centre for conflict and peace studies · centre for conflict and peace studies ... though the...

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Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies

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Executive Summary

Using foundational multi-sourced data

regarding armed groups, the Centre for

Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS) in

partnership with the United States

Institute for Peace (USIP) conducted

mixed-method, field-based research on

militant and political alliances in the five

Afghan provinces of Kabul, Herat,

Helmand, Kunduz and Nangarhar. The

study took place over the course of

eleven months from 1 December 2013 to

30 November 2014, and was designed to

examine two central themes – structure

and identity.

Making the decision to work with other

groups was described differently across

respondents in different provinces. In

Kunduz, for example, most of the

commanders sought assistance and

coordination from the shadow district

governors and provincial authorities

after a series of heavy losses at the

hands of the Afghan government and, to

a lesser extent, Coalition Forces.

Nangarhari respondents, by contrast,

attributed all decisions regarding inter-

group working agreements to the

provincial authorities in a top-down

process. Interviews with Herati groups

revealed that commanders in the

province were overall more judicious

and reluctant to forge working

agreements with groups outside the

immediate cluster. Finally, the extreme

insecurity and unchecked violence so

pervasive in Helmand province has

created some surprising partnerships

out of necessity.

Overall, the decision to forge an alliance

with another group is very much context

specific. Commanders have to weigh a

host of factors including the extent to

which they are integrated in a higher

command structure and the relative

strength of local leadership, the level of

violence or security in the area, and the

specific objectives of the group. Not

surprisingly, then, some trends were

observed on a provincial level as the

regional variable renders a similar

context within a province.

The mechanics of formation were

described as fairly straightforward.

Though each group has a unique

contextual experience, the actual

protocols may have very subtle

variations, but there were three common

paths to solidifying a working

agreement. The first, phone call or

walkie talkie transmission, was used

most often for short term, ad hoc

alliances. As this approach does not

involve face-to-face communication, it

carries minimal risk of betrayal or

interception by GIRoA authorities. The

second pathway involves direct, face-to-

face meetings wherein the terms of the

agreement are negotiated. This

approach was by far the most commonly

cited in all provinces, though some

logistical aspects varied by the

individual alliances. The third major

mechanism of formation were jirgas,

meetings convened at the request of the

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head commander or leadership and

involved commanders from all local sub-

groups in the cluster.

It is often assumed that community

members and tribal elders play a large

role in the activities of armed groups

operating in their area. However, the

sample respondents indicate that tribal

elders rarely play a role in alliance

formation. In the rare cases where non-

members are included in formation

meetings, the precise extent of their

influence over the outcome remains

unclear. Though limited in the formative

stages, communities do appear to play a

supportive role once alliances are

established.

Generally, the working agreements

studied were considered mutually

beneficial to the extent that respondents

had a difficult time imagining cessation.

Though a small variety of situations

were offered as examples that might

prompt an individual group to cease

working with another, all can be

described as prompting distrust.

However, in those few groups that did

report breaking a working agreement,

the most prominent reason given was

anger that, what ground-level

commanders perceived as the core

values of the conflict – Afghan

sovereignty, the establishment of a

sharia-ruled government, and greater

economic opportunities – were

compromised by involvement of

neighbouring state security apparatuses

at the upper echelons of insurgent

institutions.

Ultimately, soldier respondents were

steadfast in their support of the

alliances. Soldiers unanimously

communicated a strong belief that the

alliance improved the strength of the

group, thus making it better equipped to

reach the groups’ mutual goals. Though

not necessarily stated outright, the

underlying message was that working

together with another group made the

group stronger, and the individual

members stronger. Commanders were

more pragmatic in their assessments of

the alliance. Commanders did report

that their working agreements with

other groups were a worthwhile

mechanism to aid in advancing the

group’s goals. But commanders were

also more willing to recognize the cost of

alliances, particularly financial costs.

Political alliances were expected to

exhibit some unique characteristics,

though the precise nature of was

unclear. Fieldwork confirmed that

indeed, high-level political alliances

differ significantly from those among

armed groups at the provincial level.

Though all respondents expressed a

desire of their candidate and parties to

remove tribalism concerns from

government, all were acutely aware of

provincial tribal sensitivities and cited

tribal inclusion as a driving factor and

primary benefit of the alliance. Members

of a political alliance tend to measure

the outcome and benefit of alliances in

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very concrete terms, i.e., promises of

specific positions in government

pending a win or votes delivered from

specific provinces. Finally, the demand

for these benchmarks render these

agreements relatively fragile, as

respondent groups proved both capable

and willing to realign themselves with

another group if they thought their

partner would not deliver on promises.

Ultimately, alliances in Afghanistan

share some commonalities; however,

observed variation at both the provincial

and individual levels underscore the

extent to which each partnership is

situated within the contextual

environment. Each agreement, militant

or political, is forged to address a

specific need. The parameters of

alliances consequently reflect both the

demands and constraints facing both

groups. Thus, while broad trends can be

drawn from the data to enhance our

understanding of the phenomenon as a

whole, it is impossible to neatly

typologise these partnerships.

Furthermore, homogenizing the notion

of alliances in this manner may

undermine our ability to better

understand the conflict through this lens

and apply lessons learned toward

identifying pathways towards peace and

unity. As this research very much

constitutes an exploratory study of the

subject matter, CAPS can provide

insight and a foundation of evidence to

advance the pursuit of long-term peace

and stability.

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Recommendations

1) Support and develop

meaningful mechanisms for

political reconciliation and

reintegration at all levels of

society. The high level of

organizational consolidation coupled

with unwavering support for top-down

commander led decisions can be used to

foster peace and stability in 2014 and

beyond. For this to happen, however,

the Afghan government and

international community need to

recognize the necessity of a multi-level

political reconciliation and

reintegration. Domestic and

international stakeholders should work

together to create opportunities for both

dialogue and political participation by

members of the opposition. Ensuring a

place in government and safe position in

society would create an environment

where fighters can feel more confident

laying down their arms. Simply put, if

commanders and leadership lay down

their arms the data suggests the soldiers

will follow.

A political reconciliation between

Taliban and GIRoA leadership would

probably do the most to encourage

soldiers to lay down their arms by

officially ending the conflict, but it is

also the most difficult. While efforts at

peace talks should be bolstered, political

reconciliation efforts at the provincial,

district, and community levels must

begin immediately and in earnest.

Protecting key values of diversity and

women’s rights can take place while

inviting back our fellow Afghans into an

inclusive society.

2) Strengthen and expand APRP

protections, benefits, and job

training to attract and maintain

fighters who want to lay down

their arms. While political

reconciliation and reintegration is

perhaps the single most important

element of peacebuilding, stakeholders

must continue to expand and improve

APRP. Respondents repeatedly

expressed regret for joining APRP

because they felt that they never truly

received the protection and financial

support they were promised. Some even

admitted considering going back to the

opposition as a matter of survival – not

ideology. Of course a stronger APRP will

not win over the hard line ideologues; it

will, however, encourage pragmatic

commanders to rethink their situation

and make a choice that could benefit

both their country and their personal

situation. At the very least, APRP must

deliver on promises made to current

reintegrees who are the most effective

recruiters for all future reintegrees.

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Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

RECOMMENDATIONS 5

RELEVANT ACRONYMS 8

INTRODUCTION & 9

RESEARCH METHODS 9

METHODS 10

A NOTE ON RESPONDENT CODES 13 CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS 13

NETWORK ANALYSIS 16

NETWORK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 16

OVERVIEW OF RELATIONSHIP MAPPING EXERCISE 16 DECISION MAKING PROCESSES 19

MECHANICS OF FORMATION 26 DOCUMENTATION 28

OUTSIDE COMMUNITY INFLUENCE 29

ALLIANCE DURATION 31

TACTICS 34 COMMUNICATIONS 34

COMMUNICATION METHODS 36 CESSATION 37

MECHANICS OF CESSATION 39

ALLIANCE & IDENTITY 41

SOLDIERS 41 COMMANDERS 43

KABUL: POLITICAL ALLIANCES 47

IMPORTANCE OF TRIBAL UNITY 47 CONCRETE OUTCOMES 48 RELATIVE FRAILTY 50

CONCLUSION 52

APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRES 53

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COMMANDER/LEADER QUESTIONNAIRE 53 SOLDIER QUESTIONNAIRE 56

DETAINEE QUESTIONNAIRE 60 COMMUNITY QUESTIONNAIRE 64

APPENDIX II: RELATIONSHIP MAPPING MATRIX 67

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Relevant Acronyms

APRP Afghan Peace & Reconciliation Programme

CAPS Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies

DG District Governor, referring to the Taliban shadow District

Governor

GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

GIS Geographic Information Systems

HIG Hizb-e Islami of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

MOI Ministry of Interior

NDS National Directorate of Security

PG Provincial Governors

PPC Provincial Peace Council

USIP United States Institute of Peace

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Introduction &

Research Methods

In Afghanistan, it has been presumed

that many – if not most – militant

groups operating at the sub-national

level work together with other groups

along some form of alliance. Popular

and scholastic imagination both

generally portray alliances among

militant or political groups as unstable

yet calculated agreements formed and

broken at the whim of politically shrewd

figureheads. Depicting militant and

political alliances as such implies that

alliances in Afghanistan serve as

spoilers, or forces that have the

potential to undermine the peace

process as the nation continues to

transition towards full military, political,

and economic independence in the

coming years.

Yet sub-national variation in alliances is

understudied. Instead, research on war

bargains and settlements has typically

focused on what causes alliances to form

and break up, with little focus on the

structural nature and patterns of

alliances themselves. Using foundational

multi-sourced data regarding armed

groups, the Centre for Conflict and

Peace Studies (CAPS) in partnership

with the United States Institute for

Peace (USIP) conducted mixed-method,

field-based research regarding alliance

formation, structure, maintenance, and

resilience among armed groups as well

as alliances between political groups in

the five Afghan provinces of Kabul,

Herat, Helmand, Kunduz and

Nangarhar. The study took place over

the course of eleven months from 1

December 2013 to 30 November 2014.

While the study sought to positively

contribute to the understanding of

alliances in Afghanistan, the eleven-

month project duration required that

the scope be tailored to supplement

existing research and fill knowledge

gaps while remaining feasible to

execute. After reviewing existing

literature on the nature of alliances in

Afghanistan, the study was designed to

examine two central themes – structure

and identity.

First, CAPS wanted to examine the

structural attributes of militant and

political alliances, particularly at the

intra-provincial level. As mentioned

above, Afghan and international

stakeholders are quick to assume

alliances between militant or political

groups are unstable. However, little

research directly with fighters,

commanders, and political figures exists

to support such a lofty assumption.

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Key sub-questions quickly emerged:

1. How are alliances among armed and political figures formed and what modes of alliance maintenance are employed? Are there clear differences in the structure of political alliances versus militant alliances?

2. To what extent, if any, are intergroup alliances vertically integrated (i.e., down the chain of command)?

While structural attributes of alliances

are indeed important, any analysis or

conclusions drawn solely based on

structure and facets of day-to-day

maintenance would remain superficial

without a complementary examination

of the impact alliances have on both

individual and group identity. Thus the

second major focus of the study sought

to directly ascertain how alliances shape

the way individual participants think

about their place in the group, the

group’s overall political vantage in the

local landscape, and the state of the

conflict as a whole. Again, two main sub-

questions guided the project design:

1. How do both the decision makers and general members of the alliance perceive the cost/benefit of the agreement?

2. Does the presence/absence of an alliance shape the political efficacy of the soldiers involved? How and to what extent?

By studying structure and identity

together it was our express hope that we

could better understand the way

Afghanistan’s future peace prospects

might be impacted by the very existence

of alliances.

Methods

The best approach to ensure the study

produced a manageable amount of high

quality data in the relatively short

project duration was to choose a sample

of provinces that represented the

geographic regions and the broad

cultural attributes and conflict dynamics

found in Afghanistan. In addition to

wanting a representative sample that

included all regions of the country,

CAPS also factored its previous working

experiences in the provinces, existing

social capital in communities, relative

travel ease, and staff origin when

choosing the provinces. The five

provinces selected for the study were

Kunduz (North), Herat (West),

Helmand (South), Nangarhar (East),

and Kabul.

Once the target provinces were selected,

the research teams were systematically

deployed to the field for data collection

in teams of two. Field visits lasted an

average of 21 days with Helmand

province data collection taking a full 42

days. CAPS strategically chose not to

limit sample size, but to collect full and

varied case studies for as many alliances

as time, security, and participatory

enthusiasm allowed. This means that

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the number of groups profiled and

respondent varied from province to

province. Figure 1 shows the proportion

of respondents hailing from each of the

five target provinces. In total, CAPS

researchers conducted 145 individual

interviews with active, re-integrated,

and detained militant commanders,

soldiers, community elders, and political

leaders from approximately 42 groups in

the provinces.

This study represents a marked

departure from orthodox data collection

strategies typically employed by

security-related research in Afghanistan.

Research NGOs and think tanks usually

rely solely on interviews with

community members and Afghan

government (GIRoA) security officials to

create a perception-based report of

security dynamics in the provinces. This

is primarily to help ensure safety of the

researchers, but can seriously warp

findings with inaccurate information. In

addition, when research is conducted in

this manner it can be difficult to

separate reliable data from potentially

biased analytical interpretations offered

by respondents.

In order to ensure that the data was as

reliable as possible, the study was

designed to incorporate multiple sources

of data, but primarily rest on direct

discussion with fighters and

commanders themselves. All groups

profiled were either actively fighting at

the time of the interview or had

reintegrated through the Afghan Peace

& Reintegration Program (APRP) within

the six months prior to that field visit.

Guided by jointly developed

questionnaires translated into local

languages, semi-structured interviews

were conducted with non-member

community leaders, group

leaders/commanders, lower level

soldiers, and some detained group

members (See Appendix I for

questionnaires).

Tailoring the questionnaires to each of

these groups ensured that interviews

were completed in a reasonable time

period and pertinent questions were

asked in a way that respondents could

understand and to which they were able

to respond confidently. In addition,

some foundational interviews were

conducted with local leadership in

GIRoA security institutions and the

Herat20%

Helmand24%

Kabul 11%

Kunduz24%

Nangahar21%

Geographical Representation of Respondents

Figure 1

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Provincial Peace Councils (PPCs). These

interviews helped coordinate CAPS

operations in the field, gain a general

understanding of the local conflict

dynamics, and identify potential groups

and alliances to profile in case studies.

These foundational interviews, however,

are not included in our total interview

list as many of the individuals were

either not authorized or were reluctant

to officially report on the topic to CAPS.

The CAPS research team supplemented

the qualitative interviews with the

completion of a relationship mapping

matrix wherever possible. The mapping

matrix seeks to measure relationship

strength between two individuals based

on deviations within five different

variables: shared family relationships,

village/distance, tribe, fighting legacy,

and religion. (Appendix II includes

guidelines for relationship mapping

variables.) Willing respondents would

assess their relation to other group

members and members of partner

groups with respect to the five variables.

Weighting each variable equally, CAPS

researchers then created composite

score based on the average. In some

cases, group members were also able to

provide this information for other

individuals in the group, even if they

were not interviewed as an official

respondent. Despite recognition that

there could be some factual

inconsistencies, we have included some

of this data where group size and

dynamics were such that we felt

confident in the data quality and where

the additional data could help further

illustrate broad patterns.

The purpose of this two-pronged

approach was to cross verify information

told to the research teams with

secondary, measured information. In

doing so, CAPS has been able to feel

confident in the data used for analytical

exercises. Secondly, the relationship

mapping data has allowed CAPS to

visualize and examine quantitative

evidence of group and alliance structure.

At the project outset, CAPS intended to

also collect geospatial information

systems (GIS) coordinates for interview

locations in order to also examine the

geospatial relationship between allied

groups. While some of this data was

collected, CAPS ultimately decided not

to include the data in our analysis. First,

CAPS prides itself on our commitment

to the Do No Harm approach to

research. While we have made every

effort to protect our respondents’

identities, including locational data

increased the risk that the respondents

could be identified beyond what we

deemed ethically responsible. In

addition, insecurity in some of the

provinces sometimes rendered traveling

throughout the various districts and

villages unfeasible. In these instances,

interviews were conducted in district or

provincial centres at neutral locations.

GIS data would therefore have merely

reflected interview location and could

have significantly skewed any geospatial

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relationship analysis beyond a

confidence level with which CAPS

analysts were comfortable.

A Note on Respondent Codes

In order to protect their identity, all

respondent names have been replaced

with a code to ensure anonymity. These

codes are used in the text to refer to and

attribute quotes to specific individuals.

The codes follow a uniform format of

XX-XX-XX wherein:

The first two letters refer to province: Helmand (HL), Herat (HE), Kabul (KA), Kunduz (KU), and Nangarhar (NA)

The second two numbers refer to the base group: 01, 02, 03, etc. When we speak of alliances, we are therefore referencing a working agreement between two or more such groups. (i.e., between KU-03 and KU-09). Group number is logically absent from community member interview codes because they are not a member of the group.

The final set give an individual identifier based on type of interview and individual number. The letters correspond to the respondent group: commander (C), soldier (S), detainee (D), and community member (COMM). 1 The last

1 As mentioned above, there were some

indiv iduals included in the relationship mapping

number simply grants an individual number to the respondent. As Kabul respondents were all members of a political group holding various positions, they all belong to the same respondent group and are referred to simply by number.

Thus, when the reader sees “KU-01-C1,”

it should be understood to reference the

commander of Kunduz Group 1.

Likewise, “HE-COMM-02” refers to the

second community leader respondent in

Herat province.

Challenges and Limitations

The project faced some challenges

although most were not unique to the

subject matter, but were expected

consequences of conducting research in

war-torn Afghanistan and during

presidential election season. As such,

most challenges were overcome with

flexibility and fortitude.

General insecurity in the target

provinces presents a challenge. CAPS

field teams spent significant time prior

to departing Kabul coordinating their

that were not interviewed as official

respondents. The presence of these additional

indiv iduals has been clearly marked on any

relevant images using the identifier “A” along

with an indiv idual number. For example, HE-

03-A1 would indicate a respondent from Herat

Group 3 provided relationship information

about an additional member of the group who

was not available for interview.

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arrival with provincial representatives of

the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and

National Directorate of Security (NDS),

as well as Provincial Governors (PGs)

and local contacts. Despite these efforts

to begin cooperation and gauge the

security environment, arrival in the

provinces and direct person-to-person

networking is truly critical to ensuring

data collection runs smoothly and CAPS

researchers are able to move about and

freely recruit respondents without fear

of legal misunderstanding. While CAPS

is well versed in these protocols, every

study and every individual province

presents a unique set of circumstances.

For example, security coordination in

Helmand province was particularly

difficult compared to others. Travel

within the province was regularly

curtailed or delayed several days due to

an inability to ensure safe passage. In

many instances, it was more practical to

hold interviews with respondents in the

provincial capital, although travel did

stymie some respondents from

participating in the study who otherwise

would have. CAPS researchers overcame

this challenge by working closely with

the PPC who ardently supported the

project and helped coordinate

interviews with recent reintegrees.

Additionally, the CAPS field office and

strong reputation in Helmand has built

trust and generated a level of social

capital within provincial communities

that probably boosted participation in

the study. Still, data collection in

Afghanistan’s most volatile province

took nearly twice as long as any other

province.

Second, the project took place during

the months immediately preceding the

presidential elections on 5 April 2014

and 14 June 2014. The campaigns and

election did impact data collection in the

provinces. Some scheduled interviews

were postponed due to security concerns

and travel restrictions when candidates

announced arrival in a province. The

election, however, had the greatest

impact on Kabul data collection. An

increase in violence in the capital in the

weeks prior to 5 April prompted CAPS to

restrict all non-essential movement

within the city in order to minimize risk

to staff. These restrictions coupled with

candidates’ busy campaign schedules

caused some delays in the data

collection, and the announcement of an

extended campaign season due to the

necessity of a runoff between the two

lead candidates further added to delays.

CAPS overcame this issue by expanding

the interview list to include political

alliances that were most accessible in

this bustling political climate, and

waited where necessary to schedule

interviews until it was clear the

respondents had adequate time and

energy to devote to providing quality

information.

Two substantive challenges must also be

acknowledged. First, was the surprising

refusal of local political leaders in all

provinces to acknowledge or report on

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alliances at the provincial or district

levels. Respondents would continually

insist that alliances between political

parties were strategic decisions that took

place at the Kabul level. Of course, even

the most rudimentary understanding of

Afghanistan confirms that community-

level politics do affect the manner in

which parties manifest themselves in the

provinces. Respondent denial of this

probably betrays a lack of confidence to

speak of these dynamics individually, as

well as an apprehension toward even

implying that local political mechanics

do not always take the exact shape

dictated from Kabul level decision

makers. Whatever the reason, repeated

denial of locally-based political alliances

across all provinces prompted CAPS to

revise the project scope somewhat to

focus on militant alliances in Helmand,

Herat, Kunduz, and Nangarhar. Political

alliances thus became the primary focus

of Kabul data collection.

Second, the various provincial realities

and fluid conflict dynamics always

presents a challenge with respect to

uniform data quality across all target

provinces. This project is not an

exception. Because CAPS research is

firmly grounded in the Do No Harm

approach and requires that all

participation in interviews is voluntary,

respondents always have the right to

decline to provide information. Given

the sensitive subject matter – inner

workings of militant groups and their

allied partners – this happened

periodically. Some respondents were

particularly uncomfortable with

providing the depth of information

asked for in the relationship matrix.

This was particularly acute in Nangarhar

province, although it happened

sporadically in other provinces as well.

Because CAPS does not compel

information from respondents, this

means that quantitative relationship

analytics was performed wherever

possible, but do not include all groups

studied.

In a similar vain, while the CAPS

researchers generally took respondent

answers at face value to be true, we have

tried to highlight inconsistencies in

numbers and events across respondents

where possible. CAPS was judicious in

the standards of data quality accepted

into the final sample. A small number of

interviews (approximately 18), primarily

with detainees in Helmand province,

were relegated to contextual information

and were not included in analytical

exercises due to glaring factual

inconsistencies and/or obvious

untruths. Ultimately, the CAPS research

team is confident that the analysis

contained within this report rests on the

highest possible quality of data on the

subject matter to date.

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Network Analysis

Network Analysis Methodology

Social Network Analysis is a

methodology grounded in sociology with

widespread, cross-disciplinary

applications for determining the kinship

and cooperative ties across members of

a given social group. The premise of the

methodology is to identify primary

actors as graphical nodes and ranked

relationship ties as connecting lines

(technically referred to as edges)

between nodes. The spatial organization

and positioning of one node to another

is not typically used in the analysis

beyond the use of clustering

relationships. The specific spatial

pattern is merely aesthetic as long as the

primary information is clearly

communicated.

The advantage of social network analysis

is the ability to visualize clusters, to

identify central actors between clusters,

measurements of network closure and

propinquity (the tendency of nodes to be

conjoined by geography). Within this

study, militant groups were measured

primarily by homophily, the affinity of

individuals to bond with others on

common values (value homophily) or

social status (social homophily).

Overview of Relationship mapping

exercise

Initial Data Collection Process

In order to conduct a diagrammatic

social network analysis of the various

groups, it was necessary to quantify the

internal and external relationships.

Naturally this is not a perfect system, yet

the important aspect of the exercise

remains intact as the overall attributes

of the nodes and edges remain

thematically valid. In other words,

given the large sample size, the

aggregate maintains overall reliability

even though small details may be

obscured at the granular level of data

collection. Likewise, the diversity of

agents assigning perception rankings

provide a method to check and cross

check each perception.

To create specific categories for analysis,

an ethnographic process of semi-

structured and open discussions were

held with a diverse pool of Afghans for

several weeks to identify the most

prominent themes in social ties. These

themes were identified as family ties,

shared village history, tribal ties,

religious values (such as common

mosque attendance), and a history of

fighting together in the past.

Researchers were trained and instructed

to provide a ranking of 1-5, wherein 1 is

the weakest and 5 is the strongest per

category, for interactions between each

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militant member in relation to the next.

So for example, when interviewing a

Helmand Commander (HL-02-C1)

about his relationship to a given soldier

(HL-02-S1), it became clear that these

two men were from the same tribe,

family, and village, attended the same

mosque, but had had zero history of

fighting together in the past. This

relationship was assigned a 5 for each

category except for fighting, where it

was ranked with a 1. See Table 1 below

for clarification.

Visual Network Modelling

Following the valuation of each

individual across 5 criteria, the criteria

were consolidated by statistical mean so

as to assign a single relationship value

between 1 and 5 between each

relationship. To diagram the

relationships into social networks, the

excel data was introduced into

Cytoscape.

Within Cytoscape, the first column of

names was assigned the relational

priority, the second set of names was

ascribed target status, and the mean

relationship was used as the relational

value. Following the input of the data, a

network diagram was generated that

merely displayed linkages, with no

reference to hierarchy, strength, or

proximity. In instances where a node

connected to itself, these self referential

loops were removed.

The diagrams were then organized by

applying a hierarchical algorithm for

sorting (most important persons at the

top) and discreetly filtering the

transparency of the edges (the

connecting lines) so that the stronger

the relationship value, the darker the

line. Lastly the vary nodes were parsed

into identifiable clusters using random

colours so as that each militant group is

clearly distinguished from the next

within the network.

Table 1

Social Network Structure Analysis

The generated social networks are

broken down into three provinces:

Helmand, Heart, and Kunduz. Each

provincial network varies in

composition, as it was possible in some

instances to go beyond mapping internal

hierarchies but to also identify and map

Co

mp

osite

Fa

mily

Villa

ge

Trib

e

Fig

htin

g

Re

ligio

n

(HL-

02-

C1)

(HL-

02-

S1)

4.

2 5 5 5 1 5

(HL-

02-

C1)

(HL-

02-

S2)

4 4 5 5 1 5

(HL-

02-

C1)

(HL-

02-

S3)

4 4 5 5 1 5

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the interactions of some groups in

relation to one another.

Overall, the relationship between

members of a group and across alliance

partnerships loosely conforms to

classical/orthodox assumptions

regarding alliance structures.

