bilateral issues confronting regional, co-operation...
TRANSCRIPT
(CHAPTER V
BILATERAL ISSUES CONFRONTING REGIONAL, CO-OPERATION -
A CASE STIIJDY OF INDO - PAK RELATIONS
(Kashmir, Nuclear Arms Race and Cross Border 'Terrorism, Siachen)
From Colonialism to Independence
Kashmir Issue
Accession of Kaslunir
Crisis in East Pakistan and Emergence of Bangladesh
Nuclear A r m s Race
Impact of Arms Build-up on Development
Cross-Border Terrorism
The New Phase - Post-Pokhran Development
Dialogue Process in the Post-Nuclear Phase
Lahore Bus Diplomacy
Kargil Issue
Siachen Dispute
Though South Asia has been treated as a different region in the world,
it has been in fact, very late in understanding the necessity of regional
co-operation. It was only in bIay 1980 that the idea of a r e ~ o n a l forum for
South Asian States was officially floated by late President Zia-U1-Rahman of
Bangladesh. Within a short !:pan of time, SAARC has gained enough
strength and importance after the first summits of South Asian Heads of
governments, held on 7-8 December 1985. Within the brief period, SAARC
has developed a respectable network of technical and action committees
consisting of technical experts imd policy administrators. This network now
covers more than a dozen areas >f activity.
The present political configuration of South Asia is the product of the
process of decolonization that f~ rmed by the end of the Second World War
in 1945. The colonialist, imperialist interests very tactfully divided region
and sowed the seeds of balkanization. The countries responsible for the
advent of SAARC are the products of composite cultural ethos, which in turn
has been the result of multifarious socio-economic, linguistic, ethnic and
religio-philosophic strains evolved through the millions of years. It is the
bilateral issues that confront the regional co-operation. A united, integrated
and homogeneous region is bourtd to emerge. Let us examine bilateral issues
confronting regional cooperation between India and Pakistan.
5.1 From Colonialism to Independence
"South Asia is the classic :lome of western imperialism."' The western
powers did not want to colonize the whole of South Asia and perhaps,
I Myron Weiner, 'The Politics of South 4siq" in Gabriel A. ;Umor1d &lames S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of ihe Developing Areas (hew Jersey Princeton Uruversity Press, 1971 ) p. 16
wanted to do it in selected areas. However, in terms of size and population,
they left a very small part of the region u~icolonized, Bhutan and Nepal were
not colonized as these Himalayan Kingdoms did not offer them in terms
material gains, nor was Maldives is very attractive for this purpose. But it
has become a protectorate of British as early as 1887 and this status
continued till the independence in 1965.' Real colonies were India and Sri
Lanka. In the beghung of colonialism, India comprised Pakistan and
Bangladesh; Pakistan was made out of India in the year 1947. East Bengal
was then part of Palastan. Easl: Pakistan (East Bengal) became independent
country as Bangladesh on 16 December 197 1, after waging a struggle for
independence against its Pakistmi rulers.
East India came into instance in 1600 as a commercial company,
gradually captured political power in areas, which they termed as British
India, entered into different kinds of political relationships with princely
states. Their political sway continued till 1857 mutiny. The British crown
took over the governance of India in 1858, as a result of 1857 mutiny, whlch
is also called the first war of independence. Gradually, India became an
independent and sovereign state on 15 August 1947. Even after partition,
India and Pakistan have been pursuing diametrically opposite policies on
many issues of common concexn. The partition has left deep wounds in both
the nations psyche. "A major cff shoot of British imperialism in South Asia
was the growing bitterness and distrust between the core-nation India and
Note: Most of the South Asian Countr~es that have become independent have adopted western model of liberal democracy, as there had been no alternative.
other peripheral nations, especially ~akistan."' Political leadership of
Pakistan has gained maximuni benefits out of the South Asian tension.
Talung advantage of thls, Palustm has taken maximum military and economic
aid from the U.S.
The communal riots that followed partition gave birth to series of
human tragedies and created er~ough suspicion and distrust even among the
people. Pakistan leadership, ins:ead of removing that suspicion and mistrust,
made these aspects as the foundation of their foreign policy. The Indo-Pak
war that began within weeks oi'partition over the Kashrnir issue made both
the countries hostile to each other and the hostility still continues. Palustan
joined SEAT0 and CENT0 - both now defunct bodies saw the U.S.
connection as prospective umbrslla against "Indian e ~ ~ a n s i o n i s m . " ~ It would
be ideal to mention here that it was not the Indian threat, which guided them
to take this policy either. Pakistim joined these American sponsored alliances
mainly due to their own internal political imperatives. Pakistani leadership
made use of this "Inhan phobia" not only to consolidate the bases of their
power but also denied masses tc~ participate in a democratic polity. Thls kind
of opportunism is still the p;ut of Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistani
leadership,to divert the attention of the people from the internal problems of
Pakistan very successfully uti1iz:s "Indian Phobia."
Prarnod Kumar Mishra, South .Isia in International Poiihcs (New Delhi: UDH Publications: 1948) p.2.
4 M.R. Shelly, Emergence of n New Nation in a Mi~ltipolar World, (Bangladesh: Dhaka University Press, 1979) p. 1 12.
134
While Pakistan became .'America's most allied ally in ~ s i a " ' India
went towards the Soviet Union due to geopolitical compulsions. This
polarization reached its climax when India and the Soviet Union signed
the Indo Soviet Treaty of peace, friendship and co-operation whch was
signed on August 9, 1971, in anticipation of the Bangladesh liberation war,
which broke out in December 11971. As such, superpowers were dragged into
South Asian politics due to the mutual suspicion of the ruling elites of these
two countries.
Kashmir issue has been behind the major conflicts between India and
Pakistan. To the old dispute over Kashmir, emergence of Bangladesh has
added new dimensions in regard to mutual allegation of interferences in each
other's internal politics.
5.2 Kashmir Issue
It has been argued in the last chapter that Kashmir is not an issue at
all. It is just like the Kerala, Antihra or Punjab. India is a nation-state, which,
the concept had developed in Ehrope. When a nation- state emerges out of
historical development and political factors, other nearly located countries
can also join to this new entity, if they want to do so. In fact, as mentioned in
the last chapter, Kashmir has joined voluntarily and therefore, the question
of dispute and issue do not arise at all6
M.A. Kahan, Friends, NotMasten (London: Oxford Un~vessity Press, 1969) p. 130. Note: The present Kashmir dispute hls half a celituly old. Intellectuals, politicians, statesmen and the United Nations ctc . . . have made efforts but no worthwhile result came out of it.
Jammu and Kashmir wa:3 the biggest of all the Indian states, prior to
independence. The adrninistriitive division of Kashmir symbolizes its
conspicuous heterogeneity even though physiographic, demographic and
cultural elements have provide:d only a few political boundary lines. The
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir comprises the Kashmir valley, Jammu,
Poonch, the remote dependencies of Gilgit, Baluchstan and the isolated
province of Ladakh or "little ~ i l~u t . " ' Their size and area almost matched the
total area of England, Wales ant1 Scotland.'
Geographically speaking the Kashmir valley is an epitome of real
dstinctiveness. At the time of partition, at least 90% of the valley's
population was Muslims. Jammu is the Hindu majority area. Poonch a
Muslim majority area, the Ladztkh is mainly Mongoloid in racial character,
Tibetan in language and Buddhist in religion. The politico religous
affiliations with Tibet through s~llegiance to Dalai Lama are still in evidence
and the economic life is mainly (dominated by the Lama series.'
From the cultural perspe:tive, there is no other state in India, which
has so much racial heterogeneity as K a s h r . It is a multi-racial, multi-
lingual and multi-relipous state. The first Dogra Ruler, Gulab Singh's
dominion produced a strange 1Jnion of Hindus, Pathans, Sikhs, Tibetans,
Buddhists and Muslims in a st3te whlch had no unifying basis in cultural
tradition or political history. The earlier Kashmiris had suffered terribly at
7 Hugh Tinker, India and Pakistan: .4 Politzcal Analysis (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967) p.38.
8 Walter Lawrence, 7he Valley ofKmlvnir (London: Oxford University Press, 1955) p.285. 9 M.C. Feer, "India's Himalayan Froiltier," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 22, No. 11, October,
1953, p.140.
the hands of the invaders, especially those from the West and South West.
As a result, they developed an attitude of distrust towards all outsiders. Such
distrust can be seen in the moc.ern struggle for the rights of the Kashmiries
as a Nationality. l o
"Kashmir has traditionaly been an enormous economic liability to
~ndia."" Geographical location has always been a crucial factor in its
strategic and political importance.'2 Moreover, the major aspects on the
Kashmir problem are the images and the ideas that India and Palustan had
created on the eve of the
5.3 Accession of Kashmir
In June 3, 1946, a cabinet mission memorandum stated that: "the
rights of the states which flow fi-om their relationship to crown will no longer
exist and that all rights surrendered by the state to the paramount power
will return to the state^."'^ It ha; also mentioned that every princely state had
the option of either joining Intlia or Pakistan. When many of the princely
states joined Indian Union, the .-uler or Kashmir did not take any decision in
this connection. However, the: Maharaja of Kashmir made a standstill
agreement with Pakistan by the exchange of telegrams on August on 12 and
16, 1947. Before the conclus~.on of a stand still agreement with India,
Pakistan cut off communications and stopped the supply of essential
lo See, Nithyanand Sharma, ''I<;Lshrmi; A Geo-Political Analysis," Geographical Observer, 25 March 1966, pp.54-61.
I I Joseph Korbel, Danger in Kashmit. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) p.3 19. 12 Sisir Gupta, Kashmir-A Study in India-F'akistan Relations (New Delhi: Asia Publishing
House, 1966) p.77. 13 Ibid, p.32. 14 Cabinet Mission Memorandum: Ccinmand f'aper No 6855, May 12, 1946
commodities (grains, clothes, kerosene, salt and sugar) for forcing Kashmir
to join ~akistan." On October 22, 1947. fully armed tribesmen from North-
West Pakistan and other Pakistani nationals penetrated Kashmir in order to
march towards the capital of the state to occupy it." The tribesmen lulled
Hindus and Muslims indiscriminately." They committed arson, loot, pillage,
plunder and violence in many towns and villages. Pakistani officials
supported the raiders, perhaps to divert the tribesmen from supporting their
own "Pushtunistan ~ o v e m e n t . " ' ~ Unable to control the situation, Maharaja
Hari Singh requested that the state of Jarnrnu and K a s h should be
permitted to join the Indian Union. Maharaja Hari Singh signed the
instrument of accession of Jammu and Kashrnir on October 26, 1947 and it
was accepted by the Governor General of India on October 27, 1947.
The Indian constitution, ,which came into existence on 26th January
1950, included in its Articles 370 which has been regulating central-state
relation^.'^ In the year 1951 State Constituent Assembly was constituted
which re-elected Sheikh Abdullah as the Prime Minister. The same year, the
constituent Assembly passed legislations abolishing monarchy and the
legislation was signed by young Prince, on behalf of this father Hari Singh,
who lived in exile in Bombay
I S An agreement in regard to communication and supply arrangements, which had always been inter-linked with British India
l6 Lord Bird Wood, India and Pakistan: A Continent Decides (New York: Frederick M. Praeger, 1954) p.77.
17 Sisir Gupta, Op. cit, p. 1 10. 18 E. Odell, "Afghamstan and the North-West Frontier," Contemporary Review, Vol. 173,
No. 4, April 1948, pp.240-44. 19 Note: The Kashrnir issue was or1 the top of the list of disputes between India and
Pakistan at the 1971. But after ths: India - Pakistan war 1971, it was relegated to the background.
State Chief Minister re~~laced constitutional amendment made in the
year 1965 the post of Prime Minister. The Jammu and Kashmir constitution
was enacted in the year 1056 during the regme of Bakshi Gulam
Mohammed. With the acceptance of accession Mount Batten wrote on
October 27, 1947: "In the case of any state where the issue of accession
has been a subject of dispute, tlie question of accession should be decided in
accordance with the wishes of ,he people of the state, it is my government's
wish that as soon as law and or'ier is restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared
of the invaders, the question of the states accession should be settled by a
reference to the people."2o Instead of helping the state to resolve its crisis,
Pakistan created more proble~ns in two ways: (a) Pakistan government
stopped the essential supplies to Kashmir state, (b) Pakistan instigated the
Kashrniri people to revolt against the government of India and tried its
best to create communal riots in the state. The purpose was to demoralize the
administration and to terrorize the Maharaja to accede the state into
Pakistan. When Pakistan failed it began to argue l o ~ c a l l y that Kashnur
belonged to Pakistan. Two dif5:rent arguments provided for this argument:
(a) Palustan claimed that rel i~c,us affinity of the majority of the Kashrniris
made it potentially a Pakistani province. (b) The state of Kashmir had a
longer boundary with Pakistan than with India. Indian political leadership
did not agree with the arguments raised by Pakistan. Indian government
20 White Paper on Jamrnu and Kashrnir (New Delhi: Publicat~on Division of the Government of India, 1948) pp. 47-48.
argued that it is not the religious majority or affinity that constitutes a
state. But, it is the general will of the people that make a state to exist."
On the other hand, the Indian leaders argued that the strength and
integrity of new nation-state of India that came into existence on August 15,
1947 would largely emerge frorn the pluralist India's capability to adjust sub-
national loyalties of caste, language, religion and other very ancient
primordial loyalties. It would be very ideal to remember here that the
leadership of modem India, through its constitution has declared India as a
secular state. Throughout history, India has been a federal polity with secular
and dominant values, which have not, perhaps, existed in any other civil
societies of the world.
While Kashmir's accession to India would create a strong, powerful,
consensus based on secular and federal polity, it would be very hlghly
dangerous if, Pakistan gets K-ashrnir. This would threaten not only the
integrity and the federal polity of India, but it would also demoralize and
threaten the very existence and unity of South Asian countries. The real
problem behind is that Pakistan is based on religious fundamentalism and the
very ancient Indian federal sec~~lar polity is based on fundamental doctrines
of secular and dominant values.
The whole question that comes out is why Pakistan another nation-
state would prefer accede Jan~mu and Kashmir to their fold. This is an
incorrect and artificial argumeni, which goes against the very ethics and the
Refer, Rousseau's concept of General Will as being enshrined in the major writings. According to Rousseau, it is the Gt:neral Will that creates a consensus for the inhabitants to stay in a particular society
140
fundamental doctrines of natic'n-state that had emerged in Europe, a few
centuries back, in the wakl: of Renaissance, Reformation and the
Geographical discoveries. Kashmir's association with India has been an
important point in her efforts to develop more intimate relations with Central
~ s i a . ~ ~ Jawaharlal Nehru briefly summed up the Indian interests in Kashrmr
in the Indian constituent Assembly on 25 November 1947 in the following
words: "We were of course, vitally interested in the decision of the state
would take: Kashmir, because of her geographical position with her frontiers
marching with three countries, namely the Soviet Union, China and
Afghanistan is intimately comected with the security and international
contacts of India. Economically also Kashrmr is intimately related with
India. The caravan trade routes firm Central Asia to India pass through
Kashmir state."23
It may be mentioned here that it would be very difficult to defend
Ladakh and the North West Frontier regons without effective control over
Kashrmr. At the same time, Kashmir is also very significant for the security
of the country as a whole in the context of the increasing military pressures
from the ~01th. '~
22 Note: Kashmir issue symbolises the incomplete p a t of the partition of India and Pakistan.
23 Jawaharlal Nehry India's Foreign Polrcy. Selecfrd .Speeches, 1946 (Deh : Publication Division of the Government of India, 1961) p.443
24 See, Kashrnir: Krishna Menon's Speeches in the Security Council on the 3 - 4 May 1962. Information Service of India, New Dell, 22nd June 1962.
The main problem with Pakistan in its approach to K a s h , is her
search for security against India. Another interest of Pakistan in Kashmir
is economic.25 The prosperity of agriculture in West Pakistan depends on the
six rivers, three of whch pass through ~ a s h m i r . ~ ' Pakistan also claims that it
has no great sources of minerals, hydroelectric energy and forest, wealthy
alternative to ~ a s h m i r . ~ '
Besides these, if Kashmir is acceded toPakistan it would ensure a
sense of completeness among the Pakistanis and it would g v e a complete
and perfect meaning to Palustani nationalism, based on Islamic religious
fundamentalism. It would also make a power centre based on Islamic value
system. Pakistan's claim for K.ashmir is based on geographcal and socio
economic conditions of the relgion. To quote Zafarullah Khan, "It is well
known that every factor, on lhe basis of which the question of accession
should be determined: Populati~m, Cultural and religious bonds, the flow of
trade, the economic situations, communication, the geographical position,
strategic considerations, point:; insistently in the direction of accession
of Kashrnir to ~ a k i s t a n . " ~ ~ But, Neutral Observer, a member of the team of
UN Representatives for India & Palastan observed that, "The State of
Jammu & Kashmu is not really a unit demographically or economically. It is
agglomeration of territories brought under the political power of one Maharajah.
25 Pakisthani Interests and claim:; for i(ashm!r were elaborately dealt with, by the Pakisthan's Foreign Minister Sir Zafal-ullah Khan in the Security Council, See United Nations Security council Oficial R.ecords (SCOR)
26 Ibid. *' Ibid. 28 Pakistan's representative to UN, Clr Zafarullah Khan's speech m the Security Council
during the discussion on India - Plklstarl Quesllon, 61h March 1951. See, SCOR, 534, 6" March 1951, pp.1-33.
That is the unity it possesses."29 This statement backs India's legalistic claim
for Kashmir, based on the politico-strategic position of Kashmu and
economic aid and development by India.
Indian leadership wants I:O accept the changed context in K a s h , the
Chinese military threat from across the border, the build up of the armed
strength of Pakistan by the Wec:t, the internal pressures in India and Pakistan
and economic progress achieved by Kashmir as a part of the Indian Union.
Indian leadership also affirms tiat the Kashrmr constituent assembly and the
subsequent election have confirmed the Maharajah's decision to join India
and secondly, the continued a:;sociation and interaction of the state as an
integral part of the Indian Union is to be taken into consideration while
looking at Kashmir as an islrue, problem or anything for that matter.
According to Pakistan, Kashmir is the most explosive dispute between India
and Pakistan. In the words of Z.A.Bhutto: "One can't divorce Kashmir from
India and Pakistan re~at ions ."~~ To Pakistan, Kashmir is a tenitorial dispute
emerging from the non-implementation of the doctrine of self-
determination. According to tke Indian leadership, it is situation brought
about by Pakistans aggression and its related tactics, which openly question
India's right to define the integrity of her territory. India and Pakistan have
also been criticizing each others conduct in subsequent years on political,
moral and legal grounds as the issue has been raised by Pakistan since the
29 United Nations Representative for [ndia & Pakistan. 0. D~xon in its report submitted to the President, Security Council, 15th September 1950, See SCOR, Suppl: September - 1950, pp.24-52 (S11791 incorporating Sl1791 Add 1).
