Chapter 11

CHINA'S NO::LRAR OPTION AND SINo-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1963-1964

Chapter · 11

OHIIA 1 1J NUCLEAR uP1'1 u!4 AJID Sl.Nu-AMARlCAB RBLATiuNS, 1963-1~

Until the signing of the Test-Ban Treaty ot 1963 the

.ceneral practice everywhere was to seek to explain the nature

ot the Sino-Soviet dispute primarily in ideological terms. The

Test-Ban Treaty, and the circumstances attendant upon its for­

mulation and signature, however, revealed that the Sino-Soviet

polemics involved a wbole set of oth~r, extra-ideological issues

as well. The dispute hinged on the vital national interests or the two countries, as also the sensitive issue ot national secu­

rity. As the dispute widened into an open ritt, it produced

inevitably a major ettect on Sino-American relations. With the

deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations, China's relations with

the United States, too, entered upon a new era. This e~a vas

characterized b,y two phases -- the phase ot sharp hostility and

the phase of a &radual thaw. During the first phase, Sino-US

relations registered a slump, and there was increased hostility.

'I'he questicm ot the Teat-Ban Treaty, besides factors like Viet­

nam, played a large role in embittering relations between

Washington and Peking. It is, therefore, pertinent to study 1n

d.etl!dl the stances and perceptions of the two countries em 'the

issue of the Test-Ban Treaty and their immediate impact en their

relationship.

I. Impgrtao;e of the la1u1

The Sino-Soviet r1tt widened sharply as a result of the

dispute over nuclear weapons. In an ottlcial statement ·an

61

15 August 1963 China made it evident that it took strong excep­

tion to the decision of the Soviet Union not to hmour its

agreement with China to supply nuclear weapons. It added:

As tar back as June ao, 1959, when there was not ,yet the sligh-. test si&n of a treaty on stoppin& nucl .. r tests, the aoviet Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology tor national defence concluded between China and tbe Soviet Union an vctober 16, 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample or an atomic bomb and technical data concerning 1 ts manu­facture. This vas done as a presentation &J.f"t at the time the Soviet leaders went to the United States tor talks with Elsen­hower in September. (l)

Thus the issue or nuclear weapons played a maJor part not on11 in the ori·gin or Sino-Soviet differences but also 1n their deve­

lopment into a major rift. The cover of ideology was unmasked

with the signing of the Test-Ban Treaty, and an unprecedented

exchange took place between the two countries an the basis of

their respective perceptions or their national interests.

China's t1rst reaction to the Test-Ban Treat7 came 1n a

stater~~t on 31 July 1963. China accused the Soviet Oh1on ot

capitulating to the Uhited States and described the treaty as g

"a dirty fraud and an alliance" aimed against it. Its repeated

references to tbe treaty as.anti-Cbinese in the manths that

followed made it amply clear that ideoloQ was not the only

factor, not even the primary factor, in the Sino-dov!et quarrel.

l See statement of the spokesman ot the Chinese Government (1.6 August 1963) in Paop1e J:lt.. ll1l, :.4orld., Unitt tSU! lila Complete, l'hwou@, Tgtal ami £it:solukl Probibitign &114 nestruotigo .Qt tiugltar WeapQDI (Peking: .tioreian Langua&es Press, 1963), PP• 28-89.

a See text in Pekin& BIJitw, vol. 6, no. 31, 2 August 1963, pp. 7-8.

52

t·he Soviet tilion rejected !->eking's charses or1 3 August

1963. It argued that though the Test-Ban Treaty was a partial

measure in so tar as it did not ban all nuclear wea,Pons at ane

stroke, it was "better to have a part than to do nothing". It

declared emphatically that the treaty was "1n the interest ot

peace and socialism•. It denied. that US imperialism had pined

an advantase, and said that the USSR had the most povertul wea­

pons and ~eans or delivery in the world and vas capable ot

smashing any target. It accused China or joining hands with US

"madmen and French and West German extremists and C otJ being

absolutely out or touch with re3l1ty in matters involving the 3 .

lives ot millions of people". It tried to show how the Chinese

statement ran counter to the Leninist policy ot peaceful co­

existence between states With ditterent social systems. "The

Chinese leaders", it declared, bad placed themselves "openly

against the ooclalist Commonwealth, the whole world communist

movement, and all the peace-loving peoples of Europe, Asia, 4 .

Africa and A£er1ca4 •

China retali$ted by issuing a most hard-hitting statement

on 15 August 1963. I~ot only did it reiterate its charge that the

3 Ibid., vol. 6, no. 331 16 August 1963, pp. 16-17.

4 Ibid., p. 18. It also added: ft~o e~powered the Govern­ment of the PRC to speak in the name or the Soviet people and for them? ~lho asked to speak for the peoples of the other socialist countries. The authors of the statement must be losing their n:inds it •• • they s~ek, in their statement, to counterpose the Soviet people to Soviet government ...

53

9oviets had abjectly capitulated to 1mperial1em1. but it denoun­

ced the 3ov1et Union tor its alleged breach ot ta1th in refusing

to supply a sample atomic bomb in 1959 under an agreement re­

portedly signed. two years earlier. Th1 s act or pertidJ on the

part of the Soviet Union, according to China, symbolized the

birth or a new phase ot international relations disadvantageous

to Cbina. In line vi th 1 ts perfidious behaviour, China noted,

the Soviet Union had taken the most objectionable stel) ot sign­

ing the lest-Ban Treaty with the West in clear disregard or China •s views as contained in the communications it had sent to

Moscow on 3 September 19621 20 october 1962 and 6 June 1963. The

Soviet purpose, China argued, was clearl.v to "curry tavour w1 tb 6

US imper1al1 sm bf discontinuing assistance to China". Althouah

the Sino-Soviet ideological debate had started even before, the

dispute, which later beca~• an open rift, originated with the

alleged Soviet refusal to supply a sample ato~r1c bOII!b.

Ln 1 ~eptember 1963 a spokesman of the Government ot

China gave a detailed reply to the 3ov1et tlovernment statement

or 21 August 1962. Be veher.ently or1t1o1zed the aov1et Union.

He accused the 8ov1et side ot carrying on false propa,a.nda that

China wanted socialism to win by &eans ot a thermonuclear war

and that China waa prepared to sacrifice half ot manklnd in a

theraoouelear war. de rei tara ted h1 s Government's view that

See text in P1ople .gt ~ World '{)lite, n. 1, p. 30.

6 the Soviet leaders were tollow1ni a ,.cap1 tulationist stand".

Yn 6 September 1963 China replied to certain charges con­

tained in an open l~tter issued on behalf ot the Communist Party

ot the Soviet Union (CPSOJ on 14 July 1963. lt accused the

Soviet tkllon of pushing o1no-i:lov1et relatioos ,.to tbe brlnk at

a split". It criticized the USSR tor its alleged revisionism

and highlighted its difference~ with·the USSR 1n such ttatters as

relations With the United States, India, and Yugoslavia. As

before, it characte~ized the 1ov1et attitude towards the Uhited

States as cap1tulat1oo1st. It der~ounced the 3oviet Union tor

its alleged policy of allying with the United ~tates an the

"pretext" ot "peaceful competi t1on ". It took exception to the

ooviet aupplJ of economic and militar; aid to India at the time

ot hoat111t1ea between India and China. ~gain 1 improved rela­

tions between the Soviet Uni<Xl and Yugoslavia, according to China,

amounteci to a betrayal or l'~rx1sm-Lenin1sm. lt pointed out that ?

~ugoslav1a was a ''revisionist", not "a socialist country".

China's criticism of the UJaa was very sharp "an the question ot

Stalin,. also. China held that in the garb ot opposing atalin's

personality cult, Khrushchev was supporting "revisionism• 1n the

USSR. He was not only undermining the "proletarian revolut1CIIlary

6 Jiau ~· Hainbua liiu Agencz (London), no. 2044, 1 September 1963, 3upplement no. 35, pp. l-16.

7 3ee ''The Ox-igin and Development of' the Differences ~t­ween the Leadership of the CP3U and Curselves •••• ", 6 September 1963. Reproduced in ~ CQIJ~1st; China. Digtat (Hongkoog), no. 104, 2 November 19~ pp. 53-85.

55

move!llmt but 9lso 1nterferlr1g 1n the internal affairs of trater­B

nal partlea".

