.2 Scriptu re is au thor itative bu t the interpretation by the Councils wasau thor itative. Within the scope of the Councils, the Bible is to be interp reted .12.1.3 Comm entary, not innovat ion. There was strict church discipline for newideas, including d eath. Detailed, abstract distinctions were m ade, wh ichaccoun ts for the repu tation of scholastic theology as opaque and picyune.12.1.4 Preoccupation with metaph ysics

12.1.4.1 Theistic rationalism in epistemologysomew hat fideistic by meansof the authority of the church.


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12.1.4.2 The sophisticated opp onen ts were Islamic ph ilosophers, along with afew Jewish philosophers, who had great logical abilities and knew Aristotleswork w ell.

12.1.5 One person with tw o natures was well-established.12.1.6 The divine nature was u np roblematic. Theology at this time wasprimarily vianegativawhat is known abou t God is primarily in terms of wh at

He is not. It is und efined enough that it doesnt pose ph ilosophical problems.12.1.7 Hu man na ture presented problems. What sort of hu man natu re did Jesushave? Four contingent states in which the hu man n ature can exist with differentprop erties attaching in each state:

12.1.7.1 innocence (ante-lapsarian sta teAdam before the fall)12.1.7.2 after the fall, before grace (post-lapsarian)12.1.7.3 after the fall, after grace (post-lapsarian w ith the indwelling of theHoly Spirit)12.1.7.4 glorified

12.1.8 What are the moral categories of the atonem ent? To a large extent, thenatu re of the atonement drives the previous question. What kind of humannatu re is necessary for the atonem ent to be accomplished?

12.2 Anselm (1033-1109)

12.2.1 MonologionGods natu re and attributes12.2.2 ProslogionGods existence and natu re (the source of the ontologicalargument)12.2.3 Cur deus homo?Why did God have to become man? This workestablishes his contribution to Christology.

12.2.3.1 The work of Christ12.2.3.1.1 make satisfaction for sinsprimary for d ecid ing wh at sort ofhuman nature12.2.3.1.2 conquer Satan12.2.3.1.3 teach humankind how to live

12.2.3.2 What sort of hum an nature is necessary to accomp lish these tasks?12.2.3.3 Anselms doctrine of satisfaction is wha t drove His view of wh at

kind of human nature was necessary.12.2.3.3.1 Satisfaction of Gods honorEveryone wh o sins ough t to payback the honor of which he h as robbed God; and this is the satisfactionwh ich every sinner owes to God. (Cur deus homo? 1:11)12.2.3.3.2 Satisfaction is mad e by complete obedience.12.2.3.3.3 But w e already ow e God complete obedience in virtue of ournatu re in relation to His natu re. It cannot m ake up for the debt of our sin.12.2.3.3.4 Therefore, anything w e can give God is what we alread y oweHim, so we cannot repay Him.12.2.3.3.5 Christ paid a debt H e did not ow e because we ow ed a d ebt wecould not pay.

12.2.4 Evaluation12.2.4.1 Is it Gods honor that need s to be satisfied? Then Gods demand of

Jesus death to sat isfy His honor seem s cruel.12.2.4.2 Satisfaction isnt a New Testament term. In Anselms case, it comesfrom his legal background in Church law. He imports the category.Propitiation is a New Testament term and has in view God s justice andwra th. He is angry at sin and He cannot comprom ise His justice.

12.2.5 Fitting requ iremen ts of satisfactionFitting is a major featu re inAnselms view of Christology. List of qualities necessary for Jesus to m akesatisfaction:


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12.2.5.1 Member of Adam s raceWere there hu man races other thanAdams?12.2.5.2 One, not two, parents because Adam had only one parent (asexualreprod uction) is a rationale for the virgin birth.12.2.5.3 From a virg inBecause Eve was taken from a man, its fitting thatJesus be taken from a woman . It roun ds things out.

12.2.5.4 Withou t original sin or else He w ould h ave a deb t to pay Himself.12.2.5.5 Actually sinless so that He not incur a debt tha t wou ld have to berepaid.12.2.5.6 Incapable of willing to sin because if He could w ill to sin it wou ld bepossible for Him to sin. Its inconceivable that the incarna te God could sin.12.2.5.7 OmniscientJesus would have to have all know ledge to know thehighest good in order to resist temptation, otherwise He might have sinnedunawares.12.2.5.8 Able to die12.2.5.9 Passableable to suffer and experience emotions

12.3 Peter Lombard (1095-1160)12.3.1 An Italian who was a great system atizer, not an originator at all.12.3.2 Quator libri Sententiarumfour books of systematic questions and answers

about the whole of theological doctrine. He considers pro and contra answersbefore arriving at his recommend ed conclusion, always steering between twoextremes.

