central asia and the caucasus, 2013, issue 1 (14)

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CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 14 Issue 1 2013

AND

CENTRAL ASIA

THE CAUCASUSJournal of Social and Political Studies

2013

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Volume 14

Issue 1

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Volume 14 Issue 1 2013 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

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CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Journal of Social and Political Studies

Volume 14Issue 1

2013

IN THIS ISSUE:

E T H N I C R E L A T I O N S

Rakhmatullo ETHNOPOLITICAL PROCESSESAbdulloev. IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER 2001 ..................................................... 7

Cholpon ETHNIC TENSION IN KYRGYZSTAN

Chotaeva. IN THE POST-CONFLICT PERIOD:ETHNOSOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY RESULTS ............................. 15

G E O P O L I T I C S A N D S E C U R I T Y

Jannatkhan POWERS ANDEyvazov. REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS:

PARAMETERS AND TYPES OF INVOLVEMENT(POST-SOVIET SPACE CASE STUDY) ........................................ 36

Ashot IRAN, TURKEY, AND RUSSIA:

Egiazarian. SEMI-PERIPHERAL STRATEGIESIN CENTRAL ASIA ANDTHE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS ..................................................... 57

Thrassy EAST MEDITERRANEAN GEOPOLITICAL ENERGYN. Marketos. ELBOWING WITH AN AMERICAN, RUSSIAN, ................................

ISRAELI, TURKISH, AND IRANIAN PREFIX:THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ANDREGIONAL ACTORS ..................................................................... 71


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E L E C T I O N S A N D R E G I M E C H A N G E

HrantMikaelian. ARMENIA: YEAR OF ELECTIONS ............................................... 78

Konstantin THE 18TH CONGRESS OFSyroezhkin. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA:

INCONCLUSIVE RESULTS,URGENT TASKS,SHAKY COMPROMISES ............................................................ 102

N A T I O N - B U I L D I N G

Shokir CONSTITUTIONALISMKhakimov. IN TAJIKISTAN:

TOWARD DEMOCRACY ORGREATER AUTHORITARIANISM? ............................................. 122

Kadyrjan PERSONNEL SHIFTSSmagulov. IN KAZAKHSTAN:

TRADITIONAL ROTATION ORA NEW POLITICAL COURSE?.................................................... 137

M A S S M E D I AEric PRESS RIGHTS AND

Freedman. CONSTRAINTS IN KYRGYZSTAN:THE FIRST YEAR OFPRESIDENT ATAMBAEV ............................................................ 144

R E G I O N A L E C O N O M I E S

Murat INFLUENCE OF THE SHADOW ECONOMYLaumulin. ON THE FINANCIAL AND

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OFKAZAKHSTAN ............................................................................. 157

Rakhmatillo PROBLEMS RELATINGZoirov. TO TAJIKISTANS ACCESSION

TO THE CUSTOMS UNION ........................................................ 167

Mavzuna MAKING EFFECTIVE STRUCTURAL CHANGESKarimova. IN TAJIK INDUSTRY ................................................................... 177


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FOR YOUR INFORMATION

The Special Feature sectionin the next three issues will discuss:

Central Eurasia: Politics Today

Afghanistan-2014: Development Prospects for the Country andthe Region

The Ferghana Valley: Conict Potential and

Development Prospects

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begin articles with a brief abstract of 300-500 words and keywords;

articles should be no less than 3,000 and no more than 6,000 words,

including footnotes;

footnotes should be placed at the bottom of each page; if there are referencesto Internet resources, please give the authors name, the name of

the document, the website address, and the date it was made available,

for example, available 2007-04-19;

quotations, names of authors and other information from English-language

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in English;

the article should be divided into sections, including an introduction and

conclusion;

the author should include the following personal information: rst name,

last name, academic degree, place of work, position, city, country.

All articles accepted are published in Russian and English,in the Russian-language and English-language versions of the journal,

respectively. The editorial board takes responsibilityfor translation of the articles.


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ETHNIC RELATIONS

ETHNOPOLITICAL PROCESSESIN AFGHANISTAN AFTER 2001

Rakhmatullo ABDULLOEV

Research Fellow, Institute of Language,Literature, Oriental Studies,

and Written Heritage,Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan

(Dushanbe, Tajikistan)

A B S T R A C T

KEYWORDS: Afghanistan; ethnic groups, political system; electioncampaigns, representation of ethnic groups, unity of the state.

Throughout the 20th century, domestic

policy in Afghanistan unfolded under

theinuenceoftheethnicfactor.In

1929, the mainly Tajik Habibullah Kalakani

movement ended the rule of Amanullah

Khan; the National Democratic Party of Af-

ghanistan, which split along ethnic lines,

was another factor that brought about his

downfall.In 1992, the mujahideen came to pow-

er; this ignited ethnic confrontation and the

countrys de facto division into ethnically ho-

mogenousparts.TheIslamistTalibanmove-

ment, which relied on the Pashtoon majority,

established an unprecedentedly cruel re-

gime and made the country the world center

ofterrorismandextremism.

In 2001, the International Conference

on Afghanistan held in Bonn could not ig-

noretheroleoftheethnicfactor;itgured

prominently while the Constitution was dis-cussed and later adopted, as well as during

the parliamentary and presidential elec-

tions.


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I n t r o d u c t i o n

Throughout its history, Afghanistan has been and remains a multinational state; today, it unitesover 30 ethnic groups, the largest of them being the Pashtoons, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmens,

Balochi, Nuristanis, and Pashayi.

The history of Afghanistan is a history of wars of independence; a history of the struggle of

national minorities for their rights and freedoms; a history of tribal feuds, ethnic separatism, and

never-ending confrontation between the Pashtoons and other peoples. In the 20thcentury, these trends

became even more vehement.

The following factors were behind the emergence and regular eruptions of ethnic contradictions

broiling for a long time within Afghanistans borders:

Ethnic contradictions: in 1747 Ahmad Shah Durrani founded the Afghan state and triggered

the process of its centralization, which ended in the late 19th century. This meant that for a

one-and-a-half centuries, the Afghan rulers remained bogged down in brutal wars for ter-

ritorial expansion; they conquered vast areas in Northern and Western Afghanistan, Ba-dakhshan, Hazarajad, Nuristan, etc. with ethnically alien populations.

The Durand Line: this was the cause of the political disagreements between independent

Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 1893, Emir of Afghanistan Abdur Rahman Khan, who came

to power with British assistance, had to sign an unequal or even humiliating peace treaty on

the borders with British India. The Line cut across the Pashtoon tribal territories, vast areas

were joined to British India and later, in 1947, became part of Pakistan.

The divided peoples issue: Pashtoons, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens, and the Balochi of

Afghanistan are all divided peoples; they constitute ethnic majorities/minorities beyond

Afghanistans bordersin Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.

The religious minorities issue: they include the Hazaras, who are Shia Muslims mostly

from the Jafarite and some from the Ismaili sects persecuted for ethnic and religious reasons.

The New Old Problem

The downfall of the Taliban, which opened a new stage in the countrys history, did nothing to

alleviate ethnic contradictions and their inuence on domestic policy. They became even sharper,

adding greater tension to local politics.

The International Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn attended by representatives of the main

ethnic groups was not free from the rivalry among them for places in the Interim Administration

coalition and the post of head of the Afghan Interim Authority (head of state until the Loya Jirga

scheduled for May 2002). Each of the ethnic groups was prepared to push forward its own candidate:the Pashtoons came up with Hamid Karzai and Seyyid Ahmad Gilani; the Mojadadis promoted head

of their clan Sigbatulla Mojadadi; and the Uzbeks put forward Abdusattar Sirat.

The Western delegations joined in the race, albeit in their informal capacities. The large states,

the U.S. and U.K. in particular, placed their stakes on the Pashtoons as the largest ethnic group that

dominated in the past and continued to call the tune in Afghan politics. Hamid Karzai was leader of

the inuential Pashtoon Popalzai tribe of the Durrani tribal confederation.

The academic community basically agrees that more or less full ethnic representation in the

newly established government would have been desirable but not obligatory. Viktor Korgun, promi-


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nent authority on Afghanistan, objected: This would have brought the Pashtoons, Tajiks, Uzbeks,

and others into a purely formal unity; each of them would have been ghting for the interests of their

own national group.

1

Amid the raging civil war, the increased rivalry for and ethnic squabbles over posts would have

most likely overshadowed the urgent national problems.

During the parliamentary elections, ethnic contradictions acquired an even sharper edge. In June

2002, the Emergency Loya Jirga met in Kabul to elect an Interim Government headed by Hamid Kar-

zai with 12 Pashtoons, 10 Tajiks, 5 Hazaras, 4 Uzbeks, 1 Turkmen, and 1 Nuristani as its members.

Deputy chairmen represented the largest ethnic groups: Tajiks (Mohammad Fahim); Hazara (Moham-

mad Karim Halili); Uzbeks (Negmatulla Shahroni); and the Pashtoons (Hidayat Amin Arsala). The

Pashtoons acquired the key posts: they became ministers of nance, internal affairs, and communica-

tions, Chairman of the Supreme Court, and Head of the Central Bank. Tajiks had to be satised with

the posts of ministers of defense, foreign affairs, information and culture, education, etc.

This was the rst time in the countrys history that the idea of a multiethnic government was

supported by parties and political groups. In the past, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Nuristani, and others

were included in the government together with the Pashtoons by royal decrees or by decisions of theruling party (the National Democratic Party of Afghanistan, to be more exact).

In December 2003-January 2004, 502 deputies of the Loya Jirga met in Kabul; on 4 January,

they approved the countrys new Constitution which brought together democratic ideas and tradi-

tional Islamic values: it declared the supremacy of law and stressed that the laws should not contradict

the norms and principles of Islam.

According to Iranian academic M. Mazahiri, the ethnic factor strongly affected the Jirgas deci-

sions on the future parliamentary vs. presidential form of government: The non-Pashtoon peoples

preferred the parliamentary form, while the Pashtoons insisted on the presidential form of

government.2

The non-Pashtoon peoples feared that under a president with broad constitutional powers, the

Pashtoons would dominate, very much as before, over the countrys political system. The Constitu-

tion, however, did not impose any ethnic or confessional stipulations on potential presidents.

The deputies found it hard to agree on the powers of the executive bodies: the non-Pashtoon

groups were opposed to strong presidential power. Former President Rabbani, supported by a large

group of deputies who regarded him as their leader, objected to the constitutional provisions related

to the president and his powers; he even tried to boycott voting.

The delegates disagreed on the state language and the text of the anthem. The Loya Jirga ap-

proved Pashto and Dari as the two ofcial languages; some of the deputies insisted on the same status

for the Uzbek language. After prolonged and heated debates, the Constitution was amended: Uzbek

and Balochi were recognized as the ofcial languages in regions where the corresponding peoples

lived in compact groups.

While the 2004 Constitution was being discussed and nally adopted, academics and the leaders

of the political parties suggested that the administrative-territorial division of the country be geared

toward the historic, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural specics of its peoples. Today, Afghanistan is di -

vided into 34 administrative units (provinces) with multinational populations, the Bamyan andNuristan provinces being the only exceptions.

On the other hand, many peoples are divided by administrative borders: the central mountainous

region of Hazarajat, home of the Hazara people, was divided for a long time among the provinces of

Bamyan, Sar-e Pol, Samangan, Baghlan, Urozgan, and Ghazni.

1Nezavisimaia gazeta, 8 December, 2001.2 M.M. Mazohiri, Payam-ha wa umidho-e Konuni asasi-e Afghanistan dar marhila-e amali, Wizhagi-e Afgoniston pas

az Tolibon, Ikra, Kabul, s.a., p. 98.


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The country inherited the present administrative division from its monarchic past: the kings

divided ethnic groups to slow down the development of ethnic awareness among the non-Afghan

peoples and keep them divided into smaller ethnic groups with their own languages, cultures, etc.This explains why the issue of administrative-territorial division surfaced during the discussions

of the constitution draft. Dr. I. Shahroni, for example, at rst suggested that Afghanistan be divided

into seven territorial-administrative units (states); later he came up with another option: smaller ad-

ministrative units, since, he argued: States should be fairly large units.3

According to the decisions of the Bonn conference, as soon as the new Constitution was ad-

opted, the country started moving toward a presidential election, rst scheduled for July 2004 and

later postponed until September because voter registration was dragging on far too long.

In the last twenty years, Afghanistan has remained divided ethnically and politically; this means

that the candidates supported by ethnic groups and respected religious leaders and warlords stand a

much better chance at presidential elections.

Peasant votes could strongly affect the results: political preferences in the countryside and those

of the urban population are worlds apart. The urban people are better educated and are more politi-

cally aware; they are responsive to all sorts of inuences and ideas.The rural population is much more devoted to the traditional Islamic values; the urban people

are divided into supporters of different political parties, while the rural people have strong ethnic

preferences.

By mid-2004, all 18 presidential candidates, who represented different ethnic groups and re-

gions, had been registered. With the Pashtoon and the world community, particularly the U.S., behind

him, Hamid Karzai, leader of the Pashtoon Popalzai tribe, the native tribe of practically all Afghan

emirs and kings, had the best chance. He also had vast nancial resources, the state-controlled media,

and political support from prominent political leaders on his side.

Karzai selected the right election tactics: he ran with M.K. Halili, prominent leader of the Haz-

aras and rst vice premier of the interim cabinet, as his vice president and Tajik Ahmad Zia Massoud

(younger brother of Ahmad Shah Massoud), Ambassador of Afghanistan to Russia, as rst vice-

president.Mohammad Mohaqiq, prominent Hazara leader and head of the Hezbe Wahdat (Unity) Party,

also ran for president; under the Taliban, he had been its irreconcilable enemy and vehement oppo-

nent. This meant that he could hardly count on the electorate of the Pashtoon-populated eastern and

southern provinces; political disunity among the Hazaras was another negative factor.

An old player, leader of the Afghan Uzbeks and the National Islamic Movement of Afghani-

stan General Abdul Rashid Dostum, joined the race.

According to Russian academic Roman Streshnev, the majority of the voters still prefer can-

didates of closer national or ethnic afliation4; even though the central government was working

hard to unite the country into a single whole.

On election day, Karzai received 55.4% of the votes; his closest rival Yunus Qanuni gained

16.3%; and General Dostum won 10%. According to the results, it became clear that the Uzbeks and

Hazaras had cast their votes for members of their own ethnic groups. According to Russian expert

Alexander Reutov, there is not much sense in presidential elections in Afghanistan. It would have

been enough to ascribe the voters of each tribe to each of the corresponding candidates.5

3 I. Shahroni, Nizam-e ayandae Afganistan, available at [http://www/ariaye.com/dari/qanooniasasi/shahrani/html],

9 November, 2007.4 R. Streshnev, Afghantsy vybiraiut prezidenta, Krasnaia zvezda, 9 October, 2004, available at [http://old.redstar.

ru/2004/10/09_10/4_03.html].5 A. Reutov, Hamid Karzai kontroliruet menee 10% territorii Afghanistana, available at [http://www.afghanistan.ru/

doc/2951.html], 4 December, 2007.


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In September 2005, Afghanistan elected a new parliament; by that time there were over 80 reg-

istered political parties and movements, which could be conventionally described as traditionalists,

moderates, and secularists.The country elected 249 deputies, who represented different parties: the Islamic Society of

Afghanistan (B. Rabbani) received 22 seats; the Unity Party and other Shia parties 30 seats; New

Afghanistan (Y. Qanuni) 25 seats; the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan gained 20 seats;

the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan 10 seats; and Afghan mellat 7 seats. The rest went to con-

servative fundamentalists, moderate traditionalists, and leftist liberals; independent deputies won

over 90 seats.6

The ethnic composition of the lower chamber (Wulusi Jirga) was also highly varied: according

to unofcial information there were 118 (47.4%) Pashtoons among the deputies; 53 (21.3%) Tajiks;

30 (12%) Hazaras; 20 (8%) Uzbeks; 11 (4.4%) non-Hazara Shia; 5 (2%) Turkmens; 5 (2%) Arabs;

3 (1.2%) Ismailis; 2 (0.8%) Pashayis; one Balochi (0.4%); and one Nuristani (0.4%). 7

Viktor Korgun treats the non-Hazara Shia and Ismaili deputies as one group. In Afghanistan,

Tajiks and Pashtoons also belong to the Shia branch; some of the Hazaras and Tajiks from Badakh-

shan profess Ismaili Shia.This means that the religious afliation of these deputies needed specication. It seems that the

non-Hazara Shia deputies represented the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan founded by Ayatollah

Asif Mohsini Qandahari (with Pashtoon, Tajik, and Aymak membership), while Ismailis belonged to

the National Solidarity Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Paiwand Milli Afgoniston) of Sayed Mansur

Naderi.