Consistently, each commander

maintains an authoritative position over

his unit, the soldiers have varying

degrees of horizontal relation to one

another, and outsiders are at a distance

from the pyramidal structure of the unit.

The strength of relationships between

soldiers and their commanders vary

considerably, and are not necessarily

stronger than the linkages between

some outsiders and the commanders.

The most significant finding of the social

network analysis is that the

relationships between groups tend to

rely upon outside individuals who have

not been identified as belonging to a

particular unit, as found in Figure 1.

Rather they frequently share

relationships between units. Because of

the challenge to interview combatants,

interviews were frequently conducted

across outside individuals in discussion

of other parties, consequently creating a

gap in understanding the identity and

role of these individuals.

However, we can see from the social

networks that these individuals tend to

be situated as essential stakeholders –

such as a governor or other similar

official position - in the local community

given their wide range of ties. Or, in the

event that the individual is not a major

stakeholder in the community, that

individual nonetheless merits high

respect among individuals retain official

and unofficial influences.

Figure 2

HE-07-A2 (Highlighted in

RED) is not a significant

figure of official status but

maintains a range of strong

connections across two

militant groups. Arguably,

such a figure is an influential

figure via informal channels.

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Alliance Formation

The interviewees were, by and large,

very candid in sharing their experiences

forging a working agreement. Though

the terms of working relationships

formed vary widely to respond to the

specific local environment, respondents

largely described alliance formation as a

fairly linear process. As such, this

chapter will examine the most critical

aspects of alliance formation – the

decision-making process encouraging

formation as well as the mechanics or

specific logistical steps taken to

negotiate and establish an agreement.

Finally, this section will also address the

manner in which the outside community

played a role in the establishment of an

alliance in some instances.

Decision Making Processes

Making the decision to work with other

groups was described differently across

respondents in different provinces. In

Kunduz, for example, most of the

commanders sought assistance and

coordination from the shadow district

governors and provincial authorities

after a series of heavy losses at the

hands of the Afghan government and, to

a lesser extent, Coalition Forces.


attributed all decisions regarding inter-

group working agreements to the

provincial authorities in a top-down

process. Interviews with Herati groups

revealed that commanders in the

province were overall more judicious

and reluctant to forge working

agreements with groups outside the

immediate cluster. Finally, the extreme

insecurity and unchecked violence so

pervasive in Helmand province has

created some surprising partnerships

out of necessity.

The decision to form alliances with other

groups was described as a more

collaborative process in Kunduz than in

other provinces. Commander

respondents repeatedly told CAPS that

they requested assistance from their

shadow district governor (DG), who

then helped make the appropriate

arrangements. For KU-02-C1, the

decision to work with other groups was

made over time and out of necessity.

“Over the last year, the number of

Taliban soldiers in our area has

decreased, making it harder to defend

the area. The foreign troops left, but I

was still attacked many times by the

government authorities so I decided to

make an alliance with other Taliban

groups.”2

Once he recognized the need for help to

hold his area, KU-01-C1 reached out to

the Taliban DG in his district of Imam

Sahib. “I just called him,” he explained,

“and reported my conditions. He then

arranged a meeting [with the other

commander] and we reached an

2 Interview, KU-02-C1, Kunduz (2 January

2014).

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agreement.” 3 KU-10-C1 described a

similar process with the Al Qaeda

representative4 to whom he reports. In

his case, however, KU-10-C1 felt he

should use his group’s strength to aid

other struggling Taliban groups in the

area. “I contacted him and asked about

supporting other small groups in

Kunduz. He approved, so I made the

decision to go ahead. They need help

and they share our commitment to our

objective so we wanted to help them.”5 A

third variation on this approach can be

seen in the alliance between the groups

KU-11 and KU-02. According to KU-11-

C1, repeated attacks from governmental

authorities over the course of a year

made an alliance between the groups an

intuitive mechanism to stem losses. The

alliance was conceived at the

commander level, but then approved by

the upper echelons of Taliban authority

in the district.6

Though many commanders reportedly

reached out to ranking officers to

request assistance vis-à-vis local

alliances, Kunduz respondents also

explained that provincial oppositional

leadership would also sometimes initiate

3 Ibid.

4 KU-10-C1 explained to CAPS that he reports

directly to an Al Qaeda representative who

jointly operates under the Taliban structure.


2014).

6 Interview, KU-11-C1, Kunduz (8 January 2014).

the process with a direct order.7 In these

cases, the commanders’ discipline and

respect for the chain of command

become paramount to the cost-benefit

analysis of the alliance itself. Even if a

commander felt the alliance would not

benefit his group, it is extremely unlikely

he would refuse to follow the order as

insubordination within the Taliban

structure is usually accompanied by life-

threatening consequences.


reported a much more top-down

process. Commanders in this province

overwhelmingly placed the decision

making power in the alliance process

firmly in the hands of the district and

provincial Taliban leadership. For

example, NA-04-C1 directly told CAPS,

“I did not have to make the decisions for

any agreement because we were all

working under Commander [redacted]. .

. We would receive orders from him,

come together, and implement the

plan.”8 Another respondent, NA-09-C1

reported that he had known his fellow

alliance partner since they fought

together during the Mujahidin era, “But

I received orders from [my senior

commander] to work with [that

group].” 9 NA-02-C1 reported the same


2014); Interview, KU-08-C1, Kunduz (2 January

2014).

8 Interview, NA-04-C1, Nangarhar (13 January

2014).


2014).

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experience, “We belong to the same

tribe, knew one another previously, and

were friendly. But the head commander

was the main decision maker. He was

responsible for organizing joint

operations between the groups

operating in the area.” 1 0 Compared to

Kunduz, the decision making power

with regards to alliance formation in

Nangarhar appears to be much more

consolidated in the district and

provincial power players.

Discussions with the Herati

commanders revealed a greater level of

hesitance to work with other groups

than respondents from other provinces.

More Herati respondents told CAPS

Researchers that they worked alone than

in any other province. HE-06-C1, for

example, noted that several other

Taliban groups were working in his area

including a close friend of his father.

“When I started fighting the Afghan

government, [he] came to me and

offered assistance. I thanked him, but

told him that I wanted to stay entirely

independent.” 1 1 HE-06-C1 chose to

operate even outside the Taliban

structure as a way to retain control over

operational procedures, and fully defend

his area from outside intervention. The

experience of HE-01-C1 also exemplifies

a deep mistrust with respect to working

with groups outside his immediate

subgroups. HE-01-C1 commanded five

1 0 Interview, NA-02-C1, Nangarhar, (30 December

2013).

1 1 Interview, HE-06-C1, Herat, (2 March 2014).

subgroups in the Pashtun Zarghon

district of Herat before he ultimately

joined APRP. He also served briefly as

the Taliban Provincial Commander

before severing ties with the Quetta-

based organization in favour of

independence. In his interview, HE-01-

C1 explained that both during his tenure

with the Taliban and after, he refused to

work with other commanders or allow

his subgroups to work with groups

outside the immediate cluster of his

command.1 2

In fact, he reportedly disarmed any

groups that crossed into his territory.1 3

For HE-01-C1, the main objective of his

armed activities was to protect his

immediate area and community from

insecurity and outside intervention.

Working with the Taliban was only a

mechanism to further that goal, and he

did not hesitate to cut ties with the

Taliban when the group allegedly

encouraged him to enter into an

agreement with foreign forces.1 4

1 2 Interview, HE-01-C1, Herat (23 February

2014).

1 3 Ibid. This was also confirmed to us by his son

and sub-commander, HE-02-C1 who also

reported that his group “disarmed two major

Taliban groups who used to operate [in our

district] and did not let them return until we

joined the peace process. Interv iew, HE-02-C1,

Herat, (26 February 2014).

1 4 Ibid.

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In that sense, HE-01-C1 and his five

subgroups more closely resemble an

illegal armed group than an integrated

part of the Taliban structure. To

observe Figure 3, it is clear that the

forces of HE-01 and HE-02 are tightly

integrated. Naturally the commanders

both float at the top of the hierarchical

structure and near one another (as we

understand their father-son

relationship.

This particular network model however,

maintains a higher level of mixed-unit

integration than any other group. In

addition, the strength of the ties,

characterized by the darkness of the

edges (connecting lines) suggests

shifting levels of interdependence

regardless of proximity (authority).

HE-03-C1 was similarly reluctant to

work with other groups outside those

with whom he shared familiar relations.

Though he reportedly commanded

about 12 subgroups in Herat at one

point, he and soldiers in his direct

command rarely worked with other

groups – the main exception being his

brother-in-law/sub-commander, HE-

04-C1.1 5 As HE-04-C1 put it, “He is my

brother-in-law and we are from the

same tribe. There were other groups too,

but frankly we did not need them.”1 6

The overall tendency of Herati

respondents to maintain independence

or gravitate toward working with direct

1 5 Interview, HE-03-C1, Herat, (3 March 2014).

1 6 Interview, HL-04-C1, Herat, (4 March 2014).

HE-01-C1 HE-02-C1

Figure 3

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family members only is probably

attributable to the fact that GIRoA

presence is stronger and more visible in

Herat than many of the other provinces.

Though it was not directly said,

increased government control in Herat

makes supporting the opposition a

dangerous game. Therefore, it is only

logical that commanders would work

with only those peers with whom they

have the strongest levels of trust, and

whose shared familiar and tribal bonds

prevent betrayal with the de facto threat

of dire social and personal safety

consequences.

Helmand province is irrefutably among

the most insecure and volatile in

Afghanistan. The tenuous security

environment has a clear impact on the

manner in which alliances are formed

and maintained. Though a smaller

number of groups were available for

interview in Helmand than in the other

target provinces, the sample includes

three surprising alliance configurations.

Ultimately, it is clear that the intensity

of the conflict in Helmand make

alliances a necessity for survival;

sometimes this means forging a working

agreement with an unlikely partner.

The social network model generated for

the alliances between H2-H11-H12 is

likely the most robust model from the

study. The model, Figure 4, captures the

deeply rooted trust of the 4 members of

HL-02, with extending ties into HL-12.

While the distributions of relationship

strength vary only by degree, the tight-

knit proximity of HL-02 versus the

regular spatial distribution of HL-11

illuminates the distinction in

organizational resilience, with HL-02 as

the clearly more resilient and possibly

better commanded forces.

Figure 4

A few of the Helmand alliances followed

a similar pattern as seen in other

provinces. For example, HL-04-C1

reportedly leads 15-20 men as a

subgroup of a higher commander who

also served as the shadow mayor for

Lashkargah City. HL-04-C1 explained

that he does work with other groups in

ad hoc alliances, but he has no decision

making power to forge or end such

alliances.

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“We have no right to make alliances of

our own with any group. The Taliban

says that they are responsible for

maintaining the proper structure and

determining troop movements. If a

commander made their own alliances

[with another commander], the Taliban

would think those particular

commanders have bad intentions –

plotting to betray the Taliban or maybe

joining the Afghan government. It might

cost them their lives.”1 7

HL-04-C1’s account of the tight grip

upon which the Taliban provincial

leadership holds on is similar to the

abovementioned reports from

Nangarhar. However, not every

commander denied having the

autonomy to forge working agreements.

HL-03-C1 commands a subgroup of men

for a senior commander who controls

five other groups in southern Helmand.

Interestingly, he reportedly has

maintained an alliance with another

commander outside the cluster for the

last three to four years. He and his

alliance partner first met as neighbours

in Pakistan during the winter, but when

the second man transferred from

Kandahar to Helmand, an alliance

naturally formed. “He is just a great

person,” explained HL-03-C1, “He

helped me extensively after my former

commander died. I think he knows we

1 7 Interview, HL-04-C1, Helmand, (2 January

2014).

have the same commitment.” 1 8 This

decision closely resembles experiences

in Kunduz, where group-level

commanders appeared to enjoy the

greatest level of freedom to request,

suggest, or form working agreements.

Two other alliances highlight variety of

decision-making processes regarding

alliance formation in Helmand. The first

is a surprising alliance between

historical rivals Hizb-e Islami

Hekmatyar and the Taliban, as reported

by HL-02-C1. HL-02-C1 reported that

Taliban in Greskh district vastly

outnumbers his group, HIG. “We work

with [Partner Commander] out of

necessity because we are weak and we

need them.” 1 9 Lack of trust and even

hate between the two groups is

pervasive; however, the alliance has

remained intact at the direct written

order of HIG leadership in Pakistan.2 0

This agreement highlights both the

manner in which the extreme violence

and instability demand pragmatism

among Helmand’s opposition leaders as

well as the pre-eminence of respect for

the chain of command.

The experience of HL-06-C1 further

illustrates the extent to which Helmand

armed groups must weigh their

1 8 Interview, HL-03-C1, Helmand (27 January

2014).


2014).

20 Ibid.

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ideological predilections against the

practical need to survive and manoeuvre

through the mine-ridden political and

security landscapes. HL-06-C1 leads a

small group of about 10-11 men in the

Deh Adam Khan area of Greskh district.

Working for a brief period in the Greskh

Police Headquarters, HL-06-C1 was

attacked and brutally beaten by the

Taliban – an incident that prompted

him to form his own group and align

himself with the powerful Taliban

commander, HE-05-C1.2 1

21 Interview, HL-06-C1, Helmand (26 January

2014).

However, as illustrated within Figure 5,

this alliance was not about an

ideological commitment to the Taliban

political goals. “It was a way for me to

stay protected from Taliban wrath, and

keep Taliban from outside our area from

coming and bothering us.” 2 2 The

financial gains, however, were another

driving factor in his decision. “If we

cannot make a living, we have to find

other ways of earning money. Worse

comes to worst, the first thing we would

do is rob people.”2 3

22 Ibid.

23 Interview, HL-06-C1.

Figure 5

Enlarged View

Weak Ties

Police

Taliban

HL-06-C1 (Circled in RED) alliance

with HE-05-C1 (Circled in ORANGE)

Independent

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Though technically allied under the

Taliban structure for a period of time, it

is clear that HL-06-C1 considers his

group independent. Not only did he

admit to undermining outside Taliban

intentions for his area, 2 4 Furthermore,

he also ordered his men to work with a

local Afghan Local Police (ALP)

commander, HL-09-C1 to help resist the

Taliban in the area. Clearly this is a

paradoxical decision, but the shared

personal history with each of the

partners makes it easy to switch sides

when the situation is most convenient.

The respondent expressed sentiments of

loyalty to both that felt genuine, which

probably makes the justification of

working with both sides of the conflict

easy to internalize.

Helmand alliances are a clear product of

the intense level of violence that

permeates the province. Because the

fighting is fierce and varies somewhat

from area to area, the decisions made

with respect to alliances are more

diverse than observed in the other target

provinces. Some Helmand groups

adhere very strictly to the organization’s

chain of command and refuse to step

outside it for fear of harsh repercussions

from leadership. Other groups that may

have been more cut off from leadership

concentrations in the district and

provincial centres were able to initiate

24 HL-06-C1 reportedly ordered his men to

diffuse or throw away land mines that were

designated to be planted in his area. Interview,

Helmand (26 January 2014).

working agreements with other groups.

Finally, in two cases, we saw that the

security environment demanded

commanders be pragmatic in their

decisions to work with others. This

pragmatism, however, created strange

bedfellows.

Overall, the decision to forge an alliance

with another group is very much context

specific. Commanders have to weigh a

host of factors including the extent to

which they are integrated in a higher

command structure and the relative

strength of local leadership, the level of

violence or security in the area, and the

specific objectives of the group. Not

surprisingly then, some trends were

observed on a provincial level as the

regional variable renders a similar

context within a province.

Mechanics of Formation

Once the decision to explore an alliance

has been made, the mechanics of

formation were described as fairly

simple and straightforward. Though

each group has a unique contextual

experience, the actual protocols may

have very subtle variations, but there

were three common paths to solidifying

a working agreement.

The first manner in which alliances are

solidified is through either a phone call

or walkie talkie transmission. This

approach was used most often for short

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term, ad hoc alliances. 2 5 As this

approach does not involve face-to-face

communication, it carries minimal risk

of betrayal or interception by GIRoA

authorities. Telecommunications also

reduce or even eliminate the need for

advance planning, a particular

advantage when a group finds itself

under a direct and imminent threat.

Though the advantages to this approach

are numerous, respondents who

reportedly primarily relied on

telecommunications for formation

usually did so with partners with whom

they had a previous and longstanding

relationship.

The second pathway to alliance

formation involves direct, face-to-face

meetings wherein the terms of the

agreement are negotiated. This

approach was by far the most commonly

cited in all provinces, though some

logistical aspects varied by the

individual alliances. In Kunduz for

example, where the district governors

are very active in their management of

the local groups, respondents usually

told CAPS that the DG was present in

the initial meetings alongside both

prospective partners. 2 6 Though it was

25 Interview, KU-09-C1, Kunduz, (8 January

2014).; Interview, KU-07-C1, Kunduz, (2

January 2014); Interv iew, NA -08-C1,

Nangarhar, (1 January 2014).


2014); Interview, KU-11-C1, Kunduz (8 January

2014).

not specifically stated, this likely serves

a two-pronged purpose.

First, the DG’s presence probably

removes apprehension and aids in trust

building, particularly when the

prospective partners do not know one

another or belong to different tribes.

Second, it also allows the DG to monitor

an alliance and maintain consolidated

control over his men.

Other respondents reportedly met with

their alliance partner without the

presence of a head commander. This

was usually done after the head

commander had given orders for the

groups to work together, or in advance

of seeking approval for the agreement

from leadership.2 7

Most respondents reportedly met only

once while a few interviewees said the

agreement was designed over multiple

meetings. For example, KU-02-C1 met

with KU-11-C1 and the DG twice to

discuss the full parameters of the

alliance. 2 8 Though meeting in person

carries more risk than

telecommunications, the former lays the

groundwork for a genuine relationship

27 Interview, HE-02-C1, Herat (26 February

2014); Interv iew, NA -09-C1, Nangarhar (16

January 2014 ); Interv iew, NA -03-C1,

Nangarhar (13 January 2014); Interview, HL-

03-C1, Helmand (27 January 2014).


2014).

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and mutual respect. Consequently, the

network model, Figure 6, of this alliance

exemplifies direct communication and

resulting functionality.

Figure 6

The third major mechanism for alliance

formation reported by interviewees were

large meetings of commanders.

Sometimes referred to as a jirga while

others simply called them planning

meetings, these meetings were usually

convened at the request of the head

commander or leadership and involved

commanders from all local sub-groups

in the cluster. 2 9 If there is to be


2014); Interv iew, KU-03-C1, Kunduz (29

December 2013); NA-08-C1, Nangarhar (1

January 2014).

community participation in alliance

formation, it occurs during this

mechanism; however, not all larger

meetings include tribal elders.

Respondents unanimously agreed that

regular foot soldiers were not included

formative meetings, only commanders.

Because of this soldier respondents

rarely answered questions relating to

issues of formation, and those who did

only spoke in general terms based on

their general understanding.

Documentation

Every respondent was asked whether a

written record of the agreement exists or

if it was strictly verbal. About one third

of the interviewees did not respond to

this question. The precise reason for the

high non-response rate is unclear.

Respondents may have been reluctant to

admit that the agreement was strictly

oral because it would reveal their

illiteracy. It is equally possible that

interviewees felt answering the question

gave too much detail with respect to the

procedural workings of the oppositional

organizations. Whatever the reason,

CAPS researchers chose not to press

non-response questions in favour of

preserving the trust required to continue

to the interview.

Of those that did offer a response, it was

found that the clear majority –

approximately 68% – were strictly oral

and lacked any sort of documentation.

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Of the responses that indicated the

existence of a written record of the

agreement, about 71% were from

Kunduz. KU-11-C1 explained that his

agreement was written and on file with

the Taliban council, but did not have a

copy himself.3 0 KU-02-C1 even went so

far as to say that written records are not

only kept for formative meetings, “Most

of our meetings are documented,

including the dates. All of the

documents remain with the Taliban

council.” 3 1 Though this penchant for

documentation appears to be

predominantly unique to Kunduz, it

suggests a higher level of formality and

organization than is commonly

associated with lower level oppositional

groups.

Outside Community Influence

Tribal elders and prominent community

members played a role in alliance

formation in very few cases. KU-03-C1

explained that the DG invited

community elders to the jirga where the

alliance was formed. “The groups were

there, along with other Taliban and the

community elders. The elder’s

recommendations are considered, and

the group helps work out any

disagreements and decide who will lead

the two groups. Sometimes it can take a


2014).


2014).

few meetings to solve all the issues.”3 2

Likewise, KU-08-C1 described a similar

meeting where elders met with the DG

and all of the commanders in the area.

Though the interviewee did not

elaborate on the extent to which the

elders had influence over the terms of

the alliance, he did highlight that the

meeting space was held in an elder’s

house.3 3 In Herat, HE-04-C1 explained

that the tribal elders in his area played a

key role in persuading the higher

commander to forge alliances. “The

elders were saying that US forces trust

the Persian speakers and will kill the

Pashtuns.”3 4

It is often assumed that community

members and tribal elders play a large

role in the activities of armed groups

operating in their area. However, the

sample respondents indicate that tribal

elders rarely play a role in alliance

formation. In the rare cases where non-

members are included in formation

meetings, the precise extent of their

influence over the outcome remains

unclear.

Though limited in the formative stages,

communities do appear to play a

supportive role once alliances are

established. HE-01-C1 and his alliance

32 Interview, KU-02-C1, Kunduz (29 December

2013).


2014).

34 Interview, HE-04-C1, Herat (4 March 2014).

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partners enjoyed a large amount of

support. “Local people supplied our

groups. They were giving us lodging,

food, and even clothes. In return we

tried to serve them well. They still bring

food and other stuff to my home even

now when I have reintegrated.”3 5 HE-

01-C1 also reportedly met with local

ulema every Friday to discuss issues,

some of which pertained to agreement

activities. Though community members

were not involved in the formation of

the alliance, HL-06-C1 reported that

tribal elders did sometimes attend

meetings between the alliance partners

and weighed in on issues pertaining to

the partnership. 3 6 These experiences

were not unique; stories such as these

were countless from both commander

and soldier respondents.

35 Interview, HE-01-C1, Herat (23 February

2014).

36 Interview, HL-06-C1, Helmand (26 January

2014).

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Alliance Duration

Alliance or working agreement duration

among the study sample produced a bell

curve distribution. Individual answers

were used to form an aggregate group

estimate. This approach helped account

for intra-group variance that might be

attributed to different perceptions of

time passage or individual tenure within

a group. The quantifiable group

estimates3 7 were then situated into one

of 6 categories.

37 Not all indiv iduals or groups offered a

quantifiable estimate. Some responses were

non-quantifiable, which included groups where

the respondent was unsure of the duration of the

alliance, unwilling to report, or offered a vague

statement that could not be corroborated by a

quantifiable duration with certainty.

Additionally, the few groups that did not

consider itself having an alliance were also

placed into this category.

As shown in Figure 7, most of the

working agreements were reported to

have lasted between two and four years.

More notably, however, is the fact that

approximately 68% of the quantifiable

working agreements last less than two

years. This is somewhat surprising given

the relatively strong interconnection

illustrated by the relationship mapping

endeavours above. Logically, very

interconnected groups should be more

durable rather than less. So why were

most of the alliances reported as lasting

such a short period of time?

DURATION OF REPORTED

ALLIANCES

Figure 7

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There are a few possible explanations for

the dissonance between the reported

intra and intergroup relationship

strength and the outcome on alliance

duration. First and most startlingly is

the possibility that the strength of

relationships as determined by the

enumerated networks are simply not

correlated to one another. This study

was informed by traditional Afghan

notions of camaraderie and loyalty as

well as the conventional discourse on

militant and political alliances in

Afghanistan. Both rest on the

assumption that the stronger the

relationships within the group and with

alliance partners, the stronger and more

durable the alliance. The data from this

sample suggests that this assumption

may need to be reconsidered.

Before totally abandoning the idea that

more connected members produce more

durable alliances, a few other

possibilities should be explored. For

example, there may be more important

factors that indicate relationship

strength between two individuals than

those used here. CAPS researchers took

great care in the selection and definition

of the five factors on the relationship

mapping matrix as well as the variance

within each indicator. Familiar

relationships, physical distance, tribe,

fighting legacy, and religious affiliations

were all considered by CAPS as strong

social linkages between individual

members of a given Afghan community.

Though well-informed by native cultural

fluency, it is possible that these

indicators were not the ideal indicators

by which to measure and forecast

relationship strength. Perhaps there are

other indicators that were not collected

that have a greater impact on

relationship strength. In this sense, the

relationship mapping in this study is

explorative; measuring the strength of

personal relationships between human

beings is not an exact, quantifiable

science. Further exploration solely of

relationship metrics in Afghanistan is

certainly warranted and encouraged.

Relationship metrics aside, there are

several more possible explanations that

may account for the short duration of

the sample working agreements. First, is

that soldiers were unable to reliably

speak about working agreement

duration beyond their own tenure in the

organization. Thus, a soldier who had

been with a group for sixteen months

would usually remark that the alliance

had been in place at least a year. In

reality, however, the agreement may

have been in place for several years prior

to his addition to the group. The

aggregate duration was based on all

quantifiable responses from

respondents in a group to help account

for this, but tenure length of soldiers

likely still influenced reported duration.

The same is also true for commander

respondents. Given that commanders

were broadly recognized as the sole

decision maker about the alliance, it

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follows that commander respondents

should be able to provide the most

reliable assessment of alliance duration.

Yet this is also not necessarily the case.

Almost no commanders would speak

about existing relationships with other

groups prior to his own tenure as

commander. In order to preserve the

interview, CAPS researchers did not

question this reluctance. Instead, it was

understood that restarting the group

narrative with the commander’s

ascension to power helped consolidate

his image and generate a cult of

personality. Taking credit for the

establishment of an alliance, even

implicitly, reinforces the commander’s

projections of power. Alternatively,

recognizing that the group has

relationships that extend beyond the

tenure of the commander may subtly

suggest to the soldiers the commander is

replaceable. It is therefore in the

commander’s best interest to construct

and maintain barriers to institutional

memory, both with respect to alliances

and other organizational matters. Thus

it is probable that even the commander

respondents under reported some of the

alliance durations.

Finally, it is also worth noting external

security developments may have

impacted the formation of working

agreements in that 2-year time period.

Most of the interviews for this study

took place in late 2013 and early 2014,

and included groups that had

reintegrated within six months of the

field visit. Looking two and a half years

into the past from data collection would

situate the alliances within the height of

the infamous US troop surge under

President Barak Obama. It is also

possible therefore that the sample

alliances were merely formed at a time

of heightened pressure on the

insurgency and only aged 1-2 years by

the time of interview or the group’s

decision to join APRP.

Afghanistan has long been recognized

for its social and political complexities.

Alliances are no exception. Particularly

with the potential correlation between

intra and inter-group relationships and

alliance duration, the data raises more

questions than it provides answers.

Traditional assumptions that a stronger

connection between group members and

across groups creates more durable

alliances should be re-examined. The

task of adequately measuring individual

relationship strength in Afghanistan

definitely represents a need for further

exploration in future studies.

Additionally, the apparent lack of

institutional memory projected by both

soldiers and commanders probably also

contributes to underreporting with

respect to duration. Finally, the short

duration of the majority of sample

working agreements might be

adequately contextualized by the troop

surge and increased pressure placed on

anti-government militant groups at that

time.

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Tactics

Alliance activities – specifically the

tactics employed to further alliance

goals – were remarkably similar across

all respondents, irrespective of province.

The answers offered to these questions

were very generic and overall

unsurprising for any reader with even a

rudimentary understanding of the

Afghan war. For example, KU-10-C1

explained that his alliance primarily

consisted in “trainings on proper

fighting technic, planting landmines,

and how to understand mapping

coordinates. We also would plan attacks

on Government check posts in hopes of

scaring them out of the area.”3 8 NA-05-

S1 told CAPS that one alliance activity in

which he had participated was an attack

on a convoy of Coalition Forces.3 9 Other

soldiers offered even more generic

answers. HE-02-S2 simply said, “We

were doing Jihad against Coalition

Forces and trying our best not to harm

government personnel.”4 0

Though disappointing, the reason

respondents were evasive when asked

directly about alliance tactics is simple:

Though many of the respondents were

no longer actively fighting, they may

have been hesitant to describe tactics in

detail for fear of legal repercussions.


2014).

39 SInterv iew, NA-05-S1, Nangarhar (31

December 2013).

40 Interview, HE-02-S2, (2 March 2014).

APRP does protect former fighters from

prosecution for their wartime activities.

However, such activities did constitute

crimes at the time at which they

occurred, and respondents would not

want to implicate themself in case there

is even a remote possibility of legal

repercussions in the future.

Communications

Once the working relationship has been

solidified between the two groups,

respondents indicated that most

communication took place on an ad hoc

basis. This is unsurprising given the

elastic nature of these alliances, where

subgroups come together primarily for

joint operations at the request of a

higher commander or District Governor.

Overall, the amount of maintenance

communication varied by agreement

and activity.

Respondents near unanimously agreed

that all maintenance communication

took place at the commander level,

usually at the request of a higher

commander, often the District

Governor. Indeed, most soldiers denied

participating in planning or preparatory

measures prior to a joint operation. And

despite the relationship mapping

matrices suggesting otherwise, most

soldiers claimed that they did not

regularly speak with the men in the

other group outside of joint fighting

opportunities. The primary exception to

this phenomenon came from NA-01-C1

who explained how he removed himself

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from direct communication with the

alliance partner.

“He is responsible for radio

communications with a member

from [partner commander’s]. That

member is also responsible for all

radio and walkie-talkie related

activities. They contacted one

another if there was a need for a joint

operation or a meeting.”4 1

Commanders were primarily responsible

for maintenance communications, either

directly with one another or through a

higher commander or the district

governor. One commander in Kunduz

told CAPS, “All the Taliban commanders

have each other’s mobile numbers. We

can call someone at any time for help,

even if we do not have a standing

agreement.”4 2

The frequency of communication,

however, between commanders varied

widely on a case-by-case basis. NA-08-

C1, for example, reported having

participated in only about 12-15

meetings with his alliance partners to

plan joint operations over a period of

about three years.4 3 “Whenever we were

planning to attack the check posts or

41 Interview, NA-01-C1, Nangarhar (30

December 2014).

42 Interview, KU-02-C1, Kundux (1 February

2014).


2014).

Coalition Forces, about 10 commanders

of small groups would participate in a

meeting to plan the best way to attack

the check posts,” he explained.4 4 In this

instance the Provincial Chief

Commander prompted communication

among the lower level commanders. In

Helmand province, a working

agreement between Hizb-e-Islami (HIG)

and the Taliban generated one monthly

maintenance communication between

commanders.4 5

Other groups had more frequent contact

with one another. In Herat, HE-03-C1

reported that he participated in alliance

maintenance communications “once or

twice a week.”4 6 This is probably also a

natural consequence of a close familiar

relationship as HE-03-C1 and HE-04-C1

are brothers-in-law. Additionally, the

commander/sub-commander

relationship is expected to produce more

maintenance communication than

between sub-commanders with a

working agreement. The alliance

between HE-01 and HE-02, which is a

commander/sub-commander

relationship between father and son,

follows a similar communication pattern

where they spoke or worked directly

with the other sub-commanders often.4 7

44 Ibid. 45 Interview, HL-02-C1, Helmand (14 January

2014).

46 Interview, HE-03-C1, Herat (23 May 2014).

47 Interview, HE-01-C1, Herat (23 May 2014).

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Though communication frequency

varied among alliance partners,

respondents also regularly reported that

communication and activities planning

still required approval from the chain of

command. HE-02-C1 said, “My brother,

my uncle [partner sub-commanders]

were also welcome to directly contact

me if they needed. But if we were going

for a joint operation, the final command

must come from HE-01-C1, the

‘Supreme Commander.’”4 8

Frequency of communication varied

significantly across the sample, but

some trends were observed in the data.

Typically commanders reported that

they spoke with their counterpart on an

ad hoc basis and soldiers only said they

had little or no contribution in planning

partnership activities, only speaking

with members of the other group during

actual joint activities.

Partnerships between commanding

officers unsurprisingly generates the

most communication, particularly when

the partners share close familial bonds.

Where respondents reported

partnerships between sub-commanders,

maintenance communication was less

common and most often prompted by

the shared commander. Sub-

commander level communication still

took place independent of the

commander, but the importance of

48 Interview, HE-02-C1, Herat, (23 May 2014).

commander-sanctioned action was

stressed.

Communication Methods

While the frequency of communication

varied according to the structure of the

working agreement, the preferred

methods of inter-group communication

were near-unanimously reported across

all respondents and provinces.

Commander respondents did report

attending in-person meetings with their

partners to coordinate joint activities,

but this was relatively rare and only

when absolutely necessary. Most often,

mobile phones and walkie-talkie were

preferred. This is unsurprising given the

dominance of oral culture, limited

communications infrastructure, and

formidable topography of Afghanistan.

Afghans generally value oral

communication strategies over written,

something that probably both

perpetuates and is a consequence of

extremely low literacy rates

countrywide. Passing written notes

through the mountains is simply

impractical and would open the

messenger to interception by state

authorities. Similarly, internet-based

communication technologies are simply

not available in most areas of the

country for both financial and logistical

reasons. Finally, though in-person

meetings are a key component of trust

building and are sometimes necessary,

they also open the attendants up

security threats. Any meeting carries a

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potential threat of ANSF or Coalition

attack; this risk increases exponentially

as a meeting grows to include more than

one group or commander. Aside from

the security risk, travel between

manteqas and districts – particularly in

areas with a strong ANSF presence

along the main roads – can be physically

taxing.

Cessation

When prompted to speak about the

causes and mechanics of ending a

working agreement, many respondents

appeared mildly amused. To most, the

answers seemed so basic and

straightforward that they were surprised

researchers had to ask.

Soldier respondents overwhelmingly

affirmed unwavering support for the

alliance under their commander’s

leadership and stressed that nothing

would make them want to end the

agreement. Most echoed the belief of

one soldier who told CAPS, “the

agreement will last until we bring an

Islamic government into power and we

do not need it anymore.” 4 9 A few

soldiers, however, were willing to

speculate as to the type of situations that

could cause the end of a working

agreement. Two such examples included

situations where a partner group might

fail to come to a scheduled joint

49 Interview, KU-09-S2, Kunduz (1 January

2014).

operation resulting in huge losses for the

group, 5 0 or running operations in a

partner’s area without permission

and/or killing local community

members of the home group5 1 . Another

respondent expressed concern that the

already tenuous Taliban alliance with

his group, Hizb-e Islami, would not

survive the elections due to different

approaches to electoral participation

between the two groups.5 2 “Members of

Hizb-e Islami,” he explained, “are likely

to follow leadership and participate in

the upcoming polls while Taliban are

producing propaganda that prohibits

their men from participating. This is a

point that might turn us against them.”5 3

Each of these situations – whether

hypothetical or current – signify an

overall degradation of trust. Thus, it can

be inferred that other situations that

similarly damage trust between

leadership and group members may lead

to alliance cessation.

Two groups, KU-09 and NA-02, noted

animosity toward and mistrust of

Pakistani involvement in the conflict as

a cause of alliance cessation.

Respondent KU-09-C1 reported his


2014).

51 Interview, NA-09-S1, Nangarhar (12 January

2014).

52 Interview, HL-02-S1, Helmand (29 January

2014).

53 Ibid.

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disillusionment when a trip to Pakistan

to meet with Taliban and Al Qaeda

leadership revealed a strong link

between the Pakistani Inter-Service

Intelligence (ISI) and the higher

echelons of fighters, including the

District Governor to whom he reported.

Ultimately, this revelation of foreign

meddling played a major role in KU-09-

C1’s decision to end the alliance. 5 4 “I

called him and said I did not want to

work with him anymore. I said, ‘You do

not fight for the rights of your people or

Islam. Your fighting is only for the

benefit of the ISI and our neighbour

[Pakistan].’”5 5

A reintegrated Nangarhari commander

echoed KU-09-C1’s disdain for Pakistani

involvement in the conflict. At the time

of the interview, NA-02-C1 had recently

broken his alliance with a larger

commander because he felt the mission

of jihad had been lost.

“We ended our agreement because we

came to realize that the Pakistani ISI is

really running the war and we cannot

destroy our homes for that. In the

beginning, we were conducting Jihad

54 Interview, KU-09-C1, Kunduz, (1 January

2014). KU-09-C1 also mentioned that a feud

between himself and a cousin partially

influenced his decision to end the agreement

with the DG after the latter had supported the

cousin in the feud. However, this was not offered

as a primary cause for cessation, but a

contributing factor.

55 Ibid.

against the government and Coalition

Forces. Over time, we realized the

money coming from Pakistan through

[the Taliban Provincial Head] was just

coming from the ISI who have their

own plans. Everyone knows that the

whole scenario is really just about

Pakistan and the ISI. So we ended our

agreement and reintegrated into the

peace process.”5 6

In both instances, disillusionment

prompted alliance cessation. The

perception that the political aspirations

of Pakistan were the “true motivations”

for fighting were fundamentally at odds

with the local commanders’ ideas of why

they were fighting the war – notions of

independence from foreign intervention

and a government that fit their own

understanding of Islam. Fighting

Coalition infidels in even tacit support of

Pakistani interests was therefore

inherently flawed.

Generally, the working agreements

studied were considered mutually

beneficial to the extent that respondents

had a difficult time imagining cessation.

Though a small variety of situations

were offered as examples that might

prompt an individual group to cease

working with another, all can be

described as prompting distrust.

However, in those few groups that did

report breaking a working agreement,

56 Interview, NA-02-C1, Nangarhar, (30

December 2014).

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the most prominent reason given was

anger that, what ground-level

commanders perceived as the core

values of the conflict – Afghan

sovereignty, the establishment of a

sharia-ruled government, and greater

economic opportunities – were

compromised by involvement of

neighbouring state security apparatuses

at the upper echelons of insurgent

institutions.

Mechanics of Cessation

Though the process of alliance

formation is nuanced and can take a

variety of forms, the mechanics of

alliance cessation are much more

straightforward and appear to take one

of 3 forms. Most commanders

responded that they would not need to

do anything; rather, they would just stop

communicating or associating with the

other group. Eventually, they reasoned,

the other group would realize they were

no longer partners. This approach

seemed especially pervasive when a

group had de facto broken a working

agreement by joining APRP. Joining the

peace process naturally places the

commander and his group at odds with

their former insurgent cohorts. Formally

ending the agreement through direct

communication would therefore only

make their new choice known more

quickly, and put the reintegrated group

into imminent danger as they await

processing into APRP.

The second avenue for ending an

alliance is through direct contact with

the other commander over phone or

radio. Of the commanders that offered

answers to the question, 5 7 a few noted

they would end a working agreement by

these means.5 8 Nangarhari commanders

in particular felt that this was the proper

protocol for ending a working

agreement. “I would make contact with

him [the other commander] through

radio or walkie-talkie, or I would call

him personally about the termination.”5 9

Another commander was more blunt as

he told CAPS, “I would call him to meet

me in private and kill him.” 6 0 However,

57 As stated above, many commanders and

soldiers were reluctant to openly speculate as to

the causes or logistical avenues of alliance

cessation, and abstained from answering. Most,

including all but one commander in Herat,

insisted that their working agreement was strong

and a positive force. Soldiers also near

unanimously chose to not offer an answer to the

question because they were either unsure of how

a commander ends an alliance or because they

believed speaking about a commander’s choices

violated local notions about the chain of

command.

