century of humiliation

The “Century of Humiliation,” Then and Now:Chinese Perceptions of the International Order*

Alison Adcock Kaufman

Chinese elites today draw on the “Century of Humiliation” (1839–1949) as a

starting point for their views on how China should interact with other nations.

Arguments about the nature of international competition, about the reasons

that nations succeed or fail in the international arena, and about the prospects

for long-term global peace and cooperation draw not just on China’s experi-

ences during that period, but on the vocabulary and debates that Qing- and

republican-era intellectuals developed to understand the modern international

system.pafo_1039 1..33

Today there are at least three views among Chinese elites of the interna-

tional system and China’s role in it. All three start from the implicit premise

that today’s international system has not changed in its essence from the 19th

century: the world is composed of strong and weak nation-states that vie for

dominance on the global stage. They differ, however, on whether this state of

affairs is permanent and on what global role China should seek. Some assert

that the international system still revolves around Western interests that aim to

subjugate and humiliate weaker nations, and that China’s bitter experiences

during the Century of Humiliation should provide a cautionary tale about the

dangers of this system. A second viewpoint suggests that the current system is

acceptable now that China can play a prominent role in it. They assert that

China’s period of humiliation has ended, and that China should now seek to

ensure the stability of the system and to assure other nations of its commitment

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the American PoliticalScience Association in Toronto. The author thanks Robert Adcock, Thomas Bickford, Avery Goldstein,and Karrie Koesel for their comments on that paper. The opinions presented in this paper are my ownand do not represent the views of CNA.

Pacific Focus, Vol. XXV, No. 1 (April 2010), 1–33.doi: 10.1111/j.1976-5118.2010.01039.x© 2010 Center for International Studies, Inha University

1

to doing so. This view suggests that the potential dangers of a competitive

international system can be mitigated by adapting existing institutions and

practices. A third line of reasoning suggests that China is in a unique position

to fundamentally remake the international system because its experiences of

shame and subjugation have given the Chinese people an alternative vision of

how international relations can and should be conducted.

Key words: century of humiliation, international system, Chinese foreign

policy, US–China relations, competition, Qing Dynasty.

China’s rise presents observers with a seeming paradox. On one hand, its ascent

to a position not just of influence but of a great power is now a foregone conclusion.

Chinese elites express pride over the fact that, as a team of scholars and think-tank

researchers agreed at a conference in late 2008, “China’s status as a power has been

established.”1 During the 2009 60th anniversary celebrations for the founding of the

People’s Republic of China (PRC) one Politburo member included among China’s

great accomplishments since the revolution the fact that China has “substantially

enhanced its comprehensive national power” and “noticeably upgraded its interna-

tional position.”2 Yet these statements of confidence are interspersed with reminders

of a darker past. China’s elites and general populace continue to reference the

“Century of Humiliation” (bainian guochi; ), the period from the begin-

ning of the first Opium War in 1839 to the triumph of the Chinese Communist Party

(CCP) in the Chinese civil war in 1949. During this time China’s effective territorial

control shrank by a third, its millennia-old imperial system collapsed, and the

country was riven by internal uprisings, invasion, and civil war.

One American commentator noted in 1959 that “The Chinese have one very broad

generalization about their own history: they think in terms of ‘up to the Opium war’

and ‘after the Opium war’; in other words, a century of humiliation and weakness

to be expunged.”3 Today, Chinese and Taiwanese history textbooks still divide

1. Li Nan, “ ‘Zhongguo de guoji zeren guan’ yanjiuhui zongshu” [Summary of Seminar on “TheConcept of China’s International Responsibility”], Dangdai Yatai 2008–06 (November/December2008), p. 151.2. Liu Yunshan (Politburo member), “Jifa aiguo reqing, zhenfen minzu jingshen, ningju renminliliang” [Stimulate a passion for patriotism, inspire national spirit, and pool the people’s efforts],transcript of a public speech, Renmin Ribao (14 April 2009), p. 2.3. Richard Harris, “China and the World,” International Affairs, 35-2 (April 1959), p. 162.

2 / Pacific Focus

© 2010 Center for International Studies, Inha University

Chinese history in this way,4 and members of China’s national legislature have in

the past decade called several times for the establishment of an official “national

humiliation day” to commemorate these experiences.5 Scholars note that this expe-

rience of subjugation and humiliation has become a central element of Chinese

identity today, such that “Chinese nationalism is not just about celebrating the

glories of Chinese civilization; it also commemorates China’s weakness.”6 This

constant reference to such a dark period in China’s past strikes many observers as

peculiar for a nation on the cusp of global dominance. As Orville Schell wrote in

2008, “why would any leader seeking to gain global respect want to constantly

remind his people and the world of his country’s former humiliation?”7

One answer is that the Century of Humiliation is part of a narrative of loss and

redemption that legitimizes the PRC’s political system, crediting the CCP with

pulling China out of this nadir and into a globally prominent position. Much has

been written about the way that Chinese elites today use the memory of national

humiliation to promote nationalism and bolster support for a regime that depicts

itself as increasingly able to block any current-day attempts by Western powers to

again subjugate or “humiliate” China. In its strongest articulation, the Century of

Humiliation narrative may be used to strengthen popular anti-foreign sentiment and

to justify belligerent actions on the international stage, all in the name of “never

forgetting” (wuwang; ) the shame of the past.8

4. See, e.g. Xu Jianjun and He Shaohua, eds, Daxue Junshi Jiaocheng [College Military Courseof Study] (Changsha: Zhongnan University Press, 2004); “ ‘Fayang youliang chuantong chongsuzhanli’-Ma Zongtong guofang zhengce zhidao xili zhi er” [President Ma’s National DefensePolicy Guidance Series, Article Two: Carry Forward Outstanding Traditions, Rebuild FightingSpirit], Qingnian Ribao (9 February 2009), at <http://news.gpwb.gov.tw/newsgpwb_2009/news.php?css=2&rtype=9&nid=74998> (searched date: 7 July 2009). William Callahan similarlynotes that, “It would not be an exaggeration to argue that the master narrative of modern Chinesehistory is the discourse of the century of national humiliation.” William A. Callahan, “NationalInsecurities: Humiliation, Salvation and Chinese Nationalism,” Alternatives, 29-2 (2004), p. 204.5. “China Fails to Designate National Humiliation Day,” Renmin Ribao (29 April 2001), at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200104/29/eng20010429_68888.html> (searched date: 20 August2009); Callahan, “National Insecurities,” op. cit.; William A. Callahan, “Historical Legacies andNon/Traditional Security: Commemorating National Humiliation Day in China,” Paper presentedat Renmin University, Beijing, April 2004, at <http://www.durham.ac.uk/resources/china.studies/Commemorating National Humiliation Day in China.pdf> (searched date: 3 February 2010).6. Callahan, “National Insecurities,” op. cit., p. 202.7. Orville Schell, “China: Humiliation and the Olympics,” The New York Review of Books, 55-13 (14August 2008), at <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21715> (searched date: 22 August 2009).8. On the use of the Century of Humiliation to justify popular anti-foreign nationalism, see, e.g. thework of Peter Hays Gries, particularly “Narratives to Live By: The ‘Century of Humiliation’and Chinese National Identity Today,” in Lionel M. Jensen and Timothy B. Weston, eds., China’s

“Century of Humiliation,” Then and Now / 3


While acknowledging the prevalence of the Century of Humiliation narrative as a

rhetorical tool for shaping and directing Chinese nationalism, this paper focuses on

the substantive lessons that today’s Chinese elites take from that period to understand

China’s role in the contemporary world and in the future. By “elites,” I refer to

high-ranking members of the government, the Party, the military, and government-

affiliated think tanks and research organizations. While I discuss several strands of

discourse and debate over China’s aspired position in the world, I do not attempt to

systematically determine where exactly the lines of cleavage among these different

positions lie (e.g. whether certain institutions tend to favor one line of interpretation

over another). This paper focuses rather on the universe of possible arguments that

have been proposed in China in recent years, while acknowledging that different

arguments have held stronger sway at different times.

I argue that the discourses China’s elites developed during the 1839–1949 period

in order to understand China’s weakness at the time continue to shape China’s

outlook on how it should engage the international system today. The Century of

Humiliation presents not just a cautionary tale about past experiences, but a source

of beliefs about how the world works. Both explicitly and implicitly, Chinese elites

still use the vocabulary and questions developed during that period to interpret the

dynamics of international relations today. Contemporary arguments about the nature

of competition among nations, the reasons that nations succeed or fail in the

international arena, and the prospects for long-term global peace or cooperation are

conducted through terms and assumptions developed during the late 19th and early

20th centuries.

The Century of Humiliation: Subjugation as Part ofthe Natural Order

The Century of Humiliation opened in 1839–42, when the British government

forced China to open its ports to the opium trade. In the eyes of most Chinese today

it did not end until the Chinese Communist Party won the civil war in 1949 and began

to rebuild China’s domestic order and international standing. The litany of indignities

Transformations: The Stories Beyond the Headlines (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006),pp. 112–128; China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley, CA: University ofCalifornia Press, 2004). See also Callahan, “National Insecurities,” op. cit.; Paul A. Cohen, ChinaUnbound: Evolving Perspectives on the Chinese Past (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon,2003), pp. 148–184.

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that China suffered at the hands of foreigners during this period is long and well

known. Prior to this point, China’s rulers had sat comfortably at the center of a ring

of tributary relationships, and their familiarity with any civilization outside of Asia

was minimal. Yet starting in the 1840s China was compelled by force of arms into a

semi-colonial position, ceding large pieces of its territory to Western nations and

Japan, including ports along the coast and theYangtze River, Manchuria, Hong Kong,

and Taiwan. This shame was further compounded in the 1910s and ’20s by indepen-

dence movements in Tibet and Mongolia and by further Japanese incursions into

Manchuria. During this period, China lost nearly a third of its territory of effective

control. Internally, China was riven throughout the 19th century by massive rebellions

and uprisings, which were frequently fanned by popular opposition to the growing

foreign presence and to what many Chinese subjects viewed as the Qing court’s

acquiescence to the demands of “barbarian” invaders. The eventual collapse of the

millennia-old imperial system in 1911 led only to more political and social chaos, as

China’s nominally republican government found itself unable to control large swaths

of the country. Brief periods of cooperation between the two major political parties of

the day and their eventual victory over local “warlords” were short-term triumphs at

best, as China again fell victim to Japanese depredations and to civil war.

The impact of these experiences on China’s self-image cannot be overestimated.

The Opium War and all that followed were viewed, then and now, as marking an

irrevocable break in China’s historical trajectory. The events of this period marked

China’s abrupt transition from a powerful, proud, and unified state to one whose

territory was “carved up like a melon” (guafen; ) by foreign powers and whose

army had been humiliated. Where Chinese rulers and intellectuals had before had

little concept of an “international” arena, they now had to grapple with the notion

that there existed a global system of power relationships whose dynamics – though

almost entirely out of China’s control – would determine its fate. The growing

sense of national inferiority among intellectual and political elites was particularly

intense when they compared China’s experience with Japan’s: where China had

considered itself Japan’s superior, an “older brother” from whose culture Japan had

derived its own, Japan now showed itself to be far better at adapting to the modern

world.9

9. See Rebecca E. Karl, Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), Chapter 6, for a discussion of Qing formulations of therelationship between China and Japan.



These experiences cemented a conviction that China lacked the resources and

knowledge to successfully integrate itself into the modern international system. The

great intellectuals of the late Qing – Kang Youwei, Yan Fu, Liang Qichao, Zhang

Binglin, and others – sought the source of China’s weakness relative to the Western

powers; the reasons why Japan had been able to adapt to the Western incursion while

China had not; and the means by which China might regain a strong position within

Asia and in the world. This period of loss became one of learning as well, as these

figures imported large numbers of foreign texts, on topics ranging from economics

and business to political sociology, in an attempt to understand how these more

powerful societies operated.

Two lines of conversation followed. One concerned China’s internal conditions.

Traditionally, dynastic power was believed to rest on a divine mandate that stemmed

from the emperor’s superior moral and administrative abilities, enabling him not

only to rule his own subjects but to attract tribute from neighboring states; an

ineffectual ruler was bound to eventually lose that mandate and thus his power.

China’s loss of regional power was taken to mean that China had lost its moral

“mandate” over its neighboring states, due to internal decline that was varyingly

thought to be political, social, philosophical, moral, or cultural.10

The second line of discussion centered on the nature of the international system

into which China had been so rudely thrust. Chinese thinkers came to believe that

modern nation-states interacted with one another in the international arena accord-

ing to laws that China did not yet well understand. As a result, China had fallen

behind while Europe and Japan had surged forward. In 1902 Liang Qichao asserted

in his famous work “On the New Citizen” (Xinmin Shuo; ) that China was

now falling prey to the same patterns of natural rise and decline that applied to all

civilizations:

Since the beginning of the world . . . can there have been any fewer than ten million differentcountries around the globe? Yet of those who exist today, how many are able to occupy a ‘color’[i.e. be marked out as a sovereign nation] on a map of five continents? I say: only about a hundred

10. Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and its Modern Fate: The Problem of Intellectual Conti-nuity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966); Young-tsu Wong, “Remoldersof Tradition: Reformist Thought in Nineteenth Century China,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University ofWashington, 1971); Y.C. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872–1949 (Durham, NC: Uni-versity of North Carolina Press, 1966); Lin Yü-sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: RadicalAnti-Traditionalism in the May Fourth Era (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979).

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or so. And how many of those are able to stand strong, to have mastery over the world . . . ? I say:four or five and that’s it.11

Liang and many of his contemporaries set themselves the task of uncovering the

laws that governed international relations in their own era. They were particularly

attracted by a syncretic mix of theories they imported from China’s subjugators:

constitutional thought from Anglo-American liberals; statism from Germany; evo-

lutionary theory from Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer; and adaptations of all of

the above from Japanese translators and theorists. From this amalgamation, often

further adapted by Chinese thinkers to square with Confucian theories, these think-

ers drew several conclusions about the nature of modern international relations.

They posited, first, that human history was driven by a competitive dynamic.

Evolutionary competition between groups of humans – whether families, tribes, or

nations – was viewed as both a natural and a necessary feature of human interaction

and progress, and as the source of warfare and expansion. Only peoples who

comprehended and embraced this dynamic could prevail: as Liang Qichao wrote in

1902, “[H]uman nature does not survive without competition. . . . How has the white

people’s superiority over other races [i.e. the triumph of colonizing Europe over

Asians and Africans] occurred? . . . Other races prefer peace, the white races do not

turn away from competition.”12 These thinkers believed that in the modern era, it was

as nation-states that different peoples would compete with one another.13 Nation-

states that competed successfully rightfully gained a dominant position in the world,

and could dictate the terms of engagement with other countries.14 This global order

11. Liang Qichao, “Xinmin Shuo” [On the New Citizen], in Liang Qichao, Yinbingshi Zhuanji 4[Collected Works from the Ice-Drinker’s Studio Volume 4] (Shanghai: Zhonghua ShujuYinxing, 1936),p. 1.12. Liang Qichao, “On the New Citizen,” op. cit., p. 18, 22.13. The basis on which nation-states would be able to successfully compete against one another wasusually thought to be rooted in domestic political organization. See, e.g. Alison Adcock Kaufman,“Adapting the West: The Syncretism of Liang Qichao’s ‘On the New Citizen’ ” (Paper presented to the2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 2–5 September 2004),pp. 24–28. The link between domestic political organization and international competitiveness is a keyelement of political debates inside China both during the Qing period and today, though they lie outsidethe scope of this paper.14. For more on the “might makes right” formulation of these theories, particularly in the work ofBaron Kato Hiroyuki, who heavily influenced some Chinese thinkers of this period, see Michio Nagai,“Herbert Spencer in Early Meiji Japan,” The Far Eastern Quarterly, 14-1 (1954), pp. 55–64;Don C. Price, “From Might to Right: Liang Qichao and the Comforts of Darwinism in Late-MeijiJapan,” in Joshua A. Fogel, ed., The Role of Japan in Liang Qichao’s Introduction of Modern WesternCivilization to China (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2004), pp. 68–102.



was perceived by most of these thinkers to reflect immutable laws of political

organization and evolution, and thus to be unavoidable; weaker nation-states could

not “opt out” of competition and hope to survive. Later thinkers suggested variations

on this dynamic: Mao Tse-tung, for instance, argued that the fundamental competi-

tion was between ideological blocs of nations rather than individual nation-states.

