case digests part 4

7/28/2019 Case Digests Part 4

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CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARYARBITRATOR MONTAOG.R. No. 182836. October 13, 2009

FACTS

1. Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation(Continental Steel) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and

Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

2. The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife had apremature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died

during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.

3. Petitioner immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims forbereavement leave and other death benefits.

4. It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that the provisions of the CBA didnot specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have

acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA

death benefits.

5. Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of anunborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the

entitlement to the benefits, namely:

a. death andb. status as legitimate dependent,

6. none of which existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel contended that only one withcivil personality could die, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code which provides:

Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall beconsidered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later

with the conditions specified in the following article.

Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time itis completely delivered from the mothers womb. However, if the fetus had an

intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within

twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon therights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by

will.

7. Hence according to the petitioner, the unborn child never died because it never acquiredjuridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned

that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the

term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality.

8. Labor arbiter Montao argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parentsfrom the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support;

he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of

someone else, specifically, his/her mother.

9. Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the Labor Arbiters resolution. Hence thispetition.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die

2. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent

3. Whether or not any ambiguity in CBA provisions shall be settled in favor of the employee

RULING

1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legaldefinition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires

personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born.

Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil

personality is not relevant in this case.

The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover,

while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it

does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first

before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life.

No less than the Constitution (Article II, Section 12, 1987 Constitution) recognizes the life ofthe unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother.

If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being

delivered, qualifies as death.

2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not havereached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos

wife, for sustenance. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such

that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality. Without such

qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the

unborn fetus in the mothers womb.

3. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in theinterpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor oflabor. In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. As

decided by this Court, any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor

pursuant to the social justice policy. (Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199

SCRA 265 (1991)])

Bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if

possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved

one. It cannot be said that the parents gr ief and sense of loss arising from the death of their

unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery,

is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED.


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GELUZvs CAG.R. No. L-16439. July 20, 1961

FACTS

1. Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married. Desiringto conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio

Geluz.

2. After her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELECand her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by Geluz.

3. Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, inconsideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband did not know of, nor consented to the

abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private respondent, sued petitioner for damages based on the

third and last abortion.

4. The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages,P700.00 as attorneys fee and the cost of the suit.

5. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence the petition for certiorari.ISSUE

1. Whether or not an unborn child has juridical capacity so that if the unborn child incurs injury,his parents may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child

RULING

1. Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, ofcourse, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as never

having possessed legal personality.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to the

one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the

unborn child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively

accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the

unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to

anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality.

It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 ofthe Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by

imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case,

the child was dead when separated from its mothers womb.

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages must

be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the rights of

the deceased child, its right to life and physical integrity.

CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 40Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are

favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.

ARTICLE 41For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the

mothers womb. However, if the fetus had an intra -uterine life of less than seven months, it is not

deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

ARTICLE 42Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the

deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

ARTICLE 2206

The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousandpesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

1. The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and theindemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be

assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical

disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

2. If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, therecipient who is not an heir called to the decedents inheritance by the law of testate or

intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period

not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

3. The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased maydemand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

ARTICLE 2217

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirchedreputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of

pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the

defendants wrongful act for omission.

ARTICLE 2230In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime

was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct

from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.


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Florendo, JR. vs ColomaG.R. No. 60544. May 19, 1984

FACTS

1. Adela Salindon, an awardee of a Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation (hereinafterreferred to as PHHC) lot filed a complaint for ejectment against William Vasquez and Silverio

Nicolas with the respondent court on the grounds that private respondents are squatting on

her property.

2. Private respondent Vasques and Nicolas alleged that he had been in continuous, open,adverse and actual possession and occupation of the lot since 1950 and for more than 10

years respectively. Both also questioned the city court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of

the action stating that the facts alleged in the complaint involved questions of title or

ownership of the lot, matters outside the jurisdiction of the respondent court.

3. While the case was pending, private respondent defendant Silverio Nicolas died. He wassubstituted by his wife Erlinda who filed an amended answer with third party complaint

against PHHC.

