CHAPTER SIX

POLITICAL VIOLENCE- REVOLUTIONARY ATTEMPT AND SEQUENCES IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

In 1988 the Sri Lankan State faced all major categories of threats

and the rapid growth of insurgency enhanced the JVPs attempt to seize

the State power. At the same time, the regime was hard put to tackle the

JVP challenge, primarily because all the conventional instruments of

suppression had become at least partly ineffective 1 •

Thus, the State seemed to be a State without central authority as

explained by Thomas Hobbes : " ... There was no such things as right or

wrong because where there was no common power, there was no law;

where no law, no injustice". Hence, above all, "how should one live

without fear" became the principal concem of the masses2 • At this

junction, while the rulers' concem was about their own survival,

individuals were told to look after their own security3 • In such a

For analyses. see, Dayan Jayatilleka, Sri Lanka : The Travails of a Democracy, Unfinished War. Protracted Crisis <International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Kandy, 1995) Chapters I & 2: and Rohan Gunaratna. Sri Lanka : A Lost Revolution? (Institute of Fundamental Studies. Sri Lanka, 1990) Chapters 12 & 13.

For explanation, see. Mark Kauppi & Paul R. Viotti, ed., The Global Philosophers : Issues in World Politics Series (Lexington Books, New York, 1992) pp. 163-16 7.

For explanation, of regime's responsibility and basic security functions of the State. see Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear ~Transasia Publishers, New Delhi, 1987) Introduction and Chapter I 0: For the Sri Lankan situation in 1988-89, see P. V.J Jayasekara & Mahinda Werake. ed., Security Dilemma of a Small State (South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1995) Part 2. pp.23-40: and for Deputy Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratna · s comments on individuals security, see Divaina September 6. 1988 (p.l ).

192

situation, violence seemed to succeed as an instrument of systemic

change. According to the rebellious youth a 'Socialist Revolution 'was

the only remedy to uproot the social injustices and the inequalities of the

society. In that context, "alternative government" ( Vikalpa Anduwa)' its

orders and 'Kangaroo Courts4 played a remarkable role in the society.

This not only represented an anarchic situation, it was also the

result of massive injustices which the mass of the people were no longer

willing to bear. For a social order with coercive authority, justice was

perhaps the sole legitimating factor. Such a legitimation based on justice

was demanded by the youth under the JVP leadership. In other words,

theoretically, justice may be seen as a concept of critical legitimation and

legitimation of coercive powers depends on the welfare of the affected

community.5 Hence, only the Wijeweera faction of the original JVP

existed in 1989, this faction succeeded in projecting the :image that if any

revolutionary movement was possible in Sri Lanka, it was of their JVP

kind. However, this group conceded that "revolutions are infrequent ...

Insurrections (attempts at revolutions) are more common ... "6 •

h

"Kangaroo Courts" mean improperly constituted courts having no legal standing_ During the second NP insurrection. the word was used by the mass media to symbolize NP orders and justice. especially in their punishment measures. For the purpose, JVP decisions were taken with disregard of normal legal procedure and criteria of the State. Sometimes, it was seen by the State authority as 'wild law· while the JVP defined it as 'peoples power'. See, Ceylon Daily News. September 4. 1988.

For the full text of this approach, see Otfried Hoffe. Political Justice (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995) p.31. (emphasis original).

See. Mick 1\toore. 'lhoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka" in. Modern Asian Studies. vol27. part 3 (July 1993) p.941.

193

Especially, specific features of the modem State formation, dependent

upon capitalism and semi-authoritarianism- as prevailing in Sri Lanka-

were hardly suitable for a complete revolutionary victory. But, in the

rulers' rationale the State had the 'democratically enacted' laws such as

the emergency powers, to fight 'terrorism".

Thus, the regime could 'resolve' the conflict by December 1989

through a near-total physical annihilation of the JVP - including the

leader, Rohana Wijeweera. The implications were that the Premadasa

regrme was responding to the demands of the State. Repression and

coercion were used as a dominant part of the strategy. It also attempted

to divert popular pressures into areas which did not threaten the regime.

In adopting such a strategy, political violence was converted into an

instrument as well as a resource, resulting in the growth of a cycle of

political violence. This violence not only weakened the Sri Lankan State

but made some of its leading politicians victims of that process.

Ironically, President Premadasa himself became a victim of that cycle in

1993. The events that followed also led to a culmination of the seventeen

year-long UNP rule in 1994. That context is examined in this chapter

under the following headings :

For instance. see Deputy Defence Minister. Ranjan Wijeratna·s explanation in Island. November 17. 1989.

194

1. NATURE AND DIRECTION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AFTER

1987

(A) Anti-Accord Violence:

The period from the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord in July, 1987 to the

second JVP insurrection in 1989 was the period that was highly

characterized by violent activities in the modern Sri Lankan State. This

phase may be sub-divided into pre- and post-Presidential and general

elections. The anti-government drive of the pre-election period may be

considered in three aspects : youth-led violent activities, issues in

electoral politics and socio-economic issues.

The JVP focus had been on both political and military aspects in

capturing the State power. In the military strategy, various tactics

adopted to paralyse State elements, orders of Kangaroo courts and

assassinations and planned attacks on the State infrastructure were

important. In the political strategy, apart from the means and methods

of mass mobilization, the JVP tried to form a United Political Front with

the other mainstream political parties against the UNP regime. Both

those objectives were attempted simultaneously. For instance, as

Rohan Gunaratna explained, while the JVP was appealing its military

wing, the DJV (Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya) threatened and carried

195

out orders8 • It began with the protest campaign against the Indo-Lanka

Peace Accord.

At first, the anti-Accord campaign was led by the MSV (Mavubima

Surakeeme Viyaparaya - Movement for the protection of the Motherland,

led by the JVP) and the MSS (Mavubima Surakeeme Sangamaya - The

Association for the Protection of the Motherland, led by SLFP

moderates).9 Eventhough the formation of those two groups- MSV and

MSS - had resulted from ideological differences, both the organizations

seemed to adopt a .Qearly-similar campaign against the peace move of the

governmentlo.

On the eve of signing the Accord, the SLFP leader, Mrs.

Bandaranaike, invited at a public rally, Prime Minister R.Premadasa to

lead the protests against the proposed Accord - hoping that he would

oppose the proposals and even quit the Cabinet11 • President J.R.

Jayewardena reacting to this, told members of the parliamentary group

that those who did not support the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement could quit

the party. He even threatened to dissolve Parliament and hold general

elections if his MPs rebelled against the Accord12 • Against that

I <I

II

I~

For instance. see Rohan Gunaratna, A Lost Revolution, no. I p.314.

For explanation. see Island, October. 6, 1987 p.4.

See. Ravaya. July 5. 1992 p.5.

For instance, see Ceylon Daily News July 25. 1987. and for an account. see Rohan Gunaratna. A Lost Revolution. no. I pp. 233-234

Ceylon Daily News July 26 .. 1987.

196

background, perhaps even without collective will, the Cabinet approved

the agreement. But the SLFP leaders' response was that they would not

allow the implementation of the Accord. Defining the Accord as a "sell-

out of one-third of the country to minority Tamils and to India", they led

'national prayer protests' and a 'day of mourning' against the impending

signing of the Accord 13 •

(b) Military Strategy of the JVP for Seizing State Power:

While the Sri Lankan intellectual attitude might have been ready to

accept the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord as a necessity under the prevailing

circumstances, the average Sinhalese regarded it as a surrender of

. sovereignty and land to India 14 • The JVP was successful in propagating

their anti-Indian doctrine through History. According to the JVP, in

ancient times, when Sri Lankan rulers became weak, Indian rulers were

successful in expanding their dominance over Sri Lanka. Invasions in

the eleventh century under the Chola kings were examples. Like those,

the present situation was also a historical reality before an "illegal and

puppet" regime15 • The sudden revival of the JVP after the Accord

1.1

l·l

I~

For detailed accounts, see Ceylon Daily News. July 27, 28, 29 & 30. 1987: Island, July 26. 27.28 & 29, 1987: Rohan Gunaratna,A Lost Revolution no. I pp.234-237: and. Times of india July 27. 28. 29 & 30 .. 1987

The JVP also propagated the same in July 1986. See the NP leaflet, dated July I, 1986 A'otinra A"appam-Janathavata Hulon (meant Ransom to Tigers, Air to People): 30 percent of the land and 60 percent of the sea beach to 14 percent ofthe population.

For instance. see. Tribune, August, I 0, 1987 p.2: Rohan Gunaratna. A Lost Revolution?. no. I pp.234-237~ and Ceylon Daily News, July 27. 28. 29 & 30, 1987

See. explained in Niyamuwa August 8. 1987.

197

manifested that it was more than a movement and was a state of mind; A

mass upsurge paved the way for the JVP to become a dominant force in

its campaign- "to save the Nation by capturing State power".

Because of the President's supreme position in the State, "kill JR"

was the first widespread JVP slogan throughout the country.

Subsequently, slogans such as "Motherland or Death"; "Motherland

First-Education Second" and "Motherland First - Workplace Second",

became alive among the protesting youth. Meanwhile, under the

changed situation, four new political lectures were conducted by the JVP.

Those lectures emphasised that the nation could only be saved by a

'patriotic struggle' launched by a 'patriotic action front' 16 • Emergence of

the DJV (Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya) exposed this patriotism. In

Rohana Wijeweera's words, "when people were protesting peacefully

against the Indo-Lanka Accord, the government forces killed 142

innocent people. This was the context in which the DJV was born. It

challenged the J.R. Jayewardene regime and the fifth battalion of Indian

imperialism which had the monopoly of violence in Sri Lanka by that

Accordingly, the second JVP insurrection was executed through a

strategy of protracted armed rebellion. It capitalised on the "wounded

lh For explanation. see Victor Ivan. "The Political Legacy of Wijeweera· in Island. February 4. 1990 p.Il.

See Wijeweera ·s interview with Lankadeepa (Sinhalese Daily) November 13. 1988. p.ll.

198

national pride" of the majority Sinhalese. The rationale of the JVP was

that the UNP regime lacked moral and rational legitimacy and was

incapable of defeating internal and external threats to the State including

the Indian intetvention. This argument was accepted by almost all the

Sinhalese - dominated opposition mainstream political parties, as well as

the Sinhalese masses. However, the failure of those opposition parties to

guide the masses properly drove the youth to join in the JVP - led

violence. Hence, the "patriotic war to liberate the motherland from

Indian occupation" was capitalized on by the JVP as the motto of protest

and violence 18•

Among the pre-planned attacks and killings, the grenade attack on

18th August, 1987 in the Committee Room of Parliament took the

country by surprise 19 • Following the attack, President Jayewardene

addressed the nation seeking assistance from those "who are interested

in freedom and democracy" and condemned the actions of the 'Sou them

terrorists'2o. On the other hand, a group called 'Patriotic Peoples

Movement' had claimed the responsibility of the attack and assured that

actions would continue until the Indo-Lanka Agreement was abrogated'21 •

lK

l'!

20

21

For explanation. see. Y.R. Amarasingha, "The Role of the Opposition in the Politics in Sri Lanka : 1977 to 1991" in, Security Dilemma no.J pp.102-119.

For details, see Ceylon Daily News August 19. 1987 and Times of India. August 19, 1987.

For details, see Ceylon Daily News August, 19,1987: Island, August 19, 20, & 2 L 1987. and Timesoflndia August, 19, !987.

Ibid.

199

Since all universities had been closed indefinitely and been made

out of bounds for the students, there was a large number of youth with

JVP connections participating in the clandestine activities. By this time,

student movements all over the country had been united under the pro-

JVP Socialist Student Union22• According to them, the organized labour

movement in Sri Lanka was very weak by the mid-1980s due to betrayal

of the old Left leaders and repression of the Government. After the

killing of students on June 19 and 20, 1984, the student movements

could mobilize students and workers against the Old Left and the

Government. Even though the govelnDlent banned the Socialist

Student Union after Daya Pathirana's assassination,23 no one could

weaken the students' and workers' unity. It was in this context that

Deshapremi Shisya Viyaparaya (Patriotic Students Movement) and

Janatha Satan Peramuna (Peoples Fighting Front) were formed after the

Indo-Lanka Accord24• With the disappearance of Sathyapala Wannigama

(a Philosophy lecturer at Ruhuna University) in the police custody in

22 For details, see l'iru ,\'agamn Samarana Dina (On the day commemmorating student heroes). a leaflet distributed by the Socialists Student Union. dated June 19. 1985: and, Niyamuwa vol. 6. June 1985.

The government and mass media accused the JVP of this killing: Daya Pathirana was the Independent Student Union leader at the Colombo University. He was abducted and killed by cutting his throat on December 16. 1986. However. in the JVP view, it was a result of the conflict between L TIE and EPRLF. For details. see, the JVP leaflet "Who killed Daya .Pathirana? Prabahakaran·s tigers or Uma·s tigers') .. dated December 25, 1986. and 'Eelam Terrorism in University, too· in Niyam_uwa. vol.6 no 29. March. 1987. P. 7.

See. Wijeweera·s interview Lankad~~. November. 13. 1988.

200

November 198725, professionals also supported the student-worker

protest campaign. Thereafter, District Ministers, Ministers and Deputy

Ministers and high-ranking UNP office bearers were attacked by the DJV.

Besides those highly visible targets, there was also a considerable

number of killings of UNP supporters, local government members and

police personneJ26.

According to one commentator, the 'end of 1987 showed signs of

terminal illness in Sri Lanka's political system '27 • Escalating violence

and terror, compounded with all sorts of anti-systemic measures could

be seen on the militants' side. By 1988, the targets of the attacks had

been changed to not only UNPers but also to SLFP and to USA

supporters (Alliance of the LSSP, the CCP, the NSSP and Sri Lanka

Mahajana Pak.saya led by Vijaya Kumaratunga). One of the major killings

was Vijaya Kumaratunga, that of the SLMP leader at his residence on

16th Februruy, 198828• At the same time, militants continuously attacked

security points, police stations and state plantation offices, etc., to gather

weapons for their militruy activity and other equipments for their

25

2h

See for details. "Sath_vapala Wanni~ama~e Sathya 1\athal'a"' (Tme Story of Sathyapala \Vannigama) in Ravaya (monthly Journal) May, 1988.

For detailed accounts. see Rohan Gunaratna A Lost Revolution, no. I pp .. 270-281.

See Bryan Pfaffenberger. "Sri Lanka in 1987"' in. Asian Survey, vol.28. no.2. Febmary 1988. pp.137-147.

For explanation see, Rajiva Wijesinha, Sri Lanka in Crisis : J.R. Jayewardene and the Erosion of Democracy (Council for Liberal Democracy, Colombo. 1991) chapter eleven.

201

propaganda activity. The attack on the air-force base at Katunayake (for

the second time) on April22, 1988 was significant among them29•

Thus, on the one hand, the regime demonstrated that it could no

longer handle its opposition as before. On the other hand, subordinate

and discontented social groups seemed to accept the use of collective

violence as a means of achieving their goals. During this time, the

success of the State armed forces against the JVP had been marginal.

The Government's hectic announcement of a secret pact with the JVP in

itself was an acceptance of this reality3o.

As announced by the National Security Minister Lalith

Athulathmudali, at a press conference on May 10, 1988, the Government

had drafted an agreement to be signed by the representatives of the JVP,

through a JVP mediator known as K.C. Senanayake. The signatories had

been the National Security Minister on behalf of the Government; and

Rohana Wijeweera, Upatissa Gamanayake and K.C. Senanayake on

behalf of the JVP. Father Tissa Balasuriya had been the witness to the

signing of the agreement. The Government agreed to lift the ban on the

JVP, the trade unions and the student organizations related to the JVP.

The condition was that the JVP would cease all acts o( violence. The

Government further requested the JVP to surrender their arms by May

For instance. see Ceylon Daily News. April 23. 1988.

For details. see Ceylon Daily News May II & 12. 1988~ and Island, May II, 1988.

202

29, 198831 • Ironically, this peace pact became an embarrassment as the

JVP shortly announced that it was not an initiative of the JVP. However,

even though the National Security Minister himself had also been

ridiculed before the nation, the so-called pact turned out to be to the

advantage of the JVP. Its proscription was lifted by the President and the

JVP became a legally accepted party. Yet, violence did not cease.

Instead it exposed the weakness of the government in facing the military

threat posed by the JVP.32

The situation became worse by July, 1988. The killings were

followed by an appeal to the security forces to desert and join the JVP "to

fight for the liberation of the country". By this time, the JVP had entered

a phase of open confrontation with the security forces.

This situation compelled the rulers to accept the JVP threat as an

unavoidable force. Thus, in July 1988, A.C.S. Hameed, Deputy Minister

of Higher Education was given the task of negotiating with university

students hereby giving up the government's earlier resolve not to discuss.

Members of the Action-Committee and IUSF (Inter University Student

Federation) - both dominated by the JVP - came for talks, especially

covering their faces as one of their own security measures. They

demanded the release of all students being held by the armed forces and

the removal of national security personnel (police and army) from

12 For instance see. Rajiva Wijesinha. Sri Lanka in Crisj~Lno.28. pp.l ~5-1-H.

203

university premises. Among the academic issues, the North Colombo

Medical college or private Medical college issue dominated all the

discussions. In this regard, in addition to several requests on the

examination procedure, the students' ultimate demand was to

nationalize the private Medical College. At this point, Government

Medical Officers' Association also supported the students and warned for

strike action in hospitals unless the demands of the students were

fulfilled. As agreed, a sub-committee of the Cabinet was appointed to

examine the matter. As far as political demands were concerned, the

students were able to acquire a "favourable status" for them (compared

to ordinary people) in police arrests and similar matters through the

authority of universities33 • This outcome was a step forward for the JVP

and their decision to form a united front .,. through the IUSF - to fight

forthcoming elections was taken against this background.

(c) Political Strategy and Its Aftermath:

By mid-1988, the JVP was seeking a mandate to establish a

National Liberation Government under a National Liberation United

Front (NLUF). For this purpose, they presented a document as the

United Front's National Programme to save the Nation34 • They asked for

the following pre-conditions to be fulfilled before holding elections :

l1 For details. see. Kingsley de Silva ··sri Lankan Universities from 1977 to 1990" in Minerva 38(2). Summer 1990 pp.20o-210.

The JVP leaflet distributed throughout the country is quoted in. A Lost Revolution no. I p.259.

204

vacation of the Presidency, resignation of the Government, appointment

of an impartial President and care-taker Government, dissolution· of the

Provincial Councils, suspension of all the oppression launched against

the people, disbandment of the various 'party armies' especially those

belonging to the UNP and the USA, and immediate holding of elections

under the caretaker government. They appealed to 'all patriotic-

democratic forces to join in ensuring that these pre-conditions would

come into effect.35 Whether out of sincere considerations or fear of

reprisals, there were sections in the Sinhala mainstream parties like the

SLFP and the MEP, who were sympathetic to the JVP. Therefore the JVP

held several discussions with the opposition parties including the SLFP,

MEP and the EWP (Eksath Lanka Janatha Paksaya). IUSF acted as the

mediator in this process. As a result of such discussions, an eight party

(the SLFP, the JVP, the MEP, the EWP, the Liberal Party, the Sri Lanka

Muslim Congress (SLMC), the Tamil Congress and the Democratic

Workers' Congress) coalition emerged.36

Within this coalition, however, differences arose about the JVPs

firm stand on the resignation of the President. But others underlined the

constitutional difficulties in establishing an Interim Government. Instead

they suggested that Parliament be dissolved and an all-party interim

.l~ Ibid. pp.263-266

For explanation. see. Dayan Jayatilleka. Sri Lanka no. I Chapter 2: and Rajiva Wijesinha, Civil Strife in Sri Lanka: the UNP Govt. (McCallum Books, Colombo. 1995) chapter 2.

205

Cabinet be appointed for the duration of the elections37• The JVP did not

accept this and refused to be a partner of the DPA (Democratic People's

Alliance) led by the SLFP. Since then, the JVP asked for a boycott of the

polls and unleased violence to ensure that. Their rationale was that free

and fair elections were not possible under the J.R. Jayewardene regime.

Yet, the IUSF supported the DPA38, perhaps to keep the option of greater

mobilization after the elections. However, in the short-term, by the end

of 1988, the political aspect received less attention in the JVP strategy for

conquering power.

II. ELECTIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE FAILURE OF THE

'SECOND JVP REVOLUTION' :-

(b) Presidential and General Elections :-

The Presidential election was due in December 1988. However,

mounting unrest and rumour about the elections could be observed in

political circles. On its part, the JVP had capitalized on violence with an

intensified propaganda campaign39 • In such a context, perhaps all

leaders of opposition parties, professional organizations, and even the

business community in and around Colombo, pressed for elections as an

,. Ibid.

See the JVP leaflet. "f)esha(1remi .Janatha\'ani A\'adimnna" (Patriotic People Be aware) dated October 2. 1988

For instance see. Rajiva Wijesinha. Civil Strife in Sri Lanka. no. 36. chapter I.

206

absolute necessity4°. As such, on September 16, the President

announced December 19, 1988 as the date of the Presidential election.

This ended all rumours that President J.R. Jayewardene himself wanted

to remain in office. Accordingly, Prime-Minister R. Premadasa became

the UNP candidate. The other two candidates, the SLFP leader Mrs.

Bandaranaike and the SLMP leader Ossie Abeygoonesekare represented

the opposition. Nomination day was fixed for November 10, 198841 •

However, by November, a state of near anarchy prevailed in the

country amidst JVP violence and counter-violence of the State. In such a

situation, even though the electorate did not show any interest in

elections, the UNP manifesto could change that apathy - to some extent.