Like his Qing predecessors, however, he made clear that simply “sitting out”

international competition was not an option; as he noted in a 1949 speech,

The forty years’ experience of Sun Yatsen and the twenty-eight years’ experience of the Commu-nist Party have taught us to lean to one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victoryand consolidate it we must lean to one side. . . . all Chinese without exception must lean either tothe side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there athird road. We oppose the Chiang Kaishek reactionaries who lean to the side of imperialism, andwe also oppose the illusions about a third road. . . .15

Second, many of the Qing thinkers argued that human history is progressive and

that, although the basic competitive dynamic could not be altered, individual nations

could control its direction. Rather than following a cyclical pattern of rise and fall,

as Chinese historians had traditionally argued, history was moved forward by

peoples – in the modern world, nation-states – who took fate into their own hands

and pushed ahead toward dominance. This was contrary to the perceived “fatalism”

of Chinese culture, which these thinkers claimed rested on a false assumption that

a civilization’s rise and fall was beyond its control. Hence, as the late Qing thinker

Yan Fu noted,

The Chinese believe that to resolve from order to disorder, from ascension to decline, is the naturalway of heaven and of human affairs. The Westerners believe, as the ultimate principle of alllearning and government, in infinite, daily progress, in advance that will not sink into decline, inorder that will not revert to disorder. . . . China trusts to fate; the Westerners rely on humanstrength.16

These two beliefs about the nature of modern international relations allowed

Chinese thinkers to see their nation as having fallen prey to an evolutionary dynamic

15. Mao Tse-tung, “On The People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” speech given in commemoration ofthe 28th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 30 June 1949, in SelectedWorks of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 4 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969), pp. 411–424, at <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4-65.htm> (searched date: 7July 2009) emphasis added.16. From Yan Fu, “Lun Shibian Zhiji” [On the Urgency of Change in the World] (1895) quoted inJames Reeve Pusey, China and Charles Darwin (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies,1983), p. 51.

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that put their country near the bottom of the international heap, while holding out the

possibility that China could eventually improve its international status.

These Qing- and republican-era discussions established two further convictions

about the nature of the modern international system and China’s role in it, and two

major questions about what could be hoped for in the future. First, these figures

viewed international relations as essentially conflictual, a zero-sum arena in which

some nations could be up only if others were down. Second, they asserted that there

were fundamental cultural differences between China and the West that helped

explain why China had done so poorly in modern international competition. Qing-

and republican-era figures argued that China needed to alter its political, social,

philosophical, and martial practices in one of two directions. Some rejected Chinese

culture as essentially inferior and recommended eschewing it entirely in favor of

imported Western ideas; the leaders of the 1919 May Fourth Movement are the most

well-known advocates of this view. Others, such as Zhang Binglin, supported the

restoration of ancient “Chinese values” (often deriving from a Confucian or Bud-

dhist base), which, they argued, had been lost or degraded in the many centuries

since their origin.17 Both groups argued that national success in the modern world

was predicated on the existence of certain cultural features that would allow one

nation-state to prevail over others.

Alongside these two common convictions were two questions about what the

world might look like in the future. Here there was less consensus. The late Qing

debates had suggested that modern international relations rested on a fundamental

inequality of nations. Many depicted the relationship between strong and weak

nations as that between “masters” (zhu; ) and “slaves” (nu; ). “Imperialism”

(diguo zhuyi; ) – that is, the ability of strong nations to colonize or

otherwise infringe on the sovereignty of weak ones – was perceived as a manifes-

tation of this unequal relationship, as was the ability of strong nations to mistreat

Chinese citizens overseas.18 Later thinkers, however, were less accepting of the

implications of inequality for China than they were of the basic idea of competition.

By the republican period, the desire to bring China up to an “equal” status with the

17. See, e.g, Young-tsu Wong, Search for Modern Nationalism: Zhang Binglin and RevolutionaryChina, 1869–1936 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989).18. Liang Qichao, “Selections from Diary of Travels through the New World,” transl. Janet Ng, EarlTai and Jesse Dudley, Renditions, 53/54 (2000), p. 209; Kevin Scott Wong, “Encountering the Other:Chinese Immigration and Its Impact on Chinese and American Worldviews, 1875–1905,” (Ph.D.Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1992).



Western powers and Japan became a rallying cry for Chinese citizens angry about

their country’s long decline.19 Chinese diplomats and politicians began to label

China’s many enforced agreements with foreign powers “unequal treaties” (bu-

pingdeng tiaoyue; ) that made it impossible for China to gain power

under existing international law, and argued that this was both unjust and unsus-

tainable.20 Most of these writers did not address whether equality among nations

could truly coexist with international competition; nor did they say whether China

sought to prevail over other nations or simply be “equal” with them. They did,

however, insist that cooperation among nations could be established only under

conditions of equality, as when Mao wrote in 1949 that his “New China” must “unite

in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals. . . .”21

Finally, some of these figures believed that the modern condition of competition

among nation-states did not preclude cooperation in the distant future. They posited

that in the very long term, a final “great unity” or “great peace” (datong; ), in

which all humanity would be united under a single, universal government, might

arise. In his famous work on the topic, Kang Youwei proposed that the evolution of

international relations progresses through three stages – “chaos” (luan; ) between

nations, “small peace” (xiaokang; ), and “great peace.”22 However, the mecha-

nism by which the world was to transition from the current state of “chaos” to even

a “small peace” was hazy at best in these writings. The premise that came to be

accepted during the late Qing and republican periods was that global competition in

the nearer term was inevitable, and that China’s only way forward was to become a

better competitor. “Humiliation” was viewed as a natural, if frustrating, part of the

contemporary global order.

19. Zhitian Luo details the way that Chinese students overseas reacted to their government’s acqui-escence to Japan’s “21 Demands” in 1915, declaring that “they would rather die as fighters than liveas slaves.” Zhitian Luo, “National Humiliation and National Assertion: The Chinese Response to theTwenty-One Demands,” Modern Asian Studies, 27-2 (May 1993), p. 302.20. Dong Wang, “The Discourse of Unequal Treaties in Modern China,” Pacific Affairs, 76-3 (Fall2003), pp. 403–405. Wang’s article provides an excellent overview of the way that a concern with“equality” and “mutual respect” – or their absence – became central to Chinese national identity duringthe 1920s.21. Mao Tse-tung, “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” op. cit., emphasis added.22. For more background on Kang’s great work on the “Great Peace,” as well as a (contested)translation of the work itself, see Kang Youwei, Ta T’ung Shu: The One World Philosophy of K’angYu-wei, transl. from the Chinese with introduction and notes by Laurence G. Thompson (Norwich, UK:George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1958).

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Post-1949: How should China Interact with the World?

In 1949, as the end of the civil war loomed and the Communist triumph seemed

certain, Mao Tse-tung famously declared that “China has stood up.” The CCP’s

victory was viewed as ending not only decades of on-and-off civil war, but also the

Century of Humiliation itself.23 It was at this point that China is believed to have

thrown off the shackles of its subjugated, backward past, such that, in the words of

a current-day Politburo member, “the establishment of new China . . . put an end to

the situation in which old China was split up, the nation was subject to humiliation,

and the people experienced untold sufferings.”24

The establishment of long-elusive internal order meant that China could turn its

attention to rebuilding its standing in the international arena. The Century of

Humiliation provided a cautionary tale for Chinese elites interested in moving

their nation forward. For the first several decades of the People’s Republic, elites

referenced China’s experiences of subjugation and humiliation as a reason for

being wary of close engagement with other nations. Referencing the experience of

being “carved up,” they championed state sovereignty above all other values, and

touted the principle of “non-interference in domestic affairs” as the basis for

refusing to participate in any international actions seen to undermine it. Practically

speaking, this has often meant a stance toward international activities that

has been viewed as isolationist, withdrawn, or obstructionist. For instance,

China’s leaders have for many years presented their concern to respect territorial

sovereignty as a primary rationale for not taking part in various multilateral

activities and for abstaining from or vetoing various UN Security Council

resolutions.25

23. It is not quite as simple as this; Peter Hays Gries notes, for instance, that there are in fact severaldates that vie for the title of the official “end of the Century of Humiliation,” including the KoreanWar (which the CCP and PLA to this day say that China won). See Gries in Jensen & Weston, op. cit.,p. 118.24. Liu Yunshan, “Stimulate a passion for patriotism. . . . ” See also, e.g. Li Changchun, “Ba xinZhongguo chengli 60 zhounian qingzhu huodong de baogui jingshen caifu zhuanhua wei kaichuangZhongguo tese shehui zhuyi shiye xin jumian de qiangda jingshen liliang” [Convert the PreciousSpiritual Treasure of the Activities to Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of New ChinaInto Great Spiritual Power for the Creation of a New Situation in the Cause of Socialism With ChineseCharacteristics], Renmin Ribao (26 October 2009), op. cit., p. 2.25. See, e.g. “Implementing ‘responsibility to protect’ must not contravene state sovereignty,”Xinhua News Agency (25 July 2009), at <http://www.china.org.cn/international/2009-07/25/content_18201835.htm> (searched date: 28 August 2009).



Today, however, there is little doubt that China’s leaders seek a prominent and

even a central role in the international arena. Their growing advocacy of Chinese

interaction with other nations and with multilateral institutions has led to vociferous

debates about whether China can engage in this arena without sacrificing its sover-

eignty and its principles – and, if it can, what role China should seek in the

international system today and in the future. These debates often reference the

Century of Humiliation, indicating that that period retains a prominent position in

China’s memory. Yet there is little consensus on what the Century of Humiliation

means for China’s stance on the international system today.

Chinese elites today offer at least three views of how China should interact with

other nation-states. All three use vocabulary and world views developed during the

Century of Humiliation, and all start from the implicit premise that today’s inter-

national system has not changed in its essence from the 19th century: the world is

composed of strong and weak nation-states that vie for dominance on the global

stage. They differ, however, on whether this state of affairs is permanent and on

what global role China should seek. Some assert that the international system still

revolves around Western interests that seek to subjugate and humiliate weaker

nations. They suggest that China’s leaders should tread cautiously in their interac-

tions with the “strong nations” of the world. A second viewpoint suggests that the

current system is acceptable now that China can play a prominent role in it. This

view tends to soften the potentially harmful nature of a competitive international

system, arguing that this dynamic can be sufficiently modified by tweaking existing

institutions and practices. And a third line of reasoning suggests that China is in a

unique position to fundamentally remake the international system precisely because

its experiences of shame and subjugation have given the Chinese people an alter-

native vision of how international relations can and should be conducted.

Viewpoint #1: The International System is Harmful for China

While few advocate shunning all interaction, a substantial number of Chinese

elites express discomfort about engaging substantially in the international system

as it stands. In their view, China remains vulnerable. Such thinkers reference the

Century of Humiliation as a major source of their anxieties about Western inten-

tions: President Hu Jintao himself, in a 2004 speech on the main tasks of the

People’s Liberation Army (PLA), warned that “Western hostile forces have not

given up the wild ambition of trying to subjugate us, intensifying the political

12 / Pacific Focus


strategy of Westernizing and dividing up China.”26 PLA Major General Zhu

Chenghu has similarly explained (referring to the reasons for China’s aggressive

military modernization) that “in modern times China suffered over 100 years of

being invaded. As the popular saying goes, once bitten by a snake, a person may

be afraid of a rope for ten years.”27 Many Western scholars have examined the

prevalence of a “victim narrative,” in which Chinese authors complain that

Western powers have shown their past and continued determination to subjugate

China.28

In addition to using the Century of Humiliation as a direct source of defen-

siveness, Chinese elites also take lessons from the broader understanding of

international relations developed during that period to explain why China should be

cautious today. They view international relations as a competitive, usually con-

flictual, dynamic between nations of unequal status. The competitive language of

evolutionism has translated, in the current day, into a great interest in realist and

neo-realist theories of international relations.29 Zhu Feng, professor at the School of

International Relations at Peking University, recently echoed evolutionary language

when he wrote that “international relations always involves the system of ‘compe-

tition and heavenly mandates, and the survival of the fittest.’ In world politics, the

essence of power is always selfish.”30

These figures do not all accept realism as a general proposition, however. Some

argue that the continued existence of a competitive, zero-sum system is not so much

natural and universal – as their 19th century predecessors believed – as it is reflective

of the worldview of Western powers. They suggest that US discomfort with China’s

rise derives from this understanding of global dynamics. Zhu Feng argues that, “The

26. Hu Jintao, “Renqing xinshiji xinjieduan wojun lishi shiming” [Understand the New HistoricMissions of our Military in the New Period of the New Century], 24 December 2004 at <http://gfjy.jiangxi.gov.cn/HTMNew/11349.htm> (searched date: 11 July 2008).27. WuYurong, “Meiguo yaoqiu Zhongguo duideng junshi touming bu heli, ye wufa shixian” [The USDemand on China for Equal Levels of Military Transparency is neither Reasonable nor Feasible],Dongfang Zaobao (13 November 2009).28. See especially the works of Peter Hays Gries, supra note 8.29. See, e.g. Daniel Lynch, “Chinese Thinking on the Future of International Relations: Realism as theTi, Rationalism as the Yong?” China Quarterly, 197 (March 2009), particularly pp. 98–99; Lei Guang,“Realpolitik Nationalism: International Sources of Chinese Nationalism,” Modern China, 31-4(October 2005), pp. 487–514.30. Zhu Feng, “Zhongguo jueqi: Zhuding shi monan de licheng” [China’s Rise: Destined tobe a Process of Tribulation], Lüye (24 May 2008), at <http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4bbb81fb01009g3u.html> (searched date: 12 January 2010).



international relations theory and historical conclusion about the [risk to the West]

of the rise of China were not created by China’s experiences but have in fact evolved

from Western experiences” – in other words, China’s rise only threatens the West

because the West itself believes that this is what will happen.31 Similarly, a think

tank scholar argues that Western nations seek to prevent China’s increasing global

prominence because “[the Western nations’] own experience and the rise of all great

powers in the past” make them “wary” of threats from a newly-rising power.32 They

thus regard realism as a way of explaining Western behavior, while holding out the

possibility that international relations need not follow this path.

These figures caution that engagement is highly risky. They assert that because

the current international system reflects Western interests, it allows China to engage

only as a way of protecting the Western-dominated status quo. Attempts by inter-

national institutions or individual Western nations to dictate how China should

behave are simply more sophisticated ways of making “unequal demands” on

China. Hence Ma Zhengang, director of the prominent think tank the China Institute

of International Studies (CIIS), has written that, “the international system today has

lasted since the end of World War II, and is basically in line with the West’s interests

and standards . . . the various ‘demands’ always presented to China by the United

States and other Western countries in the past have not fundamentally changed, they

have just been renamed the ‘China responsibility theory.’ ”33 Similarly, at a 2008

conference on “The Concept of China’s International Responsibilities,” a professor

from the State Council Development Studies Center, “pointed out that the concept

of ‘responsibility’ was first put forward by the colonialist countries; they had

interests overseas that were making demands on them, so they demanded that

responsibilities be undertaken.”34

As leader of the current international system, the USA bears the brunt of criticism.