When writing about the impact of ethnic afliation on the parliament and its decisions, Viktor

Korgun says: Since none of the ethnic groups have a majority of over 50% in the parliament, all

attempts to push through purely nationalist programs will be checked.8

There is a fairly widespread opinion that the parliament will ultimately be divided into ethnic

groups on the strength of the fact that the discussions about native language, which went on in the

Loya Jirga between 14 December, 2003 and 4 January, 2004 (when the Constitution was adopted),

divided the deputies into Pashtoons and non-Pashtoons.The inuential military-political groups that represent national minorities reject the idea of a

united Afghan state with the Pashtoons as a dominant political force.

In the past, the ethnic minorities (lumped together, they constitute over half of the countrys

population) living to the north of Hindu Kush were tired of the Pashtoon political domination. These

sentiments, very much alive today, are fanned by the Tajik and Uzbek bourgeoisie, which wants a

much greater share of political power and which, due to certain historical conditions, has developed

into the countrys decisive economic and nancial power. Geo-economic factors also contribute to

the anti-Pashtoon and separatist sentiments: over 60% of the countrys grain- and vegetable-growing

areas, 46% of the fruit-growing areas, and over 80% of the areas on which industrial crops are grown

are found in the countrys north.9 Over 70% of the total herd of small cattle and nearly the entire herd

of karakul sheep (5-6 million) are raised in the north.

In the last 10 years, these sentiments have intensied; indeed, the civil war unfolded mainly

between the Pashtoons and non-Pashtoons; the defeat of the Pashtoon Taliban convinced the ethnicminorities of their military power and moral superiority and made them determined to insist on broad

autonomy.

6 See: V.G. Korgun, Sostav afghanskogo parlamenta, available at [http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2005/30-12-05.htm].7 See: Ibidem.8 Ibidem.9 See: M.F. Slinkin, Afghanistan: problemy voyny, mira i bezopasnosti v strane i regione, available at [http://www.

nbuv.gov.ua], 25 December, 2012.


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External Factor at Play

With the Taliban out of the way, the civil war in Afghanistan became extremely complicatedand unpredictable; after a short respite, it resumed in a qualitatively new dimension. Russian

academic Mikhail Slinkin has pointed out: at rst, starting in the mid-1970s, the civil war un-

folded as an ideological and political confrontation; later, with the collapse in 1992 of the leftist

regime, it developed into ethnic and confessional bloodshed. Today, the ethnic and confessional

conict is rapidly developing into a national-liberation movement against the foreign military

presence.10

In April 2007, a new political structurethe National Front of Afghanistan (NFA)was set up

with Burhanuddin Rabbani as its leader and popular politicians, warlords, and even royals among its

members.

Some analysts think that, to a certain extent, it resembled the former Northern Alliance be-

cause of the great number of Ahmad Shah Massouds former supporters among its members: Tajiks

B. Rabbani, Ahmad Zia Massoud, Yu. Qanuni, Ismail Han, and M. Fahim (the Islamic Society ofAfghanistan); leader of the Uzbeks A.R. Dostum (NIMA), as well as Hazaras Mustafa Kazemi (the

Islamic Society of Afghanistan), Sayed Mansoor Naderi, and Muhammad Akbari (the Peoples Is-

lamic Unity Party of Afghanistan); Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoy, former leader of the Afghan Com-

munists and Minister of Internal Affairs (1980-1989), General Noorul-haq Ulumi, a prominent mili-

tary leader, and Mustafa Zahir, grandson of Zahir Shah.

As a new political force, the NFA formulated three major tasks: a parliamentary rather than

presidential republic; elections of provincial governors; and voting by party lists. Elected governors

were a striking novelty, even if the governors (wali) had been elected under Zahir Shah.

According to the widely shared expert opinion, a federative state (suggested by the NFA) har-

monized with the idea of a parliamentary republic and elections of governors. Waheed Mujda, for

example, writes that there is nothing new in the idea of a federative state, yet it has preserved its

urgency. The recent events have shown that the dependence of 34 provinces on a weak Center doesnothing good for the countrys development.11 He pointed out that a federative state might make the

non-Afghan peoples independent of the Pashtoon rulers.

The new political force was set up to stand opposed to the Taliban, which although ousted, was

still popular in the countrys east and south and among the Pashtoon tribes on the other side of the

Durand Line.

The political elite, however, headed by President Karzai and supported by the U.S., NATO, and

the U.N. wants to include moderate members of the Taliban in the government. This cannot but cause

deep concern among the leaders of the former Northern Alliance who represent the non-Pashto ethnic

groups.

We should bear in mind that Russia, Iran, and Uzbekistan supported the NFA. Before the new

bloc appeared, Russia supported Rabbani and his allies, as well as Gulabzoy and Ulumi, former

NDPA members; Iran backed Hazara leaders Kazemi, Naderi, and Akbari, while Uzbekistan was on

Dostums side. This meant that if President Karzai weakened its grip on power, the United States

would lose much of its impact, while Russia, Iran, and Uzbekistan would strengthen their positions.

The National Front of Afghanistan claried the balance of power inside the country: if it con-

tinues to gain in strength this could have a negative effect on the countrys further existence as an

independent state.

10 M.F. Slinkin, op. cit.11Asia-Plus, 25 April, 2007.


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The Pashtoon and pro-Pashtoon ruling circles will never support the ideas of federalismthis

much is absolutely clear. R. Momun of Afghanistan wrote that if a Pashtoon ruler accepts the idea

of federalism it will signify that he has accepted the Durand Line and agreed to the end of Pashtoonrule in Afghanistan.12

Mikhail Slinkin asserts that the separatist sentiments among the Turkic-speaking peoples of

Afghanistan are not only home-grown, they are also initiated outside the country. He had in mind

certain Turkic-speaking countries and their cherished dreamthe Great Turan stretching from the

Mediterranean and the Black Sea to Eastern Turkestan.13

Iran has his own far-reaching plans: it is seeking greater inuence in Afghanistan on a pan-Is -

lamist and ethnic basis. A. Boguslavskiy, a Russian researcher, believes that Tehran has in view

several objective and subjective factors in its Afghan policy: First, for the sake of national security

and in the dangerous context of the use of force by the United States, Iran prefers, if not a friendly, at

least a neutral and loyal neighbor with no political, economic, or border claims against Iran. Second,

the countrys geographic location makes it a potentially advantageous trade and economic partner of

Tehran, as well as a very much needed intermediary in transporting hydrocarbon resources (oil, natu-ral gas, etc.) and all sorts of other cargoes along the North-South and East-West lines. Third, common

historical roots, close languages, religion, culture, and customs create favorable conditions in which

Iran can promote its national interests in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.14

The Hazaras, who live in the central part of Afghanistan (according to certain sources they

comprise about 19% of the countrys total population) and follow Shia Islam, could always count on

Tehrans understanding, compassion, and support in their confrontation with the countrys Sunni

majority. Iran is very popular with the Tajiks and Uzbeks living in the central and northern parts of

Afghanistan; likewise, Irans inuence is very strong in the Herat Province as a whole. Not long ago

Iran had certain claims on the region.

This means that the idea of maximum autonomy of some of the ethnic groups for the sake of

continued political stability in the countrys north meets the geopolitical interests of the western and

northern neighbors of Afghanistan, including Russia.

The political preferences of the Pashtoon population of Afghanistan are strongly affected by

Pakistan, where the Pashtoons are the second largest ethnic group (over 15% of the total population or

about 15 million)15; they live in the northwestern part of Balochistan and the Sindh province and are

in the majority in the North Western Frontier Province of Pakistan and the tribal zone. Traditionally,

the Pashtoons gure prominently among the middle- and top-level commanders of the Pakistan army.

Since the 1950s, the inuential military circles of Pakistan have been toying with the idea of an

Afghan-Pakistani confederation as the best possible method of settling interstate contradictions. At

the same time, the rulers of Pakistan are ready to accept the idea of a single Afghan state if the idea

of Pashtunistan is not placed on the agenda of their bilateral relations. In fact, Pakistan would rather

see a united Afghanistan for the simple reason that otherwise the Pakistani Pashtoons might start

thinking about an independent state.

The political sentiments of the Afghan Balochi (over 0.2 million) are strongly affected by the

Balochi of Pakistan and Iran. In Pakistan, the Balochi constitute about 3% of the total population

12 Ibidem.13 See: M.F. Slinkin, Etnicheskaia problema v Afghanistane (istoriko-politichesky analiz), available at [http://www.

nbuv.gov.ua/Articles/Kultnar/knp66/knp66_46-60.pdf], 6 February, 2013.14 A.Ya. Boguslavskiy, Irano-afganskie otnoshenia na sovremennom etape, 8 August, 2009, available at [http://www.

iimes.ru/rus/stat], 5 February, 2013.15 See: Natsionalno-etnicheskiy sostav naseleniia Pakistana, available at [http://kraff.narod.ru/samudai/pak/

pakpeople.htm], 5 February, 2013.


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(about 3.5 million); they are scattered across Balochistan (nearly 70%), Punjab, and Sindh. Over one

million Balochi live in Iran.

Some of the trends of the Balochi national movement are waging a guerilla war under the slo-gans of a united or Greater Balochistan. The main political parties, which side with the national in-

terests of the Balochi of Pakistan and Afghanistan, demand broad autonomy for Balochistan.

The position of the United States and its NATO allies should be taken into account for a correct

assessment of the situation inside and around Afghanistan.

Since early 2009, the United States has been implementing its new plan for Afghanistan and

Pakistan; Washington is determined to liquidate terrorist networks by strengthening the regional se-

curity forces, building up democratic efforts, and promoting international cooperation. Barack Obama

revealed certain details: Today, Im announcing a comprehensive, new strategy for Afghanistan and

Pakistan A campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone. 16 The

president went on to say that the U.S. would rely on agricultural specialists, doctors, and engineers

not only to set up an environment in which people would realize that they were more interested in

cooperating with the United States and international community than in supporting extremist ideolo-

gies. The American president rmly stated: This is just one part of a comprehensive strategy to

prevent Afghanistan from becoming the al-Qaeda safe haven.

Today American politicians and analysts are fond of saying that ethnic imbalance in the Kabul

corridors of power cost Washington its strategy. After the Taliban was defeated by the coalition

forces in 2001, the Northern Alliance commanders, who represented ethnic minorities, acquired a lot

of power; Tajik commanders who belonged to the so-called Panjshir group that controlled the defense

and security structures had even more power than other ethnic groups.

The Americans decided that since the majority of the Pashtoon tribal leaders who had been rul-

ing the country for centuries had been removed from power, Washington should revise its policies in

Afghanistan and Pakistan.

According to Michael Whitney, the Pentagon has settled on a new counterinsurgency doctrine

(COIN) which it intends to implement in Afghanistan. The program will integrate psyops, special

forces, NGOs, psychologists, media, anthropologists, humanitarian agencies, public relations, recon-struction, and conventional forces to rout the Taliban, assert control over the South and the tribal

areas, and to quash any indigenous resistance. Clandestine activity and unmanned drone attacks will

increase, while a civilian surge will be launched to try to win hearts and minds in the densely popu-

lated areas. Militarily, the goal is to pit one ethnicity against the other, to incite civil war, and to split

the country in smaller units that can be controlled by warlords working with Washington. 17

C o n c l u s i o n

The Afghan crisis, which has been going on for decades and which NATO interference has

failed to stop, has far-reaching social-economic, ideological, ethnic, and national roots. The develop-

ments in Afghanistan of the last third of the 20th century show that neither military force nor foreigninterference alone can bring peace.

On the other hand, discussion and adoption of the new Constitution and the parliamentary elec-

tions showed that popular sentiments and the political climate in Afghanistan are still strongly af-

16 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_ofce/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-

Pakistan].17 [https://deeppoliticsforum.com/forums/showthread.php?2738-The-Audacity-of-Ethnic-Cleansing-Obama-s-plan-

for-Afghanistan].


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T

fected by ethnic contradictions: the text of the national anthem was approved only in Pashto, despite

the frantic efforts of deputies of other ethnic groups to approve the Dari text as well.

Moreover, during the presidential election of 2004 some of the demands and provisions of theelection law were attenuated, without legal reasons, for certain categories of voters in eastern and

southern provinces, that is, the tribal zone.

The following events can be described as evidence of another bout of South-North confrontation:

(1) removal of Mohammed Mohaqiq, one of the leaders of the Peoples Islamic Unity Party of

Afghanistan, from his post.

(2) Attempted assassination of former governor of Herat Province Ismail Khan and murder of

his son Mirwais Sadiq.

(3) Allegations against leader of the Uzbek community General Dostum.

(4) Assassination of former president and prominent leader of the Tajiks B. Rabbani.

(5) Attempts of the authorities to kindle confrontation between the military-political groups

and their leaders.(6) The increased tension in the northern and western regions and in Hazarajad.

The contradictions in Afghanistan cannot be resolved in favor of one ethnic group alone. The

multinational state, which in the past assumed the name of Afghanistan, is the homeland of the Pash-

toons, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Balochi, Nuristani, and other ethnic groups. They share a

history, varied culture, and common religion.

If this reality is ignored much longer, negative consequences and a threat to the states unity

cannot be excluded.

ETHNIC TENSIONIN KYRGYZSTAN

IN THE POST-CONFLICT PERIOD:ETHNOSOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY RESULTS

Cholpon CHOTAEVA

D.Sc.(Hist.),Professor,HeadoftheAnthropologyProgram,

American University in Central Asia(Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)

A B S T R A C T

he author analyzes the ethnocultural

and psychological factors contribut-

ing to the continued ethnic tension in

Kyrgyzstaninthepost-conictperiod.These

factorsguredprominentlyintheare-ups

ofethnictensionandcontinuedethnicstrain.


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KEYWORDS: Kyrgyzstan, ethnic tension, ethnic relations,ethnic situation, ethnocultural factors, psychologicalfactors, common civic identity, ethnosociologicalsurvey.


According to the 2009 population census, Kyrgyz constituted 71% of the countrys population;Uzbeks 14.3%; Russians 7.8%; and people of other nationalities 7%. Kyrgyz live throughout the re-

public and in its capital, Bishkek; Uzbeks are concentrated mainly in the south: the Osh, Jalalabad,

and Batken regions; while Russians live mainly in the north: the Chu and Issyk Kul regions and in

Bishkek. There are other fairly large ethnic groups: Dungans (1.1%); Uighurs (0.9%); Tajiks (0.9%);

Turks (0.7%); Kazakhs (0.6%); Tatars (0.6%); Ukrainians (0.4%); Koreans (0.3%); Azeris (0.3%);

Kurds (0.3%); and Germans (0.2%).

Negative social, economic, political, cultural, psychological, and other factors have done noth-

ing to improve ethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan. This holds true for both the end of the Soviet period

and continues to be the case during the countrys independent development. Whereas in 1990, the

ethnic conict in the Osh Region was triggered by political factorscentrifugal trends, mounting

national self-awareness, Kyrgyz as the only state language, etc.the ethnic conict of 2010 in the

republics south was rooted in social and economic problems, such as the deepening economic crisis,ination, unemployment, and plummeting standard of living. However, ethnocultural and psycho-

logical factors come to the fore every time ethnic relations become tense. While social, economic,

and political factors set the ball rolling and help to feed the further development of ethnic conicts,

ethnocultural and psychological factors add fuel to the re.

The author analyzes the ethnocultural and psychological factors that have contributed to

the ethnic troubles and continued tension in Kyrgyzstan a year after the 2010 ethnic conflict in

the republics south based on information gleaned from an ethnosociological survey carried out

in 2011.

Dr.Chotaevaproceedsfromtheresultsof

an ethnosociological survey carried out in

veregionsofKyrgyzstan.The ethnocultural factors are related

to various aspects of ethnic identitythe

extent to which the family and close relatives

affect ethnic self-identity and the degree

to which the survey respondents were fa-

miliar with their ethnic history and follow

ethnic traditions and customs in every-

daylife.

The psychological factors were deter-

mined by the degree of trust the members of

oneethnicgroupfeeltowardanother.

The sociological survey also included

questions designed to identify the respon-

dents civic identity, which directly dependson the degree to which the republics ethnic

groups are integrated and which, on the

other hand, is slowed down by ethnic and

regionalspecics.Thecontinuedethnicten -

sionhasintensiedanawarenessofethnic

identity; however the sociological survey

demonstrated that a common civic identity

stillprevailsoverethnicidentity.Theabso-

lute majority of the respondents consider

themselves to be citizens of Kyrgyzstan and

arenotcontemplatingemigration.


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How the Ethnosociological Survey

was ConductedThe author carried out this ethnosociological survey in 2011 within the framework of a UNES-

CO project called Encouragement of Ethnic Tolerance among the Youth of Kyrgyzstan to reveal the

state of ethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan after the 2010 ethnic conict and identify the factors conducive

to ethnic stabilization and harmonization.

The survey covered four regions (Chu, Issyk Kul, Osh, and Jalalabad) and the city of Bishkek.