China found 1t espceially hard to forgive the Soviet

nhion tor following pollc1es s1m11sr to those ot Yugoslavia, a

"revisionist" country. It viewed Russi~ support of Yugoslavia

as representing a "dangerous trend". ~t held .that both the UJSR

and ~ugoslav1a had betrayed the fundamentals or ~arx1sm-~eniniam by supporting "peaceful transition t~ socialism" and championing

a poli.C1 of ••peaceful co-existence .. with the imperialists in 9

internatioual affairs.

lhe Joviet reaction to all these cr1 tici sms was naturally

quite sharp. ln a state~ent the Joviet Government accused China

or "staking the lives of hundreds of millions of people, includ-10

ing the Chinese people, in a thermonuclear wnr". It charac-

terized the Chinese view on the use of nuclear weapons as •anti-, . .

f"arxist, ant1-L•n1n1st, inhuman". It drev attention to the in­

gratitude ot the Chinese leaders in abustn« t..,e Soviet ~len tor

possessing nuclear arms and in forgetting t~at by Virtue ot 1ts

nuclear strength :tussia had in raot helped "China's peaoetul 11

construction at home by protecting lt". ln another statement

8 J.1i. 1bl. tuestism ,g( §;&lin... (?ek1n6: Foreign Languages Press, 1963;, PP• 1-ao.

9 "ls Yugoslavia a .3oo1aliat Oountr11", lW \:gnimutl11J1& china ~cast, no. 104, 2 ~ovember 1963, PP• 99-110.

10 ft'd,n; i&Ue:w, Yol. 6, no. 36, 6 .ieptember 1963, p. 22.

ll lb14., p~. 20-21.

56

or, P.1 oepten,ber 1003 the. Soviet ~overno:ent aocused ~hina ot

·~pocrisy•. lt said that China ~~s t1&ding itself 1solnted

1h the tece or overwhelm1n6 world opinion in favour or the lest-1.2

Ban J.renty.

An article 1n Kom~~uolst on 1.3 vctober 1~3 described

Chir.a as a country which was anti-Marxist 1n theory, which wns

guilty of fostering a persanali ty cult, which sought to n:a1n­

ta1n internal tensions in the sphere or foreign affairs, and

whic~ bPtrqy~d want of taith in the role of t~e socialist camp

as the ~ost effective instrument ln the d•velopment of the 13

modern world.

•-tas the Zest-Ban Treaty of 1963 the cause or the CQI'lse-14

quence of the 3ino-Jov1et rit't'i Xhere can be two opinions

an this subject. lt 1tay be said that if

one sought to compare the ia:portance of the ;fest-.aan with other issues exacerbating Jino-Joviet relations prior t-;» July 1~3, 1 t wuulu be d1tt1oult to point to any other that so ccnsistently gnawed at what both sides reaarded as their vital interests, whose sy~bolic and material significance was so areat in itself, or whose ram1t1catiaos penetrated so Ean1 areas of the dis• pute. (16)

l2 ~·or the text of the statement of 21 September 1963, see ~.b. Griffith, ed., 1ha ~-Jov1tt ~ (Cambridge, ~ss., 1~), pp. 426-61.

13 ''Marxism-Leninism Is the Basis for tho Unity of the Con:tr:uni st :/ovettent 11

, .&01tmun1 gt ( !4oscov), 18 Uct ober 1963. Also see Grift1 th, n. Ja, P• 467.

14 '.•ial ter C. Cleamens1 Jr., "The Nuclea:r l'est-Ban and Sino• Soviet Relations• in ~·orton K. Halperin, ed., §1D.Q-3ovi•t ~tlej1gn• aw1 ~ Cmtrol (Cal"lbridge, Jla.ss., 1967), pp. 57-58.

1! lb1d., p. 155. For • detailed discussion, see dalter c. Cle~UI'Iens, Jr., .lb!:. .!l::u ~ IIUl Jlnsl-Soviet Btlatlonl

(Contd. on next page)

J

57

As the ~lno-'lovlet di $PUte widE~ned into a r1 tt, one

noticed increasing U"l-Joviet co-operation in the n:.atter or halt­

ing nucl~ar proliferation and other, related issues. In short

there was a let-up in the ~old War. Correspondingly China's re­

lations with tho Ur.ited States, ~lready hostile, further deter•

iorated. China had no alten1ative but to oppose the. United

~tates. the Ur.ited 3tates, too, on its part felt the need to

take a tough line towards China. lhi s was because China, being

dissatisfied w1th the situation brouiht about by the limited

ragprocbtUGIQt between the United Jtates and the Joviet lka.i.ca1

atter the test-Ban lreaty, was looking out tor an o~portun1ty to

thwart what it regarded as a design by the two Juper Powers to

impose their ~11 on the rest of the world.

II. ~bine•r Attitude After thR SimlQ.I ot tbe Test-Dan Ireaty

China's violent r•~ct1cn to the signing of the Test-Ban

Treaty might s••~ at first 91ght as a protest sg~tnst the poli­

cies or disarmament followed by the United Jtates and the lovlet

Union. . It, however, one cor.siders the sequence of events closely

and makes a detailed study or the evolution of China's attitude

towards nuclear weapons during the sixties and seventies, one

can see what exactly was at stake. J.be .1eat-aan .L'reaty demons­

trated China • s isolation in the world. ChiMl felt that its voice

vas not be1n& hearu as muoh it ought to be an account of the new

(~tanfora, Calif. 1 lhe Hoover lnst1 tut1or.. on ~~ar, Revo­lution, and Peace, 1968).

68

balance or power that was coming into being. lt, there1'ore, de­

cided apoo a change or •trategy. 6ven a literal reading ot

the Chinese statement or 31 July would show ~hina's basic politi­

cal !illrPOSe is opposing the treaty. ~h.Lna arguecU

The central purpose ot this treaty is, throUJh a partial ban on nuclear tests, to prevent all the threatened peace-loving count­ries, includfol ~)dna, ~ ingreaainc ~bet~ detencl gapab111tr, .a2 ~ lll& lilited Jtates me. ~ mm:e. unbridled .W. .tbr•a.ttDin&: aDJ1 bJ,ac]sma1l,1ng tbeac gouptrJ.ea. (16)

It felt that Its interests bad been sold out by the Soviet

UnlCI'l and that the ~oviet Union had made an ally or the United 17

3tates "to oppose China". tllable to hide its d1ssat1stact1on

about t~~ •••rcence of a nev balance or power, it ar~ued that the

Urited States, the 3ovlet Union, and Brit31n--the nuclear Powers

that had signed the ~est-Ban Ireaty--were atterept1ng to "consoli­

date their nuclear monopoly and bind the hands ot ~11 the peace-18

loving countries subJected to the nuclear threat". It even

teare4 that the nuclear Powers ~ight try to isolate 1t and even

encircle 1 t. 'Ihus, 1 t perceived tbe new balance ot power that

appeared to be emerging with the dominance of the two Dig fowars

in mutual. co-operation as 41rected against its interests.

16

17

18

ieop~ ,gL 1hJ. @grlsJ Unite •• •t n. 1, P• 2. j8r.pbaa1s_ Added. It U~ alone possessed nuclear weapons, and.others, in­cluding China, were denied the right to acquire them, they would be subject to the pressures or the UJA. As the USA, in Chin~•• Yiev, was an aggressive power active in areas an China's periphery, China would be particularly vulnerable to U'J nuclear blaclm!ail.

Ibid., PP• 3-4.

Ibid., P• 1.

59

China helet that the prohibition ot nuclear weapats and the

outlawing ot nuclear war were ~ajor questtor.s affecting the

destiny or all countries, big And small. It argued that such

questions should not be decided exclusively by a re~ nuclear 13

?over•.