4. Third-Party defendant PHHC admitted the sale of the disputed land to Adela Salindon.According to PHHC, the award of the lot to Salindon was a valid exercise of the PHHC's

powers and could not be collaterally assailed; the illegal acts of the defendants could not

ripen into legal ones; the defendants being squatters have not acquired any vested right over

the property and that, since the subject lot is not a relocation area intended for squatters, the

defendants cannot claim preference in the award of the lot. The PHHC also questioned thejurisdiction of the city court over the third party complaint on the following grounds:

(1) cancellation of the deed of sale executed in favor of Salindon amounts to an action forrescission of contract which falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the

Court of First Instance; and

(2) the action involves title or possession of real property, hence the action against PHHCshould be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

5. Trial court decided in favor of the respondents. Salindon appealed to the Court of Appeals.While appeal was pending, Salindon died but there was no substitution of part hence

Salindon continued to be the appellant in the appealed case. Salindons estate was settled

and subject lot was transferred with a new TCT to the petitioners.

6. CA issued a resolution ordering Salindon to show cause why her appeal should not bedismissed. After several months, CA issued another resolution dismissing the appeal for

having been abandoned and respondents filed for motion to cancel TCT in Salindons name so

property can be transferred in their names.

7. Petitioners who are Salindons heirs, filed a manifestation and opposition to the motionsmade by the respondents claiming that since there was no legal representative substituted

for Salindon after her death, the appellate court lost its jurisdiction over the case and

consequently, the proceedings in the said court are null and void.

8. Hence the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not the death of Salindon extinguished her civic personality in the case at bar

RULING

1. There is no dispute that an ejectment case survives the death of a party. The superveningdeath of plaintiff-appellant Salindon did not extinguish her civil personality (Republic v.

Bagtas, 6 SCRA 242; Vda. de Haberes v. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 534). Section 17, Rule 3 ofthe Rules of Court provides:

After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court

shall order upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased

to appear and to be substituted for the deceased within a period ofthirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. . . .

Section 16 of Rule 3 provides:

Whenever a party to a pending case dies . . . it shall be the duty of his

attorney to inform the court promptly of such death . . . and to give the

name and residence of the executor, administrator, guardian or other

legal representative of the deceased . . .

In the case at bar, Salindon's counsel after her death on December 11, 1976 failed to inform

the court of Salindon's death. The appellate court could not be expected to know or take

judicial notice of the death of Salindon without the proper manifestation from Salindon's

counsel. In such a case and considering that the supervening death of appellant did notextinguish her civil personality, the appellate court was well within its jurisdiction to proceed

as it did with the case. There is no showing that the appellate court's proceedings in the case

were tainted with irregularities.

It appears that the petitioners are heirs of Adela Salindon. In fact, it was because of this

relationship that the petitioners were able to transfer the title of Adela Salindon over the

subject lot to their names. After Salindon's death, the disputed lot was included as part of her

estate. Salindon's counsel, whose acts bind his client, failed to comply with his duty to the

court and his deceased client. Considering all this, the appellate decision is binding andenforceable against the petitioners as successors-in-interest by title subsequent to thecommencement of the action(Section 49 (b) Rule 39, Rules of Court).

Furthermore, ". . . judgment in an ejectment case may be enforced not only against

defendants therein but also against the members of their family, their relatives, or privies

who derived their right of possession from the defendants" (Ariem v. De los Angeles, 49 SCRA

343). Under the circumstances of this case, the same rule should apply to the successors-in-

interest if the decision should go against the original plaintiff.

Under the circumstances of this case, the ownership of the disputed lot remains with the NationalHousing Authority. The NHA may use the authority of this decision to evict the private respondents andtheir successors-in-interest from the property and deal with the lot according to its present powers

vested by law and in the light of its current policies and programs.

This decision, however, should not be interpreted to preclude the private respondents from introducing

evidence and presenting arguments before the National Housing Authority to establish any right to

which they may be entitled under the law and the facts of the case.


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WHEREFORE, the decision dated May 20, 1975, the writ of execution dated August 3, 1981 and the order

to annul TCT Nos. 138007 and 239729 dated March 1, 1982, all issued by the respondent city court are

nullified and set aside for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion

insofar as the private respondents are concerned. Considering our findings as regards the petitioner, the

Registrar of Deeds for Quezon City is hereby ordered to cancel TCT No. 239729 in the names of the

petitioners and TCT No 138007 in the name of Adela Salindon. The National Housing Authority is

declared the owner of the disputed lot and is directed to take possession of the same and to either hold

or dispose of it according to law and this decision.