The regions were selected based on ethnic criteria: they are the areas of the country with the greatest

ethnic diversity on a national scale and the greatest share of non-titular peoples.

A total of 1,000 people aged 16 and over participated in the survey: 200 people in each of the

covered areas. The sample was representative and proportional in terms of three main categories:

nationality, age, and gender.

As representatives of the three largest ethnic groups, Kyrgyz comprised 58.9%, Russians 16.3%,

and Uzbeks 15.3% of the survey sample. Representatives of other nationalities (9.5%) were classied

together in the Others category.

The survey was carried out using questionnaires consisting of three parts with a total of 38 questions.

The rst part included questions about the respondents native language, how procient

they were in Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Russian, and their language preferences. The same part

contained questions about various aspects of ethnic identity; the degree to which the fam-

ily affected ethnic self-identity; the degree to which the respondent was familiar with the

ethnic history, customs, and traditions of his or her ethnic group; and religious afliation

and the extent to which the respondent followed religious rites.

The second part dealt with the problem of ethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan; in particular, the

environment in which the respondent lived, studied, and worked; the causes of ethnic dis-

crimination and the measures needed to eliminate it; the level of ethnic tension in the givenregion; and the prospects for ethnic relations in the country.

The third part dealt with civic identity; in particular it asked the respondents to identify their

predominant identity, assess the extent of ethnic integration and the factors that could pro-

mote integration of ethnic groups, and specify whether they would prefer to continue living

in the country or emigrate.

In the course of the sociological survey, two hypotheses were formulated:

1. There is ethnic tension caused by numerous social, economic, political, and cultural prob-

lems;

2. Continued ethnic tension contributes to actualization of ethnic identity and its domination

over civic identity.

The Level and Factors ofEthnic Tension

We all know that ethnic tension is a special state of ethnic relations characterized by inated

enmity among ethnic groups; its level depends on the content and form of ethnic relations, and eth-

nocultural and psychological factors play an important role in fanning ethnic tension.


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Ethnic tension continues to linger a year after the tragic events of 2010 in the south of Kyrgyz-

stan. When assessing the level of ethnic tension in the republic, most of the respondents (46% of the

Kyrgyz; 49% of the Uzbeks; 38.7% of the Russians, and 34.7% of the Others) described it as av-erage (see Table 1). At the same time, 44.2% of the Others, 31.9% of the Russians, 29.2% of the

Kyrgyz, and 24.2% of the Uzbeks described it as low; 11.8% of the Uzbeks, 11.7% of the Russians,

10.5% of the Kyrgyz, and the same share of the Others spoke of it as high.

T a b l e 1

Answers to the QuestionHow Do You Assess

the Level of Ethnic Tension in Your Region?(% by nationality)

Nationality

Kyrgyz Russians Uzbeks OthersLow 29.2 31.9 24.2 44.2

Average 48.6 38.7 49.0 34.7

High 10.5 11.7 11.8 10.5

Undecided 11.2 17.8 15.0 10.5

No tension 0.5 0 0 0

The largest share (17.6%) of those who described ethnic tension as high live in the Osh region

(see Table 2). The largest share (57.5%) of those who described ethnic tension in their region as

average live in the Jalalabad Region, while in the Issyk Kul Region 45.7% assessed ethnic tension

as low (the largest share among the ve regions).

T a b l e 2

Answers to the QuestionHow Do You Assess

the Level of Ethnic Tension in Your Region?(% by region)

Region

Bishkek Chu Issyk Kul Osh Jalalabad

Low 32.2 30.0 45.7 25.1 18.5

Average 46.7 37.9 38.2 48.2 57.5

High 9.5 13.3 4.0 17.6 10.0

Undecided 10.6 18.7 12.1 8.5 14.0

No tension 1.0 0 0 0.5 0

It was established that social, economic, political, historical, cultural, and psychological factors

were thought to have a negative effect on the republics ethnic environment.


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The social and economic factors (unemployment, poverty, poor living conditions, etc.) were

described as the main causes of worsening ethnic relations by 49.7% of the Others; 41.3% of the

Kyrgyz; 35.9% of the Uzbeks; and 41.7% of the Russians (see Table 3).T a b l e 3

Answers to the QuestionWhat are the Causes of Ethnic (National) Discrimination?

(% by nationality)

Nationality

Kyrgyz Russians Uzbeks Others

Social-economic problems:economic crisis;unemployment; poverty;housing and land problems

41.3 41.7 35.9 49.5

Political problems:absence of political rightsfor ethnic minorities;inadequate representationof ethnic minoritiesin the power structures

10.2 19.0 10.5 17.9

Historical-cultural problems:the language problem;few or no schools anduniversities that teachin the native language;shortage of objects ofculture; absence of cultural

rights

16.8 6.1 14.4 2.1

Psychological problems:predomination of negativestereotypes about differentethnic groups (nationalities);rumors about discriminationagainst different ethnicgroups

16.6 17.2 18.3 12.6

Undecided 14.3 16.0 20.9 16.8

Other 0.8 0 0 1.1

Political factors came second for 19% of the Russians; 17.9% of the Others; 10.5% of the

Uzbeks; and 10.2% of the Kyrgyz. They pointed to the fact that ethnic minorities had no politicalrights and, therefore, had almost no representation in the power structures, etc.

Cultural, historical, and psychological factors comprised the third group; 16.8% of the Kyrgyz;

14.4% of the Uzbeks; 6.1% of the Russians; and 2.1% of the Others pointed to cultural and his-

torical problems: the language issue; few or no schools and universities that teach in the native lan-

guage; inadequate number of cultural objects; and the absence of cultural rights. Psychological prob-

lemsnegative stereotypes about ethnic groups and negative rumors about ethnic discrimination

across the countrytroubled 18.3% of the Uzbeks; 17.2% of the Russians; 16.6% of the Kyrgyz, and

12.6% of the Others.


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It should be said that the largest share of those who pointed to social and economic problems

lived in the north (the Chu Region and Bishkek51.2% and 43.7%, respectively) (see Table 4).

Much smaller shares of respondents concerned with these problems were found in the south (the Oshand Jalalabad regions37.2% and 33%, respectively).

T a b l e 4

Answers to the QuestionWhat are the Causes of Ethnic (National) Discrimination?

(% by region)

Region


Social-economic problems:economic crisis;

unemployment; poverty;housing and landproblems

43.7 51.2 41.2 37.2 33.0

Political problems:absence of political rightsfor ethnic minorities;inadequate representationof ethnic minorities in powerstructures

14.1 7.9 12.6 17.6 10.0

Historical-cultural problems:the language problem;few or no schools anduniversities that teachin the native language;shortage of objects ofculture; absence of culturalrights

6.5 10.8 17.6 18.1 13.5

Psychological problems:predomination of negativestereotypes about differentethnic groups (nationalities);rumors about discriminationagainst different ethnicgroups

21.1 15.8 13.1 14.6 15.8

Undecided 14.1 13.3 14.6 12.6 24.5

Other 0.5 1.0 1 0 0.5

The largest share of respondents concerned with political and historical-cultural problems lived

in the Osh Region (17.6% and 18.1%, respectively). The share of those concerned with psychological

problems is not small either: 14.6% and 15.8%, respectively. The largest share of respondents con-

cerned with psychological problems live in Bishkek (21.2%).

Social and economic factors affect the ethnic context to a much greater extent than the other

factors, yet they proved to be less prominent in the countrys south, the scene of the 2010 ethnic

disturbances, than historical, cultural, and psychological problems. They gured much more promi -

nently in the development of ethnic relations there, which explains the larger number of respondents


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in the southern regions than elsewhere who pointed to political, historical, cultural, and psychological

problems.

When asked about the measures conducive to regulating ethnic relations, the respondents pri-marily pointed to social and economic measures, such as more jobs to ease unemployment, more

better quality housing and successful solution of the land problem, subsidies for poor and needy

families, and economic reforms. These measures were recommended by 34.6% of the Uzbeks; 46.2%

of the Kyrgyz; 47.2% of the Russians, and 49.5% of the Others (see Table 5).

T a b l e 5

Answers to the QuestionWhich Measures Would Help to Remove Ethnic (National) Discrimination?

