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Canadian multiculturalism as IdeologyKogila Moodley

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Published online: 13 Sep 2010.

To cite this article:Kogila Moodley (1983) Canadian multiculturalism as Ideology, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 6:3, 320-331

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C a n a d i a n m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m

s

I d e o l o g y

ogi la M oodley

U n i v e r s i t y o r it is h C o lu m b i a

I

Nowhere is the confusion of myth and reality more evident than in the

meaning of the Canadian policy of multiculturalism. It encompasses a range

of notions of heritage, cultural diversity, recreation and entertainment

activities, cultural centres, and an entire way of life with fundamental in-

stitutional structures. Cultural differences are at once extolled and con-

sidered a hindrance to be removed in the interests of equal opportunity.

1

On the one hand, there is frequent reference to the 'multicultural movement,'

2

while on the other, surveys show that only a fifth of the Canadian public

has ever heard about multiculturalism,

3

let alone being moved by it.

With the stroke of a multicultural brush, the policy neutralized the special

claims of French and Native Canadians. Both of these historical groups

with charter rights are now equalized among numerous others. Although

the French language is recognized as one of the two official languages, the

French complain about a loss of cultural hegemony. At the same time,

other European ethnics complain that cultural preservation without linguistic

protection is boun d t o fail, while Native groups poin t out tha t multiculturalism

achieves nothing for the recognition of their controversial land claims and

forgotten treaty rights.

Yet with a festive aura of imaginary consensus, multiculturalism implies

that Canadian society offers equality of opportunity in the public sphere,

regardless of private ethnic classification. Hence the usage of 'ethnic' to refer

to all cultural sub-groups including 'dom inant e thnic s' thereby obfuscating

the cultural hierarchy and redefining ethnicity until it is meaningless. All

are exhorted to draw on some subliminal cultural allegiances, nostalgia,

customs and traditions as part of their hereditary insignia, even though

officially given the right to choose whether to identify or not. The fear

that ethnic groups in sustaining their respective cultures will undermine

national unity is mitigated by a meek plea to share these cultures with the

rest of Canadian society, thereby enriching the whole.

4

All wh o so desire,

are subsidised to bring cultural identities out of the private closet into the

public sphere, presumably elevating all to equally important pieces of a

diverse Ca nadian c ultura l mosaic .

s

Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 6 Numb er 3 July 1983

R.K.P. 1983 0141-9870/83/0603-0320 $1.50/1


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Canadian

multiculturalism as ideology 32 1

Official policy defines culture as 'a way of being, thinking and feeling *

undisturbed that such cultural existentialism may profoundly change under

altered circumstances. This somewhat primordialist emphasis, as opposed

to an instrumental notion of culture, is also true for most studies of Canadian

ethnicity. Ethnicity is seen as having an intrinsic vitality regardless of the

context.

This analysis, however, will argue against such a depoliticized and static

definition of ethnic ity. Instead, ethnic mobilization is viewed as situational,

always in response to specific socio-structural contexts, arising in unique

historical constellations which in turn mediate ethnic expression dialectically.

The waxing and waning of ethnicity, it is argued, can hardly be understood

without reference to the motivational factors and underlying interests. These

are differently perceived according to constantly changing needs and their

ideological interpretations.

Both at the level of political and social reality, Canadian multiculturalism

greatly resembles the emperor's new clothes. Only unlike the emperor's

audience, Canadian professional ethnics, cultural entrepreneurs and a coterie

of academics are more directly and amply rewarded for their fantasies. It is

they who benefit most from multiculturalism and the big business of culture.

Their activities are largely the outcome, rather than the cause of official

policy. As Trudeau promised in his announcement of the policy, 'the whole

question of cultural and ethnic pluralism in this coun try . . . i s . . . an area

of study given all too little attention in the past by scholars.'

7

Judging by

the sheer volume of Canadian Ethnic Studies today, this can hardly be said

to be the case. It would still, however, seem to apply to the somewhat limited

focus of research. Modelled largely along U.S. examples of a positivistic

methodology and functionalist tradition, the numerous descriptive and

classificatory studies fall all too frequently short of what an historically

informed, interpretive sociology can achieve.