12.3.2.1 Book I: God, the Trinity prov idence, predestination, evil12.3.2.2 Book II: Creation , angels and d emon s, the fall, sin, and grace12.3.2.3 Book III: Incarn ation, red emp tion, the virtues, ten command men ts12.3.2.4 Book IV: Sacraments, last things

12.3.3 All systematic theologies have followed th is organ ization since. He fixedthe territory for the d ebate thereafter.12.3.4 The Sentences on Chr ists hu man ity

12.3.4.1 What was fitting for Chr ist? What was exped ient for us? Chr istmu st assum e some features of each state of human natu re:

12.3.4.1.1 innocenceno sin na ture12.3.4.1.2 before gracehum an natu re after the fall; hu man defects, ableto suffer. All defects exped ient for him, but not sin. Passibility12.3.4.1.3. after gracefullness of grace

12.3.4.1.3.1 Potent ially omn iscient (scope, not clarity): a second ordercapacity un realized , not a first order capacity so Jesus grew inknowledge. Finite beings can know an infinite number ofprop ositions if there is an infinite amoun t of time to learn. Notpotentially om nipotent because it w as not necessary to accomplishatonement.12.3.4.1.3.2 Two wills (d ivine and h um an): Two affections (rationalaffection belongs to the d ivine will and ru les the sensory affection,sensory affection belongs to the hu man w ill because it is subject to

temptations).12.3.4.1.4 glory: non posse peccare

12.4 Bonaventu re (1221-1274)12.4.1 Minister General of Franciscans; Card inal-Bishop; tend er piety andprofound learning; wrote a num ber of books, including Commentary on theSentences12.4.2 Robert Grosseteste vs. Bonaventu re

12.4.2.1 G: The incarnat ion was necessary in sp ite of sin; logically necessary.Its primary p urp ose is to perfect human natu re.


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12.4.2.2 B: The incarnation is only necessary because of sin. Its pr imarypu rpose was cleansing. Because Jesus was d ivine, He stored up a surp lus ofgood that could be d rawn on to perform m iracles and execute satisfaction forsin.

12.4.3 Thomas vs. Bonaventu re12.4.3.1 B: Synthetical; Augustinian (practical ap plication s of theology);

teacher of p ractical life; inflamed the h eart; theology of love; mystic12.4.3.2 T: Analytical; Aristo telian; teacher of the schools; enligh tened themind ; love of theology; rationalist

12.5 Thom as Aqu inas (1225-1274)12.5.1 Greatest of the scholasticsone of the grea test thinkers in history;Christian Aristotelianism;12.5.2 Works: His und isputed w ritings add u p to 8 million words. Summatheologiae (Christology from above); Summa contra gentiles (Christology frombelow); commentaries and lectures.

12.5.2.1 His argu es from natural reason to prove conclusively andded uctively that God exists and what H is character is like. These argum entsare for the infidels.12.5.2.2 He then moves to what w e know on ly by revelation, like the Trinity.

These argumen ts are for the faithful.12.5.3 Christs nature

12.5.3.1 Omniscience (passive power)12.5.3.1.1 Jesus had the beatific vision from conception becau se of Hisomniscience.12.5.3.1.2 His human natu re also had infused kn owledge of angels andprop hets, as distingu ished from knowledge they have natu rally.Knowledge of vision is of actual things. He has as much knowledge as itis possible for a hum an being to have. He also has knowledge of simp leintelligence, that is knowledge of what is possible.12.5.3.1.3 His human mind grew in intensity of know ledge as he seesthings more clearly. Jesus has a strong capacity for close to omniscience.

12.5.3.2 Omnipotence (active power)not symmetrical to omniscience12.5.3.2.1 Jesus hu man nature is not omnipotent. Because omn iscience isa passive pow er, it is possible for Jesus to have it in H is hum an natureand not use it. But because omnipotence is an active pow er, He cannothave it in H is human n ature.12.5.3.2.2 Jesus hu man nature can be used by the divine nature to act,such as w orking miracles.

12.5.3.3 Satisfaction theory of atonemen t12.5.3.3.1 It was not absolutely necessary for Jesus to be incarnated , butwas d one out of love.12.5.3.3.2 Jesus death p lacates, propitiates Gods wrath.

12.5.3.4 Grace12.5.3.4.1 Passibility

12.5.3.4.2 Hu man natu re sanctified and perfected12.5.3.4.3 Headsh ip: pow er to sanctify others

12.5.3.5 Sin: Jesus is impeccable.12.6 John Duns Scotus (1266-1308)

12.6.1 Biography12.6.1.1 Gradu ate of Oxford and stud ied in Paris at the end of the years ofAquinas and Bonaventure.


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12.6.1.2 Called the subtle doctor because he was adep t at making fine,exact d istinctions. Theologian of the Franciscans as Thomas is of theDominicans.12.6.1.3 It is said that he mad e the controversial claim that began to d ivorcefaith and reason. Scotus is the beginning of the end of the great Scholasticsynthesis.

12.6.1.4 Hes the first, in virtue of synchronic contingency, to suggest thatGod is in time in virtue of Gods men tal states.12.6.1.5 Stresses the au thor ity of the Bible and the Chu rch.

12.6.2 Voluntarist12.6.2.1 God is comp letely free, bu t He is not capr icious. He can do wha t Hewills, but He wont. It follows that ou r reason could not d iscover moralprinciples because God could change at any time.12.6.2.2 God is not bound by reason and could save how ever He wanted to.Satisfaction isnt necessary.

12.6.3 Hum ans have libertarian free will.12.6.4 Famou s for his form al distinctions (cf. intellectua l and real d istinctions)between things tha t can be logically separated bu t not m etaphysically separated.E.g., the soul is metaphysically unified, but has faculties that can be considered

separately.12.6.5 Doctrine of intu itive cognitionRather than th inking that we abstractthe natu re of universals out of particulars, we have an innate cognition. Thisinfluenced Calvin w ith his sensus d ivinitatus.12.6.6 Soteriology

12.6.6.1 The incarnation was necessary but not for salvation. The atonemen tis a logically later pu rpose of the incarnation otherwise the greatest thingGod did would be in response for the worst thing man d id.12.6.6.2 Hu man natu re must be fit for Trinitarian love-life. Christs hu mannatu re is created fit for the role as the head of comm un ity of created co-lovers. Angels and humans are raised almost to the level of God toparticipa te in the d ivine love life.