30 As quoted in, Rajendra Sareen, "South Asla: Indo Pakistan Relations- A Case Study," South Asian Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1976, p.108.
days of partition. Indian leadership feels that Pakistan had violated the U.N.
when she sent her troops to Kashmir. Moreover, Pakistan's efforts to
integrate Azad Kashmir with I'akistan and treat Azad Kashmir as Pakistani
temtory violate the U.N resolutions and even the people who inhabit t h s
area are not allowed to have any say in any matter. Thudly, Pakistan has not
withdrawn her troops from certain disputed areas; apart from that it has built
up the strength of its Anned Forces and military bases in Azad Kashmir
in violation of the UN Conunission for India & Pakistan (UNCIP'S)
resolutions. Fourthly Pakistan has miserably failed to create a peaceful
atmosphere and in fact, it has been encouraging lawlessness in the state.
Finally, Pakistan continues to tight with India and sends 'mujahids' across
the border.
According to Pakistan, India violated the U.N. resolution when the
government of India integrated Jarnmu and Kashmir into the Indian union,
through a process of consensus and peace. Pakistan holds the view that India
has been following the same i r ~ the state of Jammu and Kashmir since its
inception into India; secondly, India has rejected all U.N. suggestions for
parallel demilitarization. Pakistim says that India has built up her military
strength in Kashrnir on the pretext of in la~nary threats from China. Thirdly,
India has refused arbitration on issues and problems in regard to Kashmir.
Finally, to Pakistan, India has withdrawn from the international commitment
of a plebiscite she had accepted ; ~ t the United ~a t ions . "
3 1 Various Claims and charges by the Ind~an &. Pakistan side have been made on Kashmir during the debates in the UN Security Council by thelr representatives.
According to Pakistan leadership "India is a known colonial country
......... of the worst type. What they are doing in Kashrnir today in the 2oth
century, no white colonial power ever did."32 Each accuses the other of
creating instability in the region. India is of the view that efforts to re-agitate
or to unsettle Kashmir are grit:vous political blows to the stability of the
region. Kashmir has been one of the main terrains of contention between
India and Palustan, which Nehn~ termed as "Pandora and Ayub Khan
,,34 " called it "time bomb what was a simple domestic problem has moved
into the sphere of International affairs", according to a member of the U.N.
Commission for India and ~ a k i s t a n . ~ ~ The lack of domestic conflict
settlement mechanism is one o:F the features of this conflict, said Bhabani
Sen ~ u ~ t a . ~ ~
Moreover, the efforts made by the super powers did not have any
effect on this issue. It may be mentioned here that Pakistan viewed it
with acute suspicion. The American attempt to get India to reach a
settlement with Pakistan in the wake of the Sino-Indian war was perceived
by India as an effort for the purpose of taking advantage of the country in its
moment of weakness. Soviet effi~rts irt 'Tashkent created a situation, where in
32 Speech by Feroz Khan Noon, National, 8th March 1958 (See, Pakistan National Assembly Debates: 1958, Vol: 1-20, pp. 1035-36).
33 The Hindu, Madras, 10th October, 1960. 34 The Pakistan Times, Islamabad, 12th October, 1960. 35 Quoted in article entitled: "Unsett1t:d Kashmir," New Statesman and Nation, Vol. 38,
No. 982,3 1 December 1949, p.773 36 Bhabati Sen Gupta and Amit Gupta, Changing Patterns of Regional Conflicts in South
Asia. Also in, Bhabani Sen Gupttr (ed.), Regional Cooperation and Development in South Asia, Vol. l(New Delhi: Soulh Asian Publishers, 1986) p.49.
145
Ayub Khan had to face a consi'ierable public outcry at home for having sold
Pakistan under Soviet pressure. The internal dynamics of the region brought
about the solution after the 19'71 war and the Shimla Agreement made both
the countries agree not to umilat.erally try to change the status quo in Kashmir
by military might.
Indian leadership holds the view that it is imperative for peace and
stability in South Asia that nothing should be done in Kashmir that would
affect the unity and integrity of the country. Pakistani leadership is of the
view that a solution of the Ks~shrnir problem is the fust step necessary to
restore Indo-Pakistan re1atior.s to normalcy through which peace and
stability of the region can be hoped for. When it comes to bilateral matters,
especially Kashmir, all the political and personal difference among the
Pakistani political elite takes a back seat. Pakistani leadership always
stressed that Kashrnir has been the main issue between India and Pakistan. It
can be concluded that the diplomatic objective of Pakistan has been to
counter the dominant position of India in the South Asian region. To settle
scores with India over the Kaslmir issue, Palustan opted for a foreign policy
of alignment and polarization of forces with any and every power, which
had over, or latent hostility touwds India. Pakistan's involvement in alliance
system has transformed the tilateral conflict in the sub-continent into a
proxy war.
5.4 Crisis in East Pakistan and Emergence of Bangladesh
The bond between East and West Pakistan was not ~ord ia l .~ ' They
were separated by 1200 Kilometers of Indian territory as well as by
languages, e t h c composition. civilization and outlook.38 They had in
common Islam, a short history and the same central government.39 Islam had
been the only cementing factor but its utility proved short-lived.40 After the
advent of Pakistan in 1947, the East Bengalis did not get much benefit from
the association other than a limited sense of s e c ~ r i t y . ~ ' The compulsions of
economic development were too strong to be side tracked by the slogan of
Islamic solidarity and brothe::ho~d.~~ Available records show that the
economic and political interest of the East Pakistanis were systematically
subordinated and marpnalized to those of west Pakistanis.
The crisis of the then East Pakistan was behind the conflict in 1971.
The crisis was manifestation of the simmering discontent of the Bengalis. It
was the result of long period of economic exploitation, political deprivation,
cultural aggression and linguistic arrogance that found vent in the demand
for autonomy of East Pakistan It IS historical fact that the contradictions
between East and West Pakistan led to their final break up. It is a general
37 Stephen Margrin and Gustav P. Pa~enek, History of Economic and Political Domination of East Pakistan, in Bangladesh Docu~nents, Vol. 1 (New Delhi: Ministry of Extemal Affairs, Go*. of India, 1971) p.5.
38 Hans J. Morgenthau, "Military Illusions", The New Hep.puhlic, Vol. 134, No. 1256, 19th March 1956, pp.14-16.
39 Stephen Margrin, Op cit, p.5. 40 Genesis of the Crisis: Factual Bzckground, in Bangladesh Documents, Vo1.l (New
Delhi: Ministry of Extemal affairs, Govt. of India, 1971) p. 1 41 Stephen Margrin, Op cii, p.5. 42 Genesis of the Crisis, Op cit, p. 1
belief, that the emergence of Bangladesh was the failure of national
integration concept mooted b> Pakistanis leadership.43 In fact, East-West
imbalance was the root cause of the crisis, which could not hold together
structure of the Pakistani state.
Richard Weeks called Pakistan "a double country.'*4 The geographical
separation between East and West Pakistan made communication and social
mobility between the two parts difficult and an expensive process. Besides
this, it has to bear in mind that, "gven the importance of capital site and
political clientele in the developing countries, geographical separation
further means that where the capital is not situated it is an economic and
administrative di~advanta~e."~: ' Moreover, their geographical separation
created two disparate economic and social life-styles. "To weld a nation out
of such a divergent elements in a geographically divided context was a
task, that given the most sagacit~us leadership, would have proved extremely
f~ rmidab le . "~~ The flow of irm~grants to West Pakistan contributed to
West Pakistan's higher rate of ~rbanization and economic development but,
on the contrary, the new imrni;yants did not compensate the exit of Hindu
elite from ~ a s t . ~ ~ This change left crippling gaps in the local economy of
East Pakistan
43 See, Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).
44 Richard Weeks as quoted in Roun2.q Jahan, Ibrd., p. 10. 45 Ibid. 46 Mohammed Ayoob and K. Subrarnaniyam, The Liberation War (New Delh: S . Chand
and Co. 1972) p. 1. 47 Rounaq Johan, Op. cil. p. 12.
148
The demographic difference between the two sides was further
accentuated by the linguistic arrogance of West Pakistan. This difference
hindered the development of 3 lingua fianca. -4s a result, none of the
languages had general acceptance in both the sides. The Quaid - i -Azam
talked of Urdu as the national language of Pakistan; but he did not specify
any time frame for the achievement of this objective. Option was gven to
East Pakistan to decide its own language. It may be mentioned here that the
Palustani leadership did not consider the deep feelings of Bengali's and
without taking into consideratioil of thls fact, Pakistan declared Urdu as the
official language - National Language. In the words of Jahan: "They initially
rejected the Bengali's claim for recognition as a National language and
attempted to make Urdu - a minority language - the only National language."'