The most common accusation is that the USA is not willing to let China “rise,” and

that US encouragement of China’s participation in international organizations is to

China’s disadvantage. Hence, for instance, “some people are worried that certain

31. Ibid.32. Cui Liru, “China’s Rise vs. International Order Evolution,” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Englishlanguage edition], 18-1 (January–February 2008), p. 5.33. Ma Zhengang, “Zhongguo de zeren yu ‘Zhongguo zeren lun’ ” [China’s Responsibility and the‘China Responsibility Theory’], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 2007–03 (May–June 2007), p. 2.34. Ding Yifan, paraphrased in Li Nan, “Summary of Seminar on ‘The Concept of China’s Interna-tional Responsibility’,” op. cit. p. 152.

14 / Pacific Focus


countries, especially the United States, may take advantage [of the concept of

international responsibility] to impose on China some responsibilities that it cannot

undertake in its present stage of economic development, and use this to slow the

speed of China’s economic development.”35 Should China acquiesce to the US’s

demands that China shoulder international responsibilities equal to those of the

USA, “[China’s] vulnerability in China–US relations will increase.”36

A variant of this theme says that the USA is willing to work with a stronger

China only because it is in the USA’s interest to do so. Hence, for instance, one

commentator suggested that Americans’ interest in pursuing a closer relationship

with China grows out of the USA’s desire to solve problems such as climate

change in order to maintain its own global standing, and to control China’s

growing influence over the US economy.37 The 2005 admonition of former US

Assistant Secretary of State Robert Zoellick that China should act as a “respon-

sible stakeholder” in world affairs is is viewed as a challenge or a slap in the face,

“hinting that China is not a responsible country at present,” and that “China can

only be described as responsible if it works with the United States in maintaining

the existing international order.”38 A Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)

researcher expressed concern that, “the US objective in wanting China to become

a ‘stakeholder’ is to get China to undertake international responsibilities that

accord with US national interests or ethical standards, hence China should not fall

into this trap.”39

In this view, the international system is based on biased interests that cannot be

adapted to accommodate a more powerful China. These thinkers argue that the

events of the 19th and early 20th centuries prove that Western nations are funda-

mentally rapacious, greedy, and aggressive. Two academics from the Academy of

Military Sciences, for instance, write that Western nations were historically “slave

states [that] frequently launched wars of conquest and pillage to expand their

35. Li Nan, “Summary of Seminar on ‘The Concept of China’s International Responsibility’,” op. cit.36. Wang Te-chen, “Zhong-Mei yuedi duihua zhuanjia cheng yiti guangfan” [China–US DialogueWill Start Toward the End of This Month; Expert Says the Subjects Will be Wide-Ranging], Da GongBao (22 July 2009).37. Xiang Lanxin, “G2 dui Meiguo yiwei kan shenme?” [What does the G2 Mean to the UnitedStates?], Huanqiu Shibao (4 June 2009), p. 14.38. Guan Shaopeng, professor at the School of Diplomacy, paraphrased in Li Nan, “Summary ofSeminar on ‘The Concept of China’s International Responsibility’,” op. cit. pp. 151–152.39. Zhou Qi, paraphrased in Li Nan, “Summary of Seminar on ‘The Concept of China’s InternationalResponsibility’,” op. cit., p. 150.



territories, plunder wealth, and extend their sphere of influence,” and that this

aggressive orientation continues to characterize the West today.40 Any international

system that reflects Western civilizational norms is thus pre-committed to a con-

flictual, unequal dynamic that will prevent either cooperation or the rise of new

powers. Such figures add that China does not yet have the power to challenge this

status quo, expressing frustration that, as a professor from Beijing Normal Univer-

sity complained, “China is not satisfied with this arrangement, but lacks the

capability to manipulate it.”41

Viewpoint #2: China can Work within the Current System

The second viewpoint assumes that China should seek a central role in today’s

international system, and centers on the terms under which China should participate.

These thinkers argue that China is now in a position to successfully interact and

compete with other strong nations. They suggest that growing recognition from, and

equality or near-equality with, the great powers “erase” the humiliations of China’s

past. Some posit further that the system itself is evolving, with harsher elements of

international competition tempered by multilateral institutions that affirm the equal-

ity of their members. They suggest that the current system can adapt to capture the

interests and needs of even the weaker nations, and moreover that a powerful,

engaged China may be in a position to spearhead such adaptations. In this view,

China’s robust participation in the present-day international system symbolizes both

China’s rise from past subjugation and its commitment to this system.

This view is reflected in the growing enthusiasm with which China has sought to

join global institutions and negotiations. Chinese leaders have over the past decade

become increasingly quick to declare their willingness to participate in multilateral

activities to solve global problems, as exemplified in a 2009 statement by the PRC

ambassador to the UN:

China [has] constructively participated in, and made important contributions to, the processes ofresolving . . . international hot-spot issues . . . China strives to undertake international responsibili-ties and obligations, successively joined more than 130 governmental organizations, and signedmore than 300 international multilateral treaties. China took part in 22 UN peacekeeping actions,

40. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds, The Science of Military Strategy [English translation](Beijing: Military Science Press, 2005), p. 93.41. Liu Jinghua, paraphrased in Li Nan, “Summary of Seminar on ‘The Concept of China’s Interna-tional Responsibility’,” op. cit., p. 152.

16 / Pacific Focus


cumulatively dispatched nearly 20 000 man-hours of peace-keeping personnel, and is now thecountry that has dispatched the most peacekeeping personnel among the five permanent membersof the UN Security Council.42

China’s participation in intrusive activities like peacekeeping is particularly

notable given its long-standing opposition to “interference” in other nations’ domes-

tic affairs. As Allen Carlson points out, although PRC leaders have carefully framed

such activities as conforming to this principle, in fact they have “gradually modified

China’s stance on intervention and, by extension, sovereignty’s role in international

politics.”43 Statements by Chinese elites also suggest that at least some of them view

certain interventionist diplomatic instruments as legitimate. One notable example is

found in a discussion of North Korea’s nuclearization and the apparent failure of the

Six Party Talks; the author, the deputy director of Peking University’s Center for

International and Strategic Studies (CISS), suggests that:

we should explore and introduce the idea of ‘coercive diplomacy’ and pool the common energy andwisdom of the [other] five parties . . . [Since the Cold War ended], in important regional securityaffairs, ‘coercive diplomacy’ has always been a basic means for resolving problems eventually.44

He adds that, in his view, the results of “coercive diplomacy” have not always been

“conclusive” in instances such as the Kosovo War or the East Timor independence

movement – instances in which China vociferously protested against international

involvement – but goes on to say that it is still a better tool than any other available

for dealing with the DPRK. Thus, while reserving judgment on past events, he

expresses a willingness to consider, in some instances, diplomatic actions that go

against earlier stated principles.

China’s participation in such activities seems to indicate a degree of acquiescence

to the present-day international system. Numerous policy and academic elites have

stated a commitment to this system, saying that “as a newly rising great power,

China needs more time to learn the rules of the game among the great powers and

42. Zhang Yesui (PRC Ambassador to the UN), “Nuli kaichuang duobian waijiao xin jumian (Zhuwaidashi tan waijiao er)” [Strive to Create a New Situation in Multilateral Diplomacy: Part 2 of ChineseAmbassadors on Diplomacy], Renmin Ribao (24 July 2009), p. 14.43. Allen Carlson, “Helping to Keep the Peace (Albeit Reluctantly): China’s Recent Stance onSovereignty and Multilateral Intervention,” Pacific Affairs, 77-1 (Spring 2004), p. 10.44. Feng Zhu, “Erci heshi hou de Chao heweiji: Liufang huitan yu ‘qiangzhi waijiao’ ” [The DPRKNuclear Crisis after the Second Nuclear Test: The Six Party Talks and “Coercive Diplomacy”], XiandaiGuoji Guanxi, 2009-07 (July 2009), p. 47.



should respect and be sensitive to those rules,”45 and that China seeks to stabilize,

rather than to upend, the current global order.46 Three beliefs explain their enthusi-

asm for joining today’s international system.

