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LEDESMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 160 SCRA 449

FACTS:

Violeta Delmo was treasurer of an organization formed by students of

the West Visayas College. She extended loans from the funds of the

club to some of the students of the school. As a result, the school

president petitioner! denied her the right to graduate "A#$A C%"

&A%D' despite the order of the Director of the (ureau of )ublicSchools that she be conferred such honor.

ISSUE:

*s the school president liable for damages+

HELD:

[I]It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful

ordeal, which was brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty

and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper.

The Solicitor !eneral tried to co"erup the petitioner's deliberate

omission to inform #iss Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of

the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's decision. !ranting

this to be true, it was ne"ertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the

said decision. $e could ha"e done so considering that he recei"ed the

decision %%% and e"en though he sent it bac& with the records of the

case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it, which consisted of only

pages. #oreo"er, the petitioner should ha"e had the decency to meet

#r. Delmo, the girl's father, and inform the latter, at the "ery lest of

the decision. This, the petitioner failed to do, and not without the

attendant bad faith which the appellate court correctly pointed out inits decision.

(ee "s De !u)man, *+ acts

-n o"ember /, 01/, a freelance salesman of respondent #otorcars,

Inc., 2then Delta #otors 3orporation4 named 5rsenio Tumibay signed

in behalf of Domingo Tupa) its 6ranch #anager in #a&ati, a price

7uotation 289hibit :5:4 and deli"ered to petitioner 5le9 6. (ee for the

sale of one 204 unit Toyota 3orolla (iftbac&, 01/ model, with the

7uoted price of ;0>.>> plus miscellaneous e9penses of

;0>,>.>>. -n the same date, petitioner (ee as customer, signed the

"ehicle sales order 289hibit :3:4 The deli"ery of the sub?ect "ehicle was

within the month of o"ember, 01/.

In "iew of such order, petitioner (ee deposited the amount of

;0,>>>.>> on o"ember 0>, 01/ as re7uired in the aforesaid price

7uotation, to which Tumibay wrote petitioner the information that the

#otorcars Inc., had ac&nowledged receipt of the deli"ery receipt for

petitioner. Thereupon, on December 0@, 01/, petitioner's counsel,

5tty. Doroteo 5. Dadal, wrote #r. icolas -. 3arrance?a, *r., 89ecuti"e

Vice;resident of #otorcars, demanding for deli"ery of the said Toyotacar. The respondent car company replied on December 01, 01/,

through its counsel 5tty. 6en?amin S. 6enito, that due to the sudden

change of prices by the car manufacturer, they had decided to e9ercise

the option contained in the "ehicle sales order which statedA

:Bhene"er deposits are made by customers for "ehicles, parts and

ser"ices ordered, the sales for such "ehicles, parts or ser"ices shall be

at the option of #otorcars, Inc., and refund of the deposits shall be

made upon re7uest and without undue delay should such option be

e9ercised.:

The respondent car company thus offered to refund petitioner'sdeposit of ;0,>>>.>>.

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+esponded appealed to S3. S3 confirmed 35's decision in toto and

case was remanded to T3.

;etitioner filed a #otion for Brit of 89ecution. ;ri"ate +espondent filed

#otion to uash Brit of 89ecution on the ground that Delta #otors

3orporation has closed shop. #otion to 7uash was e"entually denied

and an alias writ of e9ecution was filed and respondent company

continued to defy such order.

5fter some bac& and forth including a motion for contempt,

respondent ?udge ruled in fa"or of pri"ate respondent.

$ence the petition.

Issue

B- there was breach of contractE

+uling

The 3ourt ta&es notice of the fact that as alleged in the 3omment and

#emorandum of respondent company and contained in the 7uestioned

order, which is not disputed by the petitioner, that while the #otion for

3ontempt was pending before the respondent trial court, petitioner

indicated his willingness to accept a secondhand car but failed to

show its a"ailability as the classified ads refer to 01/< #odels and

could not be said that they are the same models as what appears in

89hibit :3:, the sales order. In addition, respondent car company e"en

offered the amount of ;F>,>>> as a gesture to buy peace.

It is the contention of the petitioner that the obligation is notimpossible for the 01/ Toyota cars are still a"ailable in the mar&et

today. It is howe"er the contention of respondent company that the

obligation is impossible for the car manufacturer had closed shop and

no longer manufacturing 01/ models of Toyota much less deli"er the

car specified in 89hibit :3:

The 7uestion is, should respondent #otorcars be made liable to fulfill a

seemingly impossible obligationE

It is wellsettled that when after a ?udgment has become final and

e9ecutory, facts and circumstances transpire which render its

e9ecution impossible or un?ust, the interested party may as& a

competent court to stay its e9ecution or pre"ent its enforcement.

Gnfortunately it is not possible for #otorcars to comply with the writ

of e9ecution since admittedly, the then Delta #otors who

manufactured 01/ models of Toyota (iftbac& had already closed shop,

but be this as it may, there is no 7uestion that indeed there was a

perfected contract of sale between petitioner (ee and pri"ate

respondent #otorcars pursuant to this 3ourt's 2through the Third

Di"ision4 resolution dated 5ugust 0, 01/=.

The relief left for petitioner (ee is that found under

5rticle 00=> of the 3i"il 3ode which pro"idesA :Those who in the

performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or

delay, and those who in any manner contra"ene the tenor thereof, are

liable for damages.: