cambridge imperial and post-colonial studies series of... · this informative series covers the...

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Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series

General Editors: Megan Vaughan, Kings’ College, Cambridge and RichardDrayton, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge

This informative series covers the broad span of modern imperial history whilealso exploring the recent developments in former colonial states where residuesof empire can still be found. The books provide in-depth examinations of empiresas competing and complementary power structures encouraging the reader toreconsider their understanding of international and world history during recentcenturies.

Titles include

Sunil S. AmrithDECOLONIZING INTERNATIONAL HEALTHIndia and Southeast Asia, 1930–65

Tony BallantyneORIENTALISM AND RACEAryanism in the British Empire

Robert J. BlythTHE EMPIRE OF THE RAJEastern Africa and the Middle East, 1858–1947

Roy Bridges (editor)IMPERIALISM, DECOLONIZATION AND AFRICAStudies Presented to John Hargreaves

L. J. ButlerCOPPER EMPIREMining and the Colonial State in Northern Rhodesia, c.1930–64

Hilary M. Carey (editor)EMPIRES OF RELIGION

T. J. Cribb (editor)IMAGINED COMMONWEALTHCambridge Essays on Commonwealth and International Literature in English

Michael S. DodsonORIENTALISM, EMPIRE AND NATIONAL CULTUREIndia, 1770–1880

Ulrike HillemannASIAN EMPIRE AND BRITISH KNOWLEDGEChina and the Networks of British Imperial Expansion

B. D. HopkinsTHE MAKING OF MODERN AFGHANISTAN

Ronald HyamBRITAIN’S IMPERIAL CENTURY, 1815–1914A Study of Empire and Expansion, 3rd edn

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Robin JeffreyPOLITICS, WOMEN AND WELL-BEINGHow Kerala Became a ‘Model’

Gerold KrozewskiMONEY AND THE END OF EMPIREBritish International Economic Policy and the Colonies, 1947–58

Sloan Mahone and Megan Vaughan (editors)PSYCHIATRY AND EMPIRE

Javed MajeedAUTOBIOGRAPHY, TRAVEL AND POST-NATIONAL IDENTITY

Francine McKenzieREDEFINING THE BONDS OF COMMONWEALTH 1939–1948The Politics of Preference

Gabriel PaquetteENLIGHTENMENT, GOVERNANCE AND REFORM IN SPAINAND ITS EMPIRE 1759–1808

Jennifer Regan-LefebvreIRISH AND INDIANThe Cosmopolitan Politics of Alfred Webb

John Singleton and Paul RobertsonECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND AUSTRALASIA 1945–1970

Kim A. Wagner (editor)THUGGEEBanditry and the British in Early Nineteenth-Century India

Jon E. WilsonTHE DOMINATION OF STRANGERSModern Governance in Eastern India, 1780–1835

Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies SeriesSeries Standing Order ISBN 978–0–333–91908–8 (Hardback)978–0–333–91909–5 (Paperback)(outside North America only)

You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing astanding order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write tous at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series andthe ISBN quoted above.

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Asian Empire and BritishKnowledgeChina and the Networks of BritishImperial Expansion

Ulrike HillemannImperial College, London

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© Ulrike Hillemann-Delaney 2009

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of thispublication may be made without written permission.

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Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publicationmay be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The author has asserted her right to be identifiedas the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright,Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published 2009 byPALGRAVE MACMILLAN

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ISBN-13: 978–0–230–20046–3 hardback

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Printed and bound in Great Britain byCPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

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For my parents and Richard

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Contents

Acknowledgements viii

List of Abbreviations x

1 Introduction 11.1 Britain and China – an overview 31.2 Methodological considerations 8

2 The Decline of Mythical China 162.1 The origin of language 172.2 Chinese style and British taste 212.3 A Chinese court at Brighton 27

3 At the China Coast 343.1 A diplomatic expedition 343.2 Chinese law and British rights 453.3 The unreliable interpreter 563.4 A barren land 643.5 Diplomacy and local knowledge 753.6 Trade and identity 813.7 British honour and opium 91

4 South and Southeast Asian Encounters 1064.1 China’s neighbour 1074.2 Chinese subjects for the empire 1204.3 Co-operator and corruptor 1304.4 British rule, Chinese societies 1354.5 Educating the Chinese diaspora 141

5 Asian Networks and the British Isles 1505.1 British Sinology 1525.2 Saving China 1685.3 Forces of free trade 171

6 Epilogue 188

Notes 193

Bibliography 236

Index 254

vii

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the Arts and Humanities Research Council and theCambridge European Trust, who made this work possible with theirfinancial support. The History Faculty Trust and the St. Edmund’s Col-lege Tutorial award contributed to financing the travels to archives inLondon. I would also like to thank the staff at the Cambridge Univer-sity Library, the British Library, the SOAS Archive, the Public RecordOffice and the Archive of the Baptist missionary society at the AngusLibrary Oxford who were always helpful and friendly. I am also gratefulto the Bavarian State Library for granting permission for use of the coverillustration.

This book is the result of a journey, which took me from Munichto Edinburgh and then to Cambridge. While I was an undergraduateat Munich, Eckhart Hellmuth introduced me to the fascinating worldof 18th century British history. This interest was deepened by theteaching of Harry Dickinson and Nicholas Phillipson in Edinburgh.Cambridge opened new perspectives, especially on the history of theExtra-European world.

The person who most influenced the shape of this work and thedevelopment of my understanding of history over the last years was, ofcourse, my supervisor, Richard Drayton and I thank him for his patientguidance and unwavering support.

Several people helped me by sharing their knowledge and advice:Chris Bayly, as well as Tim Harper, Peter Kornicki and Hans Van de Veen.Michael Dodson provided many useful ideas in the early stages of thiswork. Sunil Amrith, Felix Böcking, Christina Granroth, Emma Hunter,Florian Schui and Tobias Wolfhart read parts of the text and pointed outthe inconsistencies. Matthias Georgi and Georg Vogeler have listenedand discussed this study from its very beginning and even took the painsof reading through the entire work at the end. Ruth Cassidy also helpedme to avoid some of the traps of the English language. Needless to saythe blame for all the remaining errors lies with me.

My greatest thanks go to my parents, who, without questioning,helped to finance this work. In addition, my father provided tirelesscomputer support, which was truly invaluable, particularly in the last

viii

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Acknowledgements ix

months. My greatest debt is to my husband Richard Delaney. Not onlydid he still pretend to find the topic interesting after all these years, healso read all the drafts to prevent the worst grammatical mistakes. With-out his constant loving support and encouragement I could not havefinished this work.

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List of Abbreviations

BFBS British and Foreign Bible SocietyBL British Library, LondonBMS Archive of the Baptist Missionary Society, Angus Library,

OxfordCFR Canton Factory Records, APAC, BLCWM Christian World Mission, SOASEIC East India CompanyLMS London Missionary SocietyMss ManuscriptAPAC Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections, British Library, LondonPRO Public Record Office, LondonSOAS School of Oriental and Asian Studies, LondonVOC Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie

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1Introduction

China had long enjoyed a mythical place as a prestigious civilisationat the edge of European experience. At the turn of the 18th to the 19thcentury, China was considered an obstacle to the development of Britainand was also viewed as inhibiting the progress of its own inhabitants,degenerating under a corrupt and arbitrary government. From beingregarded as the domain of an ideal monarch and the origin of high qual-ity products, it was now seen as a country that was militarily weak, ruledby an irrational tyrant, incapable of progress and culturally decayed.

During this period before the Opium War in 1840, China had becomea key focus of British commercial and missionary interests, partly asa result of British activity in India and Southeast Asia. As merchantand missionary interest in this great potential market of goods, con-sumers and souls increased, pressure mounted to acquire knowledgeabout China. Yet, this demand for knowledge could not be satisfiedeasily. China’s Qing dynasty would not allow European traders and mis-sionaries to enter China. These twin forces of the will to knowledgeyet the inability to satisfy that desire make China a particularly inter-esting case for the study of knowledge formation during this period ofBritish imperial expansion and help to explain the marked deteriorationof attitudes towards China.

The starting point for this book is the diversity of British ideas ofChina in the different areas of contact between the British, the Chineseand the two empires. Neither in 1763 nor in 1840 was there one single‘idea of China’, formed and changed only in the British Isles. The booktherefore focuses on certain ‘contact zones’ in the system of British inter-est in the East to understand how the networks of imperial expansionshaped diverse British imaginations of China. It traces how these imagi-nations formed and were formed by the British search for new legitimate

1


2 Asian Empire and British Knowledge

and systematic knowledge about China. Here, India and Southeast Asiacould be as important as Canton and the British Isles. At the Bengal bor-der, China could be considered a mighty power and potential rival ofBritain. Intelligence gathering about this unknown but potentially dan-gerous power was therefore one of the major impulses for knowledgeformation in this area. In Southeast Asia, however, the Chinese wereincreasingly seen as exemplary subjects for the British Empire and inBritish eyes knowledge about Chinese law, language and racial featuresbecame key to successfully ruling over them.

This study looks at British groups which had specific interests in Asia,especially the East India Company (EIC) employees, Protestant mis-sionaries and free traders. It highlights the way these groups formednetworks that linked the different places of British expansion. Throughthese networks, ideas were exchanged and transported between South-east Asia, Bengal, London and Canton. Concepts and knowledge formedin one Asian country were considered applicable to other cultures in theregion. Studying these networks, Asian Empire moves beyond the con-centration on European intellectual history which characterises otherstudies of European views of China. It brings India and Southeast Asiainto focus as significant sites of British–Chinese encounter.

Yet, intellectual changes in Britain itself and their significance forchanging perceptions of Asian cultures cannot be ignored. The bookhighlights the complex ways in which, for example, ideas of the scaleof civilisations were influencing and were influenced by the Britishimperial expansion. In the years studied, the metropolis itself becameincreasingly shaped by the growing Asian empire, the ideas it pro-voked and the goods that were imported from the East. In particular,the fashion of Chinoiserie, inspired by silk and porcelain from China,sparked a controversy in Britain, which had a complex relationship withideas coming back from Britain’s imperial expansion in Asia. With thegrowing empire in Asia, debates arose in Britain about how the Britishshould deal with a growing non-white, non-settler dependent popu-lation. Deeply connected to these anxieties were questions of Britishidentity, both in the metropolis and the periphery.

To provide the background for the following study, this introduc-tion first gives a brief narrative of British–Chinese relations from theirbeginnings to the Opium War in 1840. It then moves to a discussionof modern historiography of this relationship and European attitudestowards China before reflecting on the theoretical and methodologicalconsiderations which give a framework to this book.


Introduction 3

1.1 Britain and China – an overview

The first regular contact with China in the early modern period wasthrough the Jesuit mission to Beijing. The reports sent back by the Jesuitmissionaries generated the enlightened idea of China. Was the Chineselanguage the original language or perhaps a model for a universal lan-guage? Was the Chinese Emperor a rational and moral ruler and wereits scholar bureaucrats to be imitated? Confucius was viewed as theChinese Socrates, a philosopher whose doctrines were based on pure rea-son, and China the shining example of a society in which reason hadreplaced superstitious religion. Chinese chronology was considered to bean important challenge to the chronology of the Bible and was used toquestion its authority. For the French physiocrats, like François Quesnay,China was the model of a state which recognised that all wealth derivedfrom the land and followed the physiocratic laws of nature.1 As DavidPorter has argued, China was seen as a signifier for representational legit-imacy, conformity and antiquity, whose traditions and language reachedback into the mists of time.2

The second, almost parallel, encounter with China took place throughthe import of consumer goods such as porcelain, silk, lacquers and, ofcourse, tea. These imports inspired the fashion of ‘Chinoiserie’ duringthe baroque and rococo periods, the manufacture of Chinese-style itemsfor interior design and gardens adorned with Chinese-style pagodas, gar-den seats and bridges. At the other end of society, in the 18th century,tea changed from an exotic beverage into a drink for the masses.3 Theenthusiasm for Chinoiserie diminished at the end of the 18th century.Tea was still in high demand, but it was by then seen as a national drink,mainly disassociated from its Chinese origin.4

In the 17th century, China gained a place in the English imaginationas a huge market for European goods, as well as possessing almost inex-haustible stores of tea, silk and porcelain.5 The first commercial contactbetween Britain and China began in 1635, but with only limited suc-cess. At this time, the Portuguese had already established themselves inMacao and the Dutch were attempting to set up a trade at the coast. Itwas only from the middle of the 18th century onwards that the Britishwere able to get a foot into the China trade.6 In the beginning, the EICimported mainly luxury goods to Britain, such as silk and porcelain.However, it was the tea trade which gave China importance to the EIC.The amount of tea imported by the EIC into England rose steeply from 2lb and 2 oz in 1664 to 5,857,882 lb in 1783, and in the 1830s it reached



about 30 million pounds.7 Over the course of the period covered, theEIC overtook their former rivals and by the time the monopoly of theEIC ended in 1834, the British dominated the European trade at Canton,creating substantial returns in taxes for the British government.8 Britishproducts, however, never found as much demand in China as was nec-essary for a balanced trade and to a large extent, the tea had to be paidfor with silver bullion, and in particular, with Indian opium. The acqui-sition of the opium monopoly in India made the opium trade to Chinacrucial for the EIC’s finances.9

Along with the growing trade, what came to be known as ‘the oldCanton system’ was established in the 1750s and 1760s. The QingEmperor closed all Chinese harbours to the Europeans in 1757, withthe exception of Canton, and reduced the permitted contact betweenEuropean and Chinese merchants to the so-called ‘Hong’ merchants,who were formed into a monopoly organisation, the Cohong. It wasonly in these years that the Company established a more regulatedsystem for their trade with China, with a General Council of Supercar-goes, instead of several individual Supercargoes. Furthermore, they werenow allowed to remain in China for the entire year, although due toChinese restrictions they were obliged to move to Macao outside theseason.10 It was under these peculiar circumstances that Britons estab-lished first regular contact with the Chinese. The Protestant mission toChina, which started in 1807, equally took Canton as its first steppingstone.

Meanwhile, the trade of the EIC in India had turned into a battlefor supremacy with the regional rulers, which resulted in the de factoBritish rule of Bengal by 1765. The British thus came to be in control ofproducts like cotton and later opium, which the Chinese were actuallyinterested in, and which could be traded for other Southeast Asian prod-ucts sold at Canton. The British were now able to become a more potentparticipant in the Asian trade system. At the same time, they encoun-tered the problem of remitting the income from the land tax in Bengaland other gains back to Britain, which was mainly dealt with throughthe triangular trade between India, China and Britain.

In this context, what became known as the country trade became pre-dominant. Attempts by the EIC to dominate the trade between India,China and Southeast Asia largely failed. Private country traders, mostlyBritish or Parsee merchants, had managed to secure this trade, especiallywith opium. Even though the company grew the opium in India, it didnot want to be associated with its sale to China, which the Chinesegovernment had prohibited.11


Introduction 5

British relations with China were thus becoming intrinsically linkedto British interests in India.12 British expansion into Southeast Asiaresulted partly from the problems of the China trade and its impor-tance for the EIC in India. From 1750 onwards, several employees ofthe EIC tried to establish a British entrepôt in Southeast Asia, to redirecttrade from Canton. Especially during the Napoleonic Wars, the Britishextended their sphere of influence in Southeast Asia, mainly to preventthe French taking root there. The large Chinese diaspora the Britishencountered there was to play an increasingly important role not onlyfor British reflections on the China trade, but also for the formation ofknowledge about China.

The British government tried to formalise its relationship with Chinaby way of two diplomatic missions, in 1792 and 1816, although thismet with little success. At the same time, the EIC at Canton developeda stronger sense of itself as a representative of British national inter-ests. With the end of the EIC’s monopoly for the China trade in 1834,this form of company diplomacy ended for good and the Foreign Officebecame paramount.

The period between 1834 and 1840 saw a significant increase in publi-cations about China in Britain. Political consideration in the metropolisstill had to change before it could look expedient to Lord Palmerston todeclare war on China. However, the key positions and the key playerswhich were to become important in the context of the Opium War werealready in place in the early 1830s. The period from 1763 to 1840 is thuscrucial for understanding British–Chinese relations in the 19th century.

However, most studies look at British relations with China in the early19th century as little more than a prequel to the Opium War and British–Chinese relations afterwards.13 Almost all historiographies of the OpiumWar discuss the British China trade from the beginning to the war itself,mostly with an emphasis on the years after 1784. They narrate the his-tory of growing tensions, from the Lady Hughes affair, regarding thesurrender of a British national to the Chinese justice system, via the firstBritish embassy to China in 1792 to the end of the EIC monopoly, andthe Napier episode. The idea of a ‘clash of culture’ and the unavoid-ability of a war to overcome China’s restriction of international tradeor to fulfil the needs of the British government in India are the majorthemes in these works.14 The opium trade takes a centre stage in mostof the discussions of the development of British–Chinese relations inthese accounts.15 Michael Greenberg has given a detailed study of theBritish trade with China, focusing on the emergence of the countrytrade, mainly based on the Jardine and Matheson archives.16



There are a few older studies which did examine the period in itsown right, written in the 1930s, by H. B. Morse and his student,Earl Pritchard. Morse, in his five volume work on the EIC trade withChina, provided a detailed narrative of the EIC records in regard tothe trade and other occurrences at Canton, mainly based on lengthyquotes of source material.17 Pritchard defined the early years of British–Chinese contact as ‘the struggle of culture against culture’, determinedby the insurmountable differences between the Chinese and Britishcivilisation.18

Louis Dermigny has looked at the European trade in general in Can-ton between 1719 and 1833. He emphasised the diverging economicand cultural development of Europe and China during the 18th andearly 19th century. Despite the trade between the two regions, he argues,no mutual understanding or even significant intellectual exchange tookplace. In his view, it was inevitable that the industrially developing andcommercially adventurous Britain would have to clash with the back-ward China. At the same time, the positive image of China distributedby the Jesuits gave way to a negative one, inspired by the material-istic world view of British merchants and the impact of the FrenchRevolution.19

However, in order to gain a full understanding of what China meantto the British in this period, and which ideas guided their interactionwith China, it is important to set the actions, concepts and ideas of theBritish in Canton in the larger context of the intellectual and culturalhistory of Britain and the British Empire. For example, there is hardlyany discussion of the development of British legal thought, ideas onlanguage and religion or British self-understanding in these studies. Fre-quently, the lack of a discussion of the intellectual and cultural historyof the British at Canton, while Chinese concepts are explained, createsthe image that the British viewpoints on issues like law and diplomacywere the only reasonable and rational ones.20 These works also, in theirmajority, pay little attention to the metropolitan dimension, a fact towhich Glenn Melancon has recently drawn attention, by closely study-ing the China policy of the British foreign office in the years from 1833onwards.21

A number of studies from historians and literary scholars haveexplored the position of China in early modern European intellectualor literary history. However, they do in most cases only lightly touchon the larger context of European interests in Asia or the question ofpower, if it is mentioned at all. Explanations of the shift from an earlysinophile admiration of China towards the arrogant attitude of the early


Introduction 7

19th century have thus mainly looked for causes of the changes in thedevelopment of the European intellectual history.22 It has been assumedthat the diminishing credibility given to the reports of the CatholicJesuits also damaged the positive view of China they had advocated.While British imperial expansion and the parallel Protestant mission areoften mentioned, the complexity of their impact is not explored.23 Thisis particularly true for the broad overviews, such as by C. Mackerras,which cover European images of China from antiquity to the present.24

Furthermore, authors such as William Appelton contend that peoplehad grown tired of the fashion of ‘Chinoiserie’.25 The actual contactbetween China and Britain is in most cases discussed in terms of howcontact with the ‘real’ China, contributed to the unravelling of the pos-itive myths and finally led to a more objective study of China.26 Inparticular, the publication of negative experiences and resulting dismis-sive opinions by British merchants, naval officers and ambassadors arehighlighted.27

Walter Demel has argued that an increased European self-confidencein their progress in the field of sciences, welfare of the population andmilitary strength led to a growing perception of Chinese inferiority inthese areas. Especially the reports about many famines in China at theend of the 18th century replaced the idea of the fabulous riches ofCathay. At the same time, the ideal of the enlightened absolutisms, forwhich China had served as a model, declined. In the context of ideasthat favoured the restriction of the ruler, China was increasingly con-sidered as just another Asian despotism.28 Jonathan Spence attributesthe change in Western perceptions to the new source of information:diplomats and travellers rather than the Jesuits, and their more scepticalwritings, which were informed by the spirit of the age of reason. Thiscoincided with more negative depictions of China by English writerssuch as Daniel Defoe.29

In their book The Great Map of Mankind, Peter Marshall and Glyn-dwr Williams argue that the image of Asia, and with it that of China,changed due to the shift within the patterns of thought from the ‘tra-ditionalist’ view, which tried to incorporate new knowledge into that ofthe Bible, to a ‘natural history of man’ that placed each nation on a scaleof civilisations. They have also referred to the effect British expansion inIndia had on the European view of Asia, without, however, examiningthe problem of China in detail.30

Recently, David Porter produced a literary analysis of philosophicaltexts as well as Chinoiserie artefacts in his book Ideographia. He arguedthat ‘China’ moves from being a signifier for cultural legitimacy and



stability to one for illegitimacy and interchangeability.31 He gives someinteresting insights into how one could understand the 18th centurydebate about Chinoiserie as part of the formation of ideas about China,but also remains limited by this approach. Norman J. Girardot hasoffered a very valuable in-depth study of sinology and Orientalism inthe later 19th century in his biography of the missionary and sinologistJames Legge. However, due to his focus on Legge, he takes little noticeof the influence of earlier British studies of China and the way they werealready connected with the British expansion.32

The aim of this book is therefore to bring the focus back on a periodthat was formative for both British–Chinese relations and deeply linkedto it, the formation of British knowledge of China and to reconnect itto the European expansion in Asia in this period.

1.2 Methodological considerations

The latest wave of globalisation has brought with it a new focus by his-torians on how practices and ideas in different parts of the globe wereconnected and how these were transferred between them, in an attemptto break up the old national narratives.

Chris Bayly has recently highlighted the global connections, exchan-ges and mutual influences that already shaped the world from the 1780sonwards, long before today’s globalisation.33 Tim Harper has drawnattention to the global connections of non-European people in the 19thcentury, which was based on networks that pre-dated much of Euro-pean imperialism.34 The ‘new’ imperial history, which has re-invigoratedimperial history since the 1990s, focuses on understanding the influ-ence of the imperial expansion on identity and other cultural concepts,such as gender and race, in both the ‘periphery’ and the ‘metropolis’,thus re-adjusting our understanding of what constituted the centre orthe periphery for those caught in the webs of imperial expansion.35

Historians are therefore increasingly discussing the interconnectednessof the different colonies and the metropolis and the transfer of goodsand knowledge between them. These works mainly concentrate onthe modification of ideas within the framework of the British Empire,often neglecting the interaction with other empires or national cul-tures. The focus lies on tracing how the British in the colonies didnot only use concepts which they had imported from the metropo-lis, but also learned from other parts of the British Empire as well astransferring new concepts back to the metropolis.36 These historians


Introduction 9

explore how the ‘British colonial discourses were made and remade,rather than simply transferred or imposed’ through these networks.37

Ideas about the governance of colonial people as well as ideas of whatconstituted the colonial ‘Other’ had different expressions in the vari-ous parts of the Empire.38 ‘Imperial Careers’, through which Britons andother subjects of the British Empire moved between colonies, broughtwith them the movement of ideas across the British Empire. As thecontributors to David Lambert’s and Alan Lester’s volume on ‘Colo-nial Lives’ have recently shown, discourse of colonial governmentalitywas formed and re-shaped through the mobility of governors betweendifferent colonies.39 Representations of Irish and Scots could thus, forexample, serve as patterns for images of ‘savages’ in the new coloniesin America, which in turn served as models for conceptualising other‘discovered’ peoples.40 Thomas R. Metcalf has recently highlighted howIndia took a prominent position in this web of Empire in the late 19thand early 20th century, creating an Indian-centred sub-system to theBritish Empire. While he focuses on the period between 1870 and 1920,this book shows that India was already central to how the British formedtheir Asian Empire from the 1760s onwards, not just in terms of eco-nomic and military logistics, but in particular also with regard to theideas and concepts that shaped this expansion.41 At the same time,as Catherine Hall has shown, the definition of ‘colonial subjects’ andBritish experience in the periphery were influential in shaping Englishand British identity itself, in the metropolis as well as in the colonies.42

Ann Stoler and Frederick Cooper have highlighted the tensions betweenthe universalising claims of European ideology in the 19th and 20thcentury and the heterogeneous and localised experience of conquestand colonial rule, thus drawing attention to global concepts and localtransformation processes and transfers.43

For the continental European context, several scholars have triedto develop alternatives to a ‘comparative history’, which took nationsas self-contained units. They emphasise the exchange and transfer ofideas between different nations, such as France and Germany.44 MichaelWerner and Bénédicte Zimmermann have developed the concept ofa ‘histoire croisée’, which draws attention to the process and natureof the international exchange of concepts and ideas. In emphasisingthe continuous ‘entanglement’ of this process, they try to overcomethe idea of a fixed starting point and end of a transfer of ideas. Theyalso problematise the use of national categories in studies of transfer,offering a perspective on the often hybrid origin of concepts and the



role of migrants in transferring ideas from one community to another.These travellers often modify ideas when they transfer them, and maybere-import a concept significantly changed by their experience outsidetheir country.45

In reflecting upon European study of Chinese culture and languageand the problem of translation, Haun Saussy has pointed out how globalinformation networks have to be seen not as a simple one-directionalprocess, through which fixed knowledge, words and concepts are trans-ported and might clash in mutual misunderstanding. Rather, one hasto view translations between two languages and cultures as a creativeprocess of negotiations, through which a meaning is transferred andmodified.46

Many of these studies were influenced by the debate that followedEdward Said’s book Orientalism and its understanding of the relation-ship between representation and imperial power.47 These questions haveonly briefly been touched upon by a number of scholars with respectto China. Norman Girardot made the case for different ‘Orientalisms’,especially a sinological Orientalism.48 Hans Hägerdal argued that ‘Ori-entalism’ could have different aspects in the context of China, but alsohow ideas about China could be influenced by intellectual traditionsunconnected to ‘Orientalism’.49 David Martin Jones in his study of theplace of China in European social and political thought from the timeof the Jesuit mission until the present tries to show that there was a farmore complex view of China than the critique of Said and his followerssuggest. Specifically he argues that China was not simply included in anoverall ‘Orient’ but seen as different from other Asian countries in manyaspects. Although he argues against the simplistic connection betweenthe orientalistic scholarship and poetry and colonial expansion of theWest, his study concentrates purely on the history of ideas in Europe anddoes not even discuss the political and economic context in which theseideas developed. Significantly he fails, for example, to address the con-nection between the study of Chinese and the British interests in Asia.50

Challenging the easy connection between Eurocentric discourse andcolonial power, Eugene Irschick has emphasised the dialogic processof the construction of knowledge in the colonial context, while stillbeing aware of the violence involved in the colonial encounter.51 HomiBhabha has drawn attention to the ambivalence and uncertainty of thecolonial discourse.52 Chris Bayly has argued, in sharp contrast to manywho followed Said’s ideas, that British rule in India depended heavilyon, and was limited by the access to local information networks as wellas the possibility of correctly understanding this information, rather


Introduction 11

than a mere imposition of a European discourse on India, which aimedat constructing the Indians as ‘the Other’.53 Partly influenced by thisargument, two recent studies have rightly called for more focus on thesocial conditions of knowledge and its use in order to move beyondthe binary of ‘colonial discourse’ and ‘objective knowledge’. ChristianWindler, in his study of French consuls in Algiers has urged to studywhich social purposes the ‘oriental discourse’ was used for by thosewho had contact with the ‘Other’ and through which social practicesthese ideas turned into what was perceived as verified knowledge, espe-cially in contact with their home country. At the same time, the actualinteraction could be dominated by norms different to this discourse.54

Michael Dodson has recently called for a move away from a mere epis-temology of knowledge in the colonial context, towards understandingit as a source of social and political power for a variety of actors in thiscontext.55

These considerations allow us to take a fresh approach to the forma-tion of knowledge and ideas about China in the period of Britain’s Asianexpansion. Central to this is exploring how a multitude of discoursesand their local contexts combined to shape what Britons considered tobe ‘China’. Bruno Latour’s network theory can be a useful frameworkfor this. Latour argues, with focus on the social sciences, that one has tostudy the networks which construct an object of study and the mech-anism of associations, which form groups. He has called for a studyof these connections and the process of association, rather than try-ing to impose a macro-structure as an explanation model on any givenstudy. To him, ‘society’ and ‘social explanations’ are thus not given enti-ties, but have to be understood as formed through connections, andconstantly transformed in the process by the actors.56 These reflectionsare especially valuable for an understanding of the diversity of connec-tions and associations which formed what contemporaries understoodas the British expansion and the British Empire, rather than taking theseconcepts as a given entity.

To draw attention to the local transformation processes, this work usesMary Louise Pratt’s concept of the ‘contact zone’ as a lens to bring intofocus the different kinds of British cultural interactions with China, andthe different networks through which ideas of China were transferred.57

Pratt employed this term to describe ‘copresence, interaction, interlock-ing understandings and practices, often within radically asymmetricalrelations of power’,58 at what she calls the ‘imperial frontier’. However,the contact zones I will describe in this work will only occasionally liein a colonial context. Although there was frequently an asymmetrical



power relation, this did not always mean that the British were theones who dominated the situation. There was a rather more ambiva-lent relation between the British meanings of China, the creation ofknowledge and the exercise of power. Often the British had to come toterms with the gap between their self-image, their image of China andthe power relations on the spot. Also, the British were never a homoge-nous group, but rather made up of a network of persons with divergingand shifting interests.

This book also understands Britain itself as a zone of contact withthe foreign, even though this was less immediate than in Canton forinstance. The contact here rather took place in the form of goods andinformation brought back to Great Britain as well as those Britonsreturned from Asia. Nevertheless, as a result, Britain constituted a promi-nent site for the construction of the meanings of China and the way itwas connected to the meanings of other countries. Here, a discourse ofthe ‘Other’ could be used without the complications of a response fromthe other culture. In Britain, knowledge of China was verified and inte-grated into a system of knowledge of the world and it was determinedwhat meaning China held for the wider British public.

While this work examines the way the British came to terms withChina in the different ‘contact zones’, it does not understand them asisolated but rather as connected entities, influencing each other throughthe travellers going back and forth between them as well as their let-ters and journals. In each ‘contact zone’, however, the meaning wouldbe changed by the reaction of those the British encountered and theirversions of China. The British discourses were never unchallenged andoften enough the British tried without success to force their idea of‘China’ and ‘Britishness’ upon the Chinese. The ‘Orientalist’ discourseemployed by the British should also not distract one from the fact thatthe British often developed a close relationship with the Chinese, beit in Canton or in Southeast Asia, forming the information networksthey needed to create their knowledge of China, and dealing with theOverseas Chinese population in Southeast Asia.

In this light, India and Southeast Asia were as important for the forma-tion of the British knowledge of China as China itself, since the Britishhad to come to terms with the Chinese position in Asia in these placesas well. Similarly, British experience as a dominant power in India wouldalso influence their attitude towards China. This does not, however,mean replacing the idea of the ‘metropolis’ with an artificial centreingof the periphery. Rather one has to trace carefully the genealogy and


Introduction 13

transfer of concepts and the uses made of them under the distinctivelydifferent conditions of each ‘contact zone’ and their varying importancefor each other, within as well as outside the boundaries of the BritishEmpire. The study uses the terminology of ‘metropolis’ and ‘periphery’to describe the fact that for those Britons engaged in the British imperialexpansion in most cases Britain remained the central focus. At the sametime, the concept of the ‘contact zone’ allows us to understand each ofthese local places of encounter as centre in their own right, which againwere connected to other centres, such as Beijing, Tibet or Bengal.

