case 2:07-cv-00216-rsm document 51-9 filed 10/14/09 page 1...

Case 2:07-cv-00216-RSM Document 51-9 Filed 10/14/09 of 2

This document was created with Win2PDF available at http://www.win2pdf.com.The unregistered version of Win2PDF is for evaluation or non-commercial use only.This page will not be added after purchasing Win2PDF.

Case 2:07-cv-00216-RSM Document 51-9 Filed 10/14/09 of 2

http://www.win2pdf.com

Case 2:07-cv-00216-RSM Document 51-10 Filed 10/14/09 Page 1 of 2

DECLARATION OF JOHN R. PRUKOP INSUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXTEND TIME - 1

John R. Prukop, Pro Se11802 Meridian East, #142

Puyallup, WA 98373

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The Honorable Ricardo S. Martinez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

JOHN R. PRUKOP, Pro Se

Plaintiff,

vs.

KING COUNTY SHERIFF, andMETROPOLITAN KING COUNTY,a Municipal Corporation,

Defendants.

)))))))))))))))

Case No. 2:07-cv-00216 RSM

PLAINTIFFS’ DECLARATION INSUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXTENDTIME

I, JOHN R. PRUKOP, hereby declare as follows, based upon information and belief:

1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action, representing myself in propria

persona. I am over the age of 18, am competent to testify and base the contents

of this declaration on my own personal knowledge and/or pleadings in this

matter.

2. In all prior pleadings submitted and filed by Defendant King County in this action,

I have always been served with separate paper copies by Certified Mail sent to

my mailbox address at 11802 Meridian E., #142, Puyallup, WA 98373, in addition

to receiving “ECF” or electronic notifications via e-mail over the World Wide Web.

Case 2:07-cv-00216-RSM Document 45 Filed 09/18/09 Page 1 of 4



Puyallup, WA 98373

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

3. With respect to Defendant King County’s latest voluminous pleadings in the

nature of a Motion for Summary Judgment and related declarations and exhibits

filed on or about August 27, 2009, I did not receive any paper copies of these

pleadings by Certified Mail at my mailbox address as had been the normal,

previous customary practice by King County. Instead, as evidenced by the

Court’s Docket in this action, Document #42 purports to be a “Certificate of

Service” by Defendant King County Sheriff, which is signed on August 28, 2009

by one Efrosina Mileva, but it states that I was served via electronic filing with 7-

documents. There is no mention of any copies being served by U.S. Mail.

4. On or about June 26, 2009, I was subpoenaed to appear for oral deposition

testimony by King County. Because of my homeless and unemployed condition I

did not have funds with which to drive to Seattle, pay for parking or fuel. By

stipulation, King County agreed to conduct the oral deposition at the County-City

Building in Tacoma. The same Efrosina Milvea, as above, executed an “Affidavit

of Service by Mailing” of that Deposition Subpoena and Notice of Deposition.

5. During the oral deposition that was conducted in Tacoma on or about July 9,

2009, I was asked about my current living condition, and at that time my family

and I were being housed at a local hotel that had Internet service. However,

since that time, my ability to connect to the Internet has not been possible, until

just recently, when on or about September 10, 2009 I was able to receive e-mail

again and connect to the World Wide Web.

6. I did not receive any paper pleadings by Certified Mail, alerting me to the fact that

a Motion for Summary Judgment had been filed by King County and therefore

need additional time to respond, as I do have evidence to support my claims.

7. I attempted to electronically file via the ECF system my Motion to Extend Time,




Puyallup, WA 98373

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Proposed Order, and this Declaration in Support, beginning at 3:30PM on

September 17, 2009, but experienced difficulties in logging into the ECF system.

I thereafter contacted “Valerie” at the ECF Help Desk at the toll-free number 866-

323-929 and was finally able to resolve the problems and log on briefly at 4:50

PM PDT and file the Motion to Extend Time. However, I was unable to file this

Declaration in Support until much later in the evening.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the

foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

DATED this 17th day of September, 2009.

/s/ John R. Prukop

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was this 17th day of September, 2009

filed electronically via the Court’s CM/ECF system, which effects service via e-mail upon

the following:

Stacy A. Connole, WSBA #33016King County Deputy Prosecuting AttorneyCivil Division, Employment Section500 Fourth Avenue, Suite 900Seattle, WA 98104Tel: 206-296-8820Email: [email protected]

John W. Cobb, WSBA #14304King County Deputy Prosecuting AttorneyCivil Division, Employment Section500 Fourth Avenue, Suite 900Seattle, WA 98104Tel: 206-296-0430Email: [email protected]

/s/ John R. Prukop


AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT

- 1 -

37803 42nd Ave. So.Auburn, Washington 98001

TEL: (253) 927-0805

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

IN THE KING COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, SW DIVISION, BURIEN

IN AND FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

State of Washington,

Plaintiff,

vs.

John Ross Prukop,

Defendant.

)))))))))))))))

NO. 250347752

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN R. PRUKOP, In re:Telephone conversation with Sharon A. Kline,Registered Owner of “A04033M”, a 1988Nissan pickup truck, used by Steven LeeRieger, Jesse Lee Copley and KennethEdward Copley, in the commission of a crimeagainst Defendant under initiating event, KingCounty Sheriff CAD Incident #05-347736.


STATE OF WASHINGTON )) SS

COUNTY OF PIERCE )

After being duly sworn upon oath I do hereby depose and state:

1. That I am the defendant as well as a victim to the action herein.



- 2 -


TEL: (253) 927-0805

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

2. That I am over 21 years of age and otherwise competent to be a witness to the

matters herein.

3. That this affidavit is submitted to impeach a type-written letter from Sharon A.

Kline, as originally submitted to the King County Superior Court at the Regional

Justice Center in Kent, WA, on January 23, 2006, on behalf of Steven Lee

Rieger, Respondent of an Anti-Harassment/Protection Order by Petitioner

John Ross Prukop, issued by Judge Stephenson under No. 06-2-00873-1 KNT

(a copy of which is attached hereto), in addition to being presented exparte to

the King County District Court, SW Division, by DPA Christopher Nielsen,

WSBA #36662, in a hearing before Judge Charles Delaurenti on 2/08/2006.

4. That this affidavit has been reduced from a “Note to File” of a telephone

conversation by defendant herein, created on January 6, 2006, from a direct

and verbatim exchange between defendant and Sharon A. Kline, the registered

owner of a 1988 Nissan pickup truck, WA License “A04033M”, that was driven

by Steven L. Rieger with his associates-in-fact, Kenneth E. Copley and Jesse

L. Copley in the early morning hours of 11/27/05, which necessitated this

action.

On 1/6/06, I received a cellular telephone call at 10:03AM from Sharon Kline in Olympia,

the registered owner of the 1988 Nissan pickup truck, WA License “A04033M”. Her telephone

number, as displayed on my screen, was (360) 866-4476. I spoke with her for a duration of 14-

minutes. She was returning my call from on or about 12/30/2005, in which I represented myself

as “John Ross”, which is my natural, as well as my professional broadcast name of fourty-

years, and that I was privately investigating a criminal matter that occurred on 11/27/2005

involving her Nissan pickup truck driven by a third party at two o’clock in the morning.



- 3 -


TEL: (253) 927-0805

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Within approximately a half-hour of receiving her call, I received two cellular telephone

calls that were noted as being “Private” and both times when I answered, someone hung up on

me without saying anything. These two calls were received at 10:38AM for a duration of :08

seconds, and the other call at 10:41AM for a duration of :13 seconds. A third “Private” call

came in at 12:13PM, and I selected the “Ignore” function and did not answer the call. The

caller apparently hung-up as there was no reference to duration of the call.

At 12:20PM, I receive a fourth call, identified as coming from 253-495-4381. I elected to

answer and the caller stated, “Is this Ross?” in a sour, sully manner. I said, “Yes,

this is Ross, who is calling please?” The caller stated, “This is STEVE!” in a loud, drawn-out,

almost slurred tone, breathing heavily into the phone. I asked, “Who is this, Steve who?” He

repeated himself, “You don’t know a Steve?” I stated, “No, I do not know a Steve, goodbye”

and hung-up. At 12:22PM, the same person again called and this time I selected the “Ignore”

function and did not answer the call. It is obviously transparent that this series of telephone

calls had been generated by “Steven Lee Rieger” and that Ms. Kline had provided him with my

cellular number within minutes of our conversation, for whatever reason.

I called the Qwest Operator to determine where the prefix “495” originated from within

the 253 area code, and she informed me it was Tacoma. I then called 411 to obtain reverse

directory information, but was told that there is no listing for this number, that it could be either

“unlisted” or perhaps a cellular number.

The nature of my conversation with Sharon Kline was to ascertain whether or not she

happened to know where her 1988 Nissan pickup truck was on the morning of 11/27/2005 at

2AM and who might have been driving it. She told me she didn’t have any idea.

I then offered that a Steven Rieger had been driving it, and that he had been involved in

an altercation involving two other individuals with the last name of Copley, and that while King

County Sheriff’s Deputies were talking to witnesses, her Nissan pickup was active in the area



- 4 -


TEL: (253) 927-0805

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

and had returned to an individuals house in the Jovita Heights area with intent to assault and

inflict bodily harm upon this particular individual (me). She wanted to know the name of that

individual, and I told her the matter was under investigation.

Ms. Kline instantly recognized the name “Copley” and stated that she had met Jesse

Copley one time, and was aware of his criminal background, and further, was discouraged that

Steven Rieger was still associating with him. After offering the name of “Steven Rieger” as

being the driver of her 1988 Nissan pickup truck on the morning of 11/27/2005, she then

volunteered the following information, without any hesitation, verbatim:

Steven Rieger is an easily led person, usually not an instigator of things, but a follower.

Steven did not have permission to be driving her Nissan pickup, especially at two O’clock in

the morning. She couldn’t understand why he was hanging out with the Copley’s, and that

his mother would be extremely concerned about this, suggesting that she thought that

Steven had finally broken ties from Copley’s bad influences.

Ms. Kline stated that Steven Rieger had stayed with her and her son David at her home in

Federal Way last year, that he had living accommodations in the basement of her home.

She stated the address as being 30224 24th Ave. SW, Federal Way, WA.

She described her son David as suffering from severe mental disorders and whom mental

health professionals had been seeing and working with on a regular basis.

She next told me that while mental health professionals had visited her home last year

looking after her son David, they had advised her that there was something definitely

“wrong” with Steven Rieger himself, and that he had some very serious mental issues that

needed to be dealt with, and that it was not in the best interests of her son David that

Steven Rieger be around her son or interact with him in any manner.

Ms. Kline stated that Steven Rieger suffers from “short-term memory loss problems,” in

addition to other mental sensory problems.



- 5 -


TEL: (253) 927-0805

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I asked where she currently lives and she told me in Olympia. I then asked if I could have

her current mailing address, which she offered as: 6223 Cooper Point Road NW, Olympia,

WA 98502. She stated that she had been at this residence since approximately December

1st, and that Steven Rieger had helped her move some of her belongings with the Nissan

pickup truck.

Ms. Kline offered that Steven Rieger is presently staying at her home in Federal Way, until

it is sold, so that her home has a “lived-in” look. (King County Sheriff Police Report 05-

347752 reveals that Steven Rieger provided the address of 616 119th Ave. E., Edgewood,

WA, as being his current residential address.)

When I offered that her Nissan pickup truck had been seen at 616 119th Avenue East in

Edgewood, on or about New Years Day, she first stated that this location must be his

mother’s house, and then suggested that it could possibly be his ex-wife’s residence, a

Katy J. Jack-Rieger, with whom Steven Rieger had two young daughters that he loved very

much. She offered that Katy J. Jack-Rieger was a manic-depressive personality and had

been partly responsible for at least some of Steven Rieger’s mental issues.

When I offered evidence that Katy J. Jack-Rieger was the petitioner in an order for

protection issued on 1/22/2004 under Pierce County Superior Court Civil Case 04-2-00206-

6 against respondent Steven Rieger, she stated that Katy was a liar, that she was the one

with the problem, which contributed to some of Steven’s mental health problems.

Ms. Kline stated that her son David had told her about having met Kenneth Copley, about

how Kenny wanted to “hang-out” with him about a year ago and she definitely did not want

that to occur, especially after having met Jesse Copley at some point and having discussed

Jesse and Kenneth Copley with Steven Rieger’s mother.

Ms. Kline offered that Steven Rieger had grown up with the Copley’s early on and that

Copley’s seemed to be in trouble with the law on a regular basis.



- 6 -


TEL: (253) 927-0805

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I offered Ms. Kline a toll-free number to King County, 1-800-326-6165, and that she could

contact the King County Sheriff’s Office and obtain information concerning what I had

discussed with her concerning the events of 11/27/2005 under King County Incident

Number 05-347736 and 05-347752.

Ms. Kline wanted to know what happened, and I briefly informed her that Steven Rieger

was an accomplice to Kenneth and Jesse Copley’s criminal acts on the morning of

11/27/2005; that Mr. Rieger had been the driver of at least her 1988 Nissan Pickup truck,

“A04033M”, if not also a gold colored Cadillac, “593-NAV”, that had attempted to run-down

an individual in his driveway on 42nd Avenue South in the Jovita Heights area at

approximately 12:55AM after the vehicle had left from a known drug house, the Harrison

residence; that her Nissan pickup had returned to the scene of the crime with the same

three individuals that had been in the Cadillac, at least four times, beginning at 1:30AM,

including passing northbound slowly past the victim’s house while King County Deputy

Sheriff’s were at the Harrison trouble house obtaining information less than 500 feet away;

that the Nissan had returned again southbound to the victim’s house within minutes after

Sheriff’s Deputies had departed from the area, and it was at this time, approximately

2:00AM, that Jesse Copley stepped out of the Nissan and came onto the victim’s property

with intent to inflict bodily harm on this particular individual; that his brother, Kenneth

Copley, who had previously assaulted the victim on April 30, 2002 was seated in the rear of

the Nissan; and further, that it was Steven Rieger who was not only driving the pickup, but

who was yelling threats and obscenities out the window. I offered that the apparent reason

why Steven Rieger was in the company of the Copley’s, was that both Kenneth and Jesse

Copley had suspended or revoked driver’s licenses.



- 7 -


TEL: (253) 927-0805

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Ms. Kline stated that the Copley’s were “bad news” and that she was very surprised Steven

Rieger was still “mixed-up” with them after all this time, and that his mother would be very,

very disappointed.