8

Official multiculturalism and

its academic reception in Canada provides a useful demonstration of the

potential for better insights which alternative critical perspectives can yield.

This would involve an eschewing of the reified numbers game and instead,

reasoning with structural changes that account for the alternating demand

for traditional cultural expressions in Canada. Historical evidence is presented

to show that the professional ethnic has a waning constituency in Canada,

despite increased sub sidization, tha t ou ght to b e directed, it is argued, towards

the largely neglected needs of a new eth nicity.

II

Th erise of the w elfare state eroded the significance of immigrant associations

for individual adjustment and advancement in the new environment. In

contrast, the pre-war generations of immigrants relied heavily on cultural

self-help organizations for initial survival. Their function has been largely

assumed by a host of state-directed social agencies. Claims for financial

and moral support in all situations exist from the day landed immigrant


4/13

322 KogilaMoodley

status is granted. Hence, an. atomize d, a utonom ous life outside cultural

bonds has become objectively possible where earlier cultural ties constituted

a lifeline for survival. Post 1960 associations appeal mainly to lower income

and older individuals. Noticeably absent from membership are youth, pro-

fessionals and unionized workers, whose occupational reference groups lie

outside the ethnic associations.

9

The improved legal status of immigrants allows for an early identification

with the host society. Previously, the immigrant frequently remained a

sojourner. Subject to political exclusion as newcomer and open economic

discrimination in a harsh competition, large numbers of immigrants in the

case of Italians in North America, before 1919, more than three quarters

actually returned to their cou ntry of origin after a period in the new

country. Despite the easing of travel nowadays, the proportion of those

who return permanently is relatively small. With the possibility of acquiring

citizenship after two years' residence often a double citizenship the

newcomer is free to oscillate, to probe and compare.

Despite the change of lifestyle and instrumental human relationships

in the country of adoption, few immigrants choose to exchange attractive

individualism, North American sty le, for the sake of cultural sentimentalities.

This is all the more so since economic opportunities in the new country

are still less bleak than those in the home country. On the contrary, with

the widening of the North-South gap, the pressure to emigrate has increased

in the less developed parts and all industrialized societies are faced with a

ready migrant labour force in search of a bette r life.

Another function of the improved legal status of newcomers was the

simultaneous immigration of entire families. Earlier immigration on the

other hand, was mainly characterized by the initial migration of single males

who were only joined by relatives, if at all, after a lengthy period of separation.

This phase not only made the single individuals rely more o n cu ltural supp ort-

groups in the new immigrant colonies but also retained strong emotional

links to the residence of their kin. Once kin have resettled as well, much

of what remains is nostalgia. With the family together in the new country,

the drive for material success and security assumes priority. Furthermore,

the maintenance of original cultures in a new society without the requisite

structural support ins titutions (schools, extend ed families) shifts from a way

of life to the realm of symbolic life embellishment. Traditional culture is

further undermined by peer socialization, media, and the 'hidden curriculum'

of a public school system, where the mainstream culture predominates as

the culture of success.

Canada's changed immigration policy in the form of the point system

led to a restructuring of the ethnic and occupational composition of new

immigrants. While in previous periods, almost all immigrants were unskilled

labourers or started as farmers, the point system favoured professionals and

wealthier members of middle groups with special skills or academic training.

These skilled newcom ers soon established themselves interspersed through out

Canadian society instead of starting in the cultural ghettos of New Italy,


5/13

Canadianm ulticulturalism as ideology 32 3

New Greece or New Ireland as in earlier periods. These skilled migrants did

not need the initial linguistic familiarity of home became most of them

already arrived with bilingual faculties that were a precondition of their

jobs.

With the exception of those who came as sponsored family members

the new wave, particularly from Third World countries, were geographically

mobile to seek opportunities outside ethnic conglomerates. In fact, many

newcomers belonged to new ethnic groups who did not y et have a sufficiently

large presence in the country to form cultural support organizations let

alone residential ghettos which they did not need in the first place. At the

most, neighbourhoods of new arrivals evolved around religious activities

or restaurants but hardly constituted centers of 'psychic shelter' and trans-

planted bases of home.