12.6.6.3 This is a teleological approach. The first cause mu st not be directedat any effect otherwise the effect would serve as the cause. That wou ld meanthat theres something necessary besides the first cause. God, in His natu re,is the first and final cause. The persons of the Trinity are related by love. Theessential causal chain w ill d irect everything to God . Since God is the goal forwh ich everything w as mad e, everything w ill be subsumed into relationshipwith God . That is the final goal.

12.6.7 The hyposta tic un ion12.6.7.1 The hypostatic un ion is the relation between the d ivine and humannatu res. It cannot raise the metaphysically finite to the infinite. The divinenatu re d oes not comm un icate the beatific vision or imp eccability to thehum an nature. He disagreed w ith everyone before him w ho thought thatJesus human natu re was omniscient.

12.6.7.2 Omniscience is a passive pow er versus an active pow er to cause.12.6.7.2.1 If a substance S can possess a degreed p roperty P, then if S isnot limited to a determinate degree of P, then S can receive any degree ofP. As a passive pow er, our intellect can possess as a degreed property theability to know m ore and more p ropositions; we are not essentiallylimited to a certain degree of knowledge. Therefore our human n aturecan possess any degree of knowledge. He ar rives at the same conclusionthat hu man natu re can be omniscient, but by a d ifferent rou te with finemetaphysical distinctions.


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12.6.7.2.2 He d raws a distinction between app rehend ing versuscomprehending. You can have true know ledge withou t havingcomprehensive knowledge.

12.6.7.3 Imp eccability is due to grace.12.6.8 He introd uced haecceity.

12.7 William of Ockham (1285-1347)

12.7.1 Rebel by natu re12.7.1.1 Sup ported the secular pow er of the Emperor over the Pope. SomeCatholics say he w as the first p rotestant.12.7.1.2 Reason cannot d emonstrate any truth s of Godmu st rely on theauthority of the Church.12.7.1.3 Prolific philosoph er, logician, and theologian12.7.1.4 Perhaps died of the Black Plague12.7.1.5 He w as a significant influen ce on Luth er.

12.7.2 Ockhams RazorEntia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate.12.7.2.1 He wanted to reform both scholastic meth odology and scholasticmetaphysics. His goal was to simplify.12.7.2.2 He opened the door to skepticism of reason in matters of faithbecause some of the entities that couldnt be verified were the existence of

immaterial things.12.7.3 Denied

12.7.3.1 He denied the d istinction between essence and existence. Theres nosuch thing as an individual essence.12.7.3.2 He d enied the distinction between the active and passive intellects.12.7.3.3 He den ied abstract un iversals. He was a conceptu alist.

12.7.4 Redu plicative sense of propositions (from nominalism).12.7.4.1 The man Christ began to exist. Chr ist the man began to exist.12.7.4.2 Ockham says both of these are false. He denies that there is anyhuman na ture. The nam e must pick out a particular and there is no nature ofman for the terms to refer to. Natu res are scattered p articulars, scattered overthe existing particulars.

12.7.4.3 If it was an individual hum an nature Jesus assum ed, nestorianism isa natu ral conclusion, though Ockham w ould n ot wan t to affirm this.12.7.4.4 Ockham s metap hysics doesnt have the resou rces to explainChalcedonean Christology.

13. Reformation Christology13.1 Luther (1483-1546)

13.1.1 He accepted the standard creed al formu lations, i.e., Chalcedon,Constantinople, but his focus was soteriology, not metap hysics (function, notontology). He asks what it means for us? He moves beyond the metaph ysics tothe ap plication.13.1.2 Insight: God the Father is revealed in Jesus Chr ist. We came to accept theword s of Scriptu re as auth oritative because they lead u s to the Father, and th en

that lends furth er au thority to the Bible as Gods word .13.1.3 Chr istological emp hases

13.1.3.1 Greek Fathers: Christ brought imm ortal life of God, which redeemsfrom sin and dea th. Justification is a process of becoming God -like.Justification and sanctification are synonymous.13.1.3.2 Latin Father s: Chr ist made satisfaction for the guilt of sin.13.1.3.3 Both: Sought the divine in Chr ist. He mu st be divine to accomp lishjustification and satisfaction.


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13.1.3.4 Luther : Chr ist show s us the heart and the will of the Father, as wellas the above. So He seeks God the Father in Christ. The way Luther willwork out Jesus human ity and deity w ill be by following this principle thatJesus reveals the Father.

13.14 Purpose of the incarnation13.1.4.1 To reveal Gods love, hear t, and will

13.1.4.2 To prop itiate Gods wrath13.1.4.3 To conquer the devil13.1.4.4 To be an examp le

13.1.5 The devil and Jesus13.1.5.1 The devil allows men to honor the man Jesus in their piety. Thedev il loves it wh en men look to Jesus as just a m oral examp le.13.1.5.2 The dev il allows men to be convinced of Christs eternal d eitybecause this is salvifically sufficient.13.1.5.3 Christological orthodoxy is not true faith. Its not necessary to workout the d etails of Christology in order to have saving faith. No need toaffirm, but a lso cannot deny.13.1.5.4 True faith grasp s the Father in the Son.

13.1.6 Incarnational distinctions

13.1.6.1 Communicatio idiomatum: He believed that there w as a full sharing ofattributes. God died in Jesus. A man created the heavens and the earth.13.1.6.2 Hu man n ature, not hum an person (anhyp ostasis)

13.1.7 Lu thers kenotic theology13.1.7.1 He emp tied Himself means He became obedient to the Father.13.1.7.2 The kenosis was an on-going act of Christs giving H imself for sinfulmen so that He entered into all the difficulties of hum anity even thou gh,being in the form of God, He w as free from th em all. Jesus par ticipated inhuman n ature w ithout being subject to its limitations. He d oesnt makedistinctions of hu man natu re an ti-lapsarian, post-lapsarian, glorified, etc.Jesus human natu re was susceptible to sin, but th e will was in the personJesus, who was divine so He couldnt sin.

13.1.7.3 From conception, the hum an nature w as omniscient, omnipotent,and omnipresent.13.1.7.4 Luke 2:52 The Spirit descend ed m ore and more upon Him andmoved H im more as time wen t on. He was more Spirit-filled as time wenton .

13.1.8 Tensions in Luthers Chr istology13.1.8.1 At the crucifixion: The deity withdrew and hid.The hu manitywas left alone, the devil had free access to Christ and th e deity withd rew itspow er and let the human ity fight alone.13.1.8.2 But: How then d id God suffer? How did the God of all eternity die?Are the two natu res separable?

13.1.9 He believed that the scholastics had m issed the wh ole point, so He d id nottry to iron out ph ilosophic problems with H is Christology.

13.2 John Calv in (1509-1564)13.2.1 Introduction

13.2.1.1 Comm entar ies, sermons,Institutes of the Christian Religion (1559)13.2.1.2 Affirmed the creed s13.2.1.3 Stressed Chr ists roles: proph et, pr iest, king. He works out hisunderstand ing of Jesus human natu re through these roles.13.2.1.4 Hu man natu re is the material cause of our salvation. Can animmaterial substance be a material cause? In Calvins mind, hu man n atureincludes having a bod y.


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13.2.2 Calvins Christology13.2.2.1 He w as p articularly concerned with App olinarianism andeuthychianism13.2.2.2 He takes issue with the mon oph ysite tend encies of Lutheranismsview that the hum an natu re is assumed into the divine. This becomes amajor point of controversy between Lutheranism and Calvinism.

13.2.2.3 Communicatio idiomatum is a figure of speech. Calvinsunderstand ing of how to attribute the divine attributes to Jesus: You cannotpred icate attributes of each natu re to the other.13.2.2.4 Communicatio operatiomunThe p roperties coincide in one person,but cannot be mu tually interpenetrated in the different natu res.13.2.2.5 Jesus role as mediator is the key to und erstanding Christs natu res.In order to be a mediator, Jesus wou ld have to be both God and man .13.2.2.6 Denied tha t the incarnation was necessary withou t sin.13.2.2.7 He d enies the passability of Jesus hu man nature.13.2.2.8 Rational will and appetitive w illJesus d id not w ant to suffer, butHis rational will determ ined to.

14. Sum mary of the historical ana lysis

14.1 The first through fifth ecum enical coun cils were correct in their analysis.14.2 The sixth and seventh ecumen ical councils and the scholastics probably said toomu ch. They pushed questions further than they should have beyond where thebiblical evidence and logical entailments could take them.14.3 Luther and Calvin retreat from th e scholastics, perhaps too far, but m aintainedthe ecumenical councils.14.4 The ground betw een the ecumen ical coun cils and the Reform ers is fertilegroun d for philosoph ical theology.

14.4.1 What is a person?14.4.2 What is a nature? What is a hum an natu re as opp osed to a divine nature?14.4.3 How does a body relate to a person and to a natu re?

15. Review of Metap hysics15.1 Properties15.1.1 This book is red . This is a statemen t of predication; the subject andpred icate both have to pick out something.15.1.2 The predicate picks out something that can be shared by more than onething. Properties are un iversals that are shared by multiple things, though theinstances of properties are different.15.1.3 Our norm al way of talking seems to commit us to things and un iversals,i.e., prop erties and ind ividu als.15.1.4 Particulars can have p roperties; and prop erties can have properties.15.1.5 Prop erties is a monad ic entity, i.e., it is instantiated in one thing . There isone thing that has a p roperty.

15.2 Relations

15.2.1 Relations are diatic or polyatic, i.e., there are m ultip le things involved .15.2.2 There are d ifferent kind s of relations.

15.2.2.1 Externa l relationThe relation is out side of the essential being. Thethings it is related to can be removed and not affect the thing itself.15.2.2.2 Essential relationThe r elation is internal to the essential beingitself, i.e., the things its related to cannot be removed without changing theessential being of the thing. Internal relations are ground ed in the na ture of athing.

15.3 Substances


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15.3.1 The subject of the sentence Grass is green picks out a k ind or species.15.3.2 Natu ral kind s are such in virtue of their natu re. Unnatu ral kinds are suchin virtue of convention.15.3.3 A natu ral kind can serve as a subject or a pred icate. When it serves as asubject, we tend to think of it as a substance. When it serves as a predicate, wetend to th ink of it as a property.

15.3.4 A kind p icks out a class un ited by a similarity of proper ties.15.3.5 A collection of properties that are un ited in a certain w ay in an individualconstitutes a substance.

