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People v. Pomar

Facts: Pomar was charged for refusing to

pay his pregnant employee in violation of

the statue ordering employers to give

pregnant women employees 30 days

vacation with pay before and after

confinement.Issue: Whether the statute was adopted in

the reasonable and lawful exercise of the

police power of the state.

Ruling: NO. The statute is not a

reasonable and lawful exercise of police

power.

The right to contract about ones own

affairs is a part of the liberty of the

individual under the Constitution, and

while there was no such thing as absolute

freedom of contract, and it was

necessarily subject to a great variety ofrestraints, yet none of the exceptional

circumstances, which at times justify a

limitation upon ones right to contract,

apply in this case. (citing Adkins v

Childrens Hospital of the District of

Columbia). The right of liberty includes the

right to enter into contracts and to

terminate contracts. The statute violates

liberty of contract without due process. It

takes into account only the welfare of the

employee but fails to consider periods of

distress in the business. The statutecreates a mandatory term in any contract

entered into by an employer. It violates

right to enter into contract upon terms

which parties may agree to.

Doctrine: The rule must have a more direct

relation, as means to an end, and the end

itself must be appropriate and legitimate,

before an act can be held to be valid which

interferes with the general right of an

individual to be free in his person and in

his power to contract in relation to his own

labor.

Occea v. COMELEC

Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against

the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing

constitutional amendments goes further than merely assailing

their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon

A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former

delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed thepresent Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather

unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the

1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling

to the contrary notwithstanding.

Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and

effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the present

petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.

Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and

applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of

Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for

prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this

Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It thenconcluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no

further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered

in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It

could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear

the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the

present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a

pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition

of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not

only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for

instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts

were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is

as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is thatthe function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative

aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black

and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate.

In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of

coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the

latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be

stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a

suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the

concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has

invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in

point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago.

During the first year alone of the effectivity of the presentConstitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

Santiago v. COMELEC

Facts: On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of

the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a

"Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective

Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the

Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for

hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After thehearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the

COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda

and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18,

1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria

Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65

raising the following arguments, among others:

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if

there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has

yet been passed; and

2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples

initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.

Issue: Is R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of theConstitution by peoples initiative?

Held: NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on

amendments to the Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the

Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are

not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject,

in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative.

They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."

The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved

or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes

initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Also, while the law

provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local

Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on theConstitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and

referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended

to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments

to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor,

considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or

hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose

amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the

initiative on national and local laws. While R.A. No. 6735 specially

detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on

national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of

initiative on amendments to the Constitution. WHEREFORE, petition is

GRANTED.

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Almario v. Alba

Amendment to the Constitution

Facts: As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the

Filipino electorate will go to the polls on January 27, 1984 to

either approve or reject amendments to the Constitution

proposed by Resolution Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112, and

113 of the Batasang Pambansa. The proposed amendments

are embodied in four (4) separate questions to be answered

by simple YES or NO answers. Petitioners herein seek toenjoin the submission on January 27, 1984 of Question Nos.

3 (grant as an additional mode of acquiring lands

belonging to the public domain) and 4 (the undertaking by

the government of a land reform program and a social

reform program), which cover Resolution Nos. 105 and 113,

to the people for ratification or rejection on the ground that

there has been no fair and proper submission following the

doctrine laid down in Tolentino v. COMELEC. The petitioners

do not seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only

ask for more time for the people to study the meaning and

implications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature

and effect of the proposals are fairly and properlysubmitted to the electorate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented

to the people on a later date.

HELD: The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the

proposed amendments are beyond the power of the courts

to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not "grant" of public

land and "urban land reform" are unwise or improvident or

whether or not the proposed amendments are unnecessary

is a matter which only the people can decide. The questions

are presented for their determination. Assuming that a

member or some members of this Court may find

undesirable any additional mode of disposing of public landor an urban land reform program, the remedy is to vote

"NO" in the plebiscite but not to substitute his or their

aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to the

millions of voters an opportunity to express their own likes

or dislikes. The issue before us has nothing to do with the

wisdom of the proposed amendments, their desirability, or

the danger of the power being abused. The issue is whether

or not the voters are aware of the wisdom, the desirability,

or the dangers of abuse. The petitioners have failed to make

out a case that the average voter does not know the

meaning of "grant" of public land or of "urban land reform."

Tolentino v. COMELEC

Facts: Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate on

February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held

simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be

elected in that election. The resolution further provides that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number

of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004. On

June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected Senators, with

the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of

Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th. Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as votersand taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend

that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to

be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to

indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly

required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the

candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4,

paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast

for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two separate

Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term. Tolentino and

Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition. Without issuing any

restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentinos and

Mojica's standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegallydisbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-

006.

Issue:WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:

(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and

(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.

Decision: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

Ratio Decidendi:

(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix the

time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered

mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.

The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election is

whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of specia lelection. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special

election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void.

(2) There is no basis in the petitioners claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted the special Senatorial

election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass

separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatory

under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC fix the date of election, if necessary, and state among others, the

office/s to be voted for.

Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14, 2001 merely

implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said resolution as

introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator

Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the resolution

by providing as it now appears, that the senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve onlyfor the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.

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Mabanag v. Lopez Vito

Journal Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory

FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were

suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed

to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They

argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the

required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to

the Constitution) which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same t ime,

the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, theResolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these

members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed

amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of

Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution

amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the

case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not

the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each

House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue

by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory,

for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two waysspecified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of

irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects

of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of

the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled

copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two,

the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to

have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give

to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals,

disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of

the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed

by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary ofstate.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210,

provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the

Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the

Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house

thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of

secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine

Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by

the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the

provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the

legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of thejournals.

Gonzales v. COMELEC

Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction. The main

facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives

passed the following resolutions:

1.R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of theConstitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the

House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present

Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as

nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, althougheach province shall have, at least, one (1) member;

2.R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, theconvention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative

district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of

November, 1971;" and 3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the

same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the

House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional

convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently,

Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967,

became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution

proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by

the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.Issue:Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates

the Constitution.

Held:Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913

and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases

must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without

special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not

be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his

acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons

are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of

a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is

concerned."The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to

determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among

the integral or constituent units thereof."

Article XV of the Constitution provides:

. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members

of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose

amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments

shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at

an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.

From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as

the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as

legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to theConvention.

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Sanidad v. COMELEC

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 on the

ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. On October 23, 1989,

Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION"

was enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of

Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take

part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act originally scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however,

reset to January 30, 1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989. The Commission on

Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 andother pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said

Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V.

Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly

newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec

Resolution No. 2167, which provides: Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. During the

plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator,

announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite Issue.

It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees

of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution. Unlike a regular news reporter or news

correspondent who merely reports the news, petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and

necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. Petitioner

likewise maintains that if media practitioners were to express their views, beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted to aplebiscite, it would in fact help in the government drive and desire to disseminate information, and hear, as well as

ventilate, all sides of the issue.

Issue: Whether or not Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional. It is clear from Art. IX-C

of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and

enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media

of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including

reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil

sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to

a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist,

commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence

from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist orcommentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless

required to take a leave of absence. However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A.

6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by

media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their

freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no

candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis. Plebiscite

Issue are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and

intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the Issue, including the

forum. The people affected by the Issue presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the

forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for

expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to

either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times. The instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional

Tanada v. Cuenco

Constitutional LawPoliticalQuestion

FACTS: After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate

were chosen. The Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by

the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was

Lorenzo. Diosdado on the other hand was a senatorial

candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the

SET. But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its

members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of9 members; 3 justices, 3 senators from the majority party

and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is

only one minority senator the other two SET members

supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the

NP. Lorenzo assailed this process. So did Diosdado because

he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP

senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista will not

have any chance in his election contest. Cuenco et al

(members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take

cognizance of the issue because it is a political question.

Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of

the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy forLorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issue before

judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public

opinion.

ISSUE:Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD: The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled in favor

of Lorenzo and Diosdado. The term Political

Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance,

namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions

which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the

people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full

discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative

or executive branch of the government. It is concerned withissues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a

particular measure.

http://www.clicksor.com/http://www.clicksor.com/

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Chapter III

PACU v. Secretary of Education

Political Law Civic Efficiency

FACTS: The petitioning colleges and

universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by

Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be

declared unconstitutional, because: A.) They deprive

owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers

and parents of liberty and property without dueprocess of law; B.) They deprive parents of their

natural right and duty to rear their children for civic

efficiency; and C.) Their provisions conferring on the

Secretary ofEducation unlimited power and discretion

to prescribe rules and standards constitute an

unlawful delegation of legislative power. Petitioners

complain that before opening a school the owner

must secure a permit from the Secretary of Education.

Petitioners reason out, this section leaves everything

to the uncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of

Education or his department. The Secretary of

Education is given the power to fix the standard. Inplain language, the statute turns over to the Secretary

of Education the exclusive authority of the legislature

to formulate standard . . . Also, the textbooks to be

used in the private schools recognized or authorized

by the government shall be submitted to the Board

(Board of Textbooks) which shall have the power to

prohibit the use of any of said textbooks which it may

find to be against the law or to offend the dignity and

honor of the government and people of the

Philippines, or which it may find to be against the

general policies of the government, or which it may

deem pedagogically unsuitable.HELD: Petitioners do not show how these standards

have injured any of them or interfered with their

operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to

assail neither the validity of the power nor the

exercise of the power by the Secretary of Education.

No justiciable controversy has been presented to us.

We are not informed that the Board on Textbooks has

prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners

refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks,

and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or

rights for so refusing.

PHILCONSA v. Villareal

Petitioner Philippine Constitution Association, joined by other

petitioners,[[1

]]all delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention,

suing in their capacity as such as well as citizens and taxpayers, filed

this mandamus proceeding on May 15, 1971 praying that a writ be

issued ordering respondents Cornelio T. Villareal, in his capacity as

Speaker of the then House of Representatives, the Chief Accountant

thereof, as well as its Auditor, to inspect and examine the books,records, vouchers and other supporting papers of the House of

Representatives that have relevance to the alleged transfer of P26.2

million from various executive offices to the House of

Representatives as well as its books, records, vouchers and other

supporting papers dealing with the original outlay of the P39 million

as appropriated for the 1969-1970 fiscal year. On May 19, 1971, this

Court adopted a resolution of the following tenor: The respondents

are hereby required to file an answer to the petition

for mandamuswithin 10 days from notice hereof, and not to move to

dismiss the petition.[[2

]]There was, on June 16, 1971, an answer and

motion to dismiss on behalf of respondents seeking the dismissal of

the suit on the ground of lack of jurisdiction under the theory ofseparation of powers, absence of a cause of action, lack of legal

personality to sue, nonjoinder of indispensable parties as well as the

mischievous consequences to which a suit of such character would

give rise. Subsequently, there was a reply by petitioners on June 26,

1971 and a rejoinder by respondents on June 28, 1971. There was

even a surrejoinder by respondents on July 6 of the same year, as

well as a reply thereto on the very same day. Then came the hearing

on August 4, 1971.

There is no need, however, to pass on the merits of the various legal

issues raised as in accordance with the ruling in Philippine

Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez,[[3

]]promulgated on

February 28, 1974, a suit of this character has become moot andacademic with the effectivity of the present Constitution and the

consequent abolition of the House of Representatives. It may not be

amiss to quote this excerpt from the resolution declaring moot and

academic the above case against Auditor General Gimenez:

Parenthetically, it is to be observed that such difficulty need not

attend a petition of this character if filed now in view of the specific

provision in the present Constitution: The records and books of

accounts of the National Assembly shall be open to the public in

accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the

Commission on Audit which shall publish annually the itemized

expenditures for each Member.[[4

]]

WHEREFORE, the above petition is declared moot and academic.