Due to their greater heterogeneity of ethnic background as well as social

stratification, the newcomers from the same country, share less with their

cultural peers and more with their counterparts across ethnic boundaries

than earlier, more homogeneous immigrant populations. This increased

class stratification of recent Canadian immigrants compared with the largely

unskilled arrivals previously, further eroded the cultural ties and social

lives the new ethnics might otherwise have shared.

To this heterogeneous ethno-class composition must be added the greater

degree of secularization of the newcomers. Two tendencies are noticeable.

Firstly, there is the loss of membership experienced by immigrant churches

through dwindling fluency in native languages, exogamy and the desire to

shed ethnic stigma. With upward mobility, the trend among church goers

has been away from 'ethnic' churches to 'Canadian' ones.

10

Overall, the

ethn ic ch urch as the core of the cultural life of the earlier immigrant com mun ity

has lost its appeal to large sections of nominal believers who prefer to pursue

non-religious leisure activities rather than have their hedonistic life styles

constricted by the conformity pressure of church groups.

The degree of secularization correlates wi th anothe r impo rtant difference

in the origin of newcomers. The vast majority of earlier immigrants, be they

from Ireland, Italy or Eastern Europe emigrated from underdeveloped rural

areas. With the exception of Jews, they constituted the surplus population

of displaced peasants, rural laborers or craftsmen, who were essentially

conservative, religious and tradition-bound in outlook. The new ethnics,

on the other hand, derived mostly from urban centers where they had already

become acculturated long ago, if not to an industrial way of life, at least

to a cosmopolitan style, not too different to the skills needed in Canadian

urban conglomerates. In fact, newcomers from Delhi, Hongkong, Nairobi

or Beirut could teach Canadians valuable lessons in urban survival without

relying on artifical crutches of cultural identity maintenance. For this group,

expressions of cultural identity are far less meaningful relics of a distant

past.

The spatial dispersal of immigrants has also undermined the previous

importance of the ethnic school.With a few exceptions, such as the schools

in Vancouver's Chinatown district, almost all Canadian schools are now


6/13

324

Kogila Moodley

truly integrated ethnically. Indeed, the proportion of children from Non-

English speaking homes sometimes exceeds 50 per cent in metropolitan

areas, although they do come from a vast variety of countries and cultures.

While the former ethnic school in the cultural ghetto could frequently

cultivate mother tongue instruction albeit after school hours, the new multi-

cultural school environment puts a premium on the shedding of the original

language in favour of the quick grasp of English language and culture. Deprived

of language, however, retention of culture becomes increasingly ephemeral

and artificial. The official language of school, business and career opportunities

determines a cultural hierarchy in which non-mainstream socialization is

relegated to the private realm at the most and to forgotten memory at the

worst. As has often been noted, true multiculturalism also presupposes

official multilingualism.

The superficial nature of current multicultural policy is highlighted by

this separation of culture and language. The explicit rejection of the relation-

ship between multiculturalism and multflinguaUsm in the official policy

announcement confirms this view. That a cultural as well as a linguistic

hierarchy exists is evident. The C.B.C., contrary to the recommendation of

the Royal Commission on Bflingualism and Biculturalism, has not removed

its proscription on the use of languages other than French and English in

broadcasting.

11

Given the role of mass communication an d languages of

instruction in cultural development, privatized multiculturalism without a

publicly recognized linguistic base is the only option left for non-English

and French-speaking Canadians. Genuine cultural pluralism, however, is

still all too easily considered as undermining the cohesion of Canadian society.

The structural changes sketched resulted in what may be called the

depoliticization of multiculturalism.

This refers to th e loss of political in-

fluence of immigrants despite their numbers and improved legal status.

The com mon assertion that throu gh increased pu rchasing, bargaining, and

electoral power, e thnic minorities acquire com petitive advantages and develop

a politicised ethnic identification,

12

is indeed arguable. Exc ept in the case

of immigrants who enter at the lowest occupational levels, and are handi-

capped through language, the incentives to escape the stigma of ethnicity

are considerable. If there is a dominant attitude among recent Canadian

immigrants, regardless of ethnic origin, it is to seek upward mobility through

.individual qualifications rather than through collective efforts. With the

opening of new economic opportunities outside the extractive and manu-

facturing sectors, many newcomers also developed the well-known white

collar me ntality of an individual achievement o rientation .