The first is that China’s increasing prominence both allows and obligates it to take

on an influential role vis-à-vis other nations. In this view, China’s successes indicate

that it is no longer the “sick man of Asia”: these writers emphasize that “China has

[recently] played an eye-catching role whether in global political and regional

affairs or in world economic and financial development,”47 and that “to a certain

extent, China has already become an indispensible important force in global politi-

cal and economic affairs.”48 These thinkers assert that China’s growing influence

and power have fundamentally altered global power relations, such that its active

participation is now needed to maintain the current order. Hence the authors of

China’s 2008 Defense White Paper declared – in a statement far stronger than in

previous iterations of the biennial report – that:

China has become an important member of the international system, and the future and destiny ofChina have been increasingly closely connected with the international community. China cannotdevelop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stabilitywithout China.49

China is thus depicted as having overcome the humiliations and subjugations of

the past; indeed, some suggest that the very concept of “humiliation” has become

defunct now that China is receiving the attention and recognition it has long craved.

As one commentator wrote in China Daily after the conclusion of the successful

Beijing Olympics, “having realized the ‘dream of the century’, perhaps it is time to

relegate the ‘Century of Humiliation’ to history where it belongs. . . . The glow of

45. Shen Yi, “Consensus Based on Mutual Respect and Equality: the Cornerstone of ‘StrategicReassurance,” Pacnet, 73A (12 November 2009), p. 1; at <http://csis.org/files/publication/pac0973a.pdf> (searched date: 29 December 2009).46. Niu Xinchun, “The Coming Sino–U.S. Clash? – A Review of The Tragedy of Great PowerPolitics,” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [English language edition], 18-2 (March–April 2008), p. 89.47. Zhang Rui, “Zhong-Mei zhanlüe yu jingji duihua de liangdian yu kandian” [Highlights andViewpoints on the Sino–US Strategic and Economic Dialogue], Zhongguo Jingji Shibao (30 July2009), at <http://www.cet.com.cn/20090730/l1.htm> (searched date: 12 August 2009).48. Ibid.49. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s NationalDefense in 2008 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2009), “Preface,” English transla-tion online at <http://english.gov.cn/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227.htm> (searched date: 3March 2009) emphasis added.

18 / Pacific Focus


the Games should have dispelled any lingering bitterness from the humiliating

defeats China suffered at the hands of imperialist aggressors in the past century.”50

Chinese elites tout membership in multilateral organizations such as the G-20 by

noting that it indicates that China is viewed not only as a partner but as an equal to

other strong nations. A commentator on the 2009 US–China Strategic and Economic

Dialogue (S&ED) wrote approvingly that, “The premise of ‘dialogue’ is equality,

meaning that the status of both sides of the dialogue is equal. The essence of

‘dialogue’ is listening . . . [it] differs from negotiations in that it seeks as much

mutual understanding as possible . . . ‘dialogue’ does not involve competition to

gain the initiative.”51 Participation as an “equal” in global organizations and con-

versations shows that China is widely acknowledged to have overcome the inferior

status under which it chafed for so many years, joining the ranks of the strong

nations (or, as Liang Qichao would say, those that have a “color on the map”).

Another commentator on the S&ED pointed out that:

the Obama administration understands the importance and the necessity for the United Statesas the biggest developed country to engage in cooperation with China, the biggest developingcountry . . . In order to play an important role in major international and regional issues, the UnitedStates needs to cooperate with China, and the two should not cut the ground from under eachothers’ feet or come into conflict with one another.52

The near-equalization of China’s power with that of the greatest global “hegemon”

means that China will no longer be forced into a losing competition.

Second, with their entrée to this elite club, many Chinese elites argue that China

must participate in global conversations. They assert that with China’s rising power

comes not only the ability but also the responsibility to engage in a substantial way

with other nations. In a sense, participation under the current rules of the interna-

tional system is the price of membership; hence as an official from China’s Ministry

of Commerce noted, “China is an implementer and thorough participant in the

current international setup; how China takes part in preserving and developing the

50. Hong Liang, “Time to Drop the Baggage of History,” China Daily (2 September 2008),at <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2008-09/02/content_6988865.htm> (searched date: 19November 2008).51. Lu Ning, “Zhong-Mei zhanlüe yu jingji duihua kaishi ‘pingqi pingzuo’ ” [China–US Strategic andEconomic Dialogue Begins on an “Equal Footing”], Beijing Qingnian Bao (29 July 2009), at <http://bjyouth.ynet.com/article.jsp?oid=54473637> (searched date: 23 August 2009).52. Zhang Rui, “Highlights and Viewpoints on the Sino–US Strategic and Economic Dialogue,”op. cit., emphasis added.



current international order is an important step in striving for status as an equal

member.”53 These figures suggest that as China’s interests expand, so also should its

willingness both to protect these interests and to uphold the system that allows it to

do so: as one commentator recently wrote, “China’s rapid development means that

China possesses global interests and must also undertake more international obli-

gations corresponding to its level of development.”54 These “obligations” include

participating enthusiastically in existing international institutions and negotiations

to address problems of global concern.

Most importantly, they include proving to the world that China is committed to

the current system. Hence although the language of “responsible stakeholdership”

ruffled feathers when first proposed, it since seems to have become a largely

accepted term that China’s leaders frequently use to display their good intentions

and the progress they have made toward fulfilling global expectations of their

expanded role.55 In a statement to the UN General Assembly in 2008, Chinese

Premier Wen Jiabao explained China’s participation in the Millennium Declaration

in terms of China’s willingness to act as a “responsible, large developing country,”

and went on to list the many ways in which China has aided the least developed

nations – thus taking on the role traditionally filled by the strong powers – “though

[we are ourselves] not rich.”56

Third, the stated commitment of these Chinese elites to the current international

system includes the critical caveat that they only support those aspects of it that

protect against the sorts of “humiliations” that their nation suffered. Rather than

taking for granted a conflictual, zero-sum vision of international politics, they argue

that the world has evolved, such that competition need not lead to conflict. One

scholar recently suggested that although nation-states still compete with one

another, they no longer fight for survival but only for influence:

53. Zhong Chuanshui, paraphrased in Li Nan, “Summary of Seminar on ‘The Concept of China’sInternational Responsibility’,” op. cit. p. 154.54. Zhang Rui, op. cit.55. See, e.g., a recent commentary by Shen Yi, professor at the School of International Relations andPublic Affairs at Shanghai’s Fudan University, who gives a number of examples to prove that “Chinahas done a lot to prove that it wants to be a responsible great power.” Shen Yi, “Consensus Based onMutual Respect and Equality,” op. cit.56. Wen Jiabao, Speech at the UN High-Level Meeting on Millennium Development Goals, New York(25 September 2008), at <http://www.nyconsulate.prchina.org/eng/xw/t515274.htm> (searched date:19 December 2009).

20 / Pacific Focus


Offensive realism [i.e. a zero-sum view of international politics] . . . ignores the significance ofprocess in international politics while insisting on the unchanged nature of states: 300 years ago,states struggled to survive; today, states are struggling to survive; 300 years later, states willstruggle to survive. . . . Actually, since the advent of the Westphalian system in 1648 the death ratefor members has fallen dramatically, despite continuing warfare and inequities of power. . . . Greatpowers do indeed compete with each other for allies, influence, economic opportunities and naturalresources, but they seldom wage wars at will. . . . States do pursue survival, but most consider theirright of survival not particularly endangered.57

The standards by which the actions of a strong nation are judged have thus

changed, such that strong nations may no longer overrun the rights and interests of

weak ones. While acknowledging a continued distinction between strong and weak

nations, these thinkers stress the development of international institutions that miti-

gate the potentially harmful ramifications of this distinction. They posit further that

China’s increasingly strong position ensures both that China will not be harmed,

and that, more generally, no single nation will be able to manipulate this system in

favor of its own selfish interests as in the past. In this way, they assert, the inter-

national system may increasingly come to represent the interests of strong and

weak nations, thus providing even the weak nations with a degree of equality and

respect.