From the sound of Ms. Kline’s voice, she was going to make a call to Steven Rieger’s

mother immediately and find out what’s going on. There was a sense of urgency to her

voice and a sense of remorse that her vehicle had been involved in a criminal act.

FURTHER, the affiant sayeth not.

____________________________________John R. Prukop, Defendant-Victim

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ______ day of February 2006.

____________________________________Notary Public in and for the State ofWashington, residing at_________________.My Commission expires:________________

Presented By:

______________________________John R. Prukop, Defendant-Victim, Pro Se


CCW

From: "CCW" <[email protected]>To: "KCSO Deputy Wayne S. Goding" <[email protected]>Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2005 8:58 PMSubject: John the Dispatcher

Page 1 of 1

10/6/2009

Hi Wayne,

Just curious what the problem is with 'John the Dispatcher' and the comments he always makes regarding me over the air, this time on TAC-3? I'm sincerely trying to help curb the crap that's going on in this neighborhood, yet I'm being paraded over the air to look like a fool by this guy and all of his little innuendo and snide remarks everytime I call something in. What gives, anyway?

Those two vehicles I called into dispatch this morning at 3:22AM, and which radio broadcast on TAC-3 about 3:30AM... the blue and white square looking van was in the lead, followed by a black 4-dr compact; the first three of the black vehicle's license plate number was "288". The vehicles came thru the goat trail from 49th Ave South via 376th to 42nd Ave. So. and down the hill past our place around 2:30AM to the countyline. It was a very still and quiet night, and because the van had a rather loud exhaust, I heard them go up the hill NB on 49th Ave. So. a few minutes later.

Just a few minutes before I called dispatch, I observed these same two vehicles loop through from 49th Ave via S. 376th with the van in the lead again, and eventually go NB on Military Road from 42nd Ave. I thought that was kinda weird and maybe they were up to no good, because when I came by Copley's late Sunday afternoon after completing the KC Deputy entry level tests, I saw that same blue and white van parked over there. Unfortunately I wasn't able to get a plate.

BTW, I passed the physical agility testing with no problem on Saturday. Did the sprint in 61-seconds; maxed out on push-ups at 35; did the same number of sit-ups; and did the 1.5 mile run in 14:20, which I need to improve on. I've just never been a 'runner.' How'd your 22-year old friend do?

Tell 'John the Dispatcher' to cut me a little slack, will ya? He may have to endure a little humility before he knows it.

J.R. Prukop


APPLICATION FOR WRIT OFHABEAS CORPUS - 1

Kurt E. BoehlAttorney At Law

1001 4th Ave, 32nd FloorSeattle, WA 98154(206) 261-5927

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON KING COUNTY

JOHN ROSS PRUKOP,

Petitioner,

v.

STEVE THOMPSON, Director of KingCounty Jail,

Hons. Judge Victoria M. Seitz KingCounty District Court, SouthwestDivision,

and

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondents.

)))))))))))))))))

No: 260050133.

APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEASCORPUS, RCW 7.36, AND, ALTERNATIVELY,A WRIT OF CERTIORARI, RCW 7.16.040,APPLICATION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

I. APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

John Ross Prukop, by his attorney, Kurt E. Boehl, petitions this court

for a writ of habeas corpus under RCW 7.36 et seq, and Wash. Const. art. 4,

sec. 6, directed to Judge V. Seitz of the King County District Court,

entitled State v. Prukop, King County District Court #260050133, requiring





1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

respondent to return to this court at a specific time and place and present

“the authority or cause of the restraint of the party in his custody.” RCW

7.36.100 (1)-(3).

Mr. Prukop asserts that his is being unlawfully detained and petitions

this court in good faith for release from his detention. Mr. Prukop alleges

that his detention is unlawful because: (1) his bail is excessive and in

violation of the Eight Amendment of the United States Constitution and

Article 1, § 14 of the Washington State Constitution. Additionally, Mr.

Prukop was never allowed the opportunity to comply with the very court order

that he is now alleged to be in contempt of.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On 11/27/2005, John Ross Prukop was arrested and charged with one count

of Reckless Endangerment1, one count of Unlawful Aiming or Discharging of

Firearm2. Mr. Prukop was released on his own recognizance, and no conditions

of release were ordered. He was arraigned on 12/22/2005. On 1/25/2006, the

State requested a hearing to address conditions of Mr. Prukop’s release; that

hearing was scheduled for 2/8/2006.

On 2/08/2006, a hearing was held and Mr. Prukop was ordered to

surrender all firearms and his concealed weapons permit as conditions of

release. In addition, the court scheduled another hearing on conditions of

release for 2/10/2006. On 2/8/2006, deputies of the King County Sherriff’s

1 RCW 9A.36.0502 RCW 9.41.230





1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Office arrived at the Prukop’s residence, at which point Mr. Prukop

surrendered several firearms.

Associated Counsel for the Accused (“ACA”) was appointed through the

Office of Public Defense on 1/26/2006. ACA withdrew on 2/08/2006 and SCRAP3

was appointed. SCRAP withdrew due to conflict on 2/09/2006.

Current counsel, Kurt E. Boehl, was appointed by the Office of Public

Defense on 2/10/2006 at approximately 11:45 a.m., two hours before the second

hearing to address conditions of release. At approximately 1:30, Mr. Boehl

filed a Notice of Appearance with the State and the trial court. At this

time Mr. Boehl received discovery from the state, and was informed of the

nature of the present proceeding. The Honorable Judge Victoria Seitz

presided over the hearing to address conditions of release. Believing

additional time was needed in order to effectively represent Mr. Prukop’s

interest, Mr. Boehl requested a continuance on the matter. Judge Seitz,

however, granted Mr. Prukop a mere 45 minute continuance. In that time, Mr.

Boehl interviewed Mr. Prukop, four state witnesses, and reviewed documentary

evidence.

After the brief continuance, the court heard arguments and Judge Seitz

provided a ruling on the matter. The State presented four witnesses;

however, Mr. Prukop was not afforded an opportunity to gather witnesses in

his defense. Judge Seitz set Mr. Prukop’s bail at $100,000. The defense

objected to the bail, on grounds that it appeared punitive because Mr. Prukop

3 Society of Counsel Representing Accused Persons





1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

has no criminal record and was charged with a misdemeanor carrying a maximum

fine of $5,000.

As a condition of bail, the court again ordered Mr. Prukop to surrender

all firearms, or show proof of sale. On the record, the Prosecutor, Randi

Austell, granted Mr. Prukop the weekend to comply with the court’s order,

stipulating that Mr. Prukop must surrender all firearms, or provide proof of

sale, by Monday, 2/13/2006, at 2:00 p.m.

However, at 3:00 a.m. on 2/11/2006, while Mr. Prukop was still in

custody, a search warrant was executed on Mr. Prukop’s residence and several

firearms were seized. At 2:00 p.m. on 2/11/2006, Mr. Prukop posted bond and

returned home where he thoroughly searched his home and located additional

firearms. Immediately thereafter, Mr. Prukop notified his attorney, Mr.

Boehl, to discuss how the additional firearms should be surrendered.

On Monday, 2/13/2006, at 9:00 a.m. Mr. Boehl called the King County

Prosecutors Office and informed Ms. Austell of the additional firearms to be

surrendered. Although Mr. Boehl contacted the State five hours before the

2:00 p.m. deadline for Mr. Prukop’s compliance with the court order, Ms.

Austell informed Mr. Boehl that there was a warrant out for Mr. Prukop’s

arrest. Mr. Prukop would be charged with one count of contempt of court for

each firearm seized, and a SWAT team would be serving the warrant for Mr.

Prukop’s arrest. Consequently, Mr. Prukop immediately agreed to surrender

himself. Ms. Austell originally denied Mr. Prukop’s request. However, after

further discussion with the SWAT team officer, Ms. Austell agreed to call off

the SWAT team and allow Mr. Prukop to surrender himself to the Maple Valley





1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Sheriff’s Department. Mr. Prukop was taken into custody on the afternoon of

Monday 2/16/2006, and a cash-only bail was set at $500,000.

On 2/16/2006, Mr. Prukop was arraigned on Cause #260050133, and bail

was converted from cash-only to bondable. In addition, a hearing was

scheduled for 3/2/2006 to readdress bail. In the meantime, Mr. Prukop has

remained in custody, pending trial on one count of Reckless Endangerment, one

count of Unlawful Aiming or Discharging of Firearm (Cause #250347752), and

eleven counts of Criminal Contempt4 (Cause #260050133). His current bail is

set at $600,000. The docket for both cause numbers is attached as Appendix

1.

III. AUTHORITY & ARGUMENT

A. Mr. Prukop Has A Right To Challenge The King County District Court’sUnlawful Detention by Writ of Habeas Corpus.

The right to challenge an unlawful restraint by writ of habeas corpus

in Superior Court is guaranteed by the Washington Constitution. Const. art.

4, sec. 6. The superior courts have original jurisdiction over such writs.

Id. The Legislature also codified the right to petition for a writ of habeas

corpus:

Every person restrained of his liberty under any pretensewhatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire intothe cause of the restraint, and shall be delivered therefrom whenillegal.

RCW 7.36.010 (emphasis added.)

The writ of habeas corpus provides a unique judicial avenue to

challenge restraint on one’s liberty. “Whatever its other functions, the

4 RCW 7.21.010(1)(b),(c), and RCW 7.21.040.





1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

great and central office of the writ of habeas corpus is to test the legality

of a prisoner’s current detention.”5 The writ of habeas corpus not only

provides “a speedy device to test the constitutionality of detention,” but

also provides, where necessary, “an evidentiary hearing to resolve

significant factual or legal issues.”6

The writ of habeas corpus is an original proceeding, not simply a

review of a lower court’s ruling. The writ petition does not seek review,

but rather sets forth allegations detailing the unlawfulness of the

detention. RCW 7.36.030 (petition must specify where and by whom petitioner

has been restrained, the pretense of the restraint and the illegality). The

court hearing the writ shall proceed “in a summary way to hear and determined

the cause, and if no legal cause be shown for the restraint or continuation

thereof, shall discharge the party.” RCW 7.36.120. A petitioner may “allege

any new matter in evidence,” and witnesses may be called to testify in a

hearing on the writ. RCW 7.36.110; RCW 7.36.170. Denial of a writ of habeas

corpus is appealable as of right.7

The writ of habeas corpus stands in stark contrast to mechanisms of

review. Certiorari is available only where there is no appeal or no

“adequate remedy at law.”8 The right to proceed by writ of certiorari, by its

5 Toliver v. Olsen, 109 Wn.2d 607, 610, 746 P.2d 809 (1987), quoting Walker v.Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335, 336 19 L.Ed.2d 1215, 88 S.Ct. 962, reh’g denied,390 U.S. 1036 (1968).6 In re Honore v. Board of Prison Terms & Parole, 77 Wn.2d 660, 663-643, 466P.2d 485 (1970). See also

Little v. Rhay, 8 Wn.App. 725, 728, 509 P.2d 92(1973).7 RAP 2.2(a)(1), (13); Brower v. Charles, 82 Wn.App. 53, 914 P.2d 1202 (1996)(extraordinary writs are appealable).8 RCW 7.16.040; Commanda v. Carey, 143 Wn.2d 651, 655 23 P.3d 1086 (2001).





1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

very terms, is a “writ of review.”9 No such language appears in the habeas

statute.

In addition, pursuant to RCW 7.36.140, this court is required to

determine whether the habeas petitioner has been denied a right guaranteed by

the federal constitution.10

1. Mr. Prukop’s bail of $500,000 is excessive and in violation of theEight Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, §14 of the Washington State Constitution.

The $500,000 bail for King County District court cause #260050133 is

excessive, and warrants reversal of the district courts order based on the

defendants Writ of Habeaus Corpus. Although there is generally no absolute

constitutional right to bail11, there is an express constitutional prohibition

from bail which is excessive12 Where bail is permitted, it may not be used as

an instrument of oppression13 because the constitutional prohibition against

excessive bail exists to protect the defendant’s right to prepare a defense

and to protect the presumption of innocence.

The state and federal constitutional provisions regarding excessive

bail ensures that the common man, presumed innocent of crime, will be able to

enjoy the freedoms that the United States was founded upon: those being life,

liberty and the pursuit of happiness. To ensure that the presumption of

innocence is upheld and that excessive bail is not imposed, Washington State

has recently adopted revised court rules in regards to the release of the

accused. Under Washington’s Court Rules of Limited Jurisdiction 3.2 there is

9 RCW 7.16.040

10 Smith v. Whatcom County District Court, 147 Wn.2d 98, 113, 52 P.3d 485(2002).11 Broussard v. Parish of Orleans, 318 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,539 U.S. 915, 123 S. Ct. 2276, 156 L. Ed. 2d 130 (2003).12 U.S. Const. Art. 8.





1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

a presumption that the court will release the accused, in noncapital cases,

on personal recognizance. This presumption may be overcome if the court

determines (1) the personal recognizance will not reasonably assure the

accused’s appearance or (2) there is a showing that the accused will likely

commit a violet crime, seek to intimidate witnesses, or otherwise unlawfully

interfere with the administration of justice. CrRLJ 3.2

When the court set Mr. Prukop’s bail at $500,000 the only guidelines

the court should have considered were those relevant to the likelihood Mr.

Prukop would interfere with justice or endanger the community. Under

Washington’s Court Rules 3.2(e), the relevant factors for the court to

consider when determining bail for an accused who presents the risk of

interfering with justice or endangering the community include: the accused’s

criminal record; willingness of community member’s to vouch for the accused’s

reliability and likelihood of complying with the conditions of release; the

nature of the charge; the accused’s character and reputation; the accused’s

past record of threats to victims or witnesses; the accused’s past record of

committing offenses while on release; and the accused’s past record of

threatening to use firearms, especially to victim’s or witnesses. CrRLJ 3.2

Given the statutorily prescribed factors for determining bail, $500,000

was unconstitutionally excessive for the Contempt of Court charges against

Mr. Prukop. First, Mr. Prukop was never afforded the opportunity to

sequester witnesses to vouch for his reliability, character, and likelihood

to comply with the conditions of the release. In addition, Mr. Prukop

voluntarily surrendered himself when he learned there was a warrant for his

arrest.

