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CHAPTER – 4

INDIA & PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

India and Pakistan were the only states outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty to declare, openly, their nuclear weapons capability. In 1998, they tested

nuclear weapons and since then, deployed ballistic missiles, enunciated nuclear

doctrine and made organizational changes to their nuclear establishments. In 2002,

they teetered on the brink of war in Kasmir. This chapter summarizes Indian and

Pakistani nuclear weapon capabilities and Foreign assistance.

Almost 50 years of nuclear ambiguity were sweptaway by the May 1998

nuclear tests of India and Pakistan. Optimists hoped that overt nuclear weapons

capabilities could help provide more conventional stability and that limited nuclear

arsenals might dampen competition in missile development.1 The 1999 conflict in

Kargil and 2002 crisis in Kashmir challenged this view point.2 South Asia remains a

nuclear flashpoint, and potentially, a source for terrorists of access to weapons of

mass destruction.

Indian Nuclear Programme

As early as June 26, 1946, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, soon to be India‟s first

Prime Minister, announced :

“As long as the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise

and use the latest devices for its protection. I have no doubt India will develop her

scientific researches and I hope Indian scientists will use the atomic force for

constructive purposes. But if India is threatened, she will inevitably try to defend

herself by all means at her disposal.”3

1 See Joeck, Neil, Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia, Adelphi Paper 312, International

Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997. 2 Riedel Bruce O., “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, “Policy Paper

Series, Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania.

[http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi]. 3 B.H. Udgaonkar, India‟s Nuclear Capability, her security concerns and the recent tests, Indian

Academy of Sciences, January 1999.

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India‟s nuclear weapons program was started at the Bhabha Atomic Research

Center in Trombay. In the mid 1950s India acquired dual use technologies under the

“Atoms for Peace” non-proliferation program, which aimed to encourage the civil

use of nuclear technologies in exchange for assurances that would not be used for

military purposes. But in 18 May 1974 India‟s occurred his first nuclear test. And

this first nuclear test described by the Indian government as a “peaceful nuclear

explosion.”

Since then India has conducted another series of test at the Pokhran test range

in the state of Rajasthan in 1998. India has an extensive civil and military nuclear

program, which includes at least 10 nuclear reactors, uranium miving and milling

sites, heavy water production facilities, a uranium enrichment plant, fuel fabrication

facilities, and extensive nuclear, research capabilities.

Nuclear Tests

India carried out its first nuclear test on May 18, 1974. Billed as a “peaceful

nuclear explosion”, the test had 15 kiloton yield.4 Subsequently, Defense Minister

Jagjivan Ram argued that the test had few or no military implications and was simply

part of India‟s ongoing attempts to harness the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.5 The

two scientists closely associated with the nuclear test, R. Chidambaram and R.

Ramana, maintained the same public postures.6 India‟s explanation of the test found

few adherents abroad, however. Of the great powers, only France congratulated the

Indians or their success.7 The Chinese and Soviet reactions were muted, but critical.

The United States and Canada cut off all nuclear cooperation with India. Canada

accused India of having diverted nuclear materials from a Canadian supplied reactor

4 The slightest doubt of the military significance of the test was effectively ruled out in October 1997

when Raja Ramanna, one of the key scientists involved in conducting the test, explicitly stated that

the 1974 test was that of a nuclear weapon. See Adirupa Sengupta, “Scientist says Bomb was tested in

„74‟, India Abroad, October 17, 1997. p. 140 5 On this point, see “Indian Rules out Atomic Arms”. Use New York Times, May 23, 1974, p. 5

6 R.Chidambaram and R. Ramanna, “Some studies on India‟s Peaceful Nuclear Experiment”,

“Peaceful Nuclear Experiment”, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions IV (Vienna : International Atomic

Energy Agency, 1975. 7 “New Delhi Assailed at Parley in Geneva for Atom Explosion,” New York Times, May 22, 1974, p.

3

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to make the bomb.8 The U.S. reaction however, was the most severe in 1976

Congress introduced the symington amendment to the foreign aid bill, thereby

cutting off certain forms of economic and military assistance to countries that

received enrichment or reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology without

full-sope international atomic energy agency safegurds.9

After 24 years without testing India resumed nuclear testing with a series of

nuclear explosions known as “Operation Shakti” Prime Minister Vajpayee

authorized the tests on April 8, 1998, two days after the Ghauri missile test-firing in

Pakistan. On May 11, 1998, India tested three devices at the Pokhran underground

testing site, followed by two more tests on May 13, 1998. After some time the U.S.

Congress passed after the Indian nuclear test significantly hobbled India‟s ability to

further its nuclear weapons program. The sharpness of international reaction and the

variety of nuclear export restrictions that the major industrial powers placed on India

came as a surprise to the Indian political elite. This body of restrictive legislation

also had a perverse and unintended consequence, however, it made the Indian

program increasingly indigenous.

Despite the inital wave of domestic support following the test, pressing

internal concerns diverted the public‟s attention from the pursuit of a nuclear

weapons option. Infact, with in the year 1984 of the test Indira Gandhi had declared a

“state of emergency” to avoid prosecution for a number of minor electoral violations.

With her personal political survival at stake, she could ill afford to devote significant

time and resources to the nuclear question.

The next stage in India‟s nuclear program was marked by little progress in

attaining nuclear weapons status, even though there was increasing public and

military and even some political support for acquiring nuclear weapons.

However, there is some other controversy also about based on seismic data,

U.S. government sources and independent experts estimated the yield of the so-

8 Robert Trumbull, “Canada Says India‟s Blast Violated use of Atom Aid,” New York Times, May

21, 1974, p. 4 9 Brahma Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation : The U.S. Indian Conflict (New Delhi : Orient Longman,

1993), pp. 74-75.

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called thrmonuclear test. Observers initially suggested that the test could have been a

boosted fission device, rather than a true multi-stage thermonuclear device. But after

these nuclear tests India called a nuclear state.

Nuclear Arsenal

Though India has not made any official statements about the size of it nuclear

arsenal, the NRDC estimates that India has a stockpile of approximately 30-35

nuclear war heads and claims that India is producing additional nuclear materials.

Joseph Cirincione at carnegie endowment for international peace estimates that India

has produced enough weapon grade uranium. Weapons grade plutonium production

takes place at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center, which is home to the Cirus

reactor acquired from Canada, to the indigenous Dhruva reactor, and to a plutonium

separation facility.

According to a January 2001 Department of Defense Report “India probably

has a small stockpile of nuclear weapon components and could assemble and deploy

a few nuclear weapons with in a few days to a week.” A 2001 RAND study by

Ashley Tellis asserts that India does not have or seek to deploy a ready nuclear

arsenal. In Jane‟s Intelligence Review10

report, India‟s objective is to have a nuclear

arsenal that is “strategically active but operationally dormat”, which would allow

India to maintain its retaliator capability “within a matter of hours to weeks, while

simultaneously exhibiting restraint”. However, the report also maintains that, in the

future, India may face increasing institutional pressure to shift its nuclear arsenal to

fully deployed status. In reality India‟s nuclear arsnel is the third largest in the world

after Russia and the U.S.

There are no official figures for weapon stockpiles at an stage of

development of India‟s arsenal. The only figures that can be offered are either

explicit estimates made from considerations of India‟s probable ability to produce

critical raw materials and considerations of likely production plans; or are unofficial

10

T.S. Gopi Rethinaraj, “Nuclear diplomacy returns to South Asian security agenda,” Jane‟s

Intelligence Review, May 2002, pp. 40-43. A concise overview of India and Pakistan‟s nuclear

arsenals, nuclear doctrines and ballistic missile capabilities accompanied by an assessment of the

relationships between Pakistan, India and China.

173

statements of uncertain provenance and authenticity. To show the problems with

figures of the latter sort we have only to look at the statement by K. Subrahmanyam,

A leading strategic theorist, that by 1990 India had stockpiled at least two dozen

unassembled weapons, versus the May 1998 estimate by G. Balachandran, and

Indian nuclear researcher, that India had fewer than 10 weapons ready to be

assembled and mounted on warplanes or missiles.

The types of weapons India is believed to have available for its arsenal

include :

A pure fission plutonium bomb with a yield of 12 kt;

A fusion boosted fission bomb with a yield of 15-20 kt, made with weapon-

grade plutonium;

A fusion boosted fission bomb design, made with reactor-grade plutonium;

Low yield pure fission plutonium bomb designs with yields from 0.1 kt to 1

kt;

A thermonuclear bomb design with a yield of 200-300 kt.

All of these types should be available based on the tests conducted during

Operation Shakti (Pokhran-II). It may be possible to extrapolate significantly from

these device classes however without further testing. There is reasonable doubt about

whether the thermonuclear device actually performed as designed. Even if this so, it

does not rule out the possibility that sufficient test data was collected to field a

successful design with reasonable confidence of good performance. Interest has been

expressed in the development of a neutron bomb (a very low yield tactical

thermonuclear device), but this would probably require additional testing to perfect.

The most widely accepted estimates of India‟s plutonium production have

been made by David Albriht ([Albrigt et al 1997], [Albright 2000]). His most recent

estimate (October 2000) was that by the end of 1999 India had available between

240 and 395 kg of weapon grade plutonium for weapons production, with a median

value of 310 kg. He suggests that this is sufficient for 45-95 weapons (median

estimate 65). The production of weapon grade plutonium has actually been greater,

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but about 130 kg of plutonium has been consumed – principally in fueling two

plutonium reactors, but also in weapons tests. His estimate for India‟s holdings of

less-than-weapons-grade plutonium (reactor or fuel grade plutonium) are 4200 kg of

unsafeguarded plutonium (800 kg of this already separated) and 4100 kg of IAEA

safeguarded plutonium (25 kg of this separated). This unsafeguarded quantity could

be used to manufacture roughly 1000 nuclear weapons, if India so chose (which

would give it the third largest arsenal in the world, behind only the U.S. and Russia.

Indian Nuclear Doctrine

The nuclear testing by India and Pakistan raises the stakes in what has

become a dangerous three cornered regional armsrace. China is a declared nuclear

power with a significant arsenal of weapons and various means to deliver them. Both

India and Pakistan are thought to be capable of putting together nuclear, weapons in

a reasonably short space of time. Neither claims to have deployed nuclear weapons.

But the latest test underline their growing nuclear capability.

The nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan has spawned a parallel

missile race as each country seeks to develop medium and long-range missiles which

might carry a nuclear warhead.

But India has declared no first use policy and is in the process of developing

a nuclear doctrine based on credible minimum deterrence.” In August 1999, the

Indian government released a draft of the doctrine which asserts that nuclear

weapons are solely for deterrence and that India will pursue a policy of “retaliation

only”. The document also maintains that India “will not be the first to initiate a

nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation if deterrence fail” and that

decisions to authorize the use of nuclear weapons would be made by Prime Minister

or his designated successor.

According to NRDC, despite the escalation of tensions between India and

Pakistan in 2001-2002, India remains committed to its nuclear no first use policy.

But in Indian foreign ministry official told Defense News in 2000 that a “no first

strike” policy does not mean India will not have a first strike capability. India has not

signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or the Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT). India is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and

four of its 13 nuclear reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards.

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Despite promoting a test ban treaty for decades, India voted against the UN

General Assembly resolution endorsing the CTBT, which was adopted on September

10, 1996. India objected to the lack of provision for universal nuclear disarmament.

“With in a time bound framework”. India also demanded that he should also treaty

ban laboratory simulations. In addition, India opposed the provision in Article XIV

of the CTBT that requires India‟s ratification for the treaty to enter in to force, which

India argued was a violation of its sovereign right to choose Lohether it would sign

the treaty. In February 1997, Foreign Minister Gujral reiterated India‟s opposition to

the treaty saying that, “India favors any step aimed at destroying nuclear weapons,

but considers that the treaty in its current from is not comprehensive and bans only

certain types of tests.

Indian Nuclear Weapon Capabilities and Thinking

India began its nuclear program shortly after independence in 1947. After a

humiliating defeat in a border war with China in 1962, followed by China‟s first

nuclear test in 1964, the drive for nuclear weapons intensified. The 1974 test of a

“peaceful nuclear device” was an important milestone, but it took several more years

to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Simultaneously, India developed a nuclear

infrastructure that supported both civilian and military purposes. For example,

India‟s development of reprocessing capabilities supported both its use of mixed

oxide fuel (plutonium and uranium) for its nuclear power plants and its plutonium-

based weapons.

The size of India‟s nuclear stockpile has been a topic of considerable debate

within scientific and defense communities. Estimates vary from a few to 100, but

several converge on around 30-35 weapons, probably stored in component form. The

U.S. Department of Defense believes that India is capable of manufacture complete

sets of components for plutonium-based weapons and has a small stockpile of such

components. India “probably can deploy a few nuclear weapons within a few days to

a week... and can deliver these weapons with fighter aircraft.”11

Most agree that India

is expanding its stockpile, and that if India uses unsafeguarded reactor-grade

plutonium, the potential to expand its stockpile is very significant.

11

U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation : Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 24.

176

India‟s delivery capability has long reflected two very different contingencies

China and Pakistan. Because of the distances involved and India‟s lack of long-range

bombers, capability against China inevitably required ballistic missiles. Against

Pakistan, however, Indian officials recognized early on that aircraft would be more

valuable, particularly in a retaliatory strike; the Indian air force is significantly more

sophisticated and capable than Pakistan‟s.12

India has some 35 Mirage 2000 fighters

that are nuclear-capable, although other aircraft cold also be used.

Ballistic missiles add considerable instability into the security equation

because they are high priority targets; the pressure to use them quickly and, for the

other side, to strike them preemptively, is great. Indian officials have said short-

range Prithvi ballistic missiles (150 km and 250 km ranges) are conventionally

armed. While nuclear-capable and able to reach almost all of Pakistan, the use of

nuclear-armed Prithvis could pose major risks of fallout to India.13

India has

deployed Agni-II missiles with a 1500 km range and tested an 5000 km range version

of the Agni-III in 2012. These solid-fueled missiles, which reportedly can be

launched within minutes, considerably enhance India‟s ability to respond rapidly in a

crisis situation.

In January 2003, the Ministry of External Affairs released to the public a

short document on India‟s nuclear doctrine. The doctrine reiterated some of the

points in the 1999 draft document on nuclear doctrine produced by the National

Security Advisory Board and refined others. In summary, the document committed

India to a credible minimum deterrent, defined as : 1. a posture of “No First Use”

and no use against non-nuclear weapon states, with the exception of the right to

retaliate with nuclear weapons against a “major attack against India, or Indian forces

anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons;” 2. Civil control in the form of the

Prime Minister as head of the Nuclear Command Authority; 3. Nuclear retaliation

against a first strike as massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. The

document described the Nuclear Command Authority as being composed of a

Political Council (chaired by the Prime Minister and authorize the use of nuclear

weapons) and an Executive Council (chaired by the National Security Advisor).

12

Perkovich, George, India’s Nuclear Bomb : The Impact on Global Proliferation, (University of

California Press, CA, 1999), p. 248-249. 13

Perkovich, op cit., p. 248

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Map 4.1 : Pakistani Nuclear Programme

Pakistan‟s nuclear program was established in 1972 by Zulfiqur Ali Bhutto,

who founded the program while he was Minister for fuel, power and natural

resources, and later became President and Prime Minister. Shortly after the loss of

East Pakistan in the 1971 was with India, Bhutto initiated the program with a

meeting of physicists and engineers at Multan in January 1972.

India‟s 1974 testing of a nuclear “device” gave Pakistan‟s nuclear program

new momentum. Through the late 1970s, Pakistan‟s program acquired sensitive

uranium enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer

Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan is a German trained metallurgist

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who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired

through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the

Netherland. Dr. Khan also reportedly brought with him stolen uranium enrichment

technologies from Europe. He was put in charge of building, equipping and

operating Pakistan‟s Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan‟s

direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the

necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment

capabilities.

In 1985, Pakistan crossed the threshold of weapons grade uranium

production, and by 1986 it is thought to have produced enough fissile material for a

nuclear weapon. Pakistan continued advancing its uranium enrichment program, and

according to Pakistani sources, the nation acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear

explosion in 1987.

Pakistan‟s nuclear progam is based primarily on highly enriched uranium

(HEU), which is produced at the A.Q. Khan research laboratory at Kahuta, a gas

centrifuge uranium enrichment facility. The Kahuta had an estimated 3000

centrifuges in operation, and Pakistan continued is pursuit of expanded uranium

enrichment capabilities.

In the 1990s Pakistan began to pursue plutonium production capabilities.

With Chinese assistance, Pakistan built the 40 MWt (megawatt) Khusab research

reactor at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the reactor was

operational. According to Public statements made up US officials, this

unsafeguarded heavy water reactor generates on estimated 8-10 kilotons of weapons

grade plutonium per year, which is enough for one to two nuclear weapons. The

reactor could also produce tritium if it were loaded with lithium – 6. According to J.

Cirincione of Carnegie, Khusab‟s plutonium production capacity could allow

Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver with a

ballistic missile.

Plutonium separation reportedly takes place at the New Labs reprocessing

plant next to Pakistan‟s Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) in

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Rawalpindi and at the larger Chasma nuclear power plant, neither of which are

subject to IAEA inspection.

Nuclear Tests

On May 28, 1998 Pakistan announced it had successfully conducted five

nuclear tests. The Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five

nuclear tests conducted on May 28. Generated a seismic signal of 5.0 on the Richter

scale, with a total yield of up to 40 kT (equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that

one device was a boosted fission device and that the other four were sub-kiloton

nuclear devices.

On May 30, 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear war head with a reported

yield of 12 kilotons. The tests were conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total

number of claimed tested to six. It has also been claimed by Pakistani sources that at

least one additional device, initially planned for detonation on 30 May, 1998

remained emplaced underground ready for detonation.

Pakistani claims concerning the number and yields of their underground tests

cannot be independently confirmed by seismic means, and several sources, such as

the Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory have reported lower yields than those

claimed by Pakistan. Indian sources have also suggested that as few as two weapons

were actually detonated, each with yields considerably lower than claimed by

Pakistan. However, seismic data showed at least two and possibly a third, much

smaller, test in the initial round to tests at the Raskoh range. The single test on 30

May provided a clear seismic signal. According to a preliminary analysis conducted

at Los Atamos National Laboratory, material released into the atmosphere during an

underground nuclear test by Pakistan in May 1998 contained low levels of weapons

grade plutonium. The significance of the Los Alamos finding was that Pakistan had

either imported or produced plutonium undetected by the US intelligence

community. But Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and other agencies later

contested the accuracy of this finding.

These tests came slightly more than two weeks after India carried out five

nuclear tests of its own on May 11 and 13 and after many warnings by Pakistani

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officials that they would respond to India. Pakistan‟s nuclear tests were followed by

the February 1999 Lahore Agreements between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and

Sharif. The agreements included confidence building measures such as advance

notice of ballistic missile testing and a continuation of their unilateral moratoria on

nuclear testing. But diplomatic advances made that year were undermined by

Pakistan‟s incursion into Kargil. Under US diplomatic pressure, Prime Minister

Sharif with drew his troops, but lost power in October 1999 due to a military coup in

which Gen. Pervez Musharraf took over.

Nuclear Arsenal

The natural resources defense council (NRDC) estimates that Pakistan has

built 24-48 HEU based nuclear war heads, and NRDC reports that they have

produced 585 – 800 kg of HEU, enough for 30-55 weapons. Pakistan‟s nuclear war

heads are based on an implosion design that uses a solid core of highly enriched

uranium and requires an estimated 15-20 kg of material per war head. According to

NRDC, Pakistan has also produced a small but unknown quantity of weapons grade

plutonium, which is sufficient for an estimated 3-5 nuclear weapons.

Pakistani authorities claim that their nuclear weapons are not assembled.

They maintain that the fissile cores are stored separately from the delivery systems.

In 2001 report, the Defence Department contents that “Isalamabad‟s nuclear

weapons are probably stored in component form” and that “Pakistan probably could

assemble the weapons fairly quickly”. However, no one has been able to ascertain

the validity of Pakistan‟s assurances about their nuclear weapons security.

Pakistan‟s reliance primarily on HEU makes its fissile materials particularly

vulnerable to diversion. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) can be used in relatively

simple gun – barrel – type design, which could be with in the means of non-state

actors that intend to assemble a crude nuclear weapon.

The terrorist attacks on September 11th

raised concerns about the security of

Pakistan‟s nuclear arsnal. According to press reports, with in two days of the attacks,

Pakistan‟s military began relocating nuclear weapons components to six new secret

locations. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Pervez Musharraf fired his intelligence Chief and

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other officers and detained several suspected retired nuclear weapons scientists, in an

attempt to root out extremist elements that posed a potential threat to Pakistan‟s

nuclear arsenal concerns have also been raised about Pakistan as a proliferant of

nuclear materials and expertise. In November, 2002, shortly after North Korea

admitted to pursuing a nuclear weapons program, the press reported allegations that

Pakistan had provided assistance in the development of its uranium enrichment

program in exchange for North Korean missile technologies.

Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine

Several sources such as Jane‟s Intelligence Review and Defense Department

reports maintain that Pakistan‟s motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons program is to

counter the threat posed by its principal rival, India, which has superior conventional

forces and nuclear weapons.

Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the Defense Department

report cited above, “Pakistan remains stead fast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating

it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Consequently, not all of Pakistan‟s

nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that

signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan‟s best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only

after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any

connection with India‟s decision.”

Pakistan does not abide by a no first use doctrine, as evidenced by President

Pervez Musharraf‟s statements in May, 2002. Musharraf said that Pakistan did not

want a conflict with India but that if it came to war between the nuclear-armed rivals,

he would “respond with full might.” These statements were interpreted to mean that

if pressed by an overwhelming conventional attack from India, which has superior

conventional forces, Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons.

Pakistani Nuclear Weapon Capabilities and Thinking

Pakistan‟s nuclear program dates back to the 1950s, but it was the

humiliating loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) that reportedly triggered a

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political decision in January 1972 (just one month later) to begin a crash nuclear

weapons program. Unlike India, Pakistan focused on the uranium route to weapons.

Pakistan sought technology from many sources, including China and North Korea.14

This extensive assistance is reported to have included, among other things, uranium

enrichment technology from Europe, blueprints for a small nuclear weapon from

China and missile technology from China.

