causa sui in descartes and medieval philosophy

8/12/2019 Causa Sui In Descartes and Medieval Philosophy

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Causa Sui: From Spinoza to Aquinas and Back Again

Richard A. Lee, Jr.

Deau! "ni#ersit$

1. Introduction

%he notion o& causa suiin Spinoza'sEthicsis undou(ted!$ centra! to that te)t.

*n the other hand, its importance is hard to trace, as the de&inition appears in on!$ three

demonstrations in the te)t +-, /, and 0123. Among the de&initions o& the &irst part,

de&s. 1, 2, and 4 are used 5ith much more &requenc$ in demonstrations. 6o5e#er, in

7udging the centra!it$ o& the notion o& causa sui, one cannot !ook mere!$ at the

quantitati#e appearance o& the de&inition (ut has to a!so consider the ro!e that the

conc!usions demonstrated ($ means o& it p!a$ in the te)t. %he t5o propositions o& art

that in#o!#e the de&inition o& causa suipoint direct!$ to its centra!it$. - esta(!ishes that

e)istence (e!ongs to the nature o& su(stance, 5hich in turn is used in the &irst proo& &or

the e)istence o& 8od in 99.9 n &act, - contains nothing short o& the genera! &orm o& a

unique kind onto!ogica! proo& &or the e)istence o& 8od. t is unique in that it com(ines

the need &or each thing to ha#e a cause 5ith that 5hich (e!ongs to the mere concept o&

su(stance. %hat is, 5hi!e it is o&ten c!assed as an onto!ogica! proo& (ecause it pro#es the

e)istence o& 8od +su(stance3 &rom the mere concept o& 8od +su(stance3, it a!so turns on

9*n 5h$ Spinoza needs t5o separate proo&s, one esta(!ishing that e)istence (e!ongs to the nature

o& su(stance and the other sho5ing that 8od e)ists, see 6ar#e$ atanson, ;Spinoza3: >>?1. 6e argues that there is some @su(t!e di&&erentiation (et5een

8od and su(stance +p. >-3. t seems that the on!$ di&&erence is one o& method. Spinoza's strateg$ at the

(eginning o& theEthicsis to assume a notion o& su(stance and then to sho5 that there can on!$ (e one andthat it e)ists. t then turns out that that su(stance is 8od.


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the notion o& causation, the ha!!mark o& 5hat is usua!!$ c!assed as a cosmo!ogica!

argument. / turns to the imp!ication o& this proo&, name!$ that &or a!! things other

than 8od, essence does not in#o!#e e)istence.1

t is precise!$ this conte)t, i.e., the proo& that 8od's nature or essence in#o!#es

e)istence, that makes the notion o& causa suia di&&icu!t one to comprehend. %he

onto!ogica! argument 5as 5ide!$ criticized in the !ater idd!e Ages, particu!ar!$ (ecause

it 5as seen as sho5ing that the proposition @8od e)ists is se!&?e#ident, and there&ore,

odd!$ enough, incapa(!e o& demonstration. Furthermore, e#en critics o& Anse!m's

argument he!d that once it is sho5n that 8od e)ists, it is a!so immediate!$ sho5n that

8od is uncaused, e#en ($ 8odse!&. Spinoza's argument, ho5e#er, 5orks in the opposite

direction o& a traditiona! onto!ogica! as &ound, e.g., in Anse!m./ For 5hereas Anse!m

argues mere!$ &rom a concept o& 8od +a (eing greater than 5hich nothing can (e

concei#ed3 to 8od's e)istence, Spinoza argues &rom the &act that su(stance is uncaused

($ an$thing e!se that it must (e se!&?caused, and there&ore, according to the de&inition o&

causa sui, e)istence (e!ongs to its essence. %he proo& that e)istence (e!ongs to the nature

o& su(stance, there&ore, turns on the notion o& causa sui, a concept that 5as re7ected ($

most, i& not a!!, scho!astic phi!osophers.

%hat Spinoza +&o!!o5ing Descartes, as 5i!! (e sho5n3, coup!es an argument (ased

on the concept o& 8od 5ith an argument (ased on the nature o& causation o#erturns much

scho!astic thought regarding the onto!ogica! argument. %hat is, &rom the re?introduction

For a thorough e)amination o& the histor$ o& the cosmo!ogica! argument, especia!!$ the important

contri(utions o& medie#a! Ara(ic and Je5ish thinkers, see i!!iam Lane Craig, Cosmological Argument

from Plato to Leibniz+e5 ork: Barnes and o(!e, 9=E>3.1%he third proposition that turns on the de&inition o& causa sui, 0p12, demonstrates that 8od's

!o#e &or 8odse!& is an inte!!ectua! !o#e. A &u!! in#estigation o& this proposition is outside the scope o& this

paper./8G% RGFGRGCG: R*SL*8*H.


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o& Aristot!e in the Latin est, phi!osophers had seen the onto!ogica! argument not on!$ as

pro(!ematic, (ut precise!$ as pre#enting an$ argument (ased on causes in genera!I

e&&icient causes in particu!ar. Spinoza, there&ore, runs counter to this tradition ($ (asing

his argument, 5hich sure!$ must (e !isted as a &ormIa!(eit strangeIo& an onto!ogica!

argument, precise!$ on e&&icient causation: since su(stance is not caused ($ an$thing e!se,

it must (e cause o& itse!&, and there&ore, its essence must inc!ude e)istence.

n 5hat &o!!o5s, 5ou!d !ike to trace this re#ersa! ($ !ooking at the ro!e o& causa

suiin medie#a! proo&s &or the e)istence o& 8od. hi!e am primari!$ interested in

sho5ing the Scotistic origins &or Descartes' a(i!it$ to posit that 8od is causa sui,

2

5i!!

&irst set the stage ($ addressing Aquinas' arguments against the notion o& causa sui

5ithin his proo& &or the e)istence o& 8od in Summa Contra Gentiles. 5ant to pa$

attention to t5o &eatures o& these discussions: &irst, 5hi!e medie#a! thinkers +and here

Aquinas and Scotus are particu!ar!$ instructi#e e)amp!es3 round!$ denied the cogenc$ o&

the notion causa sui, the$ de#e!oped the means that Descartes 5i!! use in his positing o&

8od as causa sui. Second!$, 5ant to sho5 ho5 those concepts that Descartes mo(i!izes

in making sense o& causa sui, concepts that Spinoza 5i!! e)p!oit, 5ere de#e!oped not in

proo&s &or the e)istence o& 8od (ased on causation, (ut 5ith re&erence to 8od's in&init$

and per&ection. hat hope to sho5 is that Descartes is a(!e to argue that 8od is causa

sui, precise!$ (ecause his argument turns on the notion o& in&init$ and in&inite per&ection.

%his same kind o& argument is &ound in Scotus, 5here 5e a!so ha#e a proo& &or the

2Roger Arie5,Descartes and the Last Scholastics+thaca: Corne!! "ni#ersit$ ress, 9===3, has(rought more attention to the scho!astic in&!uences on Descartes. n particu!ar, he has sho5n that much o&

the scho!astic thought 5ith 5hich Descartes 5as &ami!iar carried much o& Scotus' thought in a %homistic

5rapper. @Conta 8i!son, an ana!$sis o& Gustachius's 5orks quick!$ sho5s that e#er$ doctrine one 5ou!d

ca!! Scotist 5as he!d ($ him.t is c!ear that Gustachius 5as propounding common arisian doctrines

+3. Arie5 !ists se#era! @scotist positions that 9-thcentur$ scho!astic phi!osophers he!d and that Descartes

himse!& adopts. 6ere am interested in the !ink (et5een per&ection, in&init$, and the e)istence o& 8od that

is &ound in Scotus. t is this connection that (rings him c!ose to Descartes' notion o& 8od as causa sui.

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e)istence o& 8od that is (oth onto!ogica! +pro#ing the e)istence o& something &rom its

mere concept3 and cosmo!ogica! +pro#ing the e)istence o& a &irst cause3. t is this kind o&

argument that a!!o5s Descartes +and Spinoza &o!!o5ing him3 to make sense o& the

concept o& causa suiin a 5a$ that medie#a! thinkers cou!d not.

2. Aquinas on God as First Cause

& one compares the structures o& Aquinas' Summa Theologiae5ith his Summa

contra Gentiles, one notices remarka(!e di&&erences. *ne reason, perhaps e#en the ma7or

reason, &or these di&&erences is the di&&erent intentions that Aquinas announces &or each

5ork.4 %he Summa Theologiae+S%3 5as a te)t(ook in theo!og$, his attempt to 5rite a

rep!acement &or eter Lom(ard's Sentences.- Because it is a (eginning te)t(ook in

theo!og$, the structure o& this te)t is designed to e)hi(it 5hat one might ca!! the interna!

coherence o& the Catho!ic &aith. %hat is, Aquinas is not concerned there to demonstrate

the e)terna! #a!idit$ o& the &aith, (ut mere!$ to (ring its e)position to su&&icient c!arit$. E

%he Summa contra Gentiles+SC83, ho5e#er, as its tit!e indicates, is a (ook 5ritten to

arm the &aith&u! 5ith arguments against non?(e!ie#ers.= Aquinas states that his intention

is to pro#ide rationa! demonstrations o& those truths o& the &aith that are a(!e to (e

demonstrati#e!$ pro#en and to pro#ide reasons, though not demonstrati#e, &or those

truths that cannot (e demonstrati#e!$ pro#en +SC8 .=3. recise!$ (ecause it is 5ritten

4*n the task and procedure o& the Summa Contra Gentiles, see orman Kretzmann,Metaphsics

of Theism! A"uinas#s $atural Theolog in Summa Contra Gentiles %+*)&ord: C!arendon, 9==-3 and arkJordan, ;%he rotreptic Structure o& the ;Summa Contra Gentiles,; Thomist2> +9=E43: 9-1?>=.

-%he intention, announced in the pro!ogue o& the Summa Theologiae, is @to treat those things that

pertain to the Christian re!igion in that 5a$ that is congruent 5ith the !earning o& a (eginner.EAgain in the pro!ogue, Aquinas comp!ains that other te)t(ooks in theo!og$ +perhaps primari!$

Lom(ard's Sentences3, do not treat the su(7ect according to the @order o& the discip!ine.=@*ur intention is to sho5, according to our measure, the truth, 5hich the Catho!ic &aith dec!ares

($ e!iminating contrar$ errors, SC8 ..

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against those 5ho do not accept the &aith it cannot assume an$ e!ements deri#ing simp!$

&rom the &aith, (ut must speak to its e)terna! #a!idit$.

point to this structure (ecause think it he!ps to account &or a striking

dissimi!arit$ (et5een these t5o te)ts on the issue o& pro#ing the e)istence o& 8od. *ne

can notice immediate!$ that in STAquinas o&&ers &i#e proo&s &or the e)istence o& 8od.

%hese &i#e proo&s are o&&ered there as &i#e 5a$s to sho5 one and the same thing, name!$

that 8od e)ists. %he &i#e 5a$s, then, stand side ($ side one another, each achie#ing its

resu!t independent!$ o& the other. %hat is to sa$, at the moment the$ are o&&ered, there is

no interna! re!ation (et5een them, and Aquinas makes no attempt,philosophicall, to

sho5 an interna! re!ationship among the &i#e arguments.9> hi!e the re!ationship

(et5een the &irst e&&icient cause o& a!! things and the go#ernor o& a!! things is c!ear &rom

5ithin the &aith, Aquinas does not pro#e this in S%. From the point o& #ie5 o& the

Catho!ic &aith, a point o& #ie5 that is presupposed in S%, the identit$ is a!read$ o(#ious.

o5 this procedure is #a!id in a te)t designed to e)p!icate the contents o& the &aith, (ut it

is in#a!id in a te)t that attempts to sho5 the e)terna! #a!idit$ o& those contents. n SC8,

Aquinas o&&ers &our proo&s, t5o o& them &rom motion +Bk. , ch. 913. ot on!$ are the

t5o other proo&s remarka(!$ short, (ut the$ are (oth taken as arguments produced ($

others and their materia! is co#ered again in more detai! !ater in the te)t. 99 For e)amp!e,

the proo& that there is a go#ernor o& the uni#erse is treated in much more detai! in ch. 41

9>Kretzmann, op. cit., 2/ argues that the proo&s &or the e)istence o& 8od are not e#en necessar$ to

the task o& S%.99%his is a &act that Kretzmann does not point out in his discussion o& these arguments. ndeed, he

argues that &rom a more contemporar$ point o& #ie5, it is not the case that a demonstration o& the e)istence

o& 8od must (e carried out (e&ore an$ other task o& natura! theo!og$. 5ou!d argue that it not the

conc!usion @8od e)ists that Aquinas needs, (ut rather the proo& itse!& and its notions o& causation, motion,

&irst cause, etc., that Aquinas re!ies on in the remainder o& Bk. o& SC8. *n the re!ation (et5een these

arguments and those o& SC8 see Scott acDona!d, ;Aquinas


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o& Bk. o& SC8. %his is (ecause in sho5ing the e)terna! #a!idit$ o& the &aith, Aquinas

attempts to demonstrate a!! these &acts a(out 8od &rom out o& the #er$ notion that 8od is

the &irst mo#er o& a!! things. n other 5ords, the SC8 has a structure that is attempting to

&o!!o5 the &!o5 o& !ogica! consequences o& the notion that there must (e a &irst mo#er,

something that 5ou!d (e a5k5ard, and ma$(e e#en mis!eading, in a te)t that mere!$

attempts to gi#e an inte!!igi(!e e)p!ication to the contents o& the &aith.

Be&ore mo#ing to the proo& o& the e)istence o& 8od, Aquinas &irst addresses the

question o& 5hether the proposition @8od e)ists is demonstra(!e at a!!. Aquinas takes

up t5o sets o& arguments that the e)istence o& 8od is indemonstra(!e. %he second group

argues that the proposition @8od e)ists is he!d on!$ ($ &aith and there&ore cannot (e

demonstrated. %he &irst group, on the other hand, argues that the e)istence o& 8od is a

se!&?e#ident proposition and as such cannot (e demonstrated. A se!&?e#ident proposition

5ou!d (e indemonstra(!e (ecause there is no midd!e term (et5een the su(7ect and the

predicate that 5ou!d make a demonstration possi(!e. @t &o!!o5s, then, that in a!! our

inquiries 5e inquire either +a3 5hether there is a middleor +(3 5hat the middleis &or the

cause is a middle, and in a!! cases this is 5hat is sought.9 Aquinas, !ike man$ medie#a!

phi!osophers, considers Anse!m's onto!ogica! argument to sho5 that the proposition

@8od e)ists is se!&?e#ident, and there&ore indemonstra(!e. Aquinas does not disagree

that in itse!& the proposition is se!&?e#ident. @Certain!$simpliciterthat 8od is is se!&?

e#ident, (ecause this itse!& that 8od is is 8od's (eing. But (ecause 5e cannot concei#e

($ the mind this itse!& that 8od is, it remains unkno5n &or us +SC8 9.993. %his !ack o&

9Aristot!e,Posterior AnalticsE=(2&&, Aristot!e,Posterior Analtics, trans!ated ($ 6ippocrates

Apost!e +8rine!!: eripatetic ress, 9=E93, /E. *n the ro!e o& the midd!e in Aristot!e's theor$ o&

demonstration, see atrick B$rne,Analsis and Science in Aristotle+A!(an$: S" ress, 9==-3, 9>1?.

*n the question o& se!&?e#ident propositions in Aquinas, see m$ Science' the Singular' and the (uestion of

Theolog, e5 idd!e Ages, ed. Bonnie hee!er +e5 ork: a!gra#e, >>3, pp. 11?2-, (ut especia!!$

1/&&.

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kno5!edge a!!o5s an a posteriori demonstration o& the e)istence o& 8od, a demonstration

that 5ou!d use the e&&ects o& 8od in p!ace o& a de&inition and 5ou!d ha#e, as a resu!t, a

proper midd!e term &or the demonstration. Aquinas re7ects Anse!m's argument in puts in

its p!ace a cosmo!ogica! argument that does not turn on the mere concept o& 8od.

%he (asic structure o& the argument in SC8 is quite simp!e:

93 G#er$thing that is mo#ed is mo#ed ($ another

3 t is o(#ious, at !east &rom sensation, that something is mo#ed +!ike the

sun3.13 Gither that other that mo#es the &irst is mo#ed, or not.

/3 & it is not mo#ed, then there is a &irst mo#er that is immo(i!e, name!$

8od.

23 & it is mo#ed, there&ore it is mo#ed ($ another.43 Gither this process goes on to in&init$, or it stops at some immo(i!e

mo#er.-3 t cannot go on to in&init$, there&ore it is necessar$ to posit some &irst

immo(i!e mo#er.

%his argument, as Aquinas indicates, makes t5o presuppositions that are themse!#es in

need o& proo&, name!$ that e#er$thing that is mo#ed is mo#ed ($ another and that the

re!ation o& mo#ed to mo#er cannot proceed to in&init$. 6e there&ore em(arks on

demonstrations o& each o& these in turn. At !east one o& these arguments concerns not 7ust

!oca! motion (ut causation itse!&Iit sho5s that nothing can (e causa sui.91

Aquinas gi#es three arguments that nothing can mo#e itse!&. %he &irst one has to

do 5ith the impossi(i!it$ o& an$ 5ho!e that is made o& parts mo#ing itse!& as a 5ho!e

rather than parts mo#ing the 5ho!e. Aquinas conc!udes that in such things, a part 5i!!

a!5a$s mo#e the 5ho!e, and so the 5ho!e 5i!! not (e causa sui. %he second argument

91 assume that a se!&?mo#er 5ou!d (e causa suiinasmuch as Aquinas, !ike Aristot!e, takes motion

in the (road sense that encompasses !oca! motion, a!teration, increase and decrease, and perhaps e#en a!!

&orms o& e&&icient causation. Furthermore, (ecause this proo& &or the e)istence o& 8od turns u!timate!$ on

production, and Aquinas !inks the concept o& se!&?production to causa sui, this identi&ication o& causa sui

5ith se!&?mo#er is entire!$ 5arranted. n short, 5hi!e e#er$ se!&?mo#er might not (e cause o& itse!&, e)cept

in terms o& its motion, e#er$ cause that causes itse!& 5ou!d (e a se!&?mo#er.

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!ooks at a!! the kinds o& motion that Aristot!e posits: accidenta!, per se, ($ #io!ence, and

($ nature, and he sho5s that according to none o& these is it possi(!e &or something to

mo#e itse!&.

t is the third argument that is most signi&icant in the histor$ o& the concept o&

causa sui. t has its origins in Aristot!e's notion o& actua!it$ and potentia!it$. %his

argument sho5s that (ui!t into the notion o& causa sui5ou!d (e the &undamenta!

contradiction that something 5ou!d (e in actua!it$ and potenc$ at the same time 5ith

regard to the same. n out!ine, the argument runs:

93 othing is at the same time in act and in potenc$ 5ith respect to the same.3 G#er$thing that is mo#ed, inso&ar as it is mo#ed, is in potenc$, (ecause motion

is the act o& something e)isting in potenc$ inso&ar as it is mo#ing.13 G#er$thing that 5ou!d (e a mo#er is in act, (ecause nothing acts un!ess to the

e)tent that it is in actua!it$.

/3 %here&ore, nothing is, 5ith respect to the same, actua!!$ mo#ing and mo#ed,and thus nothing mo#es itse!&.

C!ear!$ this argument 5ou!d app!$ not on!$ to motion (ut a!so to causation in genera!.

Since a!! causation, according to (oth Aristot!e and Aquinas, can (e understood as the

@reduction o& potenc$ to actua!it$, an$ cause that is in potenc$ and in actua!it$ in the

same 5a$, that is, an$ causa sui, 5i!! (e a #io!ation o& the princip!e o& non?contradiction.

%his makes sense on!$ gi#en this speci&ic sense o& the term potentia) %he argument, then,

states that to (e reduced &rom potentia!it$ into actua!it$ requires some cause that is itse!&

in actua!it$ in the same 5a$. %hat is, actua!it$ is prior to potentia!it$ and there&ore to

assume that a (eing is causa sui5ou!d (e tantamount to assume that it is prior to itse!&I

an o(#ious, at !east to Aquinas, contradiction.

t is on!$ 5hen causation as a 5ho!e is thought on the mode! o& actua!it$ and

potentia!it$, that is, as the !eading out o& potentia!it$ into actua!it$, that the notion o&

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causa suipresents itse!& as a #io!ation o& the princip!e o& non?contradiction. &

potentia!it$ is not thought in this 5a$, 5e are not &orced into sa$ing that something is

(oth A +potentia!3 and not A +actua!3 at the same time and in the same 5a$. t is centra!

to Aquinas' argument that the potenc$ re!e#ant to causation is a!5a$s considered in

re!ation to actua!it$, or, as he most o&ten puts it, @Actua!it$ is prior to potentia!it$.9/

Because he considers causation to (e this mo#ement &rom potenc$ to actua!it$, and

(ecause he considers potenc$ to a!5a$s (e @not $et this actua!it$, he &inds the notion o&

causa suito (e an o(#ious contradiction. e 5ou!d ha#e to sa$ that the 5ood is

potentia!!$ &ire and not potentia!!$ &ire at the same time in the same 5a$.

t shou!d (e c!ear that i& some concept o& causa suiis to (e de#e!oped that does

not !ead to this contradiction, causation 5i!! ha#e to (e recast outside the mode! o&

potenc$Mactua!it$. Such an a!ternati#e is not unkno5n in the idd!e Ages, &or creation

itse!& as a 5ho!e resists this mode!. %here is no 5a$ to think that prior to creation there

5as something that 5as potentia!!$ a cosmos, or an$ mem(er o& the cosmos. For i& that

5ere the case, then that potenc$ 5ou!d ha#e to (e ascri(ed to 8od, and to ascri(e potenc$

in this sense to 8od is tantamount to sa$ing that 8od is muta(!e. Con#erse!$, one cou!d

argue that some potenc$ is co?eterna! 5ith 8od and that creation is nothing other than

8od (ringing actua!it$ to that potenc$. Such a position o(#ious!$ #io!ates the notion o&

creation e* nihilo. 6o5e#er, medie#a! thinkers, inc!uding Aquinas, use this same term

potentiato descri(e the characteristic that (e!ongs to 8od that a!!o5s 8od to do or make

things in a 5a$ other than ($ !eading them &rom potentia!it$ to actua!it$. %hat is,po+er

is ascri(ed to 8od as that 5hich a!!o5s 8od to create e* nihilo. %his sense o&potentiais

9/%he notion that potenc$ can (e !ed into actua!it$ on!$ ($ something actua! in the same +a, is

centra! to man$ o& the arguments o& the &irst (ook o& SC8.

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not opposed to actua!it$, (ut rather (e!ongs to a (eing that is a!read$ in act. Aquinas

o&ten ca!!s this @acti#e potenc$ as opposed to the @passi#e potenc$ that (e!ongs to

matter and is the potenc$ that is !ead out into actua!it$ in causation.

Re!ated to 8od'spotentiais 5hat Aquinas ca!!s a &irtus essendi, a po5er o& (eing.

%hese t5o re!ated notions o& po5er (ecome re!e#ant 5hen Aquinas comes to consider

8od's per&ection. Since 8od is the &irst cause, Aquinas argues, 8od did not (egin to (e.

6o5e#er, the &act that 8od is the &irst cause does not immediate!$ entai! that 8od is a!so

una(!e to cease to (e. Aquinas argues that 8od is una(!e to cease to (e (ecause 8od has

the po5er o& a!5a$s (eing. 6o5 are 5e to understand this po5er to (eN Aquinas

contrasts this &irtus essendidirect!$ 5ith the potenc$ that is re!e#ant in causation: @i& it

is conceded that in the ce!estia! (od$ there is no potenc$ in the sense o& (eing passi#e to

(eing, 5hich is the potenc$ o& matter, sti!! in it there is a potenc$ in the sense o& (eing

acti#e, 5hich is the po5er o& (eing +SC8 , >3. %his acti#e potenc$ that the ce!estia!

(od$ has is the @po5er a!5a$s to (e. %he hea#en!$ (od$ has an in&inite po5er o& (eing

and there&ore it is o& in&inite duration. As Aquinas argues in his commentar$ on the Book

o& Causes, something 5ith an in&inite po5er o& (eing 5i!! (e a(!e to !ast an in&inite time

(ecause the more po5er o& (eing something has, the !onger it is a(!e to !ast.92

%his a(i!it$ to !ast that resu!ts &rom a thing's &irtus essendihas (oth a positi#e and

a negati#e sense. ositi#e!$, the &irtus essendiis the acti#e potenc$ that arises not &rom

matter, (ut &rom the &orm o& the thing. @%here&ore, to the e)tent and 5hi!e an$ gi#en

thing has (eing, to that e)tent is the po5er o& its &orm. 94 %he po5er o& (eing o& an$

928G% RGFGRGCGH.94n de Cae!o, !ect. 4, n. 2: "nde tantum et tamdiu ha(et unaquaeque res de esse, quanta est

#irtus &ormae eius.

9>


11/29

gi#en thing is the po5er o& (eing a!5a$s, or &or some determinate time.9-egati#e!$, or

seen &rom the other side, this &irtus essendia!so is the po5er to resist corruption, either

e)terna!!$ or interna!!$ +SC8 , 23. %hat is, 5hi!e the po5er o& (eing is an acti#e

potenc$ that deri#es &rom the &orm o& the thing, it is 5hat accounts &or the determinate or

in&inite duration o& the thing precise!$ (ecause it is a(!e to resist corruption.9E %he po5er

o& (eing o& a thing resists corruption (ecause it gi#es to the thing actua!it$ o#er

potentia!it$. t resist corruption e)terna!!$ ($ (eing stronger than the &irtuteso& other

things.

t is this &irtus essendithat a!!o5s Aquinas to pro#e that 8od is uni#ersa!!$

per&ect. Aquinas (egins ($ arguing that the e)ce!!ence +nobilitas3 o& an$ gi#en thing

(e!ongs to it according to its (eing. @For a thing, to the e)tent that its (eing is contracted

to some specia! mode o& no(i!it$, greater or !essor, it is said to (e according to this

greater or !essor +SC8 .E3. Since no(i!it$ (e!ongs to a thing according to its (eing, @ i&

something is to 5hich (eongs the 5ho!e &irtus essendi, no po5er o& no(i!it$ 5ou!d (e

!acking &or it +i(id.3. Aquinas immediate!$ rep!aces &irtus5ithpotestas:

But to the thing that is its (eing (e!ongs (eing according to its 5ho!e

po5er +potestas3 7ust as i& there 5ou!d (e some separated 5hiteness, no5

po5er o& 5hiteness cou!d (e !acking &or it. For something o& the po5er o&

9-See n Sent., d. 1, q.9. Aquinas traces the notion o& po5er o& (eing (ack to Aristot!e'sDe

Caelo. See his commentar$ on that te)t &or the origin o& this concept in re!ation to the hea#en!$ (od$.9Et shou!d (e c!ear that do not &u!!$ agree 5ith Kretzmann's trans!ation o& &irtus essendias

@capacit$ o& (eing, and his su(sequent interpretation o& this notion. Aquinas himse!& c!ear!$ !inks the

notion o& &irtus essendi5ithpotentiain this acti#e sense, and &urthermore 5ith the a(i!it$ to resist

corruption. Fina!!$, 5hen Aquinas deri#es &rom the &irtus essendia thing's determinate or indeterminate

e)istence, it seems c!ear that he cannot mean here simp!$ @capacities +though it certain!$ can inc!ude

capacities3, so that 5isdom might (e a &irtus essendio& (eing human, on!$ to the e)tent that it a!!o5s &or

humans to resist corruption.

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5hiteness cou!d (e !acking &or something 5hite &rom the de&ect o& the

thing recei#ing 5hiteness+(id.3

%he po5er o& 5hiteness is de!imited not in itse!&, (ut ($ the thing that recei#es 5hiteness.

& there 5ere +per impossible3, separated 5hiteness, it 5ou!d contain the entire po5er o&

5hiteness. 8od's per&ection, there&ore, !ies in the &act that 8od has comp!ete &irtus

essendi. %hat is, 5hen #ie5ed &rom the side o& e&&icient causa!it$, nothing is causa sui,

$et 5hen #ie5ed &rom the side o& per&ection, or 5hat Scotus 5i!! come to ca!! eminence,

8od has the 5ho!e po5er o& (eing. Aquinas does not com(ine per&ection and causation

in his proo&s &or the e)istence o& 8od, (ut it is not di&&icu!t to see that 5hen one does, the

in&inite &irtus essendio& 8od 5i!! (e tied more c!ose!$ to 8od's causation.

Let me sum up the conc!usion o& Aquinas' re7ection o& causa sui. First, he re7ects

the consistenc$ o& the notion (ecause it is in and o& itse!& a mani&est contradiction. %his

contradiction arises, ho5e#er, on!$ 5hen causation is thought on the mode! o& the

mo#ement &rom passi#e potenc$ to actua!it$. Aquinas recognizes that 8od is pecu!iar in

that 8od has an acti#e po5er o& (eing that is in&inite, and hence 8od is eterna! and cannot

not e)ist. 8od has the po5er to resist a!! corruption. %his !ast point, ho5e#er, is a!read$

a step on the road to5ard the #er$ 5a$ in 5hich Descartes and Spinoza 5i!! come to

think causa sui. Duns Scotus, 5hi!e &o!!o5ing Aquinas in man$ 5a$s, 5i!! de#e!op this

road a (it &urther to5ard the notions 5e &ind operating in Descartes ($ (ringing together

the orders o& e&&icient causation and the orders o& eminence in his proo&.

9


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3. Duns Scotus and Orders of Causality

Scotus has o&&ered 5hat must (e counted as the most thorough e)amination o& the

re!ation (et5een a causa! order and its &irst cause.9= 6is argument (rings together

e!ements o& Aquinas' &i#e 5a$s so as to sho5 that in three signi&icant kinds o& causa!

ordersIe&&icient causation, &ina! causation, and eminenceIthere must (e a &irst, and the

&irst in an$ one o& these orders must (e identica! to the &irst in an$ o& the other three

orders. %he o#era!! structure o& the argument sho5s that there is a &irst e&&icient cause, a

&irst &ina! cause, and a &irst eminent cause, that each o& these is identica! 5ith the other,

and that there can (e on!$ one such trip!$ &irst (eing. hat is crucia! is that Scotus is

pro#ing the e)istence o& a unique infinite(eing. Beginning 5ith the notion o& an in&inite

(eing is precise!$ 5hat necessitates the com(ination o& these orders, resu!ting in an

argument that is (oth onto!ogica! and cosmo!ogica!. Scotus is one o& the &e5 medie#a!

thinkers 5ho does not re7ect Anse!m's argument, and 5ho a!so does not think that it

sho5s that the proposition @8od e)ists is se!&?e#ident. %his a!!o5s him to use the resu!ts

o& a cosmo!ogica! argument as a premise in an onto!ogica! argument.

*n his 5a$ to pro#ing his conc!usion, Scotus 5i!! sho5 that in each order o&

causation there is a cause that is simp!$ &irst, it is uncaused, and it actua!!$ e)ists. & 5e

pa$ attention to this structure, it (ecomes apparent that since the &ina! conc!usion in each

case 5i!! (e that such a &irst actua!!$ e)ists, the other conc!usions 5i!! ha#e to (e pro#en

mere!$ on the (asis o& the concept. %hat is, Scotus 5i!! sho5 that the #er$ concept o&

9=0ersions o& this argument are &ound in se#era! p!aces in Scotus' 5orks. %he t5o most e)tended

treatments o& this topic are &ound in John Duns Scotus, ,rdinatio Liber Primus Distinctio Prima et

Secunda, edited ($ Commissio Scotistica, oannis Duns Scoti *pera *mnia, #o!. +0atican Cit$: %$pis

o!$g!ottis 0aticanis, 9=2>3, d. , d. , qq. 9? and in John Duns Scotus,A Treatise on God as -irst

Principle, trans!ated ($ A!!an B. o!ter +Chicago: Franciscan 6era!d ress, 9=443. re!$ in 5hat &o!!o5s

primari!$ on the ,rdinatio#ersion, 5ith supp!ements &rom some o& the others. %he ,rdinatio5i!! (e cited

as *rd., &o!!o5ed ($ page num(ers to the 0atican edition.

91


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e&&icient cause, &ina! cause, or eminence does not contradict the possi(i!it$ o& there (eing

some &irst in each o& these orders, and that the concept itse!& inc!udes the conc!usion that

this possi(!e &irst 5i!! a!so (e uncaused. *n!$ then does Scotus go on to pro#e that such a

possi(!e &irst in each order actua!!$ e)ists. Just as in a traditiona! onto!ogica! argument,

Scotus' argument proceeds mere!$ &rom the concept o& causation and then goes on to

sho5 that there actua!!$ is some (eing that is sho5n to (e possi(!e on the (asis o& the

concept o& e&&icient, &ina!, or eminence.

%he argument a(out a &irst e&&icient cause sho5s this c!ear!$. Scotus' proo& that

there must (e a &irst e&&icient cause (egins 5ith the c!aim that @some (eing is e&&ecti(!e,

i.e., some (eing can (e an e&&ect +*rd. 9293. Scotus does not posit that there is actua!!$

some e&&ect in e)istence. Rather, he simp!$ sa$s that there is no contradiction in positing

that some (eing is e&&ecti(!e. %he meaning o& @e&&ecti(!e demands that such a (eing

5ou!d (e @&rom itse!&, &rom nothing, or &rom something e!se +(id.3. From here, the

argument proceeds much !ike that o& Aquinas: it cannot (e &rom nothing, (ecause that

5hich is nothing is the cause o& nothing it cannot (e &rom itse!&, (ecause there is no thing

that makes or generates itse!&. %here&ore, it must (e &rom another. From the concept o&

e&&ect a!one, Scotus has sho5n that 5hat is an e&&ect must (e &rom another. & 5e turn our

attention to that other, 5e run the same argument again. & it is not an e&&ect, then it is

&irst and 5e ha#e our conc!usion. & it is a!so an e&&ect, then 5e run our argument again.

Since this cannot proceed to in&init$, there must (e some &irst e&&icient cause.

Scotus, un!ike Aquinas, recognizes that there is nothing o(7ectiona(!e in genera!

a(out a series o& causes and e&&ects running to in&init$. Rather, he argues that on!$ in

5hat he ca!!s an @essentia! order o& causes is an in&inite regress impossi(!e. n a series

9/


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o& causes and e&&ects that is accidenta!!$ ordered, there certain!$ can (e an in&inite series

o& causes and e&&ects. An essentia! order o& causes is one in 5hich 5e consider not the

re!ation o& a sing!e cause to its e&&ect, (ut o& causes 5ith one another in #ie5 o& the e&&ect.

%here are three characteristics that distinguish an essentia! order &rom an accidenta!: +93

in an essentia! order a second cause, insofar as it causes, depends on the &irst, 5hereas in

an accidenta! order, a second cause depends on the &irst on!$ in (eing +3 n an essentia!

order each cause causes in a di&&erent 5a$, (ecause i& t5o causes caused in the same 5a$,

one o& them 5ou!d (e super&!uous +13 e#er$ cause in the essentia! order is required at the

same time &or (ringing a(out the e&&ect +*rd., 92/?9223.

& this distinction is to pro#e he!p&u! to Scotus' argument, he must sho5 that in an

essentia! order, an in&inite chain o& causes and e&&ects is impossi(!e and a!so that an

accidenta! order o& causes is impossi(!e 5ithout an essentia! order. Scotus o&&ers three

conc!usions to pro#e the necessit$ o& a &irst cause in an essentia! order. 6e sho5s +93 that

in an essentia! order, there must (e a &irst +3 in an accidenta! order there must (e

recourse to some essentia! order, and thus the &irst argument app!ies +13 that the re7ection

o& essentia! order is se!&?de&eating.> t is in the argument &or the &irst conc!usion that

>%his argument o&ten goes une)amined in commentaries on Scotus. %he structure o& his

argument is indeed quite comp!e). %he o#era!! structure has three steps: +93 n the orders o& e&&icientcausation, &ina! causation, and eminence there is some &irst actua!!$ e)isting +3 hat is &irst according to

one concept o& primac$ is &irst according to the others +13 that that trip!e primac$ (e!ongs to on!$ one

nature. t is on the 5a$ to pro#ing the &irst conc!usion that Scotus demonstrates nine theses, three in each

order: +93 something is simp!$ &irst +3 the simp!$ &irst is incausa(!e +13 the simp!$ &irst actua!!$ e)ists.

Scotus's re!iance on an essentia! order 5ou!d pro#e the e)istence o& this trip!$ &irst (eing on!$ i& such an

essentia! order o& causes actua!!$ e)ists. %hat is 5h$, it seems to me, he sho5s that $ou cannot posit anin&inite accidenta! order o& causes 5ithout recourse to an essentia! order. n this 5a$, it makes no

di&&erence 5hether one can actua!!$ &ind such an essentia! order, (ecause an in&inite accidenta! order 5i!!require one to posit an essentia! order. John Reading is quite c!ear a(out this argument: @An in&init$ o&

others succeeding an indi#idua! cannot (e produced or (e un!ess ($ another o& another order e)isting at the

same time 5ith the 5ho!e succession. 8irard J. Gtzkorn, ;John Reading on the G)istence and "nicit$ o&

8od, G&&icient and Fina! Causa!it$,;-ranciscan Studies/9 +9=E93: 91-. n this 5a$ disagree 5ith the

statement made ($ Rega ood, ;Scotus


16/29

concerns us most. Scotus' argument turns on an unde&ended re7ection o& the notion o&

causa sui. For he argues that in an$ essentia! order o& causes, the &irst must itse!& stand

outside that order. & it did not, then the order, #ie5ed as a 5ho!e, 5ou!d (e causa sui.

For e)amp!e, i& the o(7ect seen and the organ o& #ision are essentia!!$ ordered causes o&

#ision, then according to the characteristics o& an essentia! order o& causes the$ each

5ou!d cause #ision in a di&&erent 5a$, each 5ou!d (e required at the same time, and each

must (e something that is not caused ($ another cause in the essentia! order.9 & 5e

imagine, &or e)amp!e, that the organ o& sense is caused ($ the thing seen, then seeing

5ou!d (e, in a 5a$, causa sui, (ecause the order 5ou!d cause an e!ement o& that #er$

order, and that e!ement 5ou!d in turn (e essentia! to causing the e&&ect. n this 5a$,

5hene#er a #isi(!e o(7ect 5ou!d e)ist, #ision 5ou!d (e se!&?caused ($ that o(7ect. 6ere

5e see &irst that Scotus simp!$ denies that the notion o& causa suiis tena(!e, (ut a!so that

an essentia! order o& causes requires a!5a$s some eminent cause. n &act, &or Scotus an

essentia! order o& causes is a!5a$s an order o& eminence, (ecause the prior cause in the

order is a!5a$s superior to the posterior.

A&ter sho5ing that there must (e some &irst e&&icient cause in an essentia! order,

Scotus no5 turns to sho5ing that that &irst cause is itse!& uncausa(!e. Scotus's main

argument here is that 5hat cannot (e an e&&ect o& an$ cause is independent!$ e&&ecti#e.

%hat is, the &irst in the order o& e&&icient causes is not on!$ uncaused, (ut its causation

cannot (e in #irtue o& another, (ut on!$ in #irtue o& itse!&. & it 5ere uncaused, (ut acted

as a cause on!$ in #irtue o& another, then it 5ou!d not (e &irst, (ecause it 5ou!d require

that other &or its causing. So the &irst in the essentia! order o& e&&icient causes must cause

9@"ncontro#ersia! e)amp!es o& essentia!!$ ordered causes are nortorious!$ di&&icu!t to &ind.

ood, ;Scotus


17/29

on!$ in #irtue o& itse!&. 6ere again, the &act that the &irst cause in the order o& e&&icient

causation is uncaused and causes on!$ in #irtue o& itse!& ru!es out e#en the possi(i!it$ that

it is causa sui.

Since Scotus has started mere!$ &rom the possi(!e e)istence o& some e&&ect, his

conc!usions up to this point sho5 on!$ that the concept o& e&&icient cause requires that

there (e some simp!$ &irst (eing. %hat is, he has not $et sho5n that this &irst actua!!$

e)ists, (ut on!$ that it is possi(!e. n order to sho5 that the &irst in the order o& e&&icient

causation actua!!$ e)istsIand that there is some nature that is tru!$ e&&ecti#eIScotus

no5 has to consider the 5a$ in 5hich this &irst e)ists. Again, (eginning 5ith the concept

o& cause and e&&ect, Scotus argues that i& it is repugnant to the #er$ concept o& something

to (e &rom another, that thing must (e @a(!e to (e &rom itse!&, i& it is a(!e to (e at a!!

+*rd. 94/3. %he &irst t5o conc!usions ha#e sho5n us that it is possi(!e &or there to (e a

&irst in the order o& e&&icient causation and that it is repugnant to that (eing to (e &rom

another. So, 5e ha#e a (eing that is a(!e to (e, and $et cannot (e &rom another, there&ore,

it must (e @&rom itse!&. %his means that this &irst e&&ecti#e (eing is a(!e to (e @e) se.

But is not this notion o& (eing @&rom itse!&, the #er$ notion o& causa suiN1

Scotus goes on to c!aim that 5hat is not actua!!$ @&rom itse!& is not a(!e to (e @&rom

itse!&, &or that 5ou!d mean that non?(eing 5ou!d produce something in (eing./ %hat is,

i& something does not actua!!$ e)ist that is @&rom itse!&, then it cannot come into (eing

&rom itse!&, &or then 5hat is nothing 5ou!d produce something. Furthermore, it 5ou!d

@i!!ud si potest esse, potest esse a se.1*n this question in re!ation to !otinus and Descartes, see Jean?arc ar(onne, ;!otin,

Descartes, et !a otion de Causa Sui,;Archi&es de Philosophie24 +9==13: 9--?=2 and its companion essa$

Jean?arc ar(onne, ;La otion de uissance Dan Son Rapport a !a Causa SuiChe) !es StoOciens et dans

!a hi!osophie de Spinoza,;Archi&es de Philosophie2E +9==23: 12?21, 5hich !inks the notion o& causa sui

5ith the notion o& po5er in Spinoza and the Stoics./Puod non est a se non potest esse a se, qui tunc non?ens produceret a!iquid ad esse, quod est

impossi(i!e.

9-


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a!so mean that it 5ou!d cause itse!&. But i& it is cause o& itse!&, then it 5ou!d not (e

entire!$ uncausa(!e. *n the one hand, something that is a(!e to (e &rom itse!& and $et

does not e)ist, is not a(!e to e)ist, and there&ore is not e#en possi(!e. *n the other hand,

5hat is a(!e to (e &rom itse!& must e)ist, i& it is possi(!e.

6o5 are 5e to understand this notion o& a (eing @&rom itse!&, i& 5e do not

understand that it is cause o& itse!&N & Scotus 5ants to ru!e out thatpotest esse e* se

means causa sui, then it cou!d on!$ mean that it (e!ongs to its nature or quiddit$ to e)ist.

%hat is, i& 5e ask 5h$ it is at a!!, 5e on!$ ha#e recourse to its #er$ nature so as to sa$ that

it e)ists &rom or ($ its #er$ nature.

Reca!! that 5hat Scotus is tr$ing to pro#e is that the &irst in the order o& e&&icient

causation that has (een sho5n to (e possi(!e and to (e uncausa(!e a!so actua!!$ e)ists.

%hat is, the &irst t5o steps in the argument sho5 mere!$ that it is possi(!e that there (e an

uncausa(!e &irst e&&icient cause. ithout this !ast step, name!$ the proo& that it actua!!$

e)ists, Scotus has not su&&icient!$ made his case. *r, more precise!$, this e)tended

e)cursion into the order o& e&&icient causa!it$ turns out to (e nothing other than a

comp!icated #ersion o& Anse!m's onto!ogica! argumentIcomp!icated in that it runs

through the notion o& causation. ts (asic &orm 5ou!d (e:

+93 An e&&ect is possi(!e, there&ore a &irst e&&icient cause is possi(!e.

+3 %he &irst e&&icient cause must (e uncausa(!e.+13 t (e!ongs to the #er$ nature o& an uncausa(!e &irst e&&icient cause to e)ist.

%he onto!ogica! portion o& the argument comes in the demonstration o& +13. & Scotus

means that the &irst e&&icient cause is &rom itse!& as &rom its #er$ nature, then his argument

is that the order o& e&&icient causation !eads to the possi(i!it$ o& a &irst e&&icient cause, and

i& it is possi(!e, then it must (e actua! (ecause o& the #er$ concept o& a possi(!e (ut

9E


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uncaused e&&icient cause. %he argument sho5s that an uncausa(!e &irst e&&icient cause

cannot (e caused nor cause in #irtue o& another, so it must (e &rom itse!&.

%his notion o& (eing @&rom itse!&, in turn, (ecomes crucia! to his demonstration

that the three &irsts +e&&icient cause, &ina! cause, most eminent (eing3 are one and the

same (eing. t is in this argument that Scotus turns to something #er$ much !ike

Aquinas's &irtus essendi. %here he argues that @nothing is a(!e not to (e un!ess

something incompossi(!e, either pri#ati#e!$ or positi#e!$, to it is a(!e to (e, (ut nothing

can (e incompossi(!e, either pri#ati#e!$ or positi#e!$, to that 5hich is &rom itse!& and

incausa(!e +*rd., 9->3. %he (eing o& this &irst is thought (oth in re!ation to its cause +or

!ack o& cause3 and in re!ation to the possi(i!it$ o& its destruction. %he &irst cause that is

&rom itse!& and incausa(!e cannot ha#e another 5ith 5hich it is incompossi(!e (ecause

that other 5ou!d either (e a(!e to (e &rom itse!& or it 5ou!d (e &rom another. & it is &rom

itse!&, then neither 5ou!d e)ist at a!! (ecause each one 5ou!d destro$ the other. *n the

other hand, i& it 5ere &rom another, then 5e ha#e one (eing that is &rom itse!& and another

that is purported to (e a(!e to destro$ it that is not &rom itse!& (ut &rom another. @But no

cause is a(!e to destro$ some (eing on account o& a repugnance o& its e&&ects to that other

(eing, un!ess it 5ou!d gi#e more intense and per&ect (eing to its e&&ect than 5ou!d (e the

(eing o& that other destructi(!e thing +*rd., 9-93.2 6o5e#er, no (eing that is &rom

another is a(!e to (e more no(!e than that 5hose (eing is necessar$ &rom itse!&, (ecause

the &ormer has dependent (eing 5hi!e the !atter has independent (eing +i(id.3. %hus, the

&irst e&&icient cause e)ists (ecause it gi#es itse!&, or has &rom itse!&, a more intense and

2nu!!a causa potest destruere a!iquod ens propter repugnantiam sui e&&ectus ad i!!ud nisi suo

e&&ectui per&ectius et intensius ese det quam sit esse i!!ius a!terius destructi(i!is.

9=


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per&ect &orm o& (eing than that 5hich is &rom another, and there&ore cannot (e destro$ed

($ another. & it cannot (e destro$ed ($ another, then i& it is possi(!e, it is actua!.

6ere, Scotus comes c!ose to an outright endorsement o& the notion o& causa sui($

resorting to a notion not un!ike Aquinas' &irtus essendi. %he case is e#en more e)treme

in hisDe Primo Principio: @B$ e)!uding e#er$ cause other than itse!&, (oth intrinsic and

e)trinsic, 5ith respect to its (eing, &rom itse!& it is impossi(!e not to (e.4 %his is

(ecause, Scotus te!!s us, that nothing that is &rom another has a more @#ehement and

po5er&u! (eing, than the uncausa(!e has &rom itse!&.- n this 5a$, Scotus indicates that

@&rom itse!& re&ers to something !ike a cause, indeed the on!$ possi(!e cause o& this

po5er&u! and #ehement (eing that the &irst cause gi#es itse!&. n a &ormu!a that sounds

remarka(!$ c!ose to one that Descartes 5i!! use, Scotus seems here to sa$ that the

po5er&u! and #ehement (eing that the &irst cause has is 5hat accounts &or its e)istence.

Since Aquinas's proo& &or the e)istence o& 8od, and his re7ection o& the cogenc$

o& the notion o& causa sui, operates 5ithout an$ re&erence to either the di#ine per&ection

or in&init$, the notion o& &irtus essendi, that is, the 5a$ in 5hich 8od is &rom 8odse!&,

&ormed no part o& his proo&. e sa5, ho5e#er, that 5hen he comes to address those

attri(utes, he did so ($ recourse to this po5er o& (eing. Scotus, on the other hand, not

on!$ sets out to pro#e the e)istence o& an in&inite (eing, he does so ($ sho5ing that there

is a (eing that is the &irst e&&icient cause andthe most eminent (eing. n com(ining the

orders o& causation and eminence, Scotus had to (ring the discussion o& 8od's (eing

@&rom 8odse!& into the #er$ heart o& the proo&. %he resu!t is that 8od's in&init$ takes on

the characteristic o& an @intensit$.E %here&ore, Scotus cannot a#oid dra5ing together in

4De Primo Principio, 1.9=.-(id.E%his is argued in greater detai! in Francis J. Catania, ;John Duns Scotus on


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his proo& &or the e)istence o& 8od the notions o& in&init$, per&ection, and po5er. t is in

!inking these three concepts that he is a(!e to insert a cosmo!ogica! argument 5ithin 5hat

is o#era!! an onto!ogica! argument. %he resu!t is that &or Scotus the @#ehement po5er o&

the in&inite (eing comes to &unction as a midd!e term in the demonstration o& the

e)istence o& that (eing. hi!e certain!$ that po5er (e!ongs to 8od (ecause o& the kind o&

(eing 8od is, it is the po5er and not the essence o& 8od that (ecomes a kind o& midd!e

term in Scotus's demonstration.

4. Descartes: Te !"istence of God# $o%er# and Causation

Descartes (egins his proo& o& the e)istence o& 8od 5ith a di#ision o& ideas, i.e., o&

5hat he ca!!s the @images o& things. %hese ideas &a!! into three categories, categories

that Descartes takes to (e e)hausti#e in that there can (e no other group o& ideas. deas

are either innate, ad#entitious, or in#ented ($ me. %he di#ision o& ideas here is (ased on

the onto!ogica! nature o& the cause o& the idea. deas that are ad#entitious 5i!! (e caused

($ something that seems to (e outside o& me. deas that are in#ented are caused ($

m$se!&. nnate ideas 5i!! (e the rea!m in 5hich the proo& &or the e)istence o& 8od !i#es.

%he question is 5hether the idea o& 8od is innate or ad#entitious and 5hat its source

might (e.

Descartes proposes to in#estigate ideas on!$ inso&ar as the$ are ideas. %hat is,

e#en i& an idea seems to ha#e an inde) to something outside o& m$se!&, Descartes 5i!!

(egin ($ !ooking at its status as an idea. For Descartes, a!! ideas are @modes o& thought.

As he e)p!ains in thePrinciples of Philosoph, a mode is 5hat scho!astic phi!osophers

@'n&inite' does not change the meaning +ratio3 o& the per&ection predicated o& 8od it e)presses the manner

in 5hich that per&ection is to (e understood 5hen app!ied to 8od: intensi#e!$ rea!ized and comp!ete!$

compossi(!e 5ith a!! other pure per&ections, p. 2>. Catania sho5s that &or 8od, in&inite means @intensit$

o& (eing, a notion that is quite simi!ar to Aquinas's &irtus essendi.

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meant 5hen the$ spoke o& attri(utes or qua!ities.= %he di&&erence is that 5hen 5e

consider that some su(stance is a&&ected or #aried ($ them, 5e ca!! them modes. hen

5e consider the #ariation that is denominated ($ them, 5e ca!! them qua!ities. hen 5e

more genera!!$ !ook at the su(stance in 5hich the$ inhere, 5e ca!! them attri(utes. So, a

mode o& thought is something that a&&ects or #aries a su(stance 5hose essence is

thinking. n this 5a$, an idea is not something that @e)ists such that it needs nothing e!se

&or its e)istence, + /3, (ut is some a&&ection or #ariation o& that thing.1> A mode,

there&ore, requires some su(stance &or its e)istence. t is precise!$ (ecause ideas are

modes o& thought and that am a thinking thing, that might come to maintain that a!!

ideas are caused ($ me, the su(stance o& 5hich the$ are a&&ections.

But i& 5e attend to a &urther di&&erence among ideas, 5e can sho5 that cannot (e

the causa! source o& a!! m$ ideas. For ideas o& su(stances, i.e., ideas that represent

su(stances, ($ the mere &act that the$ represent su(stances, contain a kind o& rea!it$

through that #er$ representation. n other 5ords, since a su(stance, as 5e sa5 a(o#e, is

something that e)ists such that it needs no other &or its e)istence, then an idea that

represents a su(stance 5ou!d a!so represent that independent e)istence. Descartes,

&o!!o5ing scho!astic usage, ca!!s the kind o& rea!it$ that is present on!$ in the

representation @o(7ecti#e rea!it$. So the idea o& su(stance contains more o(7ecti#e

rea!it$ than an idea o& mode (ecause the idea represents a greater rea!it$. %he idea o&

8od, i.e., a supreme, eterna!, in&inite, omniscient creator, has more o(7ecti#e rea!it$ in it

than the idea o& a &inite su(stance. So 5here do ideas get their o(7ecti#e rea!it$N

=Rene Descartes,Principia Philosophiae, edited ($ Char!es Adam and au! %anner$, *eu#res de

Descartes, #o!. E.9 +aris: J. 0rin, 9=E3, 4. %his te)t 5i!! (e re&erred to as &o!!o5ed ($ page num(er.1>%his !anguage goes (ack at !east to Suarez, and a &u!!er understanding 5ou!d require a detai!ed

in#estigation into his thought that cannot (e attempted here.


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t is here 5here Descartes enters into a discussion o& the nature o& causa!it$, and

the terms 5i!! (e &ami!iar &rom our discussion o& Scotus. Descartes (egins ($ stating the

Aristote!ian?scho!astic princip!e o& causation: @there must (e as much rea!it$ in the

e&&icient and tota! cause as in the e&&ect o& that cause.19 Another #ersion o& this same

princip!e is stated in thePrinciples: othing comes &rom nothing, nor is that 5hich is

more per&ect &rom that 5hich is !ess per&ect as a tota! and e&&icient cause + 99?93.

%his princip!e o& causation app!ies equa!!$ 5hether 5e are considering &orma! rea!it$ or

mere!$ the representation or o(7ecti#e rea!it$. %hat is, a stone must (e caused ($

something equa! to it in &orma! rea!it$, and the idea o& a stone must a!so (e caused ($

something equa! or greater. 6o5e#er, it must (e the case that the cause o& the o(7ecti#e

rea!it$ o& an idea must (e something 5ith as much &orma! rea!it$ as concei#e in the idea.

h$ is this the caseN Because &orma! rea!it$ is more per&ect than o(7ecti#e rea!it$. o5

the o(7ecti#e rea!it$ o& the idea cannot come &rom nothing, so must come &rom

something.

Descartes argues that 5hi!e ideas can (e caused ($ ideas, since one idea can ha#e

as much or more o(7ecti#e rea!it$ than another, our &irst and most important ideas must

come &rom a cause that has as much &orma! rea!it$ as the idea has o(7ecti#e rea!it$. %he

idea o& a su(stance that is in&inite, independent, supreme!$ inte!!igent, supreme!$

po5er&u! and creator o& a!! contains much more o(7ecti#e rea!it$ than contain &orma!

rea!it$. %here&ore, this idea cou!d not ha#e come &rom me. For the same reason, it cou!d

not ha#e come &rom another (eing (esides 8od, there&ore 8od necessari!$ e)ists.

19RenQ Descartes,Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, in ,eu&res de Descartes, ed. Char!es

Adam and au! %anner$, #o!. 0 +aris: Li(rairie hi!osophique J. 0rin, 9=E13, />. %his te)t and the

o(7ections and rep!ies 5i!! (e re&erred to as ed. &o!!o5ed ($ page num(er.

1


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n Descartes's rep!$ to the o(7ections o& Caterus, he argues that his argument

hinges on the notion that, since recognize that am &inite, imper&ect, etc., cannot (e the

source o& m$ idea o& 8od.1 t is in this part o& the argument that he &urther de#e!ops his

notion o& causation such that he (egins to trou(!e the scho!astic re7ection o& causa sui. 6e

sa$s that i& @ deri#ed m$ e)istence &rom m$se!&, then 5ou!d not dou(t or !ack an$thing

at a!!, &or 5ou!d ha#e gi#en m$se!& a!! the per&ections o& 5hich ha#e an idea, and thus

shou!d m$se!& (e 8od +ed. /E3. & 5ere 8od, 5ou!d ha#e gi#en to m$se!& a!!

per&ections and i& ha#e gi#en m$se!& a!! per&ections 5ou!d (e 8od. %his !eads

Descartes to go on to sa$ that 8od has the po5er o& e)isting through 8odse!&. %hus,

Descartes seems to maintain that 8od gi#es e)istence to 8odse!& (ecause 8od has the

po5er to gi#e to 8odse!& a!! per&ections. Descartes !inks here the notion o& causation

5ith po5er and uses po5er as a midd!e term in his demonstration o& the e)istence o&

8od. %his !ink is intensi&ied 5hen the @theo!ogian +Caterus3 accuses Descartes o&

maintain that 8od is causa sui, a position, he asserts, that can on!$ (e understood

@negati#e!$.

%he theo!ogian sme!!s immediate!$ that Descartes might (e proposing that 8od is

causa sui: @From itse!& is accepted in t5o 5a$s, &irst, positi#e!$, name!$ &rom itse!& as

&rom a cause and thus that it 5ou!d (e &rom itse!& and 5ou!d gi#e to itse!& its (eing

Second it is accepted negati#e!$ that it 5ou!d (e ($ itse!& or not &rom another, and in this

5a$, as &ar as kno5, it is accepted ($ a!!. +ed. =23. %he theo!ogian raises the

standard scho!astic arguments again causa suiand e#en points to one possi(!e 5a$ to

understand Scotus's concept o& @&rom itse!&. 6is argument is quite simp!e: no one

1@sed a!iud quid ommitimus quod praecipue est considerandum, et a quo tota #is et !u) hu7us

argumenti dependet ed. 9>2.

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accepts the idea that something gi#es itse!& (eing. Descartes, ho5e#er, mo(i!izes the

other e!ement o& @&rom itse!&, the one re!ated, ha#e argued, to Aquinas's notion o&

&irtus essendi.

Descartes (egins 5ith a shocking admission: @ ha#e not said that it is impossi(!e

&or something to (e the cause o& itse!& +ed. 9>E3. 6e goes on to sa$ that neither

tempora! succession nor di#ersit$ (e!ongs to the notion o& causation. Rather, he sa$s,

@there is no thing such that 5e cannot ask 5h$ it e)ists, or rather to inquire into the

e&&icient cause o& it, or, i& it has none, 5h$ it needs none. So &ar, this is simp!$ an

app!ication o& the princip!e o& su&&icient reason. But then Descartes continues:

%here&ore, i& 5ou!d suppose that no thing in an$ 5a$ is a(!e to (e

to5ards itse!& that it is the e&&icient cause to5ard the e&&ect, than am so

&ar &rom conc!uding that there is some &irst cause since, on the contrar$,

5ou!d inquire into the cause o& it itse!& that is ca!!ed &irst, and thus 5ou!d

ne#er come to an$ &irst o& a!!. But c!ear!$ admit that something can (e in

5hich there 5ou!d (e so great an ine)hausti(!e po5er that it 5ou!d need

no other po5er that it 5ou!d e)ist, not a!so 5ou!d it need no5 that it (e

conser#ed, and this there&ore it 5ou!d (e in a certain 5a$ cause o& itse!&

+(id.3

At this point Descartes has on!$ pointed out t5o things. First, the princip!e o& su&&icient

reason demands that 5e sa$ that the &irst cause is caused ($ itse!&. Since the notion o&

cause, e#en e&&icient cause, does not demand that the cause (e tempora!!$ prior to the

e&&ect, 5e can demand the cause o& e#en an eterna! (eing. Second, the notion o&

causation is (ound up 5ith the notion o& po5er, and thus a (eing o& in&inite po5er 5ou!d

2


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ha#e to (e cause o& itse!&, other5ise it 5ou!d (e, to a certain e)tent, impotent. %he cause

5e disco#er 5hen 5e ask 5h$ 8od e)ists is 8od's ine)hausti(!e po5er. But he has $et

to sa$ ho5 this (eing is cause o& itse!&.

%his is 5here the connection to po5er comes into p!a$. n response to the

theo!ogian, he sa$s that sure!$ 5e can understand that 8od is @&rom itse!&, in the mere!$

negati#e sense o& not (eing &rom some cause. But once 5e attend to the immense and

incomprehensi(!e po5er that is contained in the idea o& 8od, then 5e ha#e to sa$ that

8od is &rom itse!& not mere!$ negati#e!$, (ut a!so positi#e!$. %his simp!$ &o!!o5s out the

conc!usion that 5e sa5 Scotus making in 7oining the order o& e&&icient causation 5ith that

o& eminence. For 5here Scotus c!aimed that e)istence comes &rom the nature o& the &irst

e&&icient cause and most eminent (eing, Descartes comp!etes this ($ sa$ing that 8od is

not &rom a cause di&&erent &rom 8od, nor &rom nothing, @(ut &rom the rea! immensit$ o&

8od's po5er. Because o& this, 5e are a!!o5ed to think 8od in a certain 5a$ 5ith

respect to 8odse!& as an e&&icient cause 5ith respect to itse!&, and thus to (e &rom itse!&

positi#e!$ +ed. 99>?9993.

Arnau!d is not satis&ied 5ith Descartes' e)p!anation o& the term causa sui, and

ca!!s it a hard and &a!se idea +ed. >E3. Descartes' response (egins 5ith reasserting

5hat he c!aimed against Caterus: 8od is in a certain +a!ike the e&&icient cause o& 8od.

hat this @certain 5a$ might (e is the heart o& the issue. 11 Descartes goes on to sa$ that

causa sui@can in no 5a$ (e understood o& e&&icient cause, (ut on!$ that the ine)hausted

11 do not take it that Descartes 5as either in7udicious in his response to Caterus, nor did he a!terhis opinion in response to Arnau!d. See Danie! G. F!age and C!arence A. Bonnen,Descartes and Method!

A Search for a Method in Meditations, Rout!edge Studies in Se#enteenth?Centur$ hi!osoph$, #o!. 9

+London: Rout!edge, 9===3 &or the opposite c!aim. t shou!d a!so (e noted that Descartes o&ten engages in

strategic responses, particu!ar!$ to Arnau!d. n his !etter o& arch 9E, 94/9, Descartes asks ersenne to

make some changes to his te)t @so that it can (e kno5n that ha#e de&erred to his 7udgment, so that others

seeing ho5 read$ am to take counci!, ma$ te!! me more &rank!$ the reasons the$ ha#e against me, and me

(e !ess stu((orn in opposing me 5ith reasons +A% 11/3.

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potenc$ o& 8od is the cause or rather reason on account o& 5hich 8od does not need a

cause +ed. 143. Since this po5er o& 8od is a positi#e thing, 5e can sa$ in a positi#e

5a$ that 8od is cause o& 8odse!&. But this positi#e thing that is the cause o& 8od not

needing an e&&icient cause shou!d not (e con&used 5ith an e&&icient cause, i& e&&icient

cause is taken to mean @some positi#e in&!u) +(id.3. n other 5ords, 5e can ask 5h$

8od does not need a cause, and the proper ans5er to that is not Arnau!d's @(ecause 8od

is 8od, (ut rather @on account o& the immensit$ o& 8od's po5er +ed. 1-3.

%he need &or arguing that 8od is causa sui arises &rom the demonstration o& 8od's

e)istence. @%hrough this midd!e the e)istence o& 8od can (e conc!uded +ed. 1E3.

So the po5er o& 8od stands (et5een the essence o& 8od and the e)istence o& 8od and

can (e used to demonstrate that the !atter (e!ongs necessari!$ to the &ormer. ithout this

midd!e, the e)istence o& 8od cannot (e demonstrated at a!!. e shou!d not ignore the

phrase Descartes repeats o&ten: 8od's immense po5er is the cause o& 8od not needing an

e&&icient cause. %his is some5hat more than the negati#e sense o& @&rom itse!& +not

needing another cause3 and some5hat !ess than sa$ing that 8od is the e&&icient cause o&

8odse!&.

think it necessar$ to sho5 that (et5een efficient cause, proper!$ ca!!ed,

and no cause, there is something intermediate, name!$ thepositi&e essence

of the thing, to 5hich the concept o& e&&icient cause can (e e)tended in the

same 5a$ in 5hich 5e are accustomed in geometr$ o& e)tending the

concept o& an arc o& an inde&inite circ!e to the concept o& a straight !ine

+ed. 1=3.

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6o5 can 5e e)tend e&&icient cause to 8od such that 8od is in some 5a$ the e&&icient

cause o& 8odN Because in 8od essence and e)istence are not distinct. e seek an

e&&icient cause &or the e)istence o&, e.g., this triang!e, (ut point to the essence or &orm o&

the triang!e as the cause o& it ha#ing three !ines. Since in 8od essence and e)istence are

not distinct, 5e can e)tend the term e&&icient cause to point to the essence o& 8od as the

reason 5h$ 8od needs no cause &or e)istence +ed. /13. %he entire demonstration o&

8od's e)istence re!ies on dep!o$ing 8od's po5er as the midd!e term, and that po5er

must (e re!ated to 8od in some 5a$ !ike an e&&icient cause is re!ated to its e&&ect.

%hus 5e ha#e, &or Descartes, the notion o& per&ection !inked to po5er and &orming

the mediumo& a demonstration o& 8od's e)istence. 6ere, he reca!!s Aquinas' concept o&

&irtus essendi and Scotus' concept o& no(!e (eing possessing @#ehement po5er.

Descartes, ho5e#er, rea!izes that this appea! requires that e&&icient causation (e thought

in terms o& po5er. & a (eing is per&ect, it must possess in&inite po5er, and i& it possesses

in&inite po5er, then it must (e cause o& itse!&.

Spinoza's (rie& proo& that e)istence (e!ongs to the nature o& su(stance turns on

e)act!$ this notion: since su(stance cannot (e produced ($ an$thing e!se, it must (e cause

o& itse!&. Furthermore, Spinoza (rings this idea o& causa sui(ack to its roots in Scotus in

his proo& that su(stance necessari!$ e)ists +993. %here he argues that a thing

necessari!$ e)ists i& there is no reason or cause 5hich pre#ents its e)istence. Since 8od

has nothing in common 5ith an$ other su(stance, i& 8od 5ere destro$ed, 8od 5ou!d (e

destro$ed ($ 8odse!&. But this is a(surd to maintain &or a per&ect and in&inite (eing.

%here&ore, (ecause 8od is in&inite and per&ect, nothing can destro$ 8od's e)istence.

Spinoza's use o& the notion o& causa suiis precise!$ 5hat a!!o5s him to pro#ide a #ersion

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o& the onto!ogica! argument that inc!udes 5ithin in it the concept o& e&&icient causa!it$. n

this 5a$, Spinoza e)p!oits the resources that Aquinas, and more so Scotus, de#e!op in

order to argue &or the e)istence, per&ection, and in&init$ o& 8od. & he and Descartes are

right, Aquinas and Scotus 5ere ne#er serious in their re7ections o& the concept o& causa

sui. Descartes' rep!$ to the theo!ogian and to Arnau!d cou!d (e stated e#en more simp!$

than he thought: read on and $ou 5i!! see that Aquinas and Scotus a!so c!aim that 8od's

po5er is to 8od's (eing as an e&&icient cause is to its e&&ect

causa sui in descartes and medieval philosophy

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