13 Ex parte Ruiz, 129 S.W.3d 751 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2004).





1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

More importantly, the original crime of Reckless Endangerment and

Unlawful Aiming or Discharging of a Firearm is a misdemeanor, carrying a

maximum fine of $5000. However, bail was ultimately set at $500,000. In

addition, Mr. Prukop has no prior criminal record (Appendix 2), and is a

neighborhood watchman for his community. Also, Mr. Prukop has never

threatened witnesses.

After bail was set at $100,000 on 2/10/2006, Mr. Prukop did everything

in his power to comply with the conditions of his release and cooperate with

the authorities. Mr. Prukop was instructed, on the record, that he had until

2:00 PM, Monday, 2/13/2006 to surrender all of his weapons. However, on the

morning of 2/11/2006, a search warrant was executed on his residence while he

was in custody. Police seized several firearms which constituted the

Contempt of Court charges. Therefore, Mr. Prukop was never given the

opportunity to comply with the conditions of his release, even though he had

every intention to do so. Ultimately, the $500,000 bail is being applied to a

man who has no criminal record, was never given the opportunity to comply

with the court order, and was not legally in contempt of court.

Moreover, immediately upon posting bail on Saturday, 2/11/2006, Mr.

Prukop thoroughly searched his residence and found four additional firearms

which he surrendered on Monday morning. When Mr. Prukop was informed there

was a warrant for his arrest, he immediately surrendered himself to the King

County Sheriff’s Department.

According to State v. Smith, 84 Wn.2d 498, 505, 527 P.2d 674 (1974) the

Court of Appeals will not substitute the judgment of the trial court in

establishing bond when there “is substantial evidence to support its

findings”. In this case, there is insufficient evidence, and certainly not

substantial evidence, to warrant a $500,000 bail for Mr. Prukop and detain





1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

him in the King County Jail for weeks on end. In Smith, the trial court

imposed a $50,000 appellate bond after the defendant had been convicted of

First Degree Murder with a weapon’s enhancement. Id. It is unfounded to

place a $500,000 bail on a person that has complied with the Court’s order to

the best of his ability and immediately surrendered himself to the police on

the charges at issue.

The United States Supreme Court has found that “pretrial detention (on

the ground of future dangerousness) is “repugnant to the concept of

substantive due process…” United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984,

100-1001 (CA2 1986). The Supreme Court also noted “our criminal law system

holds persons accountable for past actions, not anticipated future actions.”

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697

(1987). Aside from the current allegation, there is no evidence that Mr.

Prukop poses a threat to community safety. Owning firearms is not against

the law; it is a right protected under the United States Constitution14. More

importantly, Mr. Prukop did everything in his power to comply with the

conditions of his release. Salerno concluded, “[i]n our society, liberty is

the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully

limited exception.” Id., at 755.

Finally, the initial bail of $100,000 for a gross misdemeanor is

extremely high, and Mr. Prukop with the assistance of family and friends was

able to pay $10,000 on the $100,000 premium. However, here setting Mr.

Prukop’s bail at $500,000 in clearly a violation of his constitutional right

against excessive bail.

B. Even if Habeas Relief is not available, this court has authority toreview the district court’s decision by Writ of Certiorari, RCW

14 U.S. Const. Amend. II; WA Const. Art. I, §24.





1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

7.16.040. Mr. Prukop asks, in the alternative, this court to issuesuch a writ.

The constitution grants superior courts authority to issue writs

created by the Legislature.15 Therefore, the RALJ, promulgated by this court

at the Legislature’s direction,16 did not supersede the statutory writs.17 The

statutory writ of certiorari is the only available means of obtaining

interlocutory review of decisions by courts of limited jurisdiction. City of

Seattle v. Williams, 101 Wn.2d 445, 454-56, 680 P.2d 1051 (1984) (writ

available to review pretrial ruling that defendant waived right to jury

trial). RCW 7.16.04018 authorizes the superior court to grant review if: (1)

the district court exceeded its jurisdiction or acted “illegally,” and (2)

there is no appeal or “plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law.”19 “Acting

illegally” is not limited to actions ultra vires20, but can include errors of

law. Keene, 108 Wn.App. at 639-40, 644; WPEA v Personnel Resources Bd., 91

Wn.App. 640, 652-54, 959 P.2d 143 (1997).

If these criteria are met, the statute directs the superior court to

issue a writ of certiorari to review the lower court’s ruling. RCW 7.16.040.

15 Art. IV sec. 6 (jurisdiction over “such special cases and proceedings asare otherwise provided for”; “appellate jurisdiction in cases arising injustices’ and other inferior courts in their respective counties as may beprescribed by law’; and the power to issue the enumerated constitutionalwrits)16 City of Seattle v Hessler, 98 Wn.2d 73, 76-80, 653 P.2d 631 (1982).17 RALJ 1.1(b)18 RCW 7.16.040 provides:A writ of review shall be granted by any court, except municipal or districtcourt, when an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicialfunctions, has exceeded the jurisdiction of such tribunal, board or officer,or one acting illegally, or to correct any erroneous or void proceeding notaccording to the course of the common law, and there is no appeal, nor in thejudgment of the court, any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.19 Seattle v Keene, 109 Wn.App 630, 636, 31 P.3d 1234 (2001)’ See City ofSeattle v Williams, 101 Wn.2d 445, 680 P.2d 1051 (1984).20 In excess of legal authority





1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The statute gives the superior court considerable latitude to determine

whether and when to intervene in an ongoing prosecution. The superior

court’s discretion is applied to both prerequisites for issuance of the

writ.21 The process of issuing a writ of certiorari is analogous to

discretionary review in the RAPs.22

Mr. Prukop’s petition satisfies both prerequisites for the issuance of

the statutory writ of certiorari.

1. The district court’s imposition of $500,00 bail on Mr. Prukop is notreviewable on RALJ appeal. The statutory writ is the only remedyavailable.

While Mr. Prukop has the right to appeal if convicted, the district

court’s imposition of excessive bail is not reviewable in that process.

Challenges to the conditions of pretrial release evade review by appeal.23

Once the trial is successfully completed, Mr. Prukop will no longer be

subject to the conditions of his pretrial release. If Mr. Prukop is

acquitted, the he has no means to remedy the district court’s unlawful

restriction of his liberty. Thus if a writ of habeas corpus does not lie,

the writ of certiorari is the only avenue of review of the district court’s

decision.

2. The district court acted “illegally.”

21 See Keene, 108 Wn.App. 644-45; Bushman v Newhollard Div. of Sperry Randcorp., 83 Wn.2d 429, 431-32, 518 P.2d 1078 (1974); Whitney, 69 Wn.2d at 260-61.

22 See RAP 2.3. The criteria for review in RAP 2.3 replaced the former rulesfor granting extraordinary writs. Crooks, “Discretionary Review of TrialCourt Decisions Under Washington Rules of Appellate Procedure,” 61Wash.L.Rev. 1541 (1986); Comments to RAP 2.3; 86 WN.2d at 1148, citing Oliverv American Motors, 70 Wn.2d 875, 425 P.2d 647 (1967) and State v Harris, 2Wn.App. 272, 469 P.2d 937 (1970).23 Westerman v Carey, 125 Wn.2d 277, 287, 885 P.2d 827 (1995) (“the issue ofbail is one which will escape review because the facts of the controversy areshort lived”).





1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The sole source of the municipal court’s authority to impose and adjust

conditions of pretrial release is CrRLJ 3.2. The district court acted in

complete disregard for the law in imposing the $500,000 bail. The magnitude

of the court’s unlawful action calls for the exercise of this court’s

appellate jurisdiction by statutory writ of certiorari.

This court is bound by the decision of the Court of Appeals in Keene.

There the court held that interlocutory review by statutory writ of

certiorari is governed by the criteria set forth in Bushman and Williams.24

In Bushman, the court applied the threshold for review set forth in State v

Whitney.25

“whether the alleged error is likely to recur, and whether it involves

‘patently erroneous construction of the statute’ by which the

prosecution has been deprived of an accepted and reliable means of

proof.”26

The standard for review echoes the guidelines that Williams adopted

form State v Harris.27 In Harris, the court held that the statutory writ of

certiorari is available to review interlocutory orders where the lower

court’s error requires “unquestionable reversal.”28 The district court’s

illegal conduct here is similar to that reviewed by writ of certiorari in

Williams.

24 Bushman v New Hollard Div. of Sperry Rand Corp., 83 Wn.2d 429, 518 P.2d1078 (1974); City of Seattle v Williams, 101 Wn.2d 445, 455, 680 P.2d 1051(1984); Keene, 108 Wn.App. at 643-44.25 69 Wn.2d 256, 261-61, 418 P.2d 143 (1966)26 Bushman, 83 Wn.2d at 43227 101 Wn.2d at 455, quoting State v Harris, 2 Wn.App. 272, 280-81, 469 P.2d937 (1970).28 It is important to note that the lower court actions in both Williams andHarris involved errors that required reversal and remand for a jury trial anddismissal respectively. Williams, 101 Wn.2d at 451-52; Harris, 2 Wn.App. at292.





1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Judge Seitz was familiar with CrRLJ 3.2 from the 2/10/2006 hearing to

address conditions of release, and stated on the record her familiarity with

the bail process from her time spent at the jail calendar. Yet, when setting

Mr. Prukop’s bail, Judge Seitz acted in disregard of its mandates. The

reasoning she employed in setting Mr. Prukop’s bail was patently erroneous.

It calls for unquestioned reversal.

Upon granting writ, the Superior Court shall determine its merits. RCW

7.16.120.

The question involving the merits to be determined by the court upon

hearing are:

(1) Whether the body or officer had jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of the determination under review.

(2) Whether the authority, conferred upon the body or officer inrelation to that subject matter, has been pursued in the moderequired by law, in order to authorize it or make thedetermination.

(3) Whether, in making the determination, any rules of law affectingthe rights of the parties thereto has been violated to prejudicethe relator.

(4) Whether there was any competent proof of all the facts necessary tobe proved, in order to authorize the making of the determination.

(5) Whether the factual determinations were supported by substantialevidence.

Mr. Prukop asks this Court to grant his writ and determine that the

rule of law, pursuant to section (3), affecting his rights has been

prejudiced.

IV. Conclusion

Mr. Prukop respectfully requests this Court to grant his Writ of Habeas

Corpus and strike, the $500,000 bail condition of release imposed. In the

alternative, Mr. Prukop requests this court grant his Writ of Certiorari and

remand for striking of the bail condition.

DATED this _21st day of February, 2006.

Respectfully submitted,





1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

____________________________________Kurt E. BoehlWSBA #36627


----- Original Message -----From: CCWTo: Tam, LuciaCc: U.S. District Court_WAWD_Judge Recardo S. MartinezSent: Wednesday, December 10, 2008 10:10 PMSubject: Re: Prukop v. KC

December 10, 2008

King County Prosecutor's Office

Ms. Lucia,

This is in response to your e-mail below and the PDF letter that was attached from Ms.Connole.

Please inform Stay Connole that I attempted to send the referenced document in herattached letter to Judge Martinez several times, but the electronic system would onlyaccept a "status report" and this was supposed to be filed as a "joint status report," sothat is what I selected. Obviously, if you look carefully at the document I filed, there isNO electronic "signature" by King County, and none was ever intended, since KingCounty still has until December 15th to place into the record its version. How else was Isuppose to file the document with MY signature without doing so electronically? ThePURPOSE was to provide King County with a filed COPY, so that King County wouldRECEIVE IT, and thereupon REVIEW IT, and then for King County to create and signit's version into the record. Am I missing something? There is no other provision for meproviding an electronically signed copy to the court, other than the method I haveselected. How can King County state that it never received a copy, when the electronicfiling record shows the exact opposite, that both Stacy Connolle and John Cobbreceived copies?

Furthermore, regarding Ms. Connole's statement that, "...the Report does not appear toconform with what the parties discussed during our November 13, 2007 FRCP 26(f)conference," this is entirely NOT so. I went through my notes of each of the things wetalked about, and each of those items I have listed is exactly per our telcon. PerhapsMs. Connole doesn't like my writing style or syntax, or maybe she is referring to the veryfirst item, "Nature and Complexity of the Case." My version of events does NOT matchthose of King County, and it never will.

You people have obfuscated this entire matter from the get-go, and have in fact lied andpandered a false and fraudulent police report, signed under penalty of perjury from non-credible, felonious, individuals, that you then charged me with using the power of thecounty and the courts of the State of Washington to ultimately throw me in jail on$600,000 bail. That is why I vehemently objected to the King County Prosecutor's Officefrom EVER having anything to do with this case, because all of you have combined,confederated and conspired to deprive me of constitutionally secured rights and haveviolated my person and property with impunity, including making aerial reconnaissanceover-flights over my residence with King County's Guardian One Helicopter, as if I were


a criminal, or in anticipation of some kind of event in the mind of someone within theKing County Sheriff's Office. Who authorized the over flight and photos, and for whatpurpose? Did King County make aerial reconnaissance-flights over all of the othercandidates for "entry-level" King County Deputy Sheriff? Was their testing performancediscussed, as mine was, over supposedly secure channels of the 800 Mhz trunked KingCounty Sheriff radio system?

The Washington State Attorney General's Office is the only authority that can evenapproach this matter with any degree of impartiality because of your continuing interestin outcome, and even then, any impartiality or fairness would be instantly questionable,given the close-knit environment of the obsequious members of the Washington StateBar Association, which for all practical purposes, is a racketeering, influencedorganization.

In order that my rights are preserved, I will now initiate a letter to Judge Martinez toexplain MY version of the events. In fact, I will forward this e-mail to his chambers in lieuof a letter for the time being, just so the record is clear.

Thank you,

John R. Prukop, PlaintiffPrivate Attorney General

----- Original Message -----From: Tam, LuciaTo: [email protected]: Wednesday, December 10, 2008 2:34 PMSubject: Prukop v. KC

Mr. Prukop: Enclosed please find a copy of the letter dated 12/10/08. Thanks.

<<Letter 12-10-08.pdf>>

Lucia Tam | Legal SecretaryOffice of King County Prosecuting Attorney500 Fourth Avenue, Suite 900¦ Seattle, WA 98104Phone: (206) 205-5407 ¦ Fax: (206) 205-0447E-mail: [email protected]


.........