58 Interview, KU-08-C1, Kunduz (2 February

2014); Interv iew, NA -02-C1, Nangarhar (30

December 2014);


2014).


2014). NA-05-C1 qualified his response by

explaining that he and the other commander had

a life long friendship prior to the alliance.

Therefore, the only situation in which he could

imagine wanting to end the agreement would be

one in which his partner’s greed impacted the

group.

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this was not a province-specific

response; KU-10-C1 also said he would

personally contact the other commander

to trigger cessation.

Kunduz respondents comprised the vast

majority of the respondents favouring a

third mechanism for alliance cessation.

Of the seven commanders asked about

cessation, four of the five who answered

the question told CAPS that the best way

to end a working agreement was to

inform the District Governor of their

choice. Again, most expressed

confidence in their respective alliances

and were reluctant to offer hypothetical

situations that would prompt cessation.

Both KU-02-C1 and KU-08-C1 reported

that the ultimate decision making

authority regarding alliance termination

lay with the District Governor.6 1 “We can

raise the issue with the District

Governor, but he will decide whether to

call the other group commander and end

the agreement.” 6 2 Other commanders,

such as KU-07-C1 implied that they had

more autonomy in this process. “I do not

need to let the other group know, I just

inform the District Governor and he will

do the rest,” said KU-07-C1.6 3 There is


2014); Interv iew, KU-08-C1, Kunduz (1

February 2014).


2014).


2014).

no way to determine the degree to which

the local commanders control decision

making over individual alliance

cessation, but it is clear that the District

Governors in Kunduz are intimately

involved in forming and ending alliances

throughout the province.

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Alliance & Identity

A secondary focus of the study sought to

improve our understanding of the

manner in which alliances shape the way

individual participants think about their

place in the group, the group’s overall

political vantage in the local landscape,

and the state of the conflict as a whole.

All respondents were asked a series of

questions designed to encourage the

respondents to think critically about the

costs and benefits of the alliance. In

doing so, CAPS researchers were able to

better understand how the alliance

shaped the individual’s feelings about

the group and his place within.

Ultimately, soldier respondents were

steadfast in their support of the

alliances. Soldiers unanimously

communicated a strong belief that the

alliance improved the strength of the

group, thus making it better equipped to

reach the groups’ mutual goals. Though

not necessarily stated outright, the

underlying message was that working

together with another group made the

group stronger, and the individual

members stronger. Prior to data

collection, it had been hypothesized that

the natural compromises inherent in a

successful alliance may adversely affect

individual efficacy towards the group in

some cases. This was not found. Instead,

most balked at the concept that an

alliance would have any aspect with

which they could disagree. It is unclear

however, if these responses were a

reflection of the interviewee’s true

feelings or their unwavering

commitment to their commander’s

authority and decision-making.

Commanders were more pragmatic in

their assessments of the alliance.

Commanders did report that their

working agreements with other groups

were a worthwhile mechanism to aid in

advancing the group’s goals. But

commanders were also more willing to

recognize the cost of alliances,

particularly financial costs.

Soldiers

Soldier respondents unanimously

favoured the existence of the alliance to

which they were a part. This

phenomenon was observed in all target

provinces, and did not appear to

correlate to group size or alliance

duration. “Before the agreement,”

explained NA-02-S1, “We had trouble

getting enough money and weapons to

conduct operations. After the

agreement, we were able to conduct

joint operations at a bigger scale. We

were strong, we even thought it made us

the strongest [group] in the area.” 6 4

Soldiers from all provinces echoed this

sentiment repeatedly. “Everyone was

happy. The alliance brought unity and

64 Interview, NA-02-S1, Nangarhar (1 January

2014).

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strength to our groups,” announced HE-

05-S1.6 5

Soldiers were also asked whether any

aspect of the agreement was difficult for

him and his fellow soldiers to accept.

Respondents were extremely hesitant to

name any such elements. Those who did

primarily listed relatively minor

grievances. KU-10-S1, for example, did

not appreciate having to serve as a

watchmen up in the mountains for joint

operations in wintertime. 6 6 NA-03-S1

admittedly had a difficult time accepting

that the agreement between NA-03 and

NA-05 created restrictions on the

planting of land mines and attacks

against Afghan government officials. 6 7

NA-01-C1 told CAPS that one

requirement of his alliance was that his

men were no longer allowed to smoke

marijuana during or before joint

operations, which some of the men

resented initially. He explained his

solution to stem resentment about the

rule, “I allowed them to sit out the

operation and participate during the

next one.”6 8 However even respondents

who struggled with an element of the

agreement maintained that they felt the

65 Interview, HE-05-S1, Herat (26 February

2014).


2014).

67 Interview, NA-03-S1, Nangarhar (30

December 2014).

68 Interview, NA-01-C1, Nangarhar (30

December 2014).

benefits of the agreement outweighed

the negative elements.

It is unclear whether the steadfast

support of the alliances were a product

of genuine, unwavering support or fear

of saying something that might be

construed as direct criticism for the

commander or organizational

leadership. As seen throughout the

interviews, the pressure to fully submit

to the decisions of the commander is

intense. Commander respondents both

recognized this and prided themselves

on their ability to maintain order and

authority in their groups. KU-07-C1

explained that it was not appropriate for

soldiers form their own opinions

regarding an alliance.

“They have to accept [the agreement]

because once it is approved by the

leadership they do not have the right

to say a word about it... If anyone

feels his commitment is changed

because of the alliance, he should

leave the group and stay in his house.

And if we were to hear that he joined

the government, he is dead!”6 9

It is likely, therefore, that soldiers were

hesitant to report grievances with the

alliances for fear of appearing

insubordinate.


2014).

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Commanders

The vast majority of commanders

viewed the alliance experience

favourably, but they were more

pragmatic in their assessment of the

costs and benefits. Similar to their

soldiers, commanders typically viewed

the strength that comes in numbers as

the biggest asset of the working

agreement. This notion of strength

includes both the logistic sense of extra

men during coordinated activities as

well as the idea that the organizations’

morale and overall ideological goals

were boosted from unity formed through

the alliance. “We became a big group

and the opponent cannot penetrate our

groups [with the agreement,]”

explained, KU-07-C1 adding, “We are all

brothers with the same religion and

objective.” 7 0 NA-05-C1 agreed that,

“Strength is the main benefit of the

agreement. We became strong enough in

the area to ensure we survived and were

successful.” 7 1 These statements are

exemplified within the particular social

network model of Kunduz groups 7 and

8 in Figure 8.

Within the model, each organization

maintains strong integration with each

other and within themselves, established

within a clear hierarchy. Although KU-

08-S3 appears an outlier in the general

7 0 Interview, KU-07-C1, Kunduz (2

January 2014).

7 1 Interview, NA-05-C1, Nangarhar (30

December 2014).

group structure, the consistently

modelled strengths of interaction

between all soldiers of KU-08 and KU-

07 reinforce sentiments of brotherhood.

Though many reported that the alliance

had only a positive outcome for their

group, a few respondents were more

pragmatic in their assessment. Some

recognized the increased financial

burden that accompanies joint

operations. HE-03-C1 reported that the

main negative aspect of the alliances was

the cost, “Our expenses were high and I

had to pay multiple groups. If there were

fewer groups I would be rich now.” 7 2

NA-07-C1 echoed this sentiment. “More

men and more operations is a big

expense for which we lacked sufficient

funding. I have to admit there was not

sufficient income to maintain the

alliance.” 7 3 KU-10-C1 complained that

his partner refused to pay him for the

cost of ammunition, even though he

believed the group probably collected

enough money from community tithes.7 4

Overall, however, he and the other men

felt the strength gained from the alliance

outweighed the financial losses.

Not all commander complaints were

financial; they also voiced concerns over

the security of themselves and their

men. By allying his HIG fighters with

local Taliban, HL-02-C1 feared that his

7 2 Interview, HE-03-C1, Herat (3 March 2014).

7 3 Interview, NA-07-C1, Nangarhar (31 December 2013).

7 4 Interview, KU-10-C1, Kunduz (3 January 2014).

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men were at greater risk because

“Taliban can now come to our area with

loaded guns. They could turn their guns

on us and attack at any time.”7 5 HL-05-

C1 also explained that he felt the joint

operations actually made his men less

safe than they were working alone.

In relation to the network model of

Figure 10, this commanders fear is valid,

as among three Helmand groups

(H2,H1,H12) is holds the highest level of

authority and thus assumes the highest

degree of visibility and risk.

In fact, his perception of the partner

casualty rate is higher in joint

operations because you depend on the

other group to fight alongside you, but

then when you need them they are late. I

lost a few friends this way. Another time

I was injured during an operation. I was

yelling for men from [the other group]

and waiting for them to help me during

a siege, but it did not help. 7 6 This

incompetence made HL-05-C1 the only

commander to say that the agreement

gave him “No key benefits.”7 7

HL-05-C1 has no plans to end the

agreement, yet the network model

(Figure 9) identifies this particular

commander as radically detached from


2014).


2014).

7 7 Ibid.

his own men and all other allied group,

which may indicate the source of his

problems and needs. While HL-05-C1 is

a known powerful Taliban commander,

the distance between him, his men, and

other groups suggests that there is likely

a bigger problem informing the troubles

this commander has experienced.

Possibilities range from poor leadership

or managerial ability on his behalf to

lack of supplies or logistical hurdles,

unfortunately it is not possible to know.

of his condition.

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Figure 8

Figure 9

HL-05-C1 HL-05-C1’s Unit

Strong

Interdependency

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Overall, commander respondents

expressed a belief that their alliances

made more capable tactically, and that

their strength positively impacted the

morale of their soldiers. Unlike their

subordinates, however, the commanders

took a more realistic assessment of the

costs of the working agreement. As the

main decision makers, the commanders

were privy to aspects of the agreements

that soldiers were not. This meant that

they were left to contend with the

financial and human costs of the

alliance, both of which posed real

problems for some commanders.

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Kabul: Political Alliances

As the seat of national power, the

inclusion of Kabul as a target province

allowed CAPS to study political alliances

at the highest level in the midst of a

presidential election cycle. The Kabul

sample included 16 respondents

representing five groups and three

separate alliances. For coherence as well

as to protect the privacy of the

respondents, analysis of the political

alliances will continue remain

anonymous similarly to the preceding

discussion. When referring to the

specific candidate as an individual, we

will use the code “Candidate 01” with the

number referring to the corresponding

group number.

Political alliances were expected to

exhibit some unique characteristics,

though the precise nature of was

unclear. Fieldwork confirmed that

indeed, high-level political alliances

differ significantly from those among

armed groups at the provincial level.

Though all respondents expressed a

desire of their candidate and parties to

remove tribalism concerns from

government, all were acutely aware of

provincial tribal sensitivities and cited

tribal inclusion as a driving factor and

primary benefit of the alliance. Members

of a political alliance tend to measure

the outcome and benefit of alliances in

very concrete terms, i.e., promises of

specific positions in government

pending a win or votes delivered from

specific provinces. Finally, the demand

for these benchmarks render these

agreements relatively fragile, as

respondent groups proved both capable

and willing to realign themselves with

another group if they thought their

partner would not deliver on promises.

Importance of Tribal Unity

Though tribalism undoubtedly affects

the composition of militant groups at

the community level, it was not cited as

having a profound affect on alliance

formation, maintenance, or identity

among the militant respondents. It was,

however, a central feature of discussion

with respect to motivational factors

impacting the decision to form political

alliances for the election. Respondents

unanimously told CAPS their group had

a desire to move beyond political

factions formed down tribal and ethnic

lines, a phenomenon that has dominated

Afghanistan’s history. Ironically,

however, the manner in which each

group sought to accomplish this goal

was to use alliances to form a multi-

tribal coalition in the name of unity. In

this manner, tribalism appeared to be

one of – if not the – biggest factors

influencing the decision to form the

alliance.

For example, KA-01-05 admitted that

KA-01 was specifically in search of a

prominent Tajik leader to support

Candidate 01 in order to lend weight to

the claim that Candidate 01 genuinely

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wanted to serve all Afghans, not merely

his own group. “We spoke with other

Tajiks and they all had high demands.

Candidate 03, however, has a prominent

legacy and did not [have as many

demands].” 7 8 KA-02-02 similarly

embodied this contradiction as he said,

“Candidate 02 is totally against ethnic-

based politics and was frustrated how

Uzbeks were locked out of high positions

in the country.”7 9 Not only was a main

concern of the candidate representation

of his own ethnic group in government,

the same respondent explained that a

main tenet of the alliance included the

promise of Candidate 02 to deliver the

Uzbek vote for Candidate 01.8 0

The large amount of attention paid to

tribalism in alliance formation at the

presidential level despite a stated desire

to transcend tribal and ethnic divisions

probably has more to do with the

electorate than the candidates and

parties themselves. Tribal sensitivities

are deep-rooted in Afghanistan with

grievances often tracing back for a

century or more. Candidates who want

to work beyond the lines of tribe must

still be cognizant of them. Low literacy

rates and under developed information

dissemination systems mean that large

sections of the population remain

isolated at the community and district

levels. Thus, the history of local conflicts

7 8 Interview, KA-01-05, Kabul (23 July 2014).