In this altered world, the critical foundation of interdependent, equality-based

international relations is the principle of multilateralism. These thinkers portray

multilateralism as “the main platform for discussing and coping with . . . major

international issues”58 and as “an effective way to deal with common challenges

facing humanity.”59 The UN is seen as the world’s premiere practitioner of “multi-

lateral diplomacy,” and is strongly supported by Chinese elites as a curb on strong

nations. Former Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxin, for instance, is reported to have

explained that, “the reason the United Nations was founded and UN Charter was

written is so that future matters in the world cannot be dictated by one single country

or a group of countries.”60 The UN is depicted as reflecting an international consen-

sus that allows for legitimate intervention in state affairs under a limited, well-

articulated set of conditions. When the PLA Navy sent out three ships to the Horn

57. Niu Xinchun, “The Coming Sino–U.S. Clash?” op. cit., pp. 87–88.58. Zhang Yesui, “Strive to Create a New Situation in Multilateral Diplomacy,” op. cit.59. Former Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxin, quoted in “China denounces unilaterism [sic],external interference in its internal affairs,” Renmin Ribao (7 March 2004), at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200403/07/print20040307_136759.html> (searched date: 3 February 2010).60. Ibid.



of Africa in December 2008 for anti-piracy operations, its representatives asserted

that China’s commitment to “safeguarding world peace and promoting common

development” could be exercised through participation in international security

activities provided that these were UN-led, multilateral operations.61

This new-found commitment to multilateralism includes a condemnation of the

“unilateralism” that continues to characterize the actions of some nations. This

applies to strong nations, of course – the US bears much criticism in this regard – but

also to weaker ones. Hence Zhu Feng, in the discussion of North Korean nuclear-

ization mentioned earlier, decries North Korea’s “unilateralism”; he asserts that in

abandoning the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK is

breaking the heart of the international forces represented by China which supported the DPRK’sabandonment of nuclear weapons by allowing the satisfaction of the DPRK’s reasonable nationalinterests. The DPRK has disregarded the dignity of the Six Party Talks and the propriety of its ownstate behavior, stirred up disputes, aggravated the situation, ignored the international community’scommon desire for stability, cooperation, and prosperity . . . it has let down China, with all itssincerity in hosting the Six Party Talks. . . .62

In this view, multilateralism allows for the legitimate use of “coercive diplomacy” to

rein in unilateralist states.

These three beliefs present, in sum, a somewhat contradictory set of commit-

ments. On one hand, there is a commitment to upholding the stability of the

existing system and maintaining essentially competitive interactions among

nations. Those who hold this view suggest that the baser instincts of a competitive

system can be curbed by multilateral institutions that were established by Western

powers, and display pride in China’s improved ability to essentially force coop-

eration with other nations through its growing international influence. On the other

hand, they imply that the system is continuing to evolve, and that China can play

a central role in this evolution, while remaining coy about whether the system

might transform itself entirely in the future. For this question, we must turn to the

third line of debate.

61. The General Political Department of the PLA, “Di wu jiang: wei weihu shijie yu cujin gongtongfazhan fahui zhongyao zuoyong” [Lesson Five: Giving Play to the Importance of Safeguarding WorldPeace and Promoting Common Development], National Defense Education website of Yichun City,Jiangxi (June 2006), at <http://www.ycgfjy.com/Article_show.asp?ArticleID=2284> (searched date:10 September 2009).62. Zhu Feng, “The DPRK Nuclear Crisis after the Second Nuclear Test,” op. cit., emphasis added.

22 / Pacific Focus


Viewpoint #3: China can Change the System

Finally, some figures propose that China can, in the longer run, “take part in

amending and framing the international rules of the game” or even, “eventually

become a framer of international rules,”63 creating and leading a new international

system superior to the current one. This third view derives elements from both of the

previously-discussed viewpoints: its adherents agree, with those who are suspicious

of current arrangements, that the present-day international system is inadequate to

meet the needs and interests of many nations including China; and they suggest,

along with those in the second camp, that China is now in a position to actively

shape the international system. However, where those two viewpoints accepted the

19th century premise that competition is inevitable, this one asserts that this premise

is simply wrong.

One prominent PLA figure recently asserted – in direct contradiction of the

“might makes right” dynamic embraced by many 19th century thinkers – that

strength does not always equal victory, nor is war necessarily the right path to win

international prominence: “In its most powerful times, the United States fought a

war in Vietnam. While it was strong, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Yet

both of these countries were eventually forced to withdraw in a disgraceful way.”64

China’s call for a “New Security Concept” in 2002 generalized such conclusions to

postulate that, “As proven by history, force cannot fundamentally resolve disputes

and conflicts, and the security concept and regime based on the use of force and the

threat to use force can hardly bring about lasting peace.”65 President Hu Jintao, in

putting forth his vision of a “harmonious world” at a recent UN Assembly meeting,

stated that, “Security is not a zero-sum game, and there is no isolated or absolute

security,”66 and includes the term “win–win” as part of his long-term vision of

international relations.

63. Rear Admiral Yang Yi, Sr. Colonel He Congnian, both paraphrased in Li Nan, “Summary ofSeminar on ‘The Concept of China’s International Responsibility’,” op. cit. pp. 154–155.64. Wu Yurong, “The US Demand on China for Equal Levels of Military Transparency is neitherReasonable nor Feasible,” op. cit.65. “China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’sRepublic of China (31 July 2002), at <http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2612/2614/t15319.htm> (searched date: 16 August 2009).66. “Chinese President Calls for Building Harmonious World,” Embassy of the People’s Republic ofChina in the United States of America (24 September 2009), at <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/t607038.htm> (searched date: 24 October 2009).



Such statements posit that conflictual, zero-sum relations between nations are

disadvantageous even to nations that occupy a strong position in the system. They

remark that the USA’s continued adherence to what they label a “Cold War

mentality” – that is, the view that strong nations must compete against one

another – makes it impossible to establish cooperation or lasting peace.67 Instead,

they say, the international system needs to be fundamentally remade to reflect

those values that China has long articulated, first in its Five Principles of Peaceful

Coexistence and more recently in the “New Security Concept”: “dialogue,”

“cooperation,” and “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination.”68 In

so doing, the world will move beyond “conventional alliance-based systems of

security” and allow “states to treat each other as neither friend nor foe.”69

These thinkers assert that China is uniquely qualified to move the international

system toward this non-conflictual, equality-based model. They believe that China

can, and perhaps must, reshape the global system, saying that “the rise of China is

bound to bring about a realignment of the international power structure, changes to

the rules of the game, as well as redistribution of the wealth of the world.”70 Like

their Qing predecessors they assert that there are fundamental civilizational differ-

ences between China and the West that shape the vision each has of international

relations, but they now present China’s perspective as superior. PLA Major General

Zhu Chenghu asserts that China will be able to:

achieve, in a peaceful way, the goal [of international power and prestige] that cannot be achievedby means of war. . . . The United States and other Western countries . . . themselves took the courseof expansion by means of war, so they thought that China would take the same course as itdeveloped. In fact, China can become more ‘introverted’ [neixiang; , i.e. focused on internalissues] even as it becomes more powerful.71

Some of these figures claim that an orientation toward “peace and harmony” has

always been a fundamental part of Chinese culture. Daniel Lynch notes the assertion

67. See, e.g. Xia Liping, “Lun Zhongguo guoji xin linian zhong de xin anquan guan” [The NewSecurity Concept in China’s New Thinking of International Strategy], Guoji Wenti Luntan, 34 (Spring2004), pp. 4–23, English translation at <http://www.irchina.org/en/news/view.asp?id=317> (searcheddate: 20 August 2009).68. “China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept,” op. cit.69. Shi Jing, “Getting China Right: The Chinese World Order and Asia–Pacific Regional Integration,”Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [English language edition], 18–6 (November–December 2008), p. 86.70. Zhu Feng, “China’s Rise: Destined to be a Process of Tribulation,” op.cit.71. Wu Yurong, “The US Demand on China for Equal Levels of Military Transparency is neitherReasonable nor Feasible,” op.cit.

24 / Pacific Focus


of one prominent Party member that China traditionally conducted its relations with

other nations on the basis of Confucian concepts such as “benevolence, propriety,

morality and harmony,” and that this view was shattered only by its negative

interactions with the Western powers and Japan during the 19th and 20th centuries.72

President Hu Jintao’s vision of a “harmonious world” is often depicted as deriving

from ancient Chinese principles.73

Many others, however, argue that the source of China’s superiority lies not in

age-old cultural characteristics but rather in its own experiences during the Century

of Humiliation. They posit that China is uniquely qualified because of its experi-

ences as a humiliated nation to create a future world order based on a different set

of principles. By relying on what one scholar of Chinese nationalism has called “the

moral authority of their past suffering,” Chinese elites are able to suggest that they

are more committed to peace and equality than are the Western nations, and thus are

better-suited to come up with a new international system that would safeguard the

rights of all nations.74 Hence, when a member of the National People’s Congress in

2007 again proposed the creation of a “national humiliation day” to commemorate

Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, he explained that, “An outstanding nation is

one that will always keep its history firmly in mind . . . Remembering the humili-

ating part of history will help Chinese people feel urged to safeguard peace. . . .”75

Such commentators acknowledge that past “rising powers” have fallen into the

same conflictual dynamic that characterized 19th century relations, but claim that

China will do things differently. The PRC ambassador to Britain explained the roots

of China’s superior vision thus:

On the question of why would China be an exception since all the powers in history claimedhegemony, Fu said hegemony was neither part of China’s culture and tradition, nor its immediateand long-term interest. China has never been a country that enjoyed war. The essence of Chineseculture opposes aggression and hegemony . . . The Chinese people were victims of aggression andbullying, and will never agree to make their own country one of hegemony. The development and

72. Daniel Lynch, “Chinese Thinking on the Future of International Relations,” op. cit., p. 96.73. See, e.g. the essay on “Harmonious World: China’s Ancient Philosophy,” (5 October 2007)posted to the websites of Chinese embassies worldwide, at <http://mu.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/t369665.htm> and <http://na.chineseembassy.org/eng/xwdt/t410254.htm> (searched date: 20 January2010), etc.74. Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy, quoted in Schell,“Humiliation and the Olympics,” op. cit., p. 50.75. “China Calls for ‘Humiliation Day,” Associated Press (16 March 2007), <http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/World/2007/03/15/3756318.html> (searched date: 3 February 2010).



power of China today was not achieved through war. Rather, it was achieved through equitabletrade and cooperation with the rest of the world. Hegemony is definitely not an approach that bestmeets China’s interests.76

This vision suggests a contrast not only to Western-originated great power poli-

tics, but also to earlier Chinese visions of international relations. As we saw

previously, Mao in his 1949 speech claimed that there was no “third way” – all

nations must take sides in the epic struggle between communism and capitalism. Yet

today, according to one Chinese think tank scholar, the PRC may act as a model that

can “provide valuable guidelines for a world looking for a ‘third way.’ ”77 The New

Security Concept calls on all nations to “discard the old way of thinking and replace

it with new concepts and means to seek and safeguard security,” to “seek common

security through mutually beneficial cooperation,” and to adhere to principles of

“mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination.”78 Many of China’s elites

believe that by adhering to these principles, the world can finally move ahead to the

“great peace” postulated so long ago.

Conclusion

China’s elites today hold a fairly consistent view of where China has come from,

but diverge significantly on where it is going. The three viewpoints presented in this

paper portray strikingly different visions of how China should engage with the

world, today and in the future. Yet all three employ the Century of Humiliation not

only as a historical touchstone for China’s aspirations, but also as a source of

assertions and debates about what is possible and desirable in international relations.

The 19th- and early 20th-century beliefs that the international arena is conflictual

and that different civilizations have different capacities to prevail, and the questions

about whether equality and peace are possible, all remain central to contemporary

discussions about China’s role in the world.

Today’s elites draw on China’s experiences during the Century of Humiliation,

just as their Qing and republican predecessors did, to explain why China was left

76. Ambassador Fu Ying, “Is China a Power? – Ambassador Fu Ying’s Speech at Oxford University”(18 May 2009), at the website of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the UnitedKingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceuk/eng/sghd/t563034.htm> (searched date: 9 August 2009).77. Jiang Yong, “China and the World Can Enjoy Co-prosperity,” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Englishlanguage edition], 19-1 (January–February 2009), p. 18.78. “China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept,” op. cit., emphasis added.

26 / Pacific Focus


behind during the 19th and 20th centuries. For late Qing intellectuals, the lesson to

be drawn from these experiences was that China had been forced into a world of

evolution, competition, and inequality. Peace might lie on the other end of this

history, but only after an unavoidable and protracted struggle among nations. There

was no way forward to the “great peace” except through war. As a weak nation,

China needed to build its internal capacities to stave off future indignities by the

“strong nations.” The Western-dominated international system that had so subju-

gated China was viewed with suspicion, and early PRC leaders refused to engage

with other countries on the “unequal,” competitive terms that they believed charac-

terized this system. Hence China’s long-touted “Five Principles of Peaceful

Coexistence,” coined by then-Premiere Zhou Enlai in 1953 and enshrined in China’s

constitution in 1982, assert that China will only engage with other nations when

their interactions are conducted according to the principles of “mutual respect

for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference

in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful

co-existence.”79 For those Chinese elites who did not believe – and still do not

believe – that Western powers are capable of engaging with China as equals, these

principles necessitate limited interaction.

As China’s prominence on the world stage has grown, however, its elites have

increasingly come to question the premises that drove this reluctance. Many still

accept that competition lies at the heart of relations between nations, but believe that

China can now successfully compete with the strongest powers. They leave open,

however, the question of whether competition inevitably results in the downgrading

of some nations’ status as others rise; although one Western scholar has claimed

that the Chinese view of today’s world is that nations must “humiliate or be

humiliated,”80 in fact many Chinese elites suggest that rising nations can bring others

along with them. Their vision hinges on an essential shift from the Qing view of

competition: it surmises that a form of “equality” among nations can be achieved

79. China’s leaders have openly admitted that these principles stem directly from China’s own loss ofsovereignty during the Century of Humiliation. See, e.g. Ding Yuanhong, (former Ambassador ofChina to EU and Council Member of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs), “Hexie shijieyu Zhong-Mei guanxi” [A Harmonious World and the China–U.S. Relations (sic)], Heping yu Fazhan,2007-04 pp. 1–3; Wen Jiabao, “China Committed to Reform and Opening Up,” Speech at GeneralDebate of 63rd Session of UN General Assembly (26 September 2008), at <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/t515276.htm> (searched date: 9 December 2009).80. Callahan, “National Insecurities,” op. cit., p. 202.



even as nation-states contend over influence and resources. Others argue that the

very notion of international competition is a historical vestige, created by Western

powers based on their own experiences, but inapplicable to the current era. These

figures posit that China is uniquely qualified to lead the world into a better future.

They assert that China’s experiences of humiliation and shame provide it with a

clearer understanding than other nations of the price of inequality and the value of

peace, and argue that the goals of global peace and equality cannot be attained under

the current, Western-originated international system.

The basic questions of how nations should interact and whether international

peace is feasible are not unique to the Chinese. While the vocabularies and

debates through which they explore these issues are historically specific, drawing

on the concerns and worldviews of their Qing- and republican-era predecessors,

examination of elite rhetoric suggests that many of the basic foundations of the

Western-founded international system are not under question. Chinese elites still

discuss foreign policy in terms of China’s “national interest”; they do not question

the existence of nation-states; and one of their most precious principles, that of

state sovereignty, is largely derived from the Western concept of the state that was

scrutinized so carefully by Qing intellectuals. As China’s international influence

grows still further, its elites will continue to draw on both the theories of the past

and the realities of the present in order to determine what behavior befits a great

power.

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