~ 2 August the Chinese Pr1u:e lc~in1ster,Cbou. t:tn•la1, sent

letters to all heads or Uavern~ent in an etrort obviously to

acquaint them with his country's positiCil as regards nuclear

prol1terat1on and to trust~ate the OJ-soviet etdesian" by appro­

priate steps on the political level. lhe letter suggested a

conference ot all heads ot Governmer1t "to discuss the question

of complete, thorough, total and resolute prohloitian and des­

truet1Cil ot nuclear veapCilsn. lt proposed that nall countries

in t,ea world, both nuclear and non-nuclear, lshoulsii solemnly

declare that they will prohibit and destroy nucle~r weapons

corpletely, thoroughly, totally and resolutely- and that in order

to fulfil tht!t above 'mdertaldngs step by step, they should dis­

mantle all military bases, establish nuclear-weapons-tree ~ones,

retrain frOf'l" e)tporting or importin~ nuclear vaapcna, and cease

all nuclear tests. (20)

China knew that a u:eeting of heads of vovernment ;.ras .not

practicable. .i:ven then 1 t called tor such a meeting bec.ause 1 t

1e Ibid. ~or rrel!ier Chou at-lai' s letter ot ~ H.ugust .1.963 to all heads or uovernmer.t, ibid., PP• 7-8. ·

20 lbid.

tiO

.felt that it serve\~ the iiOlitical ~urpcse ~t" avpearinJ to clotu­

j4.on the CI.U.a.Se Of 1' .. on-nuc:lear COU&tries, both big and sa;all. lts

'1f!JO':ll tor a rteetJ.I~6 c..r heads ot Jovez·nment was also part ot ita

strategy oi"' t'ominJ u :•uu1 ted frc-.r.t rt and ot isolating the Uni t~d.

.,tates, 1£ possible, troa.. countries l1ke ~·rnnoe. .Ln the event

ot 1ts projiosal beil46 a.::.lepted, with a nuclear at·taok being

•o~holly ruled out, Oh1na would be almost 1.nv1nc1ble with its 21

la.rge any equipped with cooventiorel weat>oos. £iny reJection

·or the proposal, an the other hand, would leave China free to

P'lr~u~ 1 ts o~m search tor nuolear weapons.

Htfl UJ :loVP.l"'nrrer,t CAtftJiorlzed the ~hinesa proposal as

Ul'Jt"f!Al19t1e, and ga1d that 1t did not rrer1t serious attention.

A ~-~ ~-R!Q &ditorial on 2 hUgust lJ63 justified the

Chine~e staJ~d on lines s1m1l~r to those or the article published

Ul 31 Jul1 l~. lt criticized the United Jtates ror dividing

the countries of tne liorld into two categories, nuclear and. non­

nuclear, ano. tor placing the r.on-nuclear countries at the a:erey

ot the nuclear £-lowers. ~'hat hurt China most was what l<oacow' s

readiness •to strike a bar~n' with the 1a:perialists. lt was

worried over its own security although, tor public oonsuapt1cn,

it pretended tr•t the whole world was in danger of uS nuclear ?.2

b.lscklna11.

21 ~or arguments on similar 11neq, see Leo Yuen-yun Liu, Cbioa &a & ~uglear fQyer ~ Norld .fpliti;a (Londao, 1972), P• 27.

?.~ See editorial entitled "People or the ·.:orld Jr.ite: :Jtt'!Ve for tttt~ ~Oilplete Prohibition ar.d I'horou.~h !';estract1on ot

-Nuclear :,ie~por:n'J", :lm:J.-mln. .a.h-.R~Jb 2 ttUJUst 1363. Repro­duced in i·c'<'in~; Reyiey, vol. 6 1 no. 21 9 .t~ugust 1~, p. ~.

dl

A ·aienc:ratiLJii-RaQ: edi tor1al on 3 ~t~\li.Ust cr1 t1c1zed the

Soviet titlior. for "selling out'' to the Oni ted .itates. lt expres­

sed China's conce~ about the new balance ot power emerging trom

the Cup David talks. China felt thteJt th1a new balance gave

clear 1ncl1cat1on or tbfll 1ntent1 Ol'l or th@ ttli ted ltates and the

Soviet UniCil to proceed along the ,.path of US-Soviet co-operatim ?.3

to dominate the world". It saw itself a~ the victim of the

understanding that the two Super Powers had reached between them­

selves:

It is most obvious that the tripartite treat1 is aimed at tying China's hands. !he Ud representative to the Mosco~ talks has said. publicly that the United Jtates, Britain, and the .3oV1et Union were able to arrive at an agreement, because ~we could work to&ether to prevent vh1••a getting a nuclear capability••. ~ecentlJ, while tratemizing idth o. J. 1m9er1a11am on the a:ost lnti.-te terms, the aoviet leaders and the Jovlet pres• gnashed their teeth in their bitter hatred towards socialist China. Xhey use the same languaae as o. J. imperialism's to abuse ~h1na. llli.A 1s a UJ-Jovlet alliance against China pure ar.d simple. (24)

Understandably China gave oansiderable attention to •ex­

posing~ how the treaty only helped the United 3tates w.lthout in

any way reducing the danger or a nuclear war. the treaty bad

binding :torae m noo-nuclear Power only. The Un1 ted States vas

still tree to .carry out underground nuclear tests, and the treatJ

helped legalize US actions. the ULited qtates argued that the

?3 Jr1ft1th, n. 12, PP• 94-95.

24 Ibid., p. 95. Kmphas1s added.

China saw in the signing or the treaty a change in the world balance of power unfavourable to it. lt held that tbe 0~ and tbe USSR primarily aimed at dep­rivin& it or its right to acquire a nuclear capability.

62

treaty was the first step towards peaee. China challenged thi a

View. It said .that tt only aggravated tho danger ot a nuclear

var. wnat was worse, tt regarded it as·canstituting "a political a5

deal" betwettll the two nuclear Powers.

f'ekir•& 1 ssued a statement on l6 August in reply to the

o3oviet statement ot 3 August. ln this statement 1t spolt out

its opposition to the various provisions or the lest-Ban lreaty.

China took the line that the newly euer;:ing balance ot

power pre3udiced its le&1t1mate interests. It reiterated that

1 t "would not tolerate the ccnclus1m1 in disregard of China • s

opposition, of any sort or treat1 between the Joviet Jovernmen·t

and the United States which aimed at deprivina the Chinese people

of their right to take steps to resist the nuclear threats of UJ

1mper1alln". It pointed out l-tov Its repented warnings 1n the

matter had gone unheeded. It said that the 3ov1et.Uh1on bad

"brazenly ganged up with the imperialist bandits in exertin& 26

·pressure on Chin~".

China also gave sutt1c1ent indication that it was deter­

ained to develop nuclear veapc:11s. lt declared:

luclear weapons in the posse ali on or a social! st countr1 are always a means ot <1etenoe against nuclear blackmail and nuc­lear war. ao long as the iii'Zper1al1 sts retuae to ban nuclear veapgns1 the greater t·f'\e number ot social! st coWl tries possess­ing them, tbe better the auarantee ot world peace. (27)

26 J. bid..

26 Sea ftopla At 1ha wgrld Uo1tt•••t n. 1, P• 3o.

21 Ib14., p. P.a.

rurthermore, China ar&ued that .in t1&htinl aa;creaaian and defend­

ing its security every Social1 st country must needs req in the

firat place an its own defence capability. It said that Just

because the Soviet Union possessed nuclear weapons, other Social­

ist countries could not be told to deny themselves the right to 29

increase their defence capabilities.

China sharply o.r1t1cized the UD stand. In its view the

tm1ted States wanted a ban on nuclear tests tor its own benefit.

It said that the world situation was untavourable to the United

Jtates and that wh1le retaining the ~eans of "~ass1ve retalia­

tion"' the United Jtates was seeking to carry out its "strategy

ot flexible response", which meant "prepar1og tor both nuclear

war and conveLtional war and both continuing the development of

stratecic nuclear weapons as a means ot nuclear blackmail and

threats and enercetically developing tactical nuolear weapar.~s in 2~

preparation tor launch1n& 'limited nuclear wars• when necessary".

China maintained that the Un1 ted States ahoulcl b~ar full responsi­

bility tor the pollution ot the atmosphere. It accused the

United States or being engaged '''fr.·enziedlytt in the expansion of

nuclear armaments. The treaty, it insisted, did not hurt or

hinder the tlni te4 states, for it had freedom to conduct about 30

eighty per cent of the nuclear tests it deemed necessary.

28 Ibid., P• 21.

29 lb1d., P• 15.

~o lbia., p. 18.

As to the quest1oo or nuclear prollferntion, ClUna main­

tained tbat the UJ objective was to qrnanacle all socialist count-31

ries other than the aov1et Union"'. lt sa.id that there 11.tas

hardly an.v relaxat1an of tensions in the international s1tuat1oo.

~umerous taots show that, in the struggle a6ainst 1u.per1aliam, relaxation that is won thro11gh strug&le 1s a genuine relaxation, while relaxaticx1 brought by capitulation 1s a false relaxation. Xhe so-called relaxation now appearing between the United Jtates and the Joviet Union is only a transient and superficial pbeno­l.enon and a false relaxation.... {;;2)

China cont1nued to ara1nt.ain that 1 t supported d.estructian of all

nuclear weaPQDS and renewed 1 ts appelll tor a world conference

tor the deatructim. of nuclear weapons.

Earlier, too, there were critical comments in the Chinese

Press. (~ corrmentary put out by the .New C~ina t.;e1o~s Agency (!:CJJA)

criticized the us polley as an attempt ror ~world-vide aggres­

sion based oo ••• LiiJ positicm of nuclear strength". The US pur­

pose, it alleged, ,.,as to prevent the 1ocial1st countries other 33

t~an the Jov1et Union from increasing their nuclear strength.

P.'any mass rallies were organized in China. i~t all these

rallies the iest-Ban Ireaty was denounced as a fraud. China's

~~ssive propaganda vas aimed at attracting the attention o£ the

other countries or the world and to impress upon them that the

treaty did ~ot serve their interests and th3t it only helped tbe

31 1 bid. , P• 21.

32 Ibid., p. 24.

33 §gryex g! China tltinland f.rtss (~) ( Hongkong), no. 30271 26 July 1~, P• 33.

65

34 nuclear i'owers.

ChiD•'s Wgrld yuSlook &Qcl ;ltraSe~y

1:he 'i.'est-Uan -~.reaty a&gravated the 31no-Jov1et conflict.

China lost all hope that thP. Soviet Union would corte to its

rescue in the event of an A~eriean attack. It nlso ruled out

the possibility of its realizing its national objectives like

the recovery of :'a!van tdth the support of the Joviet Union. It

saw tttat the 1ntemat1onal scene was increasingly be1n~ dorr:i­

nated by the tvo Super Powers and that thia meant that its own

options were getting circumscribed at a ti~e when its national

obJectives bad not yet been realized. r.aturally, therefore, it

beca~e an anti•ata~~~ ~ Fover. lt became necessary for it to

take a fresh view cr the world in terms of the ~Aoist world 35

outlook.

~hlna's appreciation of the world situation at th1s time

could be sWUted up in 1doolo&ical term a as follows. The Uni tea

3tates was China's principal enemy, ar.d China should, thereto~e,

.torm the "broadest tm1 teet froot" against the Un1 ted States. lt

should also mobilize the countries ot Asia, Africa, and Latin

~mer1ca as these, too, were oppressed by ua imperialism. It was

35

Ibid., no. 3034, 7 August 1963; tbld., no. 3037, 12 August 1J63; ibid., no. 30441 21 Augu1t 1963; and JPR.l CO[muniat China ntc•at, no. 100, 1963, PP•

Yichael B. Yahuda, "Chinese Foreign Policy Arter 1363~1 ChiOi ~uarterlv (London), r.o. 36, OCtober-December 1968, p. 93.

66

necessary in the interest of ach1ev1n~ econ~~c and political

independence to co-operate and unitedly fight imperialism and 36

eolooial1sm both old and new.

China's ~ain strategy was to adopt a militant posture in

international affairs, to emphasize the importance of national

liberation wars, to underestimate the power of the United Jtates,

to highlight the ca1trad1ctions in the u.; camp, and to cultivate

the countries located in a zooe consisting or burope, vceana, and ' 37

Canada, a zcx1e which it calle~ the "secood intermediate zone".

Y"I 27 uecember 1~, an X.~.NA correspondent wrote that as the

year 1003 was drawing to a close, '•the multilateral contradic­

tiells arron~ the western imperial! st Powers - namely the Un1 ted

States, Britain, trance and ~est Germany - remain as acute as 38

ever".

C~ina lacked the necess3ry military and economic components

or power to bP. heard in the world arena. So 1t placed the accent

on As1Bn-Atrican solidarity in t~e hope of gaining pol1t1eal

leverages.

In tArch 1964 China Vigorously supported the cause of

usian•A.frican solidarity at the sixth session or the Atro-~sian

36 lor the Chinese delegate's speech at Al&iers on 24 ~~rch la&~, see 2Qfi, nu. 3138, 31 Y~rcb 1964, PP• 29-34.

37 .8d1 torial1 im-&n Ull-lt&Q, 2~ January 1964. Reproduced in fekJ.o& BeVitYt vol. 6, no. 6, 31 January 1964, PP• lO­ll.

38 ~, no. 31311 3 Januar1 1964, P• 3?.

67

Jol1dar1ty ~ouncil bela in Algiers. lhe Chinese delegate refer­

red to the OJ "political intrigues" in new countries, to US inter­

ference in the ir.ternal affairs or other countries, and to the

Uu attempts at subversioo of governztents. rie ar6ued against ex­

clusive reliance a1 the principle of ,,a)eacetul co-existence with

imperialism". He said that such reliance amounted to keeping 39

themselves perpetually under enslavement. Kuo Chien, the

Chinese delegate to the conference, raised the Test-Ban issue.

He ssld that h1 s country regarded the prevention of nuclear l!.-&r

and defence of world peace as matters of Vital interest to peo­

ples throughout the world and that qll countries were entitled 40

to CCI'ltr1 bute to that end.

A preparatory meeting tor the Second African-Asian Can­

terence was held at Jakarta on l0-15 April 1964. ln a speech

there on ll April China's Vice-Premier, Cbe !1, charged that the

imperialists beaded by the United. States were "carrying out an

all-out arms expansion, stepping up preparations tor a nuclear

war, and practis1ns nuclear mooopolJ and blackmail". He, there­

tore, stressed the need tor unit¥ among all Asian-African 41

countries. un 18 April an editorial in i~Q-~ ilh·R&a said

that the preparator,y meeting was a great success. In its vlev

1 t said that the meeting s1gn1tied the victor¥ ot the Bandung

39 Ibid., no. 3188, 31 March 1964, p. 30.

40 Ibid., P• 34.

41 ~ CpmmuoJnt Qbina Qicewt, no. 122, 16 June 1964, P• R.

42 spirit to fight "imperialism, colanialism, neo-colonialism".

China • s strateu ot forging a united troot against the

United States received ccr,aiderable support during eremler Cbou

&l·la.1 1 s trip to Asia and Africa 1n 1964. lt adopted this

strate&J largely in response to the developing detent• between

the UsA and the USSR, Pek1nc appeared to have convinced itself

that this doteota was a hindrance in the vay or the realization

ot what it regarded as its basic interests.

III. y. s. Re&gtims to Chinese Staterr:enta gn Teet-Ban and lt• IwplicatiQDG

It was obviously in the cante~t ot this developing dia­

logue with the Soviet Union that, 1n a speech at the American

University, Washington, D.c., on 10 June, President John F.

Kennedy gave a tor~al call tor making serious efforts to end the

Cold war, which bad bedevilled us-ossa relati<ma. Pointing out

that the 3ov1et Union and the United States had started necotia­

ting for a partial Test-Ban Treaty, he stressed the common areas

ot co-operation between the two countries. He said& "JUnoog tho

man7 traits our two peoples have 1n common, nOlle is stronger

than our mutual abhorrence ot war.... ~The_7 USA and its allies

have a ~utuslly deep interest in a just and aenuine peace and ln 43

halting the arms race". He said that he regarded agree~ents

to tb~t end as being in the interest or both the comtr1es. He

42 lrmtJ. ~ Hatabpa &u. Accugx, no. 2269, 18 April 1964, P• 11.

43 pog,.euts m. American fgrtim Belatigps1 la§i! (Rev York: Council an Foreign Relations, 1964), p. 119.

69

declared that even the most hostile nation could be relied upon

to honour its tre~tty obligations which coocerned its nat1mal 44

interest.

In contrast, tbe Americans regarded China as the greatest

danger to independent natioos. Roger K1llsman 1 Ua Assistant

Secretar.y tor Far Saster.n Atta1rs, said in a speeob that the

United Btates could not look an idly while communi sa; was tak1na

over .Asia. •For this reason we do raot recognize CommWl1st China

and seek in all possible wa,ys to llm1t the ability of Communist

China to implement its threat to obtain hegemony in the Far 46

A&st", he ad.ded.