Dumlao v. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of

section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory

and contrary to the equal protection and due process

guarantees of the Constitution.

Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or

provincial city official that already received retirement

benefits and is 65 years of age shall not be qualified torun for the same local elective office from which he has

retired.

Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional

being contrary to the equal protection and due process

rights.

Held: No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to

rational classification based on reasonable and real

differentiations. In the present case, employees 65 years

of age have been classified differently from younger

employees. The former are subject to compulsory

retirement while the latter are not.

Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification forelective local officials because there can be retirees who

are even younger and a 65 year old retiree could be as

good as a 65 year old official who is not a retiree. But

there is reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official

who is trying to run for office because there is the need

for new blood to assume relevance. When an official

has retired he has already declared himself tired and

unavailable for the same government work.

WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas

pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.

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Tijam v. Sibonghanoy

FACTS: Spouses Tijam filed a civil case for recovery of a sum of money and corresponding interests against Sopuses

Sibonghanoy in the CFI of Cebu. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against

defendants' properties, but the same was dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety

and Fidelity Co., Inc. Defendants after being duly served with summons filed an answer with a counterclaim.

CFI rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. A writ of execution was issued against defendants, however it was unsatisfied.

Spouses Tijam then moved for a writ of execution against the Surety, but the Surety opposed on the ground that no prior

demand was made and that there was failure to prosecute. CFI denied this motion on the ground that no previous demand

had been made on the Surety.Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a

second motion for execution against the counterbond. Surety motioned for extension to filed an answer, which was granted.

However, upon its failure to file such answer, CFI granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.

Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the required summary hearing, but CFI

denied the motion. Surety appealed to the CA, which affirmed the orders appealed from. It then filed a motion asking for

extension to file a MR, which was granted, but instead of filing a MR it filed a Motion To Dismiss on the ground that the CFI

had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case as in false under the jurisdiction of the Inferior Courts as per RA 296. CA re quired

Spouses Tijan to answer the motion to dismiss but failed to do so. CA then resolved to set aside its decision and certified the

case to SC.

ISSUE: Does failure to raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction for a considerable length of time bar a motion to dismiss the case?

YES.

HELD: A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak ofestoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by

exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a

reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society,

the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a

question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after

obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the

merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. It is not right for a party who has affirmed

and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that samejurisdiction to escape a penalty.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the

question of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a

quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its

case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it

finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be

declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the

judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.

In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same would be

submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon h is

request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse

without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.

Oposa v. Factoran

Fact: a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation

or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the

unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support

systems and continued rape of Mother Earth." The

complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and

alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic

of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full

benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resourcetreasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The

same was filed for themselves and others who are

equally concerned about the preservation of said

resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to

bring them all before the Court." The minors further

asseverate that they "represent their generation as well

as generations yet unborn." 4Consequently, it is prayed

for that judgment be rendered:

1] Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the

country;

2] Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,

processing, renewing or approving new timber licenseagreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental

consequences of continued and deforestation are so

capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same

may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of

action?

HELD: YES. petitioners have a cause of action. The case

at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right to

a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the

correlative duty to refrain from impairing the

environment. The said right implies the judiciousmanagement of the countrys forests. This right is also

the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial

or violation of that right by the other who has the

correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the

same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may

thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. The

right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it

the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the

environment

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Lozada v. COMELEC

Political LawVacancy in the Legislature

Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus

compelling the COMELEC to hold an election to fill the vacancies in

the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their

contention on Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution which

provides: In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa

eighteen months or more before a regular election, the

Commission on Election shall call a special election to be heldwithin sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the

Member to serve the unexpired term. COMELEC opposes the

petition alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners lack standing to

file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to

institute the action; 2) this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain

this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973

Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a

special election to fill vacancies in the legislature.