(% by nationality)

Nationality

Kyrgyz Russians Uzbeks OthersSocio-economic measures:more jobs; more better qualityhousing and successful solutionof the land problem; subsidiesfor poor and needy families;economic reforms

46.2 47.2 34.6 49.5

Political measures: politicalrights for the minoritiesand their greater representationin the top state and powerstructures

8.8 16.0 13.7 14.7

Cultural measures: schools

teaching in the native language;events devoted to culture andhistory of different ethnicities(nationalities); addressing theproblem of the absence ofcultural rights

9.0 6.7 7.8 2.1

Educational measures: schooland university courses in ethnictolerance; wide propaganda ofethnic tolerance in the media(TV and radio)

21.9 16.6 22.2 23.2

Undecided 13.2 12.9 21.6 10.5

Other 0.8 0.6 0 0

Education comes second as an important instrument: special courses in ethnic tolerance at

schools and universities; wider propaganda of ethnic tolerance in the media (TV and radio): 16.6%

of the Russians, 21.9% of the Kyrgyz, 22.2% of the Uzbeks, and 23.2% of the Others pinned their

hopes on education.

Political measures (broader political rights for ethnic minorities and their broader representation

in the corridors of power) were favored by 8.8% of the Kyrgyz; 13.7% of the Uzbeks, 14.7% of the

Others, and 16% of the Russians.


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The smallest share of respondents (2.1% of the Others, 6.7% of the Russians, 7.8% of the

Uzbeks, and 9% of the Kyrgyz) complained about the lack of cultural rights and believed that the

cultural problems could be resolved by having a greater number of schools that teach in the nativelanguage and holding events devoted to the culture and history of particular ethnicities (nation-

alities).

The largest share of respondents who pointed to social and economic measures (54.2%) lived

in the Chu Region (see Table 6), while a fairly large share in the Osh Region spoke about political

and educational measures (16.6% and 25.1%, respectively). In the Issyk Kul and Jalalabad regions,

9.5% said that cultural measures were needed.

T a b l e 6

Answers to the QuestionWhich Measures Would Help to Remove Ethnic (National) Discrimination?

(% by region)

Region


Socio-economicmeasures: more jobs;more better qualityhousing and successfulsolution of the landproblem; subsidies forpoor and needy families;economic reforms

44.7 54.2 48.2 38.7 38.5

Political measures:political rights for the

minorities and theirgreater representation inthe top state and powerstructures

9.5 10.3 5.1 16.6 14.5

Cultural measures:schools teaching in thenative language; eventsdevoted to culture andhistory of differentethnicities (nationalities);addressing the problemof the absence of culturalrights

4.0 7.9 9.5 8.0 9.5

Educational measures:school and universitycourses in ethnictolerance; widepropaganda of ethnictolerance in the media(TV and radio)

21.6 19.2 21.1 25.1 19.0

Undecided 18.1 7.9 15.1 11.6 18.5

Other 2.0 0.5 0.5 0 0


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Ethnocultural Factors

By ethnocultural factors we mean all sorts of aspects responsible for an individuals ethnicidentity, in particular, inuence of the family and relatives on ethnic self-identication; familiar-

ity of the respondents with their ethnic history; and observance of traditions and customs in ev-

eryday life.

The absolute majority of the respondents were born into mono-ethnic families in which both the

mother and the father belonged to the same nationality (see Tables 7 and 8).

T a b l e 7

Answers to the QuestionWhat was Your Fathers Nationality?

(% by nationality)

NationalityKyrgyz Russians Uzbeks Others

Kyrgyz 99.7 1.2 0 1.1

Russian 0.3 96.3 1.3 0

Uzbek 0 0 98.7 0

Other 0 2.5 0 98.9

T a b l e 8

Answers to the QuestionWhat was Your Mothers Nationality?

(% by nationality)

Nationality


Kyrgyz 97.8 3.1 4.6 11.6

Russian 0.7 93.9 3.3 9.5

Uzbek 0 1.2 88.2 6.3

Other 1.5 1.8 3.9 72.6

Parents and the family were the most prominent factors in shaping the respondents ethnic

awareness: 90.0% of the Uzbeks; 83.4% of the Russians; 72.7% of the Kyrgyz, and 85.3% of theOthers pointed to the family as the most important factor shaping their ethnic self-awareness (see

Table 9).

When asked to point to specic individuals, 55.6% to 73.6% of the respondents pointed to their

mother and father as the two people who shaped their ethnic self-awareness to the greatest extent;

34% to 52.6% pointed to their grandmother and grandfather; and 4.6% to 16% to their friends, col-

leagues, and fellow students (see Table 10).

Loyalty to cultural traditions and customs is another factor that has a signicant inuence on

shaping ethnic identity. The respondents who grew up in families that observed ethnic traditions,


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rites, and holidays knew much more about them than others: 65.4% of the Uzbeks, 56.8% of the Oth-

ers, 56.4% of the Kyrgyz, and 38.7% of the Russians grew up in the families that observed ethnic

rights, traditions, and holidays (see Table 11).

T a b l e 9

Answers to the Question

What is the Strongest Factor Shaping Your Self-Awareness?(% by nationality)

Nationality


The family 72.7 83.4 90.2 85.3

State policy andideology

14.1 8.6 5.9 7.4

Books, literature 37.7 17.8 20.9 24.2

Music, songs 8.3 25.8 5.9 11.6

National holidaysand importantdates

10.7 12.3 6.5 21.1

Religious ritesand rituals

4.2 6.1 2.0 16.8

Other 0.5 0.6 0 1.1

T a b l e 1 0

Answers to the QuestionWho has Shaped Your Ethnic Self-Awareness

to the Greatest Extent?(% by nationality)

Nationality


Grandfather,grandmother

35.8 42.9 34.0 52.6

Mother 67.6 73.6 64.7 61.1

Father 65.5 58.3 55.6 55.8

Husband/Wife 4.6 4.9 4.6 2.1

Children 0.3 1.8 1.3 0

Other relatives 3.4 2.5 1.3 7.4

Friends, fellowstudents, colleagues

8.3 16.0 4.6 8.4

Other 2.6 1.2 1.4 1.1


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T a b l e 1 1


To Which Extent did the Familyin Which You Grew Up Observe Ethnic Traditions,Rites, and Holidays?

(% by nationality)

Nationality


Observedto a greatextent

56.4 38.7 65.4 56.8

Observed,but not to a great

extent

36.3 47.9 25.5 34.7

Practicallynever observed

3.6 8.6 2.6 6.3

Undecided 3.7 4.9 6.5 2.1

A home atmosphere permeated with ethnic traditions and culture affects the choice of national-

ity of a future spouse. Nearly all of the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Russian respondents were married to

spouses of the same nationality (see Table 12).

T a b l e 1 2

Answers to the QuestionWhat Nationality is Your Spouse?

(% by nationality)

Nationality


Kyrgyz 53.5 3.1 2.6 9.5

Russian 0.8 52.8 2.0 10.5

Uzbek 0 0 63.4 2.1

Not married 45.0 41.1 27.5 37.9

Other 0.7 3.1 4.6 40.0

Over 48.6% of the Kyrgyz, 24.8% of the Uzbeks, 24.8% of the Russians, and 16.8% of the

Others responded negatively to their children marrying a man or woman of another nationality (see

Table 13).

This means that the immediate social environment, namely, family and relatives, plays an im-

portant role in shaping the respondents ethnic identity. Loyalty to ethnic traditions and customs in

the family determines the individuals ethnic identity. This is especially important for young people

who follow in the footsteps of their parents when starting their families; they observe ethnic traditions

and rites to the same degree as they were practiced in the families of their relatives.


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PsychologicalFactors

The negative or positive nature of psychological factors depends on the degree of trust of the

members of one ethnic group toward another; it, in turn, depends on personal experience with dis-

crimination. Our respondents not only were the victims of discrimination, they also infringed, either

involuntarily or intentionally, on the rights of members of other ethnic groups.

Under pressure of the worsening ethnic relations and the resultant ethnic tension, ethnic groupsare gradually losing their mutual trust. Most of the respondents gave negative answers to the question

Do you trust members of other ethnicities (nationalities)?

At the same time, 46.3% of the Others trust most members of other ethnic groups; the same

can be said about 35.9% of the Uzbeks, 35.6% of the Russians, and 20.2% of the Kyrgyz (see

Table 14). Some members of other nationalities are trusted by 49.7% of the Russians, 46% of the

Kyrgyz, 38.9% of the Others, and 34.4% of the Uzbeks; 19% of the Uzbeks, 10.9% of the Kyrgyz,

7.4% of the Others, and 3.1% of the Russians do not trust some of the members of other nationali-

ties, while 22.8% of the Kyrgyz, 11.7% of the Russians, 11.1% of the Uzbeks, and 7.4% of the Oth-

ers do not trust anyone.