In the manifesto published on October 25, 1988, R. Premadasa pledged

to be "the voice of the voiceless millions for drawing them out of their

misery" as "the humble servant of the common man"42 . His Programme

of Action was described as a "New Vision" and a "New Deal". "New

Vision" to restore peace, enforce discipline and alleviate poverty. "New

Deal" to ensure; Peace through consultation, compromise and consensus

: Discipline through rule of law, moral values and code of ethics : Poverty

.JI)

II

For instance see Divaina Sept. .I 0. 1988.

See Ceylon Daily News. September 28. 1988.

SeeR. Premadasa·s address ""Dear Friend .. in the UNP Manifesto of Action- 1988 (Government Printing. Sri Lanka)

207

Alleviation through restructuring the political, economic, social and

administrative machinery43 •

In. this respect, Premadasa had already been able to present an

image totally different from previous leaders. His constituency, Colombo-

Central, was the largest in voter strength in the country with various

backward social groups. He himself belonged to the socially depressed

groups which he exploited in projecting a new image. His Million Houses

Programme44 and Village Re-awakening Programme45 had created a

favourable impression among the deprived social groups at the national

level. As the next step he proposed a grant of Rs. 2500 per month, well

over the average wage at the time, to all those earning less than Rs. 500

per month - dependent on food stamps of the government - if he were

elected to the Presidency. This proposal was given publicity throughout

the country from about six months before the announcement of elections

and finally included in the Manifesto as Janasaviya~ i.e. self-reliance to

the common man. In Premadasa's words, 'Janasaviya was a local

answer to a local problem'.46 Alleviating poverty was the thrust of that

offer.

j.j

lh

lbidp.I.

Ibid p.Il

For Premadasa·s vision on "'Gam Udawa", see, Gam - Udawa : 1988 Anamaduwa : Speech by Hon. Prime-Minister. at the concluding ceremony of the Gam Udawa 1988 on July 3. 1988 <Govt. Printing. Sri Lanka).

See. The UNP Election Manifesto - I 988 no.42; and. Janasaviya - A 1ocal Answer to a 1ocal Problem (State Printing, Govt. of Sri Lanka 1991 ).

208

At the same time, Premadasa hardly denounced the JVP or DJV in

his election campaign. Instead, he said that the upsurge of youth

militancy in Sri Lanka was a result of the socio-economic inequalities.

Further he stressed that no one should blame the JVP leader, Rohana

Wijeweera, for assassinations or attacks until one could prove the

former's hand in those acts. 47 Although such rationalizations had been

eye-washes before armed suppression, Premadasa could gain advantage

of such tactics, especially in the South. In addition, in almost all of his

speeches, he took the sole responsibility of sending the IPKF back as

soon as he came to power8 • According to the UNP Manifesto, "If by the

time our candidate is elected President, the Indian forces have not left,

we will ensure that they are withdrawn"49 •

Conversely, the DPA had generally neglected economic issues and

welfare of the poor and lower-middle class social groups. Interestingly,

in their campaign, they said nothing about political violence in the

South. Also, there was no direct attack on or criticism of the JVP.

However, the eight party-coalition had been named Prajathanthravadi

Janatha Balavegaya (Democratic Peoples' Force) before the Sinhalese

electorate, and it expected to attract Sinhalese radical groups. Yet,

according to the Manifesto- published on November 24, 1988 -priorities

,.,

Premadasa had several times stressed this assumption during his election campagin. For instance. see Island. Feb 6.1989.

For instance. see Ceylon Daily News. November I I. 1988 and Island. November 14. 1988

See the UNP Election Manifesto no. 42 p.5.

209

had been constitutional changes, emergency laws, human rights and

related issues. Even though the economic issues had been cited, no

altemative programme was presented50• Furthermore, experts of the

DPA ridiculed Premadasa and highlighted the economic costs of his

Janasaviya programmes1•

In the final analysis, however, the UNP victory was, to a great

extent, due to terror and violence in the country. As one may argue,

there is no doubt about socio-economic issues, proportional voting and

campaign strategies. But political violence and disruptions of the

electoral process were the decisive factors in the final outcome52 • Added

to this, at the last moment, a partner of the DPA, the Muslim Congress,

broke from the SLFP and expressed their support to the UNP candidate53 •

Politically-sponsored violence and low polling in areas not sympathetic to

the UNP candidate were significant among others. All those factors had

been crucial in the electoral outcome. As such, on a very low poll, 55 per

cent as compared with 79 per cent at the previous Presidential election,

Premadasa won his contest by a very narrow margin. It was only 0.4 per

See. Manifesto of the Prajathanthral'adi Janatha Balavegava (Published by. lndrapala Abeyweera. on behalf of the SLFP. Mahajana Prakashakayo. Colombo. November 24. I 988.)

For instance see Victor Ivan, Contours of a Crisis (Sarvodaya Press. Maratuwa. 1988) final chapter.

For the background. see Election Commissioners· Report on the Presidential election - 1988. (Published in 1992 Govt. Printing. Sri Lanka).

For the SLMC's role see Rajiva Wijesinha. Sri Lanka in Crisis no. 28. p.J59.

210

cent over the minimum 50 per cent required for the victory under the

constitutionallaws54 •

Meanwhile, President J .R. Jayewardene dissolved the Parliament

m the morning of December 20, 1988, the day after the Presidential

election and general elections were scheduled for February 15, 1989. R.

Premadasa was sworn in as President on January, 2 1989 and appointed

an interim Cabinet for his government55• As a result, while pretending to

consider the JVP demand for a boycott, the mainstream opposition

started preparing for the parliamentary elections.

President Premadasa, after assuming office, revoked the emergency

powers and ordered the release of most of the JVP detainees. Violence

intensified but Premadasa did not change his view. Instead he tried from

the beginning to demonstrate that his own formula of "Consultation,

Compromise, Consensus" could work. While offering negotiations with,

and accommodation of he also warned them for military action, if the

JVP did not respond positively. Premadasa described his victory as a

victory of the common man and the UNP's power in Parliament too was

urged as essential to implement his social goals. Furthermore, on

January 3, the day after the Presidential inauguration, the IPKF

withdrew two battalions from Sri Lanka -in accordance with the

5-I For statistics, see Report of the Presidential Election no_ 52_

For details on the Cabinet of Ministers, see Rajiva Wijesinha, Civil Strife n Sri Lanka no_ 36 chapter 2_

211

agreement between President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Rajiv

Gandhi 56 •

During President Premadasa's systematic campaign to win over the

electorate, especially in view of the UNP's marginal victory at the

Presidential poll, several specific measures had been initiated. Apart

from the re-opening of academic institutions and normalizing the

essential services, Premadasa's emphasis on the rule of law and a code of

conduct for MPs and administrative officers, was aimed at rallying mass

support for him. On February 4, 1989, Premadasa pledged in his

Independence Day message, 'to bring a new revolution, a new order,

based on social progress with economic justice, equal opportunities and

unity of the State'57• In contrast, the SLFP was in disarray after the

Presidential poll. While radicals in the party revolted against the

leadership of Mrs. Bandaranaike, the MEP broke away from the DPA58 •

Meanwhile on February 11, 1989 the government made all services

connected with the conduct of the election as essential. Hospitals,

banks, post and telecommunication, and public administration were

among the sectors declared as essential, with immediate effect. Under

,.

See Neville Jayaweera ... Premadasa Policies : Almost doing the Impossible" in. Economic Review April 1990 (Publication ofthe Peoples· Bank. Sri Lanka): and. Times of India January. 3. 1989.

See Ceylon Daily News. February 5. 1989: and. Times of India. February 5. 1989.

For instance see Ceylon Daily News February 6. 1989: Rajiva Wijesinha Sri Lanka in Crisis. no 28 chapter 12: and. Divaina. Feb. II & 12. 1989.

212

the Order, those who failed to report for work were to be charged with,

given a jail sentence and had their property confiscated by the State59 •

Furthermore, armed forces took up positions in and around Colombo as

well as all major towns and cities while security forces erected barbed-

wire barricades outside the main counting centres. In such a context, as

final outcome, a tum-out of 65 per cent was recorded compared with the

lower turn-out at the Presidential election. Victory of the UNP marked a

clear majority of 125 seats in the 225 member Parliament. The SLFP

could secure only 67 seats6o.

(b) Role of Violence in the Electoral Process :-

There were two significant aspects of the parliamentary elections:

the importance of elections in democratic politics and the role of violence

in undermining the choice of the electorate. As mentioned earlier, from

the beginning the JVP had vowed to disrupt the elections and the

government had determined to win the elections at any cost. As such,

even though the contest was, on the face of it, between the traditional

adversaries - the UNP and the SLFP - the actual struggle had been

between the system and the anti-systemic JVP. The JVP made a pledge

to renew the struggle to capture power unconstitutionally. And the State,

inorder to defeat the JVP, had to demonstrate the success of the electoral

hO

For accounts see. Ceylon Daily News. Febmary II. 12. & 13, 1989, and, "Lanka measures to avert JVP strike" in Times of India Febmary 12. 1989.

For instance see. election victory coverage in Ceylon Daily News February 15, 16, & 17. 19:i0 and. Seema Guha. "Ballot-Bullet tussle in Lanka" in Times of India February 15. 1989.

213

system, even if through the use of repressive State apparatus. The use

of the State apparatus was also aimed at ensuring the victory of the

incumbant government. Hence, the elections were neither to be fair nor

peaceful and the ruling UNP was all set to emerge as the winner in the

unequal contest. Thus, the role of violence was crucial in the 1988-89

electoral process in Sri Lanka.

After refusing to be a partner of the opposition alliance, the JVP

had changed its propaganda tactics - focussing on a wide-spectrum of

the society. They were among other things, able to utilize government

resources and UNP supporters, too, for their aim. So the UNPers, the

government officers and prominent businessmen were forced to stick

posters, stitch and hang flags, distribute leaflets and to collect money for

the JV.f>6 1 • Furthermore, the JVPers sought 'safe places' in UNP

supporters' houses while security personnel was serching for them in

their localities. Yet, at first, no one could oppose those tactics because of

the threat posed by the JVP on their lives62 •

By August, 1988, 'disappearances' of youth- who were taken into

police custody as JVP suspects - became a common thing, especially in

the South. In response, the JVP-led Hartal on Monday, September 12,

1988, evoked a near-total response in the country. The immediate

This had been common experience during the time. For instance see "/'imukhthi !'eramunaka !Jt!hidi /'iliwalha" (Double-Policy of a Liberation Front) in Ravaya June 14. 1992.

~d and Rohan Gunaratna. A Lost Revolution. no. I. pp.286-287.

214

reason of that Hartal was to protest against the massacre of a well-known

lawyer and human rights activist from the South Wijedasa

Liyanarachchi, in police custody. He was arrested in late August 1988

and died on September 3, 1988 at the Colombo General Hospital on

admission, with hundreds of injuries63 • Human rights activists and

organizations, associations of lawyers, and other professional

organizations also joined street agitations after this incident. It

expanded the base of such anti-government forces which supported the

JVP.

This situation became worse with the discovery of the tortured

bodies of three students who had been abducted by a group led by the

son (Susantha Punchinilame) of the Chief Minister of the Sabaragamuwa

Province (G.V. Punchinilame). One of those abducted was a Medical

student at Ruhuna University. Their bodies were recovered from a pit

near Rathnapura, on October 22, 198864 • This was publicized by the JVP

and opposition parties as the Thrimavithana case-the Medical student's

name.

Mter this incident, the JVP urged the masses to arm themselves to

defeat State terror. Through a leaflet the JVP made an appeal;

See Ceylon Daily News. September 4, 1988. and Island, September 4. f<>88.

For details see Island. October 23, 24. 28 & 29. 1988: Ceylon Daily News October 23 & 2b.

1988: Rohan Gunaratna. A Lost Revolution? no. I p. 294: and. the JVP leaflet on "Sisu (j}wtha'hJ J>itupasa re lhm·anmu f..."umanthranayak' <A Blood Spread Conspiracy Behind Student Killings I dated October 28, 1988.

215

not to wait patiently when the struggle by students for

justice and equality is repressed by brutality

and,

not to keep quiet when the regime made a mean attempt

to deceive the world by holding a pseudo election in the

name of democracy;s.

Amidst this terror and violence, the DPA went ahead with their

demand to dissolve Parliament and to form an interim Cabinet.

Significantly, by early November, J.R. Jayewardene also initially agreed

to this demand when the DPA representatives, especially Mrs.

Bandaranaike, met him. However, within few hours he forgot the

promise; because of the Prime Minister's threat to withdraw his name as

the UNP candidate if that happened66 • More importantly, at this

junction, Mrs Bandaranaike kept silent. Thus, the JVPs hope for a

collective boycott vanished. As a result, the DPAs election campaign

suffered both from the JVPs call for a boycott as well as from the UNPs

efforts to win at any cost.

In the two months between the Thrimavithana case and the

elections, the UNP groups and their para-military formations went on

See, the JVP press release in Divaina, October 26. 1988.

See. Island November 6. 1988: Divaina, November 6. 1988: and. Ceylon Daily News November. 6. 1988.

216

committing extra-judicial killings. For the purpose, the JVP victims of

the armed forces joined paramilitary groups such as PRRA (Peoples

Revolutionary Red Army), "Kalu Balallu" (Black Cats), "Kaha Balallu"

(Yellow Cats), "Kola Koti" (Green Tigers, i.e. UNP Tigers) and "Ukussa"

(Eagle) as death or killer squads67 - formed and supported by the

government.

The JVP did not change its strategy even after the government's

intensified State terror. The revolutionary experience all over the world

has underlined the necessity of adjusting with long and short term

changes of strategy. The JVP did not follow this experience. At least,

they refused to be a 'one voice opposition' to defeat their common enemy,

the UNP. Weaknesses of the opposition leadership as well as the JVPs

boasting of their own status were equally responsible for this negligence.

In other words, Mrs. Bandaranaike's hereditary leadership could not

understand the importance of active youth support -led by the JVP- in

defeating the repressive UNP tactics as well as that regime. On the other

hand, the JVP failed to realize their place in national politics and instead,

dreamt of being future rulers without exploring the possibilities of

evolving a united opposition front. Both the SLFP and the JVP had to

pay dearly for this neglect.

For explanation. see. Jayadeva Uyangoda. "Militarization. Violent State. Violent Society: Sri Lanka'" in. Kumar Rupasinghe & K. Mumtaz. ed.. Internal Conflicts in South Asia (Sage Publications. New Delhi. 1996) pp.126-127: Raj iva Wijesmha. Sri Lanka in Crisis no. 28. pp.182-186: and. Rohan Gunaratna. A Lost Revolution. no. I p.286

217

In such a context, uncertainty, terror, violence and counter-

violence contributed equally to a spiralling anarchy in the State. And the

mass of the people were in a silent struggle to fulfil their daily needs

while living in fear. Its climax came after November 7, 1988, when

workers at the main oil refinery near Colombo stopped their work. At

this point, on November 17, President J.R. Jayewardene himself invited

the JVP for negotiations68. But, the JVP did not come to negotiate.

Instead a JVP leaflet gave eleven reasons as to why they continued the

destabilization process. One of its highlights was "the unpatriotic, illegal,

anti-people and unfair Presidential election". Furthermore, a note

followed each assassination, instructed the way the last rites were to be

carried out- in accordance with the crime of 'unpatriotic work' commited

by the person assassinated.69

The UNPs control over the State apparatus was certainly an asset

in its campaign. This Was reinforced by the armed forces' role in the UNP

election campaign. Security personnel not only organized election

meetings and transported people to the UNP rallies, but also engaged in

house-to-house distribution of UNP Manifesto and other government

leaflets, especially in the South70• Hence, the flawed strategy of the JVP

·n

For instance see, Ceylon Daily News November, 17 & 18, 1988.

The leaflet distributed in most parts of the country is quoted in. Rohan Gunaratna. A Lost Revolution no. I p.297.

Author of the present study lived in the South (Matara) during this period and experienced th1s campaign. When discussed the matter with the people, we heard the same from most parts of the country.

218

ensured Premadasa's victory. Ironically, the SLFP refused to accept the

final outcome of the elections and went to the Court but in vain.

The JVP continued its offensive irrespective of the change of

Presidency. Through their leaflets they severely criticised the

Presidential election and general elections71 • According to the JVP, all

the elections held after 1977 were illegal. In their rationale, the

manipulation of the democratic process was the source of power of the

UNP regime, especially after 1982. Mter the Presidential election they

planned a decisive assault - targeting the State power. It was thwarted

precisely because of the effectiveness and the speed of the State powers'

penetration into the social fabric72 •

In response, the government's secret methods of repression

included the expansion of death squads and more attacks on

'subversives'. Ranjan Wijeratna, who was the General-Secretruy cum

Chairman of the UNP as well as the State Minister of Defence marshalled

the UNP campaign - without hesitation. For instance, in a press

conference, when asked about the guerrilla warfare of the JVP, the

Minister's response was that 'the place for gorillas is in the zoo .... JVPers

See the JVP leaflet on ''f>eshapremi .Janathavani, .\'ohiyava l'erata J"anna (Patriotic People. Be Brave and March forward to Victory), on January I, 1989.

See Victor Ivan, 'Political Legacy of Wijeweera', in, Island Feb..+, 1990

219

are not gorillas but terrorists. We will eliminate terrorism within three

months"3 •

The performance of the DPA only facilitated the UNPs electoral

tactics. In other words, while the youth voice was against elections

under the prevailing conditions, the DPAs acceptance of that process

supported the UNP tactics. Yet, on February 5, 1989, nearly 40 people

were injured in an attack with bombs and grenades at the inaugural

campaign meeting of the SLFP at Hingurakgoda, in Polonnaruwa District.

Similarly, on the last day of campaigning, a bomb was flung at a SLFP

meeting in Colombo. On both the occassions, Mrs. Bandaranaike

escaped narrowly. Some of the violence came from the UNP in the name

of the JVP74 • But the JVP kept silent in those events and that helped the

UNPs aim - to win at any cost.

Mter the government's proclamation of the Essential Services

Order, on 14th February, the JVP declared a two-day curfew and killed

at least 27 people. They stepped up the level of violence on 13th,

torching buses and attacking political activists75 • On the other hand,

when government servants could not report for duties - because of the

JVP curfew and threat to their lives - security personnel forced them to

"·1

'I

See Divaina February 9, 1989.

See Ceylon Daily News, February. 13. 1989~ Times of India. February 6. 1989 and Rajiva Wijesinha. Sri Lanka in Crisis, no.28 chapter 12.

For Accounts, see Ceylon Daily News, February 15 & 16, I 989 ~ and Times of India February 15 & 16. I 989.

220

workplaces under emergency regulations. Bank officers and officers of

similar essential setvices including transport were severely hit by those

measures76 • As such, the general elections in 1989 - the first in the

country in eleven years - had been a battle for sutvival for government

setvants of the State. On the election day, almost all of the UNPers could

cast their vote under security cover. But other opposition groups and

'floating' voters had to decide between life and death while JVPers and

their sympathizers boycotted the election. The mandate to rule the

country given to the UNP (or, secured by the UNP) for six more years is to

be assessed against this background.

(c) Insurrection and Failure ofthe Second JVP Revolution:-

(i) Government's Strategy to Deal with the JVP: Political Aspects

President Premadasa's Cabinet was constituted of carefully

selected confidantes. Among them, Deputy Minister of Defence, Ranjan

Wijeratna had been given overwhelming powers and responsibilities for

security purposes - to wipe-out the insurgency. However, the JVP and

student fronts were once again ready to call for protests and Hartals.

The first protest day was called on March 9, 1989, and Hartal was

on March 22, 198977 • · Due to the support of anti-UNPers these

For explanation, see Chandani Wijetunga, "Veda/a Giyoth MaKa Nasee: ( ;ei Sitiyoth Ehi .Vasee" (If go to job die on the way: if stay at home die there) in Divaina Febmary 14, 1989.

See Ceylon Daily News, March 4, I 0 & 23, 1989: and Island, March I 0, 1989

221

campaigns were remarkably successful. During the strike days, the DJV

also ordered the public not to go out of their homes. In some parts of the

country, "lights off' and "switch-off Radio and Television" orders were

given by the DJV. The police killing of the first JVP politbureau member,

Sumith Athukorale, in March 1989, was the beginning of those mourning

orders to "keep quiet and dark. "7s

In his strategy against the JVP, President Premadasa politically

moved to arrest the erosion of the State's social base. For this, in late

March 1989, Winning Hearts And Minds (WHAM) Programme was

initiated through various Task Forces specially prepared for the purpose.

In April1989, while appealing to the JVP, the President offered to vacate

several UNP seats in Parliament for the JVP, if they lay down arms79 .

But the JVP responded through a press release attacking the 'illegal'

President for his 'illegal' offer of Parliamentary seats. The press release

said that the conclusion of their struggle would be the expulsion of

Premadasa and his ruling clique80• They orgartized a ten -day protest

and strike campaign to mark the anniversary of the 1971 JVP uprising

on April 5. However, on April 12 1989, the govemment announced a

week-long ceasefire against the militants during the Sinhalese and

Tamil NewYearsi.

HU

HI

For instance see Divaina. March 28. 1989.

For explanation on WHAM. see Divaina. March 30. 1989.

For details. see Ibid April 3. 1989: and Ceylon Daily News April 3.&4 • 1989.

See Ceylon Daily News, April 7. 1989: and Island April 6 and 7. 1989.

222

Furthermore, A.C.S. Hameed, the Minister of Higher Education,

began negotiations with university representatives. As a result, the

Universities (Amendment) Act no. 3 of 1989 was passed in the new

Parliament. Accordingly, from May 5, 1989, the North Colombo Medical

College (Private Medical College) became a part of the national university

system in Sri Lanka - as demanded by students82 • However, the

situation in the country was chaotic and, an island-wide strike wave

could be seen in almost all the essential services including transport,

health, post and telecommunication, and ports. In addition to the

position of the opposition whose hopes for a change vanished after the

election, the immediate provocation for the strike was the Janasaviya

proposal of Rs. 2500 for poor people. This Presidential proposal prompted

even the minor employees to demand a minimum living wage of Rs. 2500

p.m. The minor employees' strike created a chaotic situation in the State

defying the promises of peace and tranquillity of the new government83 •

Student unrest in the universities spread the violence in the

country. JVP-led student and worker formations imposed themselves on

all other views in student and worker relations. The JVP sought to

mobilize workers alongwith students. Interestingly, the election victory

of the UNP could not alter this JVP domination. Meanwhile, on June 6,

1989, a group of students at the Peradeniya University seized a jeep with

For details see Kingsley de Silva in Minerva no.32 pp.206-210.

For accounts, see Ibid, Ceylon Daily News, May 28, 1989~ and Island May 27, 28, & 29 1989.

223

three men whom they identified as members of a private spy group of a

Minister. Mter questioning the students killed them and burnt their

bodies within university premises. Shortly afterwards, a similar incident

took place at Sri Jayewardene-pura University. As such, in early July

1989, as ordered by the Minist:Iy of Defence, all universities were closed

down indefinitelys4 •

Thereafter, while JVP hartals, protest campaigns and strikes were

becoming extra-ordinarily effective, in all parts of the count:Iy including

the capital, the government's counter-offensive also became more brutal

and merciless. Furthermore, the JVP launched a campaign in June

1989, against Indian citizens and businesses, and ordered the boycott of

Indian productsss. Even though the campaign was not totally

successful, the boycott order of Indian goods brought considerable

hardships to ordinary people. Even the diplomatic staff of the Indian

High Commission in Colombo considered seeking refuge in five star

hotels86 • The government's proclamation of a state of emergency in June

1989, was meant to address the law and order problems.

Meanwhile, in a joint statement the SLFP along with four other

political parties (the Eelam Peoples' Revolutionary Liberation Front, the

See Ibid and Ceylon Daily News , June 7 & 8, 1989.

For accounts. see Shelton U. Kodikara. "The Continuing Crisis in Sri Lanka" in Asian Survey. vol.29 no. 7 July 1989: and. Mick Moore, "The JVP in Sri Lanka" in Modern Asian Studies, no.o p. 946.

See, Island, June 21. I 989.

224

United Socialist Alliance, the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna and the Sri

Lanka Muslim Congress) suggested the formation of an all-party

provisional government, pending the holding of fresh elections. It was

their only solution to the crisis. According to them, the provisional

government would also include parties not represented in Parliament.

This was an obvious reference to the JVP. As a result, an all-party

conference was mooted by the President and it was scheduled for

September 13, 1989. The JVP was also invited to the All-Party

Conference87• Refusing to participate in the Conference, the JVP asked

for "positive proof of change in the government attitude"88 The SLFP-led

opposition's suggestion to the APC was to abolish the executive

Presidency and re-institute the Westminster system through an all-party

provisional government. Significantly, from the government side, Gamini

Dissanayake and Lalith Athulathmudali also made several

· announcements accepting this proposal - to restore peace89 • The

President opened the APC with an appeal to the JVP to renounce

violence. In response, the JVP killed more people including J.R.

Jayewardene's sister-in-law, Gladice Jayewardene, on the eve of the

APCs inauguration. They set ablaze several government buildings across

the country as a part of a new civil disobedience campaign. The APC was

adjourned to October 12, 1989. F.urthermore, Premadasa once again

For an account. see Island September 2, 1989.

See Ceylon Daily News. September 7 & 8. !989.

For instance. see. Mervin de Silva ... Desperate bid for Accord in Lanka" in Times of India, September 13. 1989: and. see Island. Sept. 13, 1989: and. Niyamuwa. October, 1989.

225

warned that as long as violence and subversive activities continued, the

armed forces would perform their duty to protect people.

The question that intrigued many was whether President

Premadasa and the JVP leaders had any connection in getting their

objectives fulfilled. It was highlighted in the mass media: the JVP support

base among the rural youth drawn from the SLFP background, and the

JVP leadership especially Rohana Wijeweera's connections with UNP

leaders, ·particularly with the Premadasa group. Further, Somawansa

Amarasingha, one of the JVP politbureau members was also the brother

in-law of Sirisena Cooray, the UNP Mayor of Colombo, and one of the

close confidantes of President Premadasa. Premadasa's own social

background was similar to that of most of the JVP members. Even after

he became the President, Premadasa did not denounce the JVP but made

appeals to them and tried to justify security operations. 90

However, it was becoming increasingly clear that there were

differences in the approaches of President Premadasa and the JVP

leadership. The same differences, on the other hand, were evident

between the JVP and the security forces in dealing with the JVP. In the

first aspect, as DIG Premadasa Udugampola revealed later, there was a

consensus between the JVP leadership and President Premadasa during

the 1988-89 elections. Accordingly, the President had promised six

See. R. Premadasa, Should We Fig,ht Among, Ourselves and Let Outside Forces Override_1's') (Published by the Presidential Press Secretariat. Sri Lanka. June, I CJ89).

226

Ministerial posts, fire arms for personal protection, employment for

cadres and several other benefits to the JVP on condition of JVP support

to the UNP. 91 Surprisingly, even: though the DJV was keen to kill anyone

who violated their orders, the same DJV could not realize the long-term

danger of such electoral manipulations. Furthermore, although the JVP

boycotted the elections, they had close relations with EWP leaders

(former UNPers), the SLMP leaders (at the last moment they declared

their support to the UNP candidate in the Presidential election) and

confidantes of President Premadasa. 92 Further adding to these

suspicions, the JVP leaders have not responded against DIG

Udugampola's affidavits until today. It was this UNP-JVP connection

that seemed to be changing. Mterwards, the JVP levelled open criticism

at the President.93

The decision of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors to re-open the

universities also proved this change. Accordingly, now they accepted the

91 Police DIG, Premadasa Udugampola was the officer who assaulted the members of 'Pavidi Handa' (Voice of the Clergy) while they were campaigning against the Referendum in 1982. When the Court's decision was against (then SP) Udugampola, the JR Jayewardena government paid his fine and he was promoted to the SSP Grade. Thereafter Udugampola played a prominent role in repressing opposition voices as well as in government coercion. By 1987 he had been a DIG and took charge of anti-JVP operations in the South, Western and Central Provinces_ On July 24, 1988. militants threw bombs and set fire to his ancestral home in Galle. after killing his mother, brother and sister-in-law along with their two children. However, by late 1991. there was an open conflict between President Premadasa and DIG Udugampola. Finally, he was expelled from the service in early 1992, denying his extension in the service. As a result, he challenged the government through affidavits_ For instance, see, Divaina, May 18, 1992_

See, Niyamuwa. March, 1987 (p. 7) and, "I 'imuklhi Peramunaka Debidi-Pilivetha" (Double­Policy of a Liberation Front) in, Ravaya, June 14, 1992.

For instance. see. the JVP leaflet, ",\'ari'O-Pakshika Sudhu-Reddhe A!ineemaruvan Atha l'isa-da­(iani .. (Murderers wipe their hands with the white cloth of the All-party Conference) (n_ d).

227

necessity of close connections between the university security services

and the National Security authorities. Besides, they decided to remove

the 'favoured status' given to students in July 1988 (see, page 2o'f.of this

chapter}94• More importantly, President Premadasa himself also called

upon his party members on September 19, 1989 to be prepared for any

sacrifice for the sake of peace. 95 At the same time, the government

announced a 72-hour ceasefire against the JVP from 6.00 pm.

September 27, 1989. It was jointly sponsored by the ruling party and the

opposition. 96

By October, even though the violence had crippled the State

apparatus, the government had set up rehabilitation camps (for those

who surrendered) and a Monitoring Committee, (to report any violation of

the ceasefire, to the President).97 From subsequent developments it

became clear that although the JVP was still in a position to organize

strikes and hit out at key State installations, its capacity to seize the

State power had weakened considerably. More importantly, to capture

State power through an armed struggle, a regular supply of

sophisticated arms and sufficient trained manpower were essential. The

9"

See Kingsley de Silva. Minerva no. 32; and. "Y.C.Among 33 shot in Lanka" in Times of India. September 12. 1989.

For details. see. Ceyoln Daily News. September 26 and 27, 1989. Island, September 25. and 27. 1989, and Times of India. September 22 and 23. 1989.

See Island Sept. 17 & 19. 1989: and. Rohan Gunaratna. A Lost Revolution no. I, p. 296.

For details, see. Ceylon Daily News, September 26 and 27. 1989: Divaina, September 25. 26. and · 27. 1989: and Times of India, September 22 and 23, 1989.

228

JVP had neither. Nor had it infiltrated into the armed forces in such large

numbers as to expect large scale desertions. Realization of the mass of

people during this time can be understood from the following; ·

As we were told by an old villager in Matara, in September 1989,

while JVPers were collecting five guns through their attacks, the

government was able to import a ship load of weapons to combat

the "terrorists"

Infiltration of the JVPers into the security forces also showed the

same reality. Although the lower and middle grade security personnel

were willing to cooperate with the JVP in the 1987-88 period, large-scale

desertions did not happen. The number of such desertions and

infiltrations was nationwide between 1000-1500, but most of the

desertion took place without weapons.98 As such, there was much

debate within the top echelons of the JVP about the future course of

action.99 The fact that the JVP had been unable to kill more than 20

people from the ceasefire on 27th to the end of September, might be an

indication of their strength.1oo

In contrast, President Premadasa had been able to establish his

legitimacy of power, especially after the SLFP-led opposition's presence in

98

!lXI

For a detailed explanation, see, Divaina, October 5, 1989 (p. 7).

For instance, see, Piyasiri kularatne, "'Athethayen !Jakina Anaf(atha .J/1"'' (Future NP through Eyes ofthe Past) in Ravaya, April4, 1990.

For data. see, Ceylon Daily News, September 30, 1989.

229

the APC. On October 2,1989, the first round of Janasaviya was also

initiated by the President.tot Furthermore, on October 19, a

Commission headed by Professor Lakshman Jayatilleke, Vice-Chancellor

of Peradeniya University, was appointed to investigate the Youth Unrest

in Sri Lanka 102 In addition, prelim.inruy talks had already started between

India and Sri Lanka for the withdrawal of the IPKF. 103 By November

1989, the curfew that had been imposed almost every night for more

than three months, was lifted by the government. In early November, the

President again appealed from the Presidential Mobile Service at Matara

to the JVP to enter into a dialogue as a means of restoring peace. 104

(ii) MWtary Strategy of the Government to Repress the JVP

By July 1989 it was becoming clear that the militants'

destabilization process all over the country could no longer be met by

giving preference to conventional security measures. Strengthening this

concern of the government was the mass base of the JVP. The huge

Nugegoda (near Colombo) rally, organized by the Inter University Student

Federation on June 9, 1989 was a reflection of the JVP strength even

101

102

103

10-1

See, Janasaviya; Second-Round Upon the Success of the First (Government Printing, Sri Lanka,October 1990) pp. 1-3.

See. Sessional Paper No. I: Report of the Presidential Commission on Youth (Government Printing, Sri Lanka, I 990).

See, Ceylon Daily News. September 19. 1989 (p. I) and Times of India. September 19. 1989.

For instance. see. Ceylon Daily News, November 4. 1989 (P. I)

230

after the change of government105• Besides, in late June the JVP also

repeated its call to the armed forces to defect from the State by July 29,

1989. 106

Against this background, the government's military strategy, the

other component of President Premadasa's plan to deal with the JVP took

a new tum. Death-squads' and para-military groups' operations were

given priority. In addition, in early July 1989 Operation Combine ("Ops

Combine") or Joint Operations of the armed forces was restructured by

the Army Chief as instructed by the President (Commander-in-Chief of

the Armed Forces) and the Minister of State for Defence (Ranjan

Wijeratna). Accordingly, "Ops Combine" underwent certain changes.

The Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) was given specific tasks and a new

intelligence service unit was formed. One of the concepts of the "Ops

Combine" was the capture of special targets secretly107 • By the end of

July both sides- the government and the JVP- seemed to have prepared

for a final attack. In late July 1989 the DJV again warned the members

of the armed forces to give up the service within one month or, to face

105

106

Ill'

For details. see. Island. July 9 & I 0 1989.

See. Ceylon Daily News. July 2. 1989.

For a general explanation on the security forces in Sri Lanka. see V. Muralitharan. Armed Forces in Sri Lanka ( Cnpublished Mphil Dissertation. SIS. JNU, 1980 J and. for an account on "Ops Combine's" changed strategy. see Rohan Gunaratna. A Lost RevolutiQ!!,_no. I, p.338.

231

the death of their family members. 108 This tumed out to be one of the

JVPs worst tactical mistakes.

In retaliation, the armed forces started their onslaught on

'subversives'. In that context, the difference between State armed forces

and secret death squads seemed to erode and both had only two

objectives: eliminating subversives and injecting as much fear in the

public mind as possible. 109 As a result of this double violence the highest

number of killings in Sri Lanka took place in August 1989. In facing up

to the challenge, the target list of the JVP had also been expanded.

However in the last resort, the operations of the death squads

throughout the island and the government's strong propaganda against

'terrorism' gained the upper hand in the government's strategy against

the JVP. 110 Worst among those was the 'Mahawatte massacre' which

took place in September 1989: death squads killed about 180 people

including children and women in Mahawatte and two other villages

(Arangala and Manikhinne), in retaliation to the killings of soldiers'

relatives. "Twelve of your family members will be killed for every soldier's

family attacked" was the rationale of this massacre. According to police

sources, "the killers belonged to an anti-JVP group calling itself the

lOX

110

The DJV leaflet on "'Kumanthranaya /ladhuna (;anna: (Identify the Conspiracy) dated July. 24. 1989 and the JVP leaflet on "'Kumanthranayak: Pravesamen" (A Conspiracy: Be Careful-to the Comrades in Police and Armed Forces ) dated June 19. 1989.

See Ranjan Wijeratna ... No Hide and Seek" in Island. August. 26. 1989.

For detailed accounts. see Victor Ivan. "Political Legacy of Wijeweera .. in Island. Feb. 4. I 990 and .. ( ihatlwna Sankruthiyaka I )eshapalana !!l!daruwa"' (Political Features of a Gun Culture l 111

Ravaya May 14. !993.

232

'Eagles of the Central Hill'" and, "the situation was grim as that group

had taken the law into its own hand."11 1

Hence, while most parts of the State were in a near anarchic

situation, the majority of political forces made appeals to disband the

government's para-military groups, especially highlighting the brutal

nature of the Mahawatte massacre. The Chief Priests of the three major

Buddhist sects issued a joint appeal to the President and all major

political parties' leaders to declare an immediate cease-fire to the JVP. 112

On the other hand, the JVP called. for a civil disobedience campaign

against the 'mass civilian killings'. In a press release, Rohana Wijeweera

called on civilians to stop paying taxes, not to buy bus and train tickets

or pay vehicle licence fees, in protest against the 'government's

genocide'. In his perception, the 'illegal government is turning its anti-

JVP campaign into a mass slaughter of young Sinhalese113•

The government reacted by inforcing a strict censorship. The JVP

responded by killing Competent Authority (Thevis Guruge) and several

other prominent media persons. This was also a part of the JVPs

repeated warning to State-owned media personnel to stay away from

work. Increasing threats led to resignations .For some weeks, security

Ill

11~

ILl

See Island Sept. 17 & 19 1989: Rohan Gunaratna, A Lost Revolution no. I p. 296. and .. IRC Team to Visit Lanka" in Times of India Sept. 17. 1989.

See cited in Island Sept. 18. 1989.

See cited in lslat!Q Septermber 20. 1989 and Times of I_rrgia Sept 20. I 989.

233

forces took charge of the Radio and Television Stations . The news was

read by armed service personnel. 1 14

The strategy to kill family members of the security forces and to

destroy their property was the overriding factor in changing the security

forces' approach towards the JVP. But as a part of the mass media and

the JVP leaflets revealed, 115 this strategy of hitting security members

families was a plan of the UNP. Our experience at the time supported

this claim. For instance, in some parts of the Gampaha District, violence

against the security members' families was a strategy of the para-military

groups such as Black-Cats and Green Cats. At mid-night, during curfew,

they came in government vehicles with guns-bombs-tyres and fetrols.

Since families of the security personnel had left their homes because of

the death threats, those gunmen were free to do anything; first they fired

several shots to frighten the neighbourhood. Then they exploded one or

two bombs at the selected house and set it on fire with petrols. The next

day, security personnel from "Joint Operations" came to investigate the

incident. Abduction at mid night of JVP suspects in the village, by

gunmen with black masks was the next step. This was done according

11·1

II~

For details on those killings. see. James Warner. ed .. Fundamentalism Revivalists and Violence in South Asia (Rumesh Publications. New Delhi. 1992). pp. 75-86. and Asia Watch Report -Cycles of Violence- Sri Lanka-1989.

See. the JVP leaflet. ·A Conspiracy; Work carefully'. dated June 19. 1989. This leaflet was addressed to the "Comrades of the Police and Armed Forces" and included the follo\\ing sentence. "We don't have any problem \\ith you who belong to the same class of ours and who are our own brothers. We have problems only \\ith the clique of thieves who eat the country. who engage in various crimes. who have extended their rule illegally and prohibited our party treturously". and. see. "( ihmtluma ,\'anskruthiyaka I Jeshapalaua 1/eda-Ruva" (Political Features ofa Gun-Culture) in Ravaya. May 14. 1993.

234

to lists given by the UNP- MPs and spy groups in the area. Interstingly,

even though the "Joint Operations" (Army and Police m the area)

came for investigations, they kept quiet about the abductions and

investigations were closed after those took place. 116 As evident, the

dominant power of the day was death squads and government forces

approved of those to annihilate the JVP. This was perhaps due to the

threat posed to the forces' life and the difficulties of the unfinished war.

Strict censorship of the mass-media prevented any coverage of such

cycle of events. On the whole, the result was terror and near-anarchy in

the country. But, the situation facilitated the President's hope for peace

in the near future- without having to bear any responsibility for the

eliminated youth.

Death squads and Joint Operations did not hesitate to take away

any youths from their homes and no complaint was accepted by the

police or army posts regarding those youths. Bullet riddled and burnt

bodies continued to be a common sight in rivers, wells, pits and by the

road sides and, only those provided evidence about how many youths

could be abducted per night.II7

Ill> This is one of the author's own experiences between September 20 and 27. 1989. In Doranagoda (about 3 km from Gampaha town), black masked gun men who came by government vechicles. abducted five persons (torching three of their houses) after damaging the house of an army personnel, on September 22. 1989. Among those five, one was a school teacher. two were A· level students. one was an Air-Force desertor and the other an unemployed youth. Since then. all five were in the 'disappeared· list. Joint Operation personnel came to investigate the incident (of arson) on September 24. 1989 and abductions took place on 25th and 26th at mid-nights. 1'\o complaints were accepted by the police about the abductions We were told about similar incidents by various persons 111 most parts of the country.

For explanation. see, Divaina. October 14. 1989 (pp. I and 8).

235

It was in this context that on November 13, 1989 the government

was able to announce the capture of JVP leader, Rohana Wijeweera. It

was announced after his death in the custody of the security forces 118•

However, hours before his assassination he had been photographed and

his last appeal to the JVP cadres "to enter into democratic politics" was

telecast by national television after he was killed. At the time of his

surrender, he lived as a planter called Attanayake with this family in an

estate bangalow in Ulapane (near Nuwara-Eliya). 119 Although that might

have been a part of the JVP strategy, the State-run propaganda tried to

project a negative image of the JVP. Ordinary people saw Wijeweera as a

traitor who lived within elite society, deceiving them and the rural youth.

There were reports of fire crackers being lit throughout the country by

UNP groups and a section of the armed forces-celebrating the

"destruction"of Rohana Wijeweera.

According to DIG Udugampola, after having been informed of the

killing of Wijeweera, President Premadasa sent a group of Black-Cats

from Colombo to Ulapane to kill other members of the Wijeweera family.

The re ason behind this plan was that; Rohana Wijeweera's wife knew

all the secret discussions and promises between Wijeweera and the

118

119

According to the Deputy Defence Minister's interview with journalists on November 13, 1989 Rohana Wijweera, who was arrested on November 12, 1989 was brought to Colombo. The next morning (13th) when he was taken to a propaganda office of the NP near Colombo- it so happened that the security personnel used fire-arms because of a sudden incident took place at this NP office against Wijeweera. So, Wijeweera was shot dead unexpectedly when officers used fire-arms. There were rumours that the President was informed only after Wijeweera 's death . A video of his interogation had also been prepared. Meanwhile President Premadasa promised an impartial inquiry into the death. For details see. Ceylon Daily News November 14. 1989: Island, November 14, 1989 and Divaina,November 14 1989.

See, Divaina, November 25, 1989 and Rohan Gunaratna, A Lost Revolution , no. I. pp. 27-31.

236

the secret discussions and promises between Wijeweera and the

President, especially those during the elections. She also knew about

discussions between Upatissa Gamanayake (General Secretruy of the

JVP) D.M. Ananda (JVP polifbureau member) and UNP leaders.

However, Ms. Wijeweera had fled the residence with the children and

while Black-Cats were searching for them all over the country, she

surrendered with the children to the Army. Black-Cats abducted

Wijeweera's brother (Ananda Wijeweera) his brother-in-law (Sarath

Femando) and an unknown JVP leader; they were killed in Colombo. 120

The killing of Rohana Wijeweera was followed by the similar killing

of Upatissa Gamanayake, on the same day. He was captured in

Panadura (near Colombo), where he was running a small shop under the

psudanym of Dias. 121 By then, three members of the 13-member JVP

politbureau had been killed by the security forces. At the end of

December six other members were killed. The last member was killed in

March 1990, and the only member to survive was Somawansa

Amarasinghe who had already fled the country. 122 As the mass media

reported later, Somawansa Amarasinghe had been captured by the

security forces before they captured Rohana Wijeweera and rumour had ,.

it that h~ had already been killed. However, after all the other members

were killed, he contacted the mass media from England. 123

See Ravaya May 24. 1992 (p.,19).

121 For details. see, Ceylon Daily News. November I 5. 1989 and Divaina. November I 5. 1989.

122 For details. see. Rohan Gunaratna. A Lost Revolution. no. I. p. 341

For Instance. see. Piyasiri Kularatne in Ravaya, no 99.

237

The elimination of the JVP leadership, gradually brought to an end,

the youth-led political violence and the "disappearance" of nearly sixty

thousand Sinhalese youth in Sri Lanka after 198 7 .124 The lesson of all

this was that the JVP leadership failed to grasp the nature of both the

political culture and the social base which rejected the violent politics of

the JVP. In such a context, mass youth devotion was only an unfinished

part of the history of revolutionary movements. Hence members of the

Commission on Youth-(appointed by the President) along with various

groups of selected experts seemed to deal with the causes of unrest and

their solutions-to avoid future uprisings ofyouth. 125

III. SEQUENCES IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: DEMILITARIZATION - DEMOCRACY AND CHANGE OF GOVERNANCE

(a) Attempts at Demilitarization:

As explained in preceding sections, the militarization of the political

conflict in Sri Lanka had also led to the injection of militaristic values

into State-society relations. Militarization, as such, suggested more than

the use of armed force:it also meant the acceptance of this use as the

legitimate form of political practice, in cases of crises and conflict. Hence,

12~ Mahinda Rajapaksa. then Hambantota District MP and Secretary-General of the Parliamentary Committee on Fundamental and Human Rights. prepared a Report on Disappearances of Sinhalese Youth to present to the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. It was prepared according to the affidavits received from relatives of disappeared persons all over the country. That report estimated the disappearances after 1987 as 60.000 among the Sinhalese. We received the information from Mahinda Rajapaksa in an interview on June 23. 1992. However. International Alert estimates this number at 75.000. See. for details. International Alert (London) Report on Southern Sri Lanka-1991.

See. R~the Presidential Commission on Youth. no. 102.

238

during the post-1987 period, on the one hand, use of force against the

State power was accepted especially by the youth as a necessacy part of a

systemic change. On the other hand the repressive State apparatus was

no longer treated only as secondary to formal State organs but instead

became the very expression of the State authority. 126 Thus, in the

broader sense, demilitarization was a process of reviving a democratic

political culture and re~instituting State authority through formal State

organs such as the legislature and the judiciacy. There could be two

entry points into this process: meeting the immediate challenges and

identifying future directions. In other words, while the urgent need was

to demilitarize political power and individuals, expansion of the

democratic space formed the future directions. 127

However, as far as the first objective 1s concemed (i.e.,

demilitarizing political power), although there was little or no direct

threat from the JVP after December 1989, no immediate steps were

taken to disarm politicians. A considerable number of small arms had

been distributed by the Premadasa government-arming both, politicians

and individuals. 128 No licences were required for those arms and were

operated on permits issued by the Ministry of Defence with no renewal

126

12':'

12M

For instance, see, Jayadeva Uyangoda, "Militarization, Violent State, Violent Society: Sri Lanka" in, Kumar Rupesinghe, ed. Internal Conflicts in South Asia (Sage Publications. New Delhi, 1996) pp. 118-130.

For explanation. see, Ponna Wignaraja and A. Hussian, ed., The Challenge in South Asia (Sage publishers. New Delhi, 1989) pp. 11-24.

See, W.A.W. Waranpala ... All-Party Conference in Sri Lanka" in, India Quarterly 47 (4) October-December 1991 pp. 39-61.

239

required. Furthermore, there was no record of how many weapons

were issued and to whom. 129 As such, disarming individuals could prove

an exceedingly complex and difficult task. On the other hand, until over

three months after the JVP leadership was annihilated, no steps were

taken to disband the death squads and para-military groups of the

government. These groups continued to operate in some parts of the

country. "Sucharitha" torture-houses, the Batalanda massacres and

several other similar places of youth killings may be recalled here. 130

However, the 'disappearance' of Lakshman Perera in January and

assassination of Richard de Zoysa in February, 1990 helped in changing

this situation. Lakshman Perera was a UNP Member of the Dehiwala-

Mount Lavinia Municipal Council. He suddenly disappeared. It was

believed that he was producing a drama, Me Kavuda? Mokada Karanne?,

(Who is This? What is He Doing?) .This was a quotation of a slogan of R.

Premadasa's Presidential election campaign. 131 According to rumours he

was killed by a para-military group before staging the drama and his

body was dumped in the deep sea around Colombo by a government

129

IJO

1Jl

For instance, see, "Prachanda Deshapalanaya" (Terror Politics) in Ravay~ August I. 1993 and Nirupama Subramaniant "Gunning for Trigger: Happy Politicians" in Indian Express, February 19, 1997.

See, for "Sucharitha" torture-houses, "Laurence-Mafia Vadakagara Sugathadasa. Kreedanganaye" (Laurence-Mafia Torture Houses at Sugathadasa Stadium) in. Ravaya, June 6, 1993 (p. 19) and, "Rule by Sword" in, Asia Week, May 12. 1993, and, for details on the ''Batalanda" massacres. see, Special Presidential Commission - Batalanda coverage in btllkadeepa, June 18, 1997.

For explanation, see, Island, January 28, 1990 and, Raj1va Wijesinha, Civil Strife in Sri Lanka no. 36, pp. 41-·B.

240

helicopter132 Richard de Zoysa was a journalist, artist, 1V personality,

human rights activist and also a partner in the Political Satire of

Lakshman Perera. He was kidnapped from his house at night on or

around February 18th 1990 by an armed gang and, two days later his

tortured body was found on the sea shore near Moratuwa (near

Colombo). Although some of the kidnappers had been recognized by his

mother, they were not brought to trial. 133 However, his social base and

occupational background helped to change the government's silence.

Besides, Richard de Zoysa's international connections led to

intemational protests and criticism against the govemment. Within the

govemment itself also several members, including Gamini Dissanayake

and Lalith Athulathmudali, demanded a select committee to inquire

into the Richard de Zoysa case. 134 According to the explanation of the

Liberal Party leader Rajiva Wijesinha, after about two months of the

Richard de Zoysa case, death squads were disbanded by the

Ministry of Defence. 135 But in reality, after the elimination of about sixty

thousand youth, the remaining youth had already become docile. Even

then where ever necessity arose, the regime did not hesitate to repress

132

13.1

See, Rajaliya (DUNF tabloid in Sinhala) March 12, 1992.

See, Divaina, February 26, 1990, Accordingly, she had identified SSP Ronnie Gunasinglla as the leader of this armed gang. When she revealed this identification, SSP took legal action against Richard de Zoysa's mother, Mrs. Manorani Sarawanamuttu. However. the international media also accepted this identification in some other ways. For instance, see, Rule by Sword in Asia Week. May 12. 1993.

For instance. see. Rajiva Wijesinha. Civil Strife in Sri Lanka. no. 36, p. 43

Ibid. p. 42.

241

any signs of challenge.I36 As such, it is correct to conclude that

demilitarization of political power was not possible under the Premadasa

regime as power was acquired with the help of political violence, i.e. use

of force. Instead, the regime was compelled to' use force' secondary to

formal State organs.

b) Expansion of Democratic Space:

In this direction several events could be seen in 1991. The

Opposition's grouping into an alliance by February 1991; subsequent

Local Government elections, formation of the Mothers' Front137 and

establishment of the Parliamentary Committee on Fundamental and

Human Rights; 138 abortive Impeachment Motion against the President

and resultant break-up of the UNP; and the formation of a new party

(Democratic United National Front) by UNP dissidents were significant

among them.

For instance. see, Asia Week, May 12, 1993 and, T.D.S.A. Dissanayake, The Politics of Sri Lanka (S\\-astika Press, Colombo. 1994), vol. 1, pp. 21-23.

The Mothers· Front \\'aS formed by the 'disappreared' youths' parents in April 1991. Its aim \\'aS

to collect infomtation on 'disappearances' from 1987 and to press rulers for a response. Its founding President \\'aS Ms. Manorani Sara\\'anamuttu, Richard de Zoysa's mother. For explanation see Divaina, April 26, 1991.

The Parliamentary Committee on Fundamental and Human Rights \\'aS formed by the Opposition. Mahinda Rajapakse. Hambantota District M.P .• \\'aS its founder and he worked as the Secretary-General of the Committee. For explanation see .!anapalhi Athulu Nayakayo .lathyanthara Adhikaranaya llamuvata (President and other leaders before International Court of Justice) in Rava~a May 17. 1992 (p. 2)

242

As explained earlier, after the Lakshman Perera and Richard de

Zoysa assassination cases, there was much discussion within the UNP

itself about the political culture of the Premadasa regime. The opposition

was also able to convene without much fear of government's terror.

Although their initial focus was on human rights, by 1991 priority was

given to political issues facing the country. By then the opposition front

had an alliance of eleven parties. Its emergence as an oppositional force

was evident on February 21, 1991 at a public meeting at Havelock Park,

Colombo. 139 Meanwhile, in March, 1991, the government faced the next

crisis within it-self, with the assassination of Ranjan Wijeratna, Deputy

Defence Minister, by a car bomb, in Colombo. Even though the

government announced it as a LITE massacre, the people including the

Opposition were suspicious about this assassination. This was followed

by decision of the Opposition to boycott the third session of Parliament

on April 19, 1991.140 Meanwhile, the Mothers' Front and the

Parliamentary Committee on Fundamental and Human Rights began to

press the government through local and International interest groups

including the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in

Geneva. 141

IJ9

110

141

For explanation. see, W.A.W. Warnapala, Local Politics in Sri Lanka. (South Asian Publishers. New Delhi. 1993) Chapter 4.

See. Ibid: and, Dayan Jayetilleke, Sri Lanka, no. I, pp. 123-124.

See. Ibid: and, foot-note 138.

243

The government's decision to hold Local Government elections in

May 1991 for Municipal Councils, Urban Councils, and Pradeshiya

Sabhas all over the country (except the North-East) was an attempt to

project a democratic political image. In his campaign , President

Premadasa placed emphasis on a "New Deal" through peoples' power at

the grass-roots level'. 142 The holding of these elections was significant at

two other levels as well: in the context of the political crisis and as an

election itself. The joint opposition demanded the appointment of an

Election Commission to be in charge of the electoral process, removal of

emergency regulations; and a one-day island wide election. All those

demands were conceeded. The poll was comparatively peaceful and

was not marred by the electoral disturbances of the preceding 1982-89

period. The higher electoral turn out of about 74.67 per cent provided a

testimony to the electorates' return to normal political behaviour. 143

However, after the Cabinet reshuffle in late March, 1991, there was

an open crisis within the government As later revealed, from the

beginning. President Premadasa's aim was to reduce the power and

influence of his former competitors, especially Gamini Dissanayake and

Lalith Athulathmudali. So, in the Cabinet reshuffle, in contrast to the

President's earlier announcements, D.B Wijetunga who had been

appointed as the Prime-Minister for one -year term, was confirmed in the

lt.:'

II'

See. Ceylon Daily News. May 6. I 99 I.

See. Warnapala. Local Politics. no. 139.

244

post. Gamini Dissanayake lost his Ministership and became a

backbencher in Parliament. Lalith Athulathmudali's Ministerial portfolio

of Food and Cooperatives was also changed to that of the Minister of

Education where he faced a competition from A.C.S Hameed who was the

Minister of Higher Education. During this time, Premadasa's rule was a

"One Man Show" .144 Hence, on July 28, 1991 a section of the UNP, led

by Lalith Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake along wi~th the

opposition parties including the SLFP, tabled an Impeachment Motion in

Parliament against the President. It was prepared according to Article 38

(2)(a)of the Constitution. However, on August 30. 1991, the President

could prorogue the Parliament, as provided by Article 70 of the

Constitution, avoiding the opportunity for a debate on the Motion. While

Parliament was prorogued until September 24, 1991, President

Premadasa turned the Impeachment Motion into a conspiracy against

the President by a group who lost their corrupt dreams, and the debate

in Parliament was ultimately denied on the basis of technical pretexts.145

Yet, this situation helped in broadening the democratic space of

the State by sharpening the democratic discourse. The President, for the

first time, confronted an open challenge to his authority. On the other

hand, Gamini - Lalith combine and UNPs other supporters of the

Impeachment Motion were expelled from the party. This break-up of the

144

145

For detailed accounts, see, Dissanayake, Politics of Sri Lanka, no. 136.

For the full text, see. Constitution of Sri Lanka-1978. Articles 38 and 70~ and~ Sarath Lal Kumara. Doshahhivogava (Sahala Lanka Prakashaka. Colombo. 1994 ).

245

UNP manifested the break-up of the monolithic power of the ruling party

centred around the President. Dissidents formed a new party, DUNF

(Democratic United National Front) under Lalith, Gamini and D.M.

Premachandra (the then Labour Minister). Its indirect impact was the

group formation within the government itself, too. 146

In such a context, the focus of the government in 1992 had been

on the pro-people reforms and the challenge posed by the DUNF. Now

the President's propaganda theme had been changed to 'Peace -

Discipline and Morality of the State. 147 However, publication of Election

Commissioner's Reports (in early 1992) on the 1988-89 elections;

affidavits by the DIG Premadasa Udugampola against the President and

various campaigns organized by the Mothers' Front posed new challenges

to the President. After the Election Commissioner's Reports, the country

expected the resignation of the Opposition from Parliament148 - to press

for a free and fair election. Although it was only a hope, DIG

Udugampola's open challenge/49 revealed the nature of democracy of.

the Premadasa regime. According to Udugampola, the regime had used

Black-Cats and other death-squads not only to annihilate the JVP but

also democratic opposition leaders and anyone els.e who worked against

146

14"

1~8

See, Ibid (Doshabhiyogaya); Dayan Jayetilleke, Sri Lanka, no. I, pp. 123-124: and: Rajiva Wijesinha, Civil Strife in Sri Lanka, no. 36, pp. 71-78.

See, President's speech in, Divaina, January 18, 1990 (p. 3 ).

For details. see. Divaina. March 28, 1992 (p. I). and Ravaya, March 29. 1992, (p. I).

See, Ravaya, April 26. 1992 (p. I) and. Island, April 27, 1992 (p. I).

246

the President's will. 150 At the same time, as the highest ranking police

officer who led the anti-JVP operations in 1988-89, he revealed the

various assassinations such as "Suriyakanda" led by death-squads. 151

Thus, the killing of Ranjan Wijeratna in Colombo also became a point of

controversy- as a plan of the UNP death-squads. 152

Meanwhile, while justice was denied by the rulers, the annual

meeting of the Mothers' Front prepared an action plan against the silence

of the rulers about "disappeared" youths. Since President Premadasa was

a strong believer in supernatural things, their main programme was a

Pada Yathra (walk) from Yakkala (near Gampaha) to Kataragama (in the

deep South) to present a memorandum to the God at Kataragama

Devalaya (temple of the God). They demanded punishments to rulers -

before next June 23rd - who gave orders to abduct their children. 153

Several human rights organizations, including the Parliamentary

Committee joined the Mothers' Front. This was coincided with the

President's birthday celebrations at Gam Udawa anniversary in

Moneragala. 154 These compaigns gave a new platform to alienated and

frustrated youths after the liquidation of the JVP leadership.

150

151

152

153

See Ravaya, May I 7, 1992, (p. I). for details"

See, Ravaya, June 14, I992 (p. I) and, Divaina, June 14 and 15, 1992, (p. I).

For instance, see, "Rule by-Sword" in Asia Week, May I2, 1993 and, Walter Jayewardena, Rajaya- l !duKampola ha Nidahas .\ladhya (Government-Udugampola and Free Media) in Ravaya, July 4, 1993.

See, Divaina, June 08, 1992 (p. I) and, Ravaya, June 13, 1992 (p. 2).

Pr I . S . S . esent aut 1or was an eye-wttnesA to those ceremomes. ee, for explanatiOns, Ravaya, June 28, 1992, and Ceylon Daily News, May 02, 1993.

247

Thereafter, the DUNF organized a protest campaign to mark the first

anniversruy of the Impeachment Motion. Among others, the "Black~

Petition" by one million signatories demanding President Premadasa's

resignation- was significant. 155 Meanwhile the assassination of Denzil

Kobbekaduwa and Vijaya Wimalaratne - two army officers - in August

1992, by a bomb blast in the North was one of the major incidents that

could shake the Premadasa regime's power base. Like Ranjan

Wijeratna's assassination, opposition parties and the people suspected it

to be a government's plan. 156

By 1993, President Premadasa had completed four years of his

six-year term. The turning point was the Provincial Council elections

scheduled for May 17, 1993. In the President's view, the vote for the

UNP was a vote for him. On the other hand, both the SLFP and the

DUNF pledged to defeat the 'One Man Show' in Sri Lankan politics. 157

However, the assassination of Lalith Athulathmudali by an unknown

gun-man, in an election rally in Colombo on April 23, 1993 brought a

halt to the Premadasa regime. Indirect controversies on political

killings - after eliminating the JVP threat - became a direct accusation

against the President after Lalith's assassination. 158 While Lalith's funeral

IS6

IS8

See, Island. August 7, 1992, Divaina, August 8. 1992, and Ravaya, August 16, 1992.

See, Ravaya August 16, 1992 p. 20 and, Dissanayake , Politics of Sri Lanka, no. 136. Chapter I.

See, Ibid.

For detailed accounts, see. Divaina. April 24 and 25. 1993, and Ravaya (Special Issue) April 28. 1993.

248

was a "prohibited zone" to UNP politicians including the President and

his family, it could be seen as a killing which "revealed its purpose more

than the killer." 159 Although the government was adamant to blame it on

the LITE, the LITE rejected the charge. 160 "Even a dog being killed, we

have only one person to suspect now" was the peoples' response. 161

Ironically, as a concluding mark of this cycle, President Premadasa

himself was killed by a suicide bomber in Colombo while he was

celebrating World Labour Day on May 1, 1993. 162

(c) Change of Governance:

After the demise of President Premadasa, Prime-Minister D.B

Wijetunga became the President of Sri Lanka, from May 7 1993, to

complete the remaining term of the late President. However, the verdict

of the nation at the Provincial Council elections, the subsequent

political crisis in the Southern Provincial Council, the dissolution of that

Council by the Governor and the call for fresh elections on March 24

159

)f>()

I hi

lti~

See. Ibid <Ravaya) p. 8 and p. 3.

See. Ibid. p. I.

See. Ibid p. 2 (Opinion Poll).

See. Ceylon Daily News. May 2, 1993, Divaina, May 2 and 3. 1993. According to Ravaya special correspondent who met residents at Kehelwatta (President Premadasa·s private residence in Colombo) President Premadasa was killed by a group who were close confidantes of the President. As it reported, "By this time. 'Sucharitha' had been divided into two groups between k-line and R-line and more powerful group was K-line. Not only President Premadasa and Lalith. but also Ranjan Wijeratne were killed by the K-line. And. Premadasa's suicide bomber. Babu was a leader of the K-line. On May I st. Babu had a wound in a leg because of an accident he faced while running, after shot at Lalith by a K-line group" For details. see, Ravaya. May 4. 1993. (P. 2). And see also '':\fuga/an J>are Btwm•a ll'llrw- ,\'ahe ( ihathakaya .lila

Ciani .. (Mugalan Road lie finished~ True murderer is caught) in Ravaya March 31. 199(1 (Headline).

249

1994, had reinforced the opposition, led by the SLFP. 163 On the other

hand, after the death of Premadasa, the UNP without active leadership

was in disarray. Conversely, the newly emerged Peoples' Alliance led by

Sirima Bandaranaike and Chandrika Kumaratunga - Chief Minister of

the Western Provincial Council - faced the electorate with much hope.

Added to this was the fact that Anura Bandaranaike left the SLFP - as he

could not accept the leadership of his sister, Chandrika - and joined the

UNP. That helped to unite the joint opposition and especially the SLFP

hierarchy. 164

As such, the main parliamentary opposition - the SLFP - had become

effective and assertive after such a long period of its disarray, confusion

and, lack of leadership - paradoxically transferring those features to the

UNP. It was against this background that in August 1994 the seventeen-

year long UNP regime lost the general elections to the Peoples' Common

Alliance led by the SLFP. Their victory was based on the following

slogans: Freedom to live in a Humane Society, A Free and Democratic

Society with Law and Order, Rapid and Sustainable Development in the

Economic Sector, and Rs. 1500 (p.m) dole for every unemployed youth. 165

These were a clear manifestation of the immediate needs of Sri Lanka.

IM

lbS

For explanation. see, Imtiaz Ahmed "Sri Lanka Today" in BliSS Journal, vol. 14, no. 4, 1993.

For explanation. see, Ravaya, March 7. 1993 (p. I) and, Dissanayake, Politics of Sri Lanka. no. 136. Chapter I.

See. Election Manifesto of the Peoples Alliance. 1994; and, S. W.R.de A. Samarasinghe "The 1994 Parliamentary Elections in Sri Lanka" in. Asian Survey, vol. 34. no. 12. December 1994.

250