Chapter 1

Special Forces History

80

Tragedy at Kandahar

Following their victory at Tarin Kowt, Karzai and ODA 574

moved on Kandahar; Karzai gathering local Pashtun fighters

as they drew nearer. For two days, ODA 574 called in

precision airstrikes on dug-in Taliban positions on the

approaches to the city. Tragedy struck on 5 December when a

2000-pound joint direct attack munition (JDAM) fell short of

its intended target, killing three members of 574, some 20 members of Karzai’s force, as well as wounding five ODA

members along with Karzai.105

ODB 570, ODA 524, along

with a Marine casevac CH-53, were deployed to evacuate the

wounded and replace the fallen members of 574. Five minutes

after the blast, Hamid Karzai received a satellite phone call

informing him that he’d been selected to lead Afghanistan’s

new interim government.

Battle of Tora Bora

Following the overwhelming success of the campaign in

Afghanistan, al Qaeda fighters and the remnants of Taliban

fled south to a region known as Tora Bora in the White

Mountains. Coalition human intelligence (HUMINT)

suggested that significant numbers of enemy targets were

congregating there. Tora Bora, south of Jalalabad, meaning

“black cave,” offered al Qaeda a system of caves and defenses. The cave network had been developed by the

mujahadeen during the war against the Soviets. Beginning on

3 December, some 20 Jawbreaker operatives, along with

ODAs 563 and 572, were inserted in Jalalabad to begin an

operation against al Qaeda forces in the Tora Bora caves (See

Figure 1-21).

This special operations task force would advise mujahadeen

under the control of two warlords- Hazrat Ali and Mohammed

Zaman. Some 2,500 to 3,000 militiamen, paid for by the CIA,

were recruited for the operation to isolate and destroy al

Qaeda forces in the Tora Bora caves. ODA 572 led the attack

105

Members of ODA 574 killed in the blast were MSG Jefferson

Davis, SFC Dan H. Petithory, and SSG Brian C. Prosser.

Chapter 1

Special Forces History

81

with precision-guided bombs, while the militia, with varied

success, pressed an attack on the al Qaeda defensive positions.

Figure 1-21. Tora Bora.

With Jawbreaker and 5th SF Group stretched thin, operators

from 1st SFOD-Delta were brought in to bolster the attack.

Small teams attached themselves to the militia, taking over

tactical command from the CIA. Continuing at a steady advance through the difficult terrain, and backed by air strikes,

the combined force suffocated the entrapped al Qaeda forces;

however, on 12 December, Mohammed Zaman (incredibly)

negotiated a truce with al Qaeda, giving them time to

surrender their weapons and escape over the mountains into

Pakistan.106

By conservative estimates, the amount of al Qaeda

killed in the operation was around 300.

Operation Anaconda

Operation Anaconda, which took place in early March

2002, utilized the combined resources of the U.S. military and

CIA. Working with allied Afghan military forces, and North

106

Berntsen, Jawbreaker: The attack on bin Laden and al Qaeda,

123. Berntsen adds that two large groups of al Qaeda escaped: one

135-man headed east into Pakistan, while bin laden together with

some 200 jihadists entered Pakistan through the Peiwar pass.

Chapter 2

Select Biographies

133

Colonel Arthur D.

Simons (1918 – 1979)

Arthur D. Simons was

born 28 June, 1918 in

New York City. He

attended the University

of Missouri-Columbia

and majored in

journalism, entering the

ROTC program there in

1937. In 1941, Simons was commissioned as an

artillery officer, and was

initially assigned to the

98th Field Artillery Battalion, a part of one of the Army's pack

mule units. This unit was later redesignated as the 6th

Ranger

Battalion. On Luzon in the Philippines, he participated in the

Raid at Cabanatuan that rescued approximately 500 POWs

who were mostly survivors of the Bataan Death March.

At the conclusion of the Second World War, Major Simons

left the active Army for five years. In 1951, he was recalled to

active duty to serve as an infantry instructor and Ranger

trainer in the Amphibious and Jungle Training camp at Eglin

AFB, Florida. Simons also completed tours with the Military

Assistance Advisory Group, Turkey and XVIII Airborne

Corps before joining the 77th Special Forces Group in 1958.

In 1960 he served as Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff of the

U.S. Army Special Warfare Center. Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1961, he commanded the 107-man Operation

White Star Mobile Training Team in Laos from 1961 to 1962

and was the first commander of the 8th Special Forces Group,

Panama from 1962 to 1964. From Panama, he was assigned to

the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and

Observations Group (MACV-SOG), which conducted

numerous behind-the-line missions in Southeast Asia.