The largest share of the respondents (38.9%) who trust mostother ethnic groups live in the Chu

Region (see Table 15). The largest number of those who do not trust some members of other nation-

alities live in the Osh and Jalalabad regions12.6% and 12.5%, respectively, while the largest shareof those who do not trust anyone (34%) live in the Jalalabad Region.

Trust in the members of other ethnic groups frequently depends on whether the particular indi-

vidual has had personal experience with ethnic discrimination. Most of the respondents (42.5%-

65.5%) had no such experience (see Table 16). At the same time, 49.1% of the Russians, 45.3% of

the Others, 45.1% of the Uzbeks, and 28.7% of the Kyrgyz were sometimes exposed to ethnic

discrimination; 2.9% of the Kyrgyz, 6.3% of the Others, 6.7% of the Russians, and 7.8% of the

Uzbeksfrequently suffered from discrimination, while 0.6% of the Russians, 2.1% of the Others,

2.9% of the Kyrgyz, and 4.6% of the Uzbeks were constantly discriminated against.

T a b l e 1 3


How Would You Respond to Your Child Marryinga Man (Woman) of Another Nationality?(% by nationality)

Nationality


Positively 31.1 41.7 30.1 60.0

Negatively 48.6 26.4 24.8 16.8

Indifferent 5.8 16.0 13.7 6.3

Undecided 14.1 15.3 31.4 16.8

Positivelyto a Muslim

0.5 0.6 0 0


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T a b l e 1 6

Answers to the QuestionHave You Been Exposed to Ethnic (National) Discrimination?

(% by nationality)

Nationality


Constantly 2.9 0.6 4.6 2.1

Frequently 2.9 6.7 7.8 6.3

Sometimes 28.7 49.1 45.1 45.3

Never 65.5 43.6 42.5 46.3

T a b l e 1 4


Do You Trust Members of Other Ethnicities (Nationalities)?(% by nationality)

Nationality


Yes, most 20.2 35.6 35.9 46.3

Yes, some 46.0 49.7 34.4 38.9

No, not all 10.9 3.1 19.0 7.4

No, I do not trust any 22.8 11.7 11.1 7.4

Other 0.2 0 0 0

T a b l e 1 5

Answers to the QuestionDo You Trust Members of Other Ethnicities (Nationalities)?

(% by region)

Region


Yes, most 28.1 38.9 27.6 26.1 17.0

Yes, some 42.2 42.4 50.8 48.7 36.5No, not all 6.5 9.4 11.6 12.6 12.5

No, I do not trust any 23.1 8.9 10.1 12.6 34.0

Other 0 0.5 0 0 0


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The largest share of respondents constantly discriminated against for ethnic reasons (4.4%)

lived in the Chu Region (see Table 17). The Osh Region is the place where the largest number of those

who arefrequently andsometimes exposed to ethnic discrimination live (6.5% and 45.7%, respec-tively).

T a b l e 1 7

Answers to the QuestionHave You Been Exposed to Ethnic (National) Discrimination?

(% by region)

Region


Constantly 1.5 4.4 3.0 2.0 2.5

Frequently 5.5 4.9 2.5 6.5 3.5

Sometimes 35.2 36.5 30.7 45.7 32.5

Never 57.8 54.2 63.8 45.7 61.5

Among those who have experienced ethnic discrimination at one time or another, most (15.3%-

22.2%) were exposed to insults against their nationality, 11.0%-15.8% were exposed to indifference

T a b l e 1 8

Answers to the QuestionIn What Form Have You, If Ever,

Been Exposed to Ethnic (National) Discrimination?

(% by nationality)

Nationality


In the form ofindifference to myproblems

10.4 11.0 12.4 15.8

In the form ofviolation andinfringement on myrights to services,information, etc.

6.5 8.6 10.5 8.4

In the form ofrudeness

5.8 19.6 11.8 13.7

In the form ofinsulting commentsabout my nationality

16.5 15.3 22.2 14.7

In the form ofphysical violence

0.7 1.8 4.6 0

Never experienced 60.3 43.6 38.6 47.7


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to their problems, while the rest (5.8%-19.6%) to rudeness, and 6.5%-10.5% to infringement on their

rights. Between 0.7% and 4.6% of the respondents had experienced physical violence.

The largest number of respondents exposed to insults and infringement on their rights are foundamong the Uzbeks (22.2% and 10.5%, respectively); the Uzbeks also suffered from physical violence

more than other ethnic groups (4.6%). The Russians were exposed to rudeness more than the other

nationalities (19.6%); the group of Others experienced indifference to their problems more than any

other group (15.8%) (see Table 18).

The largest number of those who ran up against a wall of indifference and inattention to

their problems live in the Osh Region (15.1%) (see Table 19). The largest number of those who

(or whose nationality) were exposed to insults live in the Jalalabad Region (24%). The largest

number of those exposed to physical violence live in the Osh and Jalalabad regions (2.5% in each

of them).

At the same time, the respondents were not only objects, but also subjects of ethnic discrim-

ination: 26% of the Russians, 23% of the Kyrgyz, 16.9% of the Others, and 11% of the Uzbeks

were subjects of ethnic discrimination either by chance, or were forced into this or did this without

any obvious reasons (see Table 20). The largest share of such respondents (35%) live in the Osh

Region (see Table 21). The majority of the respondents never infringed upon the rights of other

nationalities.

T a b l e 1 9

Answers to the QuestionIn What Form Have You, If Ever,

Been Exposed to Ethnic (National) Discrimination?(% by region)

Nationality


In the form ofindifference to myproblems

13.6 11.3 7.0 15.1 9.5

In the form ofviolation and

infringement on myrights to services,information, etc.

6.0 10.3 8.0 9.5 4.0

In the form ofrudeness in myaddress

11.6 14.3 5.0 12.6 5.0

In the form ofinsulting commentsabout mynationality

11.1 11.8 16.1 22.1 24.0

In the form ofphysical violence

1.5 0.5 0 2.5 2.5

Neverexperienced 56.3 51.7 63.8 38.2 55.0


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T a b l e 2 0


Have You Ever Infringed Upon the Rights of Other Ethnicities (Nationalities)?(% by nationality)

Nationality


Never 73.0 67.5 83.0 80.0

Sometimesby chance

10.0 14.7 6.5 10.5

Sometimesunwillingly

6.6 6.7 2.6 3.2

Yes 6.5 4.9 2.0 3.2

Undecided 3.9 6.1 5.9 3.2

T a b l e 2 1

Answers to the QuestionHave You Ever Infringed Upon the Rights of

Other Ethnicities (Nationalities)?(% by region)

Region


Never 69.3 77.3 83.4 65.3 76.0

Sometimesby chance

12.1 9.4 7.0 14.1 9.0

Sometimesunwillingly

4.0 3.0 3.0 11.6 7.0

Yes 10.1 3.9 3.0 4.5 5.6

Undecided 4.5 6.4 3.5 4.5 3.5

Possible Development of

Ethnic RelationsDespite the continued ethnic tension, 50.6% of the Kyrgyz, 43.8% of the Uzbeks (see Table

22), 25.3% of the Others, and 15.3% of the Russians believe that ethnic relations will improve. At

the same time, 46.3% of the Others, 39.3% of the Russians, 22.6% of the Kyrgyz, and 19.6% of

the Uzbeks do not expect any changes for the better. There is even more pessimism among 24.5%

of the Russians, 17.9% of the Others, 15.0% of the Uzbeks, and 11.0% of the Kyrgyz, who are

convinced that relations will become even worse. Many people found it hard to offer any forecasts

on that score.


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T a b l e 2 2


What are the Prospects for Ethnic Relations in Your Region?(% by nationality)

Nationality


Improving 50.6 15.3 43.8 25.3

Everything willremain the same

22.6 39.3 19.6 46.3

Worsening 11.0 24.5 15.0 17.9

Undecided 15.8 20.9 21.6 10.5

Respondents in the Issyk Kul and Osh regions (57.3% and 50.3%, respectively) proved to be

more optimistic; 20.6% in Bishkek were the most pessimistic among the respondents (see Table 23).

The largest share of those who believed that nothing would change (35.7%) also live in Bishkek.

T a b l e 2 3

Answers to the QuestionWhat are the Prospects for Ethnic Relations in Your Region?

(% by region)

Region


Improving 29.6 35.5 57.3 50.3 34.5

Everythingwill remainthe same

35.7 29.6 20.1 18.1 32.0

Worsening 20.6 15.8 9.0 15.6 11.5

Undecided 14.1 19.2 13.6 16.1 22.0

Civic

IdentityThis section contained control questions of the ethnosociological survey and was intended to

nd out the respondents civic identity, which directly depends on the degree of integration of the

ethnic groups of Kyrgyzstan and which, on the other hand, is slowed down by ethnic, regional, and

tribal identity.

The absolute majority of Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Russians primarily regard themselves as citizens

of Kyrgyzstan; this is true of 78.4% of the Uzbeks, 68.3% of the Kyrgyz, 59.5% of the Russians, and

58.9% of the Others (see Table 24).


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T a b l e 2 4

Answer to the Question

What is Your Prevailing Identity?(% by nationality)

Nationality


Member of my tribe and clan 13.8 6.7 6.5 9.5

Representative of my region 3.2 1.8 4.6 6.3

Member of my ethnic group 11.9 21.5 6.5 17.9

Citizen of Kyrgyzstan 68.3 59.5 78.4 58.9

Citizen of the world 2.9 8.0 3.3 6.3

Stateless person 0 2.5 0 0

Among the Kyrgyz, 13.8% regard themselves as members of their tribe and clan, while 11.9%

see themselves as members of their ethnic group. This means that tribal identity prevails over ethnic

identity among the Kyrgyz.

Among the Russians, 21.5% regard themselves as representatives of their ethnic group; the

share among the Uzbeks is 6.5%.

Over 70% of the respondents, members of all ethnicities of Kyrgyzstan, regard the country in

which they were born (Kyrgyzstan) (see Table 25) as their motherland. Much fewer respondents re-

gard their historical homeland as their motherland: 20.9% of the Kyrgyz; 14.7% of the Russians,

11.6% of the Others, and 3.3% of the Uzbeks.

T a b l e 2 5

Answers to the QuestionWhich Country Do You Call Your Motherland?

(% by nationality)

Nationality


Country of birth 72.2 71.8 76.5 74.7

Country of residence 7.0 13.5 19.6 12.6

Where life is better 0 0 0.7 1.1

Historical homeland 20.9 14.7 3.3 11.6

Over half of the respondents answered that they are not contemplating emigration (see Table

26); 24.5% of the Russians, 22.1% of the Others, 16.1% of the Kyrgyz, and 15.7% of the Uz-

beks want to, but cannot, leave the country; 21.1% of the Others and 14.7% of the Russians are

determined to leave the country. This means that migration sentiments are most pronounced

among the Russians and other ethnicities; practically none of those who want to leave intend to

come back.


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T a b l e 2 6


Would You Like to Leave Kyrgyzstan?(% by nationality)

Nationality


Yes, by all means 6.5 14.7 7.2 21.1

I would like to leave but cannot 16.1 24.5 15.7 22.1

No, I have no plans as yet 59.3 59.5 54.9 55.8

I want to leave but will denitely

come back0.8 0 0 0

No 16.0 1.2 22.2 0

To study 0.8 0 0 0

As a tourist 0.5 0 0 1.1

A large share of those who want to leave Kyrgyzstan point to economic reasons (see Table 27):

17.2% of the Russians, 11.6% of the Others, 11.2% of the Kyrgyz, and 5.2% of the Uzbeks want

to leave in search of permanent employment and adequate wages; 14.7% of Others, 8% of the Rus-

sians, 6.5% of the Uzbeks, and 5.8% of the Kyrgyz want to leave because of the low standard of

living; 13.7% of Others, 11% of the Russians; 6.5% of the Uzbeks, and 5.6% of the Kyrgyz want

to leave because of political instability.

T a b l e 2 7

Answers to the QuestionWhat is the Reason for Your Intention to Emigrate, If Any?

(% by nationality)

Nationality


Lack of permanent employmentand adequate wages

11.2 17.2 5.2 11.6

Low living standards 5.8 8.0 6.5 14.7

Political instability 5.6 11.0 6.5 13.7

Ethnic (national) discrimination 0.5 1.8 2.0 2.1

Crime and corruption 1.0 1.8 2.6 1.1

To study abroad 0.8 0 0 0

Do not plan emigration 74.0 60.1 77.1 55.8

To spend holidays 1.0 0 0 1.1


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The results speak of a certain degree of integration of all the ethnic groups; among all the eth-

nicities, most of respondents describe the desire to unite as average (see Table 28). This is the opinion

of about half of the Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Russian respondents.

T a b l e 2 8

Answers to the QuestionHow Do You Assess the Degree

to Which Different Ethnic Groups Want Unity in Kyrgyzstan?(% by nationality)

Nationality


Considerable 29.2 18.4 9.8 28.4

Average 46.2 44.2 49.7 37.9

Insignicant 15.4 17.8 11.8 15.8

Undecided 9.2 19.6 28.8 17.9

The respondents pointed to the following unifying factors: a strong state and the rule of law:

58.4% of the Kyrgyz, 48.4% of the Others, 46.6% of the Russians, and 43.1% of the Uzbeks; po-

litical stability: 33.7% of the Russians, 33.7% of the Others, 26.1% of the Uzbeks, and 22.9% of

the Kyrgyz; economic reforms and ghting corruption and unemployment: 31.3% of the Russians;

29.5% of the Others, 20.4% of the Kyrgyz, and 17% of the Uzbeks; ethnic stability: 27.4% of the

Others, 23.9% of the Uzbeks, and 13.8% of the Kyrgyz; and social security: 26.4% of Russians;

24.2% of the Others, 14.4% of the Uzbeks, and 10.4% of the Kyrgyz (see Table 29).

T a b l e 2 9

Answers to the QuestionWhich Factors Can Unite Ethnic Groups (Nationalities)

in Kyrgyzstan? (% by nationality)

Nationality


Strong state and therule of law

58.4 46.6 43.1 48.4

Political stability 22.9 33.7 26.1 33.7

Economicreforms andstruggle withunemploymentand corruption

20.4 31.3 17.0 29.5

Social security 10.4 26.4 14.4 24.2

Ethnic stability 13.8 23.9 21.6 27.4

Other 1.7 1.8 4.0 1.1


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The above suggests that today the situation regarding emerging civic identity can be described

as encouraging; civic identity predominates over ethnic identity, even if the share of the latter is

fairly large. Those who want to leave the country are driven by economic problems. Those who wantto leave for ethnic reasons describe the absence of a stronger state and the rule of law, political insta-

bility and unemployment as the main obstacles to unication of the countrys ethnic groups.

C o n c l u s i o n

The sociological survey produced the following results.

Ethnic tension continues in the post-conict period; it is caused mainly by the still nagging

social and economic problems, while political, ethnocultural, and psychological factors continue to

gure prominently in ethnic tension. Ethnocultural and psychological factors contribute to the unfold-

ing and continued ethnic tension. While social, economic, and political factors trigger ethnic conicts,

ethnocultural and psychological factors add fuel to the re; these factors are responsible for the con -tinued ethnic tension at the post-conict stage. This means that our ethnosociological survey con-

rmed Hypothesis 1.

Continued ethnic tension emphasizes ethnic identity. In Kyrgyzstan, however, civic identity still

dominates over ethnic identity: the absolute majority of the respondents identify themselves as citi-

zens of Kyrgyzstan and do not plan to emigrate. This means that Hypothesis 2 was only partly con-

rmed. The results refuted its second part, which said that ethnic identity prevails over civic.


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GEOPOLITICS AND SECURITY

POWERS ANDREGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS:

PARAMETERS ANDTYPES OF INVOLVEMENT

(POST-SOVIET SPACE CASE STUDY)

Jannatkhan EYVAZOV

Ph.D.(PoliticalScience),DeputyDirectorof

the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus,Deputy Editor-in-Chief ofCentral Asia and the Caucasus(Baku, Azerbaijan)

A B S T R A C T

KEYWORDS: regional security system, political environment of a regionalsystem, powers, involvement, post-Soviet space, CentralEurasia, post-Soviet security macrocomplex, Russia, Turkey,Iran, China, EU, the U.S.

It is hardly possible to correctly and fully

assess the functioning and development

of a regional security system without

presenting a complete account of the entire

range of ties and relations among the actors

involvedandthedegreeofinuenceofall

thepowersconcerned.

Based on a case study of the post-So-

viet space, the author studies the involve-

ment of powers in regional security systems;

his analysis of the key parameters of this

involvement makes it possible for him to

identify and describe two types of involve-

ment:fullandpartial.


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A Regional Security System (RSS) can include all types of actors: they can be ordinary statesand those that can consistently project their inuence beyond their territories and are usually called

powers. The powers involvement determines the systems development.

The type of involvement of a power in an RSS varies according to its underlying i

central asia and the caucasus, 2013, issue 1 (14)

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