Even before the cCilclusion of the rest-Ban Treaty, the

United States had realized that the Sino-Soviet dispute bad

developed into a major rift. Ott1c1al US sources traced the

or1c1n of the dispute to the Soviet withdrawal. of economic and

Military &ld to China. Though they saw tba dangers as well as

the opportunities afforded by the r1tt, they ~de lt clear that

1n their view China was more "belligerently aggressive~ than 46

the 3oT1et Union.

The United States did foresee that the Test-Ban Treaty

would provoke criticism tr~ many countries ot the world, and

yet it signed it. Xhis was because it wanted to avail itself

44 Ibid.

45 Dppart•10t ~ 9tatt gullt~iOt vol. 491 no. 1254, 8 July 19631 P• 43.

46 Ibid., vol. 49, no. 1265, 16 July 19631 P• 82.

70

or tbe benefit or the aino-doviet ritt along with reducing the

danger of a nuclear war. lt knew that China wanted to develop

nuclear weapons, but it assumed that China vould take "some

years, maybe a decade" to become a tull-tledaed nuclear Power.

i'he Chinese atenace" was, however, a major coocern of the United

States at this time. Kennedy said an l August 1963a

••• ve assess its power at 700 million people ••• surrounded by countries which are in every case but one, ~uch smaller, which are raced with very difficult geographic and social problems, which do not have a strc:mg natiocal history. So that we find a great, powerful force in China, organized and directed ~y the govern~ent along Stalinist lines, surrounded by weaker countries. So this ve regard as a menacing situation. (47)

Chinese statements and the 31no-Sov1et rift vere discussed

more openly by UJ officials after the signing or the Test-Ban

treaty. Averell HBrri~an said 1n a National Broadcasting Corpora­

tion television interview on 28 July that one ot the reasons vhy

the doviets signed the treaty was "their relations with Pekingu.

He said that each was issuing long letters. "Jo we lmov pre~t.v

muoh what their differences are. But 1t does seem as if the

Soviet union wanted to make this a~reement tor some reaacm because

ot th~ o~flict which quite obviously exists". The US Secretary

or State, .Dean Husk, taking part in the same discusaioo, said

that he believed in the usefulness or peaceful co-existence with

the U3SR. He argued that there was a "common interest" bet"'•en

the Un1 ted States and the USSR in avoiding war. In an indirect

47 Rhoder1c VacFa~qubar, ed., ~Ame~i;an Belat1gns, liii-lm (New Y'orll:, 1972) 1 p. 200.

71

reference to China he said that those having nuclear weapons

had a "much more direct and operational sense ot what a nuclear 48

war rr:eans" than those who did not poss~ss such weapons.

Qn 31 July, in a speech before the l•t1onal Press Club,

Harriman traced the 31no-3ov1et dispute to the 3ov1et withdrawal

ot technical assistance and other such issues. Re said that

since the.Cuban crisis both countries had spoken "pretty rough

thin:&s about each other - and sc>me rtore this morning about th1 s

test-ban treaty". He referred to the Chinese description of the

treaty as a fraud perpetrated by Khrushchev and as a sell-out . 49

to the imperialists.

The course of the Sino-Soviet rift after the treat)' and

the bitter exchanges between the two Co~unist giants confirmed

the US new that the Soviet Union was clashing with China over

the 1 ssue or nuclear weapons and vas, therefore, under a compul­

sion to behave more responsibly. Harriman pointed out how

Khrushchev and the CPSU had repeatedly declared their determina­

tion to preserve the peace ot the world, and added: n ••• vhereas

China is the Cllle that is dangerous, the Chinese communists are

the ones that are going to lead the world to nuclear holocaust, ·so

and that is what is the major issue betv .. n them".

Jimultaneously the ~merioans realized that, China's capa­

city beillg 111Rited, 1t vas necessary not to allow any feeling

48 Dtpartnnt ~ Statt IJulletin, vol. 49, no. 1259, 12 AU&uat 1003, P• 244.

49 Ibid., vol. 491 no. 1260, 19 August 1963, p. aao. ·so Ibid.

?2

ot panic to develop among the countries of As1a in regard to

China's capability. Analys1n6 the Views of Ud otticials, a

senior columnist, iact Ssul.c, wrote in the Bu lW IiEta of 31

July, after China's bitter criticism ot the iest-Ban j,'l"eaty,

that he agreed with the Yiew that despite its 1solat1oo as a

result ot the treat7, China would not commit any major agcres­

s1CI'l 1n Asia and that it would continue to adhere to its policy ·

ot nmin1mum risks" in tore1gn attairs. qe linked China's reluc­

tance to take risks in foreign affairs to its "failures" at the

home tront. U3 ott1cials publicly maintained that even if China

developed nuclear weapons 1n the sixties, it would not be a 61

maJor event in nsia or in world politics.

lbe United Jtates re&arded China's pronoWlccments on the

Iest-Ban Xreat1 as demonstrating aggressive tendencies. It,

bowev•r• appeared to belittle the danger or China's coming into

possession ot nuclear weapons. It did so because it found lt

obviously advantaceous politically to array more countries

a&ainst China bJ showiftg up its aggressiveness. It also saw the

wisdom ot under-playing the threat that China posed to other

comtr1es 1n Asia. lt did not want to do or say anything that

might exaccerate the strength or China and compel the Asian

natlc:t1s to eare to tems w1 th China and recognize 1t aa the pre­

dominant force in Asia.

en· 20 August 1963 !loger Hilsman summed up the UJ Yiew of

the danger posed b7 China. He said that the "tacade or Communist

51 Iad Szulc in II.¥ .IW li•ea, 5 August 1963.

73

China" was "bold nnd dangerous-looking". All' tbe same, he telt

that the Chinese power was dwindling as a "selt .. servlng leader-52

ship" was "set in opposi tlon to the re1t of humanity". Presi-

dent Kennedy warned on the one hand that it China continued to

pursue the same old policies 1n the sixties,· it could "create a

potentially more dangerous situatioo than an.v we L-ha.veJ faced

alnce the en4 or the second war". ne also maintained, en the

other band, tbat there was no indication ot a maJor· flare-up in 63

Asia leading to a direct ccntlict v.ith the United dtates.

the military 1mpl1oat1ans of a possible nuclear explosion

by China were discussed in detail in the United States. The US

Administration's various perceptions, some ot which might appear

to be a little too dialectical, may be set torth briefly, as

follows. Ull policy-a;akers were conY1nced that China was in bad

shape owing partly to the So'Yiet v1 tbdrawal of' ald. and partly to.

the failure on the ~ame front and that it the situation d1d not

improve soon enough from China •s point or new it migbt be. unable

to mount major military operations. And yet they thought that

they needed to watch China rather carefully as it was a "sutfi­

ciently strong llilitary t'ower'', a Power capable of embarking

upon some "reckless, even desperate actions" if they pressed it

too bard. though they ruled out China • s emergence as a cajor

JU.litary power "in the foreseeable future", yet they conceded ita

jltpartment 14. State Dulletin, vol. 49, no. 1263, 9 September 1963, p. 387.

53 See report an the Ud President's news conference or 1 August 1963, 1n ld.x IW Iimta, 2 ~u&Ust 1963.

74

capability to explode a nuclear device and pose a potential 54

threat.

oa ott1c1als stressed in particular the difference bet­

ween the ab1li ty to develop a first test device and the ability

to deliver .nuclear weapons on foreign targets. It was not too

ditticult tor a country like China to develop a first test de•

vice, but it r1gbt take many years tor it to develop the ability

to deliver nuclear veapons on targets in tar-orr countries. In

view of this, vhat policy-makers were worried over was the psy­

chological rather than the ~ilitary etfect ot a possible nuc-55

lear explosion by China. They did not believe that the

Chinese would acquire the capability to deliver nuclear weapons

outside the 9eripbery of their country tor a long.time and thus

pose a military danger to the ~est. lhey, however, felt that a

nuclear device in the hands ut China mi.;ht Wlduly awe the

nations of Asia an~ make the~ accept China as a force stronc

enouah to be reckoned. with 011 a par with the Juper Powers.

Another subJect that occupied the minds ot UJ pol1C1•

l'!lakers at this time WlS the impact of the .lino-lovfet rift on

world affairs. There were ~any interpretations. Dean Rusk felt

that there waa no "complete break• between China and the lovlet

Union althoueh the dispute between them was "tunda~ental and

tar~reachtn~, errbrae1ng ideology, strugele tor influence 1n other

54 -For the text of itoger Hllnan • s speech ot 20 August 1963, see Dtartment .Qf.Jjati Bulltt~, vol. 49, no. 12631 9 September 1 · 1 PP• 386- •

55 lbid., P• 389.

