chapter - 7 additional studies -...
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Environmental Impact Assessment Report
M/s. NN Polymers
Survey No. 1458, Village: Panshina,
Taluka: Limbdi, District: Surendranagar, Gujarat.
T. R. Associates (Ahmedabad)
NABET Accredited
Chapter‐7: Additional Studies
7.1
CHAPTER - 7 ADDITIONAL STUDIES
A. PUBLIC CONSULTATION
All the aspects of the TORs are incorporated in the draft EIA/EMP report, the same
may be submitted to the Gujarat Pollution Control Board (GPCB) for conducting public
hearing/public consultation as per EIA Notification, 2006 and its subsequent
amendments.
Minutes of Public Consultation / Public Hearing will be included in final EIA report with
suggestions/recommendations, if any after public consultation.
B. RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY
The said study report is presented in next page.
C. SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT, R & R ACTION PLAN
The socio‐economic study of the study area is carried out and details are presented in
the Chapter‐3/Section‐ 3.9. It may be noted that the proposed project is to be
established on Non Agricultural land. The project site is intended for the industrial
purpose and thus no displacement of villagers/people will take place. Therefore, the
R&R (Rehabilitation & Resettlement)policy/plan is not undertaken. However, the
direct financial and social benefits with specialemphasis on the benefit to the local
people will be preferred and the proposed budgets for corporate social responsibility
(CSR) activities are summarized in Chapter‐ 8 /Section‐ 8.5.
Environmental Impact Assessment Report
M/s. NN Polymers
Survey No. 1458, Village: Panshina,
Taluka: Limbdi, District: Surendranagar, Gujarat.
T. R. Associates (Ahmedabad)
NABET Accredited
Chapter‐7: Additional Studies
7.2
B. RISK ASSESSMENT
7.1 Overview of Project
M/s. NN Polymers is proposing to manufacture Melamine Formaldehyde Resin,
Phenol Formaldehyde Resin & Urea Formaldehyde Resin as well as Laminated Sheets
at Survey No.: 1458, Village: Panshina, Taluka: Limbdi, District: Surendranagar,
Gujarat. The total production capacity of proposed unit for all resins is 900 MT/Month
and laminated sheets 1,50,000 Nos./Month. Total land area of 17,705 m2. Out of the
above stated land area approximately 6,915 m2 is green belt area (approx. 39.1 % of
the total land area).
The total estimated cost of the proposed project is Rs. 8.5 Crores out of which resin
plant cost will be approx. Rs. 1.1 Crore. Major plant machinery to be installed are
storage tanks, reactors (MOC:MS), utilities which includes Thermic Fluid Heater (TFH),
Steam Boiler and Cooling Towers. Hazardous chemicals mainly Phenol, Formaldehyde
(37%), Methanol will be stored and used in the process for manufacturing resins.
7.2 Surrounding Area
The proposed unit will be set – up in village: Panshina in Limbdi Taluka. No major
industries are situated within 10 km radius form the project site. Only one small scale
unit named Accurate Infra Industries (P) Ltd. manufacturing fly ash bricks and
Autoclaved Aerated Concrete (AAC) block is situated within 10 km radius area. The
google image showing proposed unit is given in Chapter: 2 (Figure No. 2.2). Proposed
project site is adjacent to the National Highway No. 8A which is well connected to
other state highways as well as national highway. There is no protected area notified
under the Wild Life (Protection) Act (1972) & Eco‐sensitive area notified under the
Environment (Protection) Act‐ 1986 exists within 10 km radius area from the project
site.
7.2.1 Objective and Scope
Risk Assessment is used for determining the risk of chemicals in use, handling,
transport and storage of dangerous substances. QRAs are done if dangerous
substances are thought to be present at a location (e.g. industrial sites and
transportation routes) in amounts that can endanger the environment. Due to storage
risk posed to people who work inside or live near hazardous facilities, and to aid in
Environmental Impact Assessment Report
M/s. NN Polymers
Survey No. 1458, Village: Panshina,
Taluka: Limbdi, District: Surendranagar, Gujarat.
T. R. Associates (Ahmedabad)
NABET Accredited
Chapter‐7: Additional Studies
7.3
preparing effective emergency response plans by delineating a Disaster Management
Plan (DMP) to handle onsite and offsite emergencies.
Scope of the Study:
Hazard Identification ‐ Identifying sources of accidents involving release of
hazardous material in the atmosphere and the various ways (that is scenarios)
they could occur.
Consequence Assessment ‐ Estimating the probable zone of impact of accidents as
well as the scale and/or probability of damages with respect to human beings and
plant equipment and other structures.
Accident Frequency Assessment ‐ Computation of the average likelihood of
accidents.
7.2.2 Risk Analysis Methodology:
Information on Location, Layout, Process Parameters
Hazard Identification
Quantification of Hazards
Select Most Credible Scenario which can convert into an accident out of several
major and minor.
Select Worst Case Scenario which has the highest potential to cause an accident
of maximum damage
Estimate Consequences: in the plant in the form of fire, explosion and toxic
effects
Estimate Frequency of Occurrence
Estimate effect of damage
7.3 Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis
The Hazard identification and risk analysis is used to identify possible accidents and
estimate their frequency and consequences. While identifying hazards only those
areas of plants having potential risk are used further for risk analysis. Hazard is
considered as characteristic of system/plant/process that presents potential for an
accident. Hence, all the components of a system/plant/process are thoroughly
examined to assess their potential for initiating or propagating an unplanned
event/sequence of events, which can be termed as an accident.
Environmental Impact Assessment Report
M/s. NN Polymers
Survey No. 1458, Village: Panshina,
Taluka: Limbdi, District: Surendranagar, Gujarat.
T. R. Associates (Ahmedabad)
NABET Accredited
Chapter‐7: Additional Studies
7.4
7.3.1 Hazard Identification Methods
The proposed project of setting – up resin manufacturing unit comprises of a
numbers of stages from site selection, conceptualization to decommissioning. Each
stage of plant possesses hazards. In case of proposed project during the stage of
Environmental Clearance the proposed project is considered at predesign stage.
Hazard identification method used or the proposed plant is given below.
o Identification of major hazardous units based on Manufacture, Storage and
Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989 of Government of India (as amended
in 2000); and
o Preliminary Process Hazard Analysis: Hazard associated with raw materials,
intermediates, by‐ products, final products, plant equipment.
o Hazard Indices: Identification of hazardous units and segments of plants and
storage units based on relative ranking technique, viz. Fire‐Explosion and Toxicity
Index (FE&TI).
7.3.2 Identification of Hazardous Chemicals used within Premises
Following chemicals to be stored and utilized within the premises falls under
Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989 (as amended
in 2000). List of Hazardous Chemicals is given below:
Amongst the below described raw materials and products, some are the hazardous
chemicals as per the MSIHC rule 2000. Chemical and physical properties of raw
materials are given in Table 7.1.
Environmental Impact Assessment Report
M/s. NN Polymers
Survey No. 1458, Village: Panshina,
Taluka: Limbdi, District: Surendranagar, Gujarat.
T. R. Associates (Ahmedabad)
NABET Accredited
Chapter‐7: Additional Studies
7.5
Table 7.1 Chemical Properties of Hazardous Chemicals
Sr. No.
Chemicals TLV
Toxicity Level Flammable Limit Chemical Class (As per MSIHC
Rules)
LD50 Oral mg/Kg
LD50 Dermalmg/Kg
LC50 mg/l
LEL% UEL% FP 0C BP0C
Class (As per
petroleum classification)
1. Phenol* 5 ppm 317 669 125 1.8 8.6 790C (CC) 850C (OC)
182 C Flammable,
Toxic, Hazardous
2. Formaldehyde* (37%)
0.75 ppm 100 15800 64000
ppm/4 hr 6 36.5
500C (CC) 600C (OC)
98 B Flammable,
Toxic, Hazardous
3. Methanol* 200 ppm 5628 15800 64000
ppm/4 hr 6 36.5
120C (CC) 160C (OC)
64.5 A Very high flammable
4. Caustic Soda* 2 mg/m3 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 1388 ‐‐ Hazardous
5. Melamine N.A 3161 1000 N.A N.A N.A 93.3 0C N.A C Slightly
flammable
6. Urea 10 mg/m3 8471 ‐‐ ‐‐ N.A N.A N.A N.A ‐‐ N.A
Note: * Hazardous chemicals as per MSIHC rule, 2000 ‐‐ Note: CC: Close Cup; OC: Open Cup; N.A.: Not Available.
The toxicity level of hazardous chemicals as per Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical (Amendment) Rules, 2000 (MSIHC) is
shown as below:
Sr. No Toxicity Oral Toxicity LD50 (mg/Kg) Dermal Toxicity LD50 (mg/Kg) Inhalation Toxicity LC50 (mg/l)
1 Extremely Toxic >5 <40 <0.5
2 Highly Toxic >5‐ 50 >40‐200 <0.5‐2
3 Toxic >50‐200 >200‐1000 >2‐10
Environmental Impact Assessment Report
M/s. NN Polymers
Survey No. 1458, Village: Panshina,
Taluka: Limbdi, District: Surendranagar, Gujarat.
T. R. Associates (Ahmedabad)
NABET Accredited
Chapter‐7: Additional Studies
7.6
7.3.3 Storage Details of Raw Material and Products:
Details of the raw materials and products with storage are given in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2: Storage Details of Raw Materials
Sr. No.
Name of Raw Material
Consumption per Month
Consumption Per Day
Physical State
Mode of Storage
Material of Construction
Capacity of
Storage Unit
No. of Units
Total Storage Capacity
Storage Inventory (days)
1 Melamine 120 MT 4.8 MT Solid Bags HDPE 25 kg 600 nos.
15 MT 3
2 Urea 120 MT 4.8 MT Solid Bags HDPE 25 kg 600 nos.
15 MT 3
3 Phenol (94%) 145 MT 5.8 MT Liquid Tank MS 30 MT 1 nos. 30 MT 5
4 Formaldehyde
(37%) 524 MT 21 MT Liquid Tank
HDPE MS
10 MT 30 MT
1 nos. 1 nos.
40 MT 2
5 Methanol 75 MT 3 MT Liquid Tank MS 10 MT 1 nos. 10 MT 3
6 Caustic Soda
(Flakes) 4.5 MT 0.18 MT Solid Bags HDPE 25 kg 50 nos. 1.25 MT 7
7 Acetic Acid 1.5 MT 0.06 MT Liquid Tank HDPE 1 MT 1 nos. 1 MT 16
8 Kraft Paper 236.3 MT ‐ Solid Raw Material Storage Area ‐
9 Design Paper 33.7 MT ‐ Solid Raw Material Storage Area ‐
Environmental Impact Assessment Report
M/s. NN Polymers
Survey No. 1458, Village: Panshina,
Taluka: Limbdi, District: Surendranagar, Gujarat.
T. R. Associates (Ahmedabad)
NABET Accredited
Chapter‐7: Additional Studies
7.7
Table 7.2 (A): Storage Details of Products
No. Description Physical Form Mode of storage Transportation Capacity of
storage
1 Phenol Formaldehyde Resin Semi Solid MS tank (1 No.) Captive consumption & sale.
Quantity will be transported by
road, rail & ship.
30 MT
2 Melamine Formaldehyde Resin Semi Solid MS tank (1 No.) 30 MT
3 Urea Formaldehyde Resin Semi Solid MS tank (1 No.) 30 MT
Table 7.3: Identification Hazard Associated with Storage of Raw Materials:
Sr. No.
Name of material stored
Hazard Rating Systems
Type of hazard / Risk involved
Causes Effect Control Measures proposed
(1)
Phenol
30 MT tank Ambient
TLV – 5 PPM STEL‐10 PPM NFPA Ratings: Health:4; Flammability: 2; Instability: 0 Flash Point: 79.440C
Toxic Chemicals Exposure Risks Fire /Explosion
Glands/seal leaks in valves, pumps,
Hose/pipe failure, leakage from flanged joints carrying phenol
Overflow from storage tanks
Toxic when contact with Skin
Causes burns Toxic if swallowed Irritating to Skin,
Eyes and Respiratory System
Dyke wall shall be provided to all above ground storage tank.
Separate from strong oxidant. Fire hydrant system shall be
installed. Safety shower and eye washer
shall be installed near storage area.
Flame proof Electrical fittings shall be provided at flammable storage area.
Proper selection of MOC for chemicals storage tank.
Earthing/bonding shall be
(2)
Formaldehyde (37%)
30 MT tank & 10 MT tank
TLV – 0.3 PPM (1 ppm)
NFPA Ratings: Health ‐ 3
Flammability ‐ 2Reactivity ‐ 0
Toxic Chemicals Exposure Risks
Glands/seal leaks in valves, pumps
Hose/pipe failure, leakage from flanged joints carrying Formaldehyde (37%)
Very toxic by inhalation, in contact with skin, Very toxic if swallowed.
Causes burns.
Environmental Impact Assessment Report
M/s. NN Polymers
Survey No. 1458, Village: Panshina,
Taluka: Limbdi, District: Surendranagar, Gujarat.
T. R. Associates (Ahmedabad)
NABET Accredited
Chapter‐7: Additional Studies
7.8
Sr. No.
Name of material stored
Hazard Rating Systems
Type of hazard / Risk involved
Causes Effect Control Measures proposed
Flash Point: 500C
Fire /Explosion
Overflow from storage tanks
Limited evidence of a carcinogenic effect.
Risk of serious damage to the eyes.
May cause sensitization by skin contact.
provided for static charges. Flame arrestor shall be
provided on flammable material storage tank vent.
Level gauge and level measurement instrument shall be provided on material storage tank.
Lightening arrestor on all chimney and building shall be provided.
Hazardous material should be stored away from the plant and safe distance shall be maintained.
Safety permit system shall be followed for loading, unloading of hazardous chemical.
Fencing, caution note, hazardous identification board should be provided.
Only authorized person shall be permitted in storage tank area and register will be maintained.
(3) Methanol 10 MT tank
TLV – 200 PPM (8‐hr TWA) STEL‐250 PPM NFPA Ratings: Health: 1 Flammability: 3
Fire /Explosion
Glands/seal leaks in valves, pumps
Hose/pipe failure, leakage from flanged joints carrying Methanol
Loading and unloading process
Nearby ignition sources
Fire due to Bottom nozzle failure
Damage of storage tank Pump discharge nozzle failure
Unloading road tanker hose rupture
Highly Flammable Toxic by inhalation Toxic when
contact with Skin Toxic if swallowed Danger of very
serious irreversible effects.
Environmental Impact Assessment Report
M/s. NN Polymers
Survey No. 1458, Village: Panshina,
Taluka: Limbdi, District: Surendranagar, Gujarat.
T. R. Associates (Ahmedabad)
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Chapter‐7: Additional Studies
7.9
A. Identification of Process hazards:
Name of
hazardous
process and
operation
Material in the
process /
operation
Type of hazard possible toxic
gas release / fire / explosion
/ run away reaction /
rupture, etc.
Causes
Control Measures to be provided
Thermic Fluid
Heater Oil
Fire/Explosion
Heat burns
Flash point variation of thermal
fluid/oil over a period of time
(Thermal fluids which were not
flammable at the operating
temperature when they were
initially installed but over time
become flammable at the operating
conditions)
Mist Formation around leak points
such as flagged joints, around valves
and connection points in the pipe
line. These may create explosive
atmospheres being formed outside
the pipework where ignition sources
such as motors pumps and electrical
equipment are present
Regularly replacement of thermic
fluid
Monitoring of flashpoint of thermic
fluid heater regularly
Installing Fluid conditioning
equipment in the thermal fluid
system
Reduce the extent of mist formation
by fiting mist guards
Avoiding lagging fires
Following type of instrumentation
suggested:
Install temperature indicator cum
Controllers to indicate temperature
and prevent undesired overheating at
the inlet and outlet of the system
Photo cell to sense flame failure, give
alarm and switch off the burner.
Environmental Impact Assessment Report
M/s. NN Polymers
Survey No. 1458, Village: Panshina,
Taluka: Limbdi, District: Surendranagar, Gujarat.
T. R. Associates (Ahmedabad)
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Chapter‐7: Additional Studies
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Name of
hazardous
process and
operation
Material in the
process /
operation
Type of hazard possible toxic
gas release / fire / explosion
/ run away reaction /
rupture, etc.
Causes
Control Measures to be provided
Lagging Fire – leak and dispersion of
oil within insultation leads to fire
Magnetic levels switch in the
deaerator cum expansion tank to cut
off the burner if the thermic fluid
level falls below the minimum level.
Synchronising mechanism exists
between the hot oil circulation pump
and burner, so that the burner will
not be switched on until the
circulation pump reached the full
speed.
Reactor
Vessel
Formaldehyde
(37%),
Melamine,
Urea, Phenol
Fire/Explosion
Release of Heat and Flammable gases
Fire, Toxic gas release and Explosion Failure of agitator, heating and
cooling system in the reactor
Failures of external boiler, condenser and piping system
Raw Materials quantity must be
controlled either volumetrically or
gravimetrically.
Process control devices must be
installed includes the use of sensors,
alarms, trips and other control
systems that either take automatic
action or allow for manual
intervention to prevent the
conditions for uncontrolled reaction
Environmental Impact Assessment Report
M/s. NN Polymers
Survey No. 1458, Village: Panshina,
Taluka: Limbdi, District: Surendranagar, Gujarat.
T. R. Associates (Ahmedabad)
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Chapter‐7: Additional Studies
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Name of
hazardous
process and
operation
Material in the
process /
operation
Type of hazard possible toxic
gas release / fire / explosion
/ run away reaction /
rupture, etc.
Causes
Control Measures to be provided
occurring.
High Temperature indicator valve and
alarm system must be provided
Auto cut off system must be provided
after reaching of predetermined
maximum safe temperature.
Pressure gauge is must provided.
Safety Control valve is must be
provided.
The Vessel Emergency Relief vent
should discharge to a suitably
designed catch pot or should be so
positioned that people working in the
area and members of the public will
not be in danger if the contents of the
vessel are discharged.
Use skilled worker Proper selection of MOC
Mechanical seal in all pumps and
reactors
Environmental Impact Assessment Report
M/s. NN Polymers
Survey No. 1458, Village: Panshina,
Taluka: Limbdi, District: Surendranagar, Gujarat.
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Chapter‐7: Additional Studies
7.12
Name of
hazardous
process and
operation
Material in the
process /
operation
Type of hazard possible toxic
gas release / fire / explosion
/ run away reaction /
rupture, etc.
Causes
Control Measures to be provided
Transportation of finished product from vessel to storage tank through
close pipe.
Boiler Heat burns
Thermal radiation
Explosion Heat burns
Leaking safety and or safety relief valves
Malfunctioning of Water level
indicator
Steam leaks (steam systems)
High stack temperatures (excess of
350ºF)
Condensate dripping down stack or out the front of the boiler
Constantly resetting of controllers and safety devices
Annual inspections Safety interlocks to be provided Safety and pressure gauge valves fitted Properly supported and protected
against corrosion
Testing of Jackets and joints of tubes regularly
Environmental Impact Assessment Report
M/s. NN Polymers
Survey No. 1458, Village: Panshina,
Taluka: Limbdi, District: Surendranagar, Gujarat.
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Chapter‐7: Additional Studies
7.13
B. General hazards and controls
Type of
Emergency
Identification
of Area Possible Causes Possible Results
Material
handling In Plant
Flammable, eye irritating &
accidently leakages Fire and health Hazards
7.3.4 Hazard Indices:
Hazard indices are used as relative ranking of hazard potential of proposed plant. The method used DOW fire and explosion index, Mond
Toxicity index provide direct and easy approach to a relative ranking of the risks in process plants.
DOW index : Fire‐Explosion and Toxicity Index (FE&TI)
The Fire and Explosion Index (FE&TI) calculation is a tool to help determine the areas of greatest loss potential in a particular process. It also
enables one to predict the physical damage that would occur in the event of an incident. For the proposed project storage tanks are considers
to know fire and explosion potential of each tank.
To calculate the Fire and Explosion Index, however, only storage tanks having storage capacity of 30 MT which have an impact from a loss
prevention standpoint has been evaluated. These are known as Pertinent Process Units.
Important factors for selecting Pertinent Process Units include:
a. Chemical energy potential (Material Factor)
b. Quantity of hazardous material in the Process Unit
c. Process pressure and process temperature
d. Units critical to plant operation, e.g. Reactor, storage tank
Environmental Impact Assessment Report
M/s. NN Polymers
Survey No. 1458, Village: Panshina,
Taluka: Limbdi, District: Surendranagar, Gujarat.
T. R. Associates (Ahmedabad)
NABET Accredited
Chapter‐7: Additional Studies
7.14
Table ‐7.4: Fire & Explosion Index
Sr.
No.
Material
Stored
Storage
Qty.
Nh Nf Nr MF GPH SPH FEI Degree of
hazard
Th Ts Ti Degree
of
Hazard
Radius
of expo.
(ft.)
1 Phenol 30 MT 4 2 0 10 1.93 2.12 45 Low 325 125 10.2 high 34
2 Methanol 10 MT 1 3 0 16 2.05 3 93 High 250 50 5.2 Low 83
3 Formaldehyde (37%)
30 MT 3 2 0 10 2.20 2.50 60 Low 250 125 10.0 high 46
Note: MF=Material Factor, GPH= General Process Hazardous, SPH= Special Process Hazardous, FEI: Fire and Explosion index
Based on F & EI and toxicity index TI, following categories are available:
Sr.
No.
Category F & EI TI Degree of
Hazard
1 I F<65 T<6 Low
2 II 65<F<95 6<T<10 Medium
3 III F>95 T>10 High
From the above stated toxicity index, it is evident that methanol storage tank has high potential physical damage and loss.
Environmental Impact Assessment Report
M/s. NN Polymers
Survey No. 1458, Village: Panshina,
Taluka: Limbdi, District: Surendranagar, Gujarat.
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Chapter‐7: Additional Studies
7.15
7.3.5 Credible Accident Sources/Worst Case Scenarios
Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) scenario indicates most believable, reasonable,
likely or possible accident scenario and damage distance based on it. MCA scenario
takes into account the effect of existing control measures also. It considers the
malfunctioning of the control system, opening of safety valve/failure of safety valve,
leakages from flange joint, pipe line etc. and failing of some safety devise.
Worst‐case scenario (rarely possible) is defined as the release of the largest quantity
of a regulated substance from a single vessel or process line failure that results in the
greatest distance to an end point, e.g. catastrophic failure. It considers the failure of
all control systems and release of the whole mass resulting in maximum damage.
Based on the storage and properties of the chemicals at the proposed resin
manufacturing unit, the some typical scenarios relevant for MCA analysis is given in
the following Table.
Table ‐7.5: Scenarios Considered for MCA Analysis
Sr.
No.
Chemical Storage
Quantity
Pool Fire Flash fire Toxic
Dispersion
Worst case
scenario
1 Methanol 10 MT
MS tank
2 Phenol 30 MT
MS tank
‐ ‐ ‐
3 Formaldehyde
(37%)
30 MT
MS tank
& 10 MT
HDPE tank
‐
4 Causitc soda
(Flakes)
25 Kg HDPE
Bags
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
The above table indicates that major material storage is flammable liquid. Fires could
occur due to presence of ignition source at or near the source of leak or could occur
due to flashback upon ignition of the traveling vapour cloud.
Tank fires may occur due to the following: ̇ Ignition if rim seal leak leading to rim seal
fire and escalating to full‐fledged tank fire.
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Survey No. 1458, Village: Panshina,
Taluka: Limbdi, District: Surendranagar, Gujarat.
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Lighting is a major source of ignition of tank fires; and ̇ Overflow from tank leading to
spillage and its subsequent ignition, which flashes back to the tank leading to tank
fire. The chance of overflow should be less unless operator has grossly erred.
Spillage due to overflow may result in a dyke fire if ignition occurs after sufficiently
long period.
For radiation calculations, pool fire is important and the criteria of 4.5 kW/m2
selected to judge acceptability of the scenarios. The assumptions for calculations
are: ̇ It is not continuous exposure ̇ It is assumed that no fire detection and mitigation
measures are initiated
7.4 Consequence Modeling
Hazardous incidents start with a discharge of a flammable or toxic material from its
normal containment. Discharge can take place from a crack or fracture of process
vessels or pipe work, an open valve or from an emergency vent. The release may be in
the form of gas, liquid, or two phase flashing of gas‐liquid.
7.4.1 Damage Criteria:
The storage and unloading at the storage facility may lead to fire and explosion
hazards. The damage criteria due to an accidental release of any hydrocarbon arise
from fire and explosion.
A. Fire Damage
Table 7.6 tabulates the damage effect on equipment and people due to thermal
radiation intensity whereas; the effect of incident radiation intensity and exposure
time on lethality is given in Table 7.6.
Table 7.6: Damage Due to Incident Radiation Intensities
Sr. No.
Incident Radiation
(kW/m2)
Type of Damage Intensity
Damage to Equipment Damage to People
1 37.5 Damage to process equipment 100 % lethality in 1 min. 1% lethality in 10 sec.
Environmental Impact Assessment Report
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Survey No. 1458, Village: Panshina,
Taluka: Limbdi, District: Surendranagar, Gujarat.
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Chapter‐7: Additional Studies
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Sr. No.
Incident Radiation
(kW/m2)
Type of Damage Intensity
Damage to Equipment Damage to People
2
25.0
Minimum energy required to ignite wood at indefinitely long exposure
without a flame
50% Lethality in 1 min. Significant injury in 10 sec.
3
19.0
Maximum thermal radiation intensity allowed on thermally
unprotected adjoining equipment
‐‐
4 12.5 Minimum energy to ignite with a
flame; melts plastic tubing 1% lethality in 1 min.
5
4.5
‐‐
Causes pain if duration is longer than 20 sec ,however
blistering is un‐likely (First degree burns)
6 1.6 ‐‐
Causes no discomfort on long exposures
Source: Techniques for Assessing Industrial Hazards by World Bank.
Table 7.7: Radiation Exposure and Lethality
Radiation Intensity
(kW/m2)
ExposureTime (seconds)
Lethality (%)
Degree of Burns
1.6
‐‐
0 No Discomfort even
after long exposure
4.5 20 0 1st 4.5 50 0 1st 8.0 20 0 1st 8.0 50 <1 3rd 8.0 60 <1 3rd 12.0 20 <1 2nd 12.0 50 8 3rd 12.5 ‐‐ 1 ‐‐ 25.0 ‐‐ 50 ‐‐
37.5 ‐‐ 100 ‐‐
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Chapter‐7: Additional Studies
7.18
B. Damage due to explosion
Explosion is a sudden and violent release of energy accompanied by the generation of
pressure wave and a loud noise. The rate of energy release is very large and has
potential to cause injury to the people, damage the plant and nearby property etc.
BLEVE ‐ fireball
A Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) occurs when there is a sudden loss
of containment of a pressure vessel containing a superheated liquid or liquified gas. It is
sudden release of large mass of pressurized superheated liquid to atmosphere. The
primary cause may be external flame impinging on the shell above liquid level
weakening the vessel and leading to shell rupture. Calculations are done for diameter
and duration offer ball and the incident thermal flux.
Pool fires and jet fires are common fire types resulting from fires over pools of liquid or
from pressurized releases or gas and/or liquid. They tend to be localised in effect and
are mainly of concern in establishing potential for domino effects and employee safety.
ALOHA Models are used to calculate various components ‐ burning rate, pool size,
flame height, In jet fire modelling the steps followed for the thermal effects are
calculation of the estimated discharge rate, total heat released, radiant fraction/source
view fraction, transmissivity and thermal flux and thermal effects.
Vapour cloud explosion
When gaseous flammable material is released a vapour cloud forms and if it is ignited
before it is diluted below its lower explosive limit, a vapour cloud explosion or a flash
fire will occur. Insignificant level of confinement will result in flash fire. The vapour
cloud explosion will result in overpressures.Table 7.6 tabulates the damage criteria as a
result of peak over pressure of a pressure wave on structures and people.
Table 7.8: Damage Due to Peak Over Pressure
Human Injury StructuralDamage
Peak Over
Pressure (bar)
Type of Damage Peak Over
Pressure (bar)
Type of Damage
5 ‐ 8 100 % lethality 0.3 Heavy (90% damage)
3.5 – 5 50 % lethality 0.1 Repairable (10% damage)
2 ‐3 Threshold lethality 0.03 Damage of Glass
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Human Injury StructuralDamage
Peak Over
Pressure (bar)
Type of Damage Peak Over
Pressure (bar)
Type of Damage
1.33 ‐ 2 Severe lung
damage
0.01 Crack of Windows
1 ‐ 11/3 50% Ear drum rupture
‐ ‐
Source: Marshall, V.C. (1977)' How lethal are explosives and toxic escapes'.
C. Effect due to toxic gas release
Various approaches are used to determine the consequences of toxic gases:
• IDLH
• ERPG
IDLH (Immediate Danger to Life or Health) is the maximum concentration from which
escape is possible within 30 minutes without any escape‐impairing symptoms or
irreversible health effects.
7.4.2 Details of Model Used for Consequence Analysis
ALOHA provide output as amount of chemical discharged from the source as well as
its concentration in air it takes into account different levels of concentrations for a
specified chemical.
Software used for calculation ‐ ALOHA (Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres) is
a computer program designed especially for use by people responding to chemical
accidents, as well as for emergency planning and training. ALOHA can predict the
rates at which chemical vapors may escape into the atmosphere from broken gas
pipes, leaking tanks and evaporating puddles. It can then predict how a hazardous
gas cloud might disperse in the atmosphere after an accidental chemical release.
ALOHA provides output as amount of chemical discharged from the source as well as
its concentration in air it takes in to account different levels of concentrations for a
specified chemical. Different concentration levels are given below:
ERPG 1: is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that
nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing other
than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly defined,
objectionable odor.
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ERPG 2: is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that
nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or
developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms which could
impair an individual's ability to take protective action.
ERPG 3: is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that
nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or
developing life‐threatening health effects.
IDLH: The Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) level. A chemical's IDLH is
an estimate of the maximum concentration in the air to which a healthy worker
could be exposed without suffering permanent or escape‐impairing health effects.
Input data for ALOHA are as below:
Weather Data:
Average Wind Speed: 5 m/sec, 3m/sec & 1.5 m/sec
Average Ambient Temperature: 400C, 350C, 210C
Average Humidity: 21 %, 58 %, ,68 %
Atmosphere Stability Class: D (windy day time), B (moderate wind, day time), F
(extreme calm, night time)
Chemical Properties:
Chemical properties of each hazardous chemical stored within premises is given in Table
No.: 7.1
Storage Details:
Storage quantity and type of storage of chemicals is given in Table No.: 7.2
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Table 7.9: Consequence analysis and Damage Distance (Failure of raw material storage tanks)
Name of Chemical
Type of Impact Flammable (Distance in meter) Toxic Dispersion
Pool Fire (meter)
Fire Ball (BLEVE)(meter)
Worst Case Scenario
Flash fire(Flammable Area of Vapor
Cloud)(meter)
ERPG(3)/ IDLH ERPG(2) ERPG(1)
Radiation Intensity(kW/m2)
37.5 25 4.5 37.5 25 4.5 UEL LEL
Fatalities 100% 50% 100% 50% ‐ ‐
Wind Speed
Stability Class
Methanol (10 MT x 1)
5 D <10m <10m <15m 68 100 270 19 meters ‐‐‐(43080 ppm =
60% LEL = Flame Pockets)
39 meters ‐‐‐ (7180 ppm = 10% LEL)
15 meters ‐‐‐(6000 ppm =
IDLH)
32 meters ‐‐‐(1000 ppm = ERPG‐2)
130 meters ‐‐‐ (200 ppm = ERPG‐1)
1.5 F <10m <10m <12m 68 99 270 19 meters ‐‐‐(43080 ppm =
60% LEL = Flame Pockets)
39 meters ‐‐‐ (7180 ppm = 10% LEL)
30 meters ‐‐‐(6000 ppm =
IDLH)
75 meters ‐‐‐(1000 ppm = ERPG‐2)
329 meters ‐‐‐ (200 ppm = ERPG‐1)
Formaldehyde (37% solution) (30 MT x 1)
5 D ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 118 meters ‐‐‐(20 ppm = IDLH)
167 meters ‐‐‐(10 ppm = ERPG‐2)
547 meters ‐‐‐ (1 ppm = ERPG‐1)
1.5 F ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 693 meters ‐‐‐(20 ppm = IDLH)
1.0 kilometers ‐‐‐ (10 ppm = ERPG‐2)
3.4 kilometers ‐‐‐ (1 ppm = ERPG‐1)
Phenol (30 MT x 1)
5 D ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 18 meters ‐‐‐(250 ppm =
IDLH)
22 meters ‐‐‐(50 ppm = ERPG‐2)
55 meters ‐‐‐ (10 ppm = ERPG‐1)
Note: Phenol is stored below its flash point. It is unlike to catch fire in case of BLEVE worst case scenario. Formaldehyde (37%): For modeling toxic dispersion 37 % of formaldehyde in total quantity stored in tank is considered with direct source modeling
E
Environmental Imp
T. R. As
NABET
pact Assessment Re
sociates (Ahmedab
Accredited
port
bad)
Taluka: Limb
Figure 7.1: Me
M
Survey No. 1458, V
bdi, District: Surend
Chapter‐7: A
ethanol Pool Fire
M/s. NN Polymers
Village: Panshina,
dranagar, Gujarat.
dditional Studies
7.22
e (Threat Zone)
N
E
Environmental Imp
T. R. As
NABET
pact Assessment Re
sociates (Ahmedab
Accredited
port
bad)
Figure 7.
Taluka: Limb
2: Methanol BL
M
Survey No. 1458, V
bdi, District: Surend
Chapter‐7: A
EVE ‐ Worst Cas
M/s. NN Polymers
Village: Panshina,
dranagar, Gujarat.
dditional Studies
7.23
se Scenario (Thrreat Zone)
N
E
Environmental Imp
T. R. As
NABET
pact Assessment Re
sociates (Ahmedab
Accredited
port
bad)
Taluka: Limb
Figure 7.3:
M
Survey No. 1458, V
bdi, District: Surend
Chapter‐7: A
Methanol Toxic
M/s. NN Polymers
Village: Panshina,
dranagar, Gujarat.
dditional Studies
7.24
c Dispersion
N
E
Environmental Imp
T. R. As
NABET
pact Assessment Re
sociates (Ahmedab
Accredited
Fig
port
bad)
ure 7.4: Methan
Taluka: Limb
nol Toxic Dispers
M
Survey No. 1458, V
bdi, District: Surend
Chapter‐7: A
rsion (1.5 m/s w
M/s. NN Polymers
Village: Panshina,
dranagar, Gujarat.
dditional Studies
7.25
eather conditionn – stability classs F)
N
E
Environmental Imp
T. R. As
NABET
pact Assessment Re
sociates (Ahmedab
Accredited
port
bad)
F
Taluka: Limb
Figure 7.5: Form
M
Survey No. 1458, V
bdi, District: Surend
Chapter‐7: A
maldehyde (37 %
M/s. NN Polymers
Village: Panshina,
dranagar, Gujarat.
dditional Studies
7.26
%) Toxic Dispersioon (Threat Zonee)
N
E
Environmental Imp
T. R. As
NABET
pact Assessment Re
sociates (Ahmedab
Accredited
port
bad)
Taluka: Limb
Figure 7.6
M
Survey No. 1458, V
bdi, District: Surend
Chapter‐7: A
6: Phenol Toxic D
M/s. NN Polymers
Village: Panshina,
dranagar, Gujarat.
dditional Studies
7.27
Dispersion
N
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7.5 Failure Frequency
Fire under a tank may lead to the instantaneous release of the complete inventory of
the tank. Various causes of failure may lead to a fire under a tank:
Leakage of the connections under the tank followed by ignition. This event only
occurs for tanks loaded with flammable substances. The frequency is equal to 1
× 10‐5 per year for atmospheric tanks. (Reference Purple book: Guidelines for
quantitative risk assessment)
The best available estimates of leak frequencies for atmospheric tanks are
summarised in Table 7.10.
Reference: Storage incident frequencies International Association of Oil and Gas
Producers (UK: HSE)
Table 7.10: Atmospheric Storage Tank Leak/ Tank Fire Frequencies
Type of Tank Type of Release Leak Frequency (Tank/Year )
Fixed/ floating roof Liquid spill outside tank 2.8 × 10‐3
Tank rupture 3.0 × 10‐6
Atmospheric storage tank Fire Frequency
Type of Fi r e Fi x e d Roof Tank (Tank/Year)
Internal explosion & full surface fire 9.0 × 10‐5
Internal explosion without fire 2.5 × 10‐5
Vent fire 9.0 × 10‐5
Small bund fire 9.0 × 10‐5
Large bund fire (full bund area) 6.0 × 10‐5
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7.6 Estimation of Effect of Damage / Impact Identification
The results of consequence modeling reveal that the maximum intensity of heat
radiation is experienced for Methanol pool fire having a radius of 15 meters. This is
mainly due to the large radius of the storage tank and comparatively high heat of
combustion and heat of vaporization values of Methanol. From the dispersion
modeling of Phenol and Formaldehyde (37%), it is observed that the threat zone is
maximum for Formaldehyde (37%) from storage tank, for the atmospheric conditions
during morning and night. Threat zone distance given below are considered for
Temperature: 220C, Velocity: 1.5 m/sec, Humidity: 71%, Atmospheric stability Class:‐
F considering winter night time. Percentage fatality from different incident outcome
cases and level of concerns are given below:
Table 7.11: Estimation of Fatality
Chemical Incident outcome case
Level of concern
Treat zone
distance
% fatality(pfi)
Likely hood of
occurrence
Magnitude of Impact/Damage
Methanol Pool fire 25 kW/m2
<10 meters
50% Likely Moderate
BLEVE 25 kW/m2
100 meters
50% Unlikely high
Formaldehyde (37%)
Toxic dispersion
IDLH 20 ppm
118 meters
‐ Very Unlikely
Moderate
Phenol Toxic dispersion
IDLH : 250 ppm
18 meters
‐ Likely Moderate
All the threat zones in the proposed unit are super imposed on google image. Figure
7.1 to 7.6 shows the map of vulnerable areas corresponding to different individual
outcome cases. Figure 7.2 gives the location, where individual risk is found to be a
maximum at locations within premises as well as outside of premises. The reason for
high individual risk at this location is due to considering BLEVE scenario as worst case
scenario resulting from the catastrophic failure of storage tank. Abroadly acceptable
level of individual risk as per the ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) concept
of HSE, UK is 10‐6/year.
7.7 Summary
It may be noted that in dispersion modeling, the wind direction and air temperature,
atmospheric stability are found to be the deciding factors for the threat zones.
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The present risk assessment study shows that proposed unit of M/s. N N Polymers
having storages of hazardous chemicals mainly Methanol could have potential for
damage to those inside and outside the industry.
Fire modeling shows that the hazardous distances for methanol storage tank
extended up to 100 meters in worst case scenario, In case of pool fire it is within 15
meters which might prevent effective fire‐fighting arrangements to be provided .
A maximum threat zone of approximately 693 meters is observed in the case of
release of Formaldehyde (37%). This threat zone can be shortened by reducing the
inventory or storing Formaldehyde (37%) in smaller tanks.
7.8 Proposed Risk Reduction Measures
Storage tank of Formaldehyde 37% / Methanol / Phenol should be installed away
from the plant area.
Wind indicator should be provided at the highest level of the plant to know the
wind direction.
Automatic sprinkler system for the flammable material tanks (over ground tanks
only) may be provided as knock on effect in case of fire is possible.
Containment dykes with proper sloping and collection sumps should be provided so
that any spillages in the bulk storage and other handling areas shall not stagnate
and shall be quickly lead away to a safe distance from the source of leakage. This
reduces the risk of any major fire on the bulk storages and the risk to the
environment shall be minimized/ eliminated.
Inspection of the storage tanks as per prefixed inspection schedule for thickness
measurement, joint and weld efficiency etc.
Provision of flameproof electrical fittings / equipment’s.
Proper maintenance of earth pits.
Strict compliance of security procedures like issue of identity badges for outsiders,
gate passes system for vehicles, checking of spark arrestors fitted to the tank lorries
etc.
Strict enforcement of no smoking.
Periodic training and refresher courses to train the staff in safety fire fighting.
Employee training and education is carried out.
Structural fireproofing in the process area could be considered as a safety measure
in the light of probable spill and fires in the area.
Emergency drills should be carried out periodically to ensure preparedness must
continue.
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Wind indicator should be provided at the highest level of the plant to know the
wind direction.
Many operations involve use of highly toxic/flammable materials and these needs
to be documented as SOPs. These must be made and kept updated on priority.
Extensive training on use of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBAs) must be
ensured for emergency control.
Many of the raw materials used for resin are either toxic or flammable. It is
therefore important to ensure that these materials are stored in closed, well
ventilated totally safe areas. A fire alarm system (heat and smoke detection) should
be provided for the storage area where the material is stored as toxic fumes arise
on combustion.
Loose drums of waste materials, often solvent laden, must be removed from the
working areas and close watch kept.
Proper Earthing needs to be provided through plug type systems or through the
agitators/liquid.
Ventilation should be provided for any enclosed are where hydrocarbon or toxic
vapors may accumulate. Several such areas were noticed‐ these may be surveyed
and tackled accordingly.
All personnel should be trained in handling emergency situations and should be
apprised of their role in handling emergency situation and to ensure adequacy of
the emergency procedures simulated exercise should be carried out. This was
found wanting.
Flame arrestor should be provided.
Adequate number of caution boards highlighting the hazards of chemicals should
be provided at critical locations.
Monitoring of occupational hazards like noise, ventilation, chemical exposure etc. is
carried out regularly and its record is maintained.
Good housekeeping, use of PPE, Engineering controls, Enclosure processes,
scrubber system, display of safety boards, SOP of loading / unloading, local exhaust
ventilation, safety shower etc. are important safety measures have taken to keep
these chemicals within TLV.
Appropriate personal protective equipment is provided & ensure the usage of
them.
Workers are trained for safe material handling of hazardous chemicals.
Prepare & display the safe operating procedure for hazardous chemicals storage,
handling & transporting or using.
Local Exhaust ventilation and scrubber should be installed where it is required to
reduce fumes, vapors, temperature and heat stress.
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Reduce the level of physical activity by sharing workload with other or by using
mechanical means.
Following FIRE safety devices should be provided to protect from any malfunctioning of
plant equipments.
Water storage of adequate capacity to meet the requirements of water for fire
fighting purposes.
Fire hydrants and automatic sprinkler system. Diesel driven pumps and headers to
supply water to fire hydrant network.
Adequate Portable fire extinguishers, sand bucket, wheeled fire & safety
equipment should be provided at the required places.
Equipment required for personal safety like blankets, gloves, apron, gum boots,
face mask helmets, safety belts, first aid boxes etc. are provided. Proximity suits
and self‐contained breathing apparatus to be provided.
7.9 Occupational Health Surveillance Programme
Introduction:
Medical surveillance program (also termed as medical surveillance for workers) can
aid in the early recognition of a relationship between exposure to a hazard and
disease, in the assurance of the safety of new substances, and as an indicator of the
effectiveness of existing control measures. It is the systematic collection, analysis, and
dissemination of disease data on groups of workers and is designed to detect early
signs of work‐related illness..
The Factories Act, 1948 and the rules framed thereunder provide for pre‐employment
and periodical medical examinations of workers employed in industries with
hazardous processes and dangerous operations under section 41‐C and section 87
respectively. Chemicals exposed to workers directly or indirectly are Phenol,
Formaldehyde (37%) and Methanol. Pre‐employment medical checkup and
periodically medical examination will be done. Liver function testis will be carried out
during pre‐placement and periodical examination. In addition to the above, following
safety equipment will be provided.
Action plan for Occupational Health and safety for workers:
Monitoring of occupational hazards like noise, ventilation, chemical exposure etc.
will be carried out regularly and its record will be maintained.
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Good housekeeping, use of PPE, Engineering controls, Enclosure processes, display of
safety boards, SOP of loading / unloading, local exhaust ventilation, safety shower
etc. All necessary safety measures will be taken to keep all chemicals within TLV.
Appropriate personal protective equipment will be provided & ensure the usage of
them.
Workers will be trained on safe material handling of hazardous chemicals.
Prepared & display the safe operating procedure for hazardous chemicals storage,
handling & transporting or using.
Periodical medical examination of the workers & Liver Function Testes will be done.
Register (form no.37) for work place air monitoring will be done regularly.
Employee training and education will be carried out regularly.
Control the noise at source by substitution, isolation, segregation, barriers will be
done.
Local Exhaust ventilation will be installed where it is required to reduce fumes,
vapors, temperature and heat stress.
7.9.1 Treatment Facilities Provided to Workers affected by accidental Spillage of
Chemicals
Hazards with Acute Exposure
Contact with skin may cause severe burns or systemic poisoning.
Systemic effects may occur from any route of exposure, especially after skin
absorption.
Hazards with Chronic Exposure
Repeated or prolonged exposure may harm the respiratory system. Can irritate
and inflame the airways.
Methanol affects the central nervous system, liver, and kidneys.
Special Safety Precautions
Prevent contact with skin by wearing neoprene gloves, lab coat, and resistant
apron.
Wear safety glasses or a face shield if splashing may occur.
Store in a cool, dry, well‐ventilated area, away from heated surfaces or ignition
sources.
Skin contact requires immediate washing of the affected area with soap and
water.
Remove contaminated clothing and launder before wearing again.
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Procedure for treating workmen after skin contact:
Skin contact requires immediate flushing of the contaminated area with soap and
water at a sink or emergency shower for a good fifteen minutes. Remove
contaminated clothing. In case of eye contact, promptly flush the eyes with
copious amounts of water for 15 minutes (lifting upper and lower lids
occasionally) and obtain medical attention. If methanol is ingested, obtain
medical attention immediately. If large amounts of methanol are inhaled, move
the person to fresh air and seek medical attention at once. It is recommended to
provide the safety shower and eyewash station in plant.
7.9.2 Minimization of the Manual Handling of Hazardous Substance
Employers and employees should examine their workplaces to detect any unsafe or
unhealthful conditions, practices, or equipment and take corrective action. Provide
flameproof electrical motor & transfer chemicals through the pipelines. Use
specially designed pallets to hold, move raw materials, finished products through
work areas. Minimize lifting of raw materials, heavy loads by using appropriate
platforms, trolleys etc. Avoid the moving, manual handling of hazardous material.
7.9.3 DO’S and DONT’S
Handling of Chemicals
Do’s Dont’s
Know the hazards of the chemical before
handling.
Know the antidotes for chemical, which you
are handling.
Do keep material safety data sheet in
locations where chemicals are being handled
and study it.
Use appropriate personal protective
equipment like gloves, aprons, and respirator;
face shield etc. depending upon nature of the
work.
Label every chemical that you use and tightly
close the container.
Use eye wash fountain / safety shower in case
of splash of chemicals in the eye or body for
at least 15 minutes.
Segregate toxic, flammable chemicals and
keep them under control.
Do not store the chemicals that are
incompatible with other chemicals.
Do not spill the chemicals.
Do not dispose chemical without
neutralizing.
Do not keep large inventory of
chemicals.
Do not allow empty containers of
hazardous chemicals to be used by
others.
Do not use compressed air for
transferring chemicals.
Do not stand near chemical transfer
pump while it is in operation with
temporary hose connection.
Pouring of chemicals by hand or doing
siphoning by mouth should never be
adopted.
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In addition to draining and closing valves,
lines should be blanked before taking up
maintenance work.
Provide proper ventilation at the chemical
handling area to limit their concentration
within prescribed level.
Chemicals drums should never be
moved without protection.
Do not attempt to neutralize the acid /
alkali on the skin. Use water only.
Do not use solvent for cleaning hands.
Material Handling
Do’s Don’ts
Use proper lifting tool and tackle having
adequate capacity.
Only authorized persons should operate
material handling equipments.
Each tool, tackle or equipment should have
number and safe working load (SWL) marked
on it.
Assess weight of the material, distance to be
carried and hazards etc. before lifting the
load.
Inspect and test all the lifting tools and tackles
regularly as per Factory Rules.
Wear Personal Protective Equipments while
handling of material.
Wherever possible, mechanized material
handling shall be adopted.
While lifting a load physically, keep the load
as near as possible to the body with feet
properly placed for body balance.
Bend knees, keep back straight, keep the load
closed to the body and lift the load.
Do not use the equipment for the
purpose other than its design intention.
Do not allow personnel to move
underneath lifted load.
Do not load the equipment above its
safe working load.
Do not use makeshift arrangements for
lifting equipment without inspection
and test.
Do not use defective tool and tackles.
Keep the tools & tackles free from
adverse effect of atmosphere by
applying suitable protective coating.
The angle between the legs of two leg
sling should not exceed 90 degree.
Do not allow male and female adult to
lift a load manually higher than 55 kgs
and 30 kgs respectively.
Do not hold the load with tip of the
fingers; grasp the load firmly with palm.
Fire Prevention
Do’s Don’ts
Follow ‘NO SMOKING’ sign.
Deposit oily rags and waste combustible material
in the identified containers and dispose them
suitably.
Fire Hose used for any other purpose should be
Do not leave flammable material like
acetone, kerosene etc. used as
cleaning agent at the work area.
Do not over tighten fire hydrant
valves with F‐lever.
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permanently marked and taken out of fire
hydrant system.
Keep minimum inventory of flammable and
combustible substances.
Take permission before breaking or removal of
fire barrier and ensure subsequent relocation of
fire barrier.
Check periodically the operability of fixed fire
fighting system.
Attend any abnormality / deficiency with fire
protection system promptly.
Provide earthling or bonding to prevent
accumulation of static charges to tanks where
flammable chemicals are stored / handled.
Use instruments that are intrinsically safe in
explosive atmosphere.
Do not allow wild grass growth
around storage of the gas cylinders
and switchyard.
Do not obstruct accessibility to the
fire related equipment.
Do not destroy the inspection tag
provided with the fire equipment.
Do not misuse fire‐fighting
equipment other than intended
purpose.
Do not store the flammable material
in the open container.
Do not use instruments that are not
intrinsically safe in the explosive
atmosphere.
House Keeping
Do’s Don’ts
Assign places for everything and maintain things
at assigned places.
Clean the area after completion of work.
Use aisle space free for personnel and material
movement.
Ensure adequate illumination and ventilation for
the job.
Drop paper, plastic, glass, metal and bio‐medical
waste in a separate bin kept for this purpose.
Know the location where emergency equipment
such as first aid box, firefighting equipment,
SCBA, Stretchers are kept.
Arrest all types of spills such as chemical, water,
oil, air / gas, steam etc. and clean up the area
immediately.
Ensure exits are indicated / painted for use
during emergency.
Do not leave combustible materials
in the work area.
Do not smoke in the area of work.
Do not allow dust bin to overflow.
Do not generate extra waste.
Do not disturb the safety equipment
from assigned location.
Do not block emergency switches
and on/off switches of the
equipment by storming of materials
in front of work.
Do not leave cleaning agent like
acetone, isopropyl alcohol, kerosene
etc. at the work area after
completion of work.
Do not block fire exit point by storing
materials or by means.
Do not leave a spillage unattended.
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7.10 Disaster Management Plan
7.10.1 Disaster
Disaster , A disaster is a catastrophic situation in which the day‐to‐day patterns of life
are, in many instances, suddenly disrupted and people are plunged into helplessness
and suffering and as a result need protection, clothing,, shelter, medical and social
care and other, necessities of life.
Advance emergency planning and proper training of every employee in the
'emergency function is very essential to make emergency control measures more
effective. It is not possible to completely eliminate emergency situations, but it is
definitely possible to control them. An emergency, if uncontrolled may cause a
disaster which in turn may create a catastrophe.
There are two types of emergency control plans (1) On site emergency plan and (2) Off
site emergency or disaster plan.
7.10.2 Statutory Provisions:
Section 41B(4) of the Factories Act, 1948 requires an on‐site emergency plan and
detailed disaster control measures for the safety of the factory workers and the
general public living in the vicinity of the factory. The occupier is required to inform
the workers and the public about the safety measures to be taken in the event of an
accident.
Rule 13, 14 and Schedule II & 12 of the Manufacture; Storage and Import of Hazardous
Chemicals Rules, 1989 and Rule 5,7,9 and 10 of the Chemical' Accidents (Emergency
Planning, Preparedness and Response) Rules, 1996 also provide for on‐site and off‐site
emergency plans
7.10.3 On‐Site Emergency Plan :
Objectives of the Plan
1. To protect persons and properly of your factory in case of all kinds of accidents,
dangerous occurrences (Rule 103, Gujarat Factories Rules), emergencies and
disasters happening in or affecting your plant at any time.
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2. To inform people and surroundings about above happening if it is likely to adversely
affect them.
3. To inform authorities including helping agencies (doctors, hospitals, fire, police,
transport etc.) in advance, and also at the lime of actual happening.
4. To identify, assess, foresee and work out various kinds of possible hazards, their
places, potential and damaging capacity and area in case of above happenings.
Review, revise, redesign, replace or reconstruct the process, plant, vessels and
control measures if so assessed.
5. To work out a plan with detailed instructions to cope up with above happenings,
based on your personnel, equipment and records. Necessary requirements shall be
added if not already available. Levels of hazardous substances shall be minimised to
the extent possible. Establish machinery for rescue and recuperation operations,
total loss control and prevention of harms and recurrence of above happenings.
Ensure that absolute safety and security is achieved within the shortest time.
7.10.4 Site Plan of the Factory and Surrounding:
Proposed unit has prepared a plan of the factory premises and surroundings showing
therein the areas of various hazards such' as fire, explosion, toxic release etc., and
also location of assembly points, equipment room, personal protective equipment
room, telephone room, first aid or, emergency control room, main gate, emergency
gates, normal wind direction, north direction.
The same has been given in Chapter No.2; Figure No.2.5 of EIA report
7.10.5 Types of Overall Emergencies
In the risk assessment study section no. 7.3 describes all type of hazards are listed
along with its causes in or near plant. Fire (small and big), explosion, toxic exposure,
strike, storm, flood and other hazardous possible situations shall be described with
reasons. Sources of hazard from outside or neighboring plants, tanks, structure etc.
shall be mentioned.
Table 7.12: Types of Emergencies
Sr.
No.
Type of emergency
including disaster
(Major Class)
May arise due to
At (Place)
People and area
likely to be
affected
1 Fire
Methanol spillage or
leakages at storage tank
Leakages: Pipeline
carrying Methanol
Storage area of
raw materials
Plant Operator,
Labors, workers
Admin staff
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Sr.
No.
Type of emergency
including disaster
(Major Class)
May arise due to
At (Place)
People and area
likely to be
affected
2 Explosion
Failure of the safety
valve/pressure relief
valve, corrosion of
critical parts of the
boiler, or low water
level.
Boiler and
Thermic Fluid
Heater
3 Release of Toxic
Gas/Vapour
Leakages from
tank/pipes/valves
Tank farm
area, process
area
4 Spillage of flammable liquid
/gas
Loading and unloading Tank farm
area, process
area
5 Deliberate Sabotage,
Terrorism, Air Raid etc.
‐ ‐
6 Natural Calamities: ‐
Lightening, Storm,
Earthquake, Flood etc.
‐ ‐
7 Collapsing of structure
Overturning of tanker
containing flammable /
toxic substances
‐ ‐
7.10.6 Assessment of In‐plant Hazards
Detailed hazard assessment of in‐plant and control measures provided in section
no.7.3 & 7.4 of EIA report. Storage Hazards and Controls, Process Hazards and
Controls are described in same topic.
7.10.7 Emergency Control System:
A. Emergency Organizations and Functions
The organizational set‐up necessary for chain of commands during emergency situation,
which may arise in the premises. The system is described in following Subsections.
Organizational Set‐up
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Members of above teams will be available during all shifts and holidays. Protective
equipment, lifting gears, fire control points etc.; will be provided in sufficient numbers
and their locations will be well informed. Necessary vehicles will be kept ready to shift
persons 'in case of emergency.
B. Emergency Control Room (Safety officer room)
The place identified as Emergency Control Center is considered as safety officer room..
The facilities available at the Emergency Control Center shall include:
i. Internal Telephone& External Telephone:
Address and Telephone numbers of the Factory Inspectorate, Gujarat Pollution
Control Board, Police, Fire Brigade, Hospitals and OEP Team Members
ii. Manual Fire/Emergency Siren
iii. Siren Actuation Switch
iv. Important Address and Telephone Numbers
v. Emergency Vehicles
vi. Confined Space Entry Procedure
vii. List of Antidote/actions to be taken in case of hazardous chemical/materials.
viii. Material Safety Data Sheets of chemicals
ix. A copy of On‐Site Disaster Management Plan
x. Plant layout‐indicating storage of hazardous materials, layout of fire
Hydrants/extinguishers, entrances/exits, roads etc.
xi. Portable P.A. System, Manual Siren, flood lights, Torches, Pickaxe, Saw, Nylon
Ropes.
xii. Fire Blankets / Fire Proximity Suit, Breathing Apparatus, First Aid Box etc.
Plant Manager
EHS/Safety Officer
SupervisorPlant Chemist
Director
Skilled workers Security staff
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xiii. List of employees with address, telephone number, blood group etc.
All communications after General Shift working hours and on Sundays/ Holidays are
to be routed through the Security Gate Office.
C. On – site facilities for emergency control
Fire Emergency: Trained personnel will be employed in all the shifts. The responsibilities
and duties include:
To fight the fire with available internal firefighting equipment and to stop leakage of
liquid etc.
To provide personal protective equipment to the team.
To cordon the area and inform incident controller or site main controller about the
development of emergency.
To train the persons (essential workers) to use personal protective equipment and
fire‐fighting equipment.
D. Fire Fighting Facilitiesto be provided on ‐ site:
1. Fire Buckets / Fire Extinguishers
Fire buckets and portable fire extinguishers will be provided in all the areas depending
upon the specific needs of the area. Some spare equipment will also be maintained in
the inventory at an identified fire & safety equipment store.
2. Fire Alarm Sirens
It will be provided to alert all the employees inside the premises about the situation of
an emergency.
3. Sand Buckets
5 nos. of sand buckets will be provided within the industrial premises in case of
emergency fire.
4. Oxygen Cylinder
Oxygen cylinder will be provided for emergency.
5. Safety Equipment
All types of personnel protective safety equipment required for handling the emergency
will be arranged in the proposed unit. Some of the protective equipment is as follow:
o Canister/Cartridge type masks
o Dust Masks
o PVC suits, Aprons
o Safety showers/ Eye Wash fountains
o Other personnel protective appliances, like safety glasses, gumboots, helmets, hand
gloves, face shields, safety belts, safety ladders, safety torches, blankets.
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6. Details of fire extinguishers
Table 7.13: Details of Fire Extinguishers
Sr. No. Type Capacity Qty.*
1. Jockey Pump 250 RPM 1
2. Dry Chemical Powder 2 Kg. 15 Nos.
3. Capacity CO2 type Fire Extinguisher 3 Kg 10 Nos
4. Water storage tank (For Fire) 1. 5 KL 01 Nos
Note: * Quantity of is assumed, however these number of cylinders may changes
after commissioning of project
E. Assembly Points:
The assembly points for gathering workers / Admin staff is fixed and clearly marked as
per the wind direction on plant layout as well as on site. In case of emergency some
locations are considered as Assembly Points. Depending on the wind direction and
location of emergency, Assembly Point is declared. The employees should run across the
wind direction and not against the wind direction.
F. Medical Arrangement:
First Aid Boxes will be provided at various strategic locations. Requisite number
employees will be trained about First Aid, Liaison with nearest hospitals.
Antidotes
Antidotes for Methanol
Ethanol (30 % solution from inside, 5 % solution from outside i.e. by intravenous
injection)
Epicake syrup
In case of acidosis give sodium bicarbonate
In case of delirium give diazepam 10 mg by intravenous injection
Folinic acid (leucovorin 1 mg/kg iv, 4 hourly)
Antidotes for Formaldehyde
Milk
Activated Charcoal or Water
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Antidotes for Phenol
Polyethylene glycol 300 or 400
Activated Charcoal and 240 ml Milk
7.10.8 General Procedures and Responsibilities:
Mock drill: Mock drills will be carried out regularly to familiarize the staff with their
roles, fire protection equipment/system installed in the plant and use of personnel
protective equipment. Senior officials
Wind Socks: Wind direction will be determined with the help of installed windsocks.
Procedure on Noticing an Emergency
If anybody notices any situation, which may lead to a disaster, should be
immediately inform the Shift In‐charge / site controller / Incident Controller / Fire &
Safety Supervisor / Security.
Take charge of the situation as Incident Controller.
Rush to the site of emergency to get the correct picture and then to Emergency
Control Center for speedy control over the situation by making an arrangement for
raising the alarm.
On arrival of Team members, he shall assign duties as required and activate the On‐
Site Emergency Plan.
Ensure safety of the plant and the personnel in the plant. He will make an
assessment of the emergency and decide on external assistance.
Communicate and Coordinate among the Incidents Controller/ Site Controller/
Factory manager/ fire safety supervisor etc. and is final authority on all matters
related with management of emergency such as:
Firefighting Welfare and rescue operations.
Arrange for Civil/Mechanical/Electrical work during emergency.
Transport.
EHS/Safety Officer & Security staff:
Rush immediately to the scene of the fire/emergency, select and set out appropriate
fire/emergency equipment. He will take the below mentioned actions at the earliest
opportunity, if the fire/emergency is not controlled.
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He will
Call the security personnel from their residences for additional manpower if
required.
Regulate entry and exit of personal required for controlling the fire/emergency.
Restrict exit of personal required for controlling the fire/emergency.
Arrange for Personnel Protective Equipment required for the emergency.
Call, the local Fire Brigade, Police in case of necessity in consultation with the
Incident controller.
Arrange transport facilities for removal of causalities to dispensary / hospital.
Take responsibility of law and order.
Keep detailed records of the incident and progress of operations to fight the
emergency.
Factory manager:
He will rush to the Emergency Control Centre and collect the information from the Incident
Controller. Further he will,
Announce the location of the Assembly Point after getting information from Incident
Controller / site controller.
Take the list of persons to be communicated internally and externally.
Maintain liaison with the press, government agencies i.e. Police, Fire Brigade etc.
and the neighborhood regarding the emergency under instructions from Incident
Controller.
Courteously Receive officers from the State Government or neighbors to the
Administration Block only and inform to Incident Controller that they can be taken
care off.
Take all the steps required for the welfare such as providing tea, snacks, emergency
temporary Medical Center in consultation with the incident controller/site
controller.
Disclose all the necessary information in the plant and media so as to avoid rumors
and Confusion.
Also be responsible for the head counts at the Assembly Points.
Supervisor/ shift in charge & security:
Proceed to the scene; establish contact with firemen and incident controller to
supplement efforts in fire fighting.
Assist in searching casualties and help to remove them to the medical center.
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Organize outside assistance in fire fighting and rescue operations if required.
Mobilize personal protective equipment and safety appliances and assist
personnel handling emergency in using them.
Keep and check on any new development of unsafe situation and report the
same to Site Main Controller.
Effectively cordon off the emergency area and will prevent unauthorized people
entering the scene.
Permit the Fire tenders or Ambulance requisitioned by Incident Controller to the
plant.
Ensure that vehicles and trolleys are sent out of the plant premises.
Ensure that all the employees are conducted out of plant and assembled at
Assembly Point.
Control Traffic Movement. Remove tankers, tanker drivers outside.
Entry of unauthorized public to be prevented.
Arrange for vehicles for shifting casualties and essential workers to safe assembly
points.
Collect and preserve evidence to facilitate future inquiries.
7.11 Offsite Emergency Preparedness Plan
Offsite emergency plan would follow the onsite emergency plan. When the
consequences of an emergency situation go beyond the plant boundaries, it
becomes an offsite emergency.As the off‐site emergency plan is to be prepared by
the Government, a Central Control Committee or Group shall be formed under the
Chairmanship of the area head. For example we assume a district structure and
District Collector (is the Chairman of the District Control Committee (DCC). Other
officers from police, fire, factory, medical, engineering, social welfare, publicity,
railway, telephone, transport and requisite departments shall be incorporated as
members.
However, the plant management will provide the public administration with the
technical information relating to the nature, quantum and probable consequences
on the neighboring population. The offsite plan in detail is based on those events,
which are most likely to occur, but other less likely events, which have severe
consequence, will also be considered. Incidents which have very severe
consequences yet have a small probability of occurrence would also be considered
during the preparation of the plan.
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M/s. NN
. 1458, Village
Surendranaga
er‐7: Addition
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N Polymers
: Panshina,
ar, Gujarat.
nal Studies
7.46
on of an
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ntroller,
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Voluntary Organizations:Details of organizers, telephone numbers, resources etc.
Fuel Information:Details of the hazardous substances stored and a summary of the risk
associated with them.
Meteorological Information:Arrangements for obtaining details of weather forecasts and
weather conditions prevailing at that time
Humanitarian Arrangements:Transport, evacuation centres, emergency feeding, treatment
of injured, first aid, ambulances and temporary mortuaries.
Public Information: Arrangements for (a) Dealing with the media press office; (b) Informing
relativesAssessment of Emergency Plan
Arrangements for: Collecting information on the causes of the emergency; and Reviewing
the efficiency and effectiveness of all aspects of the emergency plan.
Role of the Emergency Co‐ordinating Officer
The various emergency services would be coordinated by an Emergency Coordinating
Officer (ECO), who is designated by the District Collector. The ECO would liaison closely with
the Factory Manager/Safety officer. The ECO has been equipped with address and phone
numbers of important agencies.
a. Role of the Local Authority
The duty to prepare the offsite plan lies with the local authorities. The emergency
planning officer (EPO) appointed should carry out his duty in preparing for a whole range
of different emergencies within local authority area. This liaison should ensure that plan
is continually kept up to date. It is responsibility of the EPO to ensure that all those
organizations which has been involved offsite in handling the emergency, know of their
role and are able to accept it by having for example, sufficient staff and appropriate
equipment to cover their particular responsibilities. Rehearsals for offsite plans should
be organized by the EPO.
b. Role of Police
Formal duties of the police during an emergency include protecting life and property and
Controlling traffic movements. Their functions should include controlling bystanders,
evacuating the public, identifying the dead and dealing with casualties, and informing
relatives of death or injury.
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c. Role of Fire Authorities
The control of a fire should be normally the responsibility of the senior fire brigade
officer who would take over the handling of the fire from the site incident controller on
arrival at the site. The senior fire brigade officer should also have a similar responsibility
for other events, such as explosions. Fire authorities in the region should be appraised
about the location of all stores of flammable materials, water and foam supply points,
and firefighting equipment. They should be involved in onsite emergency rehearsals
both as participants and, on occasion, as observers of exercises involving only site
personnel.
d. Role of Health Authorities
Health authorities, including doctors, surgeons, hospitals, ambulances and so on, should
have a vital part to play following a major accident, and they should form an integral
part of the emergency plan. For major fires, injuries should be the result of the effects of
thermal radiation to a varying degree, and the knowledge and experience to handle this
in all but extreme cases may be generally available in most hospitals.
Major off site incidents are likely to require medical equipment and facilities additional
to those available locally, and a medical "mutual aid” scheme should exist to enable the
Assistance of neighboring authorities to be obtained in the event of an emergency.
e. Role of Government Safety Authority
This will be the factory inspectorate available in the region. Inspectors are likely to
satisfy themselves that the organization responsible for producing the offsite plan has
made adequate arrangements for handling emergencies of all types including major
emergencies. They may wish to see well documented procedures and evidence of
exercise undertaken to test the plan. In the event of an accident, local arrangements
regarding the role of the factory inspector will apply. These may vary from keeping a
watch, to a close involvement in advising on operations.
Table 7.14: Offsite Action Plan
Sr.
No.
Action Required to be taken to
Mitigate Disaster by Aid giving
agency
Responsible
Agencies for
Taking action
Equipment/Material facilities
required at site to mitigate
Emergency
A
1
Arrangements for evacuation
Rescueof personsfrom zoneof
influence to predetermined camps
Police
Department
Self‐Breathing apparatus
With spare cylinder
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Sr.
No.
Action Required to be taken to
Mitigate Disaster by Aid giving
agency
Responsible
Agencies for
Taking action
Equipment/Material facilities
required at site to mitigate
Emergency
2 Caution to public by announcement
Chemical gas mask with
sparecanister
Vehicle with PA system
Transportation for evacuation
of people
3 Traffic control by cordoning of the
area
4 Law & order
5 Request to railway authority for
Keeping the nearest railway gate
open & to stop the trains at the
nearest railway station
B Control of fire District Fire
Brigade
Self‐breathing apparatus with
spare cylinders
Foam /water fire tenders
Gas mask with spare canisters
Limewater
Neck to toe complete Asbestos
suit, PVC hand gloves,
gumboots, safety goggles
Mobile scrubbing system
Along with suction
arrangement.
1 Scrubbing of the flashed off gas
Cloud with water curtain
2 To rescue trapped persons
3 If fire is big, keep surrounding
Area cool by spraying water
4 Communication to State
Electricity Board to continue or
cut off electric supply
5 Communication to water supply
Department for supplying water
C Medical facilities for affected
Persons (first aid and treatment)
Hospital and
Public health
Ambulance with on board
resuscitation unit, first aid,
stretchers
D Identification of concentration of
Gas in zone of influence
Pollution
Control Board
Gas detector
E Removal of debris and damaged
structures
Municipal
corporation
Provide bulldozers
Provide cranes
F
1
Monitor the incoming and out
Going transports
Transport
department
Provide traffic police at site
Provide emergency shifting
vehicles at site
Provide stock of fuel for
vehicles.
2 Arrange emergency shifting of
affected persons and non
Affected per son to specified area
3 Arrange diesel/petrol for needed
vehicles
G
1
Give all information related to
Meteorological aspects for safe
Meteorological
Department
Provide wind direction and
velocity instruments with
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Sr.
No.
Action Required to be taken to
Mitigate Disaster by Aid giving
agency
Responsible
Agencies for
Taking action
Equipment/Material facilities
required at site to mitigate
Emergency
handling of affected area for living
beings
temperature measurements
2 Forecast important weather
changes,ifany
Mobile van for Meteorological
parameter measurements
H
1
Representatives of all
Departments are in the local crisis
group; therefore they are
expected to render services
available with them. Since It is a
group of experts with authority,
the mitigating measures can be
implemented speedily. The
representatives from locals are
also there so that communication
with local people is easy and quick.
Local Crises
Group
Must have all resources at hand,
specially disaster management
plan and its implementation
method.
All relevant information
Related to hazardous industry
with crisis group Newspaper
editor shall be a part of the
group so that right and timely
media release can be done
2 The district emergency or
Disaster control officer/collector
shall be the president and he shall
do mockdrill etc. so that action can
be taken in right direction in time
I
1
Collector shall be the President
Of District Crisis Group therefore all
district infrastructure facilities are
diverted to affected zone
District Crisis
Group
All necessary facilities
Available at district can be made
available at affected zone
Control of law and order
situation 2 All other functions as mentioned
For local crisis group