As a result of all these de,velopments, there emerged in East Pakistan
over the language question, which was not accepted by the central
government of Pakistan. This greatly hurt the racial -regonal pride of the
Bengalis and this also brought about an imbalance in the distribution of
power among various sub-natio:lal identities and loyalties. As a result, the
Punjabis or Pakistan, who had a long bureaucratic tradition, monopolized
civil and military bureaucracy tliere by limiting Bengali participation in the
national-power structure. The policies initiated by central government of
Pakistan towards East Pakistan vias conlpletely discriminatory and it brought
about total domination of west over East wing. Even after some years of
the creation of Pakistan, Bengalis accounted for barely 15 percent in
central government. Services a id less than 10 percent in defence services. In
the hierarchy of the Army and the civ~lian services, the representation of
East Bengalis was almost nil. If the 83 Muslim Officers of the Indian Civil
Service, who opted for Pakistan in 1947, only one or two were from East
Bengal. If these, 47 Officers were still in administrative service in 1965, but
not one of them was a Bengali 49 The dominance of West Pakistan was very
explicit in Defence Service. If all the Head Quarters of three services, and all
ordnance factories located in West Pakistan, the recruit was also confined to
West Pakistan. The military, like the civil service, did not adopt any
conscious policy to contract ths imbalance. The possibility of rebuilding and
re-structuring state power was almost closed down when Ayub Khan took
over and he removed the safety valves of parliamentary facade, which had let
off a lot of simmering Benglli dis~ontent.~' Apart from this led to the
institutionalization of the don~inance of the three wings of the Palustani
military which were completel~. foreign to the East Pakistan
In the sphere of econondc activities, the exploitation by the Pakistani
state apparatus was very acute and sharp. In fact, Pakistani economy showed
all the symptoms of economic ~:xploitation bordering on colonial exploitation
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman said: "Even 200 years rule by the colonial British
could not exploit the people to such an extent as the unchallenged
exploitation of this wing (East Pakistan) of the country during the last 23
49 Khalid B. Sayeed, The Pulit~cal Svstem o,fPakistan (Boston: H . M . . 1967) p.156. 50 Mohammed Ayoob, India, Pahstan X 8angladesh Search for Relationship (New
Delhi: Indian Council of World affairs, 1975) p.5
years by the vested interests form West Pakistan."" The available sources
show that the entire political system of Pakistan and leadersh~p was ready to
exploit East Pakistan in every way possible. Arjun Sen Gupta rightly briefed
Pakistans two decades econo~nic policy as "a planning for disparity."52
Before 1970 election, East Pakistan had only third of the total development
expenditure spent by the central Government of Pakistan. It is something
very horrible to state that over 80 percent of the foreign aid was spent in
West Pakistan. It had also a great share of the imports into the country, when
as foreign in change earnlngs were mostly on account of products of East
Pakistan. Over 20 years, West l'akistan had imported goods worth more than
Rs. 3000 c r o r e ~ . ~ ~ According t~ the official report of Govt. of Pakistan, the
net transfer of resources korr East Pakistan to West Pakistan during the
period 1948-49 to 1968-69 amounted to 2.6 billion do~lars.~ ' In 1959-60,
West Palustan's per-capita income was 32 percent, higher than that of East
Pakistan, by 1967-70, it was 61 percent higher than that of East Pakistan. In
total, the increase was greater taan in percentage terms.55
The difference in per-capita income which had been Rs. 86 in 1960
was more than double i.e., R s 184 in 1970. It may be also noted here that
5 1 The Duwn, Karachi, 24 October, 971 52 Ajun Sen Gupta, "Planning for Disparity," in Pran Chopra (ed.), The ChaNenge of
Bangladesh: A Special Debate (Bombay: Popular, 1971) pp.79-101 53 Bangladesh Document, Vol 1 (New Delhi: Minishy of External Affairs. Govt. of India
1971) p.715. 5 4 Govt. of Pakistan: Planning Conmission Reports of the Advisory Panels for 4th Five
Year Plan 1970-75, Islamabad, V31. 1, Appendix 3, July 1970. 5 5 Ibid., p.2.
80 percent of defence expenditure to be allotted to West Pakistan. This
was an important aspect of expl2itation towards East pakistan.jh
The dissatisfaction and unrest fumed profusely in East Palustan due to
the antagonistic designs of W:st Pakistan. India on the other hand, was
eagerly waiting for this events and incidents to fish out of the troubled
waters. Mrs. Gandhi's timely interference in East Pakistan by supplying arms
and other assistance to the 'Muktibahinis', ultimately resulted the liberation
of East Pakistan fiom clutches of West Pakistan. Thus, the creation of a new
state, Bangladesh by the support of India has been a severe blow to Pakistan.
In short, the liberation of Bangladesh and its after effects has become one of
the prominent bilateral discords between India and Pakistan
5.5 Nuclear Arms Race
India and Pakistan now have entered into a competitive nuclear arms
race, "which has been learned as a race for Mutually Assured Destruction
(MAD), a cliche of the cold war days."j7 The plans were ready to carry out
the tests in 1983, during Mrs. (;andhi's regime, but they were subsequently
dropped under International pressures. The second attempt in 1995 was
abandoned after the U.S. intelligence gathered information regarding the
preparation for the tests and the U.S. administration persuaded India not
to go for the tests.58 "In the immediate aftermath of the tests, the craze to
56 East Pakistan used to blame West Pakistan on the following grounds. (a) Pakistan's resources plus foreign aid, are drected towards the development of West Pakistan @) East Pakistan's foreign earning are diverted to finance imports for West Pakistan.
'' Ashok K. Behuria, "In to the Nuc.leus of Relationship: Indo-Pak Relations Revisited," Journal of Peace Studies 3, Vol. 5, Issue 3, May - June, 1998
58 Ibid.
associate with the Nuclear tests and secrets related to it was so great that one
saw a whole lot of current and c:x-office claiming first hand knowledge of the
nuclear capacity and expressing their approval of the tests."s9 India became
an early beneficiary of the U.S. sponsored "Atoms for peace" programme
initiated in 1 9 ~ 3 . ~ ' Both the states had long been looked at as defacto nuclear
weapon states and neither had joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT)~' or such other legally binding nuclear non-proliferation instruments
as full scope international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards."
consciousness of the danger of nuclear weapon to peace and security has, in
the past, led to the idea of Indian Ocean as a Zone of ~eace.""
India had showed a nuclear weapon capability in May 1974, by
detonating a nuclear device, which they called "a peaceful Nuclear experiment."
Officially, India claimed, until 1998, that it did not possess nuclear weapon
capability and apart from that, :he country had no plans for nuclear weapons
programme. However, Inda talked of a nuclear weapons research programme
59 Ibid. 60 Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. M.C. Donough: "Tracking Nuclear Proliferation" -
South Asia and East Asia. Note: When India went in 1998 fc~r testing a series of nuclear explosive devices on May 11 and 13th. it officially declued itself a new nuclear weapon power. These developments triggered Palustan':: Nuclear explosive testing response, two weeks later, suddenly, emerging on the world stage-to self declared non-NPT nuclear weapon state and radically challenging the efficacy of the nuclear non - proliferation regime. The profound international outrage over India's action was all the more stronger as there was no visible nuclear security threae to India a . a justification for its nuclear testing and also because, in the earlier days, India had shownaversion to nuclear weapons and its once prominent leadership seekinj: non- proliferation and disarmament measures. Other nations objected, saying that Indii.'s nuclear tests and self declaration ran counter to the prevailing world atmosphere of luclear arms reduction, the negotiated 1996 ban on nuclear weapon testing and accumulated nonproliferation successes in other region.
62 Krishan Gopal, Geo Political Relations and Regional Cooperation-A Stud)' of South Asia (New D e h : Trans Asia Publications, 1996) p. 124.
and a nuclear posture of ambiguity &om the early 1970's and actively
pursued the development of space launchers and Nuclear Capable Ballistic
Missiles for so many years. As a result, in the years between 1974 and 1997,
Inha was considered as a threshold nuclear weapons state that could go
nuclear on short notice. Almost all political parties, event the left kont,
totally agreed that 'the tests cculd take care of the National Security issues,
especially in the wake of the Gauri Missile launched by Pakistan on to April
1 9 9 8 ' . ~ ~
Since independence, many Prime Ministers state that Pakistan more
than China, has been a securiQr threat to ~ndia." But the sense of insecurity
increased as the B.J.P. led Go1.t. came to power at the centre. A study in to
the Pakistani Defence policy would reveal that Pakistani defence policy
is entirely India - specific.65 "On the face of it, it is difficult to explain the
plaintive mood of the Palustimi's vis-a-vis Indians, especially when the
Muslims could carve out a separate homeland for themselves from the
British India. The feeling of suscess against the insurmountable obstacles on
the path to the making of Pakistan should have been too great to sweep away
all sense of distrust and hostility from the minds of the ~ a k i s t a n i s . ~ ~
63 Ashok K. Behuria, Op. cit p.5. 64 Note: George Femandes, former Defence Minister, said that China posed a potential
danger to the security of India. The rationale for the tests was worked out in an indirect manner. The scientists were waitirg for a go-ahead signal from the P.M.O. since as early as the year 1983.
65 Note: What is important to note here is the public approval of the nuclear move. In the midst of rejoicing over the tests, the gallop polls showed that and over whelming 82 percent of the population approvec! of the idea of going for weaponisation.
66 Ashok K. Behuria, Op. cit p.8.
"The comer stone of Pakistani's strategic thinking with regard to its
rivalry with Indla was its desire to achieve parity in terms of military might
vis-a-vis New elh hi."^^ Since partition, Pakistan made enough efforts to
achieve parity with India, especially in terms of military might.68 Constrained
by its comparatively small size: and modest resources, Pakistan looked for
the achieving thls objective through extra- regional interactions and
contacts.69 It joined with the U.S in the cold war by forging bilateral security
through the process of joining 3 .S. sponsored military alliances. South East
Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), and Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO). The U.S. contributed Pakistani's arrangement programme very
cautiously within the limited sphere. China has been, comparatively, more
liberal in arms and military technology transfer. At the same time, its ability
to change the correlation of forces In South Asia was limited." Mr. Pervaiz
argues that Pakistani's efforts to achieve security was treated by India as
a dangerous pursuit with the sole purpose of distortion of the existing
regional balance. The author f u ~ e r points out that this kind of difference in
67 Note: An original sponsor of NPT doctrines, India, however refused to sign the document that came up from NPT negotiations in 1968- stating that it did not fulfil the original mandate. Atter that, India confmuously opposed regional Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) and other non-prolife:-ation proposals for South Asia, calling instead for global nuclear dismnament The same waj., India had long preached the evolution of a Global Test Ban Treaty and contributed positively to early drafts of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996, but finally rejected the CTBT as wen.
68 A.K.M. Abdus Sabur, "Indo-Pakistan Security Relationship and the Kargil Crisis", BIISS Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1999, p 243
69 Note: Some writers argue that the nuclear test bar, has been made to create public support for BJP in order to ensure the stability of a fragile coalition. Even if the coalition headed by BJP fails to survive, thls would bring about popular mandate for BJP in the days to come. Another argument is that the nuclear test as a BE' phenomenon is the result of its perception of showing Indian power with Hindutva ilavour
'O A.K.M. Abdus Sabur, "Indo-Pakistan Security Relationship and the Kargil Crisis", BIISS Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1999, p.244
perceptions of each other's intrinsic aims explain the reasons why India went
for Soviet friendship." These developments result in the intensity of the
arms race in the region. Another factor that has contributed towards the arms
race is the mutual perceptions and misperceptions between India and
~akis tan.~ ' "Resisting pressures and penalties, Pakistan has retained and
developed the nuclear option."73 The author further points out that Pakistan
and India are to be persuaded in order to avert a nuclear arms race in
South ~ s i a . ~ ~
Jawaharlal visualized that atomic energy was a means for economic
development and rectifying the country's technological backwardness,
Nehru, the architect of India's defence and foreign policy establishment,
visualized India as one of the: World's fourth great powers. For pursuing
long-term objectives, India began to acquire a complete nuclear fuel cycle
under its own exclusive control, by obtaining the equipment and technology
fiom outside. The main contril~ution came from Canada in 1960 in the form
of research reactor, which -as specifically suited for the production of
" Note: "The acute sense of ins1:curity and helplessness during the earlier years of independence compelled Pakistan to move in to the arms of the West. Without giving much thought to its immediate geopolitical realities, it threw its lot whole- heartedly within the West to avert the pelceived Indian threat and to acquire the much needed economic and military a i d (Source, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Arms Build-up in South Asia: Impact on the Process of Peace arid Development in the Region", in copying with the contentious issues between India and Pakistan in South Asia.
'* Note: Pakistan followed a policy of nuclear abstinence until it was forced to undertake a painful re-appraisal after the 1971 debacle, when neither its conventional defence capacity nor the U.N. General ilssembly Resolubon proved effective to safeguard its territorial integrity and the country was dismembered as a result of the lndian military interventions in East Pakistan. Source- I b ~ r l
73 Abdul Sattar, "Reducing Nuclear Dangers in South Asia," Regional Studies, Islamabad, VoI. XIU, No. I , Winter, pp 94-95,
74 Ibid.
weapon grade plutonium. "Not subject to adequate inspection by the suppliers
CIRCUS reactor, using U.S. supplied heavy water, enabled India to produce
and stockpile plutonium for its weapons Obtained on the
pretext of "peaceful uses, C1RC:US provided the plutonium for the peaceful
explosion in 1974 . "~~
5.6 Impact of Arms Build-up on Development
Defence is an important sector with affects a country's resources,
more especially in developing countries. While the purchase of weapons is a
costly affair, most of the develcping countries are faced with the problem of
resources. As such a develo3ing country would be spending a large
percentage of budgetary allocation. The choice of a certain level of defence
allocation is with the Government and the level of defence posture is decided
by the national priority. The prixity varies with the change of government in
respective countries. The pos~tion of priority on defence is quiet often
influenced by the threat perc.eptions of the incumbent government. In
democratic countries, the placement of defence on the national priority is the
75 Note: Meanwhile India had acquired sufficient plutonium for an estimated 100-plus Hiroshima - size bombs (lo), CII.CUS alone accounts for 400 of the over 500 kgs of weapon - grade plutonium necessary the purpose. The balance of the weapon - grade plutonium, India has generated ;at Dhruva, which replicated Canadian Technology. While highlighting the non-descriminatory aspects of the NPT, the Indian Govt. has allocated substantive resources to develop its nuclear programme. The comprehensive nature of India's nuclear programme and its accompanying strategies of accelerated accomplishment are directed to a~tain self sufficiex:ncy within the minimum time scale. Pakistan was singled out for pruticularly severe penalties when it began to acquire nuclear capability. The U.S. enacted a Nan-Proliferation Law ir, 1978 under which economic aid was cut off to F'akistan because i l started constructing a uranium enrichment plant. An escape clauije in the law exempted India and Israel from similar penalties. In spite of all these, Pikistan succeeded in building a uranium enrichment plant and acquiring the explosion t:chnology
76 Abdhul Sattar, 0p.cit.
result of prevailing consensus along with the govenunent's own preferences.
In all other cases, the choice lies with the prerogative of the ruling group or
the ruler himself.77 The choice of the amount to be spent for defence and in
which sector it should be spent a very difficult and complex task.
The final outcome of c.efence and national security, whtch in turn,
produces a sense of security arnong the citizens. The feeling of security puts
a man at ease and it also pr~~vides stimulus to increase productivity. As
opposed to the sense of security. insecurity creates discouragement and
disappointment, whtch, in turn, is not suitable to the healthy development of
the economy. In spite of the massive monetary inputs by the American
through Marshal Plan in Western Europe after the Second World War, the
Western European recoveIy programme did not take off until the American's
committed themselves to the c.efence of Western Europe through the North
Atlantic Treaty in 1949. This shows that a sense of security is very essential
to speed up the pace of economic development. Though the huge defence
expenditure is a necessary evil, the economic development will slow down
considerably in the absence of sense of security.
All South Asian countri,:~ indulge in the practise of hidden allocation
to defence. Another practise that is comixg among South Asian countries is
withholding directly related information. Besides India, which publishes as
annual defence report, all other countries avoid giving much detail in regard
to defence allocation.
77 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Op. cit.
5.7 Cross-Border Terrorism
The scourge of terrorism has haunted Indian Policy-makers since
independence. Violence and terrorism have resulted fi-om irrationality,
miscalculation, xenophobia, fanaticism and religous extremism. Historically
mankind has remained in a stat': of conflict and resorted to violence to bring
7 8 0 . . in changes in the society and in political systems. r l sn ofterrorism is lost
in antiquity. Terrorism and telror are as old as the human discovery that
people can be influenced by int~midation.
Terrorism, in it sirnplis:ic fbrm creates fear as a mean to achieve
political objectives. In Kashmir, the JKLF is the main militant group, around
which more than a dozen splinter groups have come up. They began their
work in a pamphlet form, which comprised the following phases of
terrorism. They are pven below in the footnotes.79 India consists of many
regions, ethnically and culturally different to each other. India's regional
culture has more ethnicity than an amalgamated civilization. Like the former
Soviet Russian Republics, we have differing reg~onal, religous, cultural,
language pulls and pressures.
The Pakistani ISI, on their part, began a well-designed propaganda
onslaught to separate Kashmir from India. Through its committed media
correspondents, informers, collaborators, they were able to project the darker
78 N.S. Jamwal, "Counter Terrorism Strategy," LYtratrglc Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 1, Jan- March 2003.
79 Note: It meant in joining in anti -Lrtdia demonstration, anti-establishment acts, boycon of Indian norms. It is also involved the tactis against Hindu minority. They have been forced to leave the valley, destabalise the administration and control the media.
159
side of the so-called anti-Indian Kashmiri rebellion. The media put out
distorted, fallacious and cooked-up stories that inflamed the Kashrmri Muslims.
Although we have been able to control such fissiparous tendencies, a
dangerous dimension has been added for the last two decades by the
involvement of Pakistan in aiding and abetting secessionism in Jammu &
Kashmir, North-East Punjab. Having failed in its attempts of annexing
K a s h r by force and realising the futility of carrying out an armed
adventure in the existing securiy scenano, Pakistan resorted to what can be
termed as proxy war and cross k'order terrorism.
The militancy in Punjab remained active for over a decade, broadly
kom 1980-1990. The conflict was caused due to a number of reasons
ranging &om various reasons both external and internal.*' During the period,
when military was at its peak, about 15,000 people died in the militant
attacks. Pakistan exploited the tlissatisfaction borne out in the state and gave
covert and overt assistance for their struggle.
In Kashrnir, there are historical reasons for whlch since 1947, some
Kashmiri Muslims have been oscillating in their demands for an independent
state or merger with Pakistar.. Unemployment amongst educated youth,
rampant corruption, and allege'j large-scale rigging of the 1987 election to
the State Assembly resulted in deterioration of the law and order situation.
A large number of unemployetf youth crossed over to Pakistan, which was
already on a look out to exploit any opportunity to its advantage, and
Palustan has since been actively providing diplomatic, political, moral,
80 Kanti Bajpai, Roots of Terrorism: 2002 (New Delhi: Penguin Books) p.58
financial and arms assistanc~: and becoming training to the militants.
Besides, many heinous crimes that terrorists commits daily, the attacks on
the Parliament and the State Assembly in J&K in 2001, many massacres of
innocent people including infants and woman of minority communities and
attacks on temples in J&K ;md outside are some of the horrific acts
perpetrated by terrorists aided and abetted by Pakistan, that defy any log~c.
The gravity of the situation spiralled out of control to the extent of
mobilization of forces of India and Palustan on the international border and
the two nuclear nations were at the brink of war. India has been involved for
many enclosed years in a costly, protracted battle against terrorism in the
valley. Islamic terrorism in Ka,jhmir has the active support of Palustan and
was further aided by Taliban. (General Pervez Musharraf had one occasion
April 1999 said that "India is a hegemonic power and low intensity conflict
(read terrorism) against it woultl continue even if Kashmir problem is solved
to our sat i~faction."~~
The goal of Pakistan-prclmoted terrorism is to affect India's national
integrity. Pakistan's efforts to disintegrate India were also echoed by the All-
Party Huniat Conference's (AI'HC) former Chairman, Gilani who had also
said in an interview to the 'Sunday observer' that if Indian soldiers could
play a role in the birth of Bangladesh, what is wrong in Pakistani soldier's
playing a role in the independence of Kashmir.
It is to be noted here vivtdly that, "it is not only J&K that Palustan is
aiming at, but the larger design of Pakistan is to ultimately work for the
81 The Tribune, Chandigarh, April 30. 1999
disintegration of India through the promotion of terrorism in the North East
areas and towards this objectiv,:~ IS1 is fi~lly supporting various secessionist
groups within India and outside ""
India is targeted for alleged violation of human rights in K a s h r and
the North-East by the national ;md international human rights watch groups.
Continuous fight against terrorism in Kashrnir and North East is expected
to weaken the nerves of the Indian Government. The Government of India
has been seeking a political solution to the problem and took a number
of steps towards such a solution. Like Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to
Lahore, Agra summit, unilateral cease-fire against militants, release and
rehabilitation of surrendered militants, internationally acknowledged free
and fair elections, exchange cf prisoners etc has not been produced the
desired positive resu~ts .~"
Finally, Pakistan-promoted terrorism questions the multi e t h c and
multi-religious Indian State's right to exist. Pluralism itself is under attack,
since terrorism, in its latest phase, after Musharraf took power, has been
presented as Jihad to liberate ~ : ~ s h m i r . ' ~
It was in this background, one could easily found that the above-
mentioned terrains of bilateral confTontations have been conspicuous in
preventing a smooth and cordial relationship between India and Pakistan
in South-Asia. It would be more relevant to realise these confrontations, if,
more a bit closely to have a glance in the even more complex situations
82 Muchkund Dubey, "Anatomy of Terronsm in South Asla-1 ," The Hindu, Januq 21,2003. 83 The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, January 1, 2003. 84 The Hindu, Madras, March 2 , 200.1.
between these two main countries in the region after the nuclear explosions
and the Kargil misadventure as the new phase.
5.8 The New Phase- Post - Pokhran Development
India-Palustan relations acquired an entirely new dimension with
India conducting its nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998 and Pakistan
responding with its own nuclear tests on May 28 and 30. In the midst of
vigorous international criticism of both India and Pakistan and demands on
both that further test must be a~andoned and both countries sign the CTBT,
Pakistan did not hesitate to indulge in mudslingmg against India for having
raised the level of the arms rac:e in the regon and for not doing enough to
resolve the Kashmir question. India on the other hand, displayed
considerable understanding of the motives of Pakistani tests and offered a
No-First-Use Agreement. Pakistan whle rejecting the No-First-Use proposal by
India offered instead a Non-Aggression Pact which India described as
irrelevant because of the exi!;tence of the Simla Agreement. Pakistan's
continuous refusal to consider India's proposal pertaining to no-first-use of
nuclear weapons confirms suspicions that Pakistan considers nuclear
weapons as not merely means of deterrence but weapons of war, which it
would not hesitate to use if the need arose. Pakistan's Foreign Secretary,
Sharnshad Ahmad, during the Kargil crisis stated that, "We will not hesitate
to use any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial in tegr~ t~ ."*~
Pakistan in the post Chagai period actively tried to link the nuclear
tests with the Kashmir question, by suggesting that Kashmir being an
85 The News International May 3 1 , F'akistan
unresolved issue which has been the cause of frequent wars in the past is
now pregnant with the possibilities of a nuclear conflict in the subcontinent.
This has been projected by Pak~stan as a good enough reason for third party
mediation in the Kashmir dispute and Pakistan has been openly m h g a
bid for intervention by the United States, United Kmgdom, Chma, Japan
and other countries. India continues to take the position that Pakistan and
India between themselves are capable of resolving t h s dispute bilaterally,
also because this is the approach agreed upon by the two countries in the
Simla Agreement.
India has been emphas:sing the fact that both the countries have
succeeded in avoiding a war since 1972 despite the fact that Pakistan has had
a nuclear weapons capability since 1987 and India since about the same time
or later in 1990. There has been a view among senior military leaders in
Pakistan that once Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons, this would neutralise
Indian conventional military superiority. It would then be possible for
Pakistan to snatch Kashmir from India through irregular warfare under the
nuclear umbrella without Indi ,~ being able to impose any punishment on
Pakistan for the acts. "A Pakist;mi nuclear capability would paralyse not only
the Indian nuclear decision, but also Indian conventional forces, and a bold
Pakistani strike to liberate Kashrnir might go unchallenged if Indian
leadership was inde~isive."'~ I:ormer Chief of Army Stiff (COAS) Aslam
Beg, stated in a seminar that in spite of the battle over K a s h r ragmg for
86 Stephan P Cohen, The Pakzslan Army (New Delh~ H~rnalayan Books, 1984) p 153
the past many years, "we h a ~ e nc, fear of war which has been possible
because of the nuclear deterrence which exists today in the ~ubcontinent."~'
The launching of the proxy war in Kashmir in 1988 following the acquisition
of the bomb and subsequent escalation of the militancy in December 1989
proved this assessment. When both the countries went overtly nuclear in
May 1998, Pakistan hoped that its nuclear weapons would deter India from
responding to any act of aggression by it in Kashmu. However, despite
Pakistan's nuclear weapons, India took on the Pakistani challenge in Kargil
and gave a befitting reply. In a sense, the Pakistani bluff was called and India
gave clear proof of its determi~iation that it will not brook any violation of
its borders, whether there are ;my nuclear weapons or not in the hands of
the enemy.
5.9 Dialogue Process in the Post-Nuclear Phase
It becomes important to 1:ake a look at the impact of the nuclear tests
on the process of dialogue betueen the two countries. In a climate of newly
created tension and suspicions in the wake of nuclear tests by India and
Pakistan, both countries felt the need to talk to each other at sufficiently hlgh
levels to find a meeting ground ;md to instil mutual confidence. The dialogue
process between India and Pakistan could not be resumed in June 1998 as
the two could not agree on the niodalities for talks. There was a difference in
the interpretation of the June 23, 1997 agreement, wh~ch was signed between
87 Farahat H. Syed (ed ), Nuclear Disarmament and Convenhonal Arms Control Including Light Weapons (Islamabad. Friends, 1997) p 449
165
the foreign secretaries of lndia and Pakistan, in Islamabad. This difference
occurred over whether the working groups were to address all issues between
India and Pakistan, or whether peace and security and Kashmir would be
discussed by the foreign secrc:taries themselves. The earliest opportunity
available after that was at the SAARC Summit in Colombo whlch was held
in end July 1998. However, the talks held between July 29 and July 30 ended
in a stalemate. Meanwhile, the inte~mittent firing exchanged between Indian
and Pakistani troops across ihe line of control during July 1998 and
beginning of August further vitiated the atmosphere between the two
countries. Hopes for meaningful interaction between Vajpayee and Nawaz
Sharif at Durban on the sidelines of the NAM summit came to naught as
Nawaz Sharif stayed away due i:o domestic compulsions. However, Palustani
Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz held fruitful talks with Indian Minister of State
for External Affairs, Vasundhara Raje, on the sidelines of the summit, and
on September 3, it was announc:ed that India and Pakistan had agreed on the
modalities for resumption of fo1.eig-n secretary level talks.
The deadlock in Indo-E'alustan relations was finally broken when
Vajpayee met Nawaz Sharif at New York on September 23,1998 during the
UN General Assembly session. The New York meeting also resulted in a
host of CBMs. For instance, telephone hotlines between the two prime
ministers were to be restored, t:ade and people to people contact were to be
enhanced, the railway link between Kokrapar (Pakistan) and Munnabao
(Rajasthan) was to be restartc:d. a direct bus service between Delhi and
Lahore was proposed, visa ~ ~ l e , j were to be relaxed, and efforts were to be
made to stop cross border firing."
The October round of talks ~n lslamabad did not achieve any major
breakthrough, except that the process of dialogue received an impetus. India
and Pakistan reiterated their known positions on "Kashmir, but agreed to
meet again and cany forward t h ~ dialogue at the next round of talks between
the two foreign secretaries T'le Indian s ~ d e proposed a no-first-use of
nuclear weapons agreement, ensuring reliable communication links and
greater transparency between the two sides through extending the hotline
between the two Directors Gene,ral of Military Operations to divisional and
sector commanders, reviving the hotline between the two foreign secretaries,
giving advance notice of missile tests of over 200 krn range and extending
the existing agreement on non-a.%ack on each other's nuclear installations to
cover economic and populatior~ centres, renewal of the invitation to the
Pakistani Army Chief to visit Inclia and exchange of officers between the two
National Defence Colleges The Pakistani side spoke of a non-aggression
pact, mutual nuclear and ballistic restraint whlle it remained cool to the no-
first-use proposal.89 The Noveml~er talks in New Delhi became bogged down
due to the usual accusations and counter accusations hurled by India and
Pakistan towards each other.
The New Delhi round of talks held in November 1998, included six
issues, which were Tulbul navigation project. Siachen, Sir Creek, trade,
88 The Indian Express, Sept. 24, 1998 89 The Pioneer, Oct.21, 1998
terrorism and drug trafficking and cultural exchanges. With regard to the
Tulbul navigation project, the Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman, Tariq
Altaf, on his return to Pakistan, accused India of trying to "justify" its
"violation" of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty and rejecting Pakistan's move
to settle the dispute through During the talks, Pakistan rejected
India's proposal for a ceasefire in Siachen, wanting instead to address the
question of troop disengagement in the area. Pakistan, during the eighth
round of talks on Siachen in November, called for the "redeployment of
troops." According to Pakistar., troop pullback should be considered on the
basis of the 1989 "agreement". India proposed a package of confidence
building measures which would lead to a "comprehensive ceasefire" in the
Saltoro range region." India also wanted a ''freeze" on the ground positions
of troops from both sides to "immediately defuse tension and atmosphere of
confkontation in the area." Once the ceasefire had been agreed in principle
specific "modalities" which wwld make it durable could be discussed in an
"agreed framework." It was suggested by India that both sides could
establish a "bilateral monitorit~g mechanism." New Delhi did not agree with
the Pakistani proposal of placing an "international monitoring mechanism"
to supervise the ceasefire in the Siachen area.9'
India rejected Pakistan's bid to internationalise the Sir Creek issue,
reiterating that all differences between New Delhi and Islamabad after the
Simla Accord have to be resolved bilaterally. Wanting to arrive at an early
90 The Hindu, Nov. 1 5 , 1998 91 The Hindu, Nov. 7, 1998.
resolution of maritime boundaries, Indla proposed a new formulation, whlch
delinks the charting of maritime frontiers from fixing the land boundary in
Sir Creek. India proposed that the two sides should delimit the maritime
boundary from the "seaward" side. The two sides could proceed towards
land from the extremity of the EEZ limit to a "mutually acceptable limit."
Pakistan rejected this approacl~ and insisted that the determination of the
land boundary in the Sir Creel: area and fixing its maritime borders were
inseparable.92 India and Pakistan a wide range of economic and commercial
issues. However Palustan insi:;ted that progress in these areas would be
restricted till and environment of "peace and security" was created between
the two countries. The talks on bilateral economic cooperation were held for
the first time since 1989. The Indian side stressed upon the need to be
accorded MFN status by Pakistan, which is obligatory under the rules of the
World Trade Organisation. It was suggested that till this came about,
Pakistan could consider increa:jing the list of commodities importable from
~ n d i a . ~ ~ On the issue of promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields,
India put forth 22 detailed suggestions in the field of art, culture, youth
affairs, sports, information and media.
The November round oi' talks became bogged down due to the usual
accusations and counter accusations hurled by India and Pakistan towards
each other. In some situations 1:hey were not able to move beyond their often
stated positions. Pakistan s h o ~ e d its tenacity in trying to bring in third party
92 The Hindu, Nov. 10, 1998. 93 The Hindu, Nov. 11, 1998.
intervention into what should be bilaterally resolvable issues. However, the
effort on both sides to discuss a wide range of issues was itself commendable.
There was some amount of progress in the November talks, which can be
measured by a number of positive developments. Both countries set up
technical committees on the :;upply of surplus power to India. Certain
proposals by India to avoid dollble taxation were under consideration. The
Pakistani proposal for setting up a mechanism for quick information flows
on trade and investment was agreed to by India. Pakistan agreed to ensure
that visas were issued to Indian:. within six weeks and that there would be no
delay. Both countries agreed to set up a mechanism for regular meetings and
exchange of operational information between the Central Bureau of
Investigation and Federal Invesiigating Agency of Pakistan, "for expeditious
assistance to each other for combating various kinds of crimes including
counterfeiting of currency and cyber crime^."'^
5.10 Lahore Bus Diplomacy
The Next landmark in Inclo-Pak relation was the Indian Prime Mmister
Vajpayee's visit to Lahore on Feljruary 20-2 1, 1999 on the inaugural run of the
DebLahore bus service. There was an increasing relation on the part of
both Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee that improvement of relations between the
two countries had to be a priority.
The Lahore Summit led to the signing of the Lahore Declaration by
the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India on February 2 1, 1999, the issuing
of the Joint Statement by India and Pakistan, and the Memorandum of
94 The Hindu, November 1 I , 1998
Understanding signed by the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan. Both
the Lahore Declaration and the MOU referred to mutual adherence to the
principles of the UN Charter, as also contained references to the
implementation of the Sirnla ~ g r e e m e n t . ~ ~ Both the Lahore Declaration and
the MOU agreed to the resolution of outstanding issues, including that of
Jammu and Kashrnir. While New Delhi conceded simultaneity in terms of
bringing talks on Kashmir ontcl the agreed agenda, along with other areas of
mutual benefit, Islamabad conceded bilateralism. The reference to the
"composite and integrated" dialogue process implied that it would not be
hostage to any single issue.96
While hopes were high after the summit both sides had to come down
to earth soon. Nawaz Sharif could not be seen to be softening his stance on
Kashrmr in undue haste. Nawaz Sharif, barely a week after the summit in
Lahore, stated, "There would (come a time when the talks would have to be
superseded in case there is no concrete development in solving the Kashmir
issue."97 Palustani Foreign Selcretary, Shamshad Ahrned, stated, soon after
the meetings, that Pakistan is not to blame for the bloodshed in Kashmu.
This was in reaction to cornments by Vajpayee, who on returning to
New Delhi, on February 2 1, from Pakistan, said that relations between the
two neighbours could o d y improve when killings by Muslim separatists
95 The Hindu, Nov. 13, 1998. 96 Acwrdmg to Lahore Declaration: both the Prime Mimsters of India and Palastan were
"wmmitted to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the universally accepted principles of r~eaceful w-existence and they reiterated the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit."
97 The Hindustan Times, March 9, 999.
in Kashmir ended. The happenings in Indo-Pakistan relations after
Vajpayee's visit give an idea of the existing contradictions present in
relations between the two stat1:s. Nawaz Sharif brought up the "Kashrnir
issue when he made a statement that Mr. Vajpayee had agreed with
Islamabad's view's that the people of Kashmir should have the right of self-
determination. This statement was refuted by the Indian PM's office. Again
at Dhaka, where Nawaz Sharif had gone for the D-8 summit, he stated that
"a solution to Kashmir is a rnust for achieving peace in a nuclearised
South ~ s i a . " ~ '
The contradiction in Indcl-Pak relations became apparent again when,
Nawaz Sharif while visiting Rawalpindi stated that, "the Pakistan Army is
fully geared and equipped to fxce any eventuality."" His remarks came in
the wake of Indian External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh's interview to
the Pakistani newspaper The hews, in which he ruled out any thlrd party
mediation on the Kashrmr issue and dismissed Pakistani demands to pull out
the army from the Valley as a ccnfidence building measure.
While the Lahore process was the culmination of Nawaz Sharif s
efforts towards taking Indo-Pak relations to a new hlgh, it is known that the
army in Pakistan was even then uncomfortable with this event, and had in
the meanwhile been planning the Kargil adventure. It was reported in July
1999, "Highly placed sources confirm that the decision to take over the
Kargil posts was taken in October last year and preparations started
98 The Times of India, March 2 , 1999 99 The Times ofIndia, March 3 , 1999
immediately after that."'0" In an article, General Mirza Aslam Beg, the
former Chief of Army Staff disclosed that the mujahideen's operation was
approved after briefings give11 to the Prime Minister at GHQ and IS1
*Headquarters as early as J a n u . q 1999.101 Another Pakistani commentator,
in an article published in July 1'399, stated that, "It is generally accepted that
Kargil was planned last year ar.d its execution began in February just about
the time of the Lahore ~ec1arat: ion." '~~ Afzal Mohamood, in his article asks
the question, "Why did (Palustan) fail to g v e the (Lahore) process a good
try which means reasonable time and opportunity to prove its worth as a
conflict resolution mechanism? First we accept the concept of bilateralism,
glorifL the Lahore process and take pride in opening a new chapter in Indo-
Pak relations and shortly the~.eafter embark upon a course of action-ill
thought out and rash - that brings us to an eyeball- to eyeball confrontation
with India.
The feeling of euphoria created by the Lahore Summit was completely
shattered due to Pakistan's aggre:rsion in Kargd, whlch marked an unanticipated
downturn in Indo-Pakistan relations.
5.11 Kargil Issue
It becomes meaningful to examine the implications of the Kargl war
over Indo-Pak relations. Kargil has to be seen in the context of the proxy war
conducted by Pakistan in the last decade. Kargl was in a sense the
culmination of the proxy war. The purpose of the Pakistani operation in
100 "Beating A Hasty Retreat," News ,:me, July 1999 10 1 Stated in an article by Afzal Mahmood, Dawn, July 18, 1999 102 M.P.Bhandara, Dawn, July 2 1, 1 9'19
173
Kargil is clear. Pakistan wanted to enlarge the conflict in Kashmir, and to
bring to the focus of the inte~national community, the danger of another
Indo-Pak war, one in which nu:lear weapons could be used. By fabricating
this kind of danger, Pakistan hoped for international intervention, whlch
would succeed in defieezing the Kashmir issue.
The roots of the Kargil episode can be traced back to Pakistan's
yeaning, to mastermind a people's revolt in Kashmir. The people of
Kashmir, despite being under duress due to terrorist activities, went in for an
elected government in 1996. Pakistan, realising the hopelessness of the
situation, opted for military action in Kargil, Pakistan disregarded the peace
initiative offered by India in Lahore. It deceived India by simultaneously
planning the Kargil operations in great secrecy. The Kargil conflict was a
great setback for the peace process and the confidence building measures
initiated in the year preceding tt:e Kargil intrusion. The Pakistani forces were
found to be composed of Pakistani army units, mercenaries and Afghan
war veterans.
A Pakistani commentator admits that, "Carried out with the help of
religious militants backed by the para-military Northern Light Infantry, the
plan, it appears, was to take control of the vacant Indian positions on the
Kargil heights, fiom where miiitary supply routes to Ladakh and Siachen
7,103 could be blocked. A survey of various articles written by a number of
analysts in Pakistan leaves no room for doubt that Palustan was directly
involved in the Kargil war. M.1'. Bhandara wrote, "We are told incessantly
103 Afsal Mahmood, See n. 90
that the Karpl freedom fighters are genuine Kashrniri freedom fighters.
However, is it reasonable to believe that freedom fighters can fight at 15,000
feet above sea level without Pakistani rations, cloth~ng, logistics,
ammunition and intelligence s ~ ~ p p o r t ? " ~ ~ ~ Ikram Sehgal stated that, though
belated we have begun to reco~pise the sacrifice and valour of the Northern
Light Infantry (NLI) No single unit of our army has inflicted such damage
on men, morale and equipment of the Indians in their history as the NLI has
done."'05 Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz visited New Delhl for talks
on June 12, 1999 but the Indian External Affairs Minister made it clear that
no negotiations could take place until P&stan withdrew all infiltrators
beyond the LOC. Jaswant Sin& also confronted Sartaj Aziz with a taped
conversation between two Paki:;tani Generals, which confirmed the Pakistan
army's involvement in the Kargil fighting.
India's stand was of course vindicated, by the immense international
support it received. During the Clinton-Sharif meeting of July 4, 1999,
Nawaz Sharif agreed, "that concrete steps will be taken for the restoration of
.,I06 the Line of Control in accordance with the Sirnla Agreement. Nawaz
Sharif by agreeing with Presidznt Clinton on this point, adrmtted not only
that Kargil constituted a violat~on of the Line of Control, but that it was in
Pakistan's power to undo this ~iolation. The implicit suggestion was that he
would withdraw his forces from Indian Kashmir, to the position, as it existed
before Pakistan's aggression in Kargil sector across the LOC. In a sense, the
'04 Zafar Abbas, "Who done it"? The Herald, August 1999 Io5 M.P. Bhandara, Dawn, July 21, 1'299. 106 Ikram Sehgal, Nation, July 3 1, 1999.
175
Palustani government accepted the sanctity of the LOC there by putting a
stamp of approval on its as forming-a-de facto boundary between India and
Palustan. According to report:;, General Zinni, the chief of US central
command, during his visit Islamabad in the last week of June 1999, received
a firm commitment from the F'akistani leadership that they were ready to
take concrete measures to de-i:scalate the situation. Faced with a serious
economic situation, Pakistan ccmuld not afford to antagonise the US, which
could have with held the 100 million dollar tranche of the IMF loan due in
July. The G8 countries condemned the infiltration and demanded withdrawal
of the intruders fiom the Indian side of the LOC. China stated that both India
and Pakistan must exercise restraint and should solve the Kargl problem
peacefully through negotiations.
India felt terribly cheated by Pakistan because India had invested a lot
of hope and faith in the Lahore process. That somethmg as disastrous as an
act of blatant aggression across the LOC in the Kargil sector could have been
done by Pakistan so soon after the Lahore Declaration came as a fatal blow
to India's hope about improvir~g relations with Palustan. Disappointment
turned into disgust when widespread stories emanated from Pakistan
suggesting that the army had specifically sought and obtained Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif s clearance with regard to intrusions in Kargil soon after
Nawaz had signed the Lahore ~c : c l a r a t i on . ' ~~
107 Text of the Joint Statement of President Clinton and Prime M~nister Nawaz Sharif at Washington on July 1999. Dawn. July 5 . 1999.
5.12 Siachen Dispute
This is also one of the major contentious issues between India and
Pakistan. Siachen Glacier has In the North Eastern part of Kashmir an area
where both the ceazefire line :md the line of control are ill-defined. To the
mouth of the Glacier lies the Karakoram Range which separates India and
China. Pakistan claimed that the Line of control runs directly to the Kara
Koram range from the point where the boundary was not demanded and that
the Siachen was not part of' India,Pakistan's argument goes like "the
inhospitable climatic condition of the regon. Prevented both India and
Pakistan from drawing up a detailed demarcation line is the part of t h s
issue."lo8 The Glacier is situat1:d in the Baltistan district, which is a part of
Pakistan's Northern Areas close to the border of Chma. India argued that
the Line of Control went beyyond the glacier, thus the glacier belonged
to 1ndia.lo9
Siachen came into the limelight in 1984 when India moved its troops
into the area. The Pakistan army quickly moved to check India's exercise
and the situation escalated violently. Heavy casualties reported after the
fkequent exchange of fire in the highest battlefield of the world. India's
interest in this snow-bound land is inspired by strategc motives. Inda wanted
108 There is controversy regarding the legal status of Northern areas. The Jammu and Kashrnir High Court has decl;ired that the Northern areas (Gilgit, Baltistan etc.) presently administered by Ministry of Kashmir Affairs m Islamabad is legally a part of Kashrnir. Most Pakistanis think it belongs to Pakistan because there was a revolt against Srinagar in 1947 and th: people of Gilgit and Baltistan 'liberated' themselves and joined Pakistan. See, editorial in The Fronfler Post, Peshawar, 1 1 March 1993
'09 Robert Wirsing, Pakistan's S ~ C U ~ T J J ~mder Zia (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1990) pp. 143-44.
to reach closer to the Karakoram Highway and the Pakistan-China border.
Indian strategists believe that in order to be Central Asian power, India
must manage to secure direct ~lrotected access to the Karakoratn~."~
Fighting over Siachen took place in late 1987 and early 1988. Palustan
and India have also held negotiations at Defence Secretary level to resolve
the issue. Five rounds of talks were held, starting from January 1986 and
ending in June 1989. At the end of the fifth round, both countries agreed to
work towards the settlement 0:- the Siachen dispute based on redeployment
of forces to the pre-Simla position in order to reduce the chances of
conflict. I '
Pakistan's stand has been that the troops should be withdrawn to their
position in 1972, before the Simla agreement, meaning thereby that New
Delhi must vacate the en~roac:hment."~ T h s was contradictory on India's
point of view that it meant partial withdrawal on both sides, just to avoid
armed conflict, thus leaving its~:lf in the advantageous position of controlling
the heights. In fact, S.K. Singh tlie Indian leader of the delegations, accordmg to
Newsmen had agreed to a compromise with Palustan with regard to
~ i a c h e n . " ~ The arguments arid counter arguments from both the sides
portrayed a contradictory picture in this regard and blamed each other by
holding the misinterpretation ofthe wordings of the joint statement.
110 Afzal Iqbal, "Stalemate Over Sia;hen," The Nation, 4 Dec. 1989 I" Palnstan Horizon, Vol. XLU, Nc.3, 1989, p.8 'IZ The Pakistan Times, Lahore, 13 'ebruary 1992.
The Hindu, June 1989.
However, spokesmen for the Pakistani government maintained that
India was changing her stand on Siachen. Earlier at the end of the meeting,
India had promised to withdraw its troops from the glacier area, and only
after that all other matters to be sorted out. The Pakistani officials involved
in the negotiations also, disclocied that the Indian side agreed that the troops
could be withdrawn from the g: acier and then only the delimitation would be
possible."4 The Indian side on the other hand blamed the Pakistani side for
not coming to a compromise. A. senior military participant in the negotiations
alleged that the Pakistan's proposal for redeployment was nothing but a
hood&. Pakistan, said nothlng with regard to the positions at the time of
Simla accord. Moreover, they ,#anted to control the glacier area by arguing
that it is coming under her territ~r-y."~ The sixth round of talks Defence
Secretary level was held in New Delhi in November 1992. The talks failed
because India insisted on the recognition of the onground realities, which
was not acceptable to ~ a k i s t a n . " ~ In fact, these talks were futile and at the
end of the negotiation both the sides accused each other for scuttling
the talks"' and both the countries are hesitant to withdraw that troops
from Siachen.
The political climate prevailing in the regon is not conducive to
the smooth and successful co-operation. The above-mentioned bilateral
constraints between India anti Pakistan overshadows all the efforts of
114 Robert Wirsing, no 5 1, pp.79-80 115 India Today, 1 5 July 1989. 116 The Pakistan Times, Lahore, 13 February 1992 "' The Hindu, 27 June 1989.
economic co-operation and intzgration in the region. The small neighbour's
apprehension towards India, clue its size, potential resources and the so-
called hegemonir$2esigns and the confrontation between India and
Pakistan in the areas which tliscussed so far has become the stumbling
block against the effective regional co-operation in the regon of South
Asia. The relationship between the small neighbours and the big brothers
i.e. India and Pakistan is portrtyed in the next chapter.