In the earlier phases, ethnic voting constituted a well-known fact. The

immigrant vote, on the whole went to left of centre parties (in the West to

the Socialists, in Ontario to the liberals), that were seen to represent the

interest of the newcomers against the conservative establishment. This ethnic

block vote has now, for th e m ost p art, dissipated, although the NDP and the

federal liberals still receive a disproportionally large share. But the com mun ity

leader who could deliver *his' vote in return for other favors is rare. Many of


7/13

Canadianm ulticulturalism as ideology 32 5

his more successful 'members' would be more inclined to confirm their new

status by supporting the conservative establishment, including the federal

Liberals. This swing of a mu ch m ore free-floating ethn ic vote has made all

three parties embrace multiculturalism without, paradoxically, giving the

new heterogeneous lobby within their ranks any more power in their ma-

chinery. Apart from the one or two occasional token ethnics in the Ottawa

parliament, the so-called third force which comprises almost a third of the

total population, is not decisively represented as a political force. The dis-

sipation of ethn ic voting paralleled by a decline of the ethnic press, has

weakened the immigrants who now prefer to pursue their special concerns

individually rather than collectively. Cultural interests became privatized

at the same time as they disappeared from the political arena under the

non-controversial and depoliticized formula of m ulticulturalism.

It is, therefore, misleading when Canadian academics frequently pose

the pseudo problem of political integration of the immigrants. In this vein,

a recent study begins with the remarkable question: *How is the cohesion of

Canadian society affected by the fact that over a quarter of its population

consists of immigrants and their descendants?'

13

Not only is the question

superfluous, but it makes the false and controversial assumption that Canadian

'mainstream' culture does not constitute an immigrant society. Only non-

charter members are seen as a threat to Canadian cohesion. Such questions

represent a typical example of unquestioned ethnocentric perceptions and

merely reflects the real inequality of power, hidden by the multicultural

cloak.

in

However, the erosion of traditional ethnicity does not imply that there

are no cultu ral needs left for Canadian imm igrants. It is argued here as the

central critique of multicultural policy that new ethnic needs demand a

different emph asis tha t is ignored or not sufficiently addressed by the present

policy.

What then is the subjective basis of the new ethnicity? It is one based

on the feeling of being a constant outsider, of being non-English, of having

to do all the adapting and yet never enough. When these feelings are combined

with shared inequalities of opportunity in the market place, and of being

relegated to a lower caste status despite efforts, they foster networks which

span across the non-controversial specifics of particular cultural heritages.

For immigrants in poorly paid, exacting occupations, the advantages of

organizing as an occupational group, transcending ethnicity, are far greater

than their use of ethnicity as an organizing principle. These interest-based

alliances,

14

loosely bound by a cultural basis of not-belonging, which cross-

cut ethnic affiliation, are likely to be a far more pote nt force than particu-

laristic ethnic groups in the pursuit of culture maintenance. If the uplifting

of immigrants and their easier adjustment to Canadian society is the main

goal of multiculturalism, official policy would have to start supporting


8/13

326 Kogila Moodley

such non-cultural interest groups as well. The outdated ethnic division of

labour is frequently still reflected in some regions and in certain occupations

despite the trend towards increased intra-ethnic stratification.

In the ideological realm, the new cultural needs do not derive from problems

of psychological ad aptation or dem ands from conflicting cultures which would

have to be reconciled, as multiculturalism pretends. The problem is not

'cultural jealousies'

ls

of which Trudeau speaks, but the ethnocentrism of

entrenched Anglo-Canada. The new ethnicity needs to be structurally in-

tegrated. It therefore requires support in its continuous battle for equal

access to the power and status positions occupied by the charter groups.

In addition to ensuring equality, the new ethnics, particularly from Third

World countries, need multifaceted support and protection from implicit

and increasingly explicit racism.

The ideological aspect of multiculturalism is best illustrated by its focus

on the non-controversial, expressive aspects of culture. As long as cultural

persistence is confined to food, clothes, dance, and music, then cultural

diversity provides colour to an otherwise mundane monotonous technological

society. It even enhances tourism, if one considers how much Indians and

'ethnic' restaurants add to the magnificence of Canadian landscape. As such

it proves to be no th reat, but on the con trary trivialises, neutralizes and absorbs

social and economic inequalities. However, if this should shift from an

expressive to an instrumental orienta tion, whereby cultural adherence becomes

a vehicle for mobilization and a voice for expressing grievances, then the

relationship between private identity and public policy has mo re controversial

consequences for Canadian society.

Typical of the futile distinctions with which some Canadian research has

been preoccupied, is the question whether differences in occupational place-

ment between ethnics and others can be attributed to levels of schooling or

differences in oppo rtunity . As if these are separable, the Roy al Comm ission

on Bilingualism and Biculturalism 1969 cited empirical evidence that dif-

ferences in occupational status among ethnics is attributable to lower levels

of schooling rather than lesser opportunities. A subsequent study in Toronto

by Goldlust and Richmond, however, provides quite a contrary picture.

Among a sample of immigrant men sharing similar characteristics, the earning

capacity ranged hierarchically from English and Jewish origin at the top,

followed by West-European, Slavic, Greek, Portuguese-origin and finally

Asians and Blacks at the bo ttom .

16

These unequal ethnic life chances call for the politicization of multi-

culturalism

beyond the apolitical celebration of nostalgia. Politicized multi-

culturalism could ensure that the financial support for schools with large

proportions of immigrants is adequate, that special teacher training programs

in intercultural education

17

are offered and that optimal m ethod s in language

training are used. The schools, vocational institutes and institutions of higher

education still remain one of the crucial battlegrounds where the success or

failure of the new multicultural C anada is to be decided.

Not the least, the target of multiculturalism would have to be the dom inant


9/13

Canadianmulticulturalism a s ideology 32 7

culture. Anglo-conformity standards would have to be 'multi-culturalized.'

This would jettison the very notion of a mainstream culture, in which the

others would have to fit. On the contrary, English Canada would genuinely

have to learn from other traditions and also internalize valuable habits of

other ways of life. At present, not even a different face for a C.B.C. television

announcer is tolerable, let alone a Punjabi accent. To be authentic, genuine

multiculturalism would have to preclude a cultural hierarchy as-well as mere

parallelism of cultural traditions in isolated compartments and represent a

mu tual learning process, in contrast t o the one-sided effort at pres ent.

IV

Finally, Canadian multiculturalism has to be viewed against the background

of Quebec nationalism. This is, of course, a complex subject in itself Only

a few crucial trends in the rise and decline of the movement with regard to

specific state policies will be highlighted here.

In the vast literature on ethnicity, a perspective which has gained support

holds tha t e thnic n ationalism should be explained as a response to bureaucratic

intrusion into the lives of people. The increased control, associated with the

welfare state, is said to be rejected by regional elites who mobilize dif-

ferentiated populations 'into political constituencies seeking redress from

bureaucratic government.'

18

This explanation suggests a populist backdrop

to the ethnic revival, the protest of the periphery against the domination of

the centre. In the words of its proponents: 'The developmental phases of

these movements show their creation and manipulation by self-conscious

counter elites, or ethnic elites, who use them to carve out, reinforce, or

protect their access to power, wealth, and other prerequisites at first as

local influentials and then later as brokers between an increasingly bureau-

cratized state government and the ethnic collectivity.'

19

This intriguing perspective seems apt, insofar as it focuses on the situational

manipulation of symbols of descent by certain beneficiaries. However, even

more than bureaucratic intrusion by the welfare state, it is neglect or ex-

ploitation by the centre that causes regional resistance. Moreover, when

applied to Canada, it is obvious that the stress itself has set out to manage

ethnicity. By rhetorically supporting ethnic revival and diversity, the state

has not only co-opted what is left of an unassimilated ethnic leadership,

bu t diffused the very basis of ethnic resistance to its policies. Incorporated

and deprived of its antagonist, ethnic nationalism falters on the very oppor-

tunities it has grasped.

Quebec nationalism offers th e best example of a thwa rted ethnic movement

by a petty-bourgeoisie that set ou t -to redress Anglo-domination by the

much more powerful economic centre. The separatists were first appeased

by nation-wide official bilingualism as well as improved career opportunities

in the federal civil service. The Parti Quebecois nevertheless managed to

capture provincial state power by pandering to its main public service con-

stituency. It was not a resented welfare state intrusion but a desired bureau-


10/13

328 KogilaMoodley

cratic expansion that propelled Quebec nationalism. A sovereign Quebec

promised unlimited career opportunities and higher status to a technocratic

elite that had assumed the dominant role once played by the church, as one

observer aptly noted.

20

However, the price for this mobilization of public support was high and

soon unaffordable. With one of the highest civil service wage rates in the

world and ambitious public projects of an 'ethnic social democracy', the

province was soon heavily in debt. Indirect taxes in Quebec are substantially

higher than in the rest of Canada. Salaries alone now account for 55 per cent

of the provincial budget. The credit rating of Quebec at the New York

bond mark et sank dramatically. The time arrived wh en the ruling party had

to demand back that which brought it into power in the first instance.

When the recession hit, accelerated by adverse demographic trends (exodus

and low birth rates) the Levesque government had no choice but to turn

against the exalted expectations of its own constituency. An unprecedented

20 per c ent roll-back o f civil service salaries and o ther severe aus terity m easures

produced bitter strikes that could only be ended by tough legislation. This

alienated the ethnic grassroot sentiment beyond repair from the separatist

movement. Ultimately, the demise of Quebec nationalism was brought about

by market forces that made the balkanization of an interdependen t economy

unfeasible. Likewise, separatist fringe movements in Western Canada rapidly

faltered with the decline of the resource-dependent regional economy in

depressed export markets.

With econom ic crisis managem ent in the forefront of governmental concern,

Canadian cultural policy also underwent a significant twist in the early

1980s. The rationale for multiculturalism changed from preserving heritage

as an end itself to an instrum ental an d pragm atic justification of diversity.

The minister in charge now talks abo ut the benefits of difference'.

21

Th e

instrumental value of multiculturalism is seen in better serving external

markets and improving the country's sales image. The competition is fierce;

we need every edge we can get, and one is knowledge of foreign languages.'

The study of 'heritage languages' was discovered as an asset in talking to

poten tial customers. A t the same tim e, mu lticultural socialization is supposed

to bring about a new type of corporate employee who is able to function

in a global economy. In place of the somewhat parochial outlook of an

agricultural and extractive economy, 'the new mercantilism calls for a new

type of corporate manager, a flexible cosmopolitan aware of cultural sen-

sitivities . . . , who can cut costs and waste by knowing how cu lture affects

behavior, who can motivate workers with differing standards, read between

lines of reports from abroad, and pinpoint the pitfalls of overseas selling,

what is or is not acceptable.' Moreover, the government now discovered its

immigrants from som e seventy-odd back groun ds as a poten tial reservoir

of new ideas and skills. With the Japanese booming post-war economy in


11/13

Canadian multiculturalism as ideology 32 9

mind, the new ethnics are encouraged to import know-how more than labour.

Multiculturalism almost assumes the role of commercial spying: The cultural

tentacles of our ethnic groups can reach into the world's knowledge centres,

keeping tabs on new discoveries and innovations, a communication network

that could funnel commercial intelligence into Canadian companies from

every centre on ear th.' Difference as a resource is now expec ted to give

Canada's bidding on overseas projects an edge over its culturally homo-

geneous com petitors, such as Japan or G ermany.

In this competition, the imagery of a sophisticated middle-power with

no domestic problems of interracial antagonism is considered a decided asset

as 'a message of .hope in a world of conflict.' The government has not ye t

set out to sell multiculturalism itself as a recipe of conflict resolution but

thus far merely aims at projecting 'a strong multicultural

image

of equality,

tolerance and fairness.' The minister in charge now approvingly talks about

art and culture as t h e handmaiden of the econom y, preparing the ground for

trade by instilling respect and e steem .' While many governments, particularly

France, have always supported artistic endeavors for ulterior motives as

well, Canada seems unique at least in being so unashamedly instrumental

in its views of culture as a commodity. Culture has little intrinsic value,

other than as a saleable commodity.

The image of multicultural harmony that the Canadian state tries to

project, however, must not clash too conspicuously with a contrary domestic

reality. It is for this reason that the federal bureaucracy has recently become

genuinely concerned with issues of racism and discrimination. Closed shop

policies are officially cond emn ed as adding to everyon e's tax bill. 'Manpow er

and Immigration noted that about two-fifths of new immigrants, even after

a year in Canada, were unable to find work they'd been trained for, and one

in five said the reason was that professional and trade associations refused

to accept or recognize their qualifications.' What comes increasingly under

attack, is the hidden costs of discrimination that 'lowers productivity, breeds

labour and social unrest, chronic conflict and disunity.'

The latter aspect constitutes the most important function of the new

version of multiculturalism: it is promoted as an ideological formula for

unity. In a society with bitter labor strife, ethnicity is expected to erode

the adversary principle. The ethnic bond is a positive force that cuts across

all lines of conflict, including those of region and class.' Ethnic revival is

meant to forge traditional ties, 'communal feelings that counter negativism.'

The state co ntrasts the loyalty of the newcomers who take out citizenship

faster than th e Anglo-Celts', with the unconstructive dissent' of the Canadian-

born. In a country with a vague identity, in a society rich in geography and

short of history, multiculturalism is propagated as the lowest common

denominator on which all segments may agree. After all, the magic formula

merely asks tha t *we accept and try to understand the people next do or,

regardless of their skin color and custo ms .'

As a foundation for the cultural hegemony of a ruling class, however,

such pleas 'to see ourselves in positive terms as a cultural mo saic'und oubte dly


12/13

33 0

Kogila Moodley

fall short of affective appeal. If the desired harmony and partnership under

state guidance should work, all segments must find their everyday life would

be reflected and m ade intelligible in a dominant ideology . Multiculturalism,

in its present state, lacks this quality. Treating those who seem different

as equals is good business* is advice that appeals to the profit-minded. It

hardly engenders affectionate supp ort from other s. Thus the state can not

manufacture meaning with a fading ethnic reality. Does the Canadian state

then really need the multicultural ideology? Beyond the liberal image, the

dominant section still can fall back on a hegemonic charter cultural tradition

that is being merely mystified by the symbolism of diversity. Multiculturalism

affords external legitimacy to a heterogeneous state. In fact, however, the

system really emphasizes othe r criteria th an th e equality of relative newcom ers

as a priority.

Both the rise and decline of Quebec nationalism as well as the federal

counter ideology of multiculturalism highlight how much ethnic expressions

in Canada depend on specific state policies. The manipulation of ethnicity

in the pursuit of objective interests can be clearly traced and ethnicity as a

primordial aspect of identity withers away as a vehicle for political mobil-

ization under given circumstances. At the same time, the Canadian case

demonstrates not only the wide scope but also the limits of ethnic ma-

nipulation from above, mainly circumscribed by economic conditions that

activated and inspired official ethnic policies in the first place.

Notes

*This is a revised and expa nded paper presented at the World Congress of th e International

Sociological Association, Committee on Ethnic, Race and Minority Relations, Mexico

City, August 1 6 - 2 1 , 19 82 . I am grateful to H eribert Adam for many critical discussions

of the issues.

1.

Trudeau , in introducin g the polic y, speaks of providing assistance to all cultural

groups to overco me cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian socie ty, and in

the same breath, speaks of the value of cultural heritage retention (House of Commons

Debates , October 8 , 19 71 , p. 8545 .

2. There is even reference to a flourishing multicultural mov eme nt (E. Kallen,

Ethnicity and Hum an Rights in Canada Toronto, Gage Publishing Limited, 1982,

p.

2 04 ) .

3 .

Joh n W. Berry, R. Kalin and Dona ld M. Tay lor,

Multiculturalism and Ethnic

Attitudes in Canada Ottawa, 1977, p. 241 .

4 .

Howev er, for tho se groups wh o are com mitted to cultural rete ntio n, an important

prerequisite has been isolation from the mainstream as well as a clear separation, as

illustrated in the somewhat extreme case of the Hutterites.

5. The superficiality of multiculturalism in reality is revealed by th e improvem ents

experienced by non-visible immigrants who have changed their names. In an early

study b y t he Canadian Institute of Cultural Research, name changers reported that

although they had weighed considerations of loyalty and pride, practicality and reality

had won out (Canadian Institute of Cultural Research, Toron to, 19 65 , pp. 3 3 -5 ).

6. The Royal Com mission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Boo k 1) Ottaw a,

Queen s Printer, 1967 .


13/13

Canadianm ulticulturalism as ideology 331

7. House of Commons Debates, October 8, 197 1, pp. 85 45 -8 .

8. For further elaboration of this approach, see Kogila Moodley, 'Canadian Ethnicity

in Comparative Perspective: Issues in th e L iteratu re,' in Jorgen Dahlie and Tissa Fernando

(eds),

Ethnicity Power and Politics in Canada

Toronto, Methuen, 1981, pp. 6- 21 .

9. John Norris, Strangers Entertained: A History of the E thnic Groups of

ritish

Columbia Vancouver, Evergreen P ress, 1971.

10.

A favoured church is the United Church. In 1961, the United Church in Alberta

cited am ong those who claimed affiliation '50 per cent of those of Chinese and Japanese-

origin (combined), 26 per cent of Dutch, 20 per cent of Germans, 32.6 per cent of

Scandinavians, 14.5 per cent of Ukrainians and 10 per cent of Poles and Italians' (H.

Palmer,

Immigration and the Rise of Multiculturalism

Tor onto, Copp-Clark Publishing,

1975,

p. 181.)

11 . In a similar vein, a Vancouver school superintendent maintained that Chinese

language and culture ought not to be incorporated into Vancouver schools since they

were not the language and culture of success in the business world (Vancouver Sun

April 8, 1975).

12 . Sce. E. Kallen,

Ethnicity and Human R ights in Canada

To ron to, Gage Publishing,

1982, and also John Wood, 'A Visible Minority Vote: East Indian Electoral Behaviour

in the Vancouver South Provincial and Federal Elections of 1979,' in Jorgen Dahlie

and Tissa Ferna ndo (eds), op.cit. pp.

177-201 .

13 . In this vein, a recent study by Jeffrey G. Reitz in R. Breton, J.G. Reitz, V.F.

Valentine (eds),C ultural Boundaries and the Cohesion of Canada Montreal, Institute

for Research on Public Policy, 1980, p . 33 1.

14. The advantages of organizing as an occupational group, as in the case of the

Farmworkers of B.C., despite their predominantly, though not exclusively, East Indian

composition, outweigh their use of ethnicity as an organizing principle. The very fact

that many of the farmowners are East Indian also militates strongly against the ethnicjza-

tion of the conflict.

15. Prime Minister's statement, House of Commons, October 1971 , p. 2.

16 .

J. G oldlust and A. Richmon d, 'A Multi-variate Analysis of the Economic Ad-

aptation of Immigrants in Toron to' m imeo. Downsview, Ontario: Institute for Behavioural

Research, 1973, as cited in R. Bretonet al.(eds),op.cit. p. 367.

17.

For an excellent, well researched view of what such an education might entail,

see C. Bagley and G.J. Verma (eds), Self Concept Achievement and Multicultural

Education Londo n, Macmillan, 198 2.

18. Charles F. Keyes (ed.),Ethnic Change Seattle, University of Washington Press,

1981,p . 198.

19. Richard G. Fox, Charlotte H. Aull and Louis F. Cimino, 'Ethnic Nationalism and

the Welfare State , in C. Keyes (ed.),

op.cit.

p. 202.

20 .

Dominique Clift, 'Quebec public service losing its exalted role', Globe and Mail

February 17, 1983.

21. The H onourable James Fleming, 'Multiculturalism: Who's it for?' Speech to the

Fourth Canadian Conference on Multiculturalism, Ottawa, October 2 3, 198 1. All sub-

sequent quotes are from this keyno te address by the Minister of StateforM ulticulturalism.

canadian multiculturalism as

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