While this study focuses on the British–Chinese encounter, it doesnot see British history in a vacuum. The British idea of China and theknowledge they created about it were also influenced in a variety ofways by the competition with the other great European powers, suchas the French, Dutch, Spanish and Russians, but also by the intellectualcontact with individuals from these countries and also from Germany.However, there was no indiscriminate ‘European’ idea of China. Rather,knowledge was transferred between these different cultures, and themeaning of China was linked to the identity of those involved. Inthis context, ‘British’ is not understood as a fixed entity, but ratheras a ‘contested terrain, a “sign of difference” the specific meanings ofwhich depended upon the context of its articulation’59 being shaped andreshaped through the contact with others and the shifting intellectuallandscape.

This book examines the themes of language, religion, civilisationand race, law and trade, which were the main categories of knowledgethrough which China was mapped by the British. They are traced inthe different ‘contact zones’, highlighting the transfer of ideas as wellas the different meaning attached to knowledge in these contexts. Inparticular, this book focuses on how this knowledge and ideas about thecharacter of the Chinese were used in power relations with the Chineseand the Chinese Empire in the different ‘contact zones’.

The first chapter looks at the meaning of China in Britain itself, espe-cially in the fields of philosophy and aesthetics. During this period,contemporary intellectual developments, as well as first contacts withthe political and economic entity ‘China’, changed and diversifiedBritish images of China. These were inherently British, mainly con-nected to other European discourses, but not concerned with Britain’srelationship with China as such.

The book moves on to discuss the ‘contact zones’ in Asia in whichthe British came to encounter the Chinese and the Chinese Empire. The



second chapter studies the ‘contact zone’ in Canton closely, includingthe two British embassies to China during this period. The conditionsof this meeting place between Britons and Chinese did not only shapeBritish knowledge about China, but also the way the British here under-stood their relationship with the Chinese. This section discusses threeareas which were important for the formation of knowledge aboutChina: law, language and religion. It draws attention to the extent towhich the British experience in India was important in shaping theBritish responses to China in these areas. The last part of the chapterfocuses on a discussion of how the influence of the country traders, theBritish experience in India and the failure of the second British embassyled to an escalation in Canton, during which the EIC tried to force theChinese to accept their idea of Britishness and the rules of interaction.It concludes with a study of the events that led to the Opium War.

The third chapter looks at two different ‘contact zones’ which hadan increasing importance for the way the British assigned meaning toChina: India and Southeast Asia. The first part addresses the way Chinawas perceived as a great Buddhist power at the fringe of British expan-sion in India, which was potentially dangerous to British interests inthe region. The question of Chinese religion and language were againimportant here, but despite the contact between Calcutta and Can-ton, were transformed into having a different significance, highlightingdifferent aspects of Chinese language and religion.

In the period under scrutiny, the ‘contact zone’ in Southeast Asiabecame very important for the development of British ideas on China.Here, the British came into contact with a Chinese population on colo-nial terms. This chapter explores how this shaped a meaning of theChinese as industrious workers, but also as possible competitors. Theinfluence of the Protestant mission meant that the moral improvementof the Chinese through education and Christianity came to the fore-front. It is discussed how the encounter with different groups of overseasChinese led to the idea of a more diverse China, in contrast to ear-lier notions of an extremely uniform culture in China. Ideas such asthe stages of civilisation and early race theory therefore became moreimportant in this context.

The fourth chapter studies how the meanings and knowledge formedin the ‘contact zones’ in Canton, India and Southeast Asia were trans-ferred back to the metropolis itself and how they were transformed to fitinto the cultural and political conditions of the regency period and thedebates about reform. When the debate about the renewal of the EIC’scharter began in earnest in 1830, all these different sites of knowledge


Introduction 15

production about China became significant. The final part of the chapteranalyses how the different parties in the debates of the 1830s and in therun up to the Opium War used the knowledge created in the ‘contactzones’ in Asia and shaped ideas of China that suited their interests andin the end made a war with China imaginable.


2The Decline of Mythical China

China had long occupied European imagination as a faraway, myste-rious country. The Romans had marvelled about the fantastic regionfrom where they imported silk and Marco Polo brought rumours aboutCathay’s fabulous riches back to medieval Europe. However, a new wayof thinking about China began with the Jesuit mission to China in themiddle of the 16th century.1 The Portuguese, and later the French andGerman Jesuit monks followed the Portuguese and French traders to theEast and for the first time sent detailed reports back to Europe. Theirtranslations of Chinese culture created a new idea of China,2 whichwould play a significant role in debates about ideas, language, govern-ment and religion of the enlightenment. These debates placed Chinamainly in the philosophical realm, alongside ancient Greece and Egypt.In doing so, the European literati created their own Europeanised visionof China.

A similar process took place with regard to the consumer productswhich the increasing trade with China brought to European shores, andwhich gave rise to the European fashion of Chinoiserie. Both of thoseaspects of early modern contact with China will be discussed in thischapter. They shaped the image of China in Britain significantly. How-ever, this process mainly took place within a European network andcreated an idea of China as a far away, mystical country rather thana real political entity. Developments in the European history of ideastransformed the resulting images of China and from the 1750s onwardsa slow change can be noticed in Britain that brought China into closerconnection with India and British interests in the East.

16


The Decline of Mythical China 17

2.1 The origin of language

The reports emanating from the Jesuit mission in Beijing had providedEurope with a continuous flow of information about China since the17th century. The Jesuit principle of accommodation, as well as theirneed to defend this approach to converting China resulted in very pos-itive representations of China. Enlightenment thinkers such as Leibnizand Voltaire were inspired by these accounts to create an image of Chinaas a rational, enlightened state.3

By the second half of the 18th century, this enthusiasm had recededand the critics became more dominant. Moreover, The Rites Contro-versy at the beginning of the century and finally the abolition of theJesuit order in 1773 deprived China of their most favourable advo-cates. Sinophilia had never been that dominant amongst the literatiin Britain, and the suspicion about the reports from Catholic priestsgrew. In addition to this, changes in the intellectual climate and epis-temological standards made the Jesuit reports appear increasingly lessreliable. In the second half of the 18th century, the study of Asiachanged from the framework of the ‘traditionalists’, to a ‘natural historyof man’. The former had tried to incorporate information produced bythe European ‘discoveries’ into the knowledge created by the Bible andthe classical authors. The latter was more concerned with the progress ofmankind and tried to identify different stages through which mankindhad evolved, by observing contemporary societies. In this context, theJesuit accounts of China were considered to be increasingly untrustwor-thy and many members of Britain’s intellectual elite saw the need fornew knowledge about China.4

Despite this perceived lack of knowledge, China still figured in Britishphilosophical debates of the second half of the 18th century. The Jesuitletters were still used as a source of information, although the interpre-tation of them changed. It was subordinated to the idea of progress, sodominant in the Scottish enlightenment, and the attempt to order theworld according to a stadial theory. What had made China so fascinat-ing to Leibniz and other enlightenment thinkers, namely its antiquityand its system of writing, now made it prone to the disdain of the literatiof this period.

China could thus stand for example as a prototype for the agricul-tural society in Adam Smith’s ‘Wealth of nations’. Even though he stillacknowledged its status as a civilised society, it had not been able toreach the highest level – that of a commercial society. He thought thiswas due to the Chinese neglect of foreign trade, which resulted from



their huge internal market. Only by way of a substantial extension oftheir foreign trade could the Chinese hope to learn from other nationsand improve themselves.5 There was no longer the idea that the Euro-peans might learn from the Chinese, but rather an emphasis on China’slack of progression. However, this did not mean that the British, ata time where agricultural ‘improvement’ figured increasingly on thepolitical agenda,6 could not admire the seemingly perfect agricultureof China and the dominant position accorded to it by the Emperor.Lord Kames, urging British gentlemen to occupy themselves with farm-ing evoked the image of the Chinese Emperor, ‘who performs yearly theceremony of holding the plough, to show that no man is above being afarmer’.7

The Chinese language, especially, had long fascinated Europeanminds. Developments of ideas about the Chinese language in the18th century were strongly connected with the Enlightenment idea ofprogress.8 The first accounts of the Chinese language to reach Europein the late 16th and early 17th century excited great interest amongstscholars and philosophers. What were considered to be the character-istics of the Chinese language – its emphasis on the written language,its antiquity and its potential to be understood by members of differentlinguistic communities – made it the perfect example for those lookingfor a common and uncorrupted language in a Europe divided by warand religious conflicts. Some, like John Webster, also assumed that theChinese characters might have a more direct relation to ‘things’ them-selves and thereby could convey a better understanding of the naturalworld and help in the discovery of the ‘real knowledge’ of it. Never-theless even early on some, like John Wilkins, denied that the Chinesecharacters had this quality.9

In the mid 18th century, the Chinese language irrevocably lost itsspecial status, where it was viewed as a legitimating and stabilising sym-bol. This was caused by changes within the intellectual framework ofthe literati referred to above as well as possibly being influenced by theassociation of everything Chinese with the superficial Chinoiserie.10 Atthe same time as these changes came the speculations about the originof all the arts and sciences in Egypt.

While the search for an universal language did not die completely, thestudy of languages in the 18th century was more strongly influenced bythe question of the origins of language,11 and Chinese became incor-porated into this quest. Here, two opposing concepts prevailed, bothof which had their roots in the 17th century. The one is exemplifiedby Descartes, who argued in favour of dualism of spirit and matter.He claimed that language produced by the body only communicated



ideas of the immaterial soul without influencing them. In the 18thcentury, Locke became the greatest counterpart to Descartes’s theoryof language. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, he arguedagainst the Cartesisian assumption that all ideas derive from sensationand reflection, implying that there were no a priori ideas.12 Develop-ing these considerations further, Condillac related the progress of thehuman mind to the development of language and thereby introducedthe dimension of time into the study of language.13

As the dichotomy between the positions concerning the possibility ofimmaterial ideas continued throughout the 18th century, the dimensionof time became increasingly important. Even opponents of empiricistideas like James Harris agreed that languages developed over time andstood in correlation to the political system of a people. Languages there-fore could provide information about the character and culture of anation.14 The main focus of the study of language had shifted fromthe search for a unifying language, a successor of the original languagethat had existed before the confusion of languages at Babel, towards thequest for the origin of language and its progress, thus linking the studyof language with the developing stadial theory.15 Now, the literati triedto find connections between languages, in order to determine the levelof progress and character of a language and the people that spoke it.Chinese was no longer of interest as a model of a universal language,uncorrupted over ages and protected by an enlightened government. Ithad to be placed within the story of the origin and progress of language,which would also reveal the character of the Chinese nation. The stabil-ity that had formerly led to it being perceived as the ideal of society, wasnow seen as proof for the non-creativity of its people.

As early as 1738, William Warburton had claimed in the Divine Lega-tion of Moses that hieroglyphic as well as alphabetical writing was aninvention of the Egyptians. In contrast to them, the Chinese, accordingto Warburton, were ‘known to be the least inventive people upon earth;and not much given to mystery’.16 This juxtaposition of Chinese writingand Egyptian hieroglyphics was taken further by Thomas Percy in hisMiscellaneous Pieces Relating to the Chinese, who similarly to Warburtonargued for the higher antiquity of the Egyptian culture in order to provethat the chronology of the Bible was accurate. For him however thismeant that the Chinese could not have invented writing at all but musthave received it from the Egyptians. He held the opinion that Egyptianhieroglyphics had arrived in China as a result of trade between the twonations.17

About ten years later, the Scottish thinker Lord Monboddo put for-ward the same idea in his Of the Origin and Progress of Language, making

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a major contribution to the ongoing discussion about the origin oflanguage. His work displays a continuous tension between ‘conservativemetaphysics’ and a ‘progressive anthropology’.18 He argued that humanbeings developed a ‘barbaric’ language on the basis of sensual experi-ences and due to the need of society, but it was only the ‘art of language’which made it possible to express, ‘accurately and distinctly all the con-ceptions of the human mind’. However, not all societies had yet reachedthat state of civilisation which enabled them to develop such a languageof art.19 He also firmly believed that these concepts did not derive fromsensation alone, but were a priori ideas, archetypes.20 According to him,it was the ancient Greeks who had achieved the highest standard of thisartificial language. When compared with this most excellent language,Chinese was necessarily deficient and inferior, albeit no longer whollybarbaric: ‘It cannot be called a language of art; nor is it entirely bar-barous; but it participates of both, and may be said to be an intermediatestage betwixt the two.’21 He viewed the language as semi-barbarous,because it made no use of composition, derivation, or flexion. He judgedthe Chinese according to a standard which had been set by the Greekgrammar, a typical feature in the early modern study of languages.22

After lengthy considerations on the unsatisfactory development of thesciences in China, he became convinced that this ‘dull and uninventivepeople’ could not possibly have invented the more sophisticated partsof its language and writing.23 He therefore came to the conclusion thatthose must necessarily have been imported to them from the Egyptians,via India. Monboddo saw another proof for the uninventive characterof the Chinese in the fact that they had obtained their writing from theEgyptians when it had still been in a very rudimentary state and had notcared to develop it any further.24

Tracing back the beginning of science and civilisation to the Egyptianswas a popular notion held by the freemasons ever since they came intobeing in the 16th century. In the case of Warburton, Percy, Monboddoand Needham it probably arose mainly from the wish to prove thechronology of the Bible right. By this they still might, consciously ornot, have joined into a pattern of discourse provided by the adherents ofdeism. Percy was delighted by the ‘proofs’ of the Egyptian origin of theChinese characters, because ‘it demolishes at once all the pretences ofthe Chinese to that vast antiquity, which has been wont to stagger weakminds, and which has with so much parade been presented by certainwriters as utterly incompatible with the history of the Bible.’25 Consid-ering that Monboddo attempted decisively to argue against the purelymechanical and sensualist idea of human language by introducing the



concept of the language of art, it is highly probable that he also tried tore-establish the Biblical chronology and thereby prove the unity of thehuman race.26

China, in any case, could neither continue to serve as a model, norcould it be seen as the origin of all languages. The change could not havebeen greater. From being the nation which could claim the invention ofwriting in ancient times, and which might still speak the Adamitic lan-guage, China was now deemed incapable even of having developed asystem of writing at all. In a time that was no longer preoccupied withideas of stability but rather with ideas of progress, the Chinese were seenas lacking the capability to invent things and to develop. Within thisstudy of language, Chinese became to be seen not just as stagnant andan obstacle to progress, but this European perception of it was also seenas a valid indicator for the state of Chinese culture in general. Moreover,Chinese antiquity disturbed those who sought to defend Christianityand the Church from the deists and ‘dangerous’ empiricists. They there-fore had a vested interest in undermining this claim to antiquity, whichwas difficult to align with biblical history. If the Chinese ability to writepost-dated that of the Egyptians, they reasoned, Chinese culture couldnot possibly be as old as the Chinese claimed. Rather, it had to post-dateEgyptian culture, which was part of Biblical history.

Up until this time, the study of the Chinese language in Britain wasconfined to philosophical discussions. None of the protagonists of thedebate could speak any Chinese nor were they interested in gaining abetter understanding of it. They were not so much concerned with thestudy of Chinese and Chinese culture itself but rather used it as an argu-ment in the search for the origin and development of languages andcivilisations.

2.2 Chinese style and British taste

The reports of the Jesuits from the court of Beijing were hardly the onlygoods that were transported back from China. Rather, it was mainly thegrowing trade between Europe and China that made this communica-tion possible. In the 17th and 18th century, this trade was to a largeextent an import trade, supplying Europe with consumer goods suchas porcelain, silk, lacquers and of course tea. These imports inspiredthe fashion of ‘Chinoiserie’ during the baroque and rococo periods,the manufacture of Chinese-style items for interior design, and gardensadorned with Chinese-style pagodas, garden seats and bridges.



Things, as Arjun Appadurai has noted, have a social life. Their eco-nomic and social value changes according to specific social and culturalsituations, a process in which the social context of their production,the knowledge about their appropriate consumption and questions ofauthenticity play a significant role.27 As soon as the tea, silk and porce-lain through which the EIC hoped to transmit its revenues from Bengalback home left the docks of London they turned from trading goodsinto fashion items. In the stores and in the homes of the British, theyjoined goods from all over the world, especially coffee and sugar fromthe West Indies. The porcelain, while keeping its distinctive Chinesestyle most of the time, was already produced in China as an export goodaccording to the tastes of its European buyers and then set on ‘Chinesestyle’ tables and cupboards which were designed by Chippendale andthe Penny brothers. Methods of production for Asian luxury itemssuch as cotton, silk and porcelain were at the same time reinvented inEurope in the 18th century, thus stimulating the British manufacturingindustry.28

In 1762, a ‘Chinese visitor’ arrived in London: Lien Chi Altangi.William Goldsmith’s fictitious citizen of the world was a product of theEnlightenment’s fashion of clothing criticism of society in exoticism. Hefamously mocked the craze for the ‘Chinese style’. Invited to visit a ‘Ladyof taste’, his hostess, delighted by her ‘outlandish’ visitor, asked him tocomment on the Chinese-style pagodas and furniture. Much to her dis-appointment, however Lien Chi sees them as ‘clumsy and cumbrous’or fails to recognise them as Chinese at all. Furthermore, he is bewil-dered by the crowdedness of this ‘Chinese’ interior design. ‘She tookme through several rooms all furnished, as she told me, in the Chinesemanner; sprawling dragons, squatting pagodas, and clumsy Mandarins,were stuck on every shelf: in turning round, one must have used cautionnot to demolish part of the precarious furniture.’29

The trade with China had introduced the foreign into the houses ofBritain, and a meaning of China was created in this sphere of consumergoods, adaptation, imitation and rococo rebellion against baroque andclassicism. Even though this was not a direct encounter between Britonsand Chinese, the imported goods nevertheless established a ‘contactzone’, where this supposedly Chinese style could also threaten Britishtaste and identity.

While tea itself became increasingly ‘British’, the tea services thataccompanied its use were mainly kept in the ‘Chinese style’. The coreelement of the fashion of Chinoiserie, which became popular in Britainin the 18th century for interior design and garden architecture, was its



foreignness and exoticism, despite being produced mainly in Britain oron the European continent. While there had been earlier examples ofChinoiserie in England, particularly during the Restoration period,30 itwas only to reach its height from the 1740s onwards, coinciding withincreased imports of tea and porcelain by the EIC. During this period,numerous furniture and interior designs were fashioned according tothe ‘Chinese style’. While these designs were inspired by the porcelainand lacquer items imported from China, they were actually invented byBritish cabinet makers. They featured pig-tailed little men, Mandarins inlong robes, wizards and exotic birds, playing idly or drinking tea. In thepopular Chinese-style bedrooms and dressing rooms, these were oftencombined with tapestries imported from China, which were alreadybeing produced according to the tastes of the European market. Thetapestries and other items were sometimes called ‘Indian’ sometimes‘Chinese’ and it was not uncommon to see Native Americans depictednext to a Chinese Mandarin.31 This shows the hybridity of this style,through which everything that looked foreign might be incorporatedand domesticated as symbols of a delightful, if incomprehensible andinterchangeable ‘Other’ that lent itself to cheerful room decorations,plays and costumes. Nevertheless, the fashion was clearly generallyassociated with China.32 The cabinet-makers, architects and play writ-ers of Europe, in this period particularly the British ones, had createdtheir own China. The fashion was first sized upon by the upper classesof British society. William Chambers built a pagoda in the garden ofKew for Princess Augusta, and the Duke of Cumberland entertained hisnephew George III on his Chinese yacht.33 To the horror of its classicistcritics, this exotic fashion was highly popular and soon seemed to beubiquitous. In 1756, James Cawthorn, in a poem bemoaning the influxof all sorts of foreign evils into Britain, sarcastically remarked

Of late, ’tis true, quite sick of Rome and GreeceWe fetch our models from the wise Chinese;European artists are too cool and chaste,For Mand’rin is the only man of taste . . .

On ev’ry shelf a Joss divinely stares,Nymphs laid on chintzes sprawl upon our chairs;While o’er our cabinets Confucius nods,Midst porcelain elephants and China gods.34

‘China’ and ‘Chinese’ had become the objects of consumer desire, thusgiving it a place of importance in British culture, which might equal the



role of China for the British expansion in Asian trade, partly creating thedemand that sustained this role. The meaning China acquired in thiscontext was quite different from the one it held in the EIC headquartersin London.

David Porter has recently argued that Chinoiserie with its ‘flow ofunmeaning Eastern signs’ around the middle of the 18th century sub-stituted the earlier idea of a China that was substantial, knowable and aplace of theological and linguistic legitimacy.35 Altangi’s hostess appre-ciates her Chinoiserie goods precisely because they are ‘meaningless’ toher. In Ladies Amusement or, the Whole Art of Japanning Made Easy . . . ,advice is given to the ladies that

With Indian and Chinese subjects greater Liberties may be taken,because Luxuriance of Fancy recommends their Productions morethan Propriety, for in them is often seen a Butterfly supporting anElephant, or Things equally absurd; yet from their gay Colouring andairy Disposition seldom fail to please.36

This association with meaningless signs probably made Chinoiseriedesirable for consumers and contributed to a shift in British percep-tions of China. However, to see this as the main reason for changesin the intellectual sphere, as Porter does, is somewhat far-fetched. Also,William Chambers’s curious tracts on Chinese gardening show anotherdimension in the use of Chinoiserie. The foreignness of China served tolegitimise an attack on the ‘English’ style of his opponent, ‘Capability’Brown. In the Preface to his Designs of Chinese Buildings, Chambers dis-cussed the Chinese art of laying out gardens, which he used to attackthe English landscape garden. While both took nature for their pat-tern, Chambers argued that the Chinese artfully employed the ‘pleasing,horrid, and enchanted’ features of nature, thus surprising the visitor,quite in contrast to the rather dull rolling hills of the English landscapegarden.37 In his second tract, A Dissertation on Oriental Gardening of 1772,he followed this up by a description of a fantastic Chinese garden, whichis a place of luxury, excitement and sublime extravagances. He evokesthe idea of an oriental splendour, which a European monarch cannotaspire to reach, but that is worth trying to imitate.38 China here standsfor an exotic, fantastic foreignness that excites the mind and can givenew ideas and impulses to an uninspired British present.39

This influx of foreign ideas, which were a source of entertainmentand fantastic splendour for some, were seen as a danger to a healthyBritish state for others. It thus could come in combination with a certain



uneasiness about the extended contact with the foreign which theBritish expansion brought with it. In his attack on Chambers’s Disser-tation, William Mason wrote

His royal mind, whene’er from state withdrawn,He treads the velvet of his Richmond lawn;These shall prolong his Asiatic dream,Tho’ Europe’s balance trembles on its beam.40

For Mason, Chambers’s praise of the Chinese garden with its extrav-agances stood for yet another example of the corruptness of the Courtand the Tory government and the problematic nature of British interestsin the East.41

The indulgence of the British upper and middle classes in this fash-ion, so associated with the foreign, was also seen as a danger toBritish virtues. For the classicist critics, Chinoiserie stood for everythingthat quickened the decay of British society by featuring a foreign andgrotesque false taste, which would lead the observer away from the pathof moral and virtue. The critic Joseph Warton thus remarked

If these observations are rightly founded, what shall we say of thetaste and judgement of those who spend their lives and fortunes incollecting pieces, where neither perspective nor proportion, nor con-formity to nature are observed; I mean the extravagant lovers andpurchasers of China, and Indian screens. . . . No genuine beauty is tobe found in whimsical and grotesque figures, the monstrous offspringof wild imagination, undirected by nature and truth.42

In the 18th century, which highlighted the importance of taste for theformation of the right character, this criticism was more than a questionof the appropriate interior design; it questioned the very ability of thosewho adhered to this ‘grotesque’ style to make correct judgements onother issues.43

The other most prominent product of China, tea, had attracted simi-lar criticism around the middle of the 18th century, mainly due to theeconomic imbalance it produced for British foreign commerce.44 Theamount of tea imported by the EIC into England rose steeply from 2 lband 2 oz in 1664 to 5,857,882 lb in 1783, and in the 1830s, it reachedabout 30 million pounds.45 From the 1760s onwards, the trade in teaand porcelain from China, with its connection to the EIC in India, wasconsidered to be a good investment. This idea did not only stem from



the European taste for tea but also from the Jesuit reports from Beijing,which constantly put forward the notion of China’s huge population,46

which to the mind of commercial men would be an ideal market. Upuntil then, however, the Europeans had not been successful in sellinganything in large quantities to the Chinese and had had to pay fortea, silk and porcelain with silver bullion. Although this could still be afairly profitable business for the EIC stockholders and the government,47

this practice alarmed those who shared the mercantilist fear that Britishtreasure disappeared in the East.

This issue had already found its critics in the early years of the 18thcentury. Most prominent in this context was Jonas Hanway, who in his‘Essay on tea’ in 1756 described tea as a beverage which made the Britishweak and drained Britain of its substance for life, the silver bullion.48

Hanway was strongly concerned with the moral improvement of theBritish people and, as a merchant, with the welfare of British trade.His criticism of the tea trade echoed bullionist fears as well as worriesabout the social implications of the consumption of luxury goods.49 Healso aimed at lower class women, especially wet nurses. He feared thatspending money and time on tea would destroy the economy of theirfamilies and that they would neglect their duties to raise strong menfor Britain. He considered their thirst for tea a dangerous craving forluxury, which was not suitable for their place in society.50 His assaulton tea can thus be seen to have been a part of his other endeavours topromote the moral well-being of his fellow Britons, especially the lowerclasses.51 David Porter has argued that this criticism was also a sign forthe changed meaning assigned to China, which was no longer identifiedwith a possible universal language and a stable origin, but rather as theorigin of instability which threatened British welfare.52 Hanway’s argu-ment is indeed closely linked to the classicistic criticism of Chinoiserie,53

mixed with a strong element of a medical discourse on the dangers ofnew exotic goods. He thus writes about how the tea trade, instead ofproviding the nation with ‘useful articles of commerce’, ‘consumes ourstrength in tea, by which we can possibly make no profit, except uponourselves, whilst it sucks up our very blood; and, by exhausting our trea-sure, weakens the nerves of the state.’54 In contrast to the benefit tradewould normally bring to the island nation Britain, any contact of thissort with China was highly injurious in his eyes.

Hanway’s attack on the tea trade was an early example of the discourseon the dangers of Asian trade and empire. After the Seven Years War,this critique became strongly connected to the idea of the corruptinginfluence of the growing British Empire in the East and moved beyond



purely bullionist fears. It culminated in the parliamentary enquiry intoLord John Clive’s actions in India and the impeachment of WarrenHastings.55 The link of the China trade to the EIC meant that themeanings of China came to be influenced by these considerations. Forexample, the satirist Peter Pindar was able to use the then widely known‘Ode to tea’ by the Chinese Emperor Qianlong as a foil for his criti-cism of the Warren Hastings trial. In his version ‘An ode to coffee’, heimplied that while the wise Chinese Emperor knew how to properlycelebrate the oriental beverage tea, the British only created havoc fromtheir desire for coffee and other Asian products.56 Pindar’s primary goalwas to attack the government, describing it as even more corrupt thanthe Asian princes. However it linked in with Hanway’s earlier criticismin that it emphasised that the British should leave Asian luxuries to theAsians, as they were hopelessly corrupting British virtues. China in thisperiod had thus come to be associated with the dangers of the Britishexpansionist activities in the East.

For many Britons, tea and Chinoiserie formed the first contact withChina. Robert Southey wrote in 1807, ‘Plates and tea wares have madeus better acquainted with the Chinese than we are with any other dis-tant people.’57 While it became integrated into the day-to-day life ofBritons, the association with loftiness and almost fairy-tale figures mayhave made the political entity of the Qing Empire seem even moreremote. Through the classicistic criticism of Chinoiserie and bullionistfears of the tea trade, it also acquired the meaning of a source of moraldegeneration, which remained prominent also in the early 19th cen-tury in the context of Chinoiserie. This did not of course reflect the roleplayed by art and consumer goods in China and Chinese concepts ofbeauty. In this sense, the associations made with China in the contextof the fashion for the Chinese style were a form of aesthetic Orientalism.Chinoiserie with its ‘grotesque’ forms was considered to be the absoluteother to the classicistic style, with its Roman and Greek models. In con-trast to tea, it appeared impossible to integrate this into British culture asan indigenous style and thus it remained linked to the discussion aboutthe problematic nature of the EIC’s involvement in Asia.

2.3 A Chinese court at Brighton

In his armour room at Carlton House, the Prince Regent kept a life-size effigy of Tippu Sultan. He had also commissioned paintings ofthe epic battle at Mysore.58 The conquest of India by the EIC and theBritish military clearly inspired George’s attitudes to Asia. This physical



appropriation of the Indian monarch was however only one materialresponse to the different nature of British contacts with Asia in thisperiod.

One of the most famous examples of British Chinoiserie is the RoyalPavilion in Brighton. As with other examples of Chinoiserie, the build-ings, furniture and tapestry mainly created the idea of an exotic Chinathat was a far away and not quite real country. It was this context whichmade it a prominent metaphor for criticism of the Prince Regent. How-ever, the increasing contact with China at the turn of the century alsocreated a new version of British Chinoiserie.

The first expression of the Prince’s interest of Chinoiserie was the fur-nishing of one room at Carlton House in the Chinese style in 1792, theyear the first British embassy to China left under the leadership of LordMacartney. The Chinoiserie used there was mainly French inspired.59

The association of Chinoise style with leisure and luxury might havebeen the main attraction for the Prince, even if it was the embassy thathad drawn his attention to China in the first place. However, when hedecided to redecorate the Pavilion at Brighton ten years later, he optedfor a different, new style of Chinoiserie, which was clearly inspiredby the new contact with China, paying more attention to ‘authentic’Chinese style. The Prince had acquired the Pavilion in 1783 when it wasstill a humble house. He mainly used it to escape from the formal andstrict atmosphere of his father’s court and famously lived there with hisillegitimate Catholic wife, Maria Fitzherbert. During the first years, thehouse was transformed in a neo-classical style by Henry Holland. After1800, the prince turned away from this cool and sober style and towardsa more eclectic and luxurious one. The interior design developed by thefirm of John Crace seems to have tried to develop a new authenticity forthe Chinoise style.60

It was strongly influenced by a new type of images arriving in Britainfrom China. Most prominent amongst them was the work of WilliamAlexander, who had accompanied the Macartney embassy as a drafts-man. After his return, he published the sketches he had made duringthe journey in two books.61 Earlier, a traveller to Canton, George Mason,had already published two books on Chinese export-paintings.62 In heressays on William Alexander, Mildred Archer claims that his drawingshad shown the ‘real’ China to the British for the first time, which didnot look like the Chinoiserie and Jesuit dreamland any more.63 However,these drawings also did not give an objective image of China, partly dueto the choice of the depicted objects, but more particularly due to thestyle of the sketching. Rather, William Alexander mixed several sketches



and added Chinoiserie items to produce drawings that more closely fit-ted the expectations of his audience.64 The pictures therefore were notvery authentic, despite what George Staunton, the second man on theMacartney embassy, claimed.65

A strand that was even more dominant in the drawings of WilliamAlexander than Chinoiserie, was the method of ethnographic paint-ing, which from the middle of the 18th century was influenced bythe natural history paradigm. Late 18th century explorers such as themembers of the Cook expedition had adopted this style of painting as amethod of documenting newly discovered places in a seemingly objec-tive way.66 One assumed that one could identify and put down on paperthe differences between different groups of people, by attributes suchas costumes or jewellery, and thereby assign them their place in thesystem of peoples.67 With descriptive techniques like these, the foreignwas also normalised. The customs and manners of the others, whichwere represented in these pictures and the adjoining texts penned byEuropeans were made to seem timeless. They were described as if theirappearance and their actions never changed. In contrast to the observer,the observed object was thus situated in a different place in time.68

Alexander, in his book ‘Customs of China’ thus mainly depicts types,such as ‘A Chinese Soldier of Infantry, or Tiger of War’, rather thanindividuals. Alexander shows an anonymous Chinese soldier in frontof his military post, wearing a yellow-red-striped uniform with a tiger-cap, shield and sword. He does not interact with others, but is shownto the observer in complete isolation as a type. The text on the oppo-site side places emphasis on its assertion that this kind of clothing andarmament were typical for a soldier of this class.69 The text suggests thatin this way one could recognise a ‘Tiger of War’ everywhere on accountof this dress and these objects.

The character of these ethnographic drawings and descriptionsbecomes even clearer if one compares the drawing and the text abouta Chinese fisherman in the ‘Costume of the Chinese’ and a fishermanin ‘The Costume of Great Britain’, which was published only one yearlater by the same publishing house.70 The commentary in the ‘Costumeof Great Britain’ hardly mentions the picture. Rather it narrates the his-tory of fishing in Great Britain and the importance of this professionfor the nation.71 The picture by Alexander, ‘A Fisherman and his familyregaling in their Boat’ and its description is in stark contrast to this. Theadjoining text describes in detail what can be seen on the drawing: ‘Thefemale of the group, surrounded by her children, is smoking her pipe.One of these has a gourd fastened to its shoulders, intended to preserve



it from drowning, in the event of its falling overboard.’72 Then the textspeaks about their sleeping places, the Cormorants, the different fish-ing methods and the sluice that can be seen in the background.73 Thiskind of description emphasised the foreignness of the culture depictedand therefore the need for the author to explain every single detail tothe viewer in order to make the picture comprehensible. Moreover, thelanguage is that of a distanced, scientific observer who does not becomepersonally involved but notes everything he sees objectively. The authorreduces the description purely to the exterior, and the costumes of theChinese are represented as timeless, very much in contrast to the textabout Great Britain with its focus on historical development.

George Henry Mason’s book ‘The Costume of China’ stood in a sim-ilar tradition.74 From his prolonged stay at a factory in Canton, he hadbrought with him a set of drawings by the Chinese draftsman Pu Qua,and he published them in 1804 with commenting texts, similar to thevolumes by Alexander. Even though this time the prints were producedby a Chinese hand, nevertheless they were equally no ‘objective’ rep-resentation of Chinese reality. Rather they stood in the tradition ofChinese export watercolours, which had been produced since the mid-dle of the 18th century for the Western market, probably as souvenirsfor European merchants in Canton. They orientated themselves on theWestern European painting tradition, not the Chinese one.75 For thisthey used the stereotypes of the Chinese that the Europeans had giventhem.76 They mostly depicted Chinese workers in simple jobs, such asmoneychanger, barber, frog catcher or beggar.

However, these drawings did not only stand in the tradition of nat-ural history paintings but were also inspired by English genre-paintingor ‘fancy pieces’, which were produced at the same time, and whichshow the English poor at their work. The most popular edition of thesegenre-paintings was the series ‘The Cries of London’ by Francis Wheat-ley. These pictures also do not show portraits of individual people. Itis the activity that defines the identity of the represented person: theservant who plucks the turkey, the women who sell mackerel and soon.77 The majority of Alexander’s pictures represent Chinese of the lowerranks at their work: for example, ‘A Group of Trackers at Dinner’78 or‘A Bookseller’.79 Members of the Chinese upper ranks were hardly shownat all. Significantly, Alexander did not include several sketches that hehad made of them in his publication, in particular one of a Chinesescholar.80 Until 1841, these books published by Alexander and Masonwere the only major ethnographic representation of the Chinese. It wasonly in 1827, between April and May, that two ‘Chinese ladies’ were



exhibited as a special attraction of a ‘Chinese exhibition’, where ‘gen-uine Chinese goods’ were sold. They were advertised as typical examplesof their people, carrying out the superstitious practices of the Chinese.This short ethnographic display of Chinese people however has to beseen mainly in the context of the sale of Chinese goods and the enter-tainment industry of London, in which everything Chinese, from theChinoise play to Chinese jugglers, was still very much in fashion. Itis not known whether it attracted any attention from more scientifi-cally interested men.81 These new representations of China in Britainwere thus influenced by Chinoiserie as well as ideas on ethnographicalpainting.

These images were used to give the interior design of the Pavilion inBrighton its more authentic character. Paintings based on the Masonand William Alexander books, which showed the ‘manners of the peo-ple’, were applied in the Ante-Room, and Chinese implements of warpainted on the walls. Similar paintings decorated the Small DrawingRoom. There were even some life-size statues adorned with Chinesecostumes.82 Real Chinese wallpaper was used as well as a vast amount ofChinese export furniture and curiosities and fewer Chinoise accessorieswhich had been manufactured in Europe. This more authentic style ofChinoiserie probably served two purposes. On the one hand, it satis-fied the Prince’s interest in weapons as well as his pleasure in theatricalscenes and dressing up. On the other hand, this more authentic Chinesestyle and the depiction of Chinese people and their customs demon-strated the direct contact the British had with the Chinese Empire andtheir ability to observe them, thus expressing its power in diplomacyand trade. It was the short-lived expression of a truly British Chinoiserie.

The plans for a Chinese style exterior, developed after 1802, werenever executed. Rather, from 1805 onwards, the Prince seems to havebeen more fascinated with Indian architecture. Humphry Repton set outto develop plans for the grounds and the enlargement of the Pavilionas an Indian Palace. He might have been attracted by the association ofIndian architecture with the sublime and the noble and glittering past ofthe Mughal Empire, which especially the Romantics relished. The Britishconquests in India probably played a role as well.83 However, the finalIndian exterior was only developed by Nash from 1815 onwards.84

China, in this context held the meaning of pleasurable things, whichcould be collected and assembled with other novelties from around theworld and from the past. The Chinese style, as well as the Indian, proba-bly also served the Prince Regent as a setting in which he could imaginehimself as a powerful monarch – much like the Chinese Emperor



Qianlong and rather less like the idea of monarchy his father, ‘FarmerGeorge’, had developed.85 After all, he had aspired in all his buildingwork more to equal the ancient regime Bourbons than a constitutionalBritish king.86 In its setting, Brighton, a place which came to be moreassociated with leisure than court and politics, the Pavilion was theexpression of a lifestyle of luxury, moral laissez-faire and monarchicalgrandeur.87

As with other elements of Prince George’s self-image, his use ofChinoiserie did not necessarily achieve the desired effect. His associationwith this style, together with the increasing notion of China as an Orien-tal despotism, expressed for example in the reports of the second Britishembassy to China in 1816, contributed to the use of Chinoiserie-stylesketches as a language of political satire. George was a favourite targetfor the caricaturists, especially in times when the reform movementgained in momentum. They commented on his culinary and drink-ing excesses, his embonpoint, his mistresses and his attempts to geta divorce from his wife Queen Caroline.88 Besides caricaturing Georgeby military boots or as an overgrown child, the caricaturists often casthim as an Oriental despot, be it Nebuchadnezzar or, even more promi-nently, as a Chinese figure. Even in those cartoons where George wasnot shown clad in Chinese attire, the Chinoiserie interior of the RoyalPavilion was used as the backdrop for criticising him and his court liv-ing in Oriental pomp and splendour, spending money on grotesque andunnecessary fancies.89 China seems to have been still foreign enough toappeal to the Prince as the origin of lofty, luxurious and light-heartedsurroundings. However, this otherness, which placed China half in therealm of fairy tales, half in that of an Oriental despotism, made it theperfect image for demonstrating how removed the Prince, and equallylater as King George IV, and his Circle were from the real needs of hisnation. By depicting the Prince and his circle in Chinese costume, oras a mythological Chinese character (Joss and Fum), his distance fromhis nation is even more exaggerated.90 This becomes evident in a car-toon by William Williams in 1822 where the King is shown as a ChineseMandarin and the royal arms are transformed into a Chinese emblem,with dragons as supporters. While George liked to portray himself as ahero and saviour of the British nation, the caricaturists saw him as aregent without Britishness, without interest in his nation, amoral andwith clearly despotic tendencies, not least in his spending pattern andhis demand for public money.91

The association of China with Chinoiserie thus remained vivid inthe British mind. Attempts to incorporate these new, more ethno-graphic images of China into the Chinoiserie interior design as in the



Pavilion were short-lived. This Chinoiserie meaning of China remainedattached to notions of deformity and luxury. In the context of the car-icatures of Prince George, this Chinoiserie China also became morepoliticised, representing dangerous excessive and absolutist tendencies,much as the Bourbon Court had done before the Revolution. Thefailure of the Amherst embassy and with it the rapid decline of theidea of the benevolent Chinese monarch probably contributed to thisdevelopment.92

Above all, the use of Chinoiserie in this context shows its meaningas the complete other, something alien, with which a British monarchshould not associate himself. China might be observed in ethnographicpaintings, but in the minds of those concerned with British nationalidentity, it should no longer infiltrate British homes. In the realm oftheatre and, to a limited extent, interior design, the idea of an exotic,mysterious China nevertheless continued.

The intellectual debates about China as well as Chinoiserie were bothanswers to the influx of reports about China as well as its consumergoods. They were two ways in which information on China and itsconsumer goods were incorporated into a British-centred dialogue. Bothaspects contributed to the chain of associations which formed ‘China’in British minds. However, the meaning of China could change depend-ing on the context. It could be a stagnating civilisation, a metaphor fordecaying British morals or an escapist fantasy.

The influence of William Alexander’s paintings on Chinoiserie designsin the Royal Pavilion shows that the contact with China in the con-text of the British imperial expansion became increasingly importantfor the way in which China was imagined in Britain after the Macart-ney embassy and how new, allegedly scientific knowledge about it wasconstructed.

Britons in Canton, in embassies to Beijing, and in India and SoutheastAsia formed new ‘contact zones’ with China and the Chinese from the1760s onwards, a process which intensified after 1790. This expansionbrought a pluralisation of British experiences, in each of which they hadto come to terms with what China meant and increasingly what Britainmeant to China. Knowledge about Chinese language, law and religionwas influenced by the local contact zones as well as the networks ofEurope’s imperial expansion in Asia. As far as Britain was concerned, itspoints of reference for the meanings of China shifted from the Europeannetworks of literati and of fashion to those of its nascent Asian Empire.


3At the China Coast

Within the space of 30 years the British monarch sent two embassiesto the court in Beijing. From the 1760s, the British community at theChina coast was growing, although never to large numbers. Duringthe embassies and in Canton, the British had to take into account thereaction of the Chinese to the image of Britain and China formed bythe British. This was a stark contrast to the philosophers, merchants orappreciators of Chinoiserie in Britain, who could create their own imageof China quite unencumbered by any real contact. In particular, Cantonwas to become one of the main hubs in which knowledge about Chinawas created, used and transferred to and from other regions of Asia andback to Britain from the 1760s to 1840s, radically changing the wayChina was understood in the British Empire.

The search for knowledge about the Chinese Empire was central to theendeavours of the British in Canton as well as during the Macartney andlater the Amherst embassies. They hoped that knowledge of Chinese cus-toms, law and language would give them more agency in their dealingswith the Chinese. Moreover, it would allow them to style themselves as‘China experts’ who not only knew how to interact with this seeminglyso peculiar country but also, especially towards the end of the period, toadvocate what China needed for its own improvement. The geograph-ical proximity to India and the institutional link between the EIC inCalcutta and the Select Committee in Canton meant an increasing influ-ence of the British presence in India and the ideas developed in thiscontext for this ‘contact zone’ in the south of China.

3.1 A diplomatic expedition

The Macartney embassy holds a prominent place in reflections aboutBritish–Chinese relations and the image of China in this period. For

34


At the China Coast 35

the first time, a representative of the British Crown reached the courtof Beijing and met the Emperor of China, who had held the positionof a philosopher king in the European imagination. The narration ofthis contact developed many of the themes which were significant dur-ing this period of British–Chinese contact and the meaning of Chinadeveloped in this ‘contact zone’. Some had already played an importantrole in Canton in the years after 1750, when the British first came tostay there, but with the embassy, and especially its ultimate failure, theywere to become even more prominent after 1794.

The 1780s brought significant changes in the structure of the BritishEmpire and the role of the state in Eastern expansion. This was aresult of the increasing importance of Asia for Britain, and with it theChina trade. The main focus of these transformations was India, andthus connecting India and China even more strongly in the Britishimagination.

The American War of Independence ended in 1783 and broughtwith it the loss of Britain’s largest settler colony. In Asia, the EIC hadincreased its debt significantly by its engagement in ever further warsand conquests, while stock market speculations in Britain added to itsprecarious situation. In this context, the gains from the tea trade becameincreasingly important to the British government. The CommutationAct, introduced in 1784, reduced the duties on China teas from 120 percent to 12.5 per cent to limit smuggling and thus increased the exciserevenue, while at the same time helping the shaken EIC. The Britishinvolvement in India became more lucrative due to the export of Indiantextiles and later opium to China to pay for the tea. Finally, the increasedneed for an entrepôt for the China trade led to new, reinforced efforts tofind a suitable spot in Southeast Asia and thus really started off Britishexpansion into this region.1

At the same time, Pitt’s India Act established a stronger governmentinfluence on the EIC’s Indian affairs. During the Warren Hastings trial,the ambiguous role of the EIC in India had drawn public attention.The Company was accused of ruling its Indian possessions like an Asiantyrant and being a hoard of corruption.2 This, and just as importantly,its huge debts, led to the introduction of stronger government controlover its political business in Asia. The Act established a Board of Control,which was appointed by the King and consisted of one of the Secretariesof State, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and four other members of thePrivy Council. The Board was to supervise the political decisions andadministration of the Company in India.3 As president of the Board,Henry Dundas soon established the importance and influence of this



position. He was eminent in shaping the government’s Asia policy inthis period. As a purely commercial enterprise, the EIC’s China tradewas not touched by this new institution. Consequently, it acquired agrowing importance for the Court of Directors as it was the only spherein which they could act unhindered and achieve profit. The Chinatrade gained particular importance when it became clear that the Indianpossessions would not produce as much revenue as had been hoped.4

After the Commutation Act, the EIC had managed to establish a nearmonopoly for the European tea trade in Canton. In 1784, during ‘TheLady Hughes Affair’, a British gunner at Canton was hanged by theChinese authorities after accidentally killing two Chinese. This broughtto the attention of the British government that the China trade stillstood on an unstable basis. They were concerned that the British nei-ther had a source of information about nor influence on the ChineseCourt, which had become such an important neighbour to the Britishin India.5 They realised that the state had to take a greater interest in thismatter and decided to send an ambassador. It was believed that, in con-trast to the merchants, he would be able to impress the Chinese Courtdue to his rank, and would leave them with a more positive view of theBritish. As a result, it was hoped that he would be able to ensure Britishpredominance in the China trade. A collection of modern scientificinstruments as presents were supposed to impress the Emperor of Chinaof British advances in the sciences and thus demonstrate their powerin the world.6 The British feared that others had played the diplomaticgame better and had already maligned the British at Beijing. The Frenchand the Portuguese had a presence at the Court of the Qing Emperorthrough their missionaries and Britain was afraid that the French mightrepeat their Indian game here, supporting a native power against them.7

However, as J. Cranmer-Byng has pointed out, the British were equallyconcerned about Russian activities in the region, both in connection toChina and to Japan.8

The embassy, that was decided upon by Henry Dundas and WilliamPitt, was not simply a diplomatic enterprise. It was also an expressionof the new importance of the science of men and nature, informed byEnlightenment patronage of explorers and scientific improvement ofagriculture. The prime example of this was Captain Cook with his SouthSea Voyages, but also expeditions such as the journey of the Bounty.9

Following this spirit, the Macartney embassy was equipped like a scien-tific expedition. Even in the letter of introduction from George III tothe Chinese Emperor, the importance of scientific journeys was high-lighted as a representation of the virtue of a ruler.10 Especially in the



context of Chinese entry restrictions, a mission to the Chinese Emperorwas an occasion not to be missed and Joseph Banks became stronglyinvolved with the preparations for the embassy. Its entourage includedtwo ‘botanic gardeners’, an expert in chemistry as well as a ‘naturalphilosopher’.11

The embassy, which embarked from Portsmouth on the 21 September1792 under the leadership of Lord Macartney was thus both an attemptby the state to set the trade with China on a better footing and anattempt to discover the secrets of the Chinese flora, fauna and culture.

The embassy has frequently attracted the attention of historians.12

It has been portrayed as a symbol for the beginning of a radicalEurocentrism with Macartney’s refusal to kowtow,13 as well as theclash of the progressive, rational Britain and the immobile, traditionalChina.14 James L. Hevia revised this idea by establishing the importanceand meaning of ritual for both sides, showing that neither side had amore rational or irrational system of foreign relations. He argued thatrather than understanding the embassy as a clash of cultures, one hadto see it as the meeting of two ‘imperial formations’, each of whichinsisted upon the acceptance by the other side of its universal claimto sovereignty and its way to conduct international relations.15 WhileHevia’s work has done a lot to leave the well-trodden paths that havedominated understanding of the embassy, his narrow focus on somevague British ‘enlightened bourgeois public sphere’ as the culture thatshaped Macartney and caused him to perceive and interact with theChinese in a certain way does rather ignore the influence of other fac-tors on the embassy, such as British ideas on India as well as the fearof a Russian expansion in Asia. It is essential to consider in the follow-ing how these aspects shaped British ideas of China in the context ofthe embassy and how this expedition transformed British perceptionsof what their country’s relationship with China ought to be. The ideaof the good British character was central to this new relationship, to aneven greater extent than Hevia has recognised.

The image of China as the immutable empire, which was not inter-ested in foreign commerce was so strong in the 18th century that forAdam Smith, China served as the prime example of a society that iso-lated itself from foreign trade. Why then did Pitt and Dundas think thatan embassy might be successful? It was mainly the Russian example thatwas cited in this context. The Russian embassy from Peter the Great,under the ambassador Ismailov, had managed to obtain permission totrade in Beijing and to have an agent residing there. In addition to this,the conditions of their trade had been settled in a treaty – something no



other European power had achieved.16 For the British, this constitutedthe proof that an embassy was the right method to gain concessionsfrom the Chinese and indeed that the British had the right to a per-manent mission in Beijing.17 While this had already been an importantelement in the planning of the Cathcart embassy, which was abortedafter the death of the ambassador en route in 1787, it became evenmore important in 1792. At this point, there were already political ten-sions between Great Britain and Russia, when the British became awareof new plans by Catharine II to extend her influence and possibly ter-ritory in the Amur region, as well as planning an embassy to Japan.18

This made it even more important to gain influence on the Chinesebefore the Russians were able to do so in a diplomatic or military way.This British knowledge of the Russian approaches to China also hadimportant consequences for the kowtow question as will be discussedlater.

However, the success of the embassy did not only depend on theChinese actually being open to negotiations and diplomatic influence –it also depended on the assumption that the Chinese monarch couldbe understood as somebody who was worthy of the attention of theBritish King and who would understand the meaning of his letter andpresents. While his country was considered to be in the decaying stageof an oriental civilisation, the emperor himself was seen by those whoprepared the embassy as an enlightened, if oriental monarch, who wasmerely unaware of the corruption and oppression which his Mandarinsat Canton were guilty of.19 This monarch was believed to be open tothe benefit of trade and the rule of law and would clearly approve ofGeorge III’s support for expeditions and science to the improvementof mankind.20 Thus, Dundas and the other organisers of the embassyhoped that if only the Chinese understood the British position in theworld, they would naturally be interested in coming to a friendly agree-ment with them, which would at least be equal to the one they hadalready established with the Russians.21

The primary goal of the embassy was thus to establish a relationof friendship between the two monarchs, and the recognition of eachother’s position in the world. The changes in the conditions of tradetowards such that were of mutual benefit would then follow naturally,since it was the duty of every sovereign to protect the exchange ofcommodities, which were spread out over the world.22

The ambassador who was to achieve this goal was clearly selected toadapt to the apparent Chinese disapproval of merchants as well as beingsomebody who had experience in dealing with more or less enlightened



oriental despots. Lord Macartney, styled ‘cousin’ of the King, was a well-established member of the British aristocratic elite. Furthermore, he hadbeen ambassador to the Court of Catharina II in Russia and governor ofMadras, and George Staunton as his secretary had negotiated with TippuSultan. He was strongly influenced by Enlightenment ideas with theiremphasis on systematisation, rational discussion and the ‘disinterestedobserver’.23 Thus the key personnel of the embassy had been formed bythe intellectual climate in Britain as well as by their experience in andperception of India.

In addition to the presents and the letter to the Chinese Emperor,the British saw the direct and uninterrupted communication with theChinese as central to the success of the embassy. Since there were noBritons who could speak Chinese, so-called Chinese ‘linguists’, whohad some knowledge of English conducted the necessary transactionsin Canton, while Jesuits served as interpreters in more difficult cases.The British had great doubts about the ability and the loyalty of bothand therefore did not want to rely on any interpreters appointed by theChinese government.24 After all, those persons should not be able todestroy the first demonstration of the true British character to the Chi-nese. Macartney’s experience in Madras probably also played a role. Inthe EIC’s territories in India, the question of the truthfulness of nativeinterpreters and language teachers increasingly became an issue and wasone of the major reasons for William Jones’s efforts to learn Sanskrit.25

In a similar way in China, it was felt that the lack of knowledge of theforeign language became a problem, in particular at the point where therelationship between the countries exceeded that of trade.

However, the only interpreters the British could find for this expedi-tion were two Chinese converts from the Roman Catholic College ofPropaganda at Naples.26 During the months at sea, they taught twomembers of the embassy, the scientist John Barrow and the 12-year-old son of Sir George Staunton, George Thomas Staunton, rudimentaryknowledge of Chinese. Whereas it seems that the former did not makea great progress, the young boy became familiar enough with the lan-guage to be able to occasionally act as a writer for the embassy. Duringthe audience at Jehol, he was presented to the Chinese Emperor andspoke a few words of Chinese to him.27

During their stay in China, the higher ranking members of theembassy saw their opinion about the problem of native interpretersreinforced.28 In this context, the Chinese were represented as eitherunreliable or timid, weak and corrupted by the fear of a despotic gov-ernment. The Jesuit missionaries were shown to be partly affected by



that fear as well, since they were also dependent on and thereforecorrupted by this government. Only the innocent young Englishmanand the Chinese interpreter, who had attached himself so much tothe British that he was only called ‘Mr. Plumb’ and was described asoften passing for a European,29 could actually provide the service Britainneeded. The ambassador, Lord Macartney, therefore underlined the needof the British to learn Chinese in order to become independent ofthe unreliable and sometimes false Chinese and the biased Catholicmissionaries:

We therefore almost entirely depend on the good faith and good-nature of the few Chinese whom we employ, and by whom we can bebut imperfectly understood in the broken gibberish we talk to them.I fancy that Pan-ke-qua or Mahomet Soulem would attempt doingbusiness on the Royal Exchange to very little purpose if they appearedthere in long petticoat clothes, with bonnets and turbans, and couldspeak nothing but Chinese or Arabic.30

Once the embassy had met with the Chinese who would accompanythem to the audience with the Emperor, Macartney quickly started toevaluate the officials. By categorising them, he wanted to make surethat he was treated with respect by the Chinese side as well as iden-tifying whom he could trust.31 In particular, he noted the differencebetween the Manchus and the Chinese in his effort to make sense of theChina that was presented to him. Here, his Indian experience was to becrucial. The Manchus, in Macartney’s mind, like the Mughals, were for-eign rulers who had established a tyranny of a handful ‘over more thanthree hundred millions of Chinese’.32 Despite perceived knowledge, heargued, the Manchus had not become Chinese, but rather remained trueto their origin, as was typical for Oriental monarchs: ‘A series of twohundred years in the succession of eight or ten monarchs did not changethe Mogul into a Hindu, nor has a century and a half made Ch’ien-lunga Chinese.’33

Although he praised the government through which the four suc-cessive Manchu emperors managed to stabilise the empire despite thisimbalance, the Chinese had suffered under this rule. Since the conquestby the more barbarous Tartars, Macartney stated, the Chinese civilisa-tion had deteriorated, while Europe had developed its arts and sciencesevery day. He also attributed the negative character strains he noticedin the Chinese, especially their tendency to lie, to the fact that everyChinese with aspiration had to attach himself to a despised Tartar.34



Now, however, the Chinese began to ‘feel their native energies revive’.And it was thus only a matter of time before the Chinese would riseagainst their Tartar tyrants, but if this were to take the form of a violentrevolution rather than that of a gentle and gradual change, a new catas-trophe would await them: ‘Thus then the Chinese, if not led to emanci-pation by degrees, but let loose on a burst of enthusiasm would probablyfall into all the excesses of folly, suffer all the paroxysms of madness,and be found as unfit for the enjoyment of freedom as the Frenchand the negros.’35 One wonders who was supposed to lead the Chineseto emancipation, since Macartney obviously did not trust the Manchuemperors to control the situation much longer; and, as he points out inanother part of his diary, Britain would certainly be the primary bene-factor of a revolution in China.36 In such an event, the British wouldpay back all the humiliations received by the Chinese, as they had donewith the Indian Rajas and Nawabs.37 Macartney thus established a sys-tem through which he could create a China that he could understandand that would help him not only during his immediate mission, butwhich would also give the British an insight into the long-term develop-ments in China and a possible British role in its future. His estimationof China’s political future however was more influenced by his view ofthe events in India than by any proper assessment of the situation inthe Qing Empire. Macartney thus gave China a new political meaning.

One of the most important features in this context was Macartney’sunderstanding of the kowtow ceremony, which officially established anew relationship between Britain and China. While Macartney’s precon-ception of China undoubtedly played an important role in his positiontowards the question of the kowtow, the ceremony he did conduct inthe end, and which has been considered as such a significant sign of thenew eurocentrism, was a result of the contact zone. In his instructions,Henry Dundas had after all only vaguely told Macartney to ‘conform toall ceremonials of that Court which may not commit the honor of yourSovereign or lessen your own dignity, so as not to endanger the successof your negotiations.’38

Macartney’s refusal to comply with the ceremony of the kowtow hadtwo connected reasons. To an enlightened Englishman, a ceremonylike the kowtow smacked too much of irrational pomp, associated withabsolutism, tyranny and Asian slavishness.39 This rationalisation of cere-monies also seems to have filled them with more meaning. Where earlierambassadors had gone through the kowtow or the hand kiss of theAlgerian bey without attributing too much to it, it was now consideredan act of submission and thus humiliation of the British monarch.40



However, Macartney’s attitude to the kowtow was also a consequenceof his understanding of the Chinese system of foreign relations. He hadclosely studied all the available reports of the former European embassiesto China. The Russian precedent played a crucial role in the set up ofthe embassy. Similarly, it seems to have served Macartney as the keyexample of successful negotiations with the Chinese Emperor. Accord-ing to the Scot John Bell, who had travelled with the Russian embassy,the Russian ambassador, Ismailov, had initially refused to kowtow, how-ever had apparently then complied with the ceremony after he hadnegotiated that a Chinese ambassador to the court of the Tsar wouldequally conduct the appropriate ceremonies.41 It was thus not just Euro-centric arrogance towards foreign customs when Macartney demandedthe reciprocity of ceremonies from the Chinese, rather than of sim-ply kowtowing. It had been the Russian, after all, who, after changingthe ceremony in this way, had managed to negotiate a favourable set-tlement with the Chinese.42 From this precedent, Macartney drew theconclusion that the Chinese only negotiated on an equal basis withpowers whom they acknowledged as being above their normal ‘tribu-tary’ states, and that this had to find its expression in the ceremonyduring the audience with the Emperor. When the Chinese negotiatorsrefused Macartney’s suggestion of using the etiquette of the Englishcourt at the audience, the British ambassador suggested the Russiansolution: he would kowtow if a Chinese of equal rank with him wouldperform the same ceremony before the picture of the British king; unlikeIsmailov’s arrangement however, this did not leave the reciprocity to avague future.43

As Hevia has argued, the Qing guest ritual was an adaptable instru-ment through which the dynasty defined its relationship with otherpowers. While the goal was to constitute a supreme lord–lesser lord rela-tionship, the ritual itself could be modified to acknowledge the specialstatus of the other power to a certain extent.44 It appears that whenthe embassy arrived in Jehol, the summer residence of the emperor,neither the emperor nor his close advisers were aware of Macartney’sintentions.45 When these came to the attention of the emperor, hisgrand councillors seem to have made an attempt to press Macartney tocomply with the ceremony,46 but then, for reasons still not entirely clear,decided to allow Macartney to conduct the English ceremony. However,one alteration was made; the kissing of the emperor’s hand was too irrec-oncilable with Qing traditions and therefore had to be dropped. Thus,both sides had been able to modify their respective rites to the extentthat the audience, which was a defining event for the relationship of the



two countries, could proceed. However, a ceremony, such as this audi-ence, was never only important in its ritual content for the participants,but also in its effect on and reception by the audience.47 In contrastto inter-European relationships, the audience in this case was sharplydivided into the English-speaking recipients of the ceremony and theQing officials. Each of them was thus able to retain some authority overtheir interpretation of it, at least for the time being. The Qing docu-ments, particularly the poem by the Qianlong Emperor directly after theaudience, did not indicate that the audience had included anything outof the ordinary and that the British had indeed come to acknowledgethe superiority and virtue of the Qing.48 In Macartney’s eyes, however,the first official contact with the Chinese Empire had been establishedduring the audience and the Chinese Emperor had acknowledged thespecial position of the British in the world. Especially his steadfastnessin the negotiations had shown the Chinese what kind of nation theywere dealing with.49

When the embassy ultimately failed to reach any of its diplomaticgoals, Macartney sought the causes in the political realm on the Chineseside, rejecting the idea that either the immutable Chinese traditions orhis own, European, expectations could possibly have caused the misad-venture. The alteration of the ceremony at the audience had proven toMacartney that Chinese customs were indeed changeable.50

As has been noted, the embassy did not only have a diplomaticmission, but was also supposed to bring new knowledge about China.Therefore, from the moment the Macartney embassy reached China itsmembers set out to measure and categorise the landscape, the harbours,the plants, animals and the inhabitants of China.51 In their reports, theypresented themselves as objective observers, distancing themselves fromthe Chinese they watched.52 However, the Chinese were suspicious thatthe British were actually not just interested in Chinese civilisation butlooking for military intelligence. The British researchers ignored thisconnotation and attributed the obstructions to their enquiring minds tothe Chinese character, which they described as ‘suspicious’ and ‘jealous’halting progress.

However, these texts cannot hide that the members of the embassywere at the same time an object of curiosity and study to the Chinese.Wherever the embassy went, its members saw crowds of Chinese watch-ing curiously, which had to be kept at bay by the Chinese guards.53

At their quarters at Beijing, they had to cope with streams of visitors,who studied all the curious items of ‘use and convenience’ which theEuropeans had brought with them, like dressing-tables, shaving-glasses



and pocket instruments. The chief Mandarin of the Emperor’s orchestraeven asked for permission to copy several of the musical instrumentsthe embassy orchestra had brought with it. Initially, Macartney wasdelighted by this inquisitiveness since it showed that the Chineseaccepted that they had a lot to learn from the British. The problemwas however that he was unable to control this investigation. He hadto ask the accompanying Mandarins to channel the number and qual-ity of the visitors who wanted to see the picture of the British kingand queen. With respect to other objects of Chinese curiosity, he wasunable to put up any restrictions, and they thus suffered from the ‘eager-ness of their curiosity, and from their awkwardness in handling them’.54

The British saw this attention as a positive process for as long as theycould see themselves in the position of a teacher; however, they feltuncomfortable as soon as they could no longer control this. This feelingof discomfort shows the ambivalence of the ‘contact zone’ where theobject of study might at any time leave its assigned role.

Through the contact with the Chinese and China, the members of theembassy could claim to have gained first-hand knowledge about them,which was verified by the eyes and ears of British gentlemen, who couldact as objective observers. Back in Britain, their reports thus became anew legitimate source of knowledge on China and the Chinese. For thefirst time it became possible to construct a China according to the ideasof the new natural history and the stadial theory.

The Chinese in this context were transformed from being more or lessequals (as they still were in the diplomatic part of the embassy), to beingmere objects of study; this increased the distance between the Britishand the Chinese as well as heightening their foreignness. By being ableto create new valid knowledge on China, the members of the embassycould also contribute to a better estimation of China by ascertaining itsplace in the order of civilisations.55 It gave the British the feeling thatthey now ‘understood’ China, at least to a certain extent, making futureapproaches possible as well as initiating further British studies of China.