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37803 42nd Ave. So. – Auburn, WA 98001 – [email protected] Voicemail: (253) 840-8071 – Cellular: (253) 468-6157 – Home: (253) 927-0805

April 25, 2007

BY FAX: (206) 296-0168 BY FAX: (206) 296-0888

King County Sheriff Susan L. Rahr, Detective Craig C. SarverPatty Shelledy, Legal Advisor Property Management Unit/GCU516 Third Avenue, W-116 4623 7th Ave. So.Seattle, WA 98104-2312 Seattle, WA 98108-1719

Re: KCSO CAD Incident #05-347752 & #06-050133; JOHN R. PRUKOP v.KING COUNTY SHERIFF, et. al., CV 07-216 RSM; On our way to theSupreme Court

Dear Sheriff Rahr, Ms. Shelledy, Det. Sarver:

This is an attempt to mitigate King County’s continuing wrongfuland harmful ways and means, which began on November 27, 2005, at1:02AM under KCSO CAD Incident #05-347736, when I first called 911as the “victim” reporting the commission of a felony crime, “assault with adeadly weapon”, in this case, a gold Cadillac, WA License 593-NAV, andin which I was denied the intangible honest services of your office, 18USC 1346. As is more fully set forth below, this is my final demand for thereturn of my property, which you are now holding unlawfully.

The three persons on board the above suspect vehicle were identified as:

STEVEN LEE RIEGER, DOB 10-11-79 with then current driver’s license# RIEGESL213PJ (hereinafter “SLR”);

JESSE LEE COPLEY, DOB 06-13-81, with then revoked and suspendeddriver’s license # COPLEJL196LL (hereinafter “JLC”); and,

KENNETH EDWARD COPLEY, DOB 03-02-79, with then revoked andsuspended driver’s license #COPLEKE216DB (hereinafter “KEC”).

A fourth suspect was later identified as:

MATTHEW WAYNE EBELING, DOB 10-22-84, with then current driver’slicense # EBELIMW166P2 (hereinafter “MWE”). This individual called-ina false police report to 911 at 1:28AM under CAD Incident #05-347752 from the Harrison residence, at the behest of his associate-in-fact criminal co-conspirators, the above named three individuals, whohad just been visitors at the notorious Harrison “200 House”, 3761742nd Ave. So., conducting nefarious criminal activity, in the company of


October 6, 2009Page 2

Cole B. Harrison, Shane M. Harrison, Nicholas A. Harrison, ChristopherM. Riley, and other unknown John and Jane Does, 1 thru 10). On thisparticular occasion, MWE’s maroon Nissan 300ZX, WA License 698-LWF, was parked on the opposite side of the street from Harrison’s,and he was in fact present at the Harrison residence when SLR, JLCand KEC initiated their motor vehicle assault on my person andproperty. MEW and/or other associates-in-fact then ‘telegraphed’ SLR,JLC and KEC via cellphone from the Harrison residence, after DeputyGoding had departed the area, in effect, giving the “coast is clear”signal for SLR, JLC and KEC to return to my residence, in disguise inanother vehicle, the maroon Nissan pickup, WA License A04033M, toinflict bodily harm upon me at 2:00AM.

On the above particular date, November 27, 2005, KCSO hadcontinuing “privity” of knowledge [See: Chambers-Castanes v. KingCounty, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 669 P.2d 451 (WA 09/15/1983)] concerningeach of the previous acts of suspects SLR, JLC and KEC, for the simplereason that each of these same three had previously made harassing andassaultive attempts on my person and property with a motor vehicle,either while I was walking or bicycling during hours of darkness whileconducting Trout Lake Blockwatch activities on behalf of my neighbors. Ineach of those reported incidents the modus operendi was the same:within a few minutes of my walking or bicycling past the Harrison’sresidence, Rieger and the Copley’s would attempt to chase me down withone of their vehicles, then leave the scene, and later return in the Nissanpickup, A04033M. Each of the incidents were reported to 911, CADincidents were generated, yet nothing was ever done by your Precinct #3Field Operations Division to stop it. Why?

Moreover, KCSO had additional “privity” of knowledge concerningthe third man on board both the Cadillac and the Nissan pickup truck onNovember 27, 2005: Kenneth Edward Copley. While KEC was definitely onboard both vehicles, he fled KCSO Deputy Goding because he hadoutstanding King County warrants at the time. That is why he is not listedas one of the “complaining” parties in the falsified police report of theforegoing CAD incident. Nevertheless, KEC aided and abetted SLR andJLC, apparently for revengeful purposes, as will become vividly clear bythe end of this letter. Your department, and the bastions of “justice” atthe King County District Court and King County Superior Court played the“slap the hand rope-a-dope” game with these people, allowing theircrimes to fester and continue, the evidence of which exists in the manyrecords generated in IRIS, DISCIS and SCOMIS and WACIC. If your FieldOperations Division and the prosecutors had been doing their jobscompetently, I would never have become a VICTIM of these people, orYOUR department.

KEC grievously assaulted me without provocation on April 30, 2002,under KCSO CAD Incident #02-133007, during the hours of darkness in



almost the same exact location, after myself and others had witnessedKEC sitting in his vehicle, parked in front of a known trouble house, theHarrison “200 House”, with a lit crack pipe. During that episode, KECattempted to ram my wife’s car from the roadway with our three smallchildren on board. Later, he tried eluding KCSO Deputy Saario, who wasresponding to my 911 call. After a chase reaching speeds of 60+ MPH,KEC subsequently crashed and bailed from his white Oldsmobile, WALicense 336-MMU, and then fled the scene on foot. After an extendedsearch effort, including K-9 and Guardian One resources, KEC was foundhold-up in the Cole B. Harrison residence, who himself has a long, sordidfelonious history. KEC was subsequently arrested, charged and convictedfor eluding a pursuing police vehicle and assault 4, when his crime shouldhave included assault with a deadly weapon. The “system” basicallyslapped his wrist and turned him back into our Trout Lake neighborhoodto REOFFEND again, which he has done innumerable times. His activitiesand those of his associates-in-fact at 37617 42nd Ave. So. and 37654 42nd

Ave. So., continue to this day and KCSO does nothing to stop it. Why?

Again, on June 19, 2005, on Father’s Day night, there was anotherKCSO “privity” incident involving KEC. As I was preparing to conduct aTrout Lake Blockwatch, my neighbor and I observed a teal 1990’s ChevyS-10 pickup arrive at the Harrison residence with its lights off shortly aftermidnight, WA License A21063U. I recognized this vehicle as being thesame one I’d observed in previous days making brief stops, first at theJustice residence at 37655 42nd Ave. So., and then the Harrisonresidence. The driver had been a WM about 50ish with graying hair andwho walked with a definite ‘gimp’ in one leg. He was always seen in thecompany of a blonde female, known as “Marilyn”. On occasion they wouldarrive in a light blue 1979/80 Chev K-5 Blazer with black top, WA LicenseA02839V. And, on occasion, this same license plate was seen on the tealChevy S-10 pickup. It was during this same general time period thatDeputy Steve Bogess had expressed interest in the S-10 with switchedplates under CAD Incident #05-182291 on June 26, 2005.

Within a few minutes, we both watched the same individual walkingsouthbound from the Harrison residence carrying a large, heavy object.He was walking with a definite “gimp”. This person disappeared into anunlit area at a vacant rental house at 37654 42nd Ave. So. We watchedthis individual retreat back to Harrison’s and leave in the same Chevy S-10 pickup with lights off. When we walked to the north side of the rentalhouse, we discovered the fruits of a crime: a $5,000 SONY PlasmaFlatscreen television set leaning up against the house.

I called 911 at 12:18AM and reported a burglary, under CADIncident #05-173798. My neighbor and I then positioned ourselves atthe north side of the paved circular driveway to this residence where wewaited for deputies to arrive. Within a few minutes we watched twoindividuals walk across the front side of the house from a trail that



connects to 43rd Avenue South, where the suspects had parked theirvehicle. As they placed their hands on the SONY TV, they were illuminatedwith a bright spotlight and ordered to halt. One of them, later identified asJoe Youngman, ran back through the trail; the other individual came atme, at which time I unholstered my Ruger 9MM pistol and ordered thesubject onto the pavement in the prone position. Another call was madeto 911 to advise “one at gunpoint” and to please step it up. DeputySteven Pope and Mark Pike responded shortly thereafter and took KECinto custody, in handcuffs, and placed him into a patrol car. Deputy Popethen fingerprinted the SONY TV, retrieved it and placed it on the trunk lidof his patrol car. At that moment, Shane Harrison walked up the road andclaimed the TV as being his. He was required to show proof of ownership,which he did. KEC was subsequently released, even though he was part ofthe crime, which Deputies Pope and Pike both opined was an insurancefraud scheme set-up by Harrison himself, to be carried out by the driverof the Chevy S-10, with Copley and Youngman “disappearing” the SONY.No charges were ever brought, no follow-up investigation was everconducted, and the crime was allowed to be brushed under a rock. Why?

Details such as the foregoing were not fortuitously omitted bychance from the testimony of KCSO Deputy Stephen Pope at the sham“conditions of release” hearing that was perpetrated against me onFebruary 10, 2006, but rather, by scheme and artifice, by design. DeputyPope was the primary responding deputy concerning the above CADIncident; the secondary officer was Deputy Mark Pike. Their appearanceand collaboration was necessary, not for the truth, but for hearsay,leaving out essential exculpatory evidence, known to both KC Deputiesand Senior King County DPA Randi J. Austell at the King County DistrictCourt. Deputy Pope’s “selective memory recall” of this incident placed theevent occurring “sometime in August”, that “Mr. Prukop had this kid’s facein the dirt in the prone position”, and that Deputy Pope’s “bestrecollection of the incident” was that “this was simply two kids returning atelevision set to a neighbor” – without ever mentioning WHO the partieswere, that they were definitely NOT “kids”, the time WHEN it occurred,nor the criminal histories of both of these “kids”, and that in fact, one ofthe participants, Joe Youngman, was at that time wanted by KCSO on anoutstanding warrant and that a “street plea-deal” was made by DeputiesPope and Pike, setting KEC “free to go” IF he would rat-out his associate-in-fact criminal friend, Joe Youngman. Is THIS department procedure?

KEC departed the area the same way he had arrived, through thetrail to 43rd Avenue South, where he started his white Oldsmobile, WALicense 411-SNN and was allowed to drive off, even though KEC wassuspended and revoked, and by this time had become an habitual trafficoffender. Deputy Pope conveniently left-out many details, that if known toan impartial trier of facts, would have exonerated any wrong doing by me,as I had no criminal background whatsoever. Why?



Moreover, Deputy Pope and Deputy Pike both had exclusivecriminal knowledge of the player’s involved, i.e., Harrison’s, Copley’s andYoungman, via investigatory tools at their disposal to ferret out everyminute detail of this incident and others, which they could easily haverecalled from their KCSO “IRIS” laptop computers while in open court.Instead, Deputy Pope “played along” with DPA Austell’s choreographed“plan” to paint me as a “danger to the community”, wherein she wouldthen call for my incarceration on $350,000 bail on trumped-up charges,alleging things that had never happened, all based on what we now knowis a FALSE and perjured King County Police Report, under CAD Incident#05-347752, signed by Deputy Goding, based on non-credible statementsfrom SLR and JLC.

DPA Austell then solicited a letter written by SLR from an electroniccourt file, which he attempted to place into evidence at MY Anti-Harassment/Protection Hearing against him under King County SuperiorCourt Cause No. 06-2-00873-2 KNT on January 23, 2006, in which JudgeElizabeth Stephenson DENIED its entry into the record of the proceedingsbecause SLR had taken the Fifth Amendment and would not testify eitheron his own behalf or against me. The fact that his letter had been DENIEDENTRY into the record made no difference to DPA Austell or Judge Seitz,because they were simply doing the bidding for their masters, facilitatingas associates-in-fact their criminal racketeering organization, the WSBAand KCSO.

Details such as have thus far been described are importantelements in ferreting out the “FIVE W’s” of who, what, why, when andwhere, in order to solve a crime. But Deputy Pope was not interested inferreting out the crime or the criminals. He was answering to a “higher”authority. The lack of veracity of his testimony and “selective memory” ofthe events of June 19, 2005 were all indicative of someone intent onobstructing justice and framing an innocent individual by reversing thedynamics of the incident to best fit the portrayal desired and elicited byDPA Austell. Why?

Not by accident, no mention of the initiating event on November27, 2005 under CAD Incident #05-347736 would ever surface; nor thefact that I had no criminal background whatsoever; nor the fact that I wasa continuing bona fide candidate for entry-level King County DeputySheriff in November 2005, summarily denied civil service considerationand hiring upon reaching the oral board on November 9th, “washed out”,not because I “did not meet the specific criteria”, but to the contrary, byartifice and scheme of KCSO, effected by ALL three of the oral boardraters, Deputies Escobar, Knudsen and Quirit, neither of whom could spellmy last name, could not grammatically construct proper syntax, whose“Oral Board Exam Rating Sheets” contain clear examples of subjectiveanswers and notes that are not in harmony with the requirements of RCW41.14, or the “impartiality” of competitiveness under KCSO’s advertised



banner of “MERIT, EFFICIENCY, & FITNESS”, and each of whom rated my“Total Score” for entry-level deputy as being “ZERO”, not under anydefined, impartial, empirical civil service standards, as required by RCW41.14, or the King County Civil Service Rules Section 8.1, but according towhim and caprice and highly subjective content. Why?

Moreover, no one within the KCSO, including OHRM, advised meprior to, or during the application or testing process, that I had theabsolute right under King County Civil Service Rules 8.5, 8.6, 8.7, toreview the examination questions and answers, to in fact protest thesame, or to appeal any negative matter or results to the Civil ServiceCommission within certain time frames. Why?

Civil Service Rule 8.7 specifically states that “no certified list will befinalized UNTIL the resolution by the Commission of all challengesdirected to the examination upon which it is based.” The “why” therefore,becomes instantly clear. Had KCSO actually advised me or anyone elseinvolved in the hiring and testing process of these specific provisions, theymight have justifiable reason to raise questions, especially since the oralboard examination accounts for one-half of the total score in the hiringprocess, and especially if someone, such as myself received a grand totalscore of “ZERO” from ALL THREE oral board raters. Secrecy and evasion isnot to my knowledge a part of the hiring process.

Notwithstanding these specific Civil Service Rules, I did in fact raiseissues and concerns as early as November 14, 2005, and particularlyspecific questions as to the empirical standards that I purportedly failed tomeet on January 18, 2006, all of which fell on deaf ears of persons inpositions of power and public trust, who are presumed to know the law,should have known better, and which demonstrates the complete andutter gross public corruption that has permeated public offices like somany spawning sycophants, and can best be summed up as:

“The civil servant had either to survive by lowering his standard of ethics,performance, and dutifulness or remain upright and perish. He chose tosurvive.” See: World Development Report 1995, The World Bank, pg. 92

Human resource management (OHRM) within KCSO is obviouslyhighly compromised in its compartmentalized systems, and their jobsecurity and existence is dependent upon their complete compliance withthe dictates of their master(s). As such, younger individuals are drawninto the ranks of KCSO field operations who are more malleable andmanipulatable because of their inexperience and because they areeffectively ignorant, lacking essential life’s seasoning, and beingconditioned from birth as “institutional units” and “human resource”trained to the lowest common denominator and "yes" man oriented.



No wonder then, when a mature individual such as myself comesalong, with training and experience in many different technical disciplinesand in a protected age class, it makes no never mind what the law sayswith respect to “Equal Employment Opportunity” and “age discrimination”,such persons are not given consideration and are summarily excised fromthe hiring process utilizing Machiavellian stratagems, which if brought tolight, would render the KCSO hiring process as a biased, unjust, unethical,inequitable and non-competitive process, i.e., a carefully crafted cronyismsystem. In my case, age, knowledge and my political affiliations andbeliefs became a target, which is prohibited under Section 12.2 of theKing County Civil Service Rules.

DPA Austell, on behalf of her ring masters, her associate-in-factcriminal racketeers within the WSBA and KCSO, would illicit racial epithetsregarding my political affiliation with Col. James “Bo” Gritz. I served his1992 Presidential Campaign as Washington State Press Secretary. Gritzwas not only the most highly decorated Green Beret Commander in theU.S. Army’s history, he had fingered and exposed those at the highestlevel of the U.S. Government who were facilitating massive heroin drugshipments into the United States from Burma’s Golden Triangle, includingformer CIA Director and U.S. President George Herbert Walker Bush andRichard Armitage, currently Deputy Secretary of State. As such, NancyReagan’s famous words, “JUST SAY NO!” to drugs and law enforcement’srole in curtailing drugs was, and remains, an insidious joke on theAmerican people.

Gritz’ 1992 presidential platform had also identified the underlyingstrangleholds on what was preventing good government under theConstitution for the United States of America. Gritz was also the “hero”who successfully negotiated with Federal authorities and brought theremaining members of the Randy Weaver family off of Ruby Ridge inNorthern Idaho, ALIVE, after Weaver’s wife and 13-year old son weremurdered and family friend Kevin Harris was grievously wounded by aFederal Marshal’s SOG sniper team, surreptitiously trespassing onWeaver’s property, without a warrant, in August 1992. U.S. MarshalWilliam Degan was also killed in that incident by friendly fire.

Gritz was also the role model for the Rambo movie series, including“FIRST BLOOD.” The great line of irony in "First Blood", is when all hellwas breaking loose (in the form of John Rambo), with the sheriff WilTeasle character, played by Brian Dennehy, ranting to the ColonelTrautman character, played by Richard Crenna, "When people startfucking with the law, all hell breaks loose!" Of course, it was the sheriffwho had "fucked with the law" in violating the rights of John Rambo, andevery other legal principle known!

In everything, there are principles which control the operation of allthings. Arrogant, corrupt, incompetent, and dangerously stupid, people



deny the existence of "principles." They believe that by denying theexistence of principles, they can dictate the ebb and flow of the universe,with their subjective beliefs. Of course, they are wrong.

The same racial epithets and demagoguery by DPA Austell wouldsurface again on the morning of February 11, 2006, sometime between3:00AM and 6:00AM, when Detective Christopher Bassett and hisentourage of deputies were executing an illegal search and seizure at myresidence, while I was “safely” out of their way, unlawfully imprisoned.Detective Bassett, in the company of another KCSO deputy, inferred andattempted to get my wife to agree with him, that Bo Gritz was a whitesupremacist, a racist and bigot, and then asked her, “Have you everquestioned John’s mental status?”, to which she emphatically told him“NO!” Not satisfied with my wife’s answer, Detective Bassett continued hiscunning and reprehensible brow beating. This pattern of questioning wasa direct carryover from the same racially charged epithets DPA Austellhad attempted to use in the courtroom of Judge Victoria Seitz, on Friday,February 10, 2006, until counsel representing me objected.

The question becomes, WHOSE “plan” was being effected? Who arethe specific players within the King County Sheriff’s Office who wereintent on depriving me of the intangible right to the honest services of thedepartment, “entry-level” deputy sheriff employment, and retaliation forquestioning authority, and finally, extortion of my property and libertyunder color of official right, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 USC 1951?

It is especially noteworthy that after Detective Christopher Bassettand his deputies were unsuccessful in getting my wife to “volunteer” hisneeded perversions, for later use by DPA Austell, he proceeded to takethings from my desk that were not listed on the bogus warrant,purportedly issued by telephonic decree at 2:00AM by one Julie Spector.What kind of things did Detective Bassett take? My personal notes andwritings, some 100+ pages. What was in my personal notes and writingshe was looking for? Anything that KCSO could use to demonize mycharacter and reputation, and broad brush paint me with the “danger tosociety” ruse, that’s what. Also taken was a “Special Security Officer”badge that had been given to me by Col. James Bo Gritz, as a “thank you”for my volunteer work to his 1992 Presidential Campaign. That too wasnot on the bogus search warrant. Moreover, as discovery proceeded, itbecame very clear that KCSO had conducted a “threat analysis” early onof their intended target victim, by making aerial reconnaissance flightswith the KCSO Guardian One helicopter, taking detailed photos of myresidence and property, as if some tactical assault was planned, andwhich indeed occurred in the mind of DPA Austell on Monday, February13, 2006, when she decided that a “SWAT” team would serve a newlyobtained arrest warrant on me for their illegally gotten gains procured inthe illegal search and seizure. There was obviously a premeditated “plan”in someone’s mind. Whose mind, besides DPA Austell, and why?



With all of the foregoing as a backdrop, we now move to the end-game, the return of ALL of my property. Beginning on Friday, March 16,2007, after waiting 8-days for some positive indication that King Countywould honor its written promises as contained in the Stipulated Order ofMarch 8, 2006, wherein, on March 8, 2007 I was to have all of myfirearms, my concealed weapons permit and other property being held byKCSO returned to me, as well as having all charges dismissed withprejudice, I contacted King County Sheriff’s Property Management Unit at(206) 296-4078 and spoke with your personnel. After politely explainingthe situation, I was told to contact Detective Craig Sarver at the GunCompliance Unit, (206) 205-5421, which I did do.

Eventually, Detective Sarver called me back on March 22, 2007 at11:00AM and left a message. I returned his call at 11:28AM. Obviouslyanticipating what needed to occur, Detective Sarver had alreadycontacted Detective Christopher Bassett at Precinct #3 and obtained a“release” concerning this matter.

As was explained to me by Det. Sarver, the ONLY thing that neededto be accomplished prior to my firearms being returned were Federal andState background checks. I questioned the validity of these checks, giventhe fact my Concealed Pistol License had been reissued with full State andFederal background checks by Law Enforcement Support Agency (LESA)in June 2005. Further, on April 10, 2006, as part of the hiring process forLESA Communications Dispatcher for the Pierce County Sheriff andTacoma Police Department’s, where I had previously been employed, Ihad also, again, just completed State and Federal background checks,including a full digital FBI fingerprint scan. Detective Sarver also statedthat due to “insufficient personnel” at the State level there could be somedelay, but notwithstanding this delay, I would be receiving notificationwhen and where to pick-up my property, and in no event beyond threeweeks.

On Wednesday, April 4, 2007, at 1:10PM, I made a follow-upcall to “Tracy” at (206) 296-4078 and inquired as to the progress. Sheadvised their office was still awaiting the State background paperwork andthat mine was anticipated to be forthcoming shortly.

On Tuesday, April 17, 2007, I again called (206) 296-4078and this time spoke to “Judy”. I was advised that I would need to talkwith Detective Sarver, that she didn’t have any information, but thatDetective Sarver had left the office at 4:00PM, and to “call backtomorrow.”

On Thursday, April 19, 2007, at 11:50AM I once again calledproperty management at (206) 296-4078 and spoke directly withDetective Sarver. I read to him the pertinent part of the Stipulated Orderconcerning the return of my property, that it was to have been effected



on March 8, 2007, that we were now at DAY 49, and, what’s the hold-up?Detective Sarver was apparently bristled at the thought of a mere citizenasking the question, and immediately countered with, “(A) IBIS ballisticstesting has to be completed on all semi-automatic pistols and handgunsbefore they’re returned; (B) Patty Shelledy in the legal department says acourt order for recovery must be issued.” Detective Sarver then providedthe telephone number for Patty Shelledy and stated “it’s out of my hands,it’s now a legal matter.” WRONG. This entire fiasco has been an ILLEGALmatter from DAY ONE and the onus is on KCSO to immediately mitigateits own wrongdoing.

At the time, I didn’t give much thought to the “ballistics” testingthat Detective Sarver mentioned, believing he was only referring to thesingle Ruger 9MM semi-auto pistol that was taken from me on themorning of November 27, 2005. On that morning, I had fired a warningshot in self-defense to thwart “JLC” who had trespassed onto my postedprivate property at 2:00AM, and who intended to inflict bodily harm uponme, and this, after the same individual and two others had tried runningover me with an automobile one hour earlier, for which I had called 911,requested officer contact, but no police report was ever taken, due to thefact that no King County Sheriff’s Deputy ever responded to myresidence. I was clearly denied the intangible “honest services” of theKCSO.

Instead of my attackers being arrested for the crime(s) they hadcommitted against me, a maliciously FALSE and FRAUDULENT policereport was filed against me by Deputy Wayne S. Goding, and based onthat prevaricated information, I was subsequently arrested from withinmy home a 3:00AM, without a warrant, and jailed.

Deputy Goding told me that he was “ordered” to arrest me by Sgt.Alexander, the 4th Shift Duty Sargent, who was on scene at the time.Sargent Alexander, a Negro woman, had taken umbrage with me severalweeks prior to this incident concerning the theft of mail near myresidence, in which I had provided her with all relevant details in which anarrest could have been effected, but wasn’t. Her attitude at that time wasnegative, indifferent and hostile, for even bringing the matter to herattention. On the morning of November 27, 2005, she had the audacity tocall me at 2:20AM while I was STILL waiting for a deputy to arrive, andcurtly grill me with, “What seems to be the problem this morning, Mr.Prukop?!” In any event, I had no criminal record whatsoever, and 18-daysbefore this egregious assault, I had been a bona fide recruit for KingCounty Deputy Sheriff. Would a reasonable thinking person think, by now,that something is seriously wrong with King County law enforcement?

When I began thoroughly researching “IBIS”, the Internal BallisticsIdentification System, a provision of the Ballistics, Law Assistance, andSafety Technology Act of the 107th Congress, 2nd Session, or “BLAST” as



it’s referred to, it became quite clear that the Congressional Intent wasfour-fold, to wit:

SEC. 2. PURPOSES.The purposes of this Act are--(1) to increase public safety by assisting law enforcement in solving more gun-related crimesand offering prosecutors evidence to link felons to gun crimes through ballistics technology;(2) to provide for ballistics testing of all new firearms for sale to assist in the identification offirearms used in crimes;(3) to require ballistics testing of all firearms in custody of Federal agencies to assist in theidentification of firearms used in crimes; and(4) to add ballistics testing to existing firearms enforcement programs.

Plainly, this Act says absolutely nothing about law enforcement agenciesperforming ballistics testing on firearms of law abiding citizens, eventhose firearms that may have been nefariously seized relative to some“purported” legal event, such as the illegal actions committed by KingCounty against me. Moreover, Section 5 of the BLAST Act seems tonegate any idea that KCSO or any other law enforcement agency caninvade privacy rights, and there is absolutely no provision within the Actthat provides for any law enforcement agency to test fire firearms in theirpossession before returning them to their rightful owners:

SEC. 5. PRIVACY RIGHTS OF LAW ABIDING CITIZENS.Ballistics information of individual guns in any form or database established by this Act maynot be used for prosecutorial purposes unless law enforcement officials have a reasonablebelief that a crime has been committed and that ballistics information would assist in theinvestigation of that crime.

Further, there are no provisions in the RCW or WAC that even hint at anysuch notion that my private property can be willy-nilly “tested” for crimesthat my private property “may” have committed. Ridiculous as thatsounds, the fact is that the majority of my firearms which were illegallyseized in the first instance by your agency, are brand new, packed in theiroriginal factory shipping containers, and have never been fired. And sinceI was the first “owner” from the point-of-sale from reputable FFL Dealers,how possibly could my firearms have been involved in any crime scenario,especially since I have NO criminal background? Who’s zoomin’ who?Under the circumstances, how then, could even the remote possibilityexist that those firearms were ever involved in a “crime”? The answer isthey have not, and I OBJECT to any such firing or ballistics testing of myprivate property, no matter how your agency has set the stage.

I am now in receipt of a letter from Detective Sarver dated April18, 2007, stating in sum that it is ME that has sixty (60) days from thedate of his letter to “initiate the process to recover the property…” andthat “Failure to institute actions to recover the property and notify theKing County Sheriff’s Office of your intent to recover the property will



result in its disposal… as abandoned property…” And further, that “TheSheriff’s Office will destroy or auction [MY] firearms...” THIS ISABSOLUTELY OUTRAGEOUS! Yet, I’m told by your legal advisor, PattyShelledy, following receipt of this letter, that I can simply “ignore” it.Since when have I ever been able to trust anything the Sheriff’s office hasdone to date?

Sheriff Rahr, et al., this is your last opportunity to mitigate theegregious wrongdoing by those persons who are apparently acting in yourname without your full knowledge and consent. However, if they areindeed acting according to your directive, then this entire matter is evenmore egregious and perfidious than I first believed possible.

So far, your agency actions have cost me the loss of 30-days of myliberty by unlawful imprisonment, extortion of my property (firearms,etc.) and money in the sum $10,900.00 in bail-bond fees under color ofofficial right, the loss of an irreplaceable and priceless coin collectiondating from 1987, the denial of employment and the humiliation andembarrassment of being a recruit for deputy sheriff only to be arrested fordefending myself on my own property from a known criminal element inthe middle of the night using the least amount of force necessary to repelthe threat, the denial of the honest services of your agency in respondingto my 911 calls for assistance, the loss of other law enforcement relatedemployment opportunities, mental anguish, and injury to my reputation.

As you are by now no doubt aware, I have filed a federal lawsuit inthe United States District Court to begin addressing these issues in thenature of a RICO complaint. Just the EEOC/Age Discrimination aspect ofthis hellish nightmare demands that King County pay damages in the sumof Seven-Million-Dollars ($7,000,000.00). Under RICO, this amount willbe trebled. You have not yet been served because I am in the process ofamending the complaint to cover every aspect and close all of the barndoors to prevent escape of those who are liable. I will leave no stoneunturned until justice is meted out to those who have wronged me.

Your duty and obligation at this juncture is clearly marked out,pursuant to the Stipulated Order of March 8, 2006. That agreementspecifies that your agency was to return ALL of my property in the samecondition as it was received at the conclusion of a 1-year period. Thatperiod ended on March 8, 2007.

I have not and do not grant your agency any additional time toretain my property, nor have I given my permission to conduct ANY testsor firing of any of my firearms. They are to be forthwith returned to meby Friday, April 27th. Otherwise, I will further amend my FederalEEOC/RICO complaint against KCSO and seek additional restitution, aswell as filing a claim with King County Risk Management for the sum of$500 for each day that my property has been unlawfully withheld.



John R. Prukop,

Private Attorney General*

* Brady v. Dairy Fresh Products Company, 974 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1992),inter alia, "The court in construing 18 U.S.C. §1962(c) of the RICO act,found that an employer who is benefited by employee or agents'violations of 18 U.S.C. §1962(c) may be held liable under the doctrine ofrespondeat superior when the employer is distinct from the enterprise;the court said the corporations and other employers that have benefitedfrom their employee or agents' RICO violations will be forced tocompensate the victims of racketeering activity; the court further saidthat respondeat superior in agency liability under 18 U.S.C. §1962(c) willencourage employers to monitor more closely the activities of theiremployees and agents; the court also in construing 18 U.S.C. §1962(a)found that liability may arise under agency and respondeat superiorprinciples when the individual or entity is benefited by it's employees oragents RICO violations; the court said that by giving full effect of RICO'sbroad net of liability the doctrines of respondeat superior and agencyliability will encourage victims of racketeering to act as private attorneysgeneral and help eradicate racketeering activity." See Ikuno v. Yip, 912F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1990); Turkish v. Kasenetz, 964 F. Supp 689 (E.D.N.Y.1997).

* From the Congressional Record, 1970: U.S. Senator John McLelland, inthe congressional debate on the necessity of enacting the RICO statutessaid, “ I n som e localit ies, organized cr im e has form ed corrupt allianceswith the police, prosecutors, courts, and legislators… the racketeeringstatutes, as proposed, em power the cit izen/ vict im s of racketeer ing asprivate attorney’s general to eradicate this scourge from our society.”


MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT - 1John R. Prukop, Pro Se

11802 Meridian East, #142Puyallup, WA 98373TEL: (253) 840-8071

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25



AT SEATTLE


Plaintiff,

vs.


Defendants.

)))))))))))))))

No. CV 07-00216 RSM

MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OFTIME FOR JOINDER OF ADDITIONALPARTIES

WITHOUT ORAL ARGUMENT

NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:February 27, 2009

To The Honorable Judge Ricardo S. Martinez:

COMES NOW Plaintiff John R. Prukop, Pro Se, in the above entitled action and

moves the Court for an Order enlarging the time within which he may cause Joinder of

additional party defendants that are necessary for the complete adjudication of this action on

the merits. Plaintiff believes he can complete a motion for joinder, praecipe for summons,

and either a separate complaint or amended complaint within the time frame of 30-days.

As provided by Rule 6(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, good cause

exists for an Order by this Court to grant this motion as follows:




1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1. In the “Combined Joint Status Report” filed on December 15, 2008 (Docket Item

#26), Plaintiff proposed and requested until February 15, 2009 for joinder of

additional parties.

2. After the court filed the “Order Setting Trial Date and Related Dates” on

December 23, 2008 (Docket Item #27), Plaintiff didn’t immediately notice that the

Court had changed and shortened the requested date on which joinder of parties

was due, to January 20, 2009.

3. Plaintiff thereafter requested a telephonic reset of the deadlines for joinder on

Tuesday, January 20, 2009, given that Monday was a Court Holiday, and the

date was subsequently extended to February 17, 2009. (Miscellaneous Docket

Entry 1/20/09)

4. Due to his continued homeless status and having suffered a recent sickness

setback with a two-week bout of influenza, Plaintiff inadvertently missed the

February 17, 2009 deadline.

5. Plaintiff is presently in the process of securing transitional housing for himself

and his family, and coupled with recent sickness, this disruption necessitates

additional time to prepare the necessary documents for joinder of indispensable

parties within the sphere of this litigation and who have “privity” of knowledge

concerning the action herein, so that these matters can be adjudicated fully on

the merits of Plaintiff’s allegations.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the

Court, upon hearing this motion, enter an Order that Plaintiff be permitted an additional 30-

days within which to prepare a motion for joinder of indispensable parties, praecipe for

summons, and Plaintiff’s first amended complaint.




1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

DATED this 20th day of February, 2009.

/s/ John R. Prukop


I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was this 20th day of February, 2009


the following:



/s/ John R. Prukop


MOTION TO EXTEND TIME - 1John R. Prukop, Pro Se

11802 Meridian East, #142Puyallup, WA 98373

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25



AT SEATTLE


Plaintiff,

vs.


Defendants.

)))))))))))))))

Case No. 2:07-cv-00216 RSM

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO EXTENDTIME TO ANSWER DEFENDANT’SMOTION FOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT

WITHOUT ORAL ARGUMENT

NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:October 2, 2009

I. INTRODUCTION

COMES NOW Plaintiff John R. Prukop, Pro Se, in the above-entitled action and moves

the Court on behalf of himself, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b), for an extension of time of 20

business days to answer, respond and otherwise present defenses or objections to Defendant

King County’s Motion For Summary Judgment and the voluminous other pleadings filed

therewith, copies of which were received by Plaintiff on or about September 10, 2009. Movant

herein expressly reserves the right to challenge sufficiency and service of process and assert

other defenses and objections to King County’s pleadings and claims. Plaintiff respectfully




1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

requests this additional time to sort through numerous procedural and substantive issues

which have been raised by Defendant King County’s claims and arguments contained in their

multiple paged documents.

II. ARGUMENT

“[W]ith or without motion or notice,” a court may extend the time in which a party must

act for good cause shown. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(1)(A).

There is good cause for the Court to grant this Motion. The claims and arguments

Defendant King County has raised against movant have created a labyrinth of both procedural

and substantive issues. Moreover, Plaintiff has been without a connection for internet service

or access to e-mail due to his homeless status and was not aware of the filings by King County

until on or about September 10, 2009. In all previous filings by King County, the Defendant

laboriously filed not only “ECF” or electronic filings, but have also served Plaintiff with copies of

all pleadings by Certified Mail. However, King County did not serve movant herein with paper

pleadings via Certified Mail in the instance of their Motion for Summary Judgment and this has

placed Plaintiff at a clear disadvantage, almost as if King County planned for this stealth

approach.

Good cause exists for the Court to grant additional time to respond to Defendant

King County’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

DATED this 17th day of September 2009.

/s/ John R. Prukop




1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25


I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was this 17th day of September, 2009


the following:



/s/ John R. Prukop


PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO KING COUNTY’SOPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FORENLARGEMENT - 1


Puyallup, WA 98373TEL: (253) 840-8071

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25



AT SEATTLE


Plaintiff,

vs.


Defendants.

)))))))))))))))

No. CV 07-00216 RSM

PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO KINGCOUNTY’S OPPOSITION TOPLAINTIFF’S MOTION FORENLARGEMENT OF TIME FORJOINDER OF ADDITIONAL PARTIES

NOTED ON MOTION CALENDAR:February 27, 2009

To The Honorable Judge Ricardo S. Martinez:

COMES NOW Plaintiff John R. Prukop, Pro Se, without the benefit of assistance of

learned counsel on the finer nuances of ‘procedural rule jousting’ in the above entitled action,

and emphatically object to King County’s obstructionist pleading in opposition to Plaintiff’s

motion for enlargement of time for joinder of additional indispensable parties.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was made homeless, and continues to be homeless, by and through the

wrongfully aided and abetted acts of King County’s own unlawful acts, including but not




Puyallup, WA 98373TEL: (253) 840-8071

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

limited to, arbitrarily and capriciously refusing, without just cause or reason, to hire Plaintiff

herein, in 2005, as an “entry level” King County Deputy Sheriff for which he was duly

qualified.

Plaintiff does not have the unlimited, tax-payer supported legal resources or a staff of

paralegals, attorneys and office staff at his beck and call, as does the Defendant King County

Sheriff and Metropolitan King County. Nevertheless, Plaintiff has diligently endeavored to

follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as the Local Civil Rules to the best of his

knowledge and ability. The rules shouldn’t be used by King County as procedural booby

traps to prevent Plaintiff from obtaining justice and having his day in court.

Frankly, KING COUNTY HAS NO LEGAL BASIS whatsoever for complaining about

Plaintiff, or to attempt to circumvent Plaintiff’s ability to prosecute his case or reach the merits

of his case in chief, or to complain that Plaintiff has been dilatory, or to hollowly suggest the

bogus and frivolous argument that by allowing Plaintiff an extension of time for joinder of

additional parties, that somehow “the workload of the Court would be increased.” If the

Defendants and the King County prosecutor’s office were truly concerned about “increasing

the workload of the court,” they would not serially violate the laws they are sworn to uphold,

requiring the injured parties to seek redress in this federal court.

Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this matter on February 7, 2007 as evidenced by the

Court’s date stamp on the Complaint itself, not February 15, 2007 as set forth by Defendant;

but due to the compounding and unfolding of events, that were created by the Defendant’s,

themselves, that they were trying to keep hidden from me throughout 2005, 2006, and

continuing through 2007, I was delayed in being able to serve the summons and complaint on

the Defendant’s until January 31, 2008. Thereafter, I was further delayed in pursuing the

objectives of his case by the almost FOUR MONTH DELAY of King County’s ‘Answer’

which was filed on May 21, 2008, yet the Court issued summons that was served with the




Puyallup, WA 98373TEL: (253) 840-8071

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

complaint on January 31, 2008 required the Defendant’s answer to be served on me within 20-

days. As a result, I cannot be expected to rush into court when I discover, and investigate, the

fact that Defendant King County is playing 'hide the crime' and setting Plaintiff up for a

procedural ambush, which to date has been their notorious modus operendi as reflected in the

files and records of this matter.

Defendant King County’s argument that by “Granting plaintiff's request to extend the

deadline to join additional parties will interject new and different issues into the case,

thereby increasing the workload on the court and the parties” is simply without merit and is a

fraudulent and frivolous attempt to deny me my right to due process of law through a full and

fair hearing of the facts and evidence where liability is placed at the proper doorsteps, to bring

under the jurisdiction of the Court all of the parties who are guilty of perjury, fraud,

concealment and obstruction of justice, and to prove my case in chief that the persons named

as defendants, herein, and others to be joined, who are employed by King County, combined,

confederated and conspired and agreed with each other, and with others unknown at this time,

to unlawfully and falsely slander, defame, and demonize Plaintiff as a “danger to the

community” to conceal the fact of their unlawful conspiracy to wrongfully deny me employment

I was, and am, duly qualified to perform, with the objective that they thwart, stave off, obstruct

justice; make false and perjured statements so they may remain unaccountable for their own

criminal and tortious acts which have so egregiously injured me.

Now, having lost their 'advantage' of fraudulent concealment of relevant, material, and

substantive facts, the defendant is trying to get my motion denied and this case dismissed by a

continuation of their own wrongdoing. It's a well settled common law principle that "No man

can take advantage of his own wronge!" Sir Edward Coke, Circa 1628, Institutes of the

Common Law.




Puyallup, WA 98373TEL: (253) 840-8071

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Of course there are “new issues” to be presented at trial. That’s a natural consequence

when a Plaintiff is diligent in his investigation and the Defendants are ‘caught,’ as a result of his

investigation and related continuing events, fraudulently concealing their criminal acts.

Joinder of the additional parties is indispensable to adjudicate the liability for the crimes

and injury perpetrated by the Defendants, and their associates-in-fact, against me which will

prove, through a preponderance of evidence, that Defendant King County is jointly and

severally liable to me herein under the settled doctrine of respondeat superior and agency

liability.

SOME OF THE CRIMES COMMITTED AGAINST PLAINTIFF

After denying Plaintiff gainful employment under a false subjective pretext, and not

according to the letter and spirit of the Civil Service laws as enumerated in RCW 41.14.080, to

wit: “All appointments to and promotions to positions in the classified civil service of

the office of county sheriff shall be made solely on merit, efficiency, and fitness, which

shall be ascertained by open competitive examination and impartial investigation,” the

Defendants, herein, employed by King County, thereafter knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully

retaliated against me, when I sought from them the specific reasons, under the civil service

act, for my not being hired. Instead of providing an honest and lawful reason, the Defendants

combined, confederated, and conspired with known criminal miscreants, some with felony

convictions, to secure for themselves an utterly perjured, false and fraudulent police report

against me, authored by the King County Sheriff and Deputies acting under her command on

November 27, 2005, after I attempted to repel an assault on my person and property by three

of these hoodlums, Steven Lee Rieger, Jesse Lee Copley and Kenneth Edward Copley, from a

known “200 house” (King County “drug house”) at 1:00AM and again at 2:00AM, using the

minimum force necessary, after King County failed to provide the honest services of their office

to my calls to 911 for help, and thereafter the King County Sheriff and its prosecution arm, the




Puyallup, WA 98373TEL: (253) 840-8071

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

King County prosecutor’s office with known “privity” of then Norm Maleng’s number two man,

Dan Satterberg, acting through the Burien King County District Court Prosecution Unit and

KCDPA Randi J. Austell, combined, confederated and conspired with the City of Milton, its

Police Officers and Acting Police Chief James Jaques to further deny me due process of law

and to obstruct justice, and thereafter utilized King County Sheriff’s Deputies Stephen Pope

and Mark Pike, City of Milton Court Clerk Debra Farnsworth and Milton Police Officer William

Downey, and the King County judicial system through the District Court Judicial Offices of

Judge James Delaurenti III, Judge Victoria M. Seitz and Judge David Christie, to obstruct

justice, deny me my 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendment rights and my 14th Amendment right to due

process, to further their objective of thwarting, and staving off, any liability for their unlawful

denial of employing me, through an unlawful scheme to slander, defame, discredit, and

demonize me by fraudulently and unlawfully railroading me into jail, on the totally unfounded

pretext of being a “danger to the community,” on the unheard of King County demand of

$350,000 “cash only” bail in violation of the 8th Amendment’s prohibition of excessive bail, and

knowingly and willfully using the false and fraudulent criminal charges against me to deprive

me of my Second Amendment Right to Keep and Bear Arms, removing from me my lawfully

owned firearms and legally issued concealed weapons permit, all done in violation of due

process of law without a bona-fide hearing or opportunity to present witnesses in my defense;

and, after I was wrongfully imprisoned in the King County Jail, on February 10, 2006, the King

County Sheriff next sought an unlawful electronic-telephonic search warrant at 2:00AM on

February 11, 2006, which was derived from the “poison fruits” of the previous days unlawfully

conducted court hearing, and then executed on it at my residence at 3:00AM with a “shock and

awe” display of at least ten King County Police cruisers with emergency lights activated for

approximately three-hours, and proceeded to fraudulently traumatize, slander, defame, and

demonize me in front of my wife and children using racially charged epithets in an attempt to




Puyallup, WA 98373TEL: (253) 840-8071

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

browbeat and then solicit statements from her that she ‘questioned my mental status,’ while at

the same time removing items from my home that were not on the fraudulently obtained search

warrant.

Subsequently, the King County Sheriff executed a wrongfully issued, fatally flawed and

fraudulent writ of restitution, without bond, containing a completely erroneous legal description

and inaccurate street address for an apartment complex in Kent, WA and not at my home, the

inherited estate and residence of my recently deceased parents, in Auburn, WA some 25-miles

away from the address on the bogus warrant they were forcefully acting upon. Acting as an

ostensible law enforcement agency, clothed with the power of the state, the King County

Sheriff was fraudulently, and incompetently, pretending to enforce the law, while actually, and

egregiously, violating the law.

THE RULES

FRCP 1 clearly sets forth the “Scope and Purpose of Rules” to wit: “They shall be

construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination

of every action.” (emphasis supplied) Moreover, as I read FRCP 77(a), I find that, “[T]he

district courts shall be deemed always open for the purpose of filing any pleading or

other proper paper, of issuing and returning mesne and final process, and of making and

directing all interlocutory motions, orders and rules.”

Hence, in following the prescribed Local Rule CR7(d)(2)(A) and the pertinent language

of that rule,

“(2) The following motions may be noted for consideration no earlier than seven judicialdays after filing:(A) motions for relief from a deadline or limit imposed by an order, federal rule orlocal rule;” (emphasis supplied)

I heretofore filed and served my motion for enlargement with respect to “excusable neglect”

pursuant to FRCP 6(b)(2) upon Defendant King County and the Court before the close of




Puyallup, WA 98373TEL: (253) 840-8071

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

business, on February 20, 2009, and it was lodged with King County and the Court at 4:36PM,

as noted in the automatic e-mail message generated by the CM/ECF system. Defendant King

County was therefore duly aware of the pending motion noted for consideration on February

27, 2009, eight days in advance. As such, I did properly note my motion and it should be

given every possible consideration by the Court.

Clearly, King County was not prejudiced or inconvenienced by my filing, and in fact,

King County has evidenced no showing of prejudice in its opposition pleading.

Regarding Defendant King County’s assertion that, “Moreover, granting an extension

would further delay the orderly conduct of this case as the parties will have to wait until

additional parties are joined to fully decide which issues require discovery”, according to

an Internet article entitled “Helping the Pro Se Litigant: A Changing Landscape” (Winter 2003)

by Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, a staff attorney and principal court research consultant with the

National Center for State Courts regarding equal access to justice for pro se litigants, she

states, “As a practical matter, however, most cases involving self-represented litigants do

not generally require a great deal of discovery or legal preparation in that they tend to

be factually and legally quite straight forward. (emphasis supplied) Such is the situation in

this case, notwithstanding that King County has proffered that they do not comprehend my

complaint which is written in plain English.

Defendant King County’s attempt at subterfuge and use of the 'rules' contrary to their

intended purpose was decided by the supreme court in Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels, 383 U.S.

363 (1966):

"These rules were designed in large part to get away from some of the old procedural boobytraps which common law pleaders could set to prevent unsophisticated litigants from everhaving their day in court. If rules of procedure work as they should in an honest and fairjudicial system, they not only permit, but should as nearly as possible guarantee, that bonafide complaints be carried to an adjudication on the merits."

Using "form" to deny "substance," in matters such as these, is clearly "obstruction of justice."




Puyallup, WA 98373TEL: (253) 840-8071

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

By way of my claims, however inartfully presented, King County and the Court have been

made aware of very serious violations of my guaranteed constitutional rights, and egregious

violations of state and federal criminal statutes, in very plain English.

As a direct consequence of these criminal and tortious acts, the damages sustained to

Plaintiff’s business and property are easily proved.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, I respectfully request that the Court, upon

hearing my motion, will enter an Order that I be permitted an additional 30-days within which

to prepare a motion for joinder of indispensable parties, praecipe for summons, and leave of

Court to file Plaintiff’s first amended complaint.

DATED this 26th day of February, 2009. /s/ John R. Prukop


I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was this 26th day of February, 2009 filedelectronically via the Court’s CM/ECF system, which effects service via e-mail uponthe following:



/s/ John R. Prukop


of 10

November 27, 2007

Risk Managament Claim pursuant to King County Code (KCC) Chapter 4.12, etseq., “CLAIMS AGAINST COUNTY”, for $20,000,000 (Million) U.S. Dollars, and fortreble damages under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951 (RICO) in the sum of$60,000,000 (Million) U.S. Dollars, as against King County METROPOLITANGovernment, a Municipal Corporation, King County Sheriff Susan Rahr, KingCounty Deputy Wayne Goding, King County Deputy Sgt. Andrea Alexander, KingCounty Deputy Stephen Pope, King County Deputy Mark Pike, King CountyDeputy Det. Christopher Bassett, King County District Court, King County DistrictCourt Judge Charles Delaurenti III, King County District Court Judge VictoriaSeitz, King County District Court Judge David Christie, King County Jail, KingCounty Superior Court Judge Jeffrey Ramsdell, King County Senior DPA Randi J.Austell, King County DPA Alexandra Keller, King County DPA ChristopherNielsen, and unidentified John and Jane Does 1 thru 50, arising out of the tortiousconduct of Officers and Civil Servants in and for King County MetropolitanGovernment, as committed against John R. Prukop, a resident of King County, onor about November 27, 2005 and continuum with additional tortious conductbeginning on or about February 8, 2006 and on February 10, 2006, and continuingthereafter for 18-months, thru and including October 17, 2007, as evidencedhereafter:

KCSO (King County Sheriff’s Office) for a false, fraudulent and perjured policereport from known unreliable and convicted felons whom KCSO had ‘privity’of knowledge concerning, and who knew was a fraudulent police report at theoutset based on IRIS data, the initiating event at 1:00 a.m., followed by thesecondary event at 2:00 a.m., as well as prior incidents of trouble making bythe same felonious subjects and as previously reported by Mr. Prukop to theKing County Sheriff’s 911 Call Center;

KCSO denial of the honest services of the King County Sheriff’s Office bydenying Mr. Prukop a 911 police response for attempted vehicular assault andattempted assault and battery and trespass by known criminal elements onNovmber 27, 2005;

KCSO Deputy and Precinct Three 4th Shift Duty Sgt. Andrea Alexander forseizure and false imprisonment by ordering primary responder, King CountyDeputy Wayne S. Goding, to “arrest Mr. Prukop” on November 27, 2005 solelyon her order and acting without a warrant at 3:00 a.m., while Mr. Prukop waslawfully and securely within his residence, afterwhich Mr. Prukop was enticedoutside of his residence by Deputy Goding;

KCDC (Burien) Senior DPA Randi J. Austell for libel and slander; wrongful andmalicious criminal prosecution and obstruction of justice without basis orfacts or evidence in support thereof. Violations of the Rules of ProfessionalConduct, “Preamble”, RPC 1.1, RPC 1.2(d), RPC 3.1, RPC 3.3, RPC 3.4, RPC3.5, RPC 3.8, RPC 4.1, RPC 4.4, RPC 8.4, and aided and abetted by associates-in-fact and co-conspirators King County DPA Alexandria Keller and KingCounty DPA Christopher Nielsen;


of 10

KCDC (Burien) Judge Charles Delaurenti II for violation of defendant’s dueprocess rights, violation of the 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Amendments to the U.S.Constitution and seizure of Mr. Prukop’s concealed weapons permit and hisfirearms without just cause or basis in law, or that Mr. Prukop would beimmediately jailed, said acts being done without benefit of counsel andwithout a bonafide hearing or trial, all being orchestrated by KCDC (Burien)Senior DPA Randi J. Austell (WSBA #28166) and associates-in-fact KCDC(Burien) DPA Alexandra Keller (WSBA #36632) and KCDC (Burien) DPAChristopher Nielsen (WSBA #36662); all in contravention of the Constitution ofthe State of Washington and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and theWashington Court Rules;

KCDC (Burien) Judge Victoria Seitz for violation of Mr. Prukop’s due processrights, violation of the 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution,Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC), “Preamble”, CJC-1, CJC-2, CJC-3, CrRLJ3.2(a),(b) & (c), conditions of release; unlawful imprisonment and conspiracyto defraud; for *CASH ONLY* excessive bail of $100,000 and $500,000respectively, for inflicting cruel and unusual punishment, mental pain andsuffering, by unlawful imprisonment based solely on hear-say and obstructionof justice by a sham proceeding by shielding the true actors from criminalprosecution, Mr. Prukop’s attackers acting in concert together, namely JesseLee Copley, Kenneth Edward Copley and Steven Lee Rieger, and with othersunknown at this time, now referred to by Judge Seitz and Senior DPA Randi J.Austell as Mr. Prukop’s “VICTIMS”. Judge Seitz was familiar with CrRLJ 3.2from the 2/10/2006 hearing to address conditions of release, and stated on therecord her familiarity with the bail process from her time spent at the jailcalendar. Yet, when setting Mr. Prukop’s bail, Judge Seitz acted in totaldisregard of its mandates. The reasoning she employed in setting Mr.Prukop’s bail was patently erroneous. The district court’s conduct was clearlyillegal and in excess of its jurisdiction, if jurisdiction ever existed in the firstinstance, since Mr. Prukop did what any other citizen would have done on thenight of November 27, 2005 when confronted by a known criminal elementwith a history of aggravated crimes in the community, trespassing on hisproperty in the middle of the night, by repelling the threat in self-defense of hisperson and property using the minimum force necessary.

KCDC (Burien) Judge Victoria Seitz for violation of WA Constitution excessivebail provision; detention was unlawful because: (1) false and perjured policereport; (2) hearsay; (3) bail excessive and in violation of the Eight Amendmentof the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 14 of the Washington StateConstitution.

KCDC (Burien) denial by Judge Seitz of effective assistance of counsel bydenying Mr. Prukop’s court appointed counsel a continuance of the 2/10/06hearing after being assigned to the case just two hours prior to the hearing. At1:30 p.m., counsel for Mr. Prukop filed a Notice of Appearance with the Stateand the trial court and received discovery from the state, and was informed ofthe nature of the proceeding. Believing additional time was needed in order toeffectively represent Mr. Prukop’s interest, counsel requested a continuance


of 10

on the matter. Judge Seitz, however, granted Mr. Prukop a mere 45 minutecontinuance, thus denying Mr. Prukop his right to due process of law, placingthe matter on a ‘rocket-docket’ and was never afforded the opportunity tosequester witnesses to vouch for his reliability, character and reputation. The‘hearing’ was thus tainted, one sided, and a sham proceeding from thebeginning.

KCSO and Detective Christopher Matthews and John and Jane Doe KingCounty Sheriff’s DEPUTIES 1 thru 20, and King County District Court throughand by the orchestration of events by KCDC Senior DPA Randi J. Austell forunlawful search of Mr. Prukop’s residence by telephonic warrant at 2:00 a.m.and executed at 3:00 a.m. February 11, 2006, while Mr. Prukop was in lock-upat the King County Jail, inflicting trauma, pain and suffering upon Mr. Prukop’swife, and the unlawful seizure of eleven of Mr. Prukop’s lawfully owned andlegal firearms, in addition to personal items and papers that were taken fromMr. Prukop’s home that were not listed on the bogus warrant, on pretext ofadditional charges being filed for contempt of court, which were in fact filedon Monday, February 13, 2006, stemming from the initial unlawful acts by theKing County Sheriff’s Office on or about November 27, 2005 and on or aboutFebruary 8, 2006 and on or about February 10, 2006 by the King CountyDistrict Court, and including denying Mr. Prukop the ability to comply with theorder he was charged with violating, as more fully set forth in the Writ ofHabeas Corpus as filed by Mr. Prukop’s court appointed (OPD) Kurt Boehl(WSBA #36627) under cause No: 260050133 in the King County SuperiorCourt, and made a part hereof as if fully set forth in its entirety;

KCDC (Kent) denial by Judge David Christie of a reduction in bail or releasefrom confinement on pretext by King County DPA’s Alexandra Keller andChristopher Nielsen (acting in concert with and on behalf of King CountySenior DPA Randi J. Austell) that Mr. Prukop was a “continuing danger to thecommunity,” absent any proof or facts of same and irrespective of Mr. Prukophaving no prior criminal record of any kind and who recently had qualified as abonafide candidate for entry-level King County Deputy Sheriff, in addition tothirteen hand-written letters from neighbors of Mr. Prukop and live testimonyby Mr. & Mrs. Booth who all vouched for Mr. Prukop’s integrity in thecommunity and their praise for his neighborhood blockwatch activities andthe resultant reduction of crime in the community;

KCDC and King County DPA’s Austell, Keller and Nielsen, with assistance ofKCSO Deputy-Detective Christopher Bassett, in collusion with Mr. Prukop’scourt appointed OPD (Office of Public Defender) Counsel, for collusion andfraud in bringing forth a “Stipulated Order of Continuance” (SOC) as the onlyway Mr. Prukop could get out of jail – absent paying $600,000 bail. The SOCencompassed the continuing seizure of Mr. Prukop’s valuable collection oflegally owned firearms and his lawfully issued concealed weapons permit byKCSO for 12-months, and Mr. Prukop’s continuing probation for 18-months fora crime he did not commit; and, furthering the fraud that Mr. Prukop’sattackers were now his “victims” and enactment of a no-contact order withsaid “victims”, in addition to a no-contact order with the King County


of 10

Prosecutor’s Office and the King County Sheriff’s Office, the latter beingexcepted only in an “emergency”, and with no reference or regard to the factthat Mr. Prukop had sought and obtained Anti-Harassment and ProtectionOrders against all three of his attackers beginning on December 7, 2005. Ofthose orders, Jesse Lee Copley was served at his residence; Kenneth EdwardCopley was served in the King County Jail at the Kent/RJC; and, Steven LeeRieger was served in open-court and was the only one to respond to process.It is to be specifically noted that KCDC DPA’s Alexandra Keller, andChristopher Nielsen and Mr. Prukop’s court appointed counsel through theKing County OPD, Kurt Boehl, share more than just an association asmembers of the same closed union shop, the WSBA. All three of thesepersons went to law school together and are intimate friends, and all threewere admitted to the WSBA on the same day. All three were acting in concertand conspiracy to defraud Mr. Prukop of the tangible right to the honestservices of the King County Office of Public Defender and due process of lawwas utterly denied due to their combined conflict of interest.

KCSO, KCDC and the King County Prosecutor’s Office for not bringing forthcriminal charges for the crimes that Mr. Prukop’s attackers engaged in on thenight of November 27, 2005, including an attempt on Mr. Prukop by use of adeadly weapon, a motor vehicle, WA License 593-NAV at 1:00 a.m., and asubsequent attempt on Mr. Prukop to physically assault him while trespassingon his property at 2:00 a.m. on November 27, 2005;

SOW & KING COUNTY for forfeiture to the state for an illegal and excessive*CASH ONLY*bail bond of $100,000.00 and the recovery of the fee therefore,forefeited to its agent, ALL CITY BAIL BONDS, in the sum of $10,000.00, pluscollateral storage fees of $900.00, and interest thereon from February 11, 2006to the date of payment of claim.

King County Prosecutor Dan Satterburg and King County Councilman Petevon Reichbauer (District 7) for their having covered-up the crimes committedagainst Mr. Prukop and in aiding, abetting and furthering the insidiouscorruption within King County Metropolitian Government, the King CountyProsecutor’s Office, the King County District Court system and the KingCounty Sheriff’s Office, and never ONCE attempting to mitigate any of theegregious things that were allowed to be committed against Mr. Prukop in thename of “justice” after being apprised of the matters. Mr. Prukop’s efforts toalert those in charge fell on deaf ears, and is more akin of reporting the ‘pimp’to the ‘whore.’ Once a fraud… always a fraud.

RCW 36.28.011

Duty to make complaint.In addition to the duties contained in RCW 36.28.010, it shall be the duty of all sheriffsto make complaint of all violations of the criminal law, which shall come to theirknowledge, within their respective jurisdictions.


of 10

[1963 c 4 § 36.28.011. Prior: 1955 c 10 § 1. Cf. Code 1881 § 2801, part; 1869 p 264 § 311, part; RRS §4173, part.]

RCW 36.28.150

Liability for fault or misconduct.Whenever any sheriff neglects to make due return of any writ or other process deliveredto him to be executed, or is guilty of any default or misconduct in relation thereto, heshall be liable to fine or attachment, or both, at the discretion of the court, subject toappeal, such fine, however, not to exceed two hundred dollars; and also to an action fordamages to the party aggrieved.

[1963 c 4 § 36.28.150. Prior: Code 1881 § 2771; 1863 p 558 § 6; 1854 p 434 § 6; RRS § 4169.]

RCW 4.16.080

Actions limited to three years.The following actions shall be commenced within three years:

(1) An action for waste or trespass upon real property;

(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action forthe specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another nothereinafter enumerated;

(3) Except as provided in RCW 4.16.040(2), an action upon a contract or liability,express or implied, which is not in writing, and does not arise out of any writteninstrument;

(4) An action for relief upon the ground of fraud, the cause of action in such case not tobe deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the factsconstituting the fraud;

(5) An action against a sheriff, coroner, or constable upon a liability incurred by thedoing of an act in his official capacity and by virtue of his office, or by the omission of anofficial duty, including the nonpayment of money collected upon an execution; but thissubdivision shall not apply to action for an escape;

(6) An action against an officer charged with misappropriation or a failure to properlyaccount for public funds intrusted to his custody; an action upon a statute for penalty orforfeiture, where an action is given to the party aggrieved, or to such party and the state,except when the statute imposing it prescribed a different limitation: PROVIDED,HOWEVER, The cause of action for such misappropriation, penalty or forfeiture,


of 10

whether for acts heretofore or hereafter done, and regardless of lapse of time or existingstatutes of limitations, or the bar thereof, even though complete, shall not be deemed toaccrue or to have accrued until discovery by the aggrieved party of the act or acts fromwhich such liability has arisen or shall arise, and such liability, whether for actsheretofore or hereafter done, and regardless of lapse of time or existing statute oflimitation, or the bar thereof, even though complete, shall exist and be enforceable forthree years after discovery by aggrieved party of the act or acts from which such liabilityhas arisen or shall arise.

[1989 c 38 § 2; 1937 c 127 § 1; 1923 c 28 § 1; Code 1881 § 28; 1869 p 8 § 28; 1854 p 363 § 4; RRS §159.]

Notes:

Reviser's note: Transitional proviso omitted from subsection (6). The proviso reads: "PROVIDED,FURTHER, That no action heretofore barred under the provisions of this paragraph shall be commencedafter ninety days from the time this act becomes effective;".

RCW 4.16.100

Actions limited to two years.

Within two years:

(1) An action for libel, slander, assault, assault and battery, or false imprisonment.

(2) An action upon a statute for a forfeiture or penalty to the state.[Code 1881 § 29; 1877 p 8 § 29; 1869 p 9 § 29; 1854 p 363 § 5; RRS § 160.]

Notes:

Limitation of action for recovery of transportation charges: RCW 81.28.270.

RCW 4.96.010

Tortious conduct of local governmental entities — Liability fordamages.(1) All local governmental entities, whether acting in a governmental or proprietarycapacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of their tortious conduct, or the tortiousconduct of their past or present officers, employees, or volunteers while performing or ingood faith purporting to perform their official duties, to the same extent as if they were aprivate person or corporation. Filing a claim for damages within the time allowed by lawshall be a condition precedent to the commencement of any action claiming damages.The laws specifying the content for such claims shall be liberally construed so thatsubstantial compliance therewith will be deemed satisfactory.

(2) Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, for the purposes of this chapter, "local


of 10

governmental entity" means a county, city, town, special district, municipal corporationas defined in RCW 39.50.010, quasi-municipal corporation, or public hospital.

(3) For the purposes of this chapter, "volunteer" is defined according to RCW 51.12.035.[2001 c 119 § 1; 1993 c 449 § 2; 1967 c 164 § 1.]Notes:

Purpose -- 1993 c 449: "This act is designed to provide a single, uniform procedure for bringing a claimfor damages against a local governmental entity. The existing procedures, contained in chapter 36.45RCW, counties, chapter 35.31 RCW, cities and towns, chapter 35A.31 RCW, optional municipal code,and chapter 4.96 RCW, other political subdivisions, municipal corporations, and quasi-municipalcorporations, are revised and consolidated into chapter 4.96 RCW." [1993 c 449 § 1.]Severability -- 1993 c 449: "If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance isheld invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstancesis not affected." [1993 c 449 § 15.]Purpose -- 1967 c 164: "It is the purpose of this act to extend the doctrine established in chapter 136,Laws of 1961, as amended, to all political subdivisions, municipal corporations and quasi municipalcorporations of the state." [1967 c 164 § 17.]Severability -- 1967 c 164: "If any provision of this act, or its application to any person or circumstance isheld invalid, the remainder of the act, or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstancesis not affected." [1967 c 164 § 18.]

RCW 4.96.020

Tortious conduct of local governmental entities and their agents —Claims — Presentment and filing — Contents.(1) The provisions of this section apply to claims for damages against all localgovernmental entities and their officers, employees, or volunteers, acting in suchcapacity.

(2) The governing body of each local governmental entity shall appoint an agent toreceive any claim for damages made under this chapter. The identity of the agent andthe address where he or she may be reached during the normal business hours of thelocal governmental entity are public records and shall be recorded with the auditor ofthe county in which the entity is located. All claims for damages against a localgovernmental entity, or against any local governmental entity's officers, employees, orvolunteers, acting in such capacity, shall be presented to the agent within the applicableperiod of limitations within which an action must be commenced. The failure of a localgovernmental entity to comply with the requirements of this section precludes that localgovernmental entity from raising a defense under this chapter.

(3) All claims for damages arising out of tortious conduct must locate and describe theconduct and circumstances which brought about the injury or damage, describe theinjury or damage, state the time and place the injury or damage occurred, state thenames of all persons involved, if known, and shall contain the amount of damagesclaimed, together with a statement of the actual residence of the claimant at the time ofpresenting and filing the claim and for a period of six months immediately prior to the


of 10

time the claim arose. If the claimant is incapacitated from verifying, presenting, and filingthe claim in the time prescribed or if the claimant is a minor, or is a nonresident of thestate absent therefrom during the time within which the claim is required to be filed, theclaim may be verified, presented, and filed on behalf of the claimant by any relative,attorney, or agent representing the claimant.

(4) No action shall be commenced against any local governmental entity, or against anylocal governmental entity's officers, employees, or volunteers, acting in such capacity,for damages arising out of tortious conduct until sixty days have elapsed after the claimhas first been presented to and filed with the governing body thereof. The applicableperiod of limitations within which an action must be commenced shall be tolled duringthe sixty-day period.

[2006 c 82 § 3; 2001 c 119 § 2; 1993 c 449 § 3; 1967 c 164 § 4.]

Notes:

Purpose -- Severability--1993 c 449: See notes following RCW 4.96.010.

RCW 4.56.115

Interest on judgments against state, political subdivisions ormunicipal corporations — Torts.Judgments founded on the tortious conduct of the state of Washington or of the politicalsubdivisions, municipal corporations, and quasi municipal corporations of the state,whether acting in their governmental or proprietary capacities, shall bear interest fromthe date of entry at two percentage points above the equivalent coupon issue yield (aspublished by the board of governors of the federal reserve system) of the average billrate for twenty-six week treasury bills as determined at the first bill market auctionconducted during the calendar month immediately preceding the date of entry thereof.In any case where a court is directed on review to enter judgment on a verdict or in anycase where a judgment entered on a verdict is wholly or partly affirmed on review,interest on the judgment or on that portion of the judgment affirmed shall date back toand shall accrue from the date the verdict was rendered.

[2004 c 185 § 1; 1983 c 147 § 2; 1975 c 26 § 1.]

Notes:

Application -- Interest accrual -- 2004 c 185: "The rate of interest required by sections 1 and 2(3),chapter 185, Laws of 2004 applies to the accrual of interest:

(1) As of the date of entry of judgment with respect to a judgment that is entered on or after June 10,2004;

(2) As of June 10, 2004, with respect to a judgment that was entered before June 10, 2004, and that isstill accruing interest on June 10, 2004."

[2004 c 185 § 3.]Application -- 1983 c 147: See note following RCW 4.56.110.


of 10

RCW 4.96.041

Action or proceeding against officer, employee, or volunteer of localgovernmental entity — Payment of damages and expenses ofdefense.(1) Whenever an action or proceeding for damages is brought against any past orpresent officer, employee, or volunteer of a local governmental entity of this state,arising from acts or omissions while performing or in good faith purporting to perform hisor her official duties, such officer, employee, or volunteer may request the localgovernmental entity to authorize the defense of the action or proceeding at the expenseof the local governmental entity.

(2) If the legislative authority of the local governmental entity, or the local governmentalentity using a procedure created by ordinance or resolution, finds that the acts oromissions of the officer, employee, or volunteer were, or in good faith purported to be,within the scope of his or her official duties, the request shall be granted. If the requestis granted, the necessary expenses of defending the action or proceeding shall be paidby the local governmental entity. Any monetary judgment against the officer, employee,or volunteer shall be paid on approval of the legislative authority of the localgovernmental entity or by a procedure for approval created by ordinance or resolution.

(3) The necessary expenses of defending an elective officer of the local governmentalentity in a judicial hearing to determine the sufficiency of a recall charge as provided in*RCW 29.82.023 shall be paid by the local governmental entity if the officer requestssuch defense and approval is granted by both the legislative authority of the localgovernmental entity and the attorney representing the local governmental entity. Theexpenses paid by the local governmental entity may include costs associated with anappeal of the decision rendered by the superior court concerning the sufficiency of therecall charge.

(4) When an officer, employee, or volunteer of the local governmental entity has beenrepresented at the expense of the local governmental entity under subsection (1) of thissection and the court hearing the action has found that the officer, employee, orvolunteer was acting within the scope of his or her official duties, and a judgmenthas been entered against the officer, employee, or volunteer under chapter 4.96 RCWor 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 et seq., thereafter the judgment creditor shall seek satisfactionfor nonpunitive damages only from the local governmental entity, and judgment fornonpunitive damages shall not become a lien upon any property of such officer,employee, or volunteer. The legislative authority of a local governmental entity may,pursuant to a procedure created by ordinance or resolution, agree to pay an award forpunitive damages.

[1993 c 449 § 4; 1989 c 250 § 1; 1979 ex.s. c 72 § 1. Formerly RCW 36.16.134.]


of 10

Notes:

*Reviser's note: RCW 29.82.023 was recodified as RCW 29A.56.140 pursuant to 2003 c 111 § 2401,effective July 1, 2004.Purpose -- Severability--1993 c 449: See notes following RCW 4.96.010.


case 2:07-cv-00216-rsm document 51-9 filed 10/14/09 page 1...

Documents