15.4 Things15.4.1 Material things are d ifficult to define, but we are tem pted to say that aparticular space-time reg ion filled by a thing is a mater ial object. A thing is acollection of parts that is held together by some kind of unity relation, and theun ity relation changes d epend ing on wh at kind of thing it is.15.4.2 Aggregates are material things that are brou ght together for a p articularfunction. Aggregates are unified in virtue of the final cause, the function. Sostrictly speak ing, when we swap parts of an artifact it isnt the sam e object; bu tsince artifacts are iden tified in virtu e of its function, it is still the sam e object.

15.4.2.1 As an ar tifact, the Good Ship Theseu s is still the sam e ship even

when its parts are swap ped ou t.15.4.2.2 Artifacts are generally fun ctional things. It is constitu ted by asubjective property; it depend s on m inds.

15.4.4 Na tural form ation things have a different kind of un ity, that isnt entirelyfunctional.15.4.5 The unity of organisms is deeper than th e un ity of an ar tifact. We onlyassign the term substance to things that have a deep u nity. In the case ofbiological things, the un ity it has gives life.15.4.6 Mereological compoun dsa sum of parts. They have their partsessentially, therefore these things cannot have gap s in their identity. Aggregates,artifacts, and natu ral formations have their p arts contingently; they can gain,add , and lose parts and still be what they are. For this reason, these three things

can have temp oral gaps in their identity.15.4.6.1 One object can be und er two descriptions and fit und er differentcategories of things.15.4.6.2 A chunk of marble isnt the same chunk of marble if parts are takenaway to form a statue. In this case its a mereological compoun d. The goodship Theseus as a m ereological whole isnt the sam e ship w hen its pa rts arechanged because it has its par ts essentially.15.4.6.3 A statue is still the same statue when w e replace the arms and legswith identical ones because the statue is an artifact and has its partscontingent ly. As an artifact, the good sh ip Theseus is still the same shipwhen viewed as an ar tifact.15.4.6.4 Which way the object is viewed is a matter o f conven tion.

15.4.7 Kinds of un ity that give rise to substances: biological and compositional.

15.5 What possesses proper ties?15.5.1 Bare par ticularsA substr atum besides the substance that possesses theprop erties. Bare particulars have no prop erties whatsoever so they cannot servethe purpose of individuating.15.5.2 AristotelianA substance possesses properties. Some proper ties areessential to that substance and the unifying relation is internal; other p ropertiesattached to the substance are accidental.15.5.3 Substances are natu ral kinds that stam p ou t individu als like a cookiecutter, and the things stamp ed out have the same essential properties. And once


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it has been stamped out it has the prop erty of being self-iden tical (haecceities).Now you have an individual thing that is a member of a kind called a substance.15.5.4 Thus, kinds strad dle the ontological space between par ticulars andprop erties. They can be un iversals or particulars.

15.6 Relevance to Chr istology15.6.1 The nature of proper ties is to be un iversals that are instan tiated by

substances and other properties as individua ls.15.6.2 Substance can be used of a genus and app lies to all ind ividu als und er thatkind . If its used specifically its used of a kind that has essential prop erties.15.6.3 Na tures are essences minus the haecceity. A natu re is a kind in thegeneric sense. A natu re is a cookie cutter before it has stamped anything ou t.15.6.4 A person with tw o natu res is one that has two sets of essential propertiesthat are internally related.

15.7 Entity15.7.1 Two categories: abstract and concrete entities.

15.7.1.1 Abstract entities: p roperties, relations, propositions, nu mbers15.7.1.2 Concrete entities (not in the sense of material; rather in the sense ofparticular or individu al):

15.7.1.2.1 EventsThere is some d ifficulty m aking events en tities

because its notor iously d ifficult to give n ecessary and sufficientconditions for marking off one event from another.15.7.1.2.2 Time15.7.1.2.3 Place15.7.1.2.4 Limitboun daries, sur faces. There are physical and n on-ph ysical limits.15.7.1.2.5 Collections15.7.1.2.6 Privations15.7.1.2.7 Tropes15.7.1.2.8 Substance

15.7.1.2.8.1 Material (corporeal)15.7.1.28.2 Immaterial (incorporeal)

15.8 Substance15.8.1 Theres a difference between th inking of substance in a stu ffy way or athingy way.

15.8.1.1 Stuff is comp ositional, either material or imm aterial.15.8.1.2 Aristotle defines substance as a thing. It is a thing that hasindependen t existence; and that wh ich has properties but cannot be had byanything. It doesnt dep end on anyth ing for its existence.

15.8.2 A nature is a kind th at stamps out individu als. What it stamp s out arethings.15.8.3 Unity of substances

15.8.3.1 Theres a causal relation of compoun ds, such that d ifferent parts ofthis comp ound are held in dynamic equilibrium , such that the d isplacementof any one of the parts resu lts in the d isplacement of the w hole. This is a

physical un ity.15.8.3.2 The tightness of the ph ysical bond ing accoun ts for why we wan t tocall certain physical things substances.15.8.3.3 Mereological compoun ds and fundamen tal particles are substances.Certain artifacts are substances in a secondary sense dep ending on theirun ity. Natu ral formations are not substances. E.g., H2O is a substance, but alake is not a substance. Organisms are substances and the un ifying relation islife.

15.8.4 A natu ral substance kind (K) meets three cond itions.


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15.8.4.1 K is essential to wh atever instantiates it.15.8.4.2 K is the proper investigation for natu ral science or it figures in thenatural laws.15.8.4.3 K is objectively instan tiated, that is the instan tiation of K doesn tdep end on anything mental. Its instantiated apar t from intentions.

15.8.5 A non-natural substance kind , an artifact substance kind (A)

15.8.5.1 A is essential to whatever instan tiates it.15.8.5.2 A is not necessarily the p roper object of scientific inqu iry andprobably w ill not figure in any kind of natural laws.15.8.5.3 It is subjectively instan tiated. Whatever instan tiates A has anartificial function, determined by intentionality.

15.8.5 Imm aterial (non-natural) substance kinds

16. What is a hum an nature?16.1 Essential proper ties: E is an essential prop erty if in any relevantly similarworld S possesses E, where relevantly similar is itself relative to un iversal discourse(i.e., how we are conceiving of E).

16.1.1 First, we must determine the d iscourse that w e are using wh en referringto E.

16.1.2 This is the intuition dr iving the distinction between comm on proper tiesand u niversal prop erties.

16.1.2.1 Comm on properties are comm on iff there is some finite probability,wh ich is greater than .5 and less than 1, such that for any x, if x is a memberof that natu ral kind , then x has prop erty c. In other word s, this is a propertythat is comm on to most members of a natural kind.16.1.2.2 Universa l prop erties are comm on iff there is a finite probability of 1,such that for any x, if x is a m ember of that natu ral kind, then x has p ropertyc.16.1.2.3 So you can have universal properties that are not essential, butacciden tal. Ask: Is it possible for hu man beings to exist without thatproperty?

16.1.3 Merely N vs. fully N: N is merely P, but is not merely P; N m ay haveadd itional properties that are not essential to N. There are other properties inadd ition that m ay not be essential.16.1.4 This helps to diffuse m any of the objections to Chalcedon ian Chr istology.E.g., it is not essential, but comm on, to all hum an beings that they have twohuman p arents. Adam and Eve, and Jesus did not. This wou ld also declassifyclones as human beings.

16.2 A substance S has the essence or natu re of hu manity iff(df):16.2.1 S is a person (a soul). There are no human non-per sons. Person is thegenus, hu man is the species.16.2.2 S is or has been embod ied as a living organism of the natu ral kind homosapiens (with a micro-structural bluepr int, which marks it as a natu ral kind) suchthat

16.2.2.1 norm ally, S apprehends objective reality (universals and p articulars;tokens and types) perceptually16.2.2.2 Ss developm ent (the realization of Ss higher -order capacities) is (atleast partly) tied to the developm ent of Ss body

16.2.3 S possesses the faculty of spirit (a group ing of higher-ord er capacities torelate to God); an ad ditional capacity of human natu re add ed to the soulscapacity. There could be kind s of person w ho cannot relate to God.

17. D ivine natu re


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17.1 A substan ce S has the essence or nature of d ivinity iff(d f):17.1.1 S is a person (a soul):17.1.2 S necessarily coexemplifies all perfections (its not necessary to determinethe extension of the perfections)

17.2 If this is what d ivine natu re is and the previous is what hu man n ature is, theredoesnt seem to be a p roblem with a p erson exemplifying both sets of properties.

18. Persons18.1 What is it to be a per son?

18.1.1 Substancea soul18.1.2 Minda collection of capacities that d eliberates, intu its, reasons, etc.

18.1.2.1 Rationality18.1.2.2 Intentionality

18.1.2.2.1 Menta l states are always directed at an object18.1.2.2.2 Beliefs are directed at prop ositions18.1.2.2.3 Desires are d irected at m ental states, states of affairs18.1.2.2.4 Thoughts18.1.2.2.5 Consciousn ess and self-consciou sness

18.1.2.3 Affect

18.1.2.3.1 Emotions (feelings) about p ropositions (as opposed to a freefloating emotion w ithout an object, e.g., anxiety, seasickness). This is thesource of intu ition. There are states of affairs that the emotion is directedat, and these states of affairs can be u ncovered w ith careful analysis andcontain the objective facts that are subject to jud gment.18.1.2.3.2 All of these m ental states p lay a causal role in d ispositions andaction, and become a source of evidence for m aking jud gments.

18.1.2.4 Volition18.1.2.5 PerceptionThe capacity to acquire inform ation from objectivelyexisting reality18.1.2.6 Relational capacities are the functioning of more than one of themind capacities together.

18.1.2.7 Morality18.1.3 All of these faculties can be broken d own and furth er analyzed assubord inate capacities.

18.1.3.1 There are thousand s of capacities in the human soul depend ing onhow carefully we d o the analysis.18.1.3.2 There probably is not one way to break them d own .

18.2 Are these faculties necessary and sufficient to be a person? This is in the senseof a priori necessary, not a posteriori necessary.18.3 Could these personhood capacities be instantiated in other forms besideshuman?

18.3.1 Could it be instantiated in granite? No. Its logically possible, bu t notmetaph ysically possible because it doesnt have the material capability ofdeveloping the capacities.

18.3.2 Could it be instan tiated in an orchid? No.18.3.3 It must be instantiated in an organism that has the organ ic capacity toexpress these capacities.

18.4 Person cannot exist without being instantiated with a nature.

19. On e Person, Two Natu res?19.1 Is it possible for a single substance to have two distinct natures?

19.1.1 No, if the two natu res are such tha t they cannot be co-exemp lified.Nothing can be both a p erson and a nu mber at the same time.


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19.1.2 Yes, if the two natures exemplify possibly coexemplified properties.19.2 Are the divine and hum an natu re such that they can be exemp lified in aperson? To be hum an or divine is to be a person with some add itional properties.19.3 Is there any relation or entailment between the divine and h um an p ropertiesthat are contrad ictory?

19.3.1 The chief motiva ting factor for saying Jesus had two wills is to avoid

saying that everything Jesus did , the Father did (Not my will, but your s bedone). They located the w ill in the natu re. They took mind and will out ofper son. But if you d o that, its not clear you can m aintain the other capacities ofperson and th en the concept of person is vacuous.19.3.2 Thomas Morris seems to describe natu re in terms of consciousness, so thatthe d ivine consciousness could access the hu man consciousness, but not theother way.19.3.3 In the kenosis, Jesus chose to limit the exercise of His personal facultiesthrough his human nature, which includes a body. He d eveloped H isknowledge and recorded H is memories in the same w ay we d o, through ou rperceptions and th e use of our bod ies. So His capacities were necessarily limitedwh ile in a body. His consciousness was limited through H is human nature andbody.

19.4 If Jesus w as one person, having the capacities above (18), then as of theincarnation His capacities of person were worked ou t through H is human natureand voluntarily did not work through His divine nature.19.5 The personal substance is the basis for the hyposta sis; it is what joins thenatures.19.6 The volition resides in the personal substance, but it mu st be expressed througha nature. Being joined to a human natu re and bod y greatly restricts the ways thepersonal capacities are expressed.

19.6.1 Derivatively, we may be able to speak of a hu man will and a divine w ill.19.6.2 Therefore, Jesus single will was expressed in accord ance with H is hum annatu re, which had limited capacities to express the w ill. The request for the cupto pass was the divine mind know ing that the hum an nature w as too weak to

carry out the d ivine w ill. The hum an na ture brings the associated fears of painand suffering and desiring to escape.19.6.3 The spiritua l capacity to relate to God is in the hu man nature, so Jesus crywas the inability of the hu man spiritual capacity to relate to God in a u nifiedway.

19.7 Could Jesus have acqu ired justified false beliefs?19.7.1 If He limited H imself to forming beliefs the way all hum ans d o, it seems itwould be possible to form justified false beliefs. But th is seems intu itivelywrong.19.7.2 He op erated at th e maximal intellectual capacity a hu man can have, so Hewou ld not accept false beliefs, but instead withhold belief without correctjustification.19.7.3 If that is the case, then Jesus had a mu ch smaller stock of beliefs than m ost

humans.19.7.4 Or it cou ld be that since his spiritual capacity was maximal, that theFather and Spirit kept H im from forming false beliefs and gave H im informationto form beliefs most hu man s wou ldnt be able to form. Jesus prop hecies andmiracles were med iated through H is spiritual capacity.

19.8 It is possible that w ithout a limited, hum an body that human persons have acapacity for infinite knowledge.

20. Is God n ecessarily good?


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20.1 Three concept ions of good .20.1.1 Intrinsic desirabilitywhat w e should w ant for itself. This doesnt satisfywhat w e mean when w e say God is good.20.1.2 Plentitud e of beingwhatever it is better to be than not to be. Aqu inasuses this type of good in regard s to God as having all abstract perfections, butnot to refer to God as a good moral agent.

20.1.3 Moral conceptions20.1.3.1 Deontological goodnessdoing His moral du ty20.1.3.2 Sup ererogatory goodnessgoing above and beyond H is duty

20.2 The modality of Gods goodness20.2.1 God is wholly good . There is as a matter of fact no moral defect in Godscharacter, intentions, or actions. Contingently de re tru e.20.2.2 God is necessarily good . It is impossible that there be any m oral defect inGods character, intentions, or actions.

20.3 The necessity of Gods goodn ess20.3.1 Thomas Aquinas

20.3.1.1 The argument20.3.1.1.1 (1) One can only do what one sees as good .20.3.1.1.2 (2) To see evil as good is to be in error .

20.3.1.1.3 (3) God cannot be in error .20.3.1.1.4 (4) Therefore, God cannot see evil as good .20.3.1.1.5 (5) Therefore, God cannot do evil.

20.3.1.2 Problem: premise (1) seems false. The result of this argumen t is thatyou on ly do evil out of ignorance, which is a Platonic notion bu t not a Biblicalone.

20.3.2 William of Ockham20.3.2.1 The argument

20.3.2.1.1 (1) Necessarily, God does whatever God wills.20.3.2.1.2 (2) Whatever God wills is good .20.3.2.1.3 (3) Therefore, necessarily God does good .

20.3.2.2 Problems

20.3.2.2.1 God is good is a vacuous statem ent. Its purely definitional andhas no content.20.3.2.2.2 Euthyph ros d ilemmano objective grou nd ing for morality

20.3.3 Anselmian: Perfect being theory20.3.3.1 The argument

20.3.3.1.1 It is more perfect to be utter ly incapable of evil than to becapable but refrain from evil.20.3.3.1.2 God is whatever is it better to be than not to be.20.3.3.1.3 Therefore, God is utter ly incap able of evil.

20.3.3.2 Problem: moral freedom and pra iseworth inessOn this view, Goddoesnt have m oral freedom ; and if He isnt free not to do good , how can H ebe praiseworthy. Premise one seems to be problematic, though not false.

20.4 The objection from m oral freedom

20.4.1 The argument20.4.1.1(SLF) A moral agent S has (strong) libertarian freed om w ith respect toact A iff:

20.4.1.1.1 S does A on her own (autonomy).20.4.1.1.2 S could have done otherwise (alternate possibilities).

20.4.1.2 But if God is necessarily morally perfect, He could not have don eotherwise.20.4.1.3 Therefore, on SLF, God is not morally free.

20.4.2 Frankfu rt-style coun ter examp les call into qu estion alternate possibilities.


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20.4.3 Refram e the argumen t20.4.3.1 (WLF) A moral agent S has (weak) libertarian freed om w ith respectto act A iff:20.4.3.1 S does A on her ow n (auton omy)20.4.3.3 Therefore, on WLF, God can be necessarily good and morally free.

20.4.4 So moral freed om is compatible with necessary goodness.

20.5 The objection from moral praiseworthiness20.5.1 The argument

20.5.1.1 (1) A person is praisewor thy for an action only if he could h averefrained.20.5.1.2 (2) A necessarily good being cannot refrain from performing goodactions.20.5.1.3 (3) If God is necessarily good, then God cannot refrain fromperforming good actions.20.5.1.4 (4) Therefore, if God is necessarily good, God is not m orallypraiseworthy.20.5.1.5 (5) But God is morally pra iseworth y.20.5.1.6 (6) Therefore, it is not the case that God is necessarily good .

20.5.2 Problems

20.5.2.1 Prem ise (2) is ambiguous. A necessarily good being cannot refrainfrom performing good actions can mean either

20.5.21.1 (2a) A necessarily good being cannot refrain from performingany good actions wh atsoever. Or,20.5.2.1.2 (2b) A necessarily good being cannot refrain from p erformingthe good actions He in fact performs.

20.5.3 The argu men t rephrased20.5.3.1 (1) A person is praisewor thy for an action only if he could h averefrained from performing it.20.5.3.2 (2a) A necessarily good being cannot refrain from performing anygood actions whatsoever.20.5.3.3 (3a) If God is necessarily good, then God cannot refrain from

performing any good actions.20.5.3.4 (4) Therefore, if God is necessarily good, God is not m orallypraiseworthy. DNF20.5.3.5 (5) But God is morally pra iseworth y.20.5.3.6 (6) Therefore, it is not the case that God is necessarily good . DNF

20.5.4 Prem ise (2b) would yield the conclusion, but (2b) is false: Among God sgood actions are su pererogatory actions that He is free to refrain fromperforming

20.5.4.1 The only way th is argum ent w orks is to claim that a necessarily goodbeing must p erform every good act, which would mean acts like grace arerequired.20.5.4.2 God m ight be pra iseworth y not because of the necessity of Hisgoodness, but because His goodness flows from His character and prod uces

supererogatory acts.20.6 The objection from om nipotence

20.6.1 The argument20.6.1.1 (1) If God is necessarily good, then there is no possible world inwh ich He actualizes (some SOA) E.20.6.1.2 (2) If God is omnip otent, He has the power to actualize E.20.6.1.3 (3) If God has the pow er to bring about E, then there is a possibleworld in wh ich God actualizes E.20.6.1.4 (4) Therefore, either God is not omnipotent or not necessarily good.


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20.6.2 Problems20.6.2.1 There is an obvious contrad iction here, so will we give up H isgoodness or H is omn ipotence?20.6.2.2 Against (1): d istinguish between strong vs. weak actualization(Plantinga). The difference is this: strongly actualize the state of affairs ifyou actualize that state of affairs or actualize a state of affairs that d irectly

brings the original state of affairs abou t. Weak actualization is one in wh ichGod actualizes a state of affairs in w hich agents bring things about. Thepow er necessary for omnipotence is weak actualization, so God d oes notactualize E. But th is response d oesnt comport w ith omnipotence.20.6.2.3 Against (2): Om nipotence does not include the ability to doanything incompatible w ith the om nipotent beings essential natu re(Wierenga). We dont require an omnipotent being to do things that arelogically impossible or to do things incompatible w ith H is nature.20.6.2.4 Against (2): E is not metaphysically possible. Conceptua l possibilityisnt identical to logical or metaphysical possibility. (Morris) It doesnt mapeasily on either of the other two categories. Just because something can beconceived , doesnt mean it is possible. There are states of affairs that are notmetaph ysically possible because God is the basis of every possible world, and

by virtue of His being, He wou ld not bring them about. This is one of thebest responses.20.6.2.5 Against (3): God has the power, but because of His mora l goodnesscannot bring Himself to exercise it. (Swinbu rne) God does have the powerto bring about any conceivable state of affairs that is not self-contrad ictory,but He doesnt exercise that pow er of necessity. In his view, omn ipotence isan abstract pow er. Reason will always guide God to do the right thing;un like in our case we h ave desires that overcome the action-guidingpr inciples of reason . Gods character is imm utable. Denying (3) seems to bethe best way to go.

21. The imp eccability of Jesus

21.1 To be God, someth ing mu st be minimally O3 + C (the three omnis and creator).It is the three omn is that pose the problem for the incarnate Jesus.21.1.1 Omniscient: There doesn t seem to be any ra tional limit to the capacity ofhumans to know an infinite num ber of things, apart from the limitations of ourembod ied state. A creature can have this capacity yet never develop it to thefullest degree. So this doesn t pose a contrad iction for the incarnation . Jesusvolun tarily

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