In Britain itself, the embassy as a diplomatic venture remained highlycontested. Especially the opponents of the Pitt government criticisedthe mission. In the eyes of Peter Pindar and William Winterbotham, theBritish government had bowed before an Asian tyrant and endangeredBritish national honour by the ridiculous outfit and behaviour of theembassy. According to them, the main reason for the embassy was thelonging for Asian luxuries. This brought the risk that even the ambas-sador himself as well as his monarch turned Asiatic and gave up Britishliberties.56



The embassy formed a ‘contact zone’ of its own between the Britishand the Chinese, which had its effects on the British ideas about Chinain Britain as well as in Canton. The idea that the British now had bet-ter knowledge about the Chinese would be of crucial importance for anyfurther interactions. Furthermore, for a short time the British hoped thata diplomatic channel to the court in Beijing could indeed be established,if the time was ripe. The Macartney embassy thus hardly formed the endin British attempts at peaceful diplomacy with the Chinese. However,the new connection between Britain and China still attracted the crit-icism of those who saw the Asia trade in luxuries as a threat to Britishliberties.

The Macartney embassy had only briefly opened a ‘contact zone’between Britain and the Chinese Empire. It had had its origin primar-ily in the British contact with the Chinese Empire in Canton and theremainder of this chapter will discuss the multiple meanings of Chinacreated by the British in this ‘contact zone’ and the relations of power,knowledge and identity in this outpost between the two empires.

3.2 Chinese law and British rights

On the 18th of June 1799, George Thomas Staunton, the young boy whohad kneeled before the Emperor of China as a member of the Macart-ney embassy, bid farewell to his parents at Portsmouth and sailed forChina again. As the only child of a not very prosperous gentry family,his father had managed to secure him the position of secretary of theEIC in Canton mainly due to his knowledge of Chinese. Staunton thusarrived in Canton to take up his position. The sensitive young boy hadreceived a very special education by several house teachers, and hadnever attended any public schools. Only rarely had he had the com-pany of other children, such as his cousins.57 This upbringing had littleprepared him for the community in which he was to live in Canton. Hefound his duties, which mainly consisted of copying the factory records,mindless, and he regarded his fellow Britons there as ignorant. Theirleisure activities, such as horse and boat racing did not appeal to him,and in his letters home he complained about the total lack of culture inthe European community at Canton.58

This British community into which Staunton found it so hard to set-tle had evolved from the 1750s onwards, when the EIC had allowedits supercargoes to stay in China for more than one season. It was verysmall – in 1828, there were only a total of 25 people on the employ-ment list of the EIC in Canton.59 In addition to this, there were several



country traders, increasing in number, but still no more than 53 privateEnglish traders and 52 Parsees in 1833.60 The EIC employees would stayin China for long periods, often as long as 15 or 20 years, hoping toacquire enough money for a good life in Britain after their return. Theywere only allowed to travel back to England on important occasions,or as member of the Select Committee, to take home leave on averageevery three years.61

The British presence in China was not an imperial one, nor even atrading post protected by the military. This as well as the small numberof Britons in Canton meant that the Qing government’s organisationof foreign trade shaped the life of the British in China to a great extent.Over the years, the Qing government had developed a set of rules to con-trol these strangers at its coast. Trade was restricted to Canton alone, andthe Europeans were only permitted to reside there during the tradingseason. Moreover, they were not allowed to bring their wives and chil-dren with them, to carry arms, to own property or to have any contactwith the Chinese population other than the Hong merchants. Outsidethe trading season, between April and September, the British had to liveon Macao, where their families stayed for the entire year. Here they hadto come to an arrangement with the Portuguese authorities.62

This system suited the interest of the Qing dynasty who wanted tokeep the coastal frontier calm while concentrating on consolidatingtheir power in Central Asia. Furthermore, they also only had rather aconfused notion regarding the origin and culture of these Europeanforeigners.63 As a Central Asian people themselves, they probably alsohad little interest in maritime trade and thus adopted the restrictive sys-tem of the late Ming dynasty which had been developed to keep theJapanese pirates at the coast under control.64

However, this situation was a continuous cause of complaint for theBritish. Restrained to stay in the factories, prohibited from entering thecity itself and met with hostility by the locals, a tension built up that waslikely to erupt. If an incident occurred that involved the wounding oreven the killing of a Chinese or a European, the British even felt moreat the mercy of the local authorities. Sometimes, as in the case of anEnglishman, Mr. Pigot, who had killed a Chinese in 1820, all sides mightwork together to guarantee the smooth continuation of trade. On thatoccasion, in order to avoid confrontation, the Hong merchants and theCantonese government agreed to accept that a man who had committedsuicide would be seen as the guilty party, thus settling the case, despitethe fact that they knew that he had not actually been the real culprit.Certainly, there was some meaningful dialogue between both sides, but



this never made the British stop seeing the Chinese authorities in a neg-ative light as ‘the Other’. The very fact that the Chinese were preparedto accept such subterfuge served yet again to prove to the employeesof the EIC the two-faced character of the Chinese; clearly these werepeople who would accept anything as long as they were able to keepup appearances. This image provided a convenient justification for themorally somewhat dubious actions of the EIC employees themselves – apattern that was to occur repeatedly.65

The contact EIC employees had with Britain was limited to letters,which took up to more than six months to arrive. It was thus to theGovernor-General in India that the EIC servants looked for supportand for guidelines in situations of crisis. In most cases, however, theSelect Committee made its own decisions, assuming later approval bythe Court of Directors. However, the contacts with the Court of Direc-tors and the EIC in India meant that the servants of the EIC in Cantonwere influenced in their attitudes towards the Chinese by ideas that wereinfluential in the Indian context as well.

The president of the Select Committee was considered by the Chineseas the person responsible for the actions of all British in the port. Thisrepeatedly led to conflicts, for example in cases where a member of acountry-ship had caused trouble with the Chinese authorities or on thefew occasions when a ship of the British navy entered the port. Theofficers of these ships would not accept any orders from the Select Com-mittee, while the Chinese held the Select Committee responsible for theconduct of the navy ships.66

With the growing importance of British trade in Canton, however,the Select Committee increasingly saw themselves as representativesof the British. To a certain extent, they also considered themselves tooccupy the role of representatives of all Europeans in Canton. Dur-ing a conflict with the Chinese authorities in 1831, for example, theyissued a public announcement stating that they would stop trade if nosolution was to be found. They added authority to this proclamationby calling themselves ‘REPRESENTATIVES of the BRITISH NATION inCHINA’.67 They were also accepted as representatives of British interestsby the country traders, as long as they supported their goals.68 The ‘freeEnglish’, or country merchants, for example, considered the rigid mea-sures taken by the majority of the Select Committee against the Chinesein 1830/1831 as beneficial to the entire community. When the Courtof Directors disapproved of the measures of the Select Committee andcalled them back, the country traders expressed their regret.69 The SelectCommittee was apparently also used as an accepted arbitrator in cases of



dispute between Britons and Chinese, especially where country traderswere concerned.70 This was a view the Court of Directors in London didnot share.71 As far as they were concerned, the China trade was purelyan economic issue and thus it was more important to keep the EICtrade going than to act in the alleged interests of the British nation ingeneral.

In the direct neighbourhood of the British were the factories of theother European trading companies, most notably the French, Dutch,Danish and those of the Americans. The Europeans often acted jointly incases where they saw their interests in danger. For example, during the‘Lady Hughes Affair’, all European traders joined the British stoppageof trade to exert pressure on the Chinese.72 However, there was fiercecompetition between the European traders for a share in the Chinesemarket. Several of them were concerned about a possible success ofthe Macartney embassy which might improve the British conditions inCanton. The Dutch were so worried in fact that the VOC (VereenigdeOostindische Compagnie) sent an embassy to Beijing the year after theBritish.73 After 1785, the British had managed to gain predominance inthe European China trade and thus began to see themselves as leadersof the Europeans.

While the employees of the EIC in Canton thus saw themselves toa certain extent as members of a European group in contrast to theChinese and other Asian traders, the Hong merchants nevertheless alsoconstituted a respected part of the trading community.

There seems to have been good and friendly contact between EICemployees and the Hong merchants. Puankequa, for example, the mostprominent Hong merchant in the late 18th century, was famous forhis banquets for Western merchants and sea captains. On the firstday, the banquet would be in Western style, with knives and forks.This was followed by a Chinese opera, which included actors in West-ern dress. The next evening, the meal would be served Chinese style,followed by further entertainment such as acrobatics and fireworks.74

Other Hong merchants maintained similar amicable intercourse withthe foreign merchants. The brother of the Hong merchant PuankequaII, for example, nicknamed ‘the Squire’, was well known for his affinityto Westerners.75

These social encounters were accompanied by the recognition of theHong as sometimes very able, but almost always respectable, business-men. This was especially important due to the long crisis of insolvenciesof several of the Hongs.76 In order to keep the trade going, it became nec-essary for the EIC Select Committee to lend huge sums to the insolvent



Hongs, in the hope to avoid their bankruptcy. To justify this to them-selves and to their superiors in London, they had to evoke the image ofa trustworthy Chinese merchant. For the EIC employees at Canton, theimage of the treacherous Chinese merchant, which had been introducedby the Jesuits, therefore was not dominant.77 On the contrary, whenthe Hong merchant Coqua faced serious financial difficulties, the SelectCommittee expressed their confidence in him and argued in favourof helping him. James Molony, a member of the Select Committee,suggested

that the President might be requested to consider Coqua in thearrangements for the ensuing Season as an act of charity to a deserv-ing man the son of an old Hong Merchant, who had suffered in theliberal assistance & confidence, which he had placed in an English-man; but more particularly to a man who had universally gainedthe esteem of ourselves & predecessors by his upright conduct in histransactions with the Hon’ble Company, his urbanity of manners, &the ready & correct communications, which he ever afforded.78

This was not confined to a single incident in the case of this particularmerchant, but applied in several cases.79 The case of Coqua is interest-ing, because he is one of several Hong merchants who were charged bythe Canton government with collaborating too closely with the British.In order to appear as a trustworthy business partner to the British, heopened himself to attacks from Chinese officials, who always tried tokeep foreigners and Chinese as far apart from each other as possible.80

Building a trusted relationship with the Hong was thus a crucial strategyof the EIC Select Committee to ensure the smooth running of their tradeand in order to make the Hong merchants overlook some of the laws andregulations of their country. Nevertheless, the idea of the treacherousChinese never seems to have been far away.

However, social contacts as well as the common commercial interestmeant that the Hong merchants and the Chinese employees were notnecessarily seen and imagined as a distant, negative ‘Other’. Chineseand European merchants formed a community which was based oncommunication, interchange and mutual respect. The Hong merchantstherefore were the main source of information about Qing politics andits norms. However, British attitudes towards the Hong could changeas soon as the Chinese government became involved, so that informa-tion acquired from the merchants was thus not always considered to bereliable.



The reports and letters of the Britons in Canton make it clear thatthey were very much aware of their absolute minority position at thefringe of the Chinese Empire. The small size of the community alsomeant that a dynamic evolved and networks were created that weresometimes quite different from the ones back in Britain. The Select Com-mittee was frequently more open to suggestions by country traders andmissionaries of a hard line against the Chinese than the Court of Direc-tors in London wished. The Court was mainly interested in satisfyingits stakeholders by making a profit, ensuring the tea supply for Britainand maintaining and extending its dominant position in the tea tradein Canton. Their main objective therefore was that the trade proceededwithout any larger interference, that the quality and price of the teawas good and that they were in a position to raise the funds for pay-ing the commodities they bought in Canton. Consequently, they urgedtheir servants in Canton more than once not to take recourse to harshmeasures if events did not go according to their will. Of course, theywrote, one had to take care that one did not give up any privileges,but in general, little advantage was to be expected from too severe aconflict with the Chinese; rather one should accept the status quo andmake allowances for ‘Chinese habits’.81 For the Select Committee how-ever, these habits and the restrictions on foreigners did not just presenteconomic problems. The defence of national dignity and independencegrew increasingly important in the situation in Canton.

The EIC merchants at Canton were hardly the laureates of an idea ofChina as the perfect commercial society and state. As merchants theywould have preferred a greater variety of merchants from whom theymight purchase, enabling them to reduce the prices. While it was possi-ble for the employees of the EIC in Canton to view the Hong merchantsas part of a group with common interest, namely trade, the Chinesegovernment, local as well as central, was identified as a threat to Britishinterests and identity. This idea had been around almost since the 1760s,but became more dominant from the 1780s onwards. Now it served asa focal point for an increasingly aggressive attitude of EIC employees inCanton towards the Qing authorities.

Episodes such as the ‘Lady Hughes Affair’ had shown the Select Com-mittee that the Chinese local government was quite willing to resort tomilitary power if they felt that this was necessary. This feeling of insecu-rity, in all likelihood heightened by an inability to fully understand themethods and reasons of the local government, increased the necessityto describe the Cantonese government and its officials as irrational andcorrupt.



Of course, the idea of Chinese despotism was already widespread atthe time and the employees of the EIC might have picked this up beforetheir journey to Canton. After their arrival in Canton, this was foundto be a suitable concept to define the Chinese authorities. The situa-tion of the authorities in Canton and the Hong system certainly didlend itself to some abuse and arbitrary measures, through which officialsmight increase their personal income.82 However, the employees of theEIC and the free merchants in Canton condensed this occasional abuseinto the defining characteristic of the Cantonese government and theChinese in general. Effectively, this put them in a position where theycould simply describe the Chinese authorities as the ‘negative Other’ –whenever any of their actions did not suit the interests of the British orindeed of the EIC.83

This idea of the corrupt and arbitrary Chinese officials becamestronger during times of crisis and it also grew more intense over time.An important element of the idea of the arbitrary Chinese officials wasthe attitude of the EIC employees at Canton to Chinese law.84 It is inthe changes to this attitude that we can trace how the idea of arbitrari-ness and a lack of justice grew stronger from 1800 onwards. To a certainextent, this corresponded to the increasing rejection of Indian law inthe context of British rule in India by the Liberals and Utilitarians. Here,Indian law was increasingly seen as source of Asian despotism and thedecay of society; hence it had to be strongly modified, or even eitherreplaced by English law or at least reformed according to Benthamiteideas of utility.85 At the same time, ideas about the law of nations wereinfluenced by Emmerich de Vattel’s argument that the facilitation oftrade was part of the ‘necessary laws’ of nations, which all states hadto submit to as laws of nature. While Vattel acknowledged the rightof nations to refuse to trade in special goods if they deemed theseharmful, most adherents of free trade ignored this caveat.86 Both tradi-tions influenced British understanding of Chinese law and their attitudetowards it.

In the Qing Empire, the position of foreigners in the legal systemhad evolved over time. During the Ming and early Qing reign, it wasclearly stated that crimes committed by foreigners on Chinese soilhad to be tried according to the Chinese Penal Code. This rule wasamended in 1743, stating that foreigners did not have to go through theprocedures ‘concerning detention and obtaining a confession’ whichwere used for Chinese. While this had been intended to accommo-date the wishes of the foreigners, it led to several complaints from the1800 onwards, because the Europeans felt themselves excluded by this



from appellate review and communications with the judges which wereopen to ordinary Chinese.87 Apart from this modification, the Qingauthorities insisted on their right to try offences that had occurred onChinese soil.

During the ‘Lady Hughes Affair’, the supercargoes of the EIC were hor-rified by the actions of the Chinese and the Chinese legal system. Theyconsidered it impossible for themselves as Englishmen to subject them-selves to this system, ‘as a conformable compliance to these notionsseems to us so contrary to what Europeans deem humanity or justiceand if we voluntarily submitted to it must appear to all that we gave upevery moral and many principle to our Interest.’88 They demanded clar-ification from their superiors in London regarding the question of theextent to which British subjects on country-ships had to obey the SelectCommittee.89 This might have been an attempt to secure for themselvespermission to practice extraterritorial law in China.90 However, it didnot mean a complete rejection of possible Chinese legal sovereignty91

since this request was also meant to protect the Select Committee fromcharges at home in the event of handing over a British subject to theChinese authorities. The Committee therefore suggested a compromisewith the Chinese: In cases of murder, the European should be judgedin the presence of a Chinese magistrate, and if found guilty, should behanded over to them. In the event that he was found not guilty, theBritish would be able to then protect him.92

The Chinese did not formally accept this compromise and thus sim-ilar cases repeatedly led to severe tensions between the Europeans andthe Chinese in Canton. Nevertheless, during the next larger incidentin February 1800, where a Briton wounded a Chinese, the President ofthe Select Committee, Richard Hall, acknowledged the jurisdiction ofthe Chinese courts to a certain extent. The facts of the case were thata sailor had shot and wounded a Chinese, who had allegedly tried tocut the anchor cable of the ship ‘Providence’. While the Chinese finallyrefrained from a conviction on account of bodily harm, the captainof the ship, John Dilkes, demanded that the Chinese be punished bya Chinese court for his attack on the ship. However, the Cantoneseauthorities refused this. In the context of this incident, Hall asked theCantonese Viceroy for a copy of the Chinese law, since ‘the Englishbeing unacquainted with the Laws and Customs of China, were contin-ually liable to involuntary infringements of them.’93 This may have beenintended mainly as a gesture of acknowledgement towards the Viceroy,



who had been helpful during the affair, or just an attempt to get a betterknowledge of the general situation. Nevertheless, it clearly shows thatthe president of the Select Committee still considered the Chinese legalsystem to be rational and understandable, and a system which could beapplicable to the British.

Knowledge of Chinese law remained an important factor in the fol-lowing years. One of the most important steps in this context was thetranslation of the ‘Ta Tsing Leu Lee’, the laws of the Qing dynasty, byGeorge Thomas Staunton in 1810. This work established its meaning intwo different contexts: for the general interested public in Great Britainon the one hand and the EIC in London and Canton on the other.In Canton, the information on Chinese law was seen in a practicallight; something that could be used in discussions with the Cantoneseauthorities, or to predict their actions as well as the character of theseauthorities. Cases such as the ones mentioned above, in which the Chi-nese cooperated with the British, even led to the idea that the Chineselaw could be more flexible than the written Penal Code suggested.94 Atthe same time however, similar to the developments concerning India,the British in Canton developed a growing contempt for Chinese law.The British increasingly assumed English laws and ideas of internationallaw to be universal and tried to elude the influence of the Chinese juris-diction and state power in all matters, not just in murder cases.95 Due tothe nature of the contact in Canton, the British here did not so muchdiscuss the possible changes of Chinese law, but rather emphasised whatthey saw as rights according to a law of nations. Thus the employees ofthe EIC in Canton moved into opposition to their superiors in London,who wanted to keep peace with the Chinese as far as possible. For head-quarters, China was still only an economic field, not an area for politicalintervention according to the ideas of international law.

This contrast became particularly evident in the context of a smallincident in 1817 during which the Chinese authorities evicted the ille-gal print shop of the EIC in Canton. The Select Committee seems to havetried to prevent the Chinese from entering by force and defended thisbefore their superiors in London with the argument that property wasinviolable according to the English law. The Court of Directors rebukedthem, indicating that the Chinese government was hardly bound byEnglish law. The only thing the British at Canton could demand wasto be protected by the Chinese law in the same way as other foreign-ers were.96 The answer of the Select Committee contained one of the



central arguments for the validity of the British norms in contact withthe Chinese:

The disposition to depress Foreigners by the most vexatious conductand restrictions has frequently rendered it incumbent upon them toresort to their individual exertions for relief [. . .] and as they unques-tionably do not participate in the full advantages of the Laws ofChina their relation to those Laws has generally been considered dif-ferent from that of a Native – the entrance of a house without noticeor the display of authority for the act is a circumstance which hasalways been deemed unjustifiable.97

The British employees of the EIC thus saw themselves excluded from thesecurity of the Chinese law, since it did not accord to foreigners thoselaws which the British considered universal. From here it was only asmall step to ideologically completely deprive the Chinese of the rightto execute their own law in their own territory.

In order to check the growing opium trade, in 1817, the Chineseauthorities demanded the right to search all foreign ships in the harbourof Canton, a request which the Select Committee refused, probably forthat very reason. During the debate, which spanned the next two years,the employees of the EIC found the formula which was to determinethe conduct towards China up to the Opium War: they argued that ofcourse according to the law of nations every country had the right tosearch the ships in their harbour to avoid smuggling; ‘China howeveracknowledges no laws except her own, no Powers beyond the confinesof her own dominion.’98 In reverse, the British were excused from actingaccording to the Chinese laws or the international law of nations. Thecruelty and injustice of the Chinese was now mentioned more often. Forexample, in 1821, the Select Committee described the execution of anAmerican, who had killed a Chinese, as ‘sacrifice to the inhumanity andinjustice of the Chinese’.99 Describing the Chinese and their legal systemin these terms made it seem impossible for a Briton to subject himselfto Chinese laws. In contrast to the Chinese, the Britons portray them-selves as safe-keepers of justice and humanity. Giving in to the Chinesetherefore would not only endanger the life of the individual concernedbut also the British identity of all Britons in the port.

In this firm stand against the Chinese authorities, the country mer-chants stood alongside the Select Committee. They also vehementlyargued for the right of foreigners to petition at the Canton city gatesand called for more rights for foreigners under Chinese law. At the same



time, however, they made it clear that they could not possibly acceptChinese law the way it was. Specifically they claimed that this was notpossible because Chinese law worked on the assumption that the for-eigner wanted to assimilate himself to Chinese culture – an impossibilityfor the British. In the Canton Register, the free traders also followed theargument of the majority of the Select Committee that since China didnot adopt other parts of the rules of international contact, such as open-ing all its ports to trade, other aspects of the law of nations equallydid not apply. This was particularly highlighted in respect of the localauthorities in Canton, who were described as even more corrupt thanthose in the rest of the country. Time and again the Canton Registerwrote against the idea of an unchanging China, with immutable laws,which had been propagated by the Jesuits as well as by the Chineseauthorities:

And all these beautifully NEW regulations, are made by the soleauthority of the Governor of Canton, without even reporting themto the Supreme Government. People may admire as they please thewisdom, and justice, and the perpetuity of Chinese Institutions, butcertainly these NEW regulations, are little calculated to exhibit anyone of these three admired qualities. There revolutionary enactments,of a provincial Governor, will, ere long, (perhaps by this said Gov-ernor himself,) be styled, the unchangeable laws of the CelestialEmpire!100

In the context of the ‘Lady Hughes Affair’, it was still seen as more orless self-evident that there was a tradition of Chinese law which had tobe taken into account and with which one had to try to compromise. Inthe following period, the British acquired more knowledge of Chineselaw through which they thought they could classify Chinese actions andto thus make them more predictable. At the same time, this was usedto highlight the cruelty of the Chinese legal system and its failure toadhere to the principles of British law. This made it easier to the Britishat Canton to represent their disregard of the Chinese law as legitimate.Following this, they increased their efforts to vehemently demand fromthe Chinese authorities that they should have the right to judge Britishsubjects themselves and thus avoid Chinese sovereignty of law.101

The ‘contact zone’ in Canton thus for the first time highlighted thequestion of Chinese law outside of a philosophical debate about thenature of the Chinese state. Here, Chinese law became one of the fea-tures which illuminated its ‘Otherness’. This ‘Otherness’ was no longer



exotic and solely served to explain Chinese society. Rather its distinc-tiveness was considered to result from its despotic government and itsrefusal to participate in the international world order, as defined bythe British. These ideas regarding the question of the extent to whichChina was part of the order of international law were to become a cru-cial element in the debates in the metropolis in the context of the endof the EIC monopoly in 1834 and even more so in the context of theOpium War.

In the following years, unofficial compromises were sometimes found.However, increasingly a discourse developed which classified Chineselaw as inhumane and portraying those enacting it as both cruel andcorrupt. Following the developments in India, a meaning of the Chineselegal system was established which categorised it as part of an Asiandespotic system. Consequently, no room was left for compromise. Anynegotiations now could be interpreted as an attack on British identity.

It was therefore increasingly easy to assert the universal validity of thelaw of nations in order to justify breaching Chinese trading laws. In thiscontext, the British developed a meaning of China which was excludedfrom and isolated itself from all other nations, an isolation that wassolely due to China’s unnatural refusal to accept universal norms. Thisdiscourse of self-sought exclusion would be crucial in the run up to theOpium War.

3.3 The unreliable interpreter

The use of the translation of the Chinese Penal Code shows thatBritish knowledge of and attitude to Chinese language was one of thefundamental changes in this period in Canton.

Bernhard Cohn considers the years 1770–1785 as the decisive period,in which the British set out to acquire knowledge of Indian lan-guages to further their rule of India. The grammars, dictionaries andteaching aids for Indian languages according to him ‘converted Indianforms of knowledge into European objects’. This epistemological projectthen helped the British ‘to issue commands and collect ever-increasingamounts of information’, needed for their dominance of India.102

The question of the use of English and vernacular languages, lan-guage teaching and translation has become central to several analysis ofimperialism. Language and language politics are discussed as medium ofpower, through which cultural imperialism is propagated. This involvesboth, the introduction of English as the language of education and



administration in the colonial setting, and the adaptation and appropri-ation of one of the local languages as ‘standard’ language by the colonialmasters.103 Particularly in the context of translations, the power over themeaning of words is crucially linked to the power over the mind of apopulation.

In the ‘contact zone’ in Canton, knowledge of the Chinese languagewas a struggle over power on both sides. While the Chinese tried toprevent the foreigners from learning Chinese, the British in this periodset out to acquire knowledge of the Chinese language. They tried tocategorise it and use it to study Chinese culture, ultimately indepen-dent of Chinese or Jesuit aides, or to transfer European religious andscientific ideas to the Chinese. In Canton, as will become clear, oneof the most important features of this knowledge of the Chinese lan-guage was that through it the British tried to gain influence over theChinese authorities and agency over the representation of Britishness.The British thus turned the power of the use of Chinese language andthe self-representation of the British into yet another tool in the strug-gle with the Chinese authorities, next to the economic power of thestoppage of trade. As in the case of law discussed above, the insistenceto acquire the Chinese language, and to be allowed to use it, showeda development of the idea that the British had the right and the dutyto determine the conditions of contact and that the Chinese could notbe trusted. At the same time, the Chinese understood the knowledge oflanguage and especially literacy as a tool for the dominance over the‘uncivilised’.104

As discussed in the context of the Macartney embassy, very fewBritons had knowledge of Chinese and ‘linguists’ conducted the busi-ness in Canton in pidgin English.105 This however was a system whichwas met with no great sympathy by the British in Canton. They oftensaw Chinese interpreters as unreliable and believed that they were anobstacle to petitions to the Viceroy due to their fear of the Chineseauthorities and their dishonesty.106 They also considered the Jesuitsmore inclined towards the interests of their own nation than towardsthe British.107 Despite these problems, no real effort was made by theCompany to change the situation. The only attempt in the 1750s toeducate an Englishman, James Flint, in Chinese and use him as an inter-preter ended in his expulsion from China by the Chinese authorities.108

After this episode, the EIC officials feared that a further attempt to geta reliable English interpreter would lead to even more restrictions ontrade. With the lack of linguistic skill, the idea remained that unreliable



and timid interpreters were responsible for a good amount of theproblems faced by the British in Canton.

This situation only changed after 1800. The Macartney embassy hadled to a short increase in interests in Chinese in Britain as well as inCanton.109 Nevertheless, the lamentation about the lack of knowledgeabout China is common to almost all publications on China and theChinese language in this period.110 It was seen as a problem concerningthe trade with China, but also to the spread of the Christian faith in it,and as a danger to national pre-eminence. In 1822, John Francis Davis,EIC employee and later first governor of Hong Kong, still despaired ofthe ‘singular listlessness’ of his countrymen in Canton concerning thelearning of Chinese language and literature. In contrast to this, ‘theFrench, for nearly a century before, had been pursuing their researchwith diligence and success.’111 Not only did this give them advantagesin the pursuit of knowledge and in contact with China, as John Bar-row feared, but within the whole region of East Asia, where Chinese wasused as the language of communication.112 Even though the French andother Catholic nations had this advantage, their accounts could not betrusted in the eyes of the British. It was seen as the mission of the Englishnation to give the first accurate account of the Chinese.113 But for this itwas necessary for Englishmen to learn Chinese, if possible in the coun-try itself.114 These reflections, together with the Protestant missionaryeagerness to spread the gospel amongst the large population of China intheir native language, led to several attempts to promote the study of theChinese language in the early 19th century, primarily in the periphery.

By this point, William Jones had done his groundbreaking studieson the Indian languages, furthering a new philology. His studies hadbeen primarily inspired by the need for the British to understand San-skrit and Hindi and thus to become independent from the presumablyunfaithful native translators in their ruling of Bengal. Since his ideas onlanguage were to become crucial in shaping British ideas on China andthe Chinese language in the periphery, they are discussed here briefly.

Even before he arrived in India as a judge on the Bengal SupremeCourt, Jones had been an Oriental scholar renowned for his translationsfrom Arabic and Persian, and his Persian Grammar. Like his contempo-raries, he considered Latin and Greek to be the most perfect languages,but in contrast to them he insisted that the Oriental literature also hadsomething to offer. Consequently, he did not pursue his language stud-ies in order to add to the philosophical study of language, but ratherto come to a better understanding of Persian and Arabic literature.115

Jones, therefore, as Hans Aarsleff has argued, first attempted to separate



the study of language from the study of the mind, by trying to pay moreattention to detailed knowledge of the different languages before com-paring them.116 This was already his main idea in his Grammar of thePersian Language, which he published before he left for India.117 His ‘dis-covery’ of Sanskrit, which was to become the core of his later influentialtheory of language, and a focal point for the study of the relationships oflanguage and people, was inspired by his work in India.118 He thereforeonly developed his comparative philology fully in contrast to etymologybased on conjecture during his stay in Bengal. In relation to the ‘Tartar’dialects, he stated in his discourse ‘On the Tartars’ that he only lecturedon this topic reluctantly, ‘because I have little knowledge of the Tartariandialects; and the gross errours of European writers on Asiatick literaturehave long convinced me, that no satisfactory account can be given ofany nation, with whose language we are not perfectly acquainted.’119

Thus, in Jones’s opinion, only etymology that derived from demonstra-ble facts and came to a posteriori conclusions could produce any reliableinformation about the relation of languages and of nations.120

In his reflections on the Chinese however, one can see little of theseideas of careful investigation. Without having knowledge of the lan-guage, he attempted to add them to one of the groups of nations he haddeveloped from his study of language. Relying on Jesuit reports on Chi-nese religion, law and writing, he argued that they must have receivedtheir religion as well as their letters from the Indians, and that they weretherefore part of the Indo-European family.121 Only later did he modifyhis opinion on this issue, claiming that this relation was ‘no more thanhighly probable’.122 For the time being, Chinese had escaped the neg-ative associations which were soon made with languages thought notto belong to the Indo-European family.123 But even within this new sys-tem of language families, the Chinese were thought to be uninventiveand unoriginal, a people who had acquired the more sophisticated partsof its law, religion and writing from another nation. Until the 1830s,Jones’s ideas about language and its study as a scientific historical toolhad almost no followers in Britain itself but was only picked up on theContinent, where it influenced the reflections of Herder and Schlegel.124

However, in the periphery of British expansion, the debate about theconnection between Chinese and Sanskrit continued, and Jones’s morefactual approach to the study of language found its adherents. It wasthere that the philological study of Chinese by the British began. GeorgeT. Staunton was the first person of whose knowledge of Chinese theSelect Committee made some use. During the temporary absences ofGeorge Thomas Staunton, the Spanish Augustinian, Father Rodriguez,



worked for the Company as interpreter and also taught interested mem-bers of the factory. In 1807, he was joined by Thomas Manning, who hadtried to study Chinese in England and France but due to lack of oppor-tunities and the Franco-English hostilities had sought an appointmentwith the Factory in Canton. His final goal had been to be employed bythe Imperial Court as an astronomer or physician. His plans howeverwere frustrated by the anti-Christian sentiment of the Chinese gov-ernment at the time, and he departed for Bengal and Tibet in 1810.The gap left by him and the expulsion of Father Rodriguez from Chinawas filled by Robert Morrison, the first British Protestant missionary toChina.125

Bengal and Southeast Asia became important sites alongside Cantonfor learning Chinese and the construction of British knowledge aboutthe Chinese language. While the British study of Chinese was estab-lished in different contact zones of the British expansion, the actorsnevertheless stood in constant contact with each other and thus devel-oped connected ideas on Chinese studies. Not surprisingly, one of thefirst influences in the British spheres in India and China on how oneshould understand Chinese was William Jones’s ‘new philology’ and thepre-eminent position of Sanskrit within it.