Most observers estimate that Pakistan has enough nuclear material (highly

enriched uranium and a small amount of plutonium) for 30 to 50 nuclear weapons.15

Like India, Pakistan is thought to have “a small stockpile of nuclear weapons

components and can probably assemble some weapons fairly quickly.”16

Pakistan could deliver its nuclear weapons using F-16s it purchased from the

United States (28 F-16 and 12 trainer aircraft; 8 are no longer in service), provided

the appropriate “wiring” has been added to make them nuclear-capable. In the 1980s,

Pakistan moved assiduously to acquire ballistic missile capabilities and now deploys

short-range ballistic missiles and a small number of medium-range missiles. AQ

Khan, former head of Khan Research Laboratories, maintained that only the

medium-range Ghauri missiles would be usable in a nuclear exchange (given fall-out

effects for Pakistan of shorter-range missiles). Other observers view the 30 to 50

Hatf2 short-range (300km) missiles (modified Chinese M-11s) as potential delivery

vehicles for nuclear weapons. Ghauri missiles (1350 and 2300km), which reportedly

are based on the North Korean No-Dong and Taepo-Dong-1, are capable of reaching

New Delhi with large payloads.17

14

A 1976 cooperation agreement with China greatly aided the program but Pakistan also

acquired significant technology from the West in the 1980s through the present, triggering a

rash of sanctions. See CRS Report RS20995, India and Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic

Sanctions. 15

SIPRI Yearbook 1995: 5-10 warheads; SIPRI Yearbook 2000: 15-20 warheads. Bulletin of

Atomic Scientists, 1998: 12 warheads. January 2002: 30 to 50. Carnegie Endowment 2002:

50-55 (Joseph Cirincione, with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals:

Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

Washington, DC, 2002). 16

U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 28. 17

Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January/February 2002, pp. 70-71.

183

Pakistan has not yet enunciated a nuclear doctrine, but it is clear that

Pakistan‟s nuclear arsenal is seen as the key to military parity with India. Because of

its fears of being overrun by larger Indian forces, Pakistan has rejected the doctrine

of no-first-use. In May 2002, Pakistan‟s ambassador to the UN, Munir Akram, stated

that “We have not said we will use nuclear weapons. We have not said we will not

use nuclear weapons. We possess nuclear weapons. So does India ...We will not

neutralize the deterrence by any doctrine of no first use.”18

On June 4, 2002,

President Musharraf went further: “The possession of nuclear weapons by any state

obviously implies they will be used under some circumstances.”19

In recent years, Pakistan apparently has taken steps toward refining command

and control of nuclear weapons. In April 1999, General Musharraf announced that

the Joint Staff Headquarters would have a command and control arrangement and a

secretariat, and a strategic force command would be established.20

The connection to

civilian leadership was unclear, given a recent account of the 1999 Kargil incursion

which suggested that Prime Minister Sharif was unaware that his own nuclear

missile forces were being prepared for action.21

Pakistan established a National

Command Authority (NCA) in February 2000, but little is publicly known about it.

Pakistani officials have repeatedly said that their nuclear capabilities are safe. The

new NCA is believed to be responsible for nuclear doctrine, as well as nuclear

research and development, wartime command and control, and advice to President

Musharraf about the development and employment of nuclear weapons.22

18

Barbara Crossette,”Pakistan Asks U.N. Council for Action on Kashmir,”New York Times,

May 30, 2002. 19

Laurinda Keys, “Pakistan President Says There are Circumstances For Use of Nuclear

Weapons,” Associated Press Newswire, June 4, 2002. 20

“Pakistan Should Respond, Says COAS,” Dawn, April 13, 1999. 21

Riedel, op. cit., p. 12. Since the military coup, there may be, ironically, less concern about

civil vs. military control, but this may be an issue for future concern. 22

Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 27.

184

Table 4.1 Potential Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Delivery System

185

Role of Kashmir

Kashmir has been a flashpoint since Indian and Pakistani independence in

1947. Many analysts have feared that nuclear weapons could be used if conventional

hostilities over Kashmir were to spiral out of control, especially if, as in 1965 Indo-

Pakistan conflict, India opened a new front on the Punjab plains to break a stalemate

in Pakistan or attempt to settle the issue decisively by confronting Pakistan with a

mortal threat to its territorial integrity.23

Under these circumstances, some have

suggested Pakistan might be tempted to detonate a small nuclear weapon on its own

territory to halt forward Indian movement. Other observers, however, believe such a

strategy would be akin to a state acting as a suicide bomber.24

Some media reports

have suggested that paradoxically, “the fact that both countries have very small

nuclear arsenals increases the pressure on both sides to use their weapons against

high-value targets.”25

Regardless of whether nuclear weapons might be used to stop

war or to gain a military advantage, many observers agree that uncertainty about

intentions could worsen stability.

Since 1998, both India and Pakistan appear to be integrating nuclear weapons

into security strategy and planning. With the ominous logic of nuclear deterrence,

each side‟s desire to make its nuclear forces more credible may make those nuclear

forces more usable. Ballistic missiles offer both sides advantages over using aircraft

as delivery vehicles, but the short ranges create a hair-trigger situation. From launch

to impact, missile flight times may be as short as 5 minutes. In the past, both sides

appeared to use the separation of warhead components as a form of command and

control (in the sense of lowering the risk of unauthorized or accidental use). Some

observers have noted that this approach becomes risky when the other side can

23

The war was preceded by a major tank engagement along the border with Pakistan‟s Sind

Province in the Spring, which went in Pakistan‟s favor, and a subsequent war over Kashmir

in August-September 1965. Pakistani troops only narrowly defeated an Indian counter-attack

in the direction of Lahore, illuminating Pakistan‟s vulnerability. 24

Salman Rushdie, “The Most Dangerous Place in the World,” New York Times, May 30,

2002. 25

“U.S. is Limited in Ways it Can Act To Subdue India-Pakistan Tension,” Wall Street

Journal, June 3, 2002. “High-value targets” could be military installations, key infrastructure

or cities.

186

launch short-range ballistic missiles against which there is no defense. These

observers have called for improving command and control of nuclear forces, while

noting, ironically, that reduced ambiguity could conversely increase the likelihood of

war.26

The Defense Intelligence Agency reportedly has estimated that a nuclear

exchange could kill between 9 and 12 million persons on both sides, with 2 to 6

million injured. These estimates are likely predicated on nuclear exchanges aimed at

cities; e.g., Indian Defense Secretary Yogendra Narain suggested in 2002 that “India

would retaliate against Pakistani aggression and that both sides should be prepared

for mutual destruction.” President Musharraf‟s interview in June 2002 with CNN

offered respite from the nuclear rhetoric when he stated, “I don‟t think either side is

that irresponsible to go to that limit [i.e., nuclear conflict]. ... One shouldn‟t even be

discussing these things, because any sane individual cannot even think of going into

this unconventional mode, whatever the pressures.”27

Confidence-Building Measures

India and Pakistan have a 30-year history of confidence-building measures.

These include hotlines between army commanders and prime ministers, a joint India-

Pakistan Military Commission (created in 1990), and agreements to provide prior

notification of troop movements and ballistic missile tests. In 1991, both sides agreed

not to attack nuclear facilities.28

Implementation, however, has been sporadic.29

In

February 1999, the two parties concluded the Lahore Agreement. That agreement

envisioned a plan for future work, to include measures to reduce the risk of

unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, reviews of confidence-building

measures and communications links, prior notification of ballistic missile tests,

continuation of unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing, and dialogue on nuclear and

26

Jock, op. cit., p. 50, p. 76. 27

[http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/06/01/musharraf.transcript/index.html] 28

Annual data exchanges on the facilities, according to some, were at first less than

forthcoming. See Hibbs, Mark, “India and Pakistan Fail to Include New SWU Plants on

Exchanged Lists,” Nuclear Fuel, March 30, 1992, p. 6. 29

The hotlines were not used to good effect either in Operation Brass Tacks in 1987 or in

May 1998 around the nuclear tests.

187

security issues. The Lahore process was undermined by the summer 2001 military

incursion by Pakistan in the vicinity of Kargil, but the two sides began a dialogue in

2004. In September 2004, India and Pakistan announced 13 confidence-building

measures. Three security-related ones included:

Experts‟ meetings on conventional and nuclear CBMs, including discussions

on a draft agreement on advance notification of missile tests;

Biannual meeting between Indian Border Security Force (BSF) and Pakistan

Rangers;

Implementation of the agreement reached between the defense secretaries in

their talks in August to discuss “modalities for disengagement and

redeployment” on the Siachen glacier.30

Foreign secretaries reported progress in their discussions on missile

notifications in December 2004.

Self-reliance was from the beginning the keynote of India‟s nuclear

programme. The country has nevertheless entered into mutually beneficial

cooperation and collaboration arrangements with many other countries, some of

these dating back to the early years of its nuclear programme. These have helped

Indian scientists get themselves acquainted with up-to-date developments in this

field in other parts of the world and to share their problems and achievements with

others. India has also taken an active part in the activities of international,

multinational, and regional organisations aimed at curbing the nuclear arms race and

promoting the civilian uses of atomic energy.

India has sought and received assistance from abroad for some of its major

nuclear projects, and this has some times been a matter of criticism within the

country. But a close study of India‟s nuclear cooperation arrangements with other

countries would provide us a clear picture of the extent of its dependence on others.

In fact, the setback which India‟s nuclear programme has suffered in the past few

years due to the withdrawal of foreign assistance could have been considerably offset

if a clearcut policy on the part of the Government was forthcoming.

30

See [http://www.southasiamonitor.org/diplomacy/2004/sep/8dip5.shtml]

188

Role of Soviet Union

The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was the world's first

communist state, the world's largest and a military superpower. The Soviet Union

was the only military and political challenge to the global dominance of the United

States in 1947. Although Pakistan could not ignore its giant neighbour to the north

only a 14km corridor separating the Afghan territory between the nation-states.

Pakistanis however initially preferred the idea of an alliance with the west rather than

with the communist powers at the time. In 1949, ignoring the indifference of the

United States, Quaid-e-Millat accepted an offer to visit the USSR. This promptly led

to an invitation from United States also at the same time and he then chose to visit

the Americans instead. This was undoubtedly a serious step as far as relations with

the USSR were concerned. By 1950, the Soviets were shifting from a neutral

poistion on the issue of Kashmir and other India/Pakistan questions to a more pro-

Indian stance. Relations between Pakistan and USSR deteriorated further when

Pakistan began to join American-sponsored military pacts in 1954 and 1955. The

Soviets protested strongly that the pacts were designed against themselves and that

Pakistan was allowing itself to be used as an American military and espionage base.

Pakistan strongly denied these allegations but could not prevent the Soviets from

declaring their open support for the Republic of India on the Kashmir Border dispute

and an Afghan claim on 'Pashtunistan' was a problem for them. In December 1955,

the Soviets leaders visited India and, much to India's satisfaction, not only declared

wholehearted support for the Indian claim on Kashmir and Jammu, but also started a

programme of economic and technical assistance towards India. In spite of this, the

Soviets always declared their intention to develop good relations with the Pakistanis

and stated that it was upto the Government of Pakistan to improve bilateral foreign

relationship by stopping its anti-Soviet policy. In 1956, the Pakistani government

refused an offer of Soviet aid which included the establishment of a steel mill within

new State of Pakistan. One of the most serious incidents in Soviet-Pakistani relations

occurred in May 1960 when an American spy plane, known as the U-2, was shot

down by the Soviets while flying over the Soviet Union. The Americans tried to

189

deny that it was on spying mission, but it transpired that the pilot had been captured

alive. Much to Soviet fury, it was also revealed that the plane had taken off from an

American base in Peshawar. The Pakistan government denied any knowledge of the

plane's purpose but the Soviets threatened that if any future missions were launched

from Pakistan, the Soviets would destroy the base. Pakistan wan not moved by these

protests and replied that although Pakistan had been unaware of the plane's

intentions, the United States, as an ally, could use Pakistan's air bases for routine

missions. By 1961, however, tension between the two nations had considerably

subsided, and the Soviets agreed to undertake oil exploration inside Pakistani

territory. The 1962 Indo-Chinese war helped Pakistan's relations with the Soviet

Union as India's acceptance of western arms antagonized the Soviets. Pakistan's

relations with the United States correspondingly deterioted because the United States

had provided India with military aid. The scene was set for greater Soviet-Pakistan

co-operation. The Soviets were also keen to prevent Pakistan/Chinese friendship

from developing much further and in August 1963, the Soviets agreed to give

Pakistan a £11,000,000 loan. Further, there was a shift in the Soviet poistion on the

disputed territory of Kashmir from outright support for India to a more neutral

stance. In April 1965, Ayub Khan became the first Pakistani leader ever to visit the

Soviet Union since 1947 independence. Although there were no dramatic

breakthroughs, further agreements on oil exploration and trade were signed and a

better understanding between the two sides was reached. During the 1965 war with

India, the Soviet leaders made direct appeals to both sides to stop fighting. The

Soviets criticized India for crossing the international boundary during the war. Once

the war ended, both Pakistanis and Hindustanis accepted the Soviet offer for a peace

conference to be held at Tashkent, in Soviet Central Asia (now Uzbekistan). The

Tashkent conference was held between 4 and 10 January 1966. Both sides praised

the fair and hospitable manner in which the Soviets conducted the conference. The

success in hosting the conference raised Soviet prestige in Asia and led to closer

Pak-Soviet ties. The USSR quietly dropped its support of 'Pashtunistan' and

economic assistance to Pakistan increased. The Soviets even eventually agreed to

supply arms to Pakistan when the American base in Peshawer was closed in 1968.

190

Pakistan was now in the unique poistion of receiving arms from China, United States

and the USSR. Relations with the Soviets took a downturn again in 1971 when it was

announced that the United States and the PRC has established diplomatic relations

with Pakistan's mediation. This implied a Sino-US-Pak understanding which

encouraged the growth of an understanding between the Indian and Russian

governments. Within a month of the Sino-US agreement, India signed a Treaty of

Peace, Friendship and Co-operation with the USSR, which was in effect a military

pact which guaranteed Soviet help if India went to war again with Pakistan. After

signing this pact, the Indians felt secure enough to provoke a war with its rival in

December 1971. By 1972, relations had imporoved with the visit of Quaid-e-Awam

to the USSR. It was as a result of this meeting that work on a Soviet assisted steel

mill inside Pakistan finally began in 1983. The possibility of better and closer

relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union was dealt a serious blow with the

Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979.

Role of Russia

THE MOST SATISFYING and mutually beneficial outcome of the visit of

the Russian President, Mr. Vladimir Putin, is the signing of a memorandum of

understanding between the two countries on intensifying bilateral cooperation in the

peaceful uses of atomic energy. If, as it is likely, this positive move by Russia is

going to annoy the western nuclear powers, they should realise that the nuclear

blockade could not have stopped India from going ahead with its nuclear

programmes though it would have had to reckon with the stringent regulations issued

by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which could have hampered its access to

advanced technology and materials for its nuclear power reactors.

The NSG, a highly exclusive cartel of advanced nations, could do with some

soul-searching on the effectiveness of its uncompromising and rigorous control over

the spread of nuclear technology to the rest of the world, especially at a time when

there is almost an unstoppable explosion of information technology (IT) which is

continuously demonstrating its capabilities to prise open everything. The nuclear

weapon states should have in fact realised as early as the mid-1970s, which

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witnessed India's peaceful nuclear explosion, that this country was only a few steps

away from the making of nuclear weapons and it was only a question of time before

the nuclear monopoly was broken by the other countries. It is, therefore, unfortunate

that the nuclear weapon states instead of coming to terms with such a reality had

sought to protect the world from nuclear ``proliferation''. It will be difficult to think

of another instance of the pick-up of a word with such a highly objectionable

connotation which imputes stealthy moves to the efforts of the rest of the world to

crack the case-hardened nuclear shell.

Mr. Putin's realisation of the futility of the nuclear weapon states persisting

with their blockade of India obviously explains Russia's decision to intensify

bilateral cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. With the nuclear weapon

states having already made the world a potentially dangerous planet with their huge

stock of atomic armoury, there is no question of its becoming more dangerous with

more states gaining entry into the exclusive club, unless there is going to be an

outbreak of a global nuclear madness. The only sensible course for the nuclear

weapon states, if they are serious about nuclear non- proliferation, is to reach an

agreement on global nuclear disarmament aimed at a progressive elimination of

atomic weapons.

The agreement signed between the two countries to establish an inter-ministerial

commission on military technical cooperation as well as their identification of key

areas of cooperation in the IT sector impart a much desired completeness to the task

of bringing India and Russia closer. Neither of them could ever have imagined that

the very close ties which they had already built up during the years when there was

no indication whatsoever of the raging Cold War coming to an end and of the

collapse of the Soviet Union were laying the foundations for further strengthening

their relations in a world which has seen the burying of the hatchet by the

superpowers. With IT racing at a speed which could make everything inclusive of

military technology - whether it relates to MiG and SU 30 aircraft or T 90 tanks - an

open book, there is nothing to which the U.S. in particular could object to the further

forging of the close relationship by New Delhi and Moscow. The gains to all the

participants would be much bigger if India, Russia, the U.S. and other countries get

192

together to explore the possibilities of reorienting their military technology for

wholly peaceful and constructive activity by turning their nuclear swords into

ploughshares.

Role of China

Pakistan and China have enjoyed a generally close and mutually beneficial

relationship over several decades. Pakistan served as a link between Beijing and

Washington in 1971, as well as a bridge to the Muslim world for China during the

1980s. China‟s continuing role as a major arms supplier for Pakistan began in the

1960s and included helping to build a number of arms factories in Pakistan, as well

as supplying complete weapons systems. After the 1990 imposition of U.S. sanctions

on Pakistan, the Islamabad-Beijing arms relationship was further strengthened.31

Pakistan continues to view China as an “all-weather friend” and perhaps its most

important strategically.

Islamabad may seek future civil nuclear assistance from Beijing, including

potential provision of complete power reactors, especially in light of Washington‟s

categorical refusal of Pakistan‟s request for civil nuclear cooperation similar to that

planned between the United States and India. The Chinese government has assisted

Pakistan in constructing a major new port at Gwadar, near the border with Iran.

Islamabad and Beijing aspire to make this port, officially opened in March 2007, a

major commercial outlet for Central Asian states. Some Western and Indian analysis

are concerned that the port may be used for military purposes and could bolster

China‟s naval presence in the Indian Ocean region.

Analysis taking a realist, power political perspective view China as an

external balancer in the South Asian subsystem, with Beijing‟s material support for

Islamabad allowing Pakistan to challenge the aspiring regional hegemony of a more

powerful India. Many observers, especially those in India, see Chinese support for

Pakistan as a key aspect of Beijing‟s perceived policy of “encirclement” or constraint

of India as a means of preventing or delaying New Delhi‟s ability to challenge

31

See CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles :

Policy Issues.

193

Beijing‟s region-wide influence. Indian leaders have called the Islamabad-Beijing

nuclear and missile “proliferation nexus” a cause of serious concern in New Delhi,

and U.S. officials remain seized of this potentially destabilizing dynamic.

In 2005, China‟s Prime Minister visited Islamabad, where Pakistan and China

signed 22 accords meant to boost bilateral cooperation. President Musharraf‟s five-

day visit to Beijing in early 2006 saw bilateral discussions on counterterrorism, trade

and technical assistance. Chinese President Hu‟s late 2006 travel to Islamabad was

the first such visit by a Chinese president in ten years; another 18 new bilateral pacts

were inked, including a bilateral Free Trade Agreement. In mid-2007, Prime

Minister Aziz visited Beijing, where Pakistan and China signed 27 new agreements

and memoranda of understanding to “re-energize” bilateral cooperation in numerous

areas, including defense, space technology, and trade. No public mention was made

regarding civil nuclear cooperation. Preident Musharraf‟s April 2008 travel to

Beijing produced ten new memoranda of understanding and a reiteration of the two

countries “special relations”.

In the month after he took office, President Zardari paid a visit to Beijing.

Speculation on his central motive focused on Pakistan‟s urgent need for aid to

correct its growing balance of payments deficit; China‟s huge foreign-exchange

reserves are a potential source of a major cash infusion. Yet Zardari left Beijing

without having secured any Chinese commitment in this regard, although reports did

suggest that the Chinese had agreed to build two new nuclear power reactors in

Pakistan.32

U.S. congressional opponents of such a development confirmed with the

Bush State Department that China‟s provision of new nuclear reactors to Pakistan

would represent a clear violation of its international obligations as members of the

NSG.33

Late 2008 visits to Beijing by senior Pakistani military officers reviewed

progress on multiple military hardware deals, including Pakistan‟s purchase of four

new Chinese guided-missile frigates and a fleet of co-produced JF-17 fighter aircraft.

32

“Pakistan Secures China‟s Help to Build 2 Nuclear Reactors”, Wall Street Journal, October 20,

2008. 33

See http://markey.house.gov/index.php? option-com_content&task=view&id=3486&Itemid=141

194

In short, China played a major role in the development of Pakistan‟s nuclear

infrastructure, especially when increasingly stringent export controls in western

countries made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire materials and technology

elsewhere. According to 2001 Department of Defense report China has supplied

Pakistan with nuclear materials and expertise and has provided critical assistance in

the construction of Pakistan‟s nuclear facilities.

In the 1990s, China designed and supplied the heavy water to Khusab reactor,

which plays a key role in Pakistan‟s production of plutonium. A subsidiary of the

China National Nuclear Corporation also contributed to Pakistan‟s efforts to expand

its uranium enrichment capabilities by providing 5,000 custom made ring magnets,

which are a key component of the bearings that facilitate the high speed rotation of

centrifuges.

According to Anthony Cordesman of CSIS, China is also reported to have

provided Pakistan with the design of one of its warheads, which is relatively

sophisticated in design and lighter than U.S. and Soviet designed first material

support in the completion of the Chasma nuclear power reactor and plutonium

reprocessing facility, which was built in the mid 1990s. The project had been

initiated as a cooperative program with France, but Pakistani failure to sign the NPT

and unwillingness to accept IAEA safeguards on its entire nuclear program caused

France to terminate assistance.

Role of U. S.

As part of the 1950s-era Atoms for Peace program, the United States actively

promoted nuclear energy cooperation with India from the mid-1950s, building

nuclear reactors (Tarapur), providing heavy water for the CIRUS reactor, and

allowing Indian scientists to study at U.S. nuclear laboratories. When other nations

joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, however, India refused to

join the treaty on the basis that it was discriminatory. In 1974, India exploded a

“peaceful” nuclear device, demonstrating that nuclear technology transferred for

peaceful purposes could be used to produce nuclear weapons. As a result, the United

195

States has refused nuclear cooperation with India for twenty-five years and has tried

to convince other states to do the same.

On July 18, 2005, President Bush announced the creation of a global

partnership between the United States and India to promote stability, democracy,

prosperity and peace throughout the world. One area of the partnership is civil

nuclear energy cooperation. Both leaders recognized the “significance of civilian

nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more

efficient manner.” President Bush said he would "work to achieve full civil nuclear

energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek agreement from Congress to

adjust U.S. laws and policies."

If implemented, this cooperation would dramatically shift U.S.

nonproliferation policy and practice towards India. Such cooperation would also

contravene the multilateral export control guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

(NSG), which was formed in response to India's proliferation. At a time when the

United States has called for all states to strengthen their domestic export control laws

and implementation and for tighter multilateral controls, U.S. nuclear cooperation

with India would require loosening its own nuclear export legislation, as well as

creating an NSG exception. Although some states may agree that it is necessary to

create a new paradigm for India, others may believe that this agreement undercuts

the basic bargain of the NPT – peaceful nuclear cooperation in exchange for

forswearing nuclear weapons. Observers note that U.S.-India cooperation could have

wide-ranging implications for the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and

could prompt other suppliers, like China, to justify their supplying other non-nuclear

weapon states, like Pakistan.

Under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act (P.L. 95-242; 42 USC 2153 et

seq), Congress must approve an agreement for cooperation. If the Administration

chooses to exempt the agreement from statutory nonproliferation criteria (including a

requirement that the recipient nation have full-scope nuclear safeguards), both

houses of Congress must pass a joint resolution of approval. The Administration

alternatively may seek to amend certain portions of the Atomic Energy Act; in

196

particular, it could seek to amend Sections 128 and 129, both of which include

nonproliferation criteria. However, the exact procedures depend on the details of

cooperation, which are not yet final. This report will be updated as necessary.

The United States actively promoted nuclear energy cooperation with India

from the mid-1950s, building nuclear reactors (Tarapur), providing heavy water for

the CIRUS reactor, and allowing Indian scientists to study at U.S. nuclear

laboratories. Although India was active in negotiations of the 1968 Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), India refused to join the NPT on grounds that it was

discriminatory. The “peaceful” nuclear test in 1974 demonstrated that nuclear

technology transferred for peaceful purposes could also be used to produce nuclear

weapons. In the United States, the Congress responded by passing the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA, P.L. 95-242), which imposed tough new

requirements for U.S. nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states – full-scope

safeguards and termination of exports if such a state detonates a nuclear explosive

device or engages in activities related to acquiring or manufacturing nuclear

weapons, among other things.34

Internationally, the United States created the Nuclear

Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1975 to implement nuclear export controls. The NSG

published guidelines in 1978 “to apply to nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes to

help ensure that such transfers would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel

cycle or nuclear explosive activities.”35

34

The NNPA, in part, amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. See 42 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.

Prior to the 1970 NPT, safeguards (inspections, material protection, control and accounting)

were applied to specific facilities or materials (known as INFCIRC/66-type agreements).

The NPT required safeguards on all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities for

non-nuclear-weapon-state parties (those states not having detonated a nuclear explosive

device prior to Jan. 1, 1967). 35

IAEA Document INFCIRC/254, Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-related Dual-use

Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related Technology. Part 1 covers “trigger list” items:

those especially designed or prepared for nuclear use: (i) nuclear material; (ii) nuclear

reactors and equipment; (iii) non-nuclear material for reactors; (iv) plant and equipment for

reprocessing, enrichment and conversion of nuclear material and for fuel fabrication and

heavy water production; and (v) associated technology. Part 2 covers dual-use items.

Additional NSG criteria for dual-use exports include NPT membership and/or full-scope

safeguards agreement; appropriate end-use; whether the technology would be used in a

reprocessing or enrichment facility; the state's support for nonproliferation; and the risk of

potential nuclear terrorism.

197

Conditioning U.S. nuclear exports on non-nuclear-weapon states having

fullscope safeguards created a problem particularly for fuel supplies to India‟s

safeguarded Tarapur reactors. When the NNPA was enacted, the United States was

supplying fuel. The Carter Administration exported two more shipments under

executive order, despite the Nuclear Regulatory Commission‟s (NRC) refusal to

approve an export license (on nonproliferation conditions). Given slim support in

Congress, no more exports were attempted after 1980. France supplied fuel under the

terms of the U.S. agreement with India until France adopted a full-scope safeguards

requirement also (1984 to 1995). After the NSG adopted the full-scope safeguards

condition in 1992, China picked up the slack. Russia supplied fuel from 2001 to

2004.36

Global Partnership

The Bush Administration has been exploring ways of creating a strategic

partnership with India since 2001. Indian officials identified their growing energy

needs as an area for cooperation, particularly in nuclear energy. The U.S.-India 2004

Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative included expanded cooperation

in civil nuclear technology as one of three goals. Phase I of the NSSP, completed in

September 2004, required addressing proliferation concerns and ensuring compliance

with U.S. export controls.37

In September 2004, the Administration published a final

ruling stating there was a presumption of approval of licenses for some items that are

used in the "balance of plant" (non-reactor-related end-uses) activities at safeguarded

nuclear facilities, and that are not multilaterally controlled for nuclear proliferation

reasons.38

"Balance of plant" activities, refers "to the part of a nuclear power plant

used for power generation (e.g., turbines, controllers, or power distribution) to

distinguish it from the nuclear reactor." In practice, this means certain dual-use

equipment (e.g. machine tools), not controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group

36

China was not a member of the NSG until 2004. Russia, an NSG member, exported fuel,

citing a safety exception, but NSG members objected so strongly that Russia suspended

supply in 2004. Russia may be reconsidering. “Russia to Review Tarapur Fuel Decision”

South Asian Media Net, May 10, 2005. 37

See fact sheet on the NSSP at [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/36290.htm]. 38

Federal Register, 69 FR 56694, Sept. 22, 2004. Only 4 of the 14 nuclear power plants in

India are under safeguards: Rajasthan 1 & 2 and Tarapur 1 & 2.

198

because they do not meet certain performance criteria, could be exported to the

Rajasthan and Tarapur reactors.

On July 18, 2005, President Bush announced creation of a global partnership

with India in a joint statement with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.39

Noting the

“significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands

in a cleaner and more efficient manner,” President Bush said he would "work to

achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek

agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies."

Three paragraphs of the joint statement were devoted to civil nuclear

cooperation. The statement noted that the United States “will work with friends and

allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation

and trade with India, including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel

supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur.” The United States committed

to encouraging its partners to consider this request – a reversal in the U.S. position,

which has been to ban fuel to Tarapur – and to consulting with its partners on Indian

participation in ITER (collaboration on fusion research) and in the Generation IV

International Forum for future reactor design.

The leaders agreed to create a working group, which presumably will

negotiate not only the scope of nuclear cooperation, but also Indian commitments to

nonproliferation. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh conveyed that India “ would take

on the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and

advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the

United States.”40

India agreed to do the following:

identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs;

declare its civilian facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA);

voluntarily place civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards;

39

Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,

White House Press Release, July 18, 2005, Washington, D.C. 40

July 18 Joint Statement.

199

sign an Additional Protocol for civilian facilities;

continue its unilateral nuclear test moratorium;

work with the United States to conclude a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty

(FMCT);

refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states

that do not have them, as well as support international efforts to limit their

spread;

secure its nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export

control legislation and through harmonization and adherence to Missile

Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and NSG guidelines.

These steps are undoubtedly welcome, but some observers believe they are

insufficient. Separating civilian and military facilities, placing civilian facilities

under IAEA safeguards, and applying an additional protocol are all positive steps,

but place India squarely in the company of nuclear weapon states. There are no

measures in this global partnership to restrain India‟s nuclear weapons program.

India has a self-imposed nuclear test moratorium but continues to produce fissile

material for its nuclear weapons program, despite support for FMCT negotiations.

Few observers are sanguine that FMCT negotiations can proceed quickly in the

Conference on Disarmament, even if negotiations do not cover verification, as the

Bush Administration prefers.41

From a technical verification perspective, the existence of India‟s nuclear

weapons program negates potential nonproliferation assurances that nuclear

safeguards on civil facilities might provide. The Administration‟s position that a

fissile material production cutoff is inherently unverifiable because of the existence

of unsafeguarded facilities and materials may be at odds with Under Secretary of

41

In Oct. 2004, Amb. Jackie Sanders explained that finding undeclared fissile material in a

state under [full-scope] safeguards” is sufficient to make a judgment of noncompliance.”

Under an FMCT, where nuclear weapon states would have undeclared material and

activities, “simply finding fissile material...would be insufficient to make a judgment of

noncompliance.” “U.S. Warns Verification Focus Would Delay Fissile Ban Treaty,”

Washington File, Nov. 1, 2004.

200

State Nick Burns‟ statement to reporters on July 19, 2005 that “this agreement can be

verified and will be verified.”42

Further, the negotiation of safeguards agreements

will be conducted between India and the IAEA, over whose outcome the United

States may have little influence. Nonetheless, the United States must have some

assurances that its assistance does not, according to its NPT Article I obligation, “in

any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture

nuclear weapons.” A significant question is how India, in the absence of full-scope

safeguards, can provide adequate confidence that U.S. peaceful nuclear technology

will not be diverted to nuclear weapons purposes.43

Presumably, when Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns states that India

has an “exceptional” record of nonproliferation, he is referring to India‟s export

control history.44

Unlike Pakistan, there is little evidence to suggest that India has

transferred sensitive nuclear technologies to other non-nuclear-weapon states.

Therefore, India‟s promise to refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing

technologies to states that do not have them, as well as its promise to adhere to NSG

guidelines, may be formalities. Under UNSCR 1540, India is obligated to strengthen

its export control legislation; it is unclear what further measures it might be taking

pursuant to the global partnership.

Congressional Role

The July 18 joint statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh

noted that the two countries would seek “full civil nuclear energy cooperation.”

Although the details have not been spelled out, it is clear that the export of nuclear

material, reactors, and their major components would require a Section 123

agreement for cooperation. Since India is considered under U.S. law and by the NPT

to be a nonnuclear weapon state and does not have full-scope safeguards, the

42

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns, “Briefing on the Signing of

the Global Partnership Agreement Between the United States and India,” July 19, 2005. See

[http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/49831.htm]. 43

Plutonium produced in the CIRUS reactor, which the United States supplied with heavy

water, reportedly was used in India‟s “peaceful nuclear explosion.” See Victor Gilinsky and

Paul Leventhal, “India Cheated,” Washington Post, June 15, 1998. 44

Burns, July 19, 2005, briefing.

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President likely will have to exempt the agreement for cooperation from at least the

full-scope safeguards requirement in Sec. 123 a. (2). The agreement must lie before

Congress for 60 days of continuous session (once a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment

Statement is received).45

An exempted agreement could only become effective if

Congress enacts a joint resolution of approval.

If such an agreement is approved by Congress, the NRC would still have to

license nuclear exports under the agreement. Since the U.S.-India agreement would

not contain the full-scope safeguards requirement and since India would continue to

have a nuclear weapons program, the President would still have to waive the Section

128 requirement for full-scope safeguards and Section 129 provision that would

terminate nuclear exports for a non-nuclear-weapon state that, since 1978, has

detonated a nuclear explosive device or is conducting nuclear weapons work and has

not made sufficient progress toward ending that activity.46

In both cases, there are

provisions for waivers and for Congressional disapproval. According to some

observers, waiving the termination of exports because of a nuclear test may be easier

than waiving a termination because of weapons work, since India committed to a

voluntary test moratorium after 1998, but not to ending its nuclear weapons program.

Impact on Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

Some observers have maintained that while the strategic benefits of expanded

cooperation with India may be considerable, the nonproliferation costs may outweigh

the benefits. U.S.-India nuclear cooperation raises several issues for the international

nuclear nonproliferation regime. First and foremost is the basic bargain of the

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In exchange for peaceful nuclear cooperation,

nonnuclear-weapon states under the NPT gave up the option of developing nuclear

weapons. This bargain was strengthened when nuclear supplier states adopted the

requirement for full-scope safeguards for nuclear exports. The nuclear

nonproliferation regime is at a crossroads now, particularly since revelations about

Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan‟s nuclear black market sales in 2004 prompted the

45

Specific procedures are found in AEA, P.L. 95-242, Sections 123 and 130. 46

The provision in Sec. 129 terminating exports for nuclear weapon tests applies in

situations where nuclear exports have begun.

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United States, its allies, the IAEA, the G-8, and the NSG to consider further

restrictions on sensitive nuclear technologies (e.g., uranium enrichment and

plutonium reprocessing). Some NPT members believe that these restrictions

contradict the basic bargain of the NPT; other NPT members believe that restricting

technologies even further is necessary.

Nonetheless, at a time when the United States has called for all states to

strengthen their domestic export control laws and implementation and for tighter

multilateral controls, U.S. nuclear cooperation with India would require loosening its

own nuclear export legislation, as well as creating an exception to NSG full-scope

safeguards requirements. The Administration has not revealed publicly how it will

handle NSG guidelines, but consensus among the 44 NSG members is not always

assured. Some states may agree that it is time to create a new paradigm for India,

while other states, particularly those who have benefitted from the right of peaceful

nuclear cooperation under the NPT, may not. Dissent within the NSG could be

counterproductive to achieving other objectives the United States is pursuing in

nuclear nonproliferation, for example, restricting the fuel cycle, disarming North

Korea, and restraining Iran, all of which rely on the considerable support of friends

and allies. U.S.-India cooperation could prompt other suppliers, like China, to justify

supplying other non-nuclear-weapon states, like Pakistan.

Other Countries

India has signed agreements for peaceful uses of atomic energy with a

number of other countries. These include Afghanistan, Argentina, Bangladesh,

Brazil, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, German Democratic Republic,

Hungary, Iraq, Iran, Italy, Libya, Indonesia, Malaysia, Poland, Philippines, Romania,

Sweden, Spain, U.K., Yugoslovia etc. Most of the agreements are for exchange of

scientists and information.

India has also assisted a few of the developing countries in their civil nuclear

efforts, often in collaboration with international agencies like the IAEA. For

instance, reactor for Bangladesh, and has offered to set up an atomic power plant in

Malaysia. In Indonesia, the BARC is setting up a „Cobalt-60‟ panoramic batch

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irradiator, on a turn-key basis, at the Pasar Jamat Research Centre of the National

Atomic Energy Agency. In collaboration with the IAEA, India has set up a neutron

crystal spectrometer in the Philippines. This is meant to be a facility for imparting

training in nuclear physics to scientists of South and Southeast Asian countries.

Taking an overall view of India‟s cooperation agreements with other

countries, it will be seen that the country‟s dependence on foreign sources has been

of a limited nature, confined to certain projects. Assistance was received mainly

from the United States and Canada. Yet the Canadian cut-off of nuclear cooperation

after the 1974 Pokhran test and the delays in the supply of enriched uranium by the

USA have caused a setback to the country‟s nuclear programme. Indian nuclear

planners, however, have only themselves to blame for much that has gone wrong

with the country‟s nuclear programme. Hesitation and lack of clarity have marked

the thinking and actions of the policy-makers. The policy of self-reliance in the

nuclear field as envisaged by Dr. Bhabha in the early 1950s has been put to a severe

test in recent years, and it must be admitted that the policy-planners have not come

off too well.