In 1970, Simons was hand-picked to be the ground

commander of Operation Ivory Coast, a joint special

operations effort to rescue American prisoners of war from the

Son Tay prison in North Vietnam. While the mission rescued

Chapter 2

Select Biographies

134

no prisoners, it did force North Vietnam to consolidate all of

the prisoners into a few central compounds in Hanoi, resulting

in a boost in the prisoners' morale and improved treatment. In

1971, Simons retired from the US Army. In late 1978, Simons

was contacted by Texas businessman Ross Perot, who

requested his direction and leadership to help free two

employees of Electronic Data Systems who were arrested

shortly before the Iranian Revolution. Simons organized a

rescue mission and ultimately freed the two men from the

Iranian prison. All involved returned safely to the United

States. Three months later, while on vacation in Vail,

Colorado, COL Simons died of heart complications at the age of 60. He is buried in the Barrancas National Cemetery in

Pensacola, Florida.

Colonel Russell Volckmann

(1911 – 1982)

Russell was born 23 October

1911, in Clinton, Iowa. In

1934, graduated from the

United States Military

Academy at West Point, New

York, and was commissioned a

second lieutenant in the

infantry. In 1940, Volckmann

was assigned to the

Philippines. Upon arrival in the

Philippines, he became the

commander of Company H,

31st Infantry Regiment. In July 1941, he was transferred to the

11th Infantry Regiment, 11th Infantry Division (Philippine Army) as the regimental executive officer.

In August 1941, Volckmann’s wife and son, along with all

other U.S. military dependents, were sent back to the United

States due to war concerns. On 8 December 1941, the

Japanese attacked the Philippines. At the fall of Bataan in

1942, Volckmann refused to surrender and accompanied by

Donald Blackburn, another American officer also serving in

the Philippine Army left Bataan and began a trek to northern

Chapter 3

Doctrinal Concepts and Principles

157

SOF Truths

The Special Operations Forces (SOF) Truths are the five

governing principles that have been the foundation for all

special operations forces since the establishment of the United

States Special Operations Command. These principles guide

the acquisition, training, employment and sustainment of all

SOF.

1. Humans are more important than Hardware.

People—not equipment—make the critical difference. The

right people, highly trained and working as a team, will

accomplish the mission with the equipment available. Yet the

best equipment in the world cannot compensate for a lack of

the right people.

2. Quality is better than Quantity. A small number of

people, carefully selected, well-trained, and well-led are

preferable to larger numbers of troops, some of whom may not

be fully capable.

3. Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced. It

takes years to train operational units to the level of proficiency

needed to accomplish difficult and specialized ARSOF

missions. Integration of mature, competent individuals into

fully capable units requires intense training, both in the ARSOF schools and units. Hastening this process only

degrades the ultimate capability.

4. Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created

after emergencies occur. Creation of competent, fully

mission-capable units takes time. Employment of fully

capable ARSOF elements on short notice requires highly

trained and constantly available ARSOF units in peacetime.

5. Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance.

Conducting special operations by, with, and through host

nation forces, as well as indigenous and surrogate forces, is a

crucial capability in accomplishing the United States’ national

interests.

Chapter 4

Leadership

158

Chapter 4 Leadership

”We herd sheep, drive cattle, we lead people. Lead me, follow

me, or get out of my way.” – General George S. Patton

Leadership

Leadership is the least tangible and most dynamic element

of combat power. It is the warrior’s art. Confident, audacious,

and competent leadership focuses the other elements of

combat power. It serves as the catalyst that creates conditions

for success. If leadership is to be defined in one word, then that word is “influence.” Leaders inspire Soldiers to succeed.

Leadership is crucial. It often makes the difference between

success and failure, particularly in small units. The US Army

defines leadership as “the process of influencing people by

providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating

to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.”142

Leaders must be tacticians. They cannot rely on a book to

solve tactical problems. They must understand and use

initiative in accomplishing the mission. This means that they

must know how to analyze the situation quickly and make

decisions rapidly in light of the commander’s intent. Good

leaders are the catalyst for success.

Principles of Leadership

An SF leader is any man who by virtue of assumed role or

assigned responsibility inspires and influences people to accomplish regimental goals. SF leaders motivate people both

inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions,

focus thinking, and shape decisions for the greater good of the

regiment.

142

FM 6-22, 1-2.

Chapter 8

Patrolling

271

Platoon Linear (Trifecta)

The Platoon Linear formation point ambush is used on

roads, trails, and streams to place a volume of fire from the

assault and support which parallel a kill zone road 50 to 100

meters in length. The linear allows enfilading fire from the

support position and interlocking fire from the assault

position. The linear is easy to establish and control.

Figure 8-31. Platoon Linear (Trifecta Technique) Ambush.

Chapter 8

Patrolling

272

X-Shaped Ambush

The X-Shaped formation is a variation of the Linear that

subjects the enemy force to enfilading and interlocking fire. In

addition to the added security, the X-Shaped allows for

ambiguity in the enemy situation by being prepared for the

enemy’s advance in either direction. In the X-Shaped, fires are

carefully coordinated to prevent fratricide.

Figure 8-32. X-Shaped Ambush.

Chapter 8

Patrolling

322

Squad Size Patrol Bases

When conducting a squad size patrol base, PL should consider

using tough terrain, such as draws, to improve security.

Figure 8-55. Squad Patrol Base Fire Plan.

Chapter 8

Patrolling

323

Clandestine Patrol Base (Squad)

The purpose of a passive patrol base is for the rest of a squad

or smaller size element. The patrol moves as a whole and

occupies in force (see Figure 8-56).

1. The PL ensures that the unit moves in at a 90 degree angle

to the order of movement.

2. A claymore mine is emplaced on the route entering patrol

base.

3. The squad sits back to back facing outward, ensuring that at

least two individuals are alert and providing security. 4. Generally, the radio hand set and claymore firing device are

passed along to those individuals alert and providing security.

Figure 8-56. Squad Clandestine Patrol Base.

Chapter 11

Special Forces Operations

346

Chapter 11 Special Forces Operations

“There is another type of warfare, new in its intensity, ancient

in its origin, war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents,

assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration

instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and

exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It preys on

unrest.”

- President John F. Kennedy

The current definition of UW is as follows: Activities

conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying

power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary,

and guerilla force in a denied area.180

FM 3-05.20 further

defines UW as, a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary

operations, predominately conducted through, with, or by

indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped,

supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external

source. UW includes, but is not limited to, guerilla warfare

(GW), sabotage, subversion, intelligence activities, and

unconventional assisted recovery (UAR).181

Special Forces often operate within a nation for many years

before escalation from peace to crisis. SF soldiers conduct a

variety of missions based upon the geographic CINC’s

campaign plan. Early use of SF to preempt or resolve a crisis

can preclude the need to involve U.S. conventional forces or

can help set the conditions for successful rapid and decisive

operations. In conflict, the commitment of conventional combat forces

may be premature, inappropriate, or infeasible. The risk of

further escalation to an unacceptable level may also increase.

180 FM 3-05.130 Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional

Warfare. The definition of UW in 1961 was: Unconventional warfare

consists of the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and

subversion against hostile states (resistance). Un-conventional warfare

operations are conducted in enemy or enemy controlled territory by

predominately indigenous personnel usually supported and directed in varying

degrees by an external source. FM 31-21 (1961), Guerilla Warfare and Special

Forces Operations, 3.

181

FM 3-05.201, 1-1.

Chapter 11

Special Forces Operations

347

In these situations, when political, economic, and other

nonmilitary means are inadequate to respond to a conflict, SF

gives the NCA options for discriminant engagement that

preclude or limit the need to employ conventional combat

forces. SF operations may also allow other powers (friendly,

neutral, and hostile) to accept the outcome of multinational

operations because they avoid the publicity of a more obvious

use of military force.

The seven core doctrinal missions of SF include:

Unconventional Warfare (UW)

Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

Special Reconnaissance (SR)

Direct Action (DA)

Counter Terrorism (CT)

Counter Proliferation (CP)

Information Operations (IO)

Unconventional Warfare

"The guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military

enemy suffers the dog's disadvantages: too much to defend,

too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips

with." – Robert Taber

Unconventional warfare (UW) as a formal mission can trace

its roots to the opening days of World War II and the

establishment of the Office of Strategic Services. 182

At the end

of World War II, the Army developed the concept of UW based largely on the experiences of Soldiers who had worked

with resistance movements during the war. The concept was

formally introduced into doctrine in 1955, specifically to

convey a wider responsibility than simply working alongside

guerrilla forces. President John F. Kennedy’s interest in UW

and his understanding of the threat posed by Communist-

inspired “wars of national liberation” led to increased

emphasis on UW capabilities. President Kennedy’s emphasis

182

Metzgar, Unconventional Warfare: A Mission Metamorphosis

for the 21st Century, 1.

Chapter 12

Weapons

361

Part Four: Common Skills

Chapter 12 Weapons

“When the crap hits the fan you won’t rise to the occasion,

you’ll default to your level of training.” – Barrett Tillman

In order to excel, it is imperative that every Special Forces soldier have expertise with the following weapon systems that

are covered in this section.

The Four Cardinal Rules of Weapons Safety

1. Always treat every weapon as if it’s loaded.

2. Never allow the muzzle of any weapon to point at anything

you are not willing to destroy.

3. Keep your finger off the trigger until you are ready to fire.

4. Always be sure of your target, and what is behind and in

front of it.

Figure 12-1. M4 Carbine with Accessories.

M4 Carbine

The M4 carbine is a gas-operated, magazine-fed, shoulder-

fired weapon with a telescoping stock. The M4 is a variant of

the original AR-15 rifle designed by Eugene Stoner and made

by ArmaLite. As a shortened variant of the M16A2 rifle, the