75

parts or the world, econ01'.1e interests, stato relat1Cilsh1ps, md 56

per1onal rivalries". Roger Bllsman, in a speech an 25 January 57

1964, characterized the dispute as a "serious" one. During

tbe initial stages of the cantlict, the United States thought it

best to exercise caution in analysing the 1~pl1cat1ons or the

split. Rusk said Cll lO Jeptember 1963: "• •• we should not take

cheap comtort troe that historic break. It eliminates none of

the dancers that hang over us and makes none or our 1mmecU.nte 58

tasks •ppreciably easier". un the otber hand, lhomaa L. Hughes,

Director ot Intelligence and Basearcb, sa1d on 8 June 1964 that

"a talUng out among our pote11tial enemies" WI a welcOile deve­

lopment, one that called tor a tlexible response on the part or 69

the ~1 ted States.

Besides deriving sat1stactton trom the l1no-Sov1et spl1 t,

the On1ted States made its own assessment or tho views of the

two sides and expressed its clear preference tor. the Soviet view

J in so tar it recognized the dangers of a nuclear wnr and the

desperate need tor peace in the world. It also judged the Views

ot the two sides 1n the light of their bearing an the relations

between the Communist bloc and itselt. Xhe Chinese wanted the

.oiociaUst countries to take a militant lir.e towards the .-.est.

56 lbid., vol. &O, no. 1.2135, 10 iebruary 1964, P• 193.

57 Ibid.., vol. 60, no. 1286, 17 ~·ebruary 1364, p. 247.

68 lb1d.' Yol. 49, no. 1R66, 30 Jeptember 1963, p. 4~.

59 Ibid., vol. 51, no. 1306, 6 July 1964, P• 11.

76

lbe Jov1ets were J.r1c11ned to try peaceful co-existence. dS the

Jov1et View liias tar less hostile, the Uui ted Jtates naturall.Y

hoped that the Soviets would prevail over the ~hinese within tbe

c~~un1st bloc. ausk sa1da

To tbe extent that the dispute is about m111tanc.v versus sen·u1ne peaceful co-en stence, we prefer recogn1 tion ot the dancers ot war 1n this nuclear age. The Joviets have not abandoned their basic goal ot world reYolut1on, nor have they renounced all terce tor the settlement of international disputes. Nevertheless, ve think they show a better understanding than the Chinese com­munists or th~ d~ngers and m~aning or nuclear war. (60)

On the whole, U3 policy-makers .telt that a possible nuc­

lear oxplos1on by China would be dangerous though they realized

that it would take a lon' time for Chlr.a to achieve soph1st1cated

development in the area or nuclear weapons. Tbe7, therefore, did

not CQDs1der Ohina as important as the Jov1et Union. Unlike

~hina, the Joviet Union recognized the necessit7 ot dettn~O with

the United Jtates. Moscov•s voice obviously carried more weight

in UJ circles, tor it was tbe more powerful of the two anta­

gonists.

IV. China's 21i&tepants After Ita luclea~ p.tqnatign QD 1§ Ugtobgr li§i

China•s vehement protest against the Test-Ban rreaty made

it clear that it would develop a nuclear capability of its om

to undo the et.fects or the treaty. Indeed China never made any

effort to hide 1~• aBb1t1ans 1n the ~uclear field. The question

before 1 t was not whether it should possess nuclear weapoos but

how som it rr1ght acquire them. It Jmev fully well ·that its

60 Ibid., vol. so, no. 1P.B5, 22 Januar1 1964, p. 193.

77

cap•b111t7 would be limited, that it ~1ght not be able to com­

m~nd tor a long time the necessary means for the deliverJ of

nuclear weapons, and that, therefore, instant change in the

world balance or power was out or the question. And yet it vent

ahead with its plans and exploded its first nuclear device on

16 uctober l.J64. ubviousl.v it meant this explos.lol'l to aerve as

a political weapon tbat vould produce a psycbolog1cal ottect ~1

the world.

Chilla • s statements after th1a event throw Ught on a

number ot issues 1n its fore1&n policy. fJur concern with them

here ia or course llliited. to their implications tor S1no-U3

relations.

ln the ver7 first state~ent that Chlna issued atter ex­

ploding its first nuclear device, it declared tbat it was "con­

ducting nucle.ar tests and .developing nuclear wespcns under

c~puls1onn. It !&1d that it could not afford to remain •tdle

in the race or ever-increasing nuclear threats from the United 61

States".. It criticized the United States tor seeking ever

greater perfection in nuclear tests, tor stationing submarines

in Japan, and tor trying to blackmail smaller nations. However,

it assured the world. that its aim was wholl,y to ensure its own

securit.v. 11Cb1na is developing nuclear weapons tor detence and

tor protectinc the ..;hinese people tr0111 OJ threat a to launch a

61 For the statement of the Cbinese aovernment issued on 16 vctober 19641 see Drtak 1ha tiugloar nQOopgll, 111m!· DAb. huc;ltar Weapcma (Peking: lt"'oreign Languages Press, 1365), P• l.

6a nuclear war".

78

l.'he Ur~ited Jtates characterised. the event as a trage~.

lt espec1all1 deplored China •s dec1a1on to divert its scarce

resources to the development ot• a. costl.J weapon.

A lln-mln ~-RaA editorial an 22 vctober expressed satis­

faction that China had broken the nuclear monopoly or the United

States. It referred to the ~u3 Seventh Fleet's actions" at the

very door or China, as also to alleged on attempts at nuclear

bl~c~A11. It argued:

3peak1ng frankly, China 1s not obsessed by the ldea or possess­ing nucle~r weapons. If 03 impor1al1sm did not develop them, China need not develop thee. aut as lan; as o.J. 1mper1al1am posseses nuclear b~bs, ;hina ~ust have them too. ~hether by deceit, intimidation or slander, Lyndon Johnsen cannot make the ~h1nese people alter this stand. {63)

~betber China turned nuclear because ot the Uo nuclear

threat or under some otber cor.pulsion ls a matter ot opinion.

•hat is clear from the Chinese statements 1s that the United

Jtates loOiied larce as a a1n1 ster force 1n Chinese eyes at th1 s 64

sta&••

62 lbid., P• 3. lhe arguments in Premier Chou's cable to heads or Government or the world on s1m1lar lines. Ibid., P• 10.

63 Ib1d., p. 16, tor the ~-~~~editorial or ?.P. October 1964.

64 Ibid. Accorcttnc to Halperin and Perkins, one baslc Chinese motive tor acquiring a nuclear capability was to reduce the likelihood of nuclear blackmail b.Y the United .1tates aca1nst China. See ~.A. Halperin and Dwight B. Perkins, Pcm:munist Sbio• 1114. Am.~ ~antrol (Nev York, 1965), P• 65.

?~ .

ln the various statements it issued after detonation

China ~ade several proposals for disarmament. aowever, the aim

ot the proposals was not ~uc~ to promote disarmament as to ex­

pose OS policies. Premier Chou Bn·lai in a cable to the various

heads ot Government of the vorld on 17 October 1964 called for

a stm~t.ftit cooterence of all the countries to promote COI'!lplete .

prohibition qnd thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. As a

first step he suggested an agreement areong the nuclear Powers

and potential nuclear Powers that they would not use nuclear

veapCX'ls against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-tree .zones or 65

against each other. At this t1&e China was isolated. lt

wanted (1) to mobilize the Ihird World against the U.ni ted .3tatea

and. {11) to restrain UJ activity around and. in the nei&hbourhood

of ~bina.

'l·he Jhinese uovarnment declared on 16 vctober that 1 t

would never "at ar~ time or under any circumstances be the first 66

to use nuclear weapons". It reiterated that it had acquired

nuclaar weapons solely ror self-defence and tor coWlter1ng U3 6?

nuclear threats. It sought throu~h its proposal tor a ban en

nuclear weapons to generate sufficient political pressure that

65 For Chou Bn-lai's communication d~ted 17 October 1964 to the various heads of Govern~ent, see Break ~ Nucle•~ ~900pol:v, illrinate f!JJSlern: !ttiRSHUh n. 6)), P• 9.

66 Ibid., p. 3, tor the statement of the Chinese Government dated 18 uctober 1964.

67 Ibid., p. 16, tor the ~-min ilb-~editor1al of 22 uctooer l~. ·

so

would deter the Oni ted 3tates tr~ using nuclear weapons. 'l'he

proposal was also ~eant as an answer to the A~erlcan de~and

that ~hlna should sign a test-ban treaty before proceeding with '68

other agreements.

~ editorial in i&D.-mn ah-JUUl on 22 ~ovembe~ 1964 dis­

cussed some of the pro9osals regarding arms control. It reJec­

ted the proposal tor a partial test-ban treaty an the ground

that such a treats would not prevent the Un1 ted Jtates from

continuing to use, manufacture, or stockpile nuclear weapons

or trom conaucting Wlderiround nuclear tests. It felt that

even a COIJiplete test-ban treaty would make no d1tterence. ior

one thing the United States had already acquired sufficient

techr~cal data to retain its nuclear monopoly. Secondly, a

total ban would only spread a talse sense ot security. As

regards the third proposal viz. the proposal tor the destruc­

tion ot delivery vehicles, the editorial conceded that the pro­

posa~ looked attract! ve, but pointed out hov 1 t could be ren­

dered 1nettect1ve by tbe use of ordinary aircraft to serve as

deliverJ vehicles. It, therefore, called for a no-first-use

a&reem~t among all nuclear Powers. It argued that the United

States in such a case vould be unable to intimidate others vi th 69

nuclear weapons.

68 Morton Halperin, Cbintst Jigclear :l;tratt&r 1 Iba iarlx .f.2l1 pttAPatigp ft&"1Ad (Londaru lnst1 tute ot Strategic Stuclies, 1965), Adelphi Paper no. 18, p. 11. .

69 Editorial, ~-mLn i!h-R&Q, 22 November 1964. lt was felt that the article showed some amount or sophistica­tion as regards armament proposals. See Halperin, n. 68, P• 10.

.t'rom China's comments on the various disarmament propo­

sals, we may infer some or tbe iEportant obJectives it had in

mind.

n.rst, the statements tmderllne Chino Is emphasis on selt­

rel1ance as a natiCilal policy. 'l'he detonation. was a loud affir­

mation or this policy or self-reliance. Indeed it represented

a resoundin~J success tor China's scient1t1c and technological

adYance in the nuclear field. Secondly, the statements bring out

China's emphasis on the ~self-defence" aspect. :birdly, China

wanted the explosion to sarYe as a psychological boost to tbe

cause ot "national liberaticn'•. l'he very first statement issued

by China after the detonation claimed that the success in the

nuclear tield was "a great encouragement to the revolutionary 70

people ot the world 111 their atruagle". China also sought

thro~h the explosion to boost the morale or its peoples to ex­

tend its influence within the COit!Lun1st bloc, and to burnish its 71

own image in Asia.

Though China appeared to make much ot the explosion, it

was under no illusion about the teat it had ach1eYed. The deto ...

nation was onlJ meant to achieve a political purpose b.v making

an !~pact on the psychology or both friend and roe. From the

mlli tary point or View 1 t was not sufficiently credible. The

70 Bee text or staterent dated 16 October 1964 issued by the Government of the People's ~epublic of China, 1n Break l{UOles~ ~~oggpoJ.r, Elidnate .Nuclear Jeapons, n. 61, P• a.

71 fl.. H. &lper1n mentions tour pr.lnc1pal Chinese objectives. See Halperin, n. 68, p. 3.

moderation thst was discernible 1n the Chinese statements was

perhaps intended to reduce the risk of prOYoking an Ar..:er1can

attack on China. It was also perhaps intended to allay the 72

tears or the smaller courttries bord.er1ng China.

AD .Aoaly si a gf CMna I I Bw;,J,aar Poli a¥

4 study ot Ch1ca•s nuclear pol1c1 FAY be undertaken at

this stace in the light of China's reaction to the Iest-.Ban

TreatJ. ibis policy played a s1gn1t1cant role in Sino-US rela­

t1CIIls in spite of !>!ao's apparentJ..y cootemptuous ideological

characterization or the atomic bomb as a paper tiger and the

consequtmt contusioo in the .iest as to the real intentions or

China as regards its nuclear option·. The Test-Ban 'freaty ot 1963

snutted out all hopes of an early improvement in 31no-US relations

although the treaty itself was A product of forces which had

little to do with Sino-US relations as such. In the sixties, by

forging its own nuclear weapons, Chin~ compelled the United

.States to tllke it seriously. Though a sa:all Power in terms ot

military strength compared with the two Juper Powers, China posed

a maJor foreign-policy problem tor the United Jtates. It 1s1

therefore, important tor us to cCils1der China's l11evs on nuclear

weapons.

Cb1nese propaaanda portr~ed the atocic bomb as a •paper

tiger" an the basis of ~•o•s theor1 that what made tor victorJ 1n

72 Ibid., P• 5.

a a

73 a war was the people, not weapons, uot even nuclear weapons.

Although the atomic bomb might destroy industrial centres and

ecanomic rttsources of the enetty curing the strategic bombing

phase, the ar~y vas necessary to terminate the var, to destra,

the enery, to occupy positions, to win victory. To rely on the 74

al"l!y vas to rely primarily on men.

We lvtv• 11lrf!ady oftered · so•e exr>lanatlans above as regards

China • s attl tude towards nuclear wea~cns. The basic question

relates to tactics and strategy. It vas ml.v trom a lcmg-term

point ot view that the fi.Soists categorized the atomic bocnb as a

"paper tiger... .i'actically, i.e. in tho short run, they took

them aeri ously •

.that did China seek to achieve through wide publicity for

its theory that the atodc borr.b was only a "paper tia:er"? \Zle

obJective w-.as obv1ously to make political capital out ot the

nuclear question thrOU6h ant1-UJ ·propaganda. !t wanted to show

that the United 3t•tes was attettptin& to dominate small countr1es

through nuclear blackmail and present itself as a champion or the

countries that were allegedly being so bl~ckmailed. aecandly,

it hoped to cover up its ow.n technological interiority at that

time by. pretending thst tt was strong enough to stand up to the

73 Yao Tse-tung, "Ieper1al1sts and All neaetionar1es ~re Paper Tigers~, Pek1nc BIJ1ey, vol. ,l, no. 37, 4 November 1958, p. 7.

74 '<(uoted troa: Alice Langley Hsieh, "~hina 's Jecret ~.111-tary F'apers", in Jonathan .o. Pollock, !'Chinese Att1 tude rowards liuclear Weapons,., China ::luartgrly, no. so, ••pril­June 1972, P• 268.

t1n1ted States even 'dthout nuclear parity~ It did r;ot want to 75

expose 1 ts wealmess in the nucle.!lr f'ield. Thirdly, it felt

that till it acquires its O'JIIl nuclear ca~b1lity and filled the

obvious gap in its m111t~ry preparedness it would be a good idea

to project the rtpeople • a arr.y" as a¥• invincible force in any

kind or war. .fhis would, au:oc& other thin.gs, strengthen the

morale or the people, especially x!A-a-Xla the United dtates.

China also emphasized the concet~t of paper tiger as an ideologi­

cal instrument for use in its controversy with tho ~ov1et ltuan.

Jome people 1n. the West were naive en\lu&h to take ~hinese

statements at their race value. They thought .that China was not

sufficiently aware or the dangerous cunsequences ot a nuclear

war. .,rguments on this subject can swing trom one extreme to

another, for one can cite Chinese statements to support either

extreme. But 1r ve take an integrated view of Chinese state­

ments, actions, and behaviour, ve can see that China understood

the importance of' the nuclear weapons well enough. It. vas by no

means 1 gnorant or the dimensions ot a possible nuclear confron­

tation. ~hat it was worried over was the denial or that instru­

ment in its own case and the.tiltlng of the balance of forces

as a cor. sequence aiainst 1 tselt. .l.t w!lllted to possess that wea- ·

pon, for only then could lt J:JOSs1bly hope to change the statgo

Q.Wl in its tavour.

75 Ralph L. Powell, "Great t'owers and Atomic Bombs Are Faper 11gers", ibid., no. 23, July-Jeptember la65, p. 55.

'1. vblna' a t,uclepr Nt2l.oa1 on and tha Ui ligactign

b.Ven befo.t•e ~bina ex~loded a nuclear device, the United

States was fairly .certain (no doubt an the basis or the 1nfor­

mati en available to 1 t) that such an event would occur. w 23

September 1964 the U.J Secretary of Jtate, Dean iblsk, saici that

China r~J.ght bring orr a nuclear explos1an in the near future.

He, however, tried to pl11y do'Wil the 1n-:portanee or. such a possi­

bility b7 saying that the ·deton~tion or a first nuclear device

would not mean a stockpile of nuclear weapons and the availabi-76

li ty ot a moderr: deli very .system. '" report by Jeymour Topping

in the .r:e,, 1Ql:k ,TJ.mma threw 11 ght an thf' Adtdni strati on's think­

ina en a poss1 ble nuclear explosion by ~hina. It noted that

~hina bad given hi~h priority to nuclear ar.d missile development

with a view to exploding 8 nuclear device. lt also noted that

China bad achieved the technical and industrial capacity needed

tor such ar.. experiment. lt felt that the aim of China's prog­

ramrr.e was to iapress the countries or Asia, Africa, and Latin

l\lnerica rather raise 1 ts o'llll status tc.. that ot a first-class 11

militar.v Power in the sixties. The AI¥ ~ Time~ said in an

edi torlal that 1 t saw nothing to be scared about in China • s ex­

plodin& a nuclear device. It pointed out that ~ns lacked the

capacity to deliver such weapons. ln order to allay the fears

76 ~ ~ Timgs, 30 September 1964.

77 Ibid., 1 october 1964.

ot countries bordering China, it ar~ued that any atter,pt by

China to use nucleAr e~plosions to threaten its nelg~bours

"would invite crushing retaliation, tre:endously disproportion-78

ate to the da~aie China's nucle~r powers could 1nfl1ot~.

lhen ~hina eventually brought oft the explos~on ot a

nuclear device, President Johnsen said 1r4 a telev1s1oo speech

that what i-ek1n ~ had exploded was ~. low yield .. atomic bomb. iie

added:

lb1s explosion cas.e as no surprise to the Ur.tited .ltates Jovern­ment. lt has been tully takell into account in plar.n1n6 our own defence program and. nuclear capab1l1t.v. lts military signifi­cance should not be overestimated. Lany years and great efforts separate testing ot a first nuclear deYice tr~ having a stock-

- pile ot reliable weapons with effective deliver.v systems. (7'd)

!he President expressed his readiness to help an1 ¥is1an natia'l

strugcling against possible Jhine1e aggression. He deplored the

Chinese policy ot diverting economic resources to the production

ot a crude nuclear device. In his view this was ·a ~ragedy tor

the Chinese people. Re stressed that ·the event vas or ql1m1ted

sign1t1cance" in order to allay the tears or the countries or Asia. Abd yet it vas clear that the United States \IllS much

disturbed by the event in view or lts significant political and

78 ~dit~rial, ~ ~ fiwea, l uatober 1~. ~lao see article by John w. ~~r~ey, ibid., 1 Vctober 1~.

?9 Statement by ¥r(_\sident Johnsoo, 16 vctober l:l64 • .rext in ;,ocmnents m American tgraian Htlatic:ma, ~ (.t~ew York; ~ouncil oo i'ore1gn .i:telat1ans, 1006), p. 186.

dO militar1 implicatians.

d7

Various expl~atians were aavancea in the On1ted Jtates

as regards the s1gn1t1cance of j1ek1n" 's explosion ot an atoedc

bomb. lhe .li.IJt ~ timaa carried a report quoting diplO&iatic

experts that i'eldng n.ight take a mo1·e aggressive line in toreicn

policy, especially in Southeast asia. lt felt that the political

significance ot the explosia'l was more important than the mili­

tary one. All were agr .. d that tbe explosion had not changed the

balance or power although it was .recognized that China had an 81

impressive potential 1n the field. In an ed1 tor1al the paper 8?.

suggested negoti~ticns vith Ohina to end the arms race. The

Cbrlst11Q 3q1smQt f:lmitQr disagreed with the general view tlult

there vas a long interval between a test explosion ar.d the attain­

ment of the capability to deliver a nuclear device on a far-off

taraet. lt, therefore; called tor uraent measures to check nuc­

lear prol1ferat10D. It suggested that the Ucla and the UJJ.a 83

should Jointly work. to check proliferation ot nuclear weapons.

1t expressed its support tor the efforts that were be1nc made 1n

80 lbid., p. 187. lt was s11dlarly ariued 1n some intellec­tual circles that '-'"hina 's possession ot nuclear weapons did not •lter the atatus JULQ and hence should not cause serious car.cer.n to the UaA. 3ee "China and the aomb-, liD Btpu}2li,s; (Wash1ngtm, 11. c. J, vol. 151, no. 15, 10 ucto'be~ 1964, p. a.

81 .Ia IQU 'timea, 17 October 1964.

82 Ibid., editorial, 19 uctober 1964.

83 Qbr1st1ao ~Qlens;a tCI11tor (Boston, Yass. ), 19 october 1964.

the d1rect1m or securing arms 11mitaticn agreements joitltly Wtde:r­

li..T1 tten by the USA and. the uasR. Finally, it called up«1 the nm­

Aligned eountri@!J to put pressures en China IUld secure 1 ts part1-

c1patioo 1n agt"eementg leading to noo-prol1terat1on or nuclear

weapoos.

In a television address an 18 uctober President Johnson

asserted that despite Chinese nuclear explos1Qll the key to peace

lay in Oii strength. lie pled-sed all non-nuclear nations "our

strong su))port against some threat ot nuclear blackmail" from

China. lie said he was aware of the danger of the spread of nuc­

lear weapons. lie cb.aracterized the explos1Clrl as •sad and serious",

all the more so because other nuclear Powers were "sober and

serious states, with lang experience as maJor Powers in tbe world", 84

whereas China had no such experience.

ln an interview Cl'l 13 Uctober, the O.'l 3ecretar,y ot 3tate,

Dean Rusk, acreed'that China's prestige had gone up as a ~•sult

of its explosion. At the sa~e time he observed th~t China had

incurred much 111 will by upsetting "ettorts e11 tbe pnrt or evel')'

other nation to end atmospheric testing" and trustrat1ng the 85

nhope!t ot manld.nd". He said that the Oni ted Jts.tes was pre-

pared to pursue lts eff'ortl! to secure a comprehensive .nuclear

test-ban treaty banning all nuclear tests, but added that no

nuclear Power wanted now to sign nan agreement eliminating all

84 Mao Farquhar, n. 47, PP• 210-ll.

85 DtRArtmtnt Rt. ~tatt Bullt1;1n, vol. 51, no. 1334, 9 ~ov•mber 1964, p. 659.

89

nuclear testa underground ana otherwise unless the Chinese 86

commm1 sts carne aboard and atop testinc Cl'1 their side".

r~ Defence ~ecretary, Robert J. McAamara, said on 28

vctober that the Chinese device \.tas ot a "pre-emptive" type

and posed no m111tar7 threat to the United Jtates and 1 ta alUes.

It would, be felt, take many years for China to ~obtain the

cnpao1 ty to inflict llUClear daa:age oo this country or our

allies". ie, however, atfirmed the danger or prol1terat1on or 87

nuclear veapcms.

<;ther tJ3 statetrents, too, CcrJflrmed this CCilcern about

the prol1terat1an of nuclear weapons. ~hat, however, gave edge

to this concern was the tact that nuclear weapons had come into

the hands of a country which was already hostile to the United

States and which vas gi v1ng every evidence ot continuing 1 ts

policy or hostility to the On1ted States.

Conclusign

~~s the UaA and the UJSR werQ simultaneously following a

policy of improvill& relatians td.th each other, China felt iso­

lated. l t thought that the United States was bent cm opposing

1t everywhere, and so it decided to direct all its energies to

frustrate what it perceived as Ul designs tor world subJugaticm.

The 1 ssue of nuclear weapons played an important role in the

S& Ibid. 1 PP• 654.;.5 •.

87 1tx ~ Timea, ~3 October 1964.

deteriorat1aa or atno-UJ relations. Sino-American relat1ans

entered upon an even ~ore host1la phAse tollow1n& China's nuc­

lear explos1an. We hAve dealt with the question at length in

order to show how in the period preceding the escalation ot the

Vietnam war the issue ot nuolear weapons candltianed 31no-US

relations and further intensified the mutual hostility.