chinese nuclear forces

8/14/2019 Chinese Nuclear Forces

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DF-3

China began work on a missile that could target the continental United States in

November 1961. The projected DF-3 ICBM was to have a 10,000 km range, using the

liquid oxygen and kerosene propellants used in the Soviet R-7 and the US Atlas.However, technical setbacks and the economic crisis produced by the Great Leap

Forward slowed the project, and in 1963 the DF-3 ICBM was canceled, with the DF-3

designation devolving to the DF-3 MRBM program.


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DF-5

The Chinese flight tested a vehicle with ICBM characteristics to a reduced range in

September 1971. The earliest possible IOC for an ICBM based on this vehicle was

projected by US intelligence in 1972 as being late 1974, but more likely a year or twolater.

Development problems evidently precluded initial deployment of the DF-5 as an

operational ICBM, but the space-launch version referred to by the Chinese as the FB-1

(Fengbao-Tempest) - was used as the booster for a series of five satellite shots that beganin July 1975 and concluded in December 1976. The rocket uses four first-stage gimballed

engines and one second-stage engine, all of which burn N2O4/UDMH. The Dongfeng-5

possessed the capability to hit targets in the western Soviet Union and the United States.

The absence of any space shots between January 1978 and September 1981 may well

have related to DF-5 testing as China prepared for the long range testing of itsexperimental ICBM. Four partial range tests were reported in 1979: 7 January, 15 July,

21 August, and 4 September, and there might have been one in October. The final test

shot was fired in February 1980.

By 1980 China had overcome the slowdown in nuclear development caused by the

Cultural Revolution and had some spectacular successes in its strategic weaponsprogram. Preparation for full-range tests base exercises at the Shuangchengzi site and

ship exercises in the Yellow Sea began in March 1980. Finally, on 18 and 21 May, two

long-range shots were made into the Pacific Ocean, where it was recovered by a naval

task force. There seems to be agreement that the first shot was a success, traveling

approximately 6,000 miles from the launch site to an area bounded by the Gilbert Islands,the Solomons, Fiji, and the New Hebrides, with splash-down occurring at 0230

Greenwich mean time. The second shot may well have been a failure, coming down

perhaps 800 miles off course.

When the DF-5 was first tested in September 1971, it had a range of 10,000 to 12,000

kms which allowed it to threaten the western portions of the United States. Beginning in1983 the Chinese inaugurated the improved DF-5A, with an increased of over 13,000 km

and a more accurate guidance system. The DF-5A upgrade increased the throw-weight of

the system from 3,000 kg to 3,200 kg.

As with the DF-4, initially the DF-5 was stored in a horizontal position in tunnels under

high mountains, and are launched immediately outside the mouth of the tunnel. Themissiles must be moved into the open and fueled prior to firing, an operational mode

dubbed chu men fang pao (shooting a firecracker outside the front door), with the fueling

operation apparently requiring about two hours. The initial deployment of a pair of DF-5s

in silos in Central China was completed in 1981. That portion of the DF-5A force that is

deployed in silos could be maintained in a ready-to-fire status. In order to enhance thesurvivability of these missiles, China has constructed a large number of decoy silos which

consist of shallow holes excavations with headworks that resemble operational silos.


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For many years almost all sources credited China as having only four DF-5s deployed in

silos, including the authoritative 1992 treatement by John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di,

which asserted that as of 1992 only four DF-5 missiles on alert. However, more recent

estimates suggest that some 8-11 were deployed as of 1995, and that at least 13 missileswere deployed at the end of 1997. According to the National Air Intelligence Center, as

of 1998 the deployed DF-5 force consisted of "fewer than 25" missiles. As of early 1999the total deployed DF-5 force was generally estimated at about 20 missiles. By mid-2000

some sources suggested that the total force was as many as 24 deployed missiles ["Inside

The Ring" By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough Washington Times July 28, 2000].

Although it is widely reported that the 5-megaton nuclear warheads for the DF-5/CSS-4nuclear missiles are not "mated" to the missiles, but rather stored nearby, some sources

suggest that US intelligence does not have a high confidence understanding of this

question ["Inside The Ring" By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough Washington Times

July 28, 2000]. Although it might be assumed that the DF-5 deployment complex would

include a nuclear weapons storage area, it is not evident that technical intelligence could

identify signatures to determine the precise whereabouts of such a small number ofnuclear weapons.

R&D on multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) was initiated as early as 1970.

On 20 September 1981 China launched three scientific satellites into space orbit from asingle booster, and many in the West mistakenly regarded this as indicating that China

might possess the technology to develop multiple, independently targetable reentry

vehicles (MIRVs). But the launch tested neither a MRV nor a MIRV, and indeed one of

the three satellites was merely attached to the tail-deck of the second stage.

The current force of DF-5A missiles is deployed with single warhead, but in November

1983 China inaugurated a DF-5 modification program to arm these ICBMs with MIRVedwarheads. Technical difficulties, however, have stalled the program. The DF-5A, able to

strike targets in the continental United States (CONUS), was the designated recipient of

the MIRVs, although there is no evidence that they have been deployed. Some sources

claim that at least four DF-5As have already been MIRVed, though it is generallyasserted that while MIRVing may occur within the next few years no DF-5s have yet

been fitted with MIRVed warheads.

Based on the DF-5A throwweight and warhead shroud the missile could be equipped

with a six reentry vehicles with each RV weighing 600 kgs (the size of the single

warhead on the DF-21). The DF-5A second stage apparently has four vernier engineswhich reportedly fire for 190 seconds after the main missile engine cuts off. Thus the DF-

5A could direct a warhead bus over a fairly large arc covering an array of aim points. But

the exact status of this program cannot be confirmed based on open sources.


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Specifications

ContractorChinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology -

CALT

Operator Second Artillery Corps

Basing Luoning

Wuzhai

Xuanhua

Tongdao

Configuration Three Stages

Length [meters] 32.6

Diameter [meters] 3.35

Mass [kilograms] 183,000Propellant Storable liquid

Guidance Inertial

First Flight 1971

IOC 1981

Deployment Silo

Range (km) 12,000 - 15,000

Re-entry Vehicle Mass

(kg)3,000 - 3,200

Warhead Yield 2 MT

CEP 500 - 3,500 meters

Launch Preparation

Time30-60 minutes
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DF-6

In March 1965 the First Academy (Carrier Rocket Research Academy) proposed a plan

to build "four types of missiles in eight years" (banian sidan). On 31 December 1965 the

scope of this plan was enlarged with a fifth missile, a fractional orbital bombardmentsystem (FOBS). This system would launches a warhead into very low orbit, less than 100

miles above earth. Before completion of first orbit, a retro-rocket retards the speed of the

warhead, which hits the target with only a few minutes warning. Based on reports that the

Soviet Union was developing a FOBS, China undertook a study of a three-stage DF-6,

which would achive a FOBS capability by adding a third stage to the DF-5. In August1970 it was planned that the DF-6 become operational by 1974. However by 30 October

1973 technical problems intervened forcing the cancellation of the DF-6.


8/61

DF-22

The DF-14 program, initiated in October 1973, was to be a two-stage storable liquid

propellant missile capable of delivering a 700kg payload over 8,000km. The relatively

small DF-14 was intended to be road-mobile, with a rapid targeting fire control system.The DF-14 program was delayed in September 1975 by the higher priority DF-4 and DF-

5 programs. And on 31 August 1978 the DF-14 resumed under the new name DF-22 [also

known as Project 202]. However in 1984 the Central Military Commission ordered a shift

from liquid to solid rocketry and a slowdown of the DF14/22 project, based in part on the

breakthrough in large-diameter solid rocket motors achieved in December 1993. By thebeginning of 1995 the DF-14/22 was cancelled, ending China's liquid-propellant ballistic

missile development efforts.


9/61

DF-31

The newest generation of Chinese strategic missile, including the Dong Feng-31, will

narrow the gap between current Chinese, US and Russian ballistic missile designs. This

system is a solid-fueled, three-stage mobile missile with a range of 8000 km carrying a700 kg, one-megaton warhead. The DF-31 limited-range ICBM will give China a major

strike capability that will be difficult to counterattack at any stage of its operation, from

pre-flight mobile operations through terminal flight phases. As with the JL-1/DF-21

combination, the DF-31 and JL-2 are land-based and sea-based variants of the same

missile. The cancelled DF-25 conventionally armed IRBM was to have been based on thefirst two stages of the DF-31, and the DF-41 long-range ICBM will use these two stages

with a large-diameter third stage. Development of these missiles was accelerated

following the successful test of their common 2m-diameter solid rocket motor in late

1983. The missile is apparently comparable in size and performance to the American

TRIDENT C-4 long-range multiple-warhead three-stage solid fuel missile missile that is

launched from submerged submarines.The DF-31 has a range of about 5,000 miles, sufficient to hit targets along the entire West

Coast of the United States and in several northern Rocky Mountain states. It is believed

to incorporate design aspects similar to those of current generation Russian missiles.These could include upgraded mobility for the transporter-erector launcher [TEL],

advanced materials for the booster and payload, use of penetration aids such as decoys or

chaff, and an improved solid propellant.

The DF-31 is being jointly developed by China Aerospace Corporation, the research

institute of the 2d Artillery Corps, and other scientific research organizations. In March1991 the CMC assigned the task of developing and testing the DF-31 to the Second

Artillery Corps, since the new missile was expected to have a limited operationalcapability as soon as its design was finalized.

The DF-31 development program is highly ambitious, and has presented Beijing with

substantial challenges. China has experienced difficulties in casting the large solid fuelmotors for the DF-31, and ensuring an adequate seal between the fuel and the booster

casing. The DF-31 is in the late stage of development following various delays, and is

expected to be deployed about the turn of the century, based on the recent completion of

silo construction at the Wuzhai Missile and Space Test Center. As of 1996 it was

expected that the DF-31 would enter full service by 1998. By 1999 it was evident thatoperational deployment of the DF-31 was expected as early as 2002 or 2003.

The details of the testing history of the DF-31 remain obscure. While the open source

literature contains a number of references to tests associated with the DF-31 program, as

of 1998 the National Air Intelligence Center characterized the DF-31 as "not yet tested."

Given the evident challenges associated with the DF-31 program, and the variety ofoperational missiles that are expected to derive from this development effort, it is

plausible that there have been a number of flight tests of components associated with the

DF-31 prior to an all-up full range test of the complete DF-31 missile.


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It is reported that the new missile was test-fired for the first time on 29 April 1992.

Because of quality problems in its components, the missile exploded after launch. The

second launch also failed due to similar problems. Subsequently four other missiles were

test-fired successfully, beginning in June 1995. Tests on 10 November 1995 and 10January 1996 possibly included endoatmospheric reentry decoys. The fourth successful

flight test of the DF-31 was conducted on December 28, 1996 from the Shanxi base incentral China.

The missile was observed on a launch pad at Wuzhai in mid-October 1997, and a flight

test was conducted soon thereafter. In October 1997 the DF-31 also underwent tests

simulating launch from nuclear-missile-submarine tubes. An "ejection" (soft launch) testwas conducted in December 1998. On 02 August 1999 China successfully tested a DF-31

launched from the PLA Second Artillery base in Wuzhai Prefecture (Shanxi Province),

with impact point somewhere in Lop Nor (Xinjiang Province). Chinese preparations for

the DF-31 test began during the second half of 1998. The US deployed the tracking ship

USS Observation Island to the Western Pacific to monitor the launch, but the PRC

missile was not fired seaward.

The 50th Anniversary National Day parade on 01 October 1999, the largest in the past

half a century, featured advanced weapons and equipment involving 11,000 soldiers in 17

ground phalanxes and 25 vehicles formations, and ten echelons consisting of 132warplanes. The DF-31 was included in the parade, though it was in a large cannister that

completely enclosed the missile.

Once DF-31 deployment begins, China is expected to decommission its CSS-3 ICBMs.

China will then be on its way to a ballistic missile force based around road-mobile

systems which will greatly improve Chinese nuclear ballistic missile survivability and

will complicate the task of defeating the Chinese threat.

Improved mobility is needed for the DF-31 TEL. Currently this TEL is probably

restricted to improved surfaces. Improved chassis features will in turn improve off-road

capabilities, increasing the number of potential deployment locations. Such

improvements will increase system survivability by making the missile more difficult tolocate. US intelligence has photographed a Belarussian six-axle mobile missile TEL

[transporter-erector launcher] at the DF-31 production facility in Nanyuan, near Beijing.

The Belarussian MAZ launcher is the chassis used for former Soviet SS-20 intermediate-

range ballistic missiles. The mobility of the MAZ vehicle is significantly better than that

of heavy Chinese vehicles. It is unlikely the Chinese will simply convert the Belarussianlauncher to a DF-31 launcher, but rather they would probably will adopt some of its

features, including all-wheel independent suspension, higher ground clearance, driver-

controlled central tire-inflation systems, and large tires. The Chinese will probably

reverse-engineer the MAZ vehicle to better understand its superior characteristics, which

can then be incorporated into the existing DF-31 TEL [transporter-erector launcher]design to enhance its mobility and performance.


11/61

The DF-41, a 3-stage 12,000km-range missile similar to the American Minuteman and

the Russian Topol SS-25, will apparently be developed using the first two stages of the

DF-31 along with a much larger third stage. The larger third stage and longer range of the

DF-41 is made possible by the fact that, unlike the DF-31, the size of the DF-41 is notconstrained by the requirement that it be fitted into a submarine launch tube. The

cancelled 1,700km-range DF-25 ground mobile missile was developed using the first twostages of the DF-31.

SpecificationsContractor Academy of Rocket Motors Technology - ARMT


Basing Tai-Hang

Wuzhai

Configuration Three Stage

Length [meters] 10+


Mass [kilograms] 20,000+

Propellant Solid

Guidance Inertial

First Flight 29 April 1992

IOC 2000

Deployment Mobile

Range (km) 3,000 - 8,000


(kg)700 kg

Warhead Yield1 @ 0.35 - 1.0 MT or

3 @ 50-100 KT

CEP (meters) 300-500 ??

Launch Preparation

Time 10-15 minutes
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DF-41

The three-stage solid-fuel DF-41 is larger than the DF-31 missile, and has a range of up

to 12,000 kilometers. While no information has been published concerning the

configuration of this missile, the most straightforward path towards its developmentwould be the addition of an enlarged third stage to the DF-31 ICBM. The larger third

stage and longer range of the DF-41 is made possible by the fact that, unlike the DF-31,

the size of the DF-41 is not constrained by the requirement that it be fitted into a

submarine launch tube. The DF-41 strategic weapons system will have a mobile launch

capability providing greatly improved survivability compared with previous Chineseintercontinental missiles. It is anticipated that the DF-41 will be delivered to the 2d

Artillery around the year 2010.

In the absence of flight testing, the final operational configuration of this solid fueled

missile remains uncertain, particularly with respect to the length of the third stage.

However, this derivative of the DF-31 would be unlikely to have a throwweight in excessof 1000 kgs, and most estimates are in the range of 800 kg. Some estimates anticipate

that, as with previous Chinese ICBMs, the DF-41 will carry only a single warhead [with a

0.35 - 1.0 MT yield]. In any event, depending on the weapon's yield, it seems unlikely

that China would be able to mount more than a few lower-yield [50-100 KT ?] RVs onthis ICBM. The American Minuteman III has 3 RVs and a throwweight of 1100 kgs at

12,900 kms, while the MX Peacekeeper carries 10 RVs and has a throwweight of 3950

kgs at 11,000 kms. Both American missiles carry warheads with yields of a few hundred

kilotons.



Basing

Configuration Three Stage

Length [meters] ~15?


Mass [kilograms] 30,000??

Propellant Solid

Guidance Inertial

First Flight xx

IOC 2010?

Deployment Silo or mobile
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Range (km) 10,000 - 12,000


(kg)800-1,000 [?]

Warhead Yield1 @ 0.35 - 1.0 MT or

3-6 @ 50-100 KT

CEP (meters) 700 - 800 ??

Launch Preparation

Time3-5 minutes


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JL-1 [CSS-N-3]

The JL-1 [CSS-N-3] is a two-stage solid-propellant submarine-launched ballistic missile

deployed on the Type-092 Xia class submarines. The Ju Lang-1 [or "Giant Wave-1"]

missile is a sea-based variant of the land-based ground-mobile DF-21. JL-1 is ejectedfrom a submerged submarine with the first-stage engine igniting after the missile has

emerged from the water. The first successful test of the 1.4m-diameter solid-rocket

engine for the JL-1 came in early 1978. The first test launch of the two stage CSS-NX-3

missile took place on 30 April, 1982 from submerged pontoon near Huludao (Yellow

Sea). The first successful launch of the JL-1 was achieved on 12 October 1982, from aGolf Class trials submarine, marking a major milestone in a development program that

had been initiated in March 1967. The second was launched on 12 October 1982 . The

first firing from Xia was in 1985 and was unsuccessful and it was not until 27 September

1988 that a satisfactory launch took place. Although the missile put to sea as early as

1983, it did not become fully operational until the successful test firing from submerged

Xia in September 1988.


Configuration Two Stage



Mass [kilograms] 14,700

Propellant SolidGuidance Inertial

First Flight 12 October 1982

IOC 1988

Deployment type-092 SSBN

Range (km) 1,700

Re-entry Vehicle Mass(kg)

600

Warhead Yield 200-300 KT

CEP (meters) 300-400

CEP (meters)
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JL-2 (CSS-NX-4)

The new JL-2 (CSS-NX-4) SLBMs will carry either 3 or 4 MIRV (90kT each) or a single

warhead with a yield of 250-1000 kT over a range of 8,000km. The missile is the sea-

based variant of the DF-31 land-mobile long-range missile. Development of thesemissiles was accelerated following the successful test of their common 2m-diameter solid

rocket motor in late 1983. The missile is apparently comparable in size and performance

to the American TRIDENT C-4 long-range multiple-warhead three-stage solid fuel

missile missile that is launched from submerged submarines.

The prospects for the deployment of this missile remain obscure, given the protracteddevelopment effort of the associated DF-31, the initial deployment of which has slipped

from 1998 to around 2003. Also worthy of note is the evident absence of public reports of

the start of construction of the Type 094 submarine that would be needed for the JL-2

missile. Construction of this submarine would constitute a leading indicator for the JL-2's

deployment schedule, since several years would be required for submarine construction,and probably an additional year or two for shake-down trials of the submarine, and

testing of the JL-2 from the submarine.


Confi guration Three Stage

Length [meters] 10+


Mass [kilograms] 20,000+

Propellant SolidGuidance Inertial

First Flight 19

IOC 19

Deployment Type 094 SSBN
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Range (km) 8,000


(kg)700 kg

Warhead Yield3 or 4 MIRV @ 90 kT

1 @ 250-1000 kT

CEP (meters) 500 ??


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Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM)

China is developing land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) for theater warfighting and

strategic attack. These cruise missiles seem to have a relatively high development priority

to ensure that Chinese forces will have greater conventional firepower. Long-range cruisemissiles probably will also be used to bolster the viability of Chinese military deterrence.

The first LACM design produced probably will be air-launched from Chinese bombers

and should be operational early in the next century. China could develop a sea-launched

version for use on either submarines or surface combatants. Almost no hard data is

available concerning this new weapon system, though various sources have providedfragmentary accounts.

Chinese LACM R&D is aided by an aggressive effort to acquire foreign cruise missile

technology, particularly from Russia. China also seeks enabling technologies and

subsystems from the United States and other foreign countries. It has been reported that

that China transported cruise missile production facilities from Russia to a location in thevicinity of Shanghai in 1993, and recruited cruise missile engineering specialists from

Russia in 1995 and. It is also reported that China has obtained technical data concerning a

Russian cruise missile guidance system.

The guidance system represents the most significant challenge for a long-range cruisemissile program. China would require an extensive database of accurate topographic

information to use terrain comparison (TERCOM) guidance. But TERCOM would

probably be relatively ineffective in areas such as the South China Sea, which present

few navigational reference points. Published reports suggest that GPS would initially be

used as the primary guidance system, possibly to be supplemented subsequently with

TERCOM.

The potential use of the American GPS system would render this system vulnerable to

jamming of the unencrypted civil signal (CA code) from GPS satellites within view of the

Chinese area of operations, or to local jamming and spoofing in the target area. Chinese

cruise missiles could still find their targets using intertial navigation system [INS]technology, but without GPS updates they would be significantly less accurate.


20/61

Project 629 GOLF

Initial Chinese efforts to to create a sea-launched nuclear-missile system used two large

Project 629 GOLF missile-armed diesel-electric submarines and seven R-11F liquid-

propellant missiles which had been transferred from the USSR in the early 1960's. Butwork on these sea-launched missiles encountered a vaariety of problems. By the early

1970's China recognized that continuation of the Project 629 effort was pointless.

Chinese development of a nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine began with a

single GOLF class submarine. This conventionally powered ballistic missile boat was

committed as a test platform role in developing a new missile of Chinese design. By 1972US intelligence had evidence of land based ejection facilities as well as construction of an

off-shore tube launcher for underwater ejection tests.


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Type 09-1

Work started on the Type 09-1 Han class nuclear powered attack submarine in the late

1950s, though the first unit was not completed until 1974. With a fully loaded

displacement of 5000 tons, this class is armed with six 533mm torpedoe tubes. The lastthree boats of the class were erroneously reported to have been lengthened by eight

meters to accommodate tubes for six YJ-1 SSM launchers to the rear of the sail. All five

units of this class are deployed with the North Sea Fleet. The Han-class SSNs are noted

for problems, including high internal radiation levels and an inability to fire missiles

while submerged, which compromise their operational effectiveness and their wartimeutility against ASW-competent adversaries.

SpecificationsDisplacement 5,500 ton

Length m

Beam m

Drought mSpeed knots dive

Missiles

Torpedoes 6 - 533 mm bow tubes

Units401

402


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403404

405


23/61

Type 92 Xia

The Chinese designed and built Type-091 HAN class submarine began sea trials in

August 1971. The HAN class submarine is a nuclear powered torpedo attack boat. While

this class boat greatly improved the Chinese Navy's distant defense capabilities againstenemy nuclear equipped surface forces, one of its most significant features was that it

served as a stepping stone in the development of a Chinese nuclear powered, submarine

launched ballistic missile (SSBN) force. Such a force would enhance Peking's assurance

of an effective retaliatory capability, as well as strengthening her deterrent posture.

In 1981 China launched the Xia-class SSBN #406, derived from the Han-class SSN, withthe hull lengthened to accommodate the missile tubes. The Type-092 became operational

in 1983, though missile firings conducted in 1984 and 1985 were unsatisfactory due to

fire control problems which were not resoloved until until 1988.

The Xia class SSBN was initially armed with 12 JL-1 (CSS-N-3) SLBMs.A major update

of the class started in 1995 to fit the new JL-2 SLBM system, with the upgrade expected

to be completed in 1998. The JL-2 (CSS-NX-4) SLBMs is reported to carry 3 or 4 MIRV(90kT each) or a single 250kt warhead with a range of 8,000km.

Operations have been limited and the Xia has never sailed beyond Chinese regional

waters. Despite a potential for operations in the Pacific Ocean, capabilities would be verylimited against modern Western or Russian ASW capabilities.

A second hull was launched in 1982, but the status of this boat remains uncertain. It is

certainly not currently in service, with unsubstantiated reports claiming it was lost in a

1985 accident.

A replacement design is under development which will be equiped with the new JL-2

SLBM system.


24/61

SpecificationsDisplacement 6500-8000 ton

Length 120 m

Beam 10 m

Drought 8 m

Speed 22 knots dive

Missiles SLBM - 12 JL-1 or JL-2



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Type 093

The ONI new Type 93 SSN will be similar to Russian second generation designs such as

the Victor III. The launch of the initial unit of this class from the Bohai Shipyard is

expected around the year 2000. As with the Song SSK, the new submarine willincorporates a hydrodynamically efficient hull form, a single shaft and a highly skewed

7-bladed propeller. The Type 09-3 it is expected to deploy submerged-launch anti-ship

cruise missiles, possibly a follow-on to the C801s, as well as the projecte Land Attack

Cruise Missile.

Specifications

Displacement ton

Length m

Beam m

Drought m

Speed knots dive


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Missiles LACM



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Type 94

A new design (type 094) has been planned and is expected to begin production between

2003-2005. Incorporating some Russian technology, the Type 094 is expected to be a

dramatic improvement over the sole Xia class SSBN, with improved quieting and sensorsystems, and a more reliable propulsion system. Other improvements in sonar,

propulsion, training, and the application of quieting techniques will contribute to a

significant improvement in the capabilities of Chinas submarine fleet. The overall size of

the Chinese submarine force will decline as older boats are scrapped and new ones are

built at a slower pace. But there is unconfirmed speculation that as many as a dozen ofthese new boats may be eventually constructed, though other estimates suggest that 4-6 or

6-8 boats may be constructed.

Plans to deploy this class of nuclear powered SSBNs are said to have been delayed due to

problems with the nuclear reactor power plants. As of late 1999 there is an evident

absence of public reports of the start of construction of the Type 094 submarine. Severalyears would be required for submarine construction, and probably an additional year or

two for shake-down trials of the submarine, and testing of the JL-2 from the submarine.

Each of the Type 094 SSBNs will mount 16 JL-2 ballistic missiles (DF-31s) with a range

of 8000 kms. When deployed, this missile will allow Chinese SSBNs to target portions ofthe United States for the first time from operating areas located near the Chinese coast.

Equipped with the JL-2 missiles, the Type 094 SSBNs would only have to patrol just to

the northeast of the Kuril Islands to hold about three-fourths of the United States at risk.


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Specifications

Displacement tonLength m

Beam m

Drought m

Speed knots dive

Missiles SLBM - 16 JL-2



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DF-2 / CSS-1

The first Chinese ballistic missile to become operational, designated the CSS-1 by the

United States and Dong Feng (DF) or East Wind 2 by the Chinese, was probably a

modified R-5 [SS-3] powered by a YF-1 storable-propellant motor. Although the firstDF-2 test on 21 March 1962 failed, a successful test flight was conducted on 29 June

1964 following a major redesign of the system which included a reduction of the liftoff

thrust from 45.5 tons to 40.5 tons and a reduction in range to 1,050 km. The original DF-

2 design was modified in 1964, with the new DF-2A having a design range of 1,250 km

with a 1,500 kg payload [the 12-KT nuclear warhead weighs 1,290 kg and the reentry-vehicle weighs an additional 200 kg]. Test launches continued throughout the period with

this system furnishing the delivery vehicle for the first, and to date only, missile delivered

test shot, on 27 October 1966 (CHIC 4). The DF-2A became operational with a nuclear

warhead in 1966.

Following an intensified and apparently successful testing of the DF-2 MRBM in 1966,little activity was observed by US intelligence relating to this system from the fall of

1966 through early 1969. During that time there were occasional exercises and possible

indications of a few firings but no firm evidence of troop training. At the Wuvei missile

school, no equipment was observed and some type of construction which had begun in1956 continued at a very slow pace through at least 1969. A few firings from October

1966 through mid-1968 were probably associated with missile modifications. It appeared

that the Chinese had no intentions at that time of deploying the DF-2, although it was

within their capability,and were beginning to concentrate their resources on developing

an IRBM.

However, deteriorating border relations with the Soviets in 1968 may have caused theChinese to rethink their missile strategy for deploying the DF-2. In August 1968, the lull

was broken with the appearance of possible DF-2 troop training exercises at the

Shuangchengtzu Launch Complex A. On several occasions during the remainder of the

year, support equipment was visible at the launch complex. There were 14 confirmedcrew-training firings through early 1972.

The picture began to change in 1969-1970, as evidence accumulated of renewed DF-2

activity. It appeared reasonably certain that troop training, involving live firings from

Shuangchengtzu, and possibly classroom and missile handling instruction at Wuwei, was

underway at least by the spring of 1969 if not by August 1968.

The Chinese began troop training firings of the DF-2 MRBM system at least by the

spring of 1969 in preparation for deployment. Around the time the DF-2 achieved initial

operational capability (IOC), the Zhenbao/Demansky Island conflict flared up (March

1969) and then spread from the Ussuri River along the border into Central Asia, raising

the prospect of a Soviet strike into China. This prospect was supported by a widespreadrumor that the USSR was considering a "surgical strike" on the Chinese nuclear testing

facilities in Xinjiang.


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The DF-2 was transportable (but not tactically mobile), and Chinese photographs indicate

that it was deployed in long caravans consisting of the launcher and its support and

fueling vehicles. These same photographs show what appear to be an unusually large

number of personnel associated with the launch process. The missile is towed on aflatbed launcher to the site. It is then elevated into its firing position through what appears

to be a lengthy and complicated process. Quite likely the DF-2 with its multiple fueltrucks was the subject of a Chinese broadcast which applauded a "fueling squadron" for

reducing fueling time from 10 to 6 hours for an undesignated missile. Deployment of this

system, begun in 1969-70, appears to have stabilized at about 50 weapons in the mid1970s. Production of the DF-2A ceased at the beginning of 1970. The DF-2 was removed

from the inventory of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) in 1979 and

replaced with the more modern DF-3 and DF-21 systems.

SpecificationsFirst Test 1963

Firings as of 1972 35-40

IOC 1966-1970

Range (km) 1,250


(kg)1,500

Warhead Yield 12 KT or 3 MT

CEP (km) 2-4

Propellant CryogenicDeployment Soft

Configuration Single Stage




Guidance Inertial

Launch Preparation

Time 150-180 minutes


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DF-3A / CSS-2

The second booster to emerge from China's program, the CSS-2/DF-3, was designed to

be China's first "modern" missile. The first Chinese MRBM, resembled the Soviet R-12

(SS-4) missile in its design and specifications, although Moscow refused to sell the R-12to China or provide technical data on the system. As with the R-12, the DF-3 used

storable liquid propellants and a cluster of four engines with a total lift-off thrust of 64

tons. The development of the missile, which began in September 1958, proved more

difficult than expected, and based upon its tactical-technical specifications, this missile

had a number of substantial shortcomings. Modifications in 1964 to the designrequirement for this missile, which was initially designated the DF-1, resulted in the

development of the longer-range DF-3. With a height of approximately 67 feet and a

girth of eight feet, the DF-3 was designed to be silo-based rather than transportable. Early

firings of the DF-3 were from Shuangchengtzu during 1967 and then moved to Wuchai

for longer-range testing in 1969, just as the DF-2 was going into series production.

The first photographic evidence of CSS-2 training was obtained by US intelligence in

November 1970. This training was conducted at Wuwei is continuing at this time. Live

firings of this missile were conducted from a launch facility at Wuchai, southwest of

Peking, and possibly represented training exercises beginning in mid-1969. It is probablethat China deployed a small number of DF-3 IRBMs beginning in late 1971. Though no

firm evidence of such deployments was available at the time, 1972 imagery indicated the

probably imminent deployment at two separate locations in China. This second

generation Chinese missile improved both range and reaction time. As a silo-deployed

missile, the DF-3 rocket would be prefueled, providing much quicker reaction time thanthe DF-2.

The DF-3 provided the first stage for the follow-on CSS-3/DF-4 IRBM.

It also provided the first stage of China's first space launch vehicle, dubbed CSL-1 in the

West and Changzheng 1 (CZ-I) or Long March 1 by the Chinese. The space booster

developed from the DF-3 launched China's first two successful space satellites. In April1970, the three-stage CZ-1 launched China's first successful space satellite. The first two

stages used liquid fuel, the third stage solid propellant. The CZ-1 also launched a satellite

in March 1971 the last until 1975, when a new series was begun.

There are at least two versions of the DF-3. The initial model had a range of about 2,650

kilometers and carried a single nuclear warhead weighing 2,150 kilograms. During 1983and 1984 a range extension program on the DF-3 increased the range of the DF-3 to

2,800 km [some sources report the range as up to 4,000 kilometers]. In addition,

according to some reports the missiles were modified to carry three nuclear warheads, all

probably in the 50-100 kT range, though lower yields have been suggested. Of a total of

some 100 DF-3 missiles, about 80 are of the improved DF-3A version which wasdeployed beginning in 1986.


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The DF-3 normally has a range of 2,780 kilometers, with a maximum altitude of 550

kilometers. With depressed trajectory, the DF-3 travels 1,550 kilometers at 100

kilometers altitude.

In 1987 China sold several dozen (reportedly between 36 and 60) outmoded DF-3

missiles to Saudi Arabia, minus their nuclear warheads.

An estimated 90-120 DF-3s were deployed in the 1980s, and some greater number were

manufactured. The CSS-2 is Chinas primary regional missile system. A road-

transportable, liquid-fueled IRBM, it can be launched from either permanent launch pads

or from portable launch stands. As of late 1997 China had about 40 DF-3 refire-capablelaunchers at six field garrisons and launch complexes. Many of those launchers are being

converted to handle new, solid-fuel DF-21 [CSS-5 Mod 1] launchers and missiles. The

number of CSS-2 sites will likely be reduced, since the United States no longer operates

bases in the Philippines, and DF-15 [M-9] short-range missiles deployed along the

eastern coast can be used to cover targets in Taiwan. The DF-21 deployments have been

limited to areas closer to China's borders to ensure adequate target coverage of areaspreviously covered by the DF-3. In areas deeper inside China, where longer range is

necessary for target coverage, DF-3 activities are relatively high, indicating the missile

could remain in service in these regions until new missiles such as the DF-21 [CSS-5

Mod 2] are deployed. Once the DF-21 deployments are adequately under way, the CSS-2will likely be removed completely from service, perhaps by 2002.

Specifications


CALT


Basing CURRENT BASES

Dalong

Datong

Dengshahe

Haiyan

Jianshui

Kunming

Lianxiwang

Tonghua Yidu

FORMER BASES

Dianwei

Fengrun

Liujikou

Xi'an

Xuanhua

First Test 1966

Firings as of 1972 14-16

IOC 1971

Range (km) 3,000 - 4,000
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Throw-weight (kg) 2,000

Yield

1 @ 700-3000 KT

3 @ 50-100 KT

3 @ 10-20 KT ???

conventional HE

Propellant Storable

Deployment Soft


Length [meters] 24



Guidance Inertial

CEP (meters) 1,000 - 4,000

Launch Preparation

Time120-150 minutes
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DF-4 [the "Chingyu" missile]

The two-stage DF-4 (CSS-3) limited-range ICBM was designed initially to hit the US

base at Guam and later modified to increase its range to 4750 kms so as to be able to

strike Moscow. The launcher is a DF-3 with an added upper stage designed to providepower for boosting a 2,200 kilogram 3-MT warhead over a range of 5,500-6,000

kilometers. The first tests of this system were conducted from Jianshui [Chingyu] in

November 1970 and 1971 to an impact area 2,050 nautical miles away. Continued testing

and possible deployment were reported over the succeeding years. The testing programs

clearly indicated that China had the potential to deploy a missile capable of reachingEuropean Russia, but only limited deployment occurred. In 1972 US intelligence

estimated an IOC for this system as being expected in 1974 or 1975. Series production of

the DF-1 and DF-2, along with development of the DF-5 might have stretched China's

RDT&E capabilities to the limit, resulting in a low priority for deployment of what may

have been a marginally effective missile.

Deployment actually began in 1975-76, but only four DF-4s were believed to be in placeby 1984; and one report stated that these launchers were without warheads at the time. An

estimated 30 DF-4s have been constructed for ballistic missile use. By 1995 between 10

to 16 were deployed, and by 1997 estimates of the deployed force ranged as high as 20missiles.

Two launch configurations exist for the CSS-3: a rollout-to-launch site and an elevate-to-

launch silo. Many of the DF-4s are stored in tunnels under high mountains, and are

launched immediately outside the mouth of the tunnel. The missiles must be moved into

the open and fueled prior to firing, an operational mode dubbed chu men fang pao(shooting a firecracker outside the front door), with the fueling operation apparently

requiring about two hours.

Specifications


CALT


Basing Da Qaidam

Delingha

Sundian

Tongdao

Xiao Qaidam

First Test 1970

Firings as of 1972 2

IOC 1974-79
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Range (km) 4,500 - 7,000

Re-entry Vehicle

Weight (kg)2,000

Yield 2-3 MT

Propellant Storable

Deployment Hard


Length [meters] 28



Guidance Inertial

CEP (meters) 1,400 - 3,500Launch Preparation

Time60-120 minutes
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DF-11 [CSS-7]

The DF-11 (M-11 / CSS-7) is the Chinese replacement for the Scud-series of missiles. As

of late 1999 the US estimated that China had deployed 40 DF-11s, with an eventual force

goal of as many as 500 short-range missiles by 2005.It was originally shown at the 1987 Beijing air show as a two-stage missile with 1000

kms range carrying a 400-500 kilogram payload. This M-18 missile had the longest range

of any of the current M-series missiles. The M-series missiles all use solid fuel, and

operational preparation time is short. They are all transported by highly-mobile cross-

country trucks which have the capacity to launch the missiles. Due to MTCRconsiderations, China exported the M-11 system variant to Pakistan as a single-stage,

solid-fueled missile with a range of 120-295 kms carrying a 500 kg (or perhaps 800 kg)

warhead.

Although the DF-11 has a range of 300 km, the Chinese continued work on a version

with a longer range. China's 50th anniversary military parade on 01 October 1999 markedthe first public Chinese display of a new version of the M-11 short-range missile, the

CSS-7 Mod 2, more commonly known as the M-11 follow-on. The new Mod 2 missile

about two meters longer than the Mod 1, and is believed to have a longer range, a larger

warhead and greater accuracy than earlier M-11. The accuracy of these missiles willimprove in the future if China is able to apply Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance

technology to provide highly accurate location information for missile launchers or pre-

surveyed launch sites.

China sold at least 34 M-11 missiles to Pakistan in November 1992. US imagery

intelligence satellites provided imagery showing M-11 missile canisters being delivered

at the Sargodha air base near Lahore, but not the M-11 missiles. But the ClintonAdministration said they would need direct photographic proof by spy satellites to

determine whether the Chinese sale to Pakistan had occurred, in order to impose Missile

Technology Control Regime (MTCR) sanctions against China for selling missiles to

Pakistan. Sanctions were imposed on China in August 1993 for selling missilecomponents to Pakistan that were barred under MTCR. The sanctions were lifted in

October 1994 after the Chinese pledged not to sell any more missiles.

In 1999 Pakistan displayed two "Shaheen" missiles in a military parade, which were

apparently the improved longer-range CSS-7 Mod 2.

SpecificationsContractor Sanjiang Space Group


Basing

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Propellant Solid

Guidance Inertial

First Flight 19??

IOC ~1995?

Deployment mobile

Range (km) 300


(kg)500

Warhead Yield 350 KT or conventionalCEP (meters) 200

Conventional Lethal

Radius

[soft target]

10 meters [crater]

60 meters [unitary]

250 meters [submunition]

Launch PreparationTime

30-45 minutes


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DF-15 [CSS-6 / M-9]

The DF-15 (CSS-6) , better known by the export name M-9, is a sophisticated solid-

fueled, single-stage mobile missile, similar in appearance to the US Pershing I-A system.

The M-series missiles all use solid fuel, and operational preparation time is short. TheDF-15 is expected to be equipped with a variety of warhead types and to become the

mainstay of China's sub-strategic missile force.

The vertically-launched 9.1 meter long missile has a range of 200-600 kms, carrying a

payload of 500 kgs, with a CEP of about 280 meters. The missile uses a strapdowninertial guidance system on the warhead section which guides the trajectory using small

thrusters. The missile body is designed to trail behind the separated warhead and provide

camouflage for the warhead (which is only one-tenth of the size of the missile body). The

DF-15 utilizes a Chinese-developed eight-wheel cross-country Transporter Erector

Launcher [TEL] with both launch and transport capacities. These highly-mobile cross-

country trucks have the capacity to launch the missiles. It is coordinated with advanceddigital C3I computer system using digital computer-controlled technology and self-test

functions to provide an operational preparation time of less than 30 minutes.

It has been suggested that in the future the DF-15 will be equipped with a global

positioning system that is coordinated with a new-type ring-laser gyroscopic inertial-guidance system, coupled to a faster on-board computer system so as to increase the

accuracy of the missile's end-segment guidance system to achieve a CEP of 30-45 meters.

As the missile has a terminal velocity of over Mach 6 this system may be considered for

deep-penetration strike requirements (against underground fortifications).

Developed in the 1980s, the DF-15 first appeared in the Beijing Defense Exhibition in1988. And it is believed that by 1989 China had equipped the Second Artillery with a few

of these missiles. Chinas DF-15 road-mobile SRBM has been operational since 1995,

with an initial force of 40 missiles. By the end of 1999 China had deployed 200 SRBMs

and was increasing the force at a rate of 50 missiles per year. As of mid-2000 the PLA

had one regimental-sized CSS-6 SRBM unit deployed in southeastern China. This CSS-6unit was expected to be augmented by a CSS-7 SRBM unit and one additional CSS-6

unit.

DF-15 missiles were launched from southern China into the waters off Taiwan in 1995

(six or seven launches) and 1996 (four launches) as part of Beijings efforts to dissuade

Taiwan from moving toward independence. These launches into specific closure areasnear Taiwan demonstrated a degree of accuracy not previously associated with Chinese

missiles.


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Basing Leping

Nanping

Yong'an

Con figuration Single Stage

Length [meters] 9.1



Propellant Solid

Guidance Inertial

First Flight 198?

IOC 1995

Deployment mobile

Range (km) 600


(kg)500

Warhead Yield 50-350 KT or conventional


Launch Preparation

Time30 minutes
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DF-21 / CSS-5

The DF-21/21A (CSS-5) solid-fueled missile was originally developed as the two-stage

JL-1. It was designed for deployment aboard China's SSBN, and it was decided to also

develop it as a land-based missile, which was designated as the DF-21. Development ofthe DF-21 began in 1967 and had its first successful test in May 1985. Shortly thereafter,

the DF-21 was deployed into an experimental regiment. Its range was later improved to

1800 kms (DF-21A) carrying a 600 kg warhead with a nuclear capability believed to be

200-300 kt. This mobile system is launched from a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL)

vehicle.

It is believed that over 100 DF-21/JL-1 missiles have been built, and as of 1995 some 15

to 20 DF-21 missiles had been deployed, with deployments increasing to some 36 by

1997. Some DF-21s have been reconfigured with conventional warheads for use along

China's southern and northwestern borders. From these locations, the DF-21 can hit

targets throughout Northern India, the Republics of Central Asia, and most of Vietnamand Southeast Asia. As of late 1997 China had about 40 DF-3 refire-capable launchers at

six field garrisons and launch complexes. Many of those launchers are being converted to

handle new, solid-fuel DF-21 [CSS-5 Mod 1] launchers and missiles. The number of

CSS-2 sites will likely be reduced, since the United States no longer operates bases in thePhilippines, and DF-15 [M-9] short-range missiles deployed along the eastern coast can

be used to cover targets in Taiwan. The DF-21 deployments have been limited to areas

closer to China's borders to ensure adequate target coverage of areas previously covered

by the DF-3. In areas deeper inside China, where longer range is necessary for target

coverage, DF-3 activities are relatively high, indicating the missile could remain inservice in these regions until new missiles such as the DF-21 [CSS-5 Mod 2] are

deployed. Once the DF-21 deployments are adequately under way, the CSS-2 will likelybe removed completely from service, perhaps by 2002. The July 2000 Japan white paper

on defense stated that China had 70 guided missiles capable of reaching Japan and other

Asian countries. The white papernoted that China has been gradually replacing the oldDF-3 missiles with the newer, more accurate DF-21 missiles.

Work is believed to be ongoing to provide this missile with a sophisticated terminal

guidance system. According to some reports the Mod 2 version of the CSS-5 will be

comparable to the US Pershing II IRBM, employ advanced radar guidance to achieve

extremely high accuracy.



Basing Chuxiong

Jianshui
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Lianxiwang

Tonghua





Propellant Solid

Guidance Inertial

First Flight May 1985

IOC 1989-1991

Deployment Mobile

Range (km) 1,800


(kg)600

Warhead Yield 200-300 KT


Launch Preparation

Time10-15 minutes
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DF-25

The land-based mobile-launch DF-25 is a a two-stage solid-fuel missile with a range of

1,700 kilometers. While the ranges of DF-25 and DF-21 are approximately the same, the

nuclear-tipped DF-21 has a throw-weight of 600kg, compared to the conventionallyarmed DF-25's 2,000kg. The DF-25 is derived by removing the third stage from the

three-stage DF-31 and substituting a modified second stage. Potential missions of the DF-

25 include providing rapid fire support over long distances to defend the Nansha Islands

in the South China Sea.

In 1996 it was reported that China had abandoned development of the DF-25, eventhough it had been anticipated to enter service in the 1996 timeframe. This report was

apparently correct, since there have subsequently been no indications of the development

or deployment of this system. A 1993 report suggesting that the DF-25 may have been a

joint project with Iran has remained unconfirmed. The Dongfeng-25 (DF-25 or East

Wind 25),



Basing


Length [meters]

Diameter [meters]

Mass [kilograms]

Propellant Solid

Guidance Inertial

First Flight 19

IOC 19

Deployment mobile

Range (km) 1,700


(kg)2,000

Warhead conventional (non-nuclear)

CEP (meters)


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DF-61

In 1975 China adopted a program for creating tactical ballistic missiles for the Ground

Troops. The main effort was concentrated on developing the DF-61 liquid-propellant

missile with a range of 600-1,000 km. Development of this system was halted because ofthe connection of the head of the program (General Cheng Jiming, chairman of the PRC

Central Military Commission) with the "Gang of Four." The program's objectives were

revised in 1980 and targeted on the development of solid-propellant missiles.

SpecificationsContractor Shanghai Academy of Space Technology - SAST


Basing


Length [meters]

Diameter [meters]

Mass [kilograms]

Propellant Storable

Guidance Inertial

First Flight 19

IOC 19

Deployment Soft

Range (km)


(kg)

Warhead Yield )
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M-7 / 8610

The M-7 missile, also known as the "8610 project," has a range of 180 kilometers with a

throw-weight of 500 kilograms. It is generally similar to the American "Lance" and the

Russian SS-21 missiles. While its range is longer than these missiles, its warheadcapacity is somewhat smaller. Although the other M-series missiles use solid fuel, this

missile is derived from the HQ-2 SAM [the Chinese version of the Russia SA-2

GUIDELINE] which uses a storable liquid propellant. As with the other M-series

missiles, the M-7's operational preparation time is short, and it is transported by highly-

mobile cross- country trucks which have the capacity to launch the missiles.

The HQ-2 was originally designed as a high-altitude SAM, derived from the Soviet SA-2.

The total number of HQ-2 missiles produced is unknown, but the HQ-2 is being retired

with some being converted to short-range surface-to-surface missile called M-7.

Specifications

ContractorChina Chang Feng Mechanics and Electronics

Technology - CCF


Basing


Length [meters]

Diameter [meters]Mass [kilograms]

Propellant Storable Liquid

Guidance Inertial

First Flight 19

IOC 19

Deployment Soft

Range (km)


(kg)

Warhead Yield )

CEP (meters)
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DF-11 / M-18

The M-18 [DF-11] is the Chinese replacement for the Scud-series of missiles. It was

originally shown at the 1987 Beijing air show as a two-stage missile with 1000 kms range

carrying a 400-500 kilogram payload. This M-18 missile had the longest range of any ofthe current M-series missiles. According to some reports the four missiles launched by

the Second Artillery Corps on 13 March 1996 were not of the M-9 type, as widely

reported, but actually missiles of the M-18 type launched from "No. 2054" base in Hunan

Province.

Due to MTCR considerations, China exported the M-11 system variant to Pakistan as asingle-stage, solid-fueled missile with a range of 120-295 kms carrying a 500 kg (or

perhaps 800 kg) warhead. Although the DF-11 has a range of 300 km, the Chinese may

be continuing working on the version with a longer range. The accuracy of these missiles

will improve in the future if China is able to apply Global Positioning System (GPS)

guidance technology. The M-series missiles all use solid fuel, and operational preparationtime is short. They are all transported by highly-mobile cross- country trucks which have

the capacity to launch the missiles.



Basing

Configuration Two StageLength [meters]

Diameter [meters]

Mass [kilograms]

Propellant Solid

Guidance Inertial

First Flight 19??

IOC ??

Deployment mobile

Range (km) 1,000-1,200


(kg)400-500

Warhead Yield conventional


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Lethal Radius

[soft target]

10 meters [crater]60 meters [unitary]

250 meters [submunition]

CEP (meters) 200


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Tu-4 BULL

The 4th Independent Regiment came into existence with the delivery of 10 TU-4 BULL

propeller medium bombers to Peking in February 1953. In following years three more of

these aircraft were acquired from the Soviets. From 1953 until 1971 the 4th IR had onlythree home bases. The original 10 BULLs remained at Peking from February 1953 until

March of that year when they moved to Shihchiachuang Takuotsun. They remained there

for one year, moving back to Peking in March 1954. Then in February of 1955 the unit

moved to Wukung, its present home base. From 1955 until 1971 all 4th IR aircraft were

based at Wukung; however, since mid-1971 the BULLs have been at Nanshui Airfield.

Medium bomber crew training began almost immediately upon receipt of BULLs in 1953

and progressed steadily until extensive long-range night bombing training was noted in

late 1954. By 1956, BULL crews were considered proficient in medium altitude bombing

under instrument flight conditions. In addition to normal training missions, 4th IR aircraft

have been used for a variety of secondary missions. BULLs may have been used againstTibetan dissidents, to shadow intruding CHINAT aircraft, in air defense exercises, and

for aerial survey missions. Both BULLs and BADGERs have been associated with

special weapons programs. In addition to participating in nuclear tests both as drop

aircraft and in air sampling roles, BULLs and BADGERs have been photographed in theair-to-surface missile area of the Shuangchengtzu test center.

While BULL crews were believed to be highly proficient in both day and night

operations, the aircraft was highly vulnerable to virtually all air defense weapons, and

was withdrawn from active combat service in the 1970s. China retains some 15 of these

aircraft in inventory, now used entirely for training and research. One was fitted with a

pylon-mounted disk for AEW radar tests.

Description

DESCRIPTION

The Bull is a midwing, four-engine, medium bomber copied from the U.S. B-29Aacquired by the USSR in World War II. Bull has two bomb bays centrally located in the

fuselage, extending fore and aft of the wing. Defensive armament consists of four turrets

located in upper forward, lower forward, lower rear, and tail positions. Although the
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Soviets have phased it out as an operational bomber, it is still used for this purpose in the

Chinese Air Force.


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H-5 [Il-28 BEAGLE (ILYUSHIN)]

The Il 28 was the Soviet Union's standard light bomber, and was in use in all air forces of

the Soviet Bloc. These aircraft were produced in China under the nomenclature H-5.

Although portion of China's jet light bomber force could be used in a limited strategicrole, the H-5's low performance envelope mitigates against its use for strategic bombing.

The high-mounted wings have a straight leading edge and forward-tapered trailing edge

with blunt tips. Two turbojets are mounted beneath the wings in pods. Pods extend

beyond wings leading and trailing edges. The fuselage is tubular and cigar-shapedtapering to the rear with a rounded, glassed-in nose and bubble canopy. The tail fin is

swept-back and tapered with a blunt tip. Flats are low-mounted on the fin, swept-back,

and tapered with blunt tips. A glassed-in tail gunner compartment is to the rear of the tail.

The reports of the demise of the H-5 seem somewhat exagerated. It was asserted without

citation in 1995 that the H-5 had been withdrawn from service, but the continuedpresence of the H-5 in the PLAAF inventory is widely attested by subsequent sources.

SpecificationsBuilder

Country People's Republic of China (PRC)

Designation Hong-5 Beagle

Similar Aircraft Canberra, Yak-28 Brewer

Type Attack

Wing Span 70 ft, 5 in (21.5 m)

Length 57 ft, 11 in (17.6 m)

Height

Weight

Engine

Ceiling 12300 meters

Maximum speedCruising speed

Cruise range 1175 nm

Internal Fuel 6400 kg

Drop Tanks Wingtip tank 266kg of fuel for 24nm range

In-Flight Refueling No


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Payload 1000kg

Crew Three

Sensors none

Armament

Cannon: 2 NR-23mm fixed forward,

2 NR-23 23mm in Tail turret.

4 500kg bombs or

2 53VA torp or

12 Type 1 250 kg bombs

1 FAB-3000 (overload)

Inventory na

Basing na

UsersEgypt, North Korea (H-5), Peoples Republic of China

(H-5).


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H-6 [Tu-16 BADGER]

In January 1959 China received two TU-16 BADGER medium jet bombers from the

USSR. China began producing the BADGER at the Hsian Airframe Plant in 1968 and

had 32 BADGERs in the operational inventory by 1972. The Japan Defence Agencyasserted in its' White Paper, Defence of Japan 1996, that China is no longer operating

strategic bombers.

BADGER flight activity was first detected by US intelligence in July 1962. Since that

time detected flight activity has been sporadic yet increasing. Night flight activity was notnoted until 1970. The first confirmation of BADGER bombing training was provided by

satellite photography on 13 August 1971 when a BADGER was photographed exiting the

Hsingjenpao bomb range. Subsequent COMINT reporting identified BADGER activity

that began in 1969 and has continued over this range as bombing training. In the early

1970s intensification of this training coupled with the highest noted altitudes for

BADGER activity -- 41,000 feet -- confirmed China's serious intent to develop a strategicstrike capability.

In addition to normal training missions, 4th IR aircraft have been used for a variety of

secondary missions. BADGERs were used extensively in 1970 for air defense exercises

in Northeast China. Both BULLs and BADGERs have been associated with specialweapons programs. In addition to participating in nuclear tests both as drop aircraft and

in air sampling roles, BULLs and BADGERs have been photographed in the air-to-

surface missile area of the Shuangchengtzu test center.

Proficiency of the BADGER force as a whole was initially assessed by US intelligence as

fair for medium to high-level daylight bombing and poor for night operations. The H-6does not have a low-level capability. With continued training, the BADGER force

reached a high degree of proficiency in high altitude bombing under instrument flight

conditions. However, the BADGER is extremely vulnerable to modern air defense

weapons systems and would have been hard-pressed to survive in the air defense

environment over the Soviet Union.

China's medium bomber force did not initially have an air to-air refueling capability,

though it was within the PRC's technical capability to develop one. By the mid-1990s

five Chinese H-6D bombers had been converted into air-refueling tankers to allow

China's warplanes to reach well into the South China Sea.

The H-6D maritime bomber which carries the YJ-6(c601) anti-ship missiles under itswings and is equiped with sea-searching radar under nose, began development in 1975

and made its first flight in 1981.

The wings of the Badger are mid-mounted, swept-back, and tapered with blunt tips.

There are fences on top of the wings and its landing gear pods extend beyond the wings

trailing edges. The Badger's engine(s) are two turbojets mounted in wing roots which


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extend beyond the leading and trailing edges of the wing root. The engines also have

round air intakes. Its fuselage is long, slender, and bulging where the engines are

mounted and tapered to the tail. It has a round, glassed-in nose and a stepped cockpit. The

tail is swept-back, tapered fin and flats with blunt tips. The Badger also has a tail gunnercompartment. The Badger is used by the CIS, Egypt, Iraq, Peoples Republic of China

(H-6), Ukraine.

SpecificationsDesignation Hong-6 Badger

Type Bomber

Builder

Wing Span

Length

Height

Weight

Engine

Ceiling 12300 meters

Cruise range 3100nm

Internal Fuel 36300 kg

In-Flight Refueling No

Drop Tanks None

Payload 8000 kg

Crew

Sensors RWR

Armament

Cannon: 1 NR-23mm fixed forward,

3x2 NR-23mm in defensive turrets

2 C602 ASMs externally (no iinternal load)

(2790nm)

12 500kg bombs or

6 1000kg bombs internally (2945 nm)

Inventory Na

Basing Na


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Tu-22M BACKFIRE

In mid-1993, China approached Russia concerning the sale of a number of Tu-22M

Backfire strike aircraft to replace its aging H-6 Badger bomber fleet. No other weapon

system has caused as much concern as did China's efforts to obtain the long-range Tu-22M Backfire bomber. With a a dual use unrefueled range of 4000km, this purchase

alone would have substantially upgraded Chinese air coverage of the area around Taiwan

or the South China Sea. Though spare parts would become a problem, the mere

possession of this system, let alone any production capability, would have constituted a

substantial upgrade to the Chinese Air Force.

However, reports that China actually purchase four of the 4 Tu-22M [Tu-26] long-range

BACKFIRE bombers proved unfounded. The deal apparently foundered due to Russian

concerns that the sale of such an advanced aircraft would alter the military balance in the

area. Following Russia's rejection to sell any Tu-22M BACKFIRE bombers to China, it

remains to be seen whether and how the PLAAF will replace its obsolescent strategicbomber force.


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H-9

The PLAAF continues to fly the obsolete H-6 bombers and there is no known bomber

replacement development program. Attempts to purchase the Tu-22M from Russia led

nowhere, and it remains unclear what plane will replace H-6 bomber, and when.According to some reports a new fighter/bomber project was started in 1995, following

Russia's refusal to sell advance bombers to China, and at least a decade would be

required for it to enter service. As of 1999 there have been no public reports concerning

this program, which may be in abeyance. If this H-9 enters service before 2005, it is

unlikely that China would embark on serial production of the JH-7A attack aircraft. TheH-9 is said to be similar to the American F-117 in terms of overall performance, and

perhaps even physical configuration.


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chinese nuclear forces

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