7 9 Interview, KA-02-02, Kabul (16 July 2014).

80 Ibid.

and perceptions of rival tribes are both

passed from generation to generation

and are commonly projected onto the

rival tribe on a national scale. Fears of

tribal subjugation are deep-rooted and

pervasive, and the leadership of each of

the political groups studied appear to

believe that acknowledgment and

inclusion of all major ethnic groups is

the first step toward pan-tribal unity at

the highest levels of Afghan government.

Concrete Outcomes

Militant alliances, as discussed above,

tended to measure outcomes in terms of

strength, identity and morale boosts

amongst group members, and financial

cost. Political alliances, by contrast,

were able to outline specific outputs and

benchmarks upon which they measured

alliance success. Interestingly, financial

cost was not mentioned as a significant

factor in considering success by

respondents of any group.

The Kabul respondents indicate that

political alliances are forged upon very

specific, measurable outcomes desired

by each side. In two of the three sample

alliances, this took the form of the

supporting party trading its

endorsement and the votes of its

political base (ethnic and geographical)

for a key position in the administration

should the dominant candidate succeed

in the election. Though respondents

typically commented that the two

leaders shared a common vision for

Afghanistan’s future and government,

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additional deciding factors driving

alliance formation were sometimes

clearly stated. For example, KA-02-02

told CAPS that there were two reasons

Candidate 02 decided to support

Candidate 01. “First,” he said,

“[Opponent] refused to promise

Candidate 02 the post he desired.

Second, Candidate 01 is a well known

Afghan leader who is qualified and

committed to an inclusive

government.”8 1 It appears therefore that

the desire for a specific high-level

position in the administration may have

actually determined Candidate 02’s

willingness to ally with any particular

candidate. Similarly, KA-03-01

explained that the primary tenet of the

four-page written agreement between

his party and KA-01 was an exchange of

Candidate 03’s willingness to rally his

ethnic group’s vote for Candidate 01 in

return for another key position in a

winning administration.8 2

The third alliance between KA-04 and

KA-05 reportedly did not follow this

pattern. According to KA-04-01, the

alliance between the two groups was the

product of a common history and a

shared commitment to “national unity,

democratic government, and youth

empowerment . . . There were no

incentives demanded or promised.” 8 3

KA-04-02 echoed the assertion that the

81 Interview, KA-02-02, Kabul (16 July 2014).



alliance was purely driven by shared

goals and common ideologies.8 4 KA-05-

01 explained that the leadership of KA-

05 expected that common ground with

dominant party would generate a sort of

soft power to influence policy. “The

alliance,” he explained, “can enable us to

pursue our goals and promote our

values.”8 5

Notably, respondents did not indicate

financial expense as a significant

indicator against which partnership

success was measured. In all three

alliances, interviewees acknowledged

that the dominant party agreed to cover

all or most of the campaign expenses

incurred by the supporting party. About

partnering with KA-01, KA-02-01 told

CAPS “Our agreement was not based on

finances . . . Both groups are sharing

some of the expenses.” 8 6 Overall,

however, it was understood that KA-01

did shoulder the majority of expenses.8 7

Still, respondents still focused on the

prospective political payoff as opposed

to the financial losses when asked to

assess the partnership.

This is another point of contrast from

the militant alliances in the other

provinces, although is a natural

consequence of the context within which

the political alliances are situated. The





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individual candidates and their parties

are some of the most influential – and in

some cases, wealthy – men in the

country. Additionally, competition at the

presidential level requires the ability of

political parties to rally support and

appreciate campaign contributions from

an intricate network of other influential

powerbrokers. Political alliances are

therefore forged in an environment

where capital is relatively plentiful. The

militant groups, by contrast, are forced

to allocate already limited resources to

alliance activities, putting capital in a

central position in commanders’ minds

when they think of alliance

performance.

The general tendency toward delineating

very specific terms to be used as

indicators of alliance success between

political groups is easily understood

through context. Unlike the militant

alliances, which are formed as both a

consequence of and a mechanism of

protracted conflict, the term of a

political alliance is discrete. That is to

say it has a definite end – either the

dominant party will succeed and alliance

promises are delivered or it fails and the

two groups return to their own

individual platforms. Thus it is

unsurprising that measures of success

primarily rest on the ability of both

partners to deliver on specific promises.

Goals of militant alliances, by contrast,

are part of a relationship that usually

spanned years, even if the groups did

not partner consistently throughout that

time. Because militant alliances were

generally assumed to extend until some

unknown point in the future,

partnership success was viewed in

broader terms of relative strength and

power.

Relative Frailty

The presence of specific success

indicators and expected outcomes in

political alliances is injects a frailty into

presidential political alliances that was

not observed in partnerships between

militant groups in the four other

provinces.

Because alliance objectives are discrete,

partners expect one another to uphold

their promises. The stakes are high; the

highest offices in the land are key

deliverables in these agreements, as are

the votes of critical sections of the

populace. Interviews therefore revealed

an overarching concern that the partner

may change course. This was

particularly acute in the partnership

between KA-01 and KA-03. In exchange

for support, Candidate 03 was promised

an executive level position in the

administration should Candidate 01

prevail. According to the KA-03 camp,

this agreement included a promise to

amend the Afghan Constitution to create

a higher level position for Candidate 03

than currently exists under Afghan

law. 8 8 At the time of interview, the

political climate surrounding the


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election was such that KA-03 members

were beginning to recognize the

ambition of that promise and speculate

as to whether Candidate 01 would be

able and willing to deliver.8 9 KA-03-01

was hesitant to say, however, whether

Candidate 03 would publically end the

agreement if Candidate 01 appointed

someone else into the promised seat. “It

is still too early to discuss this. Let us

hope it does not happen.”9 0

The unspoken desire of political parties

to ultimately find themselves standing

with the winner also suggests that

political alliances are perhaps more frail

than those observed among militant

groups. Several of the groups reported

having supported other groups at one

point in the campaign cycle. Of course,

this is in part because of the structure of

the Afghan electoral process. As

candidates are dropped in the different

stages, their support network then can

fragment and re-align with one of the

remaining candidates. This is precisely

what happened to KA-03. Candidate 03

initially endorsed another candidate –

thought to be a favourite – during the

first round of elections. When the

candidate ultimately lost and threw his

support in favour of a remaining

candidate, KA-03 then split the original

alliance in favour of KA-01. In a similar

vein, leaders of KA-05 actually backed

three different candidates in the first

89 Ibid.


round before placing a unified bet in the

second round.9 1

This tendency of political groups to

forge and fragment alliances throughout

an election cycle is hardly unique to

Afghanistan. The same phenomenon can

be seen in most democratic electorates

in the world. Still, this rendered political

alliances less stable than the militant

groups within the sample. It is true that

militant groups may face a trust deficit

with one another; however, two other

factors help counteract the deterioration

it causes. First, that most militant

alliances studied were integrated into

the Taliban structure. This inherently

strengthens the alliance by a reinforced

commitment to a shared political

ideology. Second, militant groups have

less options than political groups for

realignment – they can reintegrate and

join GIRoA or, in limited circumstances,

become an independent militia or

criminal group. Both alternatives would

put group members on a target list and

may not provide adequate protection.

Thus, militant groups probably feel

more compelled to continue working

agreements.


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Conclusion

For over ten years of conflict within

Afghanistan, militant alliances have

been frequently viewed as overly

complex and inaccessible. Given that

many Taliban and militant figures hold

far-reaching and deep connections

throughout provinces and villages, and

these ties are compounded by socio-

cultural infrastructures such as religion

and marriage, it is no easy task to

unravel these relationships from the

outside.

However this study, by focusing on the

mechanical structure of militant

alliances rather than the causal and

conditional factors, some advance has

been made toward clarity. In particular,

it has become clear through the use of

mixed methods it has been found that

not all factors are equal regarding

alliance construction. Notably, tribal

elders hold almost no influence within

alliance formation. Yet communities do

play a supportive role once the alliance

is established, if at least to not disrupt

the fragile stability introduced via the

alliance.

Upper and lower-level command was

supportive of alliance construction,

though typically for differing reasons.

Lower level soldiers primarily sought

strength in alliances while commanders

were more strategic toward deeper

ambitions. This pattern remained

steadfast, holding alliances together,

with the exception of instances in which

core values were confronted, in

particular situations of foreign

intervention within local politics.

Whereas political alliances within Kabul

are different in character and

expectation than field-level alliances

between armed groups, a tangible

outcome of this study is to recognize

that such distinctions are likely critical

to a functional peacebuilding process.

Simply put, systems that engage and

encourage reintegration and unity for

militant groups must not be modelled

on the political system.

Ultimately, it was the goal of CAPS to

provide a foundational understanding of

the formation and structure of alliances

in Afghanistan, as well as some of the

ways these partnerships affect the

identity of their participants. Though we

have learned that individual contextual

environment determines the outcome of

each of these three aspects of the

alliance, some trends have been isolated

with respect to formation, maintenance,

and expectations. Building on the

holistic snapshot provided here, future

research should look more deeply at

specific elements of these findings in

continuation of the pursuit to identify

and promote pathways toward long-

term peace and stability.

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Appendix I: Questionnaires

Commander/Leader Questionnaire

Date of Interview:

Interviewer Name(s):

Province:

Interviewee Name:

Ethnicity:

Position:

Group:

GPS Coordinates:

Mapping/File Code: (OFFICE)

Group Structure

1. What type of group do you lead? (Political or militant? Name?) 2. In what areas (districts, villages) does your group have influence? 3. How long have you been involved in this group? 4. How long have you been leading this group? 5. How many men do you command/lead? 6. Have any of your men joined your group after leaving another group?

a. If yes, please tell us about them. (What group were they in, why did they leave, etc)

7. What is the goal/political objective of the group you lead? 8. How do you try to meet your group’s goals? 9. How do you teach other members about your group’s goals? 10. Do you report to anyone else? Who? How often do you talk to him? 11. Do you work with any other political or militant groups to achieve your

goals? a. If yes, what groups? In what areas do they have influence (district,

village)

Alliance Structure

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12. When did you decide to work with X GROUP? How did you come to this decision?

13. What steps did you take to complete your agreement with X GROUP? a. How did you make contact with the other group? With whom did

you make contact first? b. Did non-group tribal/community elders play any role in the

establishment of the agreement? If yes, what type of role did they play?

c. Did you meet in person to discuss the agreement? If yes, how many times? Who all was at the meeting?

d. Were there any issues you did not agree with GROUP X? i. If yes, what were they?

ii. Were you able to resolve the disagreement? If yes, how? e. Is the agreement written or oral? (If written, can we have a copy?) f. What are the main provisions of the agreement / outcome?

14. Who are the main decision makers in the agreement? 15. Do you trust the leaders of GROUP X? Why? 16. Under the agreement, do you speak to or work with any other members of

GROUP X? a. If yes, how often do you speak with X to coordinate alliance related

activities? 17. Do any other members of your group work with members of X group

under the agreement? a. If yes, who (specify their ranks and positions in the groups) works

together? b. How often do they work together? c. What types of activities do they work together on?

18. Did the agreement with GROUP X have any impact on the monetary income or financial management of your group?

a. If yes, how did it affect your group financially? i. If the agreement had a negative impact on the financial

operations of the group: What makes this agreement agreement worth the financial losses?

19. Has GROUP X had a change of leadership since the agreement? a. If yes, how did it affect the agreement? b. If no, how do you think a change of leadership in GROUP X might

affect the agreement you have now? 20. Does your agreement affect your relationship with any other groups in the

area? a. How so?

21. How long do you think your agreement will last? 22. What would make you want to end your agreement with X? 23. If you wanted to end the agreement, how would you let X know?

Impact on Identity

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24. Has the agreement lived up to your expectations? a. If not, why not?

25. What do you think are the main benefits of the agreement? 26. What do you think are the negative aspects of the agreement? 27. Did you have to give up any aspects of your group for the agreement?

a. If yes, what did you give up? 28. Did your group or GROUP X change their name after the agreement?

a. If yes, from what to what? 29. What do your subordinates think about the agreement? 30. Was it difficult for your subordinates to accept the agreement? Why or

why not? 31. Do you think that the agreement changed the way your subordinates think

about your group? a. If yes, how do you think it affects the way they think about your

group’s goals? b. Did the agreement change the commitment of your subordinates to

the group’s goals? 32. Do you think the agreement with X affects your subordinate’s commitment

to the group? c. If yes, how so?

33. Did the agreement affect community perceptions of your group or GROUP X?

d. If yes, how so? 34. Are you willing to introduce us to a contact point in GROUP X?

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Soldier Questionnaire

Date of Interview:


Province:

Origin Village/ District/ Province:

Interviewee Name:

Age:

Ethnicity:

Position:

Group:

GPS Coordinates:


Group Structure

1. What group are you in? 2. Is this your only employment?

a. If not, what is your other profession? b. How much time do you spend on activities for GROUP? How much

time do you spend on OTHER PROFESSION? 3. How long have you been involved in this GROUP? 4. What position do you hold? 5. Have you ever held another position in this group? 6. How many men out rank you in this group? 7. How many men share your rank in GROUP? 8. How many men are below you in the command structure? 9. Other than your group membership, how do you know the other men in

GROUP? (HINT: RELATIONSHIP MAPPING QUESTIONS) 10. In what areas (districts, villages) does your group have influence? 11. Did you or any of your fellow group members join GROUP after leaving

another group? a. If yes, please tell us about them. (What group were they in, why did

they leave, what happened? Does that group still exist? etc) 12. What is the goal/political objective of your group?

a. How did you learn about the goal/political objectives of your group?

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13. What type of activities do you and your fellow group members undertake in order to meet GROUP’s goals?

14. Does your GROUP work with any other political or militant groups to achieve your goals?

a. If yes, what groups? In what areas do they have influence (districts, villages)

Alliance Structure

15. How long has your group been working with GROUP X? 16. What prompted your group to make an agreement with GROUP X?

a. Who made the decision? 17. Were you involved in the process of making the agreement with GROUP

X? a. If not, who was involved?

18. Do you know what steps were taken to complete the agreement with X GROUP?

g. Which group initiated contact? h. How was contact made? i. Did non-group tribal/community elders play any role in the


j. Was there a meeting in person to discuss the agreement? i. If yes, were you there? (If they were not there, who was?)

ii. How many times did the groups meet to discuss the agreement?

k. To the best of your knowledge, were there any issues where your group did not agree with GROUP X?

i. If yes, what were they? ii. Was the disagreement ultimately resolved? If yes, how?

l. Is the agreement written or oral? (If written, can we have a copy?) m. What are the main provisions of the agreement / outcome?

19. Who are the main decision makers in the agreement? 20. Do you know any of the members of GROUP X personally?

a. If yes, who do you know? How do you know them? (HINT: RELATIONSHIP MAPPING QUESTIONS)

21. Under the agreement, do you speak to or work with any other members of GROUP X?

b. If yes, how often do you work with members of GROUP X on alliance related activities?

c. Who from GROUP X do you work with? What ranks are they? d. What types of activities do you participate in?

22. Do any other members of your group work with members of X group under the agreement?

d. If yes, who (specify their ranks and positions in the groups) works together?

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e. How often do they work together? f. What types of activities do they work together on?



operations of the group: What makes this agreement agreement worth the financial losses?

24. Has GROUP X had a change of leadership since the agreement? c. If yes, how did it affect the agreement?

25. Does your agreement affect your relationship with any other groups in the area?

b. How so? 26. Does your agreement affect your group’s relationship with the

communities in which you have influence? a. If yes, how? b. Is your relationship with the community better or worse after the

agreement? 27. How long do you think your agreement will last?

a. What types of situations would make you want to end the agreement?

b. Who determines when the agreement ends? (Commanders? Is there a vote? Etc.)

Impact on Identity

28. Has the agreement lived up to your expectations? a. If not, why not?

29. What do you think are the main benefits of the agreement? 30. What do you think are the negative aspects of the agreement? 31. Did you have to give up any aspects of your group for the agreement?

a. If yes, what did you give up? 32. Did you group or GROUP X change their name after the agreement?

a. If yes, from what to what? 33. What do your fellow group members think about the agreement? 34. Were any parts of the agreement difficult for you to accept?

a. If yes, what were they? Why were they difficult to accept? i. What made you ultimately accept them?

b. If not, why not? 35. Did any of your fellow group members object to any parts of the

agreement? a. If yes, who objected? What did they object to? Why?

36. Did the agreement change the way you think about your group? e. If yes, how does it affect the way you think about your group’s

goals? f. Did the agreement change your commitment to your group’s goals?

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37. Do you think the agreement changed the way your fellow group members think about the group?

a. If yes, how? b. If yes, do you think the agreement as affected your fellow group

members’ commitment to the group’s goals? 38. Did the agreement affect community perceptions of your group or GROUP

X? g. If yes, how so?

39. Are you willing to introduce us to a contact point in GROUP X?

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Detainee Questionnaire

Date of Interview:


Interview Location (Prison / Province):

Interviewee Name:

Age:


Ethnicity:

Position:

Group:

GPS Coordinates:


Basic Information

1. How long have you been detained? (Month/Year) 2. Of what crime have you been accused? 3. Are/were you a member of a political or militant group? 4. If yes, what group are you in?

a. Do you still consider yourself a member? (Then use tense accordingly)

5. Was this your only employment? a. If not, what is your other profession? b. How much time did you spend on activities for GROUP? How much

time do you spend on OTHER PROFESSION? 6. Prior to your incarceration, how long were you involved in GROUP? 7. Are there any other members of your group detained in this facility?

a. If yes, who?

Group Structure

8. What position did you hold? 9. Have you ever held another position in this group? 10. How many men out rank you in this group? 11. How many men share your rank in GROUP? 12. How many men are below you in the command structure?

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13. Other than your group membership, how do you know the other men in GROUP? (HINT: RELATIONSHIP MAPPING QUESTIONS)

14. In what province is your group active? 15. In what areas (districts, villages) does your group have influence? 16. Did you or any of your fellow group members join GROUP after leaving

another group? a. If yes, please tell us about them. (What group were they in, why did

they leave, what happened? Does that group still exist? etc) 17. What is the goal/political objective of your group?

a. How did you learn about the goal/political objectives of your group? 18. What type of activities did you and your fellow group members undertake

in order to meet GROUP’s goals? 19. Does GROUP work with any other political or militant groups to achieve

your goals? a. If yes, how many groups do you work with?

i. Do they all work together? Or do you maintain individual agreements with each?

b. What groups do you work with? In what areas do they have influence (districts, villages)

Alliance Structure

20. How long has your group been working with GROUP X? 21. What prompted your group to make an agreement with GROUP X?

a. Who made the decision? 22. Were you involved in the process of making the agreement with GROUP

X? a. If not, who was involved?

23. Do you know what steps were taken to complete the agreement with X GROUP?

n. Which group initiated contact? o. How was contact made? p. Did non-group tribal/community elders play any role in the


q. Was there a meeting in person to discuss the agreement? i. If yes, were you there? (If they were not there, who was?)

ii. How many times did the groups meet to discuss the agreement?

r. Do you know if there any issues where your group did not agree with GROUP X?

i. If yes, what were they? ii. Was the disagreement ultimately resolved? If yes, how?

s. Is the agreement written or oral? (If written, can we have a copy?) t. What are the main provisions of the agreement / outcome?

24. Who are the main decision makers in the agreement?

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25. Do you know any of the members of GROUP X personally? a. If yes, who do you know? How do you know them? (HINT:

RELATIONSHIP MAPPING QUESTIONS) 26. Under the agreement, did you speak to or work with any other members of

GROUP X? e. If yes, how often did you work with members of GROUP X on

alliance related activities? f. Who from GROUP X did you work with? What ranks are they? g. What types of activities did you participate in? h. Now that you are detained, do you know if your group continues to

carry out activities with GROUP X? 27. Do any other members of your group work with members of X group

under the agreement? g. If yes, who (specify their ranks and positions in the groups) works

together? h. How often were they working together before you were detained? i. What types of activities did they work together on? j. Do you believe/know if they are still working together?



operations of the group: What makes this agreement worth the financial losses?

29. Has either group had a change of leadership since the agreement? d. If yes, what group had a leadership change?

a. How did it affect the agreement? 30. Did your agreement affect your (group’s) relationship with any other

groups in the area? c. How so?

31. Did your agreement affect your group’s relationship with the communities in which you have influence?

a. If yes, how? b. Is your relationship with the community better or worse after the

agreement? 32. Do you think your detainment has had an impact on the agreement?

a. If yes, how so? 33. How long do you think your agreement will last?

a. What types of situations would make you want to end the agreement?

b. Who determines when the agreement ends? (Commanders? Is there a vote? Etc.)

Impact on Identity

34. Has the agreement lived up to your expectations?

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a. If not, why not? 35. What do you think are the main benefits of the agreement? 36. What do you think are the negative aspects of the agreement? 37. Did you have to give up any aspects of your group for the agreement?

a. If yes, what did you give up? 38. Did you group or GROUP X change their name after the agreement?

a. If yes, from what to what? 39. What do your fellow group members think about the agreement? 40. Were any parts of the agreement difficult for you to accept?

a. If yes, what were they? Why were they difficult to accept? i. What made you ultimately accept them?

b. If not, why not? 41. Did any of your fellow group members object to any parts of the

agreement? a. If yes, who objected? What did they object to? Why?

42. Did the agreement change the way you think about your group? h. If yes, how does it affect the way you think about your group’s

goals? i. Did the agreement change your commitment to your group’s goals?

43. Do you think the agreement changed the way your fellow group members think about the group?

a. If yes, how? b. If yes, do you think the agreement as affected your fellow group

members’ commitment to the group’s goals? 44. Did the agreement affect community perceptions of your group or GROUP

X? j. If yes, how so?

45. Are you willing to introduce us to some other members of your group? 46. Are you willing to introduce us to a contact point in GROUP X?

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Community Questionnaire

Date of Interview:


Interview Location (district / Province):

Interviewee Name:

Age:


Ethnicity:

Occupation:

GPS Coordinates:


Basic Information

1. Are you from X VILLAGE originally? a. If not, where were you born? When did you move to X VILLAGE?

Why? 2. What is your trade/occupation? 3. How many sons do you have? 4. What is their occupation? 5. Do you sit on any local shuras? (CDC, PC, etc)

a. If yes, which ones? What position do you hold on it?

Community Landscape:

6. What are the major villages in your district? 7. Who is the District Governor?

a. Where is he from? b. What do people think about his performance in office?

8. Who is the District Chief of Police? a. Where is he from? b. What do people think about his performance in office?

9. Who are the most important community leaders? a. Names? What give them their influence with the people? b. What positions do they hold?

10. What shuras are active in the district? Which are the most useful?

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Security

11. Is your district secure? a. Why? Why not?

12. Has security improved or worsened in the last year? a. Why?

13. What areas of your district are the most secure? 14. What areas of your district are least secure? 15. What militant groups are active in your district?

a. How many anti-government groups are there? b. How many pro-government militant groups are there?

16. What political groups are active in your district? a. How many are there?

17. Over the past year, has the number of militant groups active in your district increased, decreased, or stayed about the same?

a. If it changed, why? 18. Over the past year, has the number of political groups active in your

district increased, decreased, or stayed about the same? a. If it changed, why?

Alliances

19. Do you know of any groups that have formed an alliance or maintain agreements under which they work together?

a. If yes, which groups have an alliance? b. If yes, how do you know about this alliance?

20. Have you or any other community members play a role in helping two or more groups form an alliance

a. If yes, tell us about it: i. What role did you play in the establishment of the

agreement? ii. Why did you and/or other community members help

facilitate the alliance? iii. Were you and/or other community members present during

the agreement negotiations? If yes, how many times did the groups meet? Who all was at the meeting?

iv. Were there any issues the two groups could not agree on? 1. If yes, what were they? 2. Were the groups able to resolve the disagreement? If

yes, how? v. Is the agreement written or oral? (If written, can we have a

copy?) 21. What are the main provisions of the agreement / outcome? 22. Did either of the groups change their name after the agreement?

Impact

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23. How has the agreement impacted security in your district? 24. How has the agreement impacted the political landscape of your district? 25. Has the agreement lived up to community expectations?

a. If not, why not? 26. What do you think are the main benefits of the agreement? 27. What do you think are the negative aspects of the agreement? 28. What does your fellow community members think about the agreement? 29. Did any of your fellow community members object to the agreement?

a. If yes, who objected? Why? 30. Did the agreement change the way you think about either group?

k. If yes, how? 31. Are you willing to introduce us to some members of either group?

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Appendix II: Relationship Mapping Matrix

Shared Family

Relationships

Village/Dista

nce Tribe

Fighting

Legacy Religion

1 (No

Relationship)

No family

relationship

Non-

neighboring

district

Different

ethnic group,

does not

speak same

language

No shared

history of

fighting or N/A

Different

sects

2

Distant relative

(greater than

2nd cousin)

Neighboring

district

Different

ethnic group;

speaks same

language/dial

ect

Both

previously

faught for

same faction,

but different

groups

Attends

different

mosque, no

religious

experience

3

Marriage

between

families (father

in-law;

brother-in law;

children are

married etc)

Different

manteqa,

same district

Same ethnic

group,

different

tribal

branches

(Barakzai &

Alizai)

Short shared

history of

fighting (1 -3

y ears)

Attends

different

mosque;

attended

same

madrassa

4

First tier

extended

family (Uncle,

cousin,

grandfather,

etc)

Different

v illage, same

manteqa

Same tribe,

different sub

group

(Noorzai,

Ishaqzai)

Shared history

of fighting (5-7

y ears)

Attends same

mosque,

attended

different

madrassa

5 (Strongest

Relationship)

Immediate

family

members

(Father, Son,

brother)

Live in the

same v illage

Same tribe,

same sub-

tribe (ex: both

Noorzai)

Shared history

of fighting (7+

y ears)

Attends same

mosque,

AND same

madrassa

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