Following his ‘discourse on the Chinese’, the main protagonists inthe field of Chinese studies from 1790 commented on the connectionsbetween Sanskrit and Chinese. By this they positioned it in relation tothe new triad of ‘original languages’: Sanskrit, Greek and Latin.126 JohnDavis did not reject the idea of a Sanskrit influence on Chinese, believ-ing that the Chinese initials and finals derived from it. For him howeverthis did not lead to the conclusion that the Chinese language was moreor less a variation of Sanskrit but reaffirmed that it ‘is still the languageof the Chinese’.127 So while Jones still placed Chinese within the Indo-European language family, the later students of Chinese rejected theinfluence of Sanskrit on it, thereby positioning it within the Asian lan-guages, but also emphasised its singularity. The absolute otherness ofChinese, and consequently of the people who spoke it, was a predom-inant feature of the texts written about the Chinese language. Davisalso pointed towards the extraordinary structure of Chinese, as did themissionary William Milne.128

The idea that Chinese was completely distinct from any other lan-guage was hardly new. When it was first suggested that the Bible shouldbe translated into Chinese for missionary purposes, the strongest oppo-sition was that, due to the nature of the language, it was impossibleto translate.129 The proponents of the plan put forward that the Jesuits



had already translated some parts of the Bible but also pointed outthat the British had been able to translate the letter of King GeorgeIII to the Emperor of China. William Moseley, the chief force behindthe project, even suggested that Chinese was easier to learn than anyEuropean language.130 While Chinese remained a ‘peculiar’ language,different from all others, people in the metropolis, but even more thosein the periphery, who were interested in a growing British influence inChina, constructed a Chinese that was also understandable and possibleto learn. They made clear, however, that for the purpose they wanted toacquire the knowledge of the language, it could only be learned in theperiphery.131

In Canton, ever since the time of James Flint knowledge of theChinese language had been a question of power. Whereas one of theideas that gave rise to the foundation of the College of Fort Williamhad been that the mastery of indigenous languages would make theBritish more independent from contact with the corrupting influenceof the Indians,132 in China it was the question of becoming indepen-dent of the false and corrupted Chinese interpreter and mediator, whoneglected British interests. The more British trade with China grew aswell as British power in the region, and the better acquainted with theChinese language they became, the more the British mistrusted Chineseinterpreters. It became a sign of status to provide one’s own interpretersand translations of official documents. After all, in some cases, this wasthe only possibility to submit petitions and complaints to the Chineseofficials as long as Chinese writers were too afraid of possible punish-ments to translate them for the British. Moreover, as Robert Morrisonpointed out, they suspected that the reason the Chinese insisted ontheir own translation was that by this they could ‘put into a foreigner’smouth the style of an abject dependant, not merely to feed their vanity,but that they may treat him as such.’133

Here, as in other circumstances as well, the British soon becameobsessed with the Chinese categories of ranking. As soon as Stauntonand Morrison had learned that there were three kinds of style inChinese, ‘a high, a low, and a middle’, this became an important featurein dealing with Chinese texts or translations into Chinese.134

After lengthy negotiations, John Fullarton Elphinstone, member ofthe Select Committee, finally got the concession from the Chinese thatthe British would be allowed to submit notes that were translated bythemselves.135 By this, the EIC, and later the second British embassyto the Court of China tried to prevent ‘wrong’ translations by theChinese and the Jesuits. This attitude also meant turning away from the



acceptance of Chinese standards in official correspondence, which hadbeen guaranteed by the Jesuits, who quite often had been the translatorsof such letters.

The importance of this topic can be seen in the example of a disputewith the Chinese authorities in 1822. It involved a letter to the Hoppoof Canton with an application to the emperor to remove the duties onCompany goods, which had been destroyed in a fire. Letters, which wereto be presented to the emperor, according to the agreement with theChinese authorities, had still to be written in English and be translatedby official translators. The first suggestion of such a letter from the Hongmerchants was refused after a translation from the Chinese by RobertMorrison. The Select Committee argued that expressions were used inthe letter, which were unnecessary and of which they had disapprovedfor a long time. One of the expressions they objected to, was ‘Ee’, or inpinyin ‘yi’, which the British translated as ‘foreign Barbarians’. GeorgeT. Staunton, they argued, had already replaced this degrading term longago with the neutral ‘Yuen Kih’ (visitor or Guest from remote Parts).Moreover, the use of the phrase ‘the wares of our Barbarian King’ impliedthat the king of Great Britain was himself little more than a merchant.Furthermore, to address the Chinese Emperor as ‘heaven’s grace’ was toopompous, even by Chinese standards.136

Morrison rejected the wording in the letter, which the Hong mer-chants had suggested, because he feared it would damage the Chineseimage of the British character. Instead of seeing it as a correct address toa Chinese official and the Chinese Emperor, he only recognised avariceand bootlicking. According to his interpretation, the Hong merchantonly wanted to flatter the Hoppo, who himself acted like a slave towardsthe emperor. They tried to get the British, with the aspect of financialgain, to use humiliating phrases and by this ‘the ideas of the Chris-tian foreigners is perpetuated, which conceives of them, as men lost toevery social and generous feeling, men whose strongest passion is thelove of gain.’137 Exactly this, however, had to be avoided. MelodramaticMorrison asked in his letter to the Select Committee: ‘shall we sacrificecharacter for the sake of gain? If we do sacrifice character and honorshall we gain more? No, is probably in the first the proper answer. No,in the second, the true one . . .’138

The Select Committee agreed with Morrison and wrote a letter to theHong merchants, in which it represented the relief by the Emperor notas mercy of the ‘Divine Prince’, but as necessary on the basis of lawand justice. Finally, and here the influence of the missionary/translatorbecomes evident: ‘For Princes and statesmen as well as poor people



Natives and Foreigners, all are God’s creatures and all finally accountableto him.’139

When the Select Committee had to realise that the Hong merchantsdid not accept the objections but simply sent the first letter, it becameeven more evident how important the representation of the British wasfor the Committee. Now everything that was within British possibili-ties should be done to limit the disastrous impression the letter had tohave at the imperial court, and to represent the British character in theright way. The Select Committee feared especially that if this practicecould go through further misrepresentations were bound to follow.140 Itwas even considered to send a letter from the British dominion in Indiavia Tibet to Beijing, an option that had not been used so far.141 Themain reason for this activism was certainly the fear that the Chineseauthorities in Canton might worsen the conditions of trade in Cantonand the British would have no possibility to contact Beijing directlyand thus evoke relief or punishment. Communication with the impe-rial court was however not the only aim. Important was also that theChinese had a positive image not just of the EIC but of the British ingeneral, without which, one feared, the court would never attempt toimprove trading conditions. It has to be remarked, however, that theBritish in Canton did not think they could achieve this by complyingwith Chinese forms, as they were provided by the Chinese in Canton orthe Jesuit missionaries, but only by behaving according to what theythought to be the British character and universal norms of conduct.Any adoption of Chinese terms was seen as a humiliation, which couldonly result in weakening the person who used them.

The country merchants also soon considered it important to haveEuropean translators. They often hired the German missionary KarlGützlaff to act as their interpreter and in 1830, John Morrison, the sonof Robert Morrison, was appointed translator to the ‘British merchants’in Canton. The Canton Register expressed the hope that with better com-munications the conditions of trade in Canton would also improve.142

The Register also continuously debated the question of whether theChinese term which was normally translated as ‘Barbarians’ was indeedan insulting term or not. Like the Select Committee, the British countrymerchants were preoccupied with how the language the Chinese usedto address them impacted on their dignity. In a peculiar article, whichmixed evangelicalism and the interests of free trade, it was argued thatthe question of what ‘Ee’ or ‘yi’ really means and whether it was offen-sive was not just a question of philology. The use of such a word was,on the contrary, ‘pernicious to the welfare of mankind’. For if one used



an offensive word like that to describe someone, one considered him asinferior and would not hesitate to harm or kill him. Drawing parallelsfrom the Greek use of the word ‘barbarian’ to the treatment of slavesand the Africans by Europeans it asked for an immediate stop of the useof this word.143 The foreigners in Canton were seemingly thus consid-ered to be in a situation that could be as precarious as that of the Africanslaves if they continued to allow the Chinese to call them ‘Barbarians’.At the same time, the Canton Register did not hesitate to declare that theChinese were barbarians and that one should not believe anybody whoascribed them any degree of civilisation.144

All three groups of Britons in Canton thus hoped to shape their con-tact with the Chinese more according to their wishes by communicatingwith them through the medium of British interpreters. Central to thisquestion was the issue of British identity and the importance given toit for the contact situation. Therefore, a change of the language usedfor communication from one that the Chinese dictated to one that wasconform to British ideas of contact was important. By doing this theBritish hoped to achieve a stronger position towards the Chinese. To getthe command of the Chinese language necessary, the British formedtheir own understanding of the nature of Chinese and the way onecould learn it. The major influence in this context was the ‘new philol-ogy’ developed by Jones in India and the interaction with their Chineseteachers. This led to the development of a meaning of China as differ-ent from all other nations, but which could be accessed and influencedthrough the knowledge of its language.

As becomes particularly evident in the context of translations, theProtestant missionaries to China, while small in numbers, had a con-siderable influence on the EIC’s and country traders’ ideas of China inthe periphery. However, the missionaries were crucial for British ideas ofChina not only as interpreters of language but also of Chinese religions.

3.4 A barren land

The religions of China had figured dominantly in European ideas aboutChina since the start of the Jesuit mission. The Jesuits had claimed thatthe ancient Chinese held theist beliefs in one God, which might indi-cate the direct descendent of the ancient Chinese from the ‘sons ofNoah’. They also introduced the notion of the ‘three religions of China’:Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism.145 Confucius, according to Jesuitreading, had reinstated the belief in this ‘Lord of Heaven’ after it had



been lost in the corruption of time. The adherents of deism turned thisargument against the Jesuit intentions and styled Confucius as one ofthe best examples for their argument that moral truths only needed rea-son and the observance of nature, not direct divine revelation throughthe Bible.146

The comparative study of religions began, as Peter Harrison hasshown, during the 16th to the 18th century. In this period, the develop-ment of natural sciences influenced the thinking about religion, whichnow developed into an object that could be studied by applying reason.At the same time, the realisation that a majority of human kind livedwithout the revelation of Christianity made the question more urgentwhether all religions had a common Judeo-Christian origin or whetherGod simply revealed himself to mankind through nature. This promptedan increased concern with other religions and their comparison. Thisevolution in the context of the religious and political upheavals inEngland in the 16th and 17th century meant that ‘the whole compara-tive approach to religion was directly related to confessional disputeswithin Christianity.’147 It was thus common for Protestants to iden-tify elements of Catholicism with heathen practices in order to criticisethem.148 This was a feature which was still dominant in the approachesof the Protestant missionaries to foreign religious practices at the end ofthe 18th and in the early 19th century. The Judeo-Christian frameworkcontinued to provide the main template for the perception of foreignreligions.

In the 18th century encounter with Asia, the British worked with thefounding premises that Asiatic people were adherents of clearly distin-guishable religions, each of which was believed to have had a historicalfounder, a set of doctrines, sacred texts and priests.149 As the Jesuits,the Protestant missionaries would look for these elements in the ‘threeChinese religions’, and judge whether they fulfilled the criteria theChristian religion set. In this context, in Canton, in particular, the writ-ings of Confucius were to become important as a presumed ‘Chinesebible’.

The presence of the Protestant missionaries in the context of the ‘con-tact zone’ in Canton, brought a new importance of the religious categoryfor the meaning of China. This is also true for the ‘contact zones’ inIndia and Southeast Asia, who however differed with regard to whichChinese religion was emphasised and in the ways in which the Britishsaw themselves interacting with this religious meaning.

The first large-scale British Protestant missionary movement devel-oped at the end of the 18th century was driven by a mixture of



religious beliefs and the growth of the second British Empire.150 TheLondon Missionary Society (LMS) had been founded in 1795 as anon-denominational body at first but increasingly became mainlycongregational. Their first goals were the South Sea and India. A missionto China, however, was also contemplated at a very early stage.

Due to the importance the evangelicals placed on the process of con-version, the ‘Otherness’ of the Chinese became very significant for thisgroup, however, it also acquired a different quality. To them, there wasalmost no greater difference than that between those who had experi-enced the personal conversion and those who had not, between a realChristian and a pagan.151 Thus, the Rev. William Moseley, one of thefirst promoters of a translation of the Bible into Chinese as a tool to con-vert that empire to Christianity, saw China as a highly civilised nation.Nevertheless, since it was not Christian, it suffered from gross immoral-ity, sacrificing to idols and murdering children.152 His reasons for theimportance of converting China to Christianity were threefold: First, itwas a perfect object, because it was the most civilised heathen nationand therefore was ready for conversion and, as it contained nearly onethird of humankind, there was a prospect of an ‘abundant harvest’. Sec-ondly, converting the Chinese was the only way of saving them fromdamnation, and thirdly, conversion was ‘the only method of effectuallysecuring the advantages of a free trade’.153

This statement clearly shows the two impulses that would drive themission to China. On the one hand, there was the religious motiva-tion, which Brian Stanley has emphasised, such as the importance theevangelicals attributed to the spread of the gospel, the weakening of theCalvinist mistrust of any kind of propagating the gospel and the nearcoming of the last age of history. Additionally, in Stanley’s opinion, therevolution in France and the Napoleonic Wars created an atmospherein which the apocalyptic strand of the evangelical movement becameeven stronger. Thus conversion and salvation of the heathens, who hadhad no chance to learn about the saving message of the Gospel, becameeven more pressing.154 In a similar way, Andrew Porter has pointed to theimportance of theological considerations and the strong Christian beliefof the missionaries for the development of the British Protestant Mis-sion. He thus emphasises their ambivalence in engaging directly withthe imperial state, or even their ability to be empire builders.155

The trope of China as a huge kingdom, comprising nearly onethird of humankind made it a high priority on the list of the mis-sionaries: if only they could convert this country, they would bea lot closer to their goal of the salvation of all mankind. Eventhough this religious motivation was very strong in the context of the



China mission, Moseley’s statement does also point to the fact thatright from the beginning there were also some rather more worldlyconsiderations.

As Susan Thorne has argued, the missionary movement was notjust a religious movement which found a convenient platform in theBritish Empire, but also provided the middle-class with a model of whatthey saw as the right way to deal with the newly acquired territorieswhich had a large non-European population, emphasising morality andsincerity.156 This book follows Thorne’s argument to the extent that themissionary movement was deeply connected with the British expan-sion, not just on an organisational level, but also on an ideologicalone.157 In the early period under scrutiny here, the missionaries began toacknowledge, if sometimes reluctantly, that an engagement with Britishimperial or colonial government was difficult to avoid.158 Even if theytried to distance themselves from the immediate goals and methodsof a colonial government, or even more, the white settlers, they sig-nificantly contributed to the idea that Britons had a divine duty forimproving and regulating the lives of non-European people. In China,where no colonial context existed, it was however less a question of howto justify rule over a foreign population, but rather of showing the rightway to interact with a non-European country. They also established theidea of a responsibility for the moral well-being of heathens worldwide,forming an immediate connection between the British Christians andthem. In so doing, they aimed to position themselves in contrast tothose morally dubious people who were merely interested in trade andstrategic questions.

Commerce was not the providential tool of God to spread the Gospelyet. Rather the spread of the Gospel was there to help British com-merce. In the evangelical mind, improved commercial relations withChina would only result in benefit for the British, not necessarily for theChinese. The moral improvement of the Chinese could only be reachedthrough their conversion to Christianity.159 The aim of Moseley’s state-ment therefore was probably to gain support for the mission from thoseinterested in trade with China and to show that the mission would notonly benefit those who believed in the necessity to save souls. It wasto point out that the evangelical way of interacting with this farawayempire would bring the solution to a problem the EIC with its mereinterest in trade and the government had failed to solve. As Moseley putit in a footnote

The many fruitless embassies from Holland, France, Russia andEngland, demonstrate the inutility of flattery, presents, and intreaty.



These have for centuries past been tried in vain. And their laws andcustoms are such that unless Christianity illuminate their minds,they may be tried for as many centuries more, with no bettereffect.160

When Robert Morrison, the first Protestant missionary, arrived in Can-ton on an American ship on 20 April 1807, he had already learned someChinese in London, from a Chinese stranded there. Morrison seems tohave been full of enthusiasm when he reached his destination. Accord-ing to William Milne, his first step consisted of trying to live like the‘natives’. He let his fingernails grow, wore Chinese dress, shoes and ‘tail’and ate with chopsticks.161

Nevertheless, he soon abandoned this project of assimilation andtogether with it the hope to be admitted to the Chinese Court at Beijingas a natural scientist.162 The explanation he gave was that the Chinesehad grown too suspicious of Europeans who did not dress and act likethe European merchants, so he adopted the common European dressin Canton – a white jacket and a straw hat.163 This change of clotheshowever also signified the transformation in Morrison away from an18th century idea about China as a cultivated nation that valued educa-tion and philosophers. He now favoured the idea of a China that, eventhough still civilised, was dearly in need of being rescued by the Britishin almost every aspect, and which was corrupt and ruled by a despot,rather than by philosophers and a benevolent monarch. Morrison eventhought that the former Chinese taste for European science and philos-ophy had to them only been ‘a rare-show: and I should suppose thatthey are now quite tired of it’.164 Additionally, the China that Morrisonnow encountered was one that did not permit the missionary to assim-ilate himself to a certain degree, in contrast to what he seems to haveexpected from the Jesuit accounts and to what he deemed appropriatefor a missionary.

The circumstances of the ‘contact zone’ in Canton thus began totransform the missionary ideas of China. The missionaries now hadto negotiate the way they attributed meaning to China with the dif-ferent groups of Chinese they encountered and the representatives ofthe British there. A British-centred missionary monologue about Chinawas no longer possible. First of all, as a British subject, Morrison wasunder the power of the EIC Select Committee in Canton, which did notreally rejoice in the presence of a missionary there, whose actions coulddisturb the Chinese authorities at Canton.



With the EIC, Morrison found an arrangement thanks to his interestin and later his knowledge of the Chinese language.165 With the help ofGeorge T. Staunton and John William Roberts, the President of the SelectCommittee in 1808, Morrison gradually became accepted by the EIC inCanton, resulting in his appointment as translator for the Company in1809.166

After several attempts, Morrison succeeded in hiring Chinese servantsand Chinese teachers, two Roman Catholic Chinese.167 His teachers andservants were the only ones Morrison could interact with freely sincethe EIC did not want him to preach openly and thus maybe draw therage of the Chinese authorities on him. His teachers were thus the mostimportant persons for informing Morrison’s view on China, the Chineseand the Chinese language.

Morrison established a daily rhythm of worship, holding services athome and reading the Bible together with his Chinese aides, thus tryingto create an environment similar to the one he knew from home.168 Eventhough he had clearly been sent to China to learn Chinese and translatethe Bible, both he and the supporters of the LMS at home seem to haveexpected nevertheless that he would still act like every other of theirmissionaries, preaching and trying to gain converts.169

Evangelicals like Robert Morrison, shaped by Enlightenment ideas,tried to win their converts by rational discussions as they were con-vinced that every rational being, if it only knew about ProtestantChristianity, had to accept it as the only possible way of life.170 Bothaspects required the missionary to have contact and especially to inter-act with those defined as ‘the Others’ to whom he had been sent.However, it was only with his Chinese teachers and servants thatMorrison was able to get into closer contact in this way. Even thoughthey were seen as distinct and different, due to their religion,171 theywere mainly presented as equals with whom one could conduct a ratio-nal discussion.172 It was only when they refused to accept the wisdompresented to them that Morrison described them as irrational, arrogantand stubborn. Whereas in the run-up to the China mission it had beenseen as an asset that China was already a civilised country and thusprepared to receive Christianity, Morrison now saw it as a defect. Thiswas a typical stance of the evangelicals in Britain, who saw intelligenceas a hindrance of feeling, which was however needed to experiencefaith.173 He thus wrote after one of the discussions with his servantsand Chinese teacher on religion, during which he had failed to con-vince them: ‘The people here possess much worldly wisdom – much



self conceit: they are too wise to learn: they are full of deceit andguile.’174

In order to convert the Chinese, Morrison and his fellow missionaryMilne started to print tracts for the distribution to the Chinese. In thesetracts, they tried to translate Christianity for the Chinese, explainingthe historical context of the Bible and the meaning of Christianity, thustrying to span the gap between the world of the Old Testament and thenewly rediscovered areas. Morrison planned amongst others, a Com-mentary to the New Testament in the ‘same manner as those on thebooks of Confucius’, ‘An abridgement of the Gospel History and plant-ing of Churches in the first ages’, ‘A volume of Dialogues – with a manworshipping at the tomb of his ancestors; with a priest in a temple, witha person newly converted on the reasons of his change of faith etc.’175

Milne even prepared a tract, tailor made for the perceived image of theChinese as even greater sinners than the rest of human kind.176

Nevertheless, the idea of equality before God meant that Chinesewho adopted Christianity, could become members of one worldwideChristian community. The letters of the first Chinese convert, LiangFa, printed in the Missionary Chronicle, tried to produce the idea of aworldwide Christian community, thus making the Chinese less foreign.The insertion of Chinese ‘translations’ of concepts such as ‘venerableteachers’ for ‘teachers of the Gospel in England and elsewhere’, wouldhowever still underline the otherness of this people who were to beconverted.177

Despite these attempts to reach a wider public through the printedword, the restrictions imposed by the Chinese as well as by the EIC pre-vented Morrison from interacting with the Chinese in the way and tothe extent he seems to have deemed as appropriate for a missionary.He could argue about religion with his Chinese aides, but he could notdistribute the Bible to the Chinese masses or preach to them openly.He saw himself as the ‘servant’ of the heathens,178 who however refused‘seeking to know what they shall do to be saved’. With the exception ofvery few converts, the Chinese could thus not be characterised as a peo-ple who was glad to accept the humanitarian benevolence of the British.Morrison described them as degenerated heathens, in dichotomy to thegood evangelical Christians. The failure of the Chinese in Canton andMacao to interact with Morrison in the way he had expected and totake on the role assigned to them in the missionary worldview madeit impossible to familiarise them and include them in the ‘members ofthe one family of Christ’.179 This failure may have been partly becausethey saw no reason for engaging with this foreign religion as well as the



persecutions of Christianity by the Chinese Empire180 and partly becauseof the institutional barriers which prevented regular direct contact. Thisresulted in frustration on Morrison’s side and made it impossible for himto ascertain his self-image as a missionary of the only right belief, whichwould eagerly be accepted.

This seems to have led to a feeling of isolation which he often men-tioned in his letters.181 Thus he wrote to the LMS headquarters, forexample,

Yours is a happy land. It abounds with all the means of instruction,edification and comfort which a Christian can desire. Far differentare our circumstances abroad. You look around you and rejoice inthousands on thousands assembled this day to praise God and hearof his great salvation. Here millions are wandering as sheep withouta shepherd. None cares for the soul of his brother and few care fortheir own182

The arrival of the missionaries in the ‘contact zones’ meant that theyacquired a new legitimacy to speak about Chinese religions and to cre-ate knowledge about them. William Milne thus, for example, dismissedthe information provided by the European literati about China, sincethese writers had not judged the nations of the East through Christianeyes,183 and thus they had not been able to come to a really valid inter-pretation and judgement of them. This was despite the fact that theProtestant missionaries seem to have silently used the Jesuit reports intheir description of, for example, the ‘three religions’, or even that mostEuropeans reports about China were based on Christian, albeit Catholicmissionary accounts.

This new legitimacy to speak about Chinese religion, and even moreimportant, the Chinese reaction to the Christian mission, placed furtheremphasis on the alleged moral corruptness of the Chinese and especiallyits government, and also opened a new platform on which to discuss thequestion of the rank of Chinese civilisation.184 Even more importantly,it brought a new definition of the relation between British and Chinese.As we have already seen, as in the context of Morrison’s advice to theSelect Committee, this was defined by the idea of the brotherhood ofman and the equality before God, but also by the gap between thosewho were true believers and those who were not.

The firm belief of the evangelicals in the importance of the perso-nal experience of conversion, made it impossible for them to con-template a mission strategy of accommodation like the Jesuits had



practiced. Accordingly, they had no interest in understanding anyaspect of Chinese worship and tradition as an original monotheismor as a philosophical tradition that could be accepted to co-exist withChristianity.

Thus, Robert Morrison, as well as William Milne, turned particularlyagainst Confucius. They attempted to make sense of the Chinese reli-gions by adopting the three main categories that had already been usedby the Jesuits: Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism, but saw them allas equally bad expressions of heathenism and idolatry. After one of thetypical discussions with his aides about Confucianism, Buddhism andTaoism, Morrison concludes, for example: ‘The two sects did not paysufficient attention to morals, and Kung-fu-tsi neglected religion, butJesus united them both in their highest perfection.’185 William Milne’sverdict after reading the Four Books by Confucius was even harsher,emphasising the need of a religion of salvation for men.

These books are the Bible of the Chinese. But alas! After having readand examined them repeatedly with tolerable care, from beginningto end, how little can be discovered illustrative of the perfectionsof deity! How little suited to the state of man as an immortal crea-ture! Scarcely a sentence adapted to his condition as a sinner! Evenin point of morals, though there is much that is good; much that isbeautifully expressed; yet how defective, and how ill suited to con-duct men to virtue and to happiness! With respect to futurity theyleave man entirely in the dark.186

Since Confucian doctrines were not a divine revelation, nor did theyclaim to be one, Confucianism could not be a good religion. As a merephilosophical guide to life in society they lacked the necessary moral-ity and prospect of the eternal salvation of the soul, something thatwas only provided by the Christian religion. Thus Confucianism didnot prevent idolatry but rather helped it flourish.187 Furthermore, themissionaries also described Christianity as the only religion that couldmake men valuable members of the society in this life.188 Thus, Milnevehemently rejected the opinion of one Chinese that all religions aremore or less the same. The only true religion, he emphasised, was theChristian one189 and there was no way to a happy, fulfilled and moral lifewithout it. This was certainly directed against the deists, Unitarians andanti-religious thinkers back in Europe, but also clearly made the Chinesethe ‘Other’ (together with the European Unitarians), and described themper definition as an amoral people.



Morrison and Milne also refuted that ‘T’een’ was an appropriate trans-lation for ‘God’, since, they argued, the Chinese used this term for theSupreme Being, but also for heaven in opposition to earth.190 This wasa clear rejection of the Jesuit arguments, who had interpreted ‘T’een’as remainder of the idea of one god. The Protestant missionaries, quitein contrast to the accommodation ideas, also founded an ‘Ultra-GangesMissionary Union’, which, besides mutual support and the support ofthe missionary school system, was also supposed to ‘give our mutualtestimony against errors in doctrine or worship, which may creep in.’191

The idea of China as a foreign and amoral society was strengthenedwhen the missionaries observed and reported the religious practices ofthe Chinese. In these observations, the Christian tradition served as theframework according to which Chinese religious practices were to bejudged. The lack of a priest preaching a sermon to the crowds disturbedthem greatly, as well as the lack of a community participating in theservice. To their eyes, everyone seemed to worship his idol individu-ally, seemingly without any deeper involvement, and especially withoutforming a union with the other worshipers. Thus Morrison revealed hisshock in his first published report to the LMS headquarters: ‘There isnothing social in their worship, nor any respect shewn by those whoare not engaged. One is praying, another is talking and laughing, a thirdcleaning utensils & &.’192

This non-existence of a service comprising a priest and a sermon wasnot only seen as a lack of respect of faith, or its sincerity, but was alsoconsidered to be an explanation and reason for the Chinese despoticpolitical regime, which seemed to place so much importance on theranking of its officials. When Robert Morrison reported to Dr. Burder, inthe LMS headquarters, on the embassy to China he had accompanied,he mentioned what he saw as a ridiculous insistence of the Chineseconcerning who was allowed to sit and who was not at an official meet-ing. In England, he continued, these things were much more relaxed,because of the Protestant religion, and the services in which the sermonsreminded the people of equality after life.193 The despotic government,the inequality of its inhabitants and their amoral behaviour such aslying and cheating were thus all traced back to a lack of the right reli-gion. The missionaries thus made sense of what they observed accordingto their religious background, forming a meaning of China as a place indire need for salvation through Christ.

In Morrison’s and Milne’s view, a reform of society towards more free-dom always had to start with the moral improvement of the individualmembers of society through a real conversion to Christianity. This was



in their eyes true for Britain as well as China. Expressing this point ofview, William Milne stated the importance of a mission to China

For, notwithstanding that various attempts had been made, in differ-ent periods of the church, to introduce the Gospel into that country[China, U.H.], still the thick shades of Pagan darkness hung over itsimmense population, who, to the present hour, have neither tastedthe sweets of political freedom, nor beheld the reviving beams of theSun of Rightneousness.194

Morrison compared China with a ‘barren land’, a ‘desert’ in contrastto the ‘fruitful plains of British Israel’, which could only become fertileagain through the help of the British missionaries.195 China is describedby the missionaries as an awful country – infertile, dark and the land ofSatan,196 and thus set in stark contrast to a positive image of the evangel-ical Britain. However, one should not forget that for the missionaries inparticular, China was not necessarily fixed in this state, thus not com-pletely the ‘Other’, but rather resembled an earlier state of Britain. AsRobert Morrison put it

However, this [the state of China] does not induce me to despair;I remember Britain – what she was, and what she now is, in respectof religion. It is not 300 years since national authority said that ‘theBible should not be read openly in any church’ by the people, not pri-vately by the poor – that only noblemen and gentlemen, and nobleladies and gentlewomen might have the Bible in their houses.’ –I remember this, and cherish hope for China.197

When the evangelicals in the metropolis first thought about a missionto China, they already created it as a space set apart from their own com-munity by its lack of faith, but they still believed that it was civilised andwould react positively to the message they wanted to give them. Apartfrom that, it was seen as the unknown other. When the first missionariesarrived in China they formed new knowledge about China, especially itsreligion. In their attempt to fit China into the cultural frame they knew,they created the idea of an extremely heathen China, describing all thenegative effects that came with this lack of faith. From their experiencesin the contact zone and the knowledge they could accumulate there,the missionaries created a China whose inhabitants suffered under adespotic system and their adherence to idolatry. Due to the lack of the



right religion, they had corrupted morally to the point where they evenrefused to accept the saving religion presented to them.198

To acknowledge the benefits of the Chinese religions or philoso-phy, as the Jesuits had partly done and which some Enlightenmentphilosophers had picked up on so eagerly, was impossible to the Britishmissionaries. And, in contrast to other writers who had stated the degen-erating state of Chinese art and science, for example, the benevolentChristian could not suffer to leave the Chinese in this state of dark-ness and let them die a spiritual death. Where the EIC was still mainlyconcerned with questions of trade, law and sovereignty, the mission-aries desperately sought a possibility to improve the moral well-beingof the Chinese and make them better human beings. In this way, theBritish saw themselves as being as responsible for the well-being of theChinese as for that of their dependent population in India or the Englishpoor at home. This was based on the firm belief that trade for mutualbenefit was not the only relationship the British should establish withnon-European populations, and that there is a responsibility, which isnot intrinsically linked and restricted to the exercise of political or eco-nomic power over these peoples. Rather it was a moral influence thatwas wanted and the acknowledgement of one’s own world view evenby those over whom one did not rule. Through their links with the EICmerchants in Canton and Morrison’s official position as a translator,this view of China had a significant influence on the Select Committee’sattitudes to China in the long run.

3.5 Diplomacy and local knowledge

In 1815, the EIC lost its monopoly for trade with India. In additionto the direct effects this had on the Indian trade, it also resulted ina new influx of country traders into the China market. The countrytraders who came now were more certain of their position. After all,their associates in Britain had already won one great battle againstthe monopoly of the Company.199 Additionally, the great war againstNapoleonic France was over, and with it the insecurity on the oceans.During the war, the British had attempted to occupy Macao, allegedly tosave it from French attack, but had to hand it back to the Portuguese inthe end. Now, the China trade was still an unsolved problem, one thathad increasing importance for the EIC, both as an economic investmentand a method to remit the money back from its government in India.

John Barrow thus deemed the time to be right to push for anotherembassy to the Emperor of China. In addition, a new embassy could give



Barrow’s former pupil, protégée and friend, George Thomas Staunton,the assignment of a lifetime, that of an ambassador to China. In his anal-ysis of the failure of the Macartney embassy, John Barrow emphasised inhis letter to the Earl of Buckinghamshire, then President of the Board ofControl, the lack of faithful, British translators as one of the fundamen-tal causes. He even described ‘Mr. Plumb’, the Chinese convert who hadtranslated for Macartney as a Catholic, who did not want or dare toreally help the ‘Heretics’. Now, however, in George Thomas StauntonBritain had somebody who had a good command of the Chinese lan-guage, ‘an advantage which can only be duly appreciated by those whohave had the mortification of experiencing the intrigues and chicanerywhich are put in practice when communications are to be held with thisjealous and corrupt Government through the intervention of Catholicmissionaries.’200

During the ensuing correspondence, the Court of Directors as well asthe Select Committee supported the idea of another embassy. The eventssurrounding the affair of the British capture of the American war ship‘Doris’ culminated in a situation where the Select Committee wanted aclear signal showing that they had the full support of their sovereign.The Court of Directors had an obvious strong interest in the stabilityof its only remaining monopoly trade, and Chinese support for theirAmerican competitors during the Doris affair was worrying. Further-more, they were afraid that a recent British expedition against Nepalmight have caused animosity at the Chinese Court. They suggested thatnot Staunton should become ambassador, but rather an envoy fromBritain, who was unknown to the Chinese and thus in their eyes clearlynot associated with trading activities.201 For the British government, thepublic revenue derived from the tea imports was the main incentive totry another embassy to secure this lucrative trade.202

The choice for the ambassador fell on Lord William Amherst. GeorgeThomas Staunton, like his father, only became the second man of theembassy, Minister Plenipotentiary, who in the case of the death ofthe ambassador would succeed to his position. As with the Macartneyembassy, the idea of a more or less enlightened monarch on the Chinesethrone, who did not know about the corruption and oppression inCanton, was crucial. The letter from the Prince Regent to the Emperor ofChina again used the language of equality and reciprocity, with whichfriendly relations between the two countries should be established.However, this time the Emperor of China was no longer addressed as ‘theSupreme Emperor of China’, ‘worthy to live tens of thousands and tensof thousands Years’,203 but simply as ‘high mighty and glorious Prince



the Emperor of China our Brother and cousin’,204 not even making anattempt to satisfy Oriental sentiments.

Interestingly, in times of free trade rhetoric in Britain, the EIC didnot ask for an increase of British imports into China. By this time, thebullion question was already solved to a large extent by the countrytrade and the import of opium. Rather, they hoped for a stabilisationof the present situation, a guarantee of all the privileges they alreadypossessed.205 The British government however added to the originalproposal of the directors that every opportunity should be taken toenquire how the consumption of British manufactures in China couldbe increased.206

The model for the embassy was clearly the Macartney embassy, andagain the British government left it open to the ambassador how hewould deal with the kowtow question, while they hoped he could followthe Macartney precedent.207 In contrast to the first embassy, which hadavoided every association with the EIC in Canton, the Amherst embassytook several of the British subjects from there on board. Most notablyGeorge T. Staunton, who at the time was President of the Select Com-mittee. In order to relieve Staunton from the duties of a translator ifnecessary, Robert Morrison, John Davis and Francis Toone joined theembassy.208 After hesitations, the Select Committee also allowed ThomasManning to become part of the group.209

These were all people who had lived in Canton for years and hadexperienced several clashes with the local authorities, as well as goodsocial contact with some Chinese, like the Hong merchants and Chineseteachers. From their minority position, they had developed the theorythat the only way to acquire any concessions from the Chinese wasto make clear that the British were a powerful nation who would notbow to them. They also, due to their knowledge of Chinese, consideredthemselves to be ‘China experts’ who understood the history, rules andcustoms of the Chinese people and the Qing government. This was espe-cially true for Staunton, who after all was the only one who had beena member of the first embassy as well. It is argued in this chapter thatthe influence of this group with what was considered to be local insideknowledge was crucial to the development of the embassy. The issuesand influences outlined above, such as the question of language, lawand the role of the missionary, were thus integral to the embassy.

As with the Macartney embassy, the kowtow question again played acentral role in the negotiations with the Chinese after the landing of theembassy in China and figured as the main concern in the later publica-tion of journals by the members of the embassy. In contrast to the first



embassy, where Macartney seems to have decided mainly on his ownhow to proceed, Amherst became the object of conflicting advice on thisissue by George T. Staunton and Henry Ellis as second and third com-missioners. While Ellis also had been in Asia before, mainly in India andPersia,210 he made a point of adopting the position of the Court of Direc-tors and the British government towards the kowtow question. It seemsto be that for them, at least at the outset of the embassy, the kowtowwas a possibility, if the ambassador could gain concessions in return. Itwas probably still fresh in their memory that the Russian embassy underGavril Golovkin had been sent home in disgrace without even reachingBeijing because they had not been willing to kowtow.211 Ellis’s argumentwas that China had already sunk so low that whatever ceremony theBritish adhered to at the audience did not really matter. Since Chinawas no longer a civilisation of equal rank to the British, it could hardlydiminish its dignity:

The ceremony, consisting of nine prostration, though not formerlywithout example in Europe [footnote on Byzantine U.H.], was cer-tainly repugnant to individual feeling and to the practice of modernEuropean courts; at the same time, viewed as an usage belonging tooriental barbarism, it could scarcely be deemed advisable to sacrificethe more important objects of the embassy to any supposed mainte-nance of dignity, by resisting upon such a point of etiquette, in sucha scene.212

Staunton, in contrast, advised Amherst to stay firm on the kowtow ques-tion and not submit to it under any circumstances. He supported hisargument with his knowledge and experience of the Chinese character:A kowtow would only be ‘a sacrifice of national credit and character’without any benefit to be gained.213 Ellis attributed this position prob-ably correctly to Staunton’s experience in Canton, which he deemednot transferable to the question of the audience with the Emperor ofChina. Where the EIC in Canton could use the stoppage of trade as aninstrument in the power struggle, which had an immediate effect onthe interests of the local merchants and government, their position inBeijing would be a lot weaker. Therefore, Ellis urged conciliation, sincethe only prospect of success for the embassy was to make a favourableimpression on the Emperor. If it was necessary to adopt the strangecustoms of the court, then this had to be done.214 He neverthelessacknowledged Staunton’s local expertise and conceded that in everyaspect concerning the Chinese character and usages Staunton clearly



could have the last word.215 Similarly, during his description of the nego-tiations with the Chinese on the kowtow question he often referredto the way in which Staunton and Morrison formulated British con-cepts and demands as being agreeable to Chinese customs.216 In the end,Amherst followed the local advice and refused to kowtow.217

During the negotiations on the kowtow question, the Macartneyembassy was frequently cited as a precedent. And whereas during theMacartney embassy both sides were able to interpret the solution theyhad found the way they deemed appropriate, during the Amherstembassy the differing ideas on the meaning of the ceremonial during theaudience came to the forefront and had to clash. Amherst and the mem-bers of his embassy insisted that Macartney had never kowtowed. On theother side, the Chinese asserted that he had submitted to the Manchuceremony.218 After all, as Hevia has shown, as far as the Qing officialswere concerned, the alteration of the kowtow during the Macartneyembassy had not changed the meaning of the ceremony as such.219

The Chinese insistence on a fact which the British clearly assumed tobe false irritated them highly and made every further interaction inse-cure. The only way the British could understand this was by seeing theirstereotype of Chinese falseness reaffirmed. This breakdown in trust theninfluenced all engagements with the Chinese during the embassy andfigured large in the reports.220 A combination of the strong position onthe kowtow question by Staunton and the assumption that any claimmade by the Chinese which deviated from Macartney’s account wasa lie, and made because lying was part of the Chinese nature, led tothe complete failure of the embassy. Amherst reached Beijing on themorning of the 29th August and was told that the emperor immedi-ately wanted to see him. When he declined this on the grounds that hewas not feeling well and the rest of his entourage had not yet arrived,the emperor commanded that the embassy had to leave immediately,without an audience.221

For the Jiajing Emperor, this was probably the only logical conclu-sion he could draw. For the Qing officials, the insistence not to kowtowand Amherst’s pledge for illness in order to avoid the hurried receptionwere indications that he did not understand proper ceremonial rela-tions. The emperor thus accepted the gifts from George III and in hisletter to the English king attributed the failure of the embassy to thelack of understanding and sincerity of the ambassador.222 Further, theemperor had just survived an assassination attempt and the rebellion bya group that called itself the Eight Trigrams. He was probably aware ofthe problems the British occasionally caused in Canton.223 The refusal



by the British to comply with the ceremony, and their insistence onan apparent lie, probably had in the eyes of the emperor removed anybelief that the embassy might be a sincere expression by the British kingof his acknowledgement of the Qing overlordship, or even a peacefulintention towards the Qing Empire.

For the British, the failure to even gain an audience with the emperormeant that this time the non-achievement of the goals of the embassycould hardly be attributed simply to intrigues by the Canton officialsand the Mandarins. These were however not excluded from the expla-nation. The idea that in an Oriental despotic government, no inferiorwould dare to tell his superior an unpleasant truth to the point thatfalseness became their second nature was used to account for the failure.Drawing on the edict issued by the Jiajing Emperor after the return of theembassy, it was clear to the British that ‘Duke Ho’ who had been respon-sible for the embassy had failed to report the intention of Amherst notto kowtow to the emperor in time.224

The main result of the embassy however was the complete break-down of the idea of the rational and enlightened Chinese monarch,who would remove the grievances of British trade if only he knew aboutthem. In his letter to George Canning about the failure of the embassy,Amherst draws a picture of an unreliable monarch, different in everyaspect from the dignified accounts of Qianlong:

I shall have to substitute a detail (as far as I shall enter into it) ofhurry and confusion, of irregularity and disorder, of insult, inhuman-ity, and almost of personal violence, sufficient to give to the court ofthe Emperor Kia-King the manners, character, and appearance of theraving camp of a Tartar Horde.225

The emperor had lost his image as an enlightened Chinese Emperor andtransformed himself into an uncivilised Tartar. This was a characterisa-tion of the Court and the Emperor every other member of the embassysubscribed to as well.226 In addition to the characterisation of Jiajing asa weak and corrupt oriental despot, Amherst saw the reason for the fail-ure of the embassy as resulting from the eternal characteristics of China’sforeign policy. Since, until the arrival of the British, the Chinese in theirhistory never had to deal with an equal or superior power, they had nat-urally become arrogant and would not even change this attitude andthe policies resulting from this if they were conscious of their weaknessand afraid of the other power.227 Falseness and arrogance as unchangingcharacteristics of the Chinese thus hindered in his eyes the free and fair



intercourse the upright Briton wanted to establish, for the best of bothsides.228 Again, China was depicted as refusing to leave its self-chosenisolation.

In contrast to this negative image of the Chinese, Amherst and hiscolleagues could represent the British in a positive light as steadfast andupright. The mortification of virtually being kicked out of the ChineseEmpire without even an audience was turned by them into a triumph ofBritishness. Staunton explained to the Court of Directors, for example,

but subject to these unlooked for disadvantages I apprehend noEvent could have been better calculated to make an impression onthe Chinese, beneficial to the British Character and Interests thanthe splendid example of firmness and motivation which under cir-cumstances of the most trying nature, the conduct of the Britishambassador has exhibited and which, I trust, it may be permitted meto add, is in perfect unison with those principles of conduct whichwere adopted at Canton during the preceding discussions.229

The idea of China which the Select Committee had developed in Cantonseemed to be legitimised by the occurrences of the Amherst embassy.The image of a China with which one could negotiate and establish rela-tions on an equal basis had disappeared. Where the Macartney embassyhad created the idea of direct state to state contact with China, whichonly had to be followed up, its successor had destroyed the possibility ofeven thinking of such a relation for the time being. As a consequence,the Select Committee of the EIC in Canton once more saw them-selves as the sole representation of British interests in China. They alsofound themselves reassured in the attitude they increasingly developedtowards the Chinese authorities, which was less based on diplomaticnegotiations, appealing to reason, but more on the demonstration ofpower and the conviction that the idea of British greatness had to bebrought home to the Chinese.

3.6 Trade and identity

Following the failure of the Amherst embassy, the EIC remained the onlyeffectual representative of British interests in Canton, while the growingtrade, particularly the country trade and opium smuggling, increasedthe tension between the British and the Chinese authorities. The lastyears of the EIC monopoly on the China trade were marked by con-flict with the Cantonese authorities. The idea that relations with the



Chinese could only be changed by a show of strength on the British partbecame predominant. British identity and its acceptance by the Chineseauthorities became even more important during these years.

Robert Travers has recently pointed out that in India, the Britishmainly defined themselves in opposition to ‘Asian despotism’, while inthe metropolis, the main point of reference for British identity was theopposition to France, absolutism and Catholicism. He argued that it wasfrom this identity that the EIC employees in India drew their justifica-tion for conquest in India in order to free the Indians from the Asiaticdespotism they were living under.230 In India, the main focus was theexpansion of the power of the EIC. In Canton, ideas regarding Asiandespotism and particularly the corruption and falseness of the Chinesewere at the forefront of the image in contrast to which the British soughtto define themselves.

It was considered crucial for the interaction between the British andthe Chinese to establish the ‘right’ image of Britain in Chinese minds.References to British national characteristics are abundant in the let-ters the EIC Select Committee sent back to the headquarters in London.Britishness was mainly defined in terms of an upright and steadfastcharacter and as morally incorruptible. A key element of this identitywas the dignity of the British monarch and the strength of the Britishnation in military and trade matters. While the question of identity hadbeen strong throughout the British presence in Canton, its importanceincreased during the 1820s and 1830s. More aggressive trading interestswere linked to feelings of national honour and a rhetoric of nationaldignity was now used to justify an ever-increasing aggressive attitudetowards the Chinese authorities in Canton.

This shift was partly due to the fact that during the final years ofthe EIC monopoly of the China trade, the so-called country merchantsbecame more influential in Canton. Despite the fact that they wereBritish subjects, they were not under the control of the EIC and devel-oped a different understanding of China, which could conflict with themeaning assigned to it by EIC servants.

Like the employees of the EIC in Canton, the British country mer-chants belonged to a transnational trading network, connecting Britain,India, China and Southeast Asia. The trading houses, which set them-selves up in Canton from the 1800 onwards were firmly connectedto the East India Agency Houses. Most of them were of Scottishorigin, working within a network of Scottish families.231 Their eco-nomic interests required a better way of importing into China, whichconnected them with the interests of British manufactures, and like



them they found the advocates of their case in the works of Smith,Bentham and Mill.

At first, the country trade and the EIC trade at Canton complementedeach other. The country trade provided the EIC with the money neces-sary to replace the problematic bullion. In return, the EIC acted as bankfor the country merchants by issuing bills on London for them. Withthe increase of the country trade, however, the country merchants likeJardine and Matheson developed interests which could not be satisfiedby cooperation with the EIC.232

The position of the country traders in Canton was characterised bymore insecurity than that of the EIC members. Due to the monopolyof the EIC they were not officially allowed to be there in the firstplace. Most of them thus came with ‘adopted nationalities’, as did,for example, James Matheson as Danish consul or Thomas Beal asPrussian.233 They also did not have the financial, military and admin-istrative backing which the Select Committee was provided with by theEIC. Consequently, it was even more important for them to define them-selves as British (despite their adopted nationalities) in order to qualifyfor support by the British crown. As a way of improving their knowl-edge base, they set up one of the first English journals on the Chinesecoast, the Canton Register.234 In this periodical, they exchanged tradingnews, but also used it to justify their breaking of Chinese law by depict-ing the Chinese as an immoral and cruel people.235 With the Registerthey also attempted to establish themselves as the only authoritativesource of knowledge about China and the Chinese character: ‘Mucherror has been propagated in the world, by the superficial informationsent forth by those who can only look on the surface of society; and whosee men only in a sort of Holiday dress.’236 They supported the veracityof their view of China by quoting ‘native informants’ or ‘old veteranChinese’ as authorities as well as emphasising their local knowledge.237

In several cases, they corrected reports on China published in otherEuropean or Strait magazines by pointing out that due to their resi-dence in China they were the only ones who had access to the correctinformation.238

While in many respects the country merchants profited from theHong system in Canton, they were also more likely to come into conflictwith it. Since they were not allowed to trade tea back to Europe, theirmain trade was cotton and, increasingly, opium export from India intoChina. However, the first could hardly be sold in China and the secondwas contraband. The opium trade led to a range of different contactsbetween the free traders and the local Chinese in contrast to those of the



EIC. The opium trade mainly took place at Macao and increasingly after1821 at ‘outer anchorages’, such as the island of Lintin. They furthertraded by way of ‘outside’ merchants, called ‘shopmen’ who originallywere only supposed to sell small items to the foreigners. To open newmarkets, Matheson and Jardine started to send ships up the coast forclandestine trade.239 On these trips, the crew was sometimes accompa-nied by the German Protestant missionary Karl Gützlaff, who worked asa translator and who used the opportunity to spread Christian tracts inother parts of China. The trade as well as the missionary activity wereclandestine operations which had to rely on the goodwill of the Chinesepopulation. Attacks by local Chinese were thus more easily provokedand also more dangerous to their trade than they were for the EIC.The outrage about the annual proclamations by the Viceroy warningthe local population against the vices of the foreigners was thereforefar greater amongst the country merchants than it was amongst EICemployees. Moreover, the country traders tended to view the Hong mer-chants as the problem in the interaction with the local authorities ratherthan as good trading partners.240 At the same time, they showed lit-tle moral scruples at selling a drug like opium. As the Canton Registerargued, it depended only on human virtue whether or not the buyerwould abuse the drug, not on whether or not it was supplied.241

The country merchants argued that it was only Chinese pride andother ‘evil passions’ which had formed such an unnatural exclusionfrom trade and, even more, from social intercourse with all othernations.242 Consequently, they demanded, echoed in the Canton Regis-ter, a far more aggressive policy against this evil, irrational and unnaturalgovernment than large parts of the EIC. The Select Committee, afterall, still advocated simply reforming the Hong and were often hesitantto take actions against the Chinese officials. At this point, however,even the country traders did not yet support a war against China to‘open’ it up for trade. Rather, the contributors to the Canton Registerseem to have been infected by the missionary spirit of the evangelicalswith whom they were in close contact; although instead of spreadingthe Bible, they wanted to acquaint the Chinese with the prophets offree trade and Utilitarianism. In response to a pamphlet by LieutenantColonel de Lacy Evans, who had argued in favour of a military attackto open up China, they called ‘for a few hundred Utilitarians, and Polit-ical Economists, with a dozen steam presses, to cast off a few millionsof Pamphlets, in Chinese, on the greatest happiness principle, and theprinciples of free Trade’.243 However, one of the subsequent issues statedthat after consulting a few texts by Adam Smith, Malthus, M’Culloch



and Mill, these were found to be too much confined to the Europeancontext and examples to be simply translated. Therefore, the CantonRegister called for somebody to write an essay targeted at a Chinese audi-ence, keeping in mind that ‘a high regard for honor and morals is notcompatible with the pursuit of wealth either individual or national’ inChinese philosophy.244

With the contraband opium trade, the Indian agency houses andtheir counterparts on the China coast gained an increasing stake inthis illegal trade, firmly connecting the British presence in both regions.With their growing economic power the country traders also exertedincreasing pressure on the EIC to work for a change in trading condi-tions at Canton.245 At the same time, their trade aggravated tensionswith the Chinese government, which increasingly became aware of theopium trade and the ensuing problems for the Chinese economy andpopulation.246

For the EIC the possibility of a complete loss of the trade monopoly,in the event that they should be unable to satisfy the demands of theBritish public and parliament, had been hanging over them like thesword of Damocles since 1814. The EIC still had the largest market sharein the European and Western trade in Canton but the Americans in par-ticular were becoming stronger. During these years, the EIC feared thatthe Chinese might favour the Americans over the British, easing traderestrictions for them.247

In addition, the British in Canton increasingly perceived themselvesas being part of a strong Asian Empire, which made the dependent sit-uation in Canton progressively less tolerable. At a time when Bentinckand his men set out to reorganise Indian administration and the Indianelite,248 it became inconceivable that their fellow EIC employees in Can-ton should have to submit to seemingly arbitrary Chinese laws. Inthe conflicts from the second half of the 1820s onwards, the Britishincreased the chasm between themselves and the Chinese while pro-voking them deliberately. For the British at Canton, the meaning of theChinese authority as despotic and humiliating became fixed and theywere determined to establish their equality with the Chinese. In thesesituations of crisis, the idea of the dignity of Britain and the British char-acter and the threat to it by actions of the Chinese authorities were ofmajor importance.

All these elements came to bear on the conflict between the SelectCommittee and the Chinese officials from 1829 onwards. Discussionsof the Select Committee with the London headquarters reflect twoopposing strategies, one more conciliatory, the other more aggressive



towards the Chinese, based on two different images of China. Theimmediate cause of the dispute was the reduction in the number ofHong merchants from eleven to seven due to bankruptcy, the seventhone pending. At the same time, the Chinese authorities tried to restrictthe activities of the outside merchants. These Chinese merchants hadoriginally only been allowed to sell small items, but in fact they engagedin large scale trade, particularly with the country traders. These twochanges made trade considerably more difficult for the country mer-chants as well as for the EIC, who saw the reluctance by Chinese officialsto secure a sufficient number of Hong merchants as a direct attack ontheir trade. The EIC feared that this policy was aimed at forcing theBritish out of their dominant market position.249

The actual impulse to take action came from Bombay, from the coun-try trade, in the form of a memorandum to the Select Committee, signedby 44 Parsee merchants of Bombay.250 They complained that the restric-tion of the outside merchants in combination with the reduced numberof Hongs might make it very difficult for them to sell their cotton inCanton.251 A decision was taken by the Committee to delay bringing thecompany ships to Whampoa at the beginning of the new trading sea-son. The Committee then used the occasion to present the Viceroy witha full list of grievances which they wanted to see redeemed before theywould be willing to start the trade again. It ranged from the demand toestablish new Hongs to the reduction of the Port tax and the abolitionof the system of the security merchant. In his first response, the Viceroyagreed to give further incentives to new Hong merchants and order theold owner of one of the almost bankrupt firms, who had fled, to backto Canton. However, this was not sufficient for the Committee and theydecided to continue their protest.252

In contrast, the president of the Select Committee, H. C. Plowden hadargued for a more conciliatory approach from the beginning and nowwished to acknowledge that the Viceroy actually seemed to be willingto resolve the problem of the small number of Hongs. He was only pre-pared to support any further actions of the Committee if these werecarried out according to the ‘Principles of Moderation and Justice’. Heconsidered the insistence of the Committee to stop all trade until alltheir demands were addressed as un-English, presenting the Viceroy asa man of caution with whom one could negotiate: ‘It is to be regret-ted that the temper and caution displayed by the Viceroy has not beenreciprocated in our proceedings, and that we have assumed, and arenow using, the weapons usually employed by the Chinese themselves.’He in particular criticised the tone of ‘assumption and demand’ in the



letters by the Committee which, in combination with few precise prob-lems they were able to specify, made the Committee’s position seemunjustifiable.253 The dispute between the president and the Committeeescalated further. They supported their arguments with two differentversions of what it meant to be British and two different images of theChinese character.

Plowden urged a settlement with the Chinese while the rest of theSelect Committee hoped to achieve a change of the entire system bystaying firm. They presented the local Chinese government as ‘haughtyand arbitrary’ and one which could only be made to conform with the‘principles of reason and justice’ by not giving in. Since the ‘encroachingspirit of extortion’ was inseparable from the ‘Chinese Character’, it couldonly be kept in its boundaries by firmness and decisions. The membersof the Select Committee argued that the latter were inherent traits of theBritish character and had brought them the estimation of the Chinese,above all other nations. An early retreat, therefore, would destroy thisimage irreparably and with it the security of trade at Canton.254 In addi-tion, they asked for ships of war to be sent from India to support theirclaims and to demonstrate to the Chinese that they had the backing oftheir sovereign. This was a measure which had been carefully avoidedbefore so as not to provoke the Chinese.255

The president vehemently refused these measures. At the end ofJanuary 1830, Plowden took leave and sailed to Britain. A month laterthe Committee finally agreed to resume trade after another response bythe Viceroy which promised to install new Hong merchants and to lookinto the matter of the entrepôt fee. The committee was convinced thattheir measure had left a lasting impression and that the Viceroy and theChinese government were sufficiently interested in the continuation oftrade to make the necessary changes in the future.256

The Bengal government did not send ships of war. After Plowden hadmade his report in London, the Court of Directors angrily refused tosanction the measures of the Committee and after another turbulentyear they recalled them in May 1830. An aggressive approach towardsthe Chinese government was not desired by the EIC headquarters aslong as the trade continued.257 In distant London, and by old Chinahands such as Plowden, even the local Cantonese government couldstill be seen as more or less reliable, a government with which negotia-tions could be conducted within the frameworks of the Chinese tradingsystem. A complete change of the system might have been desirable,but was considered unrealistic due to the immutable character of theChinese and was not to be attempted for fear of endangering the trade



in general. In Canton itself, the majority of the Committee membershad been more strongly influenced by the country traders, who as hasbeen shown, generally advocated a more aggressive attitude towards theChinese government. As a minority they might also have felt a strongerneed to show the firmness of their position, which they saw as a mainattribute of the British character, and to demonstrate that they werenot defenceless and at the complete mercy of the Chinese government.In this context, the Chinese government was necessarily described ascorrupt and arbitrary.

However, to those, like Plowden, who advocated a conciliatoryapproach, all aggressive behaviour towards the Chinese was branded‘un-British’. What was essentially a conflict about access to the Chinesemarket was thus narrated by the British as a conflict about Britishidentity and the way it was perceived by the Chinese.

The conflict with the Chinese authorities in the following yearshowed even more clearly how questions of the conditions of trade andthe pressure by the country traders merged with the necessity of the EICemployees in Canton to reassure their identity and economic interestagainst real or perceived threats by the Chinese officials. This particularconflict centred on four issues. Firstly, three Parsees had killed CaptainMackenzie of the Dutch ship Vrouw Helena and the Cantonese Viceroydemanded that they were handed over to the Chinese authorities to betried. Secondly, the president of the Select Committee, William Bayneshad brought his wife to Canton, in contravention of Chinese regula-tions. Thirdly, the Viceroy stated that foreigners at Canton were notallowed to use Sedan chairs and complained that one writer of the EICfactory had done so; and lastly, the British were upset by a proclama-tion posted in Chinese all around Canton, allegedly referring to thedepraved morals of the foreigners and calling on Chinese merchantsand linguists to educate and civilise these foreigners.258 Again, it wasthe country merchants who urged the Committee to act against theseproclamations. They complained that these were written in insultinglanguage and thus lowered the foreigners in the estimation of the lowerorder of Chinese society, thereby creating a climate in which violenceagainst foreigners was considered acceptable.259 The Committee agreedwith the free British merchants on this issue and wrote a note of com-plaint to the Viceroy. Using several Chinese proverbs they seeminglytried to show the Viceroy that they hardly needed education in Chineseculture and civilisation, especially not by badly educated linguist andHong merchants.260



The issue of the Sedan chairs also sat at odds with their self-under-standing which they wanted to see accepted by the Chinese. TheCommittee informed the Viceroy that all supercargoes and writers ofthe EIC were sons and brothers of country gentlemen. They explainedthat Mr. Astell, the writer who had used the Sedan Chair, was the sonof a former head of the Court of Directors and Member of the ‘GreatCouncil of the British Nation’: ‘How talk of his overstepping his rank bysitting in a chair!’ they exclaimed irritated.261

To counter the threat by the Viceroy of capturing those responsiblefor the death of Captain Mackenzie and removing the British womenby force, the EIC Committee ordered armed British seamen up to thefactory.262 The Viceroy, who obviously did not want an armed conflict,tried to calm the British in his next answer, but did not move in thesubstance of any of the questions. The prohibition on foreign womenand the use of Sedan Chairs by foreigners was an old custom and there-fore should remain. As to the proclamations, they were not meant asinsults but rather they were intended to urge the Chinese to help theforeigners, who came to a land of which they knew nothing. Their mis-interpretation of the proclamation really only showed their ignoranceof Chinese civilisation. He nevertheless promised that the issue of theforeign women was not important enough to use military force to evictthem. The Committee for the moment felt that the Viceroy, while notyielding on any of the points, had at least assured their security and thatof the factory in general.263

In November 1830, the new president and a new second memberof the Select Committee, Majorbanks and Davis, arrived in Cantonto replace the Committee members who had revolted against theformer president. However, they were equally opposed to too concil-iatory a position towards the Viceroy. They thought that this wouldbe against the impression of steadfastness the British always wanted topresent. This seemed particularly important to them since the year 1831brought events, which the EIC employees understood to be even greaterhumiliations.

During their absence from Canton outside the trading season, theFooyuen (Governor) and the Hoppo had destroyed the landing the EIChad built in front of their factories without direct permission by the gov-ernment. Furthermore, the merchants informed them that one of thelinguists had been arrested and threatened with execution because hehad not interfered with the construction of this place. While question-ing the linguists, the Fooyuen had ordered the picture of George III to be



uncovered, and had seated himself in front of it. The outrage amongstthe members of the EIC was great. They felt insulted in their nationaldignity and feared for their security since the Chinese authorities hadso easily walked into the factory. At the same time, an imperial edictwith new, stricter regulations for foreigners in Canton was published.The British saw a conspiracy to destroy their trade and national honour.To act decisively against these insults was even more important sincethe Select Committee saw itself as an authority amongst the Europeansat Canton.264 They thus tried several channels to protest against thesemeasures and asked the Supreme Government at Fort William for sup-port through navy ships. After several attempts, John Davis managed topass an address to the Viceroy who clearly denied the allegation thathe had insulted the King of England, stating that he had been unawareof the nature of the portrait. He acknowledged that the EIC had builtan additional landing place but also stated that in the future they werestill only allowed to address the Viceroy through the Hong merchants.The Committee saw themselves as the victors in this conflict, since themeasures they adopted satisfied the local authorities ‘that we will notsubmit to oppression, though we have every disposition to conduct ouraffairs amicably if possible.’265 When finally the navy ships from Indiadid arrive to protect British interests in Canton, it was thus only left tothem to present the letter by Governor-General Bentinck to the localgovernment and to obtain an answer to it. For the moment, the SelectCommittee and the naval forces from India agreed that there was no fur-ther need for action, even though there was still no security for the tradein Canton against the ‘grievances of the most severe and oppressivecharacter’.266

In the years after opening the India trade to free merchants, thegrowing influx of British subjects as country traders into Canton madeit increasingly important for the Select Committee to present them-selves as those who safeguarded British interests and the safety ofBritish subjects. ‘Britishness’ was defined as steadfastness, upright butwith peaceful and commercial character. Like the Select Committee, atrue Briton would defend the honour of Britain and the security ofits trade. While they provoked the Cantonese government on severaloccasions, by bringing women to Canton and using Sedan chairs, inparticular their toleration of and reliance on the illicit opium trade,they always portrayed themselves as the injured party, wronged by anarbitrary, malicious and aggressive government. They could thus jus-tify an increasingly aggressive approach to the restrictions in Canton,through which they probably hoped to pacify the demands of the



country merchants as well as securing their tea trade. This was partic-ularly emphasised by their repeated demand for naval support fromIndia, a measure they had avoided in all previous years and that was notappreciated by the Court of Directors in London. This wish to presentthemselves as protectors of British interests in Canton and as freedomloving Britons collided with a Qing government which was increasinglyworried by internal uprisings and the silver drain blamed on the grow-ing opium trade.267 The Select Committee however had no interest inconsidering the reasons for the Chinese emphasis on not changing theexisting regulations concerning foreigners. They could hardly questionthe opium trade since they relied on it to finance the tea trade andthey feared the loss of the charter and their special position in Canton.Moreover, the harsher measures by the Cantonese government proba-bly made them feel more insecure and made it even more important forthem to reassure themselves of their British identity, which linked themto a strong world power, represented in nearby India. In this context, thealleged insult of the British King’s portrait was particularly worrying.

At the same time, the acceptance of the more or less conciliatoryresponses by the Viceroy showed that the prime interest of the SelectCommittee was still to keep the trade going. This also allowed themto present themselves as those who could after all negotiate with theChinese officials. Nevertheless, it was this Committee which had to pre-side over the end of the EIC monopoly and the Select Committee itselfin 1834.

3.7 British honour and opium

When rumours reached the Hong merchants in 1831 that the EIC mightbe abolished, they asked the British to nominate a representative whowould be responsible for all the British in the port. The British govern-ment took this as a welcome pretext to finally establish an official rep-resentation in Canton. The China Act of 1834, which abolished the EICmonopoly in China therefore also established the office of Chief Super-intendent in Canton. He was to supervise the British subjects in the portand his main obligation was to protect the British trade with China andrepresent British interests in the port of Canton.268 The country mer-chants feared that George Staunton might be selected for this job andcontinue the conciliatory line towards the Chinese government whichhe and Plowden had stood for during the time of Select Committee.However, the King’s choice finally fell on William John, 9th Lord Napier,a Captain of the Royal Navy with no prior experience of China.269



Many historians have seen the end of the EIC monopoly in China asthe decisive turning point in British–Chinese relations, from which itwas only a matter of time until an outbreak of open hostilities betweenthe two empires.270 Glenn Melancon has recently cautioned against thisperceived automatism. He has pointed out that no member of the Britishgovernment was interested in opening hostilities with China in 1834,and that even the Superintendents, with the exception of Napier, werecautious in their approach to the Chinese authorities.271

In terms of trade, Michael Greenberg has shown that the change wasnot as dramatic as the country merchants would have had the pub-lic believe. Even before 1834, half of the British trade with China wasalready conducted by private merchants.272 According to him, the pri-vate merchants mainly hoped for stronger political support against theChinese than the EIC, and particularly its headquarters in London, wereprepared to give. However, the opening of the trade also meant increas-ing numbers of Britons trying to push into the market, both for tea andopium, thereby disturbing the balance which had existed before.273

While it is certainly important to point out that there is no inevitabletrajectory between the end of the EIC monopoly and the Opium War,the new situation after 1834 resulted in a number of developments, inthe ‘contact zone’ in Canton, which in the end made the war imagin-able and justifiable to the British public. The information networks inCanton shifted and thus brought a different set of images of China tothe forefront. The subsequent Superintendents of Trade each tried tocreate a narrative of British presence at the coast of China and specifi-cally of legitimate British trade with China which justified their newlyestablished institution. At the same time, they now also had to representthose British traders who were deeply involved in the opium smuggling.The result was the development of a meaning of China in the officialcorrespondence with London which made the idea of a military attackagainst China appear justified and desirable.

After the end of the monopoly, the tea trade quickly became an objectof speculation and shipments of tea to England increased by 40 per centin 1835. However, most of those who had entered into this speculationfailed and only those with previous knowledge and contacts, like JardineMatheson & Co., were able to profit from the opening of the China tradewith England.274 The EIC did not disappear completely from the Chinamarket, as they were allowed to keep a Finance Committee at Cantonwhich issued Bills on England to those who wanted to ship goods fromChina to London of a value of up to 600,000 pounds. This practice madeWilliam Jardine furious, but he achieved little against it in the years



leading up to the Opium War.275 On the other side of the trade, theHong merchants ran into increasing difficulty as they could no longerrely on the financial support of the Company and their assured demandfor tea. Thus, in the years following the end of the EIC monopoly, thetrade in Canton did not necessarily improve but moved into a series ofturmoil and troubles.276

The fall of the EIC monopoly meant that British and American mer-chants tried to push even more opium into the Chinese market. Bythe end of the 1830s, opium accounted for 20 per cent of total Indianrevenues.277 At the same time, the Chinese government became increas-ingly aware of the outflow of specie and the resulting ‘silver famine’,which to a large extent came to be associated with the illegal opiumtrade.278 Chinese officials now mainly associated opium addiction withthe unruly lower classes and soldiers and it was increasingly seen asa threat to the stability of the empire.279 James Polachek has givena detailed study of the inner-Chinese debate on this issue, showingthat enforcement of the opium prohibition was only adopted as policytowards the end of 1836. Before that, the idea of solving the Cantontrade problem by way of the legalisation of opium was favoured bymany, particularly in the Southern Provinces.280

The year 1834 also saw the end of the early modern system of Britishrepresentation in China, which operated through a private tradingcompany.281 The superintendents were officers of the British Crown andas such could not communicate with the Chinese Government throughthe medium of the Hong merchants without endangering the dignity ofthe British Crown. While the British government at this time certainlydid not want an armed conflict with China, the instructions also madeit clear that they did want a Crown representative in Canton, acceptedby the British merchants as well as by the Chinese authorities.282 Thetrope of British dignity therefore moved more into the centre of British–Chinese relations than ever before. This also meant, crucially, that thelong-standing relatively smooth communication and information chan-nel between the Select Committee as the de facto representatives of theBritish in the port and the Hong Merchants could no longer continue inthe same way.

The Superintendents now had to listen more carefully to the opin-ions of the former country merchants, especially Jardine and Math-eson, whom they now officially represented, at least in their legaltrade operations. Cut off from the Hong merchants, at least in officialcorrespondence, the information networks of the country merchantsnow came to dominate the image of China in this ‘contact zone’.



The events that followed the arrival of the first British Chief Super-intendent at the China coast already showed the resulting shift in themeanings of China amongst the British in Canton. This shift was notsimply due to the influence of merchants like Jardine and Matheson.Rather, the tropes and meanings developed by the Select Committeeplayed a significant role, as will be discussed below. However, the per-son of the first Superintendent as well as the intentions of Palmerstonto have a representative of the British Crown in Canton meant thatthe more conciliatory approach, favoured by the likes of Plowden,disappeared completely at this point.

Napier’s formative period in the Navy had been during the Napole-onic Wars, mainly on the coasts of France, Spain and the Mediterraneanin general.283 From this period, he adopted a discourse of oppositionto tyranny. Napier also brought the habitus of the Royal Navy toBritish–Chinese relations, which previously had only been conductedby merchants or gentlemen-merchants.

When Napier arrived in Macao in July 1834, he refused to commu-nicate his presence through the Hong merchants and insisted on ameeting with the Viceroy. To achieve this, he went to Canton with-out waiting for permission to do so. Several attempts to deliver his letterdirectly to the Viceroy failed. The situation escalated as Napier com-manded the two ships of war, which had accompanied him from Britain,to Canton. The Chinese authorities put Napier under house arrest andstopped the trade, which slowly turned the British trading communityagainst Napier, especially the Parsee merchants. When Napier finallydecided that the only thing he could do was to return to Macao, theChinese authorities delayed his journey. Weakened by fever, Napierreached Macao and died on 11 October 1834.284

Much has been made of the influence of the country merchants, espe-cially Jardine and Matheson, on Napier’s aggressive approach againstChina.285 Melancon has refuted this by highlighting that Napier hadalready decided on a ‘forward’ strategy against China on route fromBritain, before having met Matheson.286 While it is undoubtedly impor-tant to point this out, Melancon fails to explain how Napier arrived athis decision. It certainly did not appear out of a vacuum, as Melancondescribes it. Tracing Napier’s knowledge of China and the way he jus-tified which image of China to use reveals how the British imperialexpansion transformed and multiplied images of China, and moreparticularly how ideas formed in Asia interacted with those from Britain.

Napier’s image of China was probably influenced by the discussion inBritain about the end of the monopoly, in which the country merchants



and their supporters in Britain had a strong voice.287 On his voyage toChina, he carefully studied the brief the Foreign Office and the Direc-tors of the EIC had prepared for him, and which seems to have consistedmainly of the Records of the EIC.288 In contrast to the brief for Macart-ney, the works of the Jesuits with their positive appraisal of China seemnot to have been included in Napier’s preparation for his new positions.The meanings of China formed by the Select Committee and discussedabove were thus highly influential for Napier’s decision.289 This includedthe idea of parts of the Select Committee that the only way to achievebetter trading conditions was to take a firm stand against the Chineseauthorities. This fitted very well with the personal ambitions of LordNapier, who, from the very moment he had persuaded the King toappoint him, pushed for the extension of his power to that of a fullambassador;290 an ambition, which Palmerston rejected vehemently.291

On his journey from Britain and during his initial stay in China,Napier clearly adopted those meanings of China which had been devel-oped in the ‘contact zones’ in Canton and Southeast Asia, which showsthat these meanings had already been transferred to the British Islesto a considerable extent. His personal ambition and his experience inthe British navy during the Napoleonic Wars led him to choose theidea of China developed by those eager to change the status quo ofBritish–Chinese relations. Even after his arrival in Canton, he supportedmost of his decisions by pointing towards the records of the SelectCommittee.292 While the country merchants certainly were an influenceon him, Napier also doubted at times their loyalty to his course.293

Napier described the Chinese population as industrious and naturalsales men, who were only suppressed by their tyrannical government:

The house of every Chinaman in these extensive suburbs, is a shopof one sort of another. Every man is constantly at work; nobody seenloitering about and idle; and, in fact, every man is a merchant [empha-sis UH]; yet does one of these same Edicts [ordering Napier to obeyChinese customs and traditions] speak of the ‘petty affairs of com-merce’, - as if commerce were a matter of no concern to the empire!294

His entire approach was based on the assumption that the Chinesepeople could be persuaded to support the British against their owngovernment. In particular, Napier again picked up on Macartney’s inter-pretation of the position of the Manchu dynasty in China: ‘If theEmperor refuses on demand – remind him that he is only an Intruder



and that it would be his good policy to secure himself on his throne bygratifying the wish of his people.’295 He was so sure of the good dispo-sition of the Chinese population that he claimed that a military strikeagainst China could end without any civilian bloodshed, as the Chinesepopulation would not oppose an English attack against their Manchugovernors.296

He therefore also issued a declaration to the people of Canton explain-ing that he was sent by the King of Great Britain and as requested by theChinese Viceroy, despite John Davis urging not to do so.297 The responsefrom the Chinese authorities in Canton was short and threatening,calling for Napier to be beheaded. However, Napier saw himself justi-fied as allegedly the people of Canton took no note of this demeaningproclamation.298

Napiers description of the Chinese as industrious salespeople is typicalfor the period between the end of the EIC monopoly and the OpiumWar. It should be noted that there was a particular emphasis on theinherent capacity of the Chinese for trade, rather than as field workers,as in Southeast Asia, or as craftsmen, as in earlier descriptions of Chinaby the Jesuits.

After the Napier-debacle, George Best Robinson, a former member ofthe Select Committee, became the Chief Superintendent. He decidedto remain relatively un-active and waited for instructions from Londonon how to proceed further. However, one should not interpret this asa definitive decision against a more aggressive policy against China, assome historians have done.299 One of Robinson’s first acts was to send aseries of essays about the state of China, which he had requested fromGützlaff, to Palmerston. Robinson had explicitly chosen Gützlaff to pro-vide this information because the latter ‘adopting the Dress, habits andwhat is more surprising, the language of the people, has associated withthem on a familiar footing in various places, known formerly to noEuropean and now only to a few.’300

In 1835, Karl Gützlaff, who had accompanied the country merchantson their smuggling trips up the coast became the second interpreterfor the Superintendents. His influence on British ideas on China wasto be significant. Gützlaff had been born in Pyritz in Pomerania in1803. He first went to Asia for the Netherlands Missionary Societywith the intention of working as a missionary in the interior of Suma-tra. After a meeting with Robert Morrison in London, he began to beinterested in China. When he had to abandon his original plan of work-ing in Sumatra due to unrests, he came to Java in 1827, where hemet William Medhurst, who was working there for the LMS mission



to China amongst the Chinese diaspora, and started to learn Chinese.From there he moved to Siam, where he worked amongst the Chinesethere. He adopted a Chinese name and tried to assimilate himself com-pletely to the Chinese style of life. He made his first approach to Chinaon a Chinese junk from Siam, travelling up the Chinese coast as faras Tientsin. On his return to Macao, he met with Robert Morrison,and from there he embarked on his next journey up the coast onthe Select Committee-sponsored trip of the ship ‘Amherst’ as inter-preter to Hamilton Lindsay. His third journey was on the Sylph, a shipowned by Jardine and Matheson to smuggle opium. Afterwards, whileworking as occasional interpreter for the British merchants Gützlaffrepeatedly attempted to enter into China’s interior, getting as far asFukien. However, his presence increasingly attracted the attention ofthe authorities.301

Thus, Gützlaff was very much a product of the networks of empire,which also linked the Dutch and British imperial presence in Asia. Eventhough of German origin, Gützlaff soon associated himself fully withthe English. In his tracts, he always speaks of the English in terms of‘we’ and ‘our nation’ or ‘our sovereign’.302 This was in addition to hisattempts of submerging himself in the Chinese life style.

Country merchants and their interpreter, Gützlaff, had differentaccess to information about China than the EIC Select Committee,which had mainly cooperated closely with the Hong merchants. Thesenew networks of information were with the Chinese out merchantsalong the coast, the places the smuggling boats visited and informa-tion about the central government acquired through them. The imageof China created through these networks of information was that of aweak Empire, that was unable to cope with its coastal defence, and ofa population very interested in commerce that would willingly surren-der to anybody attempting to defeat the corrupt Mandarins who haltedcommerce and the spread of Christianity.303

With the end of the Select Committee, this image became even moreprominent in the official correspondence between Canton and London,which now was a correspondence between an officer of the crown andthe Foreign Office. At the same time, a group of British merchants,led by Jardine, Matheson and James Innes, relentlessly argued for amore aggressive policy against the Chinese government, openly dis-cussing military action in the Canton Register and lobbying the Britishgovernment to send a naval force to China.304

The essays written by Gützlaff discussed Chinese military power, thepossibility of opening trade with other ports along the Chinese coast



and the way Britain should interact with the Chinese authorities.305

Gützlaff based his arguments mainly on observations he had made dur-ing his journeys up the China coast and his forays into the Chineseinterior, and on official Chinese publications which he had probablyacquired during these trips and through contacts in Canton. In theseessays, Gützlaff developed a narrative which justifies foreign powerover China and the Chinese. He characterises the Chinese governmentand its Mandarins as corrupt, arrogant and in perpetual fear of foreignattacks on the empire, desperately trying to hold an empire togetherwhich they were no longer able to control. In contrast to this, the com-mon people are described as friendly, industrious and eager to tradewith the British and to accept their goods as well as their religion. Heemphasised that the Chinese Empire, especially the coastal regions, wasdependent on the trade with Britain. In this context, Gützlaff also sep-arated the ruling Manchus from the Chinese population, characterisingthe former as not industrious and wanting skills. Both were presented astimid, taking flight at the first sight of a firearm.306

The idea of an industrious population that was eager to interact withthe British and that was only hindered by its corrupt authorities was alsoat the centre of other efforts by the British community in Canton andMacao to change British–Chinese relations.

Explicitly following the example of India, Gützlaff and the countrymerchants, with the support of the Superintendent of trade, set up the‘society for the diffusion of useful knowledge in China’ in November1834. In the inaugural proceedings, printed for general distribution inAsia and Britain, the Jesuit image of China was finally refuted, while stillallowing China its special position amongst the Asian countries:

The favourable accounts of the Chinese empire, given by the Jesuits,have engendered in many the belief that the state of literature andmorals in China is far superior to that of other countries. Hence, toattempt improvement here, would only serve to degrade a nationwhich has reached the climax or human perfection. On this misrep-resentation, most absurd and mischievous theories have been built.[. . .] While we must reject such views as false, we cannot regard theChinese as incapable of rising and viewing with the most enlightenednations of the earth. Of all the Asiatics we regard them as the mostprepared for the reception of useful knowledge.307

The hopes of those behind this enterprise were directed towards the‘common people’ who did not have the arrogance of the ‘learned



Chinese’.308 The ‘Morrison Education Society’, set up by the samegroup of people, shortly afterwards in February 1835, had a similaraim, namely to educate the Chinese population. It wanted to establishschools in China, where Chinese children would learn Chinese as wellas English and read English books and the Bible.309

Another attempt to win over the Chinese by raising their esteem ofthe British nation was the establishment of a hospital at Macao.310 Civil-ising the Chinese thus became part of the attempt to open China toBritish trade, particularly the opium import.

The huge effort of collecting and translating information about Chinain these years, mainly by Gützlaff, led to the feeling on the part of theBritish in the ‘contact zone’ that China was no longer the unknownentity, but rather that they understood China and its politics and couldengage with China on its own terms. As James Polachek has pointedout, these improved information networks led the British in Canton tobelieve that the opium trade would be legalised sooner or later.311 Theharsh approach by Commissioner Lin, however, more or less took themcompletely by surprise. This also highlights the fact that the Britishonly had access to the information networks at the coast, but had littleunderstanding of politics of the Qing court in Beijing.

In 1836, the fraction of the court in Beijing in favour of strict oppres-sion of the opium trade gained power. Charles Elliot, who had beenappointed Chief of the Trade Commission in China by Palmerstonreplacing George Robinson in 1836, decided not to be too alarmed bythe first warning signs: steps taken by the Canton authorities to pun-ish Chinese smugglers and opium traders and to evict British opiummerchants in 1837.312 He was still certain that the Chinese economydepended too heavily on foreign trade to interrupt it significantly,despite the rhetoric of the Chinese officials.313

The main concern for Elliot and Palmerston during these years was toconvince the Chinese authorities to accept Elliot as a representative ofthe British crown, and by this, to accept at least the equality of Britain tothe Chinese Empire. Elliot certainly hoped to solve the impending trad-ing crisis through more communication, and acceptance of his status bythe Chinese authorities. However, the British metropolis and the periph-ery of its empire clashed in their views how this could be achieved.Palmerston, in the few letters he wrote to Elliot, worked on the assump-tion that Britain’s might and power had to be accepted naturally byall people in the world. Elliot, by contrast, tried to negotiate with theambivalences of the ‘contact zone’, where British power was known to acertain extent, but where the Chinese authorities still hoped to contain



this power.314 After the Napier disaster and Robinson’s attempt to simplylie still until directions would come from England, Elliot decided thatthe best way forward would be to re-open the communication chan-nel through the Hong merchants and use the word ‘pin’ on letters tothe Viceroy despite its translation as ‘petition’.315 He even maintainedthis practice after Palmerston had interdicted it, who claimed that bothdiminished the dignity of the British crown.316 Elliot only responded byfinding ways around Palmerston’s demand. For example, arguing thatChinese officers of the same rank as himself addressed the Viceroy in thesame way.317 Slowly progressing in this way Elliot gained communica-tion with the Chinese authorities, mainly through the Hong merchants.In 1838, he even achieved direct communication with the Viceroy,an achievement that would soon be lost again during the increasingtensions of the following year.318

To Elliot and Palmerston, it was of the utmost importance that theChinese authorities should recognise the representative of the BritishCrown in his full dignity, thus acknowledging the dignity of themonarch he represented. This was also important to give him author-ity over the British subjects in Canton, who on the one hand wishedmore support from Britain for their aggressive strategy against China’strade conditions, but on the other hand, did not want to be told whatthey ought to do, or be restricted in their increasingly dangerous opiumsmuggling.319 In Elliot’s letters to Palmerston, the question of how tocommunicate with the Chinese authorities and his role as Superinten-dent is almost more prominent than the growing crisis in Canton. Theestablishment of the Superintendence thus had made it crucial for theBritish government and its representative that the Chinese governmentshould recognise it as equal, as everything else would mean a loss ofhonour and dignity. Elliot’s actions in 1839, which certainly aggravatedthe crisis, were thus a logical sequel to the Napier episode, and to a greatextent, the result of the political wish of Palmerston. While the latterdid not desire a war with China, at the same time, he wanted to seethe British flag finally honoured by the Chinese. Local knowledge aboutChinese customs and Elliot’s initial attempts to accommodate these inhis dealings with them were no longer accepted in the metropolis.

The crisis about opium smuggling reached a new climax in March1839, when the court in Beijing decided to send Lin Tse-hsu, an asso-ciate of the so called Spring Purification Party, to Canton with specialpowers to enforce the anti-opium legislation and to end the opiumtrade.320 He demanded that all opium should be handed over to himby the foreign merchants. In December 1838, the crisis had been solved



by a partial handover and negotiations through the Hong merchants. InMarch 1839, however, the situation escalated due to the determinationof Commissioner Lin to end the opium trade and the decision of CharlesElliot to interfere. Elliot did not consider the merchants capable of nego-tiating with the Chinese in this situation.321 Elliot famously took it uponhimself to guarantee compensation of any property the British mer-chants handed over to the Chinese, collected all the opium and passedit to Commissioner Lin on 21 May 1839 who destroyed an estimated2 million pounds worth of opium.322

Most works on the Opium War emphasise the economic motive ofthe growing British Empire for military action, highlighting the wayin which opium had become a central trading good for the supportof Britain’s Asian expansion, while remaining prohibited in China.323

They are divided about the role of opium, seeing it either as central tothe conflict or suggesting that the conflict might have erupted in anyevent as the expanding British Empire and the restrictive policies of theChinese Empire collided.324 Glenn Melancon has correctly pointed outthat the final decision to go to war had as much to do with the poli-tics of the Melbourne government in London as with the situation inCanton. According to him, the main reason for the cabinet’s decisionwas to safeguard British honour internationally.325

Certainly, as far as the economic interest of British merchants andBritish India in the opium trade were concerned, this clampdown onthe trade was the ultimate catastrophe. However, it were the meaningsof China which had developed in the ‘contact zone’ in Canton thatdetermined the way Elliot dealt with the tensions and actions whichthe Qing court’s new policy on opium produced. On the one hand, herelied on the good will of the Chinese population, constructed as aboveas industrious, commercial and oppressed by corrupt Mandarins.326 Onthe other, for a long time the idea of the corrupt and duplicitous natureof Chinese officials led Elliot to doubt that official declarations wouldactually be acted upon.327 The understanding of the Chinese legal sys-tem developed in the previous decade also meant that at the height ofthe crisis, in June 1839, he refused to compromise with the Chinese overthe handover of a murderer, something which had still been possible in1820.328

This was closely connected with the attempts by Elliot and the mer-chants to develop a narrative of legal trade and British dignity inCanton. In a memorial to Palmerston in May 1839, the Britishmerchants emphasised that the trade in opium had been quasi-legal andfully tolerated by the Chinese authorities at the China coast, who had



profited considerably from it.329 At the same time, Elliot was worriedby the potential threats the opium trade posed to both the economyof the British Empire and the dignity of the British crown. He repeat-edly warned Palmerston that the over reliance of the British trade withChina on opium smuggling could endanger the entire trade with thatcountry.330 However, for a long time similar to the British merchants hetried to describe the opium smuggling as a more or less legal trade, con-ducted with the full knowledge of the Chinese authorities. The moreit became clear that the Chinese authorities might indeed clamp downon the opium trade, the more Elliot got worried about the dignity ofthe British flag if it was seen to be protecting an illegal trade. After theMay crisis, which led to the destruction of British opium, he increas-ingly emphasised that his main interest was to secure a ‘honorable trade’between the two countries, which could however also include the legal-isation of the opium trade.331 He was probably concerned about the lossof the tea trade, which was important for British revenue as well as theBritish population, who consumed this good en masse. While Elliot wasacutely aware of the economic importance of opium for the British inIndia and in London, he also believed that this revenue could only besaved in the long run if the trade became legal. Any further reliance onsmuggling could only be dangerous.332

This was also Palmerston’s concern when he finally mentioned theopium trade in his correspondence with the Superintendents: ‘herMajesty’s Government cannot interfere for the purpose of enablingBritish subjects to violate the laws of the country to which they trade.’333

In general, however, Palmerston seems to have decided to ignore the factthat opium smuggling formed the very basis of both, British economicinterests in Asia and the problems with the Chinese, thus avoiding themoral dilemma.

Elliot’s decision to join the besieged British merchants in Canton andto guarantee the opium handed over was part of the attempt to savewhat he defined as the legal trade in Canton. Even more than that, itwas an expression of his authority and position. Wearing full naval uni-form he tried to emphasise to the Chinese authorities and to the Britishmerchants that British trade with China was not just a private matterconducted by merchants, but a matter of great concern to Britain andthe British Empire.

For those in Canton, military action had long been an option. Whilethey sometimes argued against a war, they increasingly claimed thatthe British had to show their power to the Chinese to achieve theiraims. The country merchants and even the EIC Select Committee had



demanded a show of force since the mid 1820s, even if they had notat that time advocated a full-scale war. The merchants certainly had anincreasing economic interest in changing trading conditions in China,especially after 1837, a trading interest which linked them to the restof the British Empire in Asia. The desire of the missionaries to ‘openChina’ to Christianity conveniently coincided with the discourse ofthe merchant community that China had to be opened to interna-tional trade. However, they always had difficulties reconciling militaryaction to protect the opium trade with Christian doctrine and thus oftenargued against war.334 Most Britons in the ‘contact zone’ in Cantonhad created the image of a Chinese population as willing and naturaltraders, open to new ideas, suppressed by arrogant and corrupt Man-darins, a population which would welcome a military invention by theBritish.

Since Napier, the Superintendents had held an ambivalent positiontowards the use of force against the Chinese. However, both Robinsonand Elliot were busy gathering all necessary intelligence for such a step.Their assessment of their own role, especially under Elliot, as a directenvoy of the British Crown rather than just a mere merchant, gave evengreater importance to honour and a narrative of a supposedly legal trade,sometimes including opium in Canton. However, by May 1839, therewas no way in which Elliot could still assume that the Chinese authori-ties would finally acknowledge his position and treat him as he deemedappropriate. At this point, the Chinese under Commissioner Lin and theBritish under Elliot had decided that compromise was not possible.

While Lin assumed that he had gained the upper hand over theforeigners,335 Elliot believed that nothing but a military campaignagainst the Chinese Empire, including the demand for compensation forthe opium, could re-establish trade on a secure footing. In his view, thismilitary action could be a ‘swift and heavy blow’ as opposed to a large-scale war, which would become inevitable if the British did not showthe might of their power now.336 A central element in Elliot’s consider-ations was the idea that the Chinese population would welcome suchan attack on those disrupting trade.337 Until the British government inIndia or Britain decided to send sufficient warships, stoppage of tradewas the only weapon Elliot had, a situation from which the Americansprofited greatly.338

Throughout 1839, armed encounters between the British and theChinese increased and there was no sign of a change of Chinese poli-tics. In June 1840, a British fleet arrived in the sea of Macao and Canton,which marked the beginning of the Opium War.339 The images of China



which had been created in Canton and transferred back to Britain con-tributed to a great extend to the pressure under which the Melbourneministry finally decided to go to war.

The first major attack on China by a European power ended withChina’s defeat in 1842, sealed by the treaty of Nanjing. As a result ofthe war, the island of Hong Kong was ceded to the British which createda new ‘contact zone’ between the British, British Indian subjects and theChinese, under British imperial rule. It also abolished the Cohong sys-tem and allowed certain access for the British to the Chinese interior.Thus, in 1842, the Canton system and its networks of information cameto an end for good.

Canton was a long way away from the Royal Pavilion in Brighton andthe imagination of the Prince Regent as a mythical Chinese character.Here, at the edge of the Chinese Empire, the Chinese were daily socialcontacts for the British, and the decisions of the Qing officials had directeffect on their lives. Consequently, the meaning of China these Britonsheld differed from what might have been prevalent in other parts of theBritish expansion or indeed in Britain itself. The close contact betweenthe employees of the EIC, the country merchants and the missionar-ies meant that they influenced each others’ views on China and theChinese more strongly than this was the case between their counterpartsin Britain. Especially questions of national honour and the acquisitionand the creation and use of knowledge about the Chinese as a means togain power were more significant in Canton.

They tried to assemble knowledge about Chinese language, law andreligion in order to empower the British community in their interactionswith the Chinese. In particular towards the end of the period studiedthis meant that they tried to impose British norms on Qing officials andto ensure that Britain was represented according to the British image ofthemselves.

Britons who had lived in Canton considered themselves ‘Chinaexperts’ and tried to establish themselves as such in British public opin-ion. In the crucial years before the Opium War, the knowledge aboutChina which the British held to be true, therefore, had to a great extentbeen created in the specific conditions of the ‘contact zone’ in Canton.These ‘local experts’ however had very limited access to Chinese intel-lectual and political networks. For example, they seem to have beenunaware of any of the four principal academies in Canton, such as theXuehai Tang, founded in 1820 by the Governor-General Ruan Yuan andseveral Chinese foreign-trade merchant philanthropists.340 They werealso strongly influenced by knowledge created in other parts of Britain’s



Asian Empire, in India and Southeast Asia. In particular, ideas developedabout language, indigenous law, conversion and education in India weretransferred and applied in the Chinese context. India also served as anexample when it came to analysing the political situation in China. Par-ticularly in the period after 1834, when the idea of a military strikeagainst China was increasingly favoured, the Manchus were equatedwith the Mughals in India. This made it possible to imagine the Chineseas oppressed people, needing to be freed from the corrupt Mandarinsand who even had to be educated and enlightened by the British fortheir own good.

On the eve of the Opium War, China had become part of the imagina-tion networks of the British imperial expansion, linking it to India andother Asian cultures rather than viewing it as a civilisation on a par withEurope. However, Britain’s imperial expansion did not only provide pat-terns by which the British in Canton formed their ideas and knowledgeof China. It also created other ‘contact zones’ with the Chinese and theQing Empire, which strongly influenced British thoughts about China.


4South and Southeast AsianEncounters

The British Empire and its European rivals were not the only expandingempires in Asia in the second half of the 18th century. In the 1750s, theQing Empire under Qianlong had expanded to include the large westernarea, the Xinjiang province, into its territory. Qianlong had also tried,albeit not very successfully, to ensure Chinese military supremacy overBurma and Vietnam in the 1760s and 1780s. In the 1790s, he man-aged to tighten his grip on Tibet and defeat the Gurkhas in Nepal.At the same time, Chinese immigration from the southern provincesto Southeast Asia increased.1 Within the same 50 years, Britain beganto establish its empire in India, starting in Bengal which bordered onNepal. From Bengal and Madras, the British tried to extend their influ-ence into Burma and Vietnam. The unsolved question of the China tradeand the Napoleonic Wars brought the British to Southeast Asia. Wherethose expanding empires and the networks of their populations met,new contact zones sprang into existence in which the British meaningof China was shaped and transformed.

Under the conditions of the ‘contact zone’ in India, the insecurity and‘information panics’2 of an expanding power were pivotal for Britishideas about Chinese religion, language and customs. Moreover, theBritish here came into contact with the central Asian extension of theChinese Empire, where the Manchu emphasised other aspects of theirculture than in Southern China.

While the ‘contact zone’ on the Indian border was to diminish inimportance over this period, the increasing expansion of Britain inSoutheast Asia was to make this an important ‘contact zone’ between theBritish and the Overseas Chinese. Here, for the first time, the British hadcontact with the Chinese without the restrictions imposed by the QingEmpire and often in a situation where they were the colonial power.

106


South and Southeast Asian Encounters 107

These factors made Southeast Asia one of the prominent sites for theformation of British knowledge on China and the Chinese.

4.1 China’s neighbour

Ever since the EIC had gained supremacy in Bengal in 1765, they foundthemselves distant neighbours to the Qing sphere of influence. WhileChina was never the main focus of the British in India, it still figuredprominently in the reflections connected with the new North easternborder.3 This neighbourhood was mainly characterised by a completelack of information. From the 1770s onwards, the Company tried to fillthe white map with knowledge on the state of affairs between the Ben-gal frontier and that of the Chinese Empire. These explorations fittedin well with the general programme of the Company in India, whichwas to assert British power not just by way of military, diplomatic andeconomic means, but also by gaining information about those whomthey wanted to rule or subject to the influence of the Company.4 How-ever, this also meant that they quickly came into conflict with therulers of the neighbouring areas, such as the expanding kingdom of theGurkhas.5

The Company almost considered Bengal’s old trading connections asbeing their inherited right, which entitled them to expand their eco-nomic influence towards the region that separated them from China,especially Nepal and Tibet. Thus, from the 1770s onwards, the Britishemployees of the EIC in India started to collect information aboutChina in the context of the intelligence-gathering that accompaniedthe British conquest of India.6 While in Canton issues of translation,national dignity, law, religion and commerce dominated the meaningof China in the eyes of the British, in India this was influenced by theanxieties of an expanding power, the need for military information andthe fears and suspicions resulting from the lack of it. Also, such infor-mation as the British were able to obtain came from different sources:from the Tibetans and from the Nepalese but hardly ever directly fromthe Qing officials or the Han Chinese.

The China the British had to come to terms with was a distant empirewhich nevertheless acted as a restrictive force for British action in theregion. To the few British who went into the Chinese sphere of influ-ence, not protected by the Canton system and the knowledge built upin this context, this encounter could be more threatening on a personallevel than to those in Canton. Thomas Manning for example, an eccen-tric British traveller, finally decided to abandon his attempt to enter



China through Tibet because he feared for his safety and life.7 Most ofthe time there was no direct contact and China was more of a rumour,a chimerical threat to British interests, the exact influence of which inthe Himalayan region the British found difficult to establish.8 WithoutHoppos, Viceroys and Hong merchants, the will of those who restrictedBritish progress into the Himalayas and North-West China seemed to beeven more diffuse.

The first attempt to understand China’s North-West expansion wasmade under Warren Hastings’s governorship. In these early years, lit-tle was known about the countries beyond Bengal’s frontier or aboutthe power relations amongst them. Hastings and his colleagues of theEIC were particularly interested in finding out the extent to which theChinese really exercised influence in these mountainous regions bor-dering Bengal. On the one hand, the strategists of the EIC seem tohave wondered how far they might be able to extend their economicand political influence without colliding with the Chinese Empire. Onthe other hand, Hastings was fascinated by the idea of finding anotherentrance to China and access to the Chinese market. In this contexttherefore, and more so than in Canton, China was seen as a major powerin Asia, while its position as a desirable economic market continued.This latter point was not just important in relation to possible tradewith China through the Himalayas but also due to the EIC system ofremitting their money back to Britain via the tea trade in Canton. Theseaspects would be crucial for the British perceptions of the countries theyencountered between Bengal and China, mainly Tibet and Nepal. Inthese contacts, ideas about Chinese religion and language again playeda crucial role. However, different influences produced chains of associa-tions which made up the images of China which served a very differentpolitical situation than in Canton.

In 1774, the young Scottish EIC servant George Bogle set out on adiplomatic mission to the Panchen Lama in Tibet, thus making him-self the first Briton to reach the ‘mountain kingdom’. As Kate Teltscherrecently described, this led to a journey of culture-crossings, whichwould briefly connect the two empires and four cultures.9 In 1772, theCompany had interfered in a conflict between Bhutan and Cooch Beharon the side of the latter. As a result, the Panchen Lama, alarmed by thepossibility of a British occupation of Bhutan, sent a letter to WarrenHastings, asking him to end any hostilities against the Bhutanese.10 ForHastings, this was a welcome occasion to establish closer relations withTibet, something the Court of Directors had hoped for since at least1768.11 The main object was to expand British trade into Tibet, Nepal



and China, and to collect information about these regions. He thussent Bogle to Lhasa to open ‘mutual and equal communication of trade’between Tibet and Bengal. In addition, he was to gather informationabout the roads between Bengal and Lhasa, the communication betweenLhasa and its neighbour, their government, revenue and manners.12 Ina memorandum on Tibet, Hastings emphasised that he was particularlyinterested in having ‘any facts relative to the state of Tibet with respectto China and Tartary.’13

The Qing had continuously extended their influence over Tibet fromthe early 18th century onwards, tightening their control on inner-Tibetan affairs in 1750. Tibet was of a considerable importance for theQing, since they tried to consolidate their rule over the Central AsianMongolians by their public embrace of Tibetan Buddhism.14 Bogle, how-ever, never met any official of the Qing Empire during his journey andstay in Tibet. Still there was a constant presence of the idea of Chinesepower. On the one had, Bogle accepted Chinese overlordship over Tibet,on the other, he doubted that the Chinese influence could actuallyrestrict British interests in the region. Accordingly, Bogle considered thatthe reference to Chinese power only served as a pretext for the Tibetanauthorities to hinder his progress.15 The expedition first came to a haltat Tassisudon, the capital of Bhutan. Shortly before his arrival, the EICenvoy had received a letter from the Panchen Lama. This letter stipu-lated that Bogle would not be permitted to proceed further into Tibet.The reason given was that the Emperor of China did not permit theLama to admit any foreigners from India into his domain. Bogle con-sidered this to be a mere pretext, although he was unable to conjectureupon the real cause of the unwillingness of the Lama to allow him toproceed. He even maintained this suspicion when the Deb Rajah inTassisudon confirmed the Lama’s argument. According to Bogle, he only‘magnified the affair of China’.16 In the end, Bogle was allowed to pro-ceed to Dechenrubje, where the Panchen Lama resided, but was unableto procure the permit to proceed to Lhasa. Bogle considered the reasonfor this to be the ‘jealous and suspicious temper’ of the Gesub Rimboché,who conducted government business during the minority of the DalaiLama as a Regent in Lhasa, and his fear to draw the anger of the Chinese,who were as ‘jealous and suspicious as himself’.17 This contrasts withhis representations of the Tibetans and Bhutanese as ‘noble savages’and his positive account of the Lama as a wise, noble leader.18 In hisnegotiations with the Lama about the commencing of trade, Bogle triedto counter the constant references to the sovereignty of the Chineseemperor over Tibet as a hindrance to trade. He tried to assure the Lama



that he was to be considered the ruler of the country in all affairs, despitethe formal overlordship of the Chinese Emperor.19 In this, he respondedto a certain degree to the attempts of the Panchen Lama to conducthis own foreign policy, independently of the Chinese Emperor and theLhasa Regent.20

At the same time, Bogle hoped to profit from the connection of theLama with the Emperor of China. In his report about the trade in Tibet,Bogle highlighted the strong trading links between Lhasa and China.21

Even more promising, the Panchen Lama had suggested that on his nextjourney to Beijing he would ask for a passport for Bogle to proceed tothe Chinese capital. Bogle happily accepted the offer of support, eventhough he was sceptical of the chances of success.22 In the end, thisattempt to reach China from the West came to nothing. The PanchenLama died in Beijing in 1780, without having been able to procurethe permit for Bogle to go to China. It is likely that the Lama did notaddress the wishes of Warren Hastings during his stay in Beijing, butreports by the gosein, Purangir, who accompanied him, emphasised thatthe Panchen Lama had actually spoken warmly in favour of his Britishfriends.23 The Company therefore continued to see Tibet as a possibleroute to China and hoped to establish stable trade even after the deathsof both – the Lama and Bogle – had put an end to the first successfulestablishment of contact.

In 1783, Hastings sent Samuel Turner to Tibet on the pretext of con-gratulating the Tibetans on the discovery of the 6th incarnation of theLama in the body of a young child. Turner met with even stronger resis-tance to his wishes than Bogle had, which he also mainly attributedto the influence of the Chinese authority over the country, which inhis opinion had spoiled the Tibetans’ character. Nevertheless, he stillhad high hopes for a commercial connection between Bengal and Tibetin the future and was sure that in the end this would give them theopportunity to send an envoy to Beijing.24

An understanding of China’s religions specific to the British in Bengalwas an important factor in these considerations. The hope was that theLama as a mediator would have sufficient influence on the Emperor.In the reports, Qianlong’s interest in Tibet and the Lama is mainlyexplained by his religious veneration of the Lama, showing him to bea deeply religious person. In Canton, as well as in Britain, Confucian-ism was seen as the major spiritual influence on the Chinese, whileBuddhism and Taoism were considered to be superstitions mainly fol-lowed by the lower orders. In contrast to this, the encounters in the‘contact zone’ on the border of British power in India led to Buddhism



being seen as a much more important feature of Chinese religious life.This is the only context in which Bogle refers to the ‘Tartar’ origin ofQianlong, giving this as a reason for him being a Buddhist. Bogle isnot concerned with the question of how Buddhism relates to the otherChinese ‘religions’, Taoism and Confucianism, but seems to accept Bud-dhism as the main religion of China.25 He might well have lacked adeeper prior knowledge about China and thus had to base his under-standing of Qianlong’s and Chinese religiosity on the accounts of thePanchen Lama who of course was mainly concerned with Qianlongas a Buddhist monarch. Bogle therefore also emphasises the depen-dence of the Chinese emperor on the Panchen Lama. According tohim, Qianlong did not undertake any expedition without consultingthe Lama.26 Here, Bogle clearly accepted the Lama’s version of therelationship between the Chinese emperor and the Tibetan Lamas. AsEvelyn Rawski has pointed out, the Qing emperors in general and Qian-long in particular, tried to stress the subordination of the Lamas tothem, while the Lama tried to emphasise the Lama–patron relationshipbetween him and the emperor, thus establishing his spiritual power overhim.27 Bogle translated these Central Asian power relations into thoseof medieval Europe: To him, the Panchen Lama was a better and wiserPope while the Chinese emperor could be equated with the Germanemperor.28

During the Macartney embassy, these aspects would become impor-tant again. Since the reception of Macartney took place in Chengede,the Manchu Residence, Qianlong presented himself there as the patronof Tibetan Buddhism and thus conveyed this image to Macartney. In hisobservations on Chinese religion, Macartney therefore concluded thatthe Tartars follow the religion of Fo, as it is practiced by the Dalai Lama.He clearly separated the Buddhism of the court from that followed bythe masses, which he considered to be simple idolatry. At Chengede,he was also confronted with Qianlong’s representation of himself as anincarnate ruler, an idea which followed Mongol patterns of rule legit-imisation. Without being able to understand the political implicationsof this claim, Macartney attributed it to the extravagant superstition of asuccessful monarch, equating it to Alexander’s claim to divine descent.29

China thus still held the meaning of a huge potential market, closeddue to the suspicious and jealous nature of the Chinese. However, thiscould be overcome by a mediator like the Lama, who would be able toaddress the religious side of the ruling Manchu. The religious devotionof the Chinese Emperor, Qianlong, was therefore far more emphasisedin this ‘contact zone’ than it was in Canton. Another main difference



was that for the EIC in India, the meaning of China as a major, andexpanding, Asian power was of great importance, whereas in Canton,hardly anybody considered China under this aspect. Already during theBogle mission, this facet had become important in the description ofQianlong. Bogle characterised him as having ‘a violent and imperioustemper’. He wrote that during Qianlong’s conquests in Central Asia, themonarch had used ‘arts unworthy of a great monarch’ to subdue his ene-mies. The Scot predicted that in the near future there would be a rupturewith Russia, in which the Chinese could not be victorious. Qianlongwould nevertheless attempt the fight due to his haughty personality.30

It is highly likely that Bogle adopted this view of Qianlong as a violent,war-loving conqueror from the Lama, who appears to have given him aless than positive picture of the Chinese Emperor.31

In Bogle’s report, this characterisation of a warmonger had mainlybeen restricted to the Emperor himself. However, with the growing crisisbetween the British and Nepal on the one side and between the Nepaleseand the Chinese on the other, the meaning of a military power to reckonwith was increasingly attributed to the Chinese in general – independentof their emperor.

The conquests of the Ghurkha Kingdom in Nepal since the 1760s firstbrought the British into a potential direct conflict with the ChineseEmpire.32 As in Canton, a potential conflict between the two Empiresmeant that British identity and its acceptance by the Chinese becameimportant. In the Himalayas, however, the British presented themselvesdifferently to their countrymen at the South China coast.

The new Ghurkha power in Nepal led to several border conflictswith the EIC in Bengal as well as some with Tibet.33 In particular, thenew rulers frustrated British trading interests in Nepal.34 In 1791, theGurkhas invaded Tibet because the Tibetans had not paid the indem-nity agreed upon after the first attack in 1789. They captured Shigatseand plundered the monastery of the Panchen Lama at Tashilhunpo. Thistime, however, a Chinese force arrived to secure their protectorate Tibetbefore the Gurkhas could retreat with their booty. The Chinese defeatedthe Gurkhas, who were forced to agree to give up their loot and sendtribute missions to Beijing once every five years. The Chinese used theoccasion to strengthen their hold on Tibet, influencing the way a newDalai Lama was selected. The Tibetans had already asked the British forhelp in the conflict of 1789. In 1792, they hoped for British neutrality,while the Ghurkhas sought their support. Cornwallis, however, then theGovernor-General of Bengal, seems to have been little prepared to enterinto a war in the Himalayas. He only agreed to send Colonel Kirkpatrick



to Nepal to mediate between the fighting parties. However, by the timehe arrived, the Gurkahs had already surrendered to the Chinese and hecould do no more than to try and assure the goodwill of the Gurkhas tothe Company despite their lack of armed support.35

However, his mission gave rise to speculation about the way the Chi-nese perceived the British actions in the region and about Chineseexpansionist plans. The Chinese were obviously considered to be a moredangerous military power than, for example, the Gurkhas. The great-est possible threat to the British, however, was that a military conflictbetween the Company and the Chinese in the Himalayas might inducethe Chinese to cut off trade with the British in Canton.36 The almostcomplete lack of information about Chinese intentions in this regionand the kind of intelligence they had about the British led to Britishinsecurity about what to expect from the Chinese. There was the imageof the Chinese Empire as land hungry and expansionist. As Kirkpatrickremarked in his report in 1811 in retrospect: ‘This Government [theBengal] now beheld for the first time, the extraordinary spectacle of anumerous Chinese force, occupying a position, which probably affordedit a distant view of the valley of the Ganges, and of the richest of the EastIndia Company’s Possessions.’37 However, reassuring both himself andBritish pride, he immediately added

It is true, that the military character of that people was not of astamp to excite, under any circumstances, much fear for the safetyof those Possessions from their future enterprises. Least of all had weany thing to apprehend from this quarter at the period in question,when we had just significantly humbled our most formidable enemy,and were at complete peace throughout India.38

This self-image of a peaceful yet unbeatable strong power in Indiawas what the British servants of the EIC accordingly tried to promotein their dealings with the Chinese. The contact in the periphery ofthe British expansion meant that, like their colleagues in Canton, theyfeared more than anything that the Chinese might have a view of themwhich did not correspond with the image they had of themselves. Incontrast to the EIC in Canton, however, the self-image they wanted theChinese to accept was less influenced by the idea of showing Britishmight and power than by wanting to convince the Chinese of the nobleand peaceful character of the British.

Lord Macartney and George Staunton claim that the Chinese indeedsuspected that British troops had been employed to help the Gurkhas



and that therefore the commander of the Chinese troops in Tibet,Fu-k’ang-an, tried to influence the Chinese Court against the British.Even though Macartney had not heard about the conflict with theGurkhas before his departure, Macartney denied any British involve-ment in this during the embassy and also exaggerated the dis-tance between the British realm in India and the Chinese sphere ofinfluence.39 However, this did little to set the minds of the Company inIndia at rest on this issue. They noticed with growing unease that aftertheir victory over the Gurkhas, the Chinese set up military posts alongthe Southern frontier of Nepal and turned the country of the Raja of Seg-win into their protectorate. The Chinese now had a military presence ina territory immediately joining the EIC in Bengal. Furthermore, the Chi-nese presence in the region put a final stop to all trade communicationswith Tibet.40

The chimera of Chinese power and the rumours about its possibleactions against the English in the Himalayas as well as in Canton werethe dominant factors for British action in the Nepalese War in 1814–1816.41 Amid the preparations for the war as well as during it, the lackof access to either the Chinese information order or to the Tibetan wasparticularly problematic. China hung over the entire affair like a spectre.Lord Moira feared the invasion of a mighty Chinese army, concernedabout the outcome of the war as well as for commerce in Canton. Healso worried about what might happen if the Company were to occupythe Gurkha territory and thus have a common border with the Chi-nese Empire.42 In this context, China was still seen as a mighty empireof almost equal standing with the British. Francis Buchanan for exam-ple, who had gone to Kathmandu with Captain Knox in 1801, declared:‘a frontier . . . of seven or eight hundred miles between two powerfulnations holding each other in mutual contempt seems to point atanything but peace.’43

During the war, several attempts were made to acquire more informa-tion about the Chinese attitude towards the invasion of Nepal by theCompany.44 At the same time, the lack of access to Chinese informa-tion in this ‘contact zone’ with the Chinese meant that the ‘Chinese’remained unidentifiable and ambiguous. This becomes clear in theinstructions given by Lord Moira to Lieutenant Colonel Bradshaw forthe event that he should encounter Chinese troops during his cam-paign. Due to the ‘loose rumour’ that the Nepalese had actually appliedfor Chinese help, it could be expected that the British would encounterChinese troops, which should not be engaged in battle, if at all possi-ble. The difficulty, however, lay in identifying ‘real’ Chinese troops as



opposed to Nepalese troops pretending to be Chinese in order to avoidBritish attacks:45

In this event, desired that the answer to be returned by Major GeneralMarley should be to the following effect: That under the uncertaintywhich existed, whether such an intimation came from a Chinese offi-cer, or was an artifice of the enemy, he could not suspend operations,and that, deeply as he would lament doing any unintentional injuryto any Chinese troops, whatever opposed him in the field must beconsidered as a Goorka force, and treated accordingly.46

The Chinese did not interfere in the Nepal War on the side of theNepalese. Despite the agreement under which the Nepalese had sur-rendered to the Chinese in 1792, the Chinese do not seem to havethought of Nepal as an important part of its frontier-security system,but were primarily concerned with the safety of Tibet.47 However, thiswas not the image the British held of Chinese interests in the region. Intheir minds, an expanding power like the Chinese Empire would jeal-ously guard its influence over Nepal against any contact between Nepaland Britain. Here, the experience with the exclusionism of the Cantonsystem merged with reports of Qing expansion under Qianlong intoCentral Asia into the idea of an expansionist empire that would blockevery route through the Himalayas. The image of the supposedly sus-picious and mighty power of the Chinese Empire also continued afterthe signing of the peace Treaty of Segauli, which ended the NepaleseWar. Rumours reached the British via their Resident at Kathmandu thatnow indeed a Chinese army was marching towards Nepal, perhaps topunish the Nepalese for going to war with the British and then mak-ing peace with them without informing the Chinese properly. The crisisresolved itself without further consequences, since the Chinese with-drew soon after. Nevertheless, this incident gave Lord Moira anotherreason to believe that it was of the utmost importance to explain tothe Chinese the peaceful intentions of the British towards the ChineseEmpire. He hoped to send an English agent to Lhasa, who would beable to show the Chinese the ‘open and candid dealings of an EnglishOfficer’, quite in contrast to those of the treacherous Nepalese. He alsoinformed Lord Amherst in detail about the war, should he be asked dur-ing his embassy to the court. Apparently, however, the Qing officials didnot think it necessary, or were not sufficiently informed, to questionLord Amherst about this issue.48



Not only in their contact with the Chinese army in this context, butalso in their interaction with the Nepalese, the British tried to conjure upthe image of a close friendship and smooth relations with the ChineseEmpire.49 The hope was obviously to make it clear to the Nepalese thatthey had no chance in playing the Chinese and the British against eachother. In this case, China was not so much depicted as a decaying Asiancivilisation, but rather as a potential ally.

One of the results of the Nepal War was the establishment of a per-manent British Residency in Kathmandu. For the EIC, the Residencywas a means to ensure peace with Nepal and favourable trading con-dition with this Himalayan country. To strengthen British influence onthe Gurkha Kingdom, the members of the Residency soon set out tofind information about the kingdom and its relation to its neighbours.Brian Houghton Hodgson, assistant to the Resident and later Residentin Kathmandu until 1843, was particularly busy in this respect.50

China continued to play a significant role in British interactionswith the Himalayan state and in all its attempts to form knowledgeabout the Himalayan region. On the one hand, it remained a rival ofpolitical influence on the Nepalese and continued to be considered aconstant threat to British interests in the region; and the Resident closelyobserved Chinese power in Tibet and its relations to Nepal. The Britishin Bengal kept a particularly close eye on Nepalese attempts to enlistChinese support against the British and feared that British actions orthose of their allies in this area could be considered offensive by theChinese.51 On the other hand, trade with China through the Himalayasstill fascinated the British in the North of India. Brian Houghton Hodg-son contemplated the trading routes through the Himalayas for Britishgoods in the 1830s and envisaged great trade surpluses through thisroute. He hoped to bypass the trading restrictions with China by usingthe long-established trade routes between Nepal, Tibet and China andrecorded routes from India to China.52 However, this trade would stillonly be restricted to the Company’s Indian subjects.53 Hodgson hoped toalso use this route for the opium trade to Mongolia and China, thus pro-viding an additional route for this trade which might be less dangerousthan the contraband trade via Canton.54

Increasingly, Russian influences in the region also drew the atten-tion of the British. Thus Hodgson was also particularly interested in theRussian trade connections in Nepal and with China. He hoped that byutilising trading routes through Nepal, Indian traders would be able toundersell Russians in Szechuan in items such as English wool, hand-ware and glassware, thus finally discovering a more rewarding outlet for



English goods for those areas of China to which the British did not haveaccess from Canton.55

However, Hodgson’s interest in Nepal and the Himalaya region wentfurther than mere trade issues. To further British understanding of theregion and ultimately to further British influence, he conducted inten-sive research into the ethnography, languages and nature of the region.He mainly acquired information from local informants on law, religion,languages and the nature of Nepal.56 He categorised the people of Nepalinto different tribes. He paid particular attention to the ‘military tribesof Nepal.’57 His main enquiries were directed towards Nepal, but when-ever possible he also tried to gain further information and books fromChina.58 Although his main interest lay in the Indian cultural influ-ence on Nepal, he also traced some elements of Newar culture to theChinese. In particular, he considered the ethnographic origin of themain Nepalese tribes, in particular the Khas to be Tartarian or Mongol.59

His linguistic and ethnographic research even led him to argue ‘thatthe Indo-Chinese, the Chinese, the Tibetans, and the Altaians, havebeen too broadly contra-distinguished, and that they form in fact butone great ethnic family, which moreover includes what are usuallycalled the Tamilian or Dravidian and the Kol and Munda elements ofIndian population, as well as nearly every element of the population ofOceania.’60 To support this argument, he also made a physionomic com-parison of the Tibetan and Nepalese people arguing that their physicalcharacteristics equally showed all the people mentioned above to be ofone ethnic family, often drawing comparisons between them and theChinese.61

Hodgson’s research thus complemented his understanding of theHimalayan region as a pass between the two great cultures of Indiaand China. From his point of view, the Mongolians were again of fargreater importance than the Han Chinese and frequently he hardlydistinguished between Mongols and Chinese.62

Hodgson’s interest in the languages of the region between Bengal andChina was linked to the attempts of another group in these years toexploit the proximity of the British in Bengal to China: the Baptistmissionaries at Serampore, led by Joshua Marshman. He had arrived inSerampore in 1799 to support the Baptist mission, which until then hadbeen represented solely by William Carey. As in Canton, the arrival ofmissionaries in the periphery meant that the study of language becamepre-eminent. Of course, the main focus of missionary study was the lan-guages of India.63 The global claim of the missionaries, however, madethem interested in the adjoining countries, preparing for the further



expansion of the Christian faith. Marshman thus sought to profit fromthe Chinese population in Calcutta as well as from the reports fromNepal and Burma regarding the proximity of the Chinese Empire.64 Hemanaged to secure a teaching position in 1805 for Joannes Lassar, anArmenian Christian from Macao who had learned Chinese as a child.65

Thus, the first ever formal British teaching position for Chinese wasestablished neither in London nor in Canton, but rather in Calcutta.66

With Lassar’s help and the mission press in Serampore, Marshman pub-lished a Chinese translation of St. Matthew’s gospel in 1810 and a fullBible in 1822, even before Morrison could finish his project.67 He alsoproduced a translation of Confucius’s work and a Chinese grammar,which paid great attention to positioning Chinese in the context ofGreek and especially Sanskrit.

Elmer H. Cutts has pointed to the political connection of this mis-sionary project. First of all the establishment of a Professorship at theCollege of Fort William shows that the Company, or at least their rep-resentatives on the spot, were interested in the knowledge of Chinese.This becomes even more evident when one considers that Governor-General Lord Minto, who was not all that favourably inclined towardsthe missionary project, was a great supporter of this work. Marshmaneven dedicated his translation of Confucius to him, thanking him for hisencouragement of the study of the Chinese language in Bengal.68 Cuttsbelieves that these attempts to establish a British faculty for Chinesestudies at Calcutta were merely there to furnish a possible second BritishEmbassy to Beijing with a British interpreter.69 However, it probablyalso had wider implications, in the context of British ideas on China inBengal discussed above. Marshman, for instance, constantly paid greatattention not only to the Chinese Empire and its language itself, butalso to its influence on its neighbouring countries. For example, follow-ing an observation on the spread of Sanskrit as well as Chinese elementsinto the languages of East Asia, he stated that ‘to those who reflect onthis intermixture of the Sungskrit with the Chinese system in the lan-guages of these countries, one fact will appear evident, that not a stepcan be effectually taken in the investigation of the language of any ofthe countries beyond Bengal, without some acquaintance with both thesystems.’70 When he first learned about the LMS sending out a mission-ary to China, he defended the continuation of his studies of Chineseat Serampore with its closeness to China and the multitude of Chineseliving in Calcutta. He compared it with a Fort, where the ‘experiencedgeneral’ could assemble and prepare his forces for the ‘grand assault atthe first favourable opportunity’. As long as the Chinese Empire was



closed to foreigners, he argued, this was the best option, better thanwaiting in vain in Canton.71

In his correspondence with the BMS (Baptist Missionary Society) inBritain, he also laid down a scheme of how the missionaries couldestablish stations in Burma, which would bring them practically to theChinese border. From there, it wouldn’t be a problem in the eyes ofMarshman, to send ‘the scriptures in separate books presented neatlylike Confucius, into the very heart of China!’72 Like his fellow country-men from the EIC, he saw the countries east of Bengal as a passage toChina well into the 1820s.

Except for these plans by the missionaries, which were never realised,the idea to use this route, or the one through Tibet, for diplomatic com-munication with China was abandoned. It was only contemplated onemore time, by the Select Committee in Canton in 1822.73 With it, theperception of the Chinese Emperor as a Tibetan Buddhist, and his rela-tion to the Dalai Lama became less important again. It seems to havebeen of interest mainly in its political implications. The importance ofTibetan Buddhism as a religion of the Manchu Emperors played no greatrole for the missionaries, who concentrated their work and their transla-tions on the ‘Chinese Bible’ – the Four Books of Confucius. This was alsotrue for Joshua Marshman.74 Tellingly, his teacher came from Macao andhis main source of Chinese books equally seems to have been the coun-try trade with South China. Buddhism was increasingly seen as a mainlyIndian religion. Hodgson had an exchange with the French Professor forSinology, Abel Rémusat, about some aspects of Buddhism. He claimed,that as the latter extrapolated his information from Chinese works, hewas bound to misunderstand some of the central concepts of Buddhismas ‘No wonder, . . . , if I discovered very many things inscrutably hiddenfrom those who were reduced to consult barbarian translations fromthe most refined and copious of languages upon the most subtle andinterminable of topics.’75

China as a Central Asian power remained of a certain interest inthe 19th century, mainly due to the increasing British fear of Russianactivities in the region.76 The question of how the Chinese Emperorrelated to British presence in India resurfaced again during the OpiumWar, in particular when the Sikh under General Zorawar Singh invadedand occupied Western Tibet, which was still under Chinese overlord-ship. Hodgson had long suspected that the Nepalese were trying toenlist Chinese help against the British, particularly after they hadlearned of the conflict between the British and the Chinese Empire inCanton.77 Being at war with the Chinese on the South China coast,



the British in India had little interest in opening a second frontierwith the Chinese Empire in the Himalayas and feared that the Chinesemight do exactly this with the help of the Nepalese.78 In this context,J. D. Cunningham 1842 still described China as a ‘consolidated empire’in contrast to the ‘contests of barbarous peoples’, arguing that none ofBritain’s Indian allies or subordinate states should try to invade Chineseterritory.79

For the Anglo-Indian British, China and the Chinese always remainedan indirect presence; one they were connected to through letters to andfrom Canton, rumours at the borders of Bengal and economic inter-ests. Knowledge about Chinese religion, ethnic origin and language wereused to assess a potentially dangerous neighbour and to gain influenceover it. The image of China formed in this context, while influenced byreflections in Britain and India on the despotic nature of Asian govern-ments, was mainly shaped by contact with people under the Chinesesphere of influence in Central Asia. However, if we move further alongthe routes of the second British Empire in the East, we inevitably reachwhat is now termed Southeast Asia.80

Where Hastings had sought access to China through the Himalayas,Alexander Dalrymple and his successors hoped to find a solution to theBritish China trade through entrepôts in the Malayan Archipelago. Theyattempted to use the networks of traders in this region to overcome Chi-nese restrictions on European trade. By doing this, they encountered theChinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, and, as in Penang, briefly in Malaccaand Java and then in Singapore, the Chinese increasingly became theirsubjects. The remainder of the chapter explores how a different mean-ing of China was shaped in the context of these ‘contact zones’ and thesignificance this had for other British encounters with China.

4.2 Chinese subjects for the empire

One Briton who travelled the routes which connected the British pres-ence in Asia was John Leyden. He was a Scottish linguist and poet whohad contributed to the study of old Scottish literature. He befriendedSir Walter Scott and helped him with the collection of the oral tradi-tions of the Highland Scots. Not gaining an appointment as a ministerin a church as soon as he had hoped, he looked for better opportuni-ties in the service of the Empire and joined the EIC as medical staffin Madras. There, he soon became a member of the Mysore surveyunder Major Mackenzie. After collecting and standardising the culturaltradition of Scotland, he thus went on to catalogue and collect the South



Indian landscape, history and cultural tradition. In October 1805, hewent from India to Penang for health reasons. There, he met ThomasRaffles who had just arrived a month earlier from England to fill theposition of assistant secretary to the Governor Philip Dundas. Raffles’sinterest for Malay and the development of British rule in Southeast Asiacoincided with Leyden’s fascination with languages in general and hisinterest in issues of colonial rule. Leyden lived in Raffles’s home duringthe 12 weeks of his convalescence and soon the two became friends.His visit to Penang inspired Leyden not only to study Malay, but alsoto attempt to learn Chinese.81 The result of his stay on this SoutheastAsian island was an article in the Asiatic Researchers, entitled ‘On theLanguage and Literature of the Indo-Chinese nations’. Here, he classi-fied the languages of the people between India and China accordingto their historic relationship, by this also attempting to establish theirdegree of civilisation.82

He used Chinese as a language of comparison to the languages inSoutheast Asia, to determine the relation of these people to China.83

His reference to the Chinese language itself makes clear that in Penanghe had developed an understanding of Chinese that was quite differentfrom that of Canton or Marshman’s in Bengal. While the British in thoseplaces had been aware that there were different Chinese dialects, theynevertheless came up with the idea of one main Chinese language, theMandarin, which they endeavoured to study and which was the basisfor their Chinese-English grammars and dictionaries. The only admis-sion of the variety of languages in China was Morrison’s ‘Vocabularyof the Canton dialect’, for the practical use of the EIC employees atCanton. This however did not lead to any doubts that one could makegeneral assumptions and study ‘the Chinese’.84 Thus Morrison’s dictio-nary is entitled ‘A Chinese – English dictionary’, not considering thedialects of China as being fundamentally different.85

In contrