CHAVEZ V PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY AND AMARI COASTAL BAY

FACTS: Nature: original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction

and a temporary restraining order. Petition also seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on PEA’s then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation.

1973: The government through the Commission of Public Highways signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay

1977: President Marcos issued PD No. 1084 creating the PEA, which was tasked to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas and to develop, improve, acquire x xx lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. On the same date, President Marcos issued PD. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)

1981: Pres. Marcos issued a memorandum ordering PEA to amend its contract with CDCP which stated that CDCP shall transfer in favor of PEA the areas reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP

1988: Pres. Aquino issued Special Patent granting and transferring to PEA parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP. Subsequently she transferred in the name of PEA the three reclaimed islands known as the “Freedom Islands”

1995: PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands and this was done without public bidding

Pres. Ramos through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres approved the JVA

1996: Senate Pres.Maceda delivered a privileged speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the “grandmother of all scams”. As a result, the Senate conducted investigations. Among the conclusions were:

1. The reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands;

2. The certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and 3. The JVA itself is illegal

1997: Pres. Ramos created the Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of the Senate Committee report.

1998: The Philippine Daily Inquirer published reports on on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI

PEA Director Nestor Kalaw and PEA Chairman ArsenioYulo and former navy officer Sergio Cruz were members of the negotiating panel

Frank Chavez filed petition for Mandamus stating that the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI and prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of the renegotiations of JVA. He cited that the sale to AMARI is in violation of Article 12, Sec. 3 prohibiting sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations and Article 2 Section 28 and Article 3 Sec. 7 of the Constitution on the right to information on matters of public concern

1999: PEA and AMARI signed Amended JVA which Pres. Estrada approved

ISSUES:1. WON the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because

of the subsequent events2. WON the petition merits dismissal for failure to observe the principle governing the

hierarchy of courts3. WON the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies4. WON petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit5. WON the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going

negotiations before a final agreement6. WON the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to

AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987 constitution; and

7. WON the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.

o Threshold issue: whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the amended JVA 367.5 has. of reclaimed foreshore and submerged area in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 & 3, Art. 12 of the 1987 constitution

HELD(1) The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution and if already implemented, to annul the effects of an unconstitutional contract

(2) The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions

Reasoning: the instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public

(3) The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question

(4) Petitioner has standing if petition is of transcendental public importance and as such, there is the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer’s suit on these matters of transcendental public importance

(5) The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract and must therefore constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order

Reasoning The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people’s right to information on matters of public concern. PEA must prepare all the data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the contract. While the evaluation or review is on-going, there are no “official acts, transactions, or decisions” on the bids or proposals but once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the part of the government

(6) In a form of a summary:o The 157.84 has.of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by

certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

o The 592.15 has.of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain and outside the commerce of man until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate

o Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 has.of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain

o Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 has.of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public services. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article 12 that prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Reasoning: CA 141 of the Philippine National Assembly empowers the president to classify lands

of the public domain into alienable or disposable (Sec. 6).The President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into—(a) Alienable of disposable, (b) timber, and (c) mineral lands.

The President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare them open to disposition or concession.

Sec. 59 states that the lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows: (a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means; (b) Foreshore; (c) Marshy lands (d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.

Sec. 61 states that the lands comprised in classes (a), (b) and (c) of section 59 shall be disposed f to private parties by lease only and not otherwise

After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties. These lands remained suis generic as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the government could not sell to private parties. The only way that the government can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale.

PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino’s issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.

in case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain, a public

bidding is required 1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are owned by the State. With the

exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. Article 12, Sec. 3 states that alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years, and not to exceed 1,000 has.in area.

ration behind the ban on corporations from acquiring except through lease is not well understood. If the purpose is to equitably diffuse lands ownership then the Consti could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. If the intent were to encourage “owner-cultivatorship” and the economic family-size farm and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case, then placing the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland were registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next. In actual practice then, this ban strengthens the consti limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. He could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation.

In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of PEA, a wholly government owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions. No patent or certificate of title has been issued to any private party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to cancel PEA’s patent or certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of the instant petition is that PEA’s certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land covered by these certificates, being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold to a private corporation.

Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant private or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a better right than what the registrant had prior to the registration. i[102] The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands. ii[103]

Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA. The transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA was made subject to the provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in Special Patent No. 3517 issued by then President Aquino, to wit:

“NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the Philippines and in conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084, supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, there are hereby granted and conveyed unto the Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of land containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters; the technical description of which are hereto attached and made an integral part hereof.” (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, “except when authorized by Congress,” the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that are transferred to government units or entities. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a “statutory lien affecting title” of the registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of title. iii[104]

Alienable lands of the public domain held by government entities under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain public lands because they cannot be alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law authorizing their disposition. Congress, however, cannot authorize the sale to private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because of the constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.

The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or

patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to acquire directly from government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law, are concededly public lands

As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.

Furthermore, PEA’s charter expressly states that PEA “shall hold lands of the public domain” as well as “any and all kinds of lands.” PEA can hold both lands of the public domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA’s name does not automatically make such lands private.

The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural resources, are to be distributed equitably among our ever-growing population. To insure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable natural resources of the State, or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk.

We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:

1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectaresiv[110] of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156

hectaresv[111] of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409vi[112] of the Civil Code, contracts whose “object or purpose is contrary to law,” or whose “object is outside the commerce of men,” are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

iii

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viREPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALSGR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998

FACTS:                On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.

Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore

land.  Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man because

RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the dictionary.

RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the CA with modifications.

ISSUE:I.        Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area.II.      Whether or not “foreshore land” and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of man.

HELD:The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent court

that the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.  A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.(Webster's Third New International Dictionary)The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term “foreshore lands.”It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.

Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene v. Bercilles

Facts: The parcel of land sought to be registered was originally a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo,

Cebu City. On 23 September 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution 2193 (3 October 1968), declared the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plan. Subsequently, on 19 December 1968, the City Council of Cebu passed Resolution 2755, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being the highest bidder and on 3 March 1969, the City of Cebu, through the Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the petitioner for a total consideration of P10,800.00.

By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application with the CFI Cebu to have its title to the land registered (LRC N-948; LRC Record N-44531). On 26 June 1974, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man. After hearing the parties, on 11 October 1914 the trial court issued an order dismissing the petitioner’s application for registration of title. Hence, the instant petition for review.

The Supreme Court set aside the order of the lower court, and the ordered said court to proceed with the hearing of the petitioner’s application for registration of title.

1. City is empowered to close city road or street and withdraw the same from public use

Section 31 of the Revised Charter of Cebu City (Legislative Powers) provides that “any provision of law and executive order to the contrary notwithstanding, the City Council shall have the following legislative powers xxx to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.” It is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street.

2. Discretion of the city council cannot ordinarily be interfered with by the court

The city council is the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use. The power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary, and the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to

the public trust will he presumed. So the fact that some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance (Favis v. City of Baguio).

3. Street withdrawn from public use becomes patrimonial property; Subsequent sale valid

When a portion of the city street was withdrawn from public use, such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract. As expressly provided by Article 422 of the Civil Code, “Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.” Further, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu, in very clear and unequivocal terms, states that “property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.” Thus, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid.

Laurel v. Garcia [G.R. No. 92013 & 92047. July 25, 1990.]Ojeda v. Macaraig [G.R. No. 92047. July 25, 1990.]

Facts: The subject Roppongi property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine

government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May 1956, the other lots being the Nampeidai Property (site of Philippine Embassy Chancery), the Kobe Commercial Property (Commercial lot used as warehouse and parking lot of consulate staff), and the Kobe Residential Property (a vacant residential lot). The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II. The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would be payable in 20 years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese governments (Article 2, Reparations Agreement). RA 1789, the Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on procurement and utilization of reparations and development loans; those which belong to the government and which may be availed of by private entities. The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year Schedule and listed under the heading “Government Sector”, through Reparations Contract 300 dated 27 June 1958. The Roponggi property consists of the land and building “for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy.” As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on 22 July 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time.

During the incumbency of President Aquino, a proposal was made by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to lease the subject property to Kajima Corporation, a Japanese firm, in exchange of the construction of 2 buildings in Roppongi, 1 building in Nampeidai, and the renovation of the Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The Government did not act favorably to said proposal, but instead, on 11 August 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition or utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe though AO-3, and AO 3-A to 3-D. On 25 July 1987, the President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations’ capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first “Whereas” clause. Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot.

Two petitions for prohibition were filed seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 sq. m. of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan scheduled on 21 February 1990; the temporary restaining order of which was granted by the court on 20 February 1990. In G.R. No. 92047, a writ of mandamus was prayed for to compel the respondents to fully disclose to the public the basis of their decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi property inspite of strong public opposition and to explain the proceedings which effectively prevent the participation of Filipino citizens and entities in the bidding process.

After multiple motions for extension to file comment by the respondents, the Supreme Court resolved to decide the 2 cases; thereby granting the petitions and enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. The Court also made permanent the 20 February 1990 temporary restraining order.

1. Roponggi lot is a property of public dominionThe nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government, that these were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property itself was specifically designated under the Reparations Agreement to house the Philippine Embassy. There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial; which respondents have failed to show.

2. Property of public dominion outside the commerce of manAs property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.

3. Pertinent provisions of the Civil CodeArticle 419 provides that “property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.” Article 420 provides that property of public dominion includes “(1) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.” Article 421 provides that “all other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.” In the present case, the Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.

4. Conversion to patrimonial property happen if property is withdrawn from public use; Abandonment must be certain and positive act based on correct legal premisesThe fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership “until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]) An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government’s own deliberate and indubitable will butto a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazarao, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises. In the present case, the recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the status and conditions of government properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties. Further EO 296 does not declare that the properties lost their public character, but merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or other disposition.

5. RA 6657 does not authorize the disposition of Roppongi property as it is outside the commerce of man; EO 296 amended nationality provision for the sale of procurements for the private sector, not the procurements for the government (the latter which includes Roppongi property)EO 296 is based on the wrong premise or assumption that the Roppongi and the three other properties were earlier converted into alienable real properties. RA 1789 differentiates the procurements for the government sector and the private sector (Sections 2 and 12, RA 1789). Only the private sector properties can be sold to end-users who must be Filipinos or entities owned by Filipinos. It is this nationality provision which was amended by EO 296. Further, Section 63 (c) of RA 6657 (the CARP Law) which provides as one of the sources of funds for its implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the properties ofthe Government in foreign countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi property from being classified as one of public dominion when it mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section63 (c) refers to properties which are alienable and not to those reserved for public use or service. RA 6657, therefore, does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund created under EO 299. Obviously any property outside of the commerce of man cannot be tapped as a source of funds.

6. Conflict of law rule does not apply when conflict of law situation does not existA conflict of law rule cannot apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the

interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply. In the present case, none of the above elements exists.

7. Issue on the authority of officials to dispose property belonging to state, and not validity of ownership or title, in question; governed by Philippine lawThe issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.

8. Opinion of Secretary of Justice irrelevant; Issue of whether the property can be sold precedes the issue of who can acquireThe assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. There is no need to discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when there is no showing that it can be sold.

9. Approval of the President of the recommendation of the committee to sell the Roppongi property premature, and without force and effect of lawThe subsequent approval on 4 October 1988 by President Aquino of the recommendation by the investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least, conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the Roppongi property. Moreover, the approval does not have the force and effect of law since the President already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already convened for more than a year.

10. There is no law authorizing the conveyance of the Roppongi property; Conveyance must be authorized by law enacted by Congress and requires executive and legislative concurrenceSection 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party) provides that “in cases in which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other instrument conveying the title to real estate or to any other property the value of which is in excess of P100,000, the respective Department Secretary shall prepare the necessary papers which, together with the proper recommendations, shall be submitted to the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the same. Such deed, instrument, or contract shall be executed and signed by the President of the Philippines on behalf of the Government of the Philippines unless the Government of the Philippines unless the authority therefor be expressly vested by law in another officer.” The requirement has been retained in Section 48, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292; Official authorized to convey real property), which provides that “Whenever real property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following: (1) for property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, by the President, unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by law in another officer; (2) for property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality.” Thus, it is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.

11. 1989 case on the Roppongi property: Ojeda v. Bidding Committee; Issue differentThe resolution of the Supreme Court in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., did not pass upon the constitutionality of EO 296 nor did it uphold the authority of the President to sell the Roppongi property. The Court stated that the constitutionality of the executive order was not the real issue and that resolving the constitutional question was “neither necessary nor finally determinative of the case.” The Court noted that “[W]hat petitioner ultimately questions is the use of the proceeds of the disposition of the Roppongi property.” In emphasizing that “the decision of the Executive to dispose of the Roppongi property to finance the CARP cannot be questioned” in view of Section 63 (c) of RA 6657, the Court did not acknowledge the fact that the property became alienable nor did it indicate that the President was authorized to dispose of the Roppongi property. The resolution should be read to mean that in case the Roppongi property is re-classified to be patrimonial and alienable by authority of law, the proceeds of a sale may be used for national economic development projects including the CARP.

12. Constitutional questions raised in the Supreme Court The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground such as the application of a statute or general law (Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909], Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [1941]).

13. Value of the Roppongi property; besides economic and financial benefitsThe Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos — veterans and civilians alike. The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property. It was given to the Filipino people in reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who died and suffered during the Japanese military occupation, for the suffering of widows and orphans who lost their loved ones and kindred, for the homes and other properties lost by countless Filipinos during the war. The Tokyo properties are a monument to the bravery and sacrifice of the Filipino people in the face of an invader. Roppongi is a reminder that cannot — should not — be dissipated.

Municipality of Antipolo v. Zapanta [G.R. No. 65334. December 26, 1984.]

Facts: The Municipality of ANTIPOLO, for more than 50 years now, has considered the disputed property,

described below, to be public land subject to ANTIPOLO’s use and permission to use within the prerogatives and purposes of a municipal corporation. There is indication to the effect that it had been the site of the public market as far back as 1908, or at the latest, since 1920 “up to today.” Gradually, additional public structures were built thereon, like the Puericulture and Family Planning Center, the Integrated National Police Building, the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, and the public abattoir. Those public structures occupy almost the entire area of the land.

On 8 August 1977, a single application for the registration of two distinct parcels of land was filed by two distinct applicants before the then CFI Rizal, Branch XV, Makati (the Registration Court). One of the two applicants was Conrado Eniceo. He had applied for registration under the Torrens system of a parcel of land containing 258 sq. m. The other applicant was “Heirs of Joaquin Avendaño”, and the land they were applying for registration was a parcel containing 9,826 sq. m. (the disputed property) surveyed in the name of the Municipality of Antipolo. Both parcels were situated in the Municipality of Antipolo. The applications were approved by the Registration Court on 26 February 1980. ANTIPOLO took steps to interpose an appeal but because it failed to amend the Record on Appeal, its appeal was disallowed.

On 22 May 1981, ANTIPOLO filed a complaint (Civil Case 41353) of the CFI Rizal, Branch XIII, Pasig against named “Heirs of Joaquin Avendaño”, and their assignees praying for nullification of the judgment rendered by the Registration Court. The defendants, in their Answer, pleaded a special defense of res judicata. After a preliminary hearing on the mentioned special defense, the case was dismissed.

ANTIPOLO perfected an appeal to the then Court of Appeals. A notice to file Brief was issued by the Appellate Court, which ANTIPOLO claimed it had not received. Upon motion of the Avendano heirs to dismiss on the ground the ANTIPOLO had not filed its Brief within the reglementary period, the appeal was dismissed on 23 August 1983 despite the fact that before the dismissal, ANTIPOLO had submitted its Appellant’s Brief. ANTIPOLO filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Appellate Court denied on 27 September 1983 for lack of legal and factual basis. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the subject parcel of land was a property of public domain.

HELD: The claim of the AVENDAÑO HEIRS that they merely tolerated occupancy by ANTIPOLO which had

borrowed the DISPUTED PROPERTY from them, since they had been in possession, since as far back as 1916, erroneously presupposes ownership thereof since that time. They forget that all lands are presumed to be public lands until the contrary is established. 4 The fact that the DISPUTED PROPERTY may have been declared for taxation purposes in their names or of their predecessors-in-interest as early as 1918 5 does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. 6 ANTIPOLO had also declared the DISPUTED PROPERTY as its own in Tax Declarations Nos. 909, 993 and 454.

Since the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for registration of public property of ANTIPOLO, its Decision adjudicating the DISPUTED PROPERTY as of private ownership is null and void. It never attained finality, and can be attacked at any time. It was not a bar to the action brought by ANTIPOLO for its annulment by reason of res judicata.

It follows that the titles issued in favor of the AVENDAÑO HEIRS must also be held to be null and void. They were issued by a Court with no jurisdiction over the subject matter. Perforce, they must be ordered cancelled.

...It follows that "if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally included" (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499, 503; Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769).

xxx xxx xxx

Under these circumstances, the certificate of title may be ordered cancelled (Republic vs. Animas, et al., supra), and the cancellation may be pursued through an ordinary action therefor. This action cannot be barred by the prior judgment of the land registration court, since the said court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. And if there was no such jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does not apply. * * *. Certainly, one of the essential requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the subject matter is absent in this case. 8 (Emphasis supplied).

Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga[G.R. No. L-24440. March 28, 1968.]

Facts: Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial

capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On 12 October 1936, Commonwealth Act (CA) 39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Section 50 of the Act also provided that "buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General." The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province. The lots are utilized as the Capitol Site (1 lot), School site (3 lots), Hospital site (3 lots), Leprosarium (3 lots), Curuan school (1 lot), Trade school (1 lot), Burleigh school (2 lots), burleigh (9 lots), high school playground (2 lots), hydro-electric site (1 lot), san roque (?1 lot), and another 23 vacant lots.

In 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog and on 16 June 1948, Republic Act (RA) 286 created the municipality of Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province. On 26 May 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, pursuant to CA 39, fixed the value of the properties and buildings in question left by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at P1,294,244.00. However, on 14 July 1951, a Cabinet Resolution was passed, conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital of the Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog. On 6 June 1952, RA 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and obligations of the old province were to be divided between the two new ones, Section 6 of the law provided that “upon the approval of the Act, the funds, assets and other properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor General."

On 11 January 1955, the Auditor General apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of Zamboanga, apportioning 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. On 17 March 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of the President, issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Section 50 of CA 39, and is entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This effectively revoked the Cabinet Resolution of 14 July 1951. The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct an amount equal to 25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for the quarter ending 31 March 1960, then for the quarter ending 30 June 1960, and again for the first quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961.

The deductions, all aggregating P57,373.46 was credited to the province of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment of the P704,220,05 due it. However, on 17 June 1961, RA 3039 was approved amending Section 50 of CA 39 by providing that "all buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga."

On 12 July 1961, the Secretary of Finance ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to stop from effecting further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to Zamboanga City the sum of P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga City admits that since the enactment of RA 3039, P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46 has already been returned to it. This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to file on 5 March 1962, a complaint entitled "Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" in the CFI Zamboanga del Norte against Zamboanga City, the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

On 4 June 1962, the lower court ordered the issuance of preliminary injunction as prayed for. After trial and on 12 August 1963, judgment was rendered declaring RA 3039 unconstitutional as it deprives the province of its private properties, ordered the city to pay the province the sum of P704,200.05 and in relation to this ordered the finance secretary to direct the Commissioner of Internal revenue to deduct from its regular quarterly internal revenue allotment equivalent to 25%, 25% from the regular quarterly internal revenue allotment for the City and to remit the same to the province until the sum has been fully paid; ordered the province to execute the corresponding public instrument deeding to the city the 50 parcels of land and the improvements thereon under the certificates of title upon full payment; dismissed the counterclaim of the city; and declared permanent the preliminary mandatory injunction issued on 8 June 1967.

The province filed a motion to reconsider praying that the City be ordered instead to pay the P704,220.05 in lump sum with 6% interest per annum. Over the city’s opposition, the lower court granted the province’s motion. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Zamboanga del Norte is entitled to its share of the value of the properties belonging to the former Zamboanga province that were transferred to the City of Zamboanga.

Held: Article 423 of the Civil Code provides that “the property of provinces, cities and municipalities, is

divided into property for public use and patrimonial properly." Article 424 of the same code provides that “property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws."

Applying the norm in the Civil Code, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capitol site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use inasmuch as they would not fall under the phrase "public works for public service." Under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Article 424. The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category. The records do not disclose, however, whether the buildings were constructed at the expense of the former Province of Zamboanga.

Considering however the fact that said buildings must have been erected even before 1936 when CA 39 was enacted and the further fact that provinces then had no power to authorize construction of buildings at their own expense, it can be assumed that said buildings were erected by the National Government, using national funds. Hence, Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in the same manner that it did with the lots in question. On the other hand, Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes. The fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in nature.

Thus, Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to collect from the City of Zamboanga the former's 54.39% share in the 26 properties which are patrimonial in nature, said share to be computed on the basis of the valuation of said 26 properties as contained in Resolution 7, dated 26 March 1949, of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General. The share, however, cannot be paid in lump sum, except as to the P43,030.11 already returned to the City, as the return of said amount to the city was without legal basis. RA 3039 took effect only on 17 June 1961 after a partial payment of P57,373.46 had already been made. Since the law did not provide for retroactivity, it could not have validly affected a completed act. Hence, the amount of P43,030.11 should be immediately returned by the City to the province. The remaining balance, if

any, in the amount of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 lots should then be paid by the City in the same manner originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and not in lump sum.

Salas V Jarencio (1972)Ponente: Esguerra, J.

Legal Doctrine: Regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes

Facts: February 24, 1919—the 4th Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, acting as a land

registration court, rendered judgment in Case No. 18, G.L.R.O. Record No. 111, declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1, Block 557 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Mani1a, containing an area of 9,689.8 square meters, more or less.

August 21, 1920 –Title No. 4329 issued on in favor of the City of Manila after the land in question was registered in the City's favor. The Torrens Title expressly states that the City of Manila was the owner in 'fee simple' of the said land

September 20, 1960—the Municipal Board, presided by then Vice-Mayor Antonio Villegas, requested "His Excellency the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the city property bounded by Florida, San Andres and Nebraska Streets, under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and 25547, containing an area of 7,450 square meters, as patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof

The said resolution of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila was officially transmitted to the President of the Philippines the following day, to which a copy was furnished to the Senate and House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines.

June 20, 1964—RA 4118 was passed by the Senate and approved by the President pursuant to the request. Such bill was enacted for social justice purposes, that they be sold to their currently landless occupants.

But due to reasons which do not appear in the record, the City of Manila made a complete turn-about, for on December 20, 1966, Antonio J. Villegas, in his capacity as the City Mayor of Manila and the City of Manila as a duly organized public corporation, brought an action for injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain, prohibit and enjoin the herein appellants, particularly the Governor of the Land Authority and the Register of Deeds of Manila, from further implementing Republic Act No. 4118, and praying for the declaration of Republic Act No. 4118 as unconstitutional.

Issues and Decisions:1. Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila? NO, it is the property of

the State.

2. Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and not repugnant to the Constitution? YES, it is valid.

Ratio:

1. Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila? NO, it is the property of the State.

The rule is that when it comes to property of the municipality which it did not acquire in its private or corporate capacity with its own funds, the legislature can transfer its administration and disposition to an agency of the National Government to be disposed of according to its discretion.

The possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes.

The City of Manila, although declared by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee simple, has not shown by any shred of evidence in what manner it acquired said land as its private or patrimonial property. The presumption is that such land came from the State upon the creation of the municipality.

That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation

Therefore, the land in question pertains to the State and the City of Manila merely acted as trustee for the benefit of the people therein for whom the State can legislate in the exercise of its legitimate powers.

2. Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and not repugnant to the Constitution? YES, it is valid.

Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of anything it owns, either under the due process clause or under the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. If it failed to get from the Congress the concession it sought of having the land involved given to it as its patrimonial property, the Courts possess no power to grant that relief. Republic Act No. 4118 does not, therefore, suffer from any constitutional infirmity.

Manila Lodge 761 v. CA[G.R. No. L-41001. September 30, 1976.]

Facts: On 26 June 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted Act 1360 which authorized the City of Manila

to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The Act provided that the reclaimed area “shall be the property of the City of Manila” and that “the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land formed by the Luneta extension at the north end not to exceed 500 feet by 600 feet in size, for a hotel site, and to lease the same, with the approval of the Governor General, to a responsible person or corporation for a term not to exceed 99 years.” Subsequently, the Philippine Commission passed on 18 May 1907 Act 1657, amending Act1360, so as to authorize the City of Manila either to lease or to sell the portion set aside as a hotel site.

The total area reclaimed was a little over 25 hectares. The City of Manila applied for the registration of the reclaimed area, and on 20 January 1911, OCT 1909 was issued in the name of the City of Manila. On 13 July 1911 the City of Manila, affirming a prior sale dated 16 January 1909, conveyed 5,543.07 sq. m. of the reclaimed area to the Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the U.S.A. (BPOE) on the basis of which TCT 2195 was issued to the latter over the parcel of land which was part of Luneta Extension in the District of Ermita. For the remainder of the Luneta Extension, i.e. after segregating therefrom the portion sold to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, a new Certificate of Title 2196 was issued on 17 July 1911 to the City of Manila. Manila Lodge subsequently sold said 5,543.07 sq. m. to the Elks Club, Inc., to which was issued TCT 67488. The registered owner, “The Elks Club, Inc.,” was later changed by court order to “Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Inc.” In January 1963 the BPOE petitioned the CFI Manila, Branch IV, for the cancellation of the right of the City of Manila to repurchase the property. This petition was granted on 15 February 1963.

On 19 November 1963 the BPOE sold the land together with all the improvements thereon to the Tarlac Development Corporation which paid P1,700,000 as down payment and mortgaged to the vendor the same realty to secure the payment of the balance to be paid in quarterly installments. At the time of the sale, there was no annotation of any subsisting lien on the title to the property. On 12 December 1963 TCT 73444 was issued to TDC. In June 1964 the City of Manila filed with the CFI Manila a petition for the reannotation of its right to repurchase; the court, after hearing, issued an order, dated November 19, 1964, directing the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila to reannotate in toto the entry regarding the right of the City of Manila to repurchase the property after 50 years. From this order TDC and BPOE appealed to the Supreme Court which on 31 July 1968 affirmed the trial court’s order of reannotation, but reserved to TDC the right to bring another action for the clarification of its rights.

On 28 April 1971, as a consequence of such reservation, TDC filed a complaint against the City of Manila and Manila Lodge 761, BPOE with the CFI Manila praying that Entry 4608/T-1635 found in TCT 73444 covering the parcel of land with buildings and improvements thereon purchased from BPOE be cancelled; that Manila pays TDS the sum of P100,000 as damages, that TDC reserve the right to recover amounts from BPOE in case that the judgment on the parcel of land declares it a public park. The City of Manila set up a special and affirmative defense claiming that TDC is not a purchaser in good faith. Manila Lodge 761 admitted to have sold the land in good faith, and that it had received quarterly installments from TDC until 15 October 1964 when the latter failed without justifiable cause to pay the subsequent installments. After due trial the court a quo rendered on 14 July 1972 its decision finding the subject land to be part of the “public park or plaza” and, therefore, part of the public domain. The court consequently declared that the sale of the subject land by the City of Manila to Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was null and void; that plaintiff TDC was a purchaser thereof in good faith and for value from BPOE and can enforce its rights against the latter; and that BPOE is entitled to recover from the City of Manila whatever consideration it had paid the latter. From said decision, TDC and Manila Lodge 761, BPOE appealed to the Court of Appeals.

In its decision promulgated on 30 June 1975, the Court of Appeals concurred in the findings and conclusions of the lower court upon the ground that they are supported by the evidence and are in accordance with law, and accordingly affirmed the lower court’s judgment. Hence, the petitions for review on certiorari.

The Supreme Court denied the petitions for lack of merit, and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, at petitioner’s cost.

1. Statutory Construction; Courts must give effect to the general legislative intentIt is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of the statute, and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a particular provision thereof, should be considered. In the present case, it is thus necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent.

2. Grant of public nature strictly construed against the granteeThe grant made by Act 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a “public” nature, the same having been made to a local political subdivision. Such grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee. One compelling reason given for the strict interpretation of a public grant is that there is in such grant a gratuitous donation of, public money or resources which results in an unfair advantage to the grantee and for that reason, the grant should be narrowly restricted in favor of the public. This reason for strict interpretation obtains relative to the aforesaid grant for although the City of Manila was to pay for the construction of such work and timber bulkheads or sea walls as may be necessary for the making of the Luneta extension, the area to be reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila, with material dredged from Manila Bay. Hence, the letter of the statute

should be narrowed to exclude matters which if included would defeat the policy of the legislation.

3. Reclaimed area of public dominion, intended for public useThe reclaimed area, an extension to the Luneta, is declared to be property of the City of Manila; and is of public dominion, intended for public use. It cannot be patrimonial property as Act 1360, as amended, provides by necessary implication, that the City of Manila could not dispose of the reclaimed area without being authorized by the lawmaking body.

4. Ownership definedArticle 348 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that “ownership is the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without further limitations than those established by law.” The right to dispose ( jus disponendi) of one’s property is an attribute of ownership.

5. Statutory Construction; every word, clause of statute interpreted in a way that no part becomes inoperative or superfluousIf the reclaimed area were patrimonial property of the City, the latter could dispose of it without need of the authorization provided by the statute, and the authorization to set aside, lease, or sell given by the statute would indeed be superfluous. To so construe the statute as to render the term “authorize,” which is repeatedly used by the statute, superfluous would violate the elementary rule of legal hermeneutics that effect must be given to every word, clause, and sentence of the statute and that a statute should be so interpreted that no part thereof becomes inoperative or superflous. To authorize means to empower, to give a right to act. Act 1360 furthermore qualifies the verb “authorize” with the adverb “hereby,” which means “by means of this statute or section.” Hence without the authorization expressly given by Act 1360, the City of Manila could not lease or sell even the northern portion; much less could it dispose of the whole reclaimed area. At most, only the northern portion reserved as a hotel site could be said to be patrimonial property, for, by express statutory provision it could be disposed of, and the title thereto would revert to the City should the grantee fail to comply with the terms provided by the statute.

6. Presumption of full knowledge of prior laws and legislation when lawmaking body enacts a statuteIt is presumed that when the lawmaking body enacted the statute, it had full knowledge of prior and existing laws and legislation on the subject of the statute and acted in accordance or with respect thereto. If by another previous law, the City of Manila could already dispose of the reclaimed area, which it could do if such area were given to it as its patrimonial property, it would be a superfluity for Act 1360 to authorize the City to dispose of the reclaimed land.

7. Extension to Luneta is also a public park or plaza and for public useThe reclaimed area, being an “extension to the Luneta in the City of Manila,” it is of the same nature or character as the old Luneta. Anent this matter, it has been said that a power to extend (or continue an act or business) cannot authorize a transaction that is totally distinct. It is not disputed that the old Luneta is a public park or plaza and it is so considered by Section 859 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. Hence the “extension to the Luneta” must be also a public park or plaza and for public use.

8. Extension definedExtension signifies enlargement in any direction — in length, breadth, or circumstance.

9. Bays, roadsteads, coast sea, inlets and shores are part of the national domain open for public useA bay is nothing more than an inlet of the sea. Pursuant to Article 1 of the Law of Waters of 1866, bays, roadsteads, coast sea, inlets and shores are parts of the national domain open to public use. These are also property of public ownership devoted to public use, according to Article 339 of the Civil Code of Spain. In the present case, the reclaimed area was formerly a part of the Manila Bay.

10. When shore or part of bay is reclaimed, it does not lose character of being property for public useWhen the shore or part of the bay is reclaimed, it does not lose its character of being property for public use, according to Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Cabangis. When the tract of land owned by a private individual wears away and later on is submerged in water in ordinary tides (thus becoming part of the shore), until the Government later on undertakes the dredging of the estuary and dumping the sand and silt from estuary on the low lands completely submerged in water forming the reclaimed lots, they belong to the public domain for public use. Hence, a part of the shore, and for that purpose, a part of the bay, did not lose its character of being for public use after it was reclaimed.

11. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius; Southern portion is not the northern portion authorized to be leased or sold

Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or sale of the northern portion of the reclaimed area as a hotel site. The subject property is not that northern portion authorized to be leased or sold; the subject property is the southern portion. Hence, applying the rule of expresio unius est exclusio alterius, the City of Manila was not authorized to sell the subject property. The application of this principle of statutory construction becomes the more imperative inasmuch as not only must the public grant of the reclaimed area to the City of Manila be strictly construed against the City of Manila, but also because a grant of power to a municipal corporation, as happens in this case where the city is authorized to lease or sell the northern portion of the Luneta extension, is strictly limited to such as are expressly or impliedly authorized or necessarily incidental to the objectives of the corporation.

12. Property of public use; Intention to consider property for public use important, not actual construction or layoutArticle 344 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that “property of public use, in provinces and in towns, comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service paid for by such towns or provinces.” A park or plaza, such as the extension to the Luneta, is undoubtedly comprised in said article. Properties of provinces and towns for public use are governed by the same principles as properties of the same character belonging to the public domain. In order to be property of public domain an intention to devote it to public use is sufficient. It is not necessary, therefore, that a plaza be already construed or laid out as a plaza in order that it be considered property for public use. It is sufficient that it be intended to be such.

13. Conversion of property of public us to patrimonial property requires explicit declaration by the executive and the legislative departmentAs held in Ignacio vs. The Director of Lands, it is only the executive and possibly the legislative department that has the authority and the power to make the declaration that said property is no longer required for public use, and until such declaration is made the property must continue to form part of the public domain. In the present case, there has been no such explicit or unequivocal declaration. The courts are undoubtedly not primarily called upon, and are not in a position, to determine whether any public land is still needed for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters.

14. Circumstantial evidence far removed in time to be considered contemporaneous to the enactment of Act 1360All items of alleged circumstantial evidence are acts far removed in time from the date of the enactment of Act 1360 such that they cannot be considered contemporaneous with its enactment. Moreover, it is not farfetched that this mass of circumstantial evidence might have been influenced by the antecedent series of invalid acts, i.e. the City’s having obtained over the reclaimed area OCT 1909 (20 January 1911); the sale made by the City of the subject property to Manila Lodge No. 761; and the issuance to the latter of TCT 2195. It cannot be gainsaid that if the subsequent acts constituting the circumstantial evidence have been based on, or at least influenced, by those antecedent invalid acts and Torrens titles, they can hardly be indicative of the intent of the lawmaking body in enacting Act 1360 and its amendatory act.

15. Mention as boundary owner is not a means of acquiring titleOCT 7333 (13 November 1935), covering the lot where the American Embassy [Chancery] stands, states that the property is “bounded on the Northwest by properties of Army and Navy Club and Elks Club.” Even if said boundaries were delineated by the Philippine Legislature in Act 4269, this does not mean that the Legislature “recognized and conceded the existence of the Elks Club property as a private property and not as a public park or plaza. A contrary argument is non sequitur, plain and simple. Said Original Certificate of Title cannot be considered as an inconvertible declaration that the Elks Club was in truth and in fact the owner of such boundary lot. Such mention as boundary owner is not a means of acquiring title nor can it validate a title that is null and void.

16. Government not estopped by mistake or errors on the part of its agentsThe Government is never estopped by mistakes or errors on the part of its agents, and estoppel does not apply to a municipal corporation to validate a contract that is prohibited by law or its against public policy. In the present case, the 13 July 1911 sale executed by the city of Manila to Manila Lodge was certainly a contract prohibited by law. Estoppel cannot be urged even if the City of Manila accepted the benefits of such contract of sale and the Manila Lodge No. 761 had performed its part of the agreement, for to apply the doctrine of estoppel against the City of Manila in this case would be tantamount to enabling it to do indirectly what it could not do directly.

17. Sale void and existent; cannot be ratified by lapse of time or by express ratificationThe sale of the subject property executed by the City of Manila to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was void and inexistent for lack of subject matter. It suffered from an incurable defect that could not be ratified either by lapse of time or by express ratification. The Manila Lodge No. 761 therefore acquired no right by virtue of the said sale. Hence to consider now the contract inexistent as it always has been, cannot be, as claimed by the Manila Lodge No. 761, an impairment of the obligations of contracts, for there was in contemplation of law, no contract at all.

18. Good faith of purchaser cannot create title where none existThe inexistence of said sale can be set up against anyone who asserts a right arising from it, not only against the first vendee but also against all its successors, which are not protected by law. The doctrine of bona fide purchaser without notice does not apply where there is a total absence of title in the vendor, and the good faith of the purchaser cannot create title where none exists.

Rabuco vs. Villegas

Facts:The constitutionality of RA No. 3120 was assailed by the city officials of the City of Manila contending that the conversion of the lots in Malate area into disposable and alienable lands of the state and placing its administration and disposal to the LTA to be subdivided into lots and selling it to bona fide occupants thereof in installments constitutes a deprivation of the City of Manila of its property by providing for its sale without the payment of just compensation.

IssueWhether or not the properties in dispute may be disposed without paying just compensation to the City of Manila?

HeldThe court held that the assailed RA 3120 is constitutional. The lots in question are owned by the City of Manila in its public and governmental capacity and are therefore public property over which Congress has absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it which cannot be deprived from the City without just compensation and without due process. RA 3120 expressly provides that the properties are reserved for the purpose of communal property and ordered its conversion into disposable and alienable lands of the state to be sold to its bona fide occupants. It has been an established doctrine that the state reserves its rights to classify its property under its legislative prerogative and the court cannot interfere on such power of the state.

Benjamin Rabuco, et. al. vs. Hon. Antonio VillegasG.R. No. L-24661. February 28, 1974.

Doctrine: When a property is owned by a political subdivision in its public and governmental capacity, the Congress has absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived without due process and without just compensation.

Facts: In the early morning of April 19, 1970, a large fire of undetermined origin gutted the Malate area including the lot on which petitioners had built their homes and dwellings. Respondents city officials then took over the lot and kept petitioners from reconstructing or repairing their burned dwellings. At petitioners’ instance, the Court issued on June 17, 1970 a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents city officials “from performing any act constituting an interference in or disturbance of herein petitioners’ possession of Lot No. 21-B, Block No. 610, of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila” as safeguarded them under the Court’s subsisting preliminary injunction of August 17, 1965 pursuant to RA 3120.

Issue: Whether RA 3120 is unconstitutional as it infringes the right to due process.

Held: No. The Court herein upholds the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 on the strength of the established doctrine that the subdivision of communal land of the State (although titled in the name of the municipal corporation) and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots by sale on installment basis to bona fide occupants by Congressional authorization and disposition does not constitute infringements of the due process clause or the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution but operates simply as a manifestation of the legislature’s right of control and power to deal with State property.

MACASIANO vs. DIOKNO

Facts:

Respondent municipality Parañaque passed Ordinance No. 86, series of 1990 which authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, Series of 19779, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and /or municipal streets, roads, and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea markets and/or vending areas under certain terms and conditions.

On June 20, 19990, the municipal council of Parañaque issued a resolution authorizing Parañaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. On July 20, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. 86 of the municipal council of respondent municipality subject to conditions.

On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets. Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.

On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran.

On December 17, 1990, the trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 of the Municipality of Parañaque and enjoining petitioner Macasiano from enforcing his letter0order against respondent Palanyag.

Issue:Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque authorizing

the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid.

HELD: NO. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public property unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress (e.g. Section 10, Chapter II, Local Government Code – Closure of Roads).

However, the afore-stated legal provision should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law.

Article 424 of the Civil Code provides that property of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or used by the local government unit to private persons.

The closure of a road, street or park should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit concerned. It is only then that the respondent municipality can “use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed” in accordance with the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of B.P. Blg. 337, known as the Local Government Code.

Those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local government has no power tom use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.

Even assuming, in gratia argument, that respondent municipality has the to pass the disputed ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered approved by the MMA due to non-compliance by respondent municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the ordinance. Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof that it has complied with the foregoing conditions precedent to the approval of the ordinance.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals131 SCRA 532 (1984)

FACTS: The subject land in this case is situated 20 meters away from the shores of Laguna de Bay. Said

land was owned by Benedicto del Rio. After the death of Benedicto, the land was acquired by his son Santos Del Rio. The private oppositors in this case sought and obtained permission from Santos Del Rio to construct duck houses on said land. The private oppositors, however, violated their agreement and instead constructed residential houses thereon. Santos then filed an ejectment suit against the private oppositors and later on sought to register the land. Meanwhile, private oppositors simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with Bureau of Lands, and they opposed Santos del Rio’s application for registration.

The CFI of Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a favourable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective petitions for review on said decision to the Supreme Court.

The Director of Lands contends that since a portion of the land is covered with water four to five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay and therefore it cannot be the subject of registration.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land; and2. Whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land.

HELD:The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides." It cannot be considered

a foreshore land, hence it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title. The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant already possesses over the land.

While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. Applicant by himself and through his father before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for more than thirty (30) years and has presented tax declarations and tax receipts. Applicant has more than satisfied the legal requirements. Thus, he is clearly entitled to the registration in his favor of said land.

Republic v. Alagad[G.R. No. 66807. January 26, 1989.]

Facts:

On 11 October 1951, Melitona, Carmen (with spouse Espiridion Kolimlim), Justo, Carlos, Librada (with spouse Emerson Abano), Demetrio, and Antonio Alagad filed an application for registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga, Pila, Laguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares (survey plan Psu-116971), which was amended after the land was divided into two parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares (survey plan Psu-226971, amendment 2). The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed ground that applicants and their predecessors have not been in possession of the land openly, continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since 26 July 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of the public domain. It appears that barrio folk also opposed the application. On 16 January 1956, by virtue of a final judgment in said case, supplemented by orders issued on 21 March 1956 and 13 August 1956, the Alagads were declared owners of Lot 1 and the remaining portion, or Lot 2, was declared public land. Decree N-51479 was entered and OCT 0-401, dated 18 October 1956, was issued in the names of the Alagads.

In August 1966, the Alagads filed before the Municipal Court of Pila, Laguna (Civil Case 52) an action to evict the barrio folk occupying portions of Lot 1. On 8 August 1968, judgment was rendered in the eviction case ordering the barrio folk therein to return possession of the premises to the Alagads. The barrio folk did not appeal.

The Republic filed a petition for “annulment of title and reversion, insofar as the 1.42 hectare northwestern portion on end of Lot 1 is concerned, contending that such is foreshore land, and that the Alagads could not have had an imperfect title to it as it was the barrio folk who filled up the land to elevate

the land to its present condition. The Court, on 6 October 1970, issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna or his deputies from enforcing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case 52, and the Alagads from selling, mortgaging, disposing or otherwise entering into any transaction affecting the area. The case was set for pre-trial on 6 July 1971, to which the attorney representing the Republic did not appear. On 16 July 1971, the court dismissed the complaint. The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, was set for hearing, and finally denied by the court. Appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial court for failure to show in the record on appeal that the appeal was perfected on time. Hence, the appeal.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower courts, and reinstated the Republic’s complaint and thus remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

1. State cannot be bound by or estopped from the mistakes or negligent acts of its officials or agentsThe State cannot be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or negligent acts of its official or agents, much more, non-suited as a result thereof. This is so because the state as a persona in law is the judicial entity, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land under the basic doctrine embodied in the 1935 Constitution as well as the present charter. It is charged moreover with the conservation of such patrimony. There is need therefore of the most rigorous scrutiny before private claims to portions thereof are judicially accorded recognition. Such primordial consideration, not the apparent carelessness, much less the acquiescence of public officials, is the controlling norm.

2. Ramos v. Central Bank, and Nilo v. Romero not applicable to the present caseThe cases of Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines and Nilo v. Romero, are not applicable. In Ramos, the Court applied estoppel upon finding of bad faith on the part of the State (the Central Bank) in deliberately reneging on its promises. In Nilo, the Court denied efforts to impugn the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the defendant had been “erroneously” represented in the complaint by the City Attorney when it should have been the City Mayor, on a holding that the City Attorney, in any event, could have ably defended the City (Davao City). In both cases, it is seen that the acts that gave rise to estoppel were voluntary and intentional in character, in which cases, it could not be said that the Government had been prejudiced by some negligent act or omission.

3. Res judicata is not an impediment to reversion of property; Republic v. CA, requisites for a prior judgment to become a barRes judicata is not an impediment to reversion of property. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that a certificate of title may be ordered cancelled (Republic v. Animus, et al.), and the cancellation may be pursued through an ordinary action therefor. This action cannot be barred by the prior judgment of the land registration court, since the said court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. And if there was no such jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does not apply. For it is a well-settled rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur; (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of cause of action (Municipality of Daet vs. C4 93 SCRA 503; Mendoza vs. Arrieta, et al., 91 SCRA 113)

4. Property of public dominion: Property for public use or public service“Property”, according to the Civil Code, “is either of public dominion or of private ownership.” Property is of public dominion if it is (1) intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads and others of similar character; or if it (2) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

5. Patrimonial property and property of public dominion“All other property of the State which is not of the character mentioned in article [420], is patrimonial property,” meaning to say, property “open to disposition” by the Government, or otherwise, property pertaining to the national domain, or public lands. Property of the public dominion, on the other hand, refers to things held by the State by regalian right. They are things res publicae in nature and hence, incapable of private appropriation. Thus, under the present Constitution, “[w]ith the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.”

6. Public Dominion, as to watersArticle 502 provides that “(1) Rivers and their natural beds; (2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and the beds themselves; (3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion; (4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on publiclands, and their

beds; (5) Rain waters running through ravines or sand beds, which are also of public dominion; (6) Subterranean waters on public lands; (7) Waters found within the zone of operation of public works, even if constructed by a contractor; (8) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands belonging to private persons, to the State, to a province, or to a city or municipality from the moment they leave such lands; and (9) The waste waters of fountains, sewers and public establishments” are of public dominion. It is also ordained in Article 44 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 that “natural ponds and lakes existing upon public lands and fed by public waters, belong to the public domain. Lakes, ponds, and pools existing upon the lands of private individuals, or the State or provinces, belong to the respective owners of such lands, and those situated upon lands of communal use belong to their respective ‘pueblos.’”

7. Laguna de Bay is a lake (Colegio de San Jose case); Highest Ordinary DepthLaguna de Bay has long been recognized as a lake. Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depressions of the earth; it contains fresh water coming from rivers and brooks or springs, and is connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. Inasmuch as Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court must resort to the legal provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to determine the character and ownership of the parcels of land in question. The recourse to legal provisions is necessary, for under Article 74 of the Law of Waters, “the natural bed or basin of lakes is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth” and in which case, it forms part of the national dominion. When Laguna de Bay’s waters are at their highest ordinary depth has been defined as the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being the “regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year. Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to the “extraordinary” action of nature, rainfall for instance, the portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of the body of water in question. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of the public dominion, and land capable of registration as private property.

8. Foreshore landA foreshore land has been defined as “that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides,” or “The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.” If the submergence, however, of the land is due to precipitation, it does not become foreshore, despite its proximity to the waters.

9. Court not a trier of facts; not enough evidence to arrive a conclusive disposition; RemandThe case has to be decided alongside the above principles and regretfully, the Court cannot make a ruling because it is not a trier of facts, and it is in possession of no evidence to assist it in arriving at a conclusive disposition. The Court thus remanded the case to the court a quo to determine whether or not the property subject of controversy is foreshore.

Binalay v. Manalo[G.R. No. 92161. March 18, 1991.]

Facts:

The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini, Isabela having an estimated area of 20 hectares. The western portion of this land bordering on the Cagayan River has an elevation lower than that of the eastern portion which borders on the national road. Through the years, the western portion would periodically go under the waters of the Cagayan River as those waters swelled with the coming of the rains. The submerged portion, however, would re-appear during the dry season from January to August. It would remain under water for the rest of the year. On 9 May 1959, Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad, daughter of Judge Juan Taccad (N: Francisco Forto, E: National Road, S: Julian Tumolva, W: Cagayan River). In 1964, Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba who had earlier acquired the same from Judge Taccad (N: Balug Creek, S: Faustina Taccad [now Manalo], E: Provincial Road, W: Cagayan river). On 21 October 1969, during the rainy season, the two parcels of land were consolidated as one lot during the cadastral survey at Balug, Tamauini, Isabela (Lot 307, 1.8 hectares + 2.9489 hectares of 8.65 hectares purchased; the other portion under water was left unsurveyed).

The Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to form two (2) branches — the western and the eastern branches — and then unites at the other end, further north, to form a narrow strip of land. The eastern branch of the river cuts through the land of and is inundated with water only during the rainy season. The bed of the eastern branch is the submerged or the unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to Manalo. For about 8 months of the year when the level of water at the point where the Cagayan River forks is at its ordinary depth, river water does not flow into the eastern branch. While this condition persists, the eastern bed is dry and is susceptible to cultivation. The elongated strip of land formed by the western and the eastern branches of the Cagayan River looked very much like an island. This strip of land was surveyed on 12 December 1969. It was found to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares and was designated as Lot 821 (10.8122 hectares) and Lot 822 (11.9087).. Lot 821 is located directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated from the latter only by the eastern branch of the Cagayan River during the rainy season and, during the dry season, by the exposed, dry river bed, being a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad. Manalo claims that Lot 821 also belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it is adjacent.

Binalay, et.al., other hand, who are in possession of Lot 821 insist that they own Lot 821. They occupy the outer edges of Lot 821 along the river banks, i.e., the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other agricultural products. They also cultivate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion during summer. This situation compelled Manalo to file a case for forcible entry against petitioners on 20 May 1969. The case was dismissed by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela for failure of both parties to appear. On 15 December 1972, Manalo again filed a case for forcible entry against petitioners. The latter case was similarly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela.

On 24 July 1974, Manalo filed a complaint before the then CFI Isabela, Branch 3 for quieting of title possession and damages against petitioners. He prayed that judgment be entered ordering petitioners to vacate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion, and prayed that judgment be entered declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during the survey. On 10 November 1982, the trial court rendered a decision declaring Manalo as the lawful owner of Lot 821 and ordering Binalay, et.al. to vacate the premises of Lot 821 and restraining them further from entering said premises; without pronouncement as to costs. Binalay, et.al. appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court. They

filed a motion for reconsideration, without success. In effect, both courts rejected the assertion that the depression on the earth’s surface which separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is, during part of the year, the bed of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.The Supreme Court set aside the decision of Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV 04892, declared Manalo as the owner of Lot 307, and declared that the regularly submerged portion or the eastern bed of the Cagayan River to be property of public dominion. The Court also declared that the ownership of Lot 821 shall be determined in an appropriate action that may be instituted by the interested parties inter se; without pronouncement as to costs.

1. Finding of facts by lower courts entitled to great respect; Whether the conclusion reached thereafter is correct is a question of lawIt is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great respect, and that they carry even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This is in recognition of the peculiar advantage on the part of the trial court of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of the witnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the Court of Appeals is the final arbiter of questions of fact. But whether a conclusion drawn from such findings of facts is correct, is a question of law cognizable by the Supreme Court. In the present case, the conclusion reached by both courts below apparently collides with their findings that periodically at the onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows through the eastern bed the Cagayan River.

2. Government of the Philippine Islands v. Colegio de San Jose not applicable to present caseGovernment of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose is not applicable to the present case. That case involved Laguna de Bay; since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court applied the legal provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to determine the character and ownership of the disputed property. Specifically, the Court applied the definition of the natural bed or basin of lakes found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. Upon the other hand; what is involved in the instant case is the eastern bed of the Cagayan River.

3. Article 70 of the Law of Waters applicable, not Article 74Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law applicable to the present case. Article 70 provides that “the natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest floods”. Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground covered by its waters during the highest floods. The highest floods in the eastern branch of the Cagayan River occur with the annual coming of the rains as the river waters in their onward course cover the entire depressed portion. The conclusion of the Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon evidence of record. The description of the lot acquired from Taguba and the other from Taccad refer to the dried up bed or the eastern branch of the river as the Cagayan River serving as the western boundary in the Deeds of Sale. Further, Manalo himself, during direct examination, depict the depressed portion separating Lot 821 and Lot 307 as a river bed. The dike-like slope of such depression, or such topographic feature, is compatible with the fact that huge volume of water passes through the eastern bed regularly during the rainy season. Even if there is no record of when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel, the bed already existed even before the sale of the land to Manalo (with the bed being referred to as “old bed” or even “Rio Muerte de Cagayan”).

4. Private ownership of the bed of a river cannot be acquired as the land constituted property of public dominion; Article 420 applies to existing beds, Article 462 applies to new beds in relation to Article 457 (Accretion) Pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, Manalo did not acquire private ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the deeds of absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors could not have validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion. Article 420 of the Civil Code states that “(1) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;” and “(2) those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth” are property of public dominion. Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, “rivers” is a composite term which includes: (1) the running waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks. Manresa, in commenting upon Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 from which Article 420 of the Philippine Civil Code was taken, stressed the public ownership of river beds. Still, even if it were alleged and proved that the Cagayan River first began to encroach on his property after the purchase from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad; Article 462 of the Civil Code would then apply divesting, by operation of law, Manalo of private ownership over the new river bed.

5. Accretion, requisites

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). In the present case, the Court notes that the parcels of land bought by Manalo border on the eastern branch of the Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by this eastern branch which Manalo may claim must be deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river.

6. Alluvial process is slow and gradual, not sudden and forcefulAssuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale transferring ownership of the land to Manalo is the western branch, the decision of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are bare of factual findings to the effect that the land purchased by Manalo received alluvium from the action of the river in a slow and gradual manner. On the contrary, the flooding, that caused the land to reappear making it susceptible to cultivation, is sudden and forceful action, and is hardly the alluvial process contemplated under Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow and hardly perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner.

7. Size of land considered alluvium and topography of land negates conclusion of incrementIt is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares. Lot 821 (11.91 hectares) is the northern portion of the strip of land having a total area of 22.72 hectares. It is difficult to suppose that such a sizable area as Lot 821 resulted from slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size. The total landholding purchased by Manalo is 10.45 hectares, even smaller than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion. Further, there are steep vertical dike-like slopes separating the depressed portion or river bed and Lot 821 and Lot 307. This topography of the land, among other things, precludes a reasonable conclusion that Lot 821 is an increment to the depressed portion by reason of the slow and constant action of the waters of either the western or the eastern branches of the Cagayan River.

8. Quieting of title requires equitable title or interest in subject real propertyUnder Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must at least have equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. The evidence of record on this point is less than satisfactory, such as that both parties claim adverse possession of Lot 821 and both parties presenting tax declarations on the subject land; thus the Court feels compelled to refrain from determining the ownership and possession of Lot 821, adjudging neither petitioners nor respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.

Hilario v. City of Manila[GR No. L-19570 April 27, 1967]

Facts:

Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land around 49 hectares in area (Barrio Guinayang, San Mateo, Rizal). Upon his death this property was inherited by his son, Jose Hilario, Jr., to whom a new certificate of title was issued. During the lifetime of plaintiff’s father, the Hilario estate was bounded on the western side by the San Mateo River.3 To prevent its entry into the land, a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch was constructed on the northwestern side. This was further fortified by a stonewall built on the northern side. For years, these safeguards served their purpose. However, in 1937, a great and extraordinary flood occurred which inundated the entire place including the neighboring barrios and municipalities. The River destroyed the dike on the northwest, left its original bed and meandered into the Hilario estate, segregating from the rest thereof a lenticular piece of land. The disputed area is on the eastern side of this lenticular strip which now stands between the old riverbed site and the new course. In 1945, the US Army opened a sand and gravel plant within the premises, and started scraping, excavating and extracting soil, gravel and sand from the nearby areas along the River. The operations eventually

extended northward into the strip of land. Consequently, a claim for damages was filed with the US War Department by Luis Hidalgo, the then administrator of Dr. Hilario’s estate. The US Army paid. In 1947, the plant was turned over to herein defendants-appellants and appellee who took over its operations.

On 22 October 22, 1949, plaintiff filed his complaint for injunction and damages against the defendants City Engineer of Manila, District Engineer of Rizal, the Director of Public Works, and Engr. Busuego, the Engineer-in-charge of the plant. Subsequently, the Bureau of Mines and Atty. Maximo Calalang were respectively allowed to join the litigation as intervenors; as per issue of fees and penalties for materials (sand and gravel) extracted. On 14 March 1954, defendants filed a petition for injunction against plaintiff and intervenor Calalang in the same case, alleging that the latter have fenced off the disputed area in contravention of an agreement had between the latter and the Director of Public Works wherein the defendants were allowed to continue their operations but subject to the final outcome of the pending suit. On 13 May 1954, plaintiff amended his complaint and impleaded as additional defendants the City of Manila, the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal, and Engr. Eulogio Sese, the new Engineer-in-charge of the plant. Plaintiff also converted his claim to one purely for damages directed against the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, solidarily, in the amount of P1,000,000.00, as the cost of materials taken since 1949, as well as those to be extracted therefrom until defendants stop their operations.

On 21 December 1956, the lower court rendered its decision, ordering the City of Manila and Director of Public Works to pay Hilario in solidum the sum of P376,989.60 as cost of gravel and sand extracted from the plaintiff’s land, plus costs; and ordering the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal to reimburse intervenor Calalang of P36.80 representing gravel fees illegally collected. None of the parties litigants seemed satisfied with this decision and they all sought a reconsideration of the same. On August 30, 1957, the lower court resolved the motions to reconsider with an order, holding that the 2/5 portion of the area in controversy to Hilario, and dismissing the case against the Bureau of Public Works insofar as money claims are concerned without prejudice to Hilario taking action against proper party in such claim. Hilario and Calalang filed a second motion for reconsideration, which the lower court denied. Hence, the appeal.

The Supreme Court set aside the decision and orders appealed from, and entered another judgment to the effect that the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, and his agent and employees, are absolved of liability from extracting materials from subject property (of public domain); and the portion within the strip of land question declared not part of public domain and confirmed as part of Hilario’s private property. No Costs.

1. Old Civil Code and Law of Waters of 1866 controlling lawSince the change in the course of the River took place in 1937, long before the present Civil Code took effect, the question should be determined in accordance with the provisions of the old Civil Code and those of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866.

2. All riverbanks, as part of the riverbeds, are of public ownershipUnder the old Civil Law and the Law of Waters, all riverbanks are of public ownership, including those formed when a river leaves its old bed and opens a new course through a private estate. Artcile 339 of the old Civil Code is very clear. Without any qualifications, it provides that “that devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character” are property of public ownership. Further, the riverbank is part of the riverbed. Article 73 of the Law of Waters which provides that the phrase “banks of a river” is understood those lateral strips of zones of its beds which are washed by the stream only during such high floods as do not cause inundations. The use of the words “of its bed [de sus alveos] “ clearly indicates the intent of the law to consider the banks for all legal purposes, as part of the riverbed. Thus, the banks of the River are part of its bed. Since undeniably all beds of river are of public ownership, it follows that the banks, which form part of them, are also of public ownership.

3. Natural bed or channel of a creek or river definedThe natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest [ordinary] floods (Article 70 of the Law of the Waters).

4. New bed, when river changes course, is of public ownership; Means to recoverArticle 372 of the old Civil Code which provides that “whenever a navigable or floatable river changes its course from natural causes and opens a new bed through a private estate, the new bed shall be of public ownership, but the owner of the estate shall recover it in the event that the waters leave it dry again either

naturally or as the result of any work legally authorized for this purpose.” Banks are not mentioned in the provision, as the nature of banks follows that of the bed and the running water of the river.

5. A river is a compound concept consisting of running waters, bed, and banksA river is a compound concept consisting of three elements; (1) the running waters, (2) the bed and (3) the banks. All these constitute the river. American authorities are in accord with this view, as that “‘ River’ consists of water, bed and banks”; and that “A ‘river’ consists of water, a bed and banks, these several parts constituting the river, the whole river. It is a compound idea; it cannot exist without all its parts. Evaporate the water, and you have a dry hollow. If you could sink the bed, instead of a river you would have a fathomless gulf. Remove the banks, and you have, a boundless flood”

6. River is of public ownership, elements follow same nature of ownership; Law explicitSince a river is but one compound concept, it should have only one nature, i.e., it should either be totally public or completely private. Since rivers are of public ownership, it is implicit that all the three component elements be of the same nature also. Still, the law expressly makes all three elements public. Thus, riverbanks and beds are public under Artciles 339 and 407, respectively, of the Code, while the flowing waters are declared so under Articles 33, par. 2 of the Law of Waters of 1866.

7. Natural is not synonymous to original or prior condition“Natural” is not made synonymous to “original” or “prior condition”. On the contrary, even if a river should leave its original bed so long as it is due to the force of nature, the new course would still fall within the scope of the definition provided by the Diccionario de La Real Academia Española. Hence, the law must have used the word “natural” only because it is in keeping with the ordinary nature and concept of a river always to have a bed and banks.