SO ORDERED.


ARTICLE 42Civil personality is extinguished by death.

The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract

and by will.

ARTICLE 1156An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do. (n)

ARTICLE 1157Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;(2) Contracts;(3) Quasi-contracts;(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and(5) Quasi-delicts.

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs LuceroG.R. No. L-60101. August 31, 1983

FACTS

1. Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines as master/captainto its vessel M/V Eastern Minicon. Under the contract, his employment was good for (1)

round trip only, the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the

Port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed that part of the captain's salary, while

abroad, should be paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila.

2. Thereafter, while the vessel was en route from Hongkong to Manila, the vessels encounteredsituation which has difficulty to further continue its voyage. Thereafter, the Company paid the

corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew members, except respondent Josephine

Lucero, who refused to accept the same.

3. Mrs. Lucero filed a complaint with the National Seamen Board, for payment of her accruedmonthly allotment since March 1980 and for continued payment of said allotments until the

M/V Minicon shall have returned to the port of Manila.

4. The Board ruled in favor of Mrs. Josephine Lucero and against petitioner Company on thegrounds that that the presumption of death could not be applied since

ISSUE

1. Whether or not the civic personality of Capt. Lucero was extinguished when the vessel failedto return to port or only after 4 years after the loss of the vessel

2. Whether or not the rule on presumption of death prevails over the rule of preponderance ofevidence to establish death in determining when Captain Luceros civic personality was

extinguished

RULING

1. We are unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the respondent NLRC. There isthus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and disappearance of the

M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite logically, are sufficient to lead us

to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had perished with

it. Upon this premise, the rule on presumption of death under Article 391(1) of the Civil Code

must yield to the rule of preponderance of evidence.

Indeed, we cannot permit Article 391 to override, or be substituted for, the facts established

in this case which logically indicate to a moral certainty that Capt. Lucero died shortly after hehad sent his last radio message at 9:50 p.m. on February 16, 1980.




and by will.

ARTICLE 391, Section 1The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the

heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, whohas not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;


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VICTORY SHIPPING LINES, INC vs WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSIONG.R. No. L-9268. November 28, 1959

FACTS1. On February 23, 1954, Pedro Icong, an employee of the petitioner, was sleeping on board

the latter's vessel, M/V "Miss Leyte," when it caught fire. Awakened by the fire, Pedro

Icong jumped overboard. Since then, he has not been heard of. The employee was

unmarried, receiving daily P4.00 with meals estimated at P1.20, and respondent Juan

Icong, his father, was his partial dependent.

2. On April 30, 1954, the latter filed with the Workmen's Compensation Commission and thepetitioner a notice of claim for death compensation. The petitioner reported the matter to

the Commission only on August 17, 1954.

3. The Commission rendered an award in favor of respondent Juan Icong in the sum ofP2,038.40, plus P200.00 for burial expenses and P20.00 as legal fee.

4. The petitioner has appealed to this Court for the review of the award and has presentedthree points of law, namely:

a. That Article 391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines was not applied in

determining whether or not Pedro Icong should be considered dead;

b. That Section 49 of Republic Act No. 772, providing for the right of the employer

to notice and hearing of the claim against him, was disregarded;

c. That Pedro Icong should have been held guilty of notorious negligence injumping overboard.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not Icongs civic personality was extinguished when he jumped off the ship oronly after 4 years a fter his disappearance at sea

2. Whether or not the rule on presumption of death prevails over the rule of preponderance ofevidence to establish death in determining when Icongs civic personality was extinguished

RULING

1. In the instant case, none of the foregoing conditions appear to exit. The fate of petitioner'svessel is not unknown. It was not lost or missing. As a matter of fact, it had been definitely

destroyed by fire and washed ashore. And in view of the further fact that when petitioner's

vessel caught fire, Pedro Icong jumped overboard and since then had not been heard from,

the aforementioned rule on presumption of death does not apply. Instead the rule on

preponderance of evidence applies to establish the fact of death.




and by will.

ARTICLE 391, Section 1The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the

heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, whohas not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane

RULES OF COURT PROVISIONS

Rule 131, Section 3. Disputable presumptions

The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome

by other evidence:

(w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee stilllives, he is considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after

an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of

five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate

among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft which is missing,who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;

case digests part 4

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