HELD: The SCs jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by

certiorari the latters decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly

provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New Constitution whichreads: Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be

brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party

within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof. There is in

this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is

sought to be reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction

as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only

known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the

Supreme Court over the COMELEC.

It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional

districts where vacancies exist, would entail huge expenditureof

money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary

appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP mayneither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may

COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of appropriation.

From the role BP has to play in the holding of special elections,

which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it

would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the

BP, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the

regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive

prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not

be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the

provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was

intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly,

now BP, not to the IBP.

Manila Motors Co. v. Flores

Facts: May 1954, Manila Motors Co. Inc. filed a

complaint before the mun. court of manila to

recover theamount of P 1,047.98 from MANUEL T.

FLORES as chattel mortgage installments w/c is due

inSeptember 1941.Flores pleaded for prescription:

1941-1954 and the complaint was dismissed.On

appeal before the CFI, the court saw the plaintiffssustaining contention that the moratorium lawshad

interrupted the running of the prescriptive period &

that deducting the time during which saidlaws were

in operation- 3 yrs. And 8 months- the 10 yr. term

had not yet elapsed when thecomplainant sued for

collection in 1954.

CFI ordered the return of the case to the mun. judge

for trial on the merits.ISSUE/S:Whether or not the

moratorium laws did not have the effect of

suspending the period due tounconstitutionality as

declared in the Rutter vs. Esteban case.Ruling:1.

In Montilla vs. Pacific Commercial3 we held that the

moratorium laws suspended the period of

prescription. That was rendered after the Rutter-

Esteban decision. It should be stated however,

infairness to appellant, that the Montilla decision

came down after he had submitted his brief. And

inanswer to his main contention, the following

portion is quoted from a resolution of this Court4

2.

Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil. 68) may be construed to

mean that at the of the decision theMoratorium lawcould no longer be validly applied because of the

prevailing circumstances. At anyrate, although the

general rule is that an unconstitutional statute

"confers no right, create no office, affords no

protection and justifies no acts performed under

it."(11 Am. Jur., pp. 828, 829.) Judgment affirmed,

without costs

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Zandueta v. Villareal

This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta against the Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent

to be illegally occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting him from said office, and holding that the petitioner

is entitled to continue occupying the office in question by placing him in possession thereof, with costs to said respondent

FACTS

- Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No. 145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District,

comprising solely the City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the President of

the Philippines in his favor on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the Commission on ppointments of the National Assembly

-On November 7, 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from the President of the

Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to

preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan

-The National Assembly adjourned without its Commission on Appointments having acted on said ad interim appointment

-Another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a new oath

-After his appointment and qualification as judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner, acting as executive judge, performed several executive acts

-On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the aforesaid ad interim ppointment of said petitioner

-On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to

preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his appointment was

approved by the Commission on Appointments

ISSUE: WON the petitioner may question the validity of Commonwealth Act No. 145 to entitle him to repossess the office occupied by him prior to the appointment issued in his favor by

virtue of the assailed statute

HELDRatio

When a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment to preside

over the same branch of the same Court of First Instance, in addition to another court of the same category, both of which belong to a new judicial district formed by the addition of

another Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot

claim to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his new appointment has been issued.

Reasoning

The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law, which new office is

incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him , qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters into the performance of his duties by

executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue

of his former appointment (46 Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he can not question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence,

166, par. 121; id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled to accept it by

reason of legal exigencies.- In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment issued by he President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with said

Commonwealth Act No. 14 - If the petitioner believed that Commonwealth Act No. 145 is unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the appointment offered him or, at least, he

should have accepted it with reservation, had he believed that his duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the f inal

determination of the question whether a law is unconstitutional or not.

-The petitioner, being aware of his constitutional and legal rights and obligations, by implied order of the law (art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office and entered into the performance of

the duties inherent therein, after taking the necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge that if he voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would later be

stopped from questioning the validity of said appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was issued, is unconstitutional.

Disposition The petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the same is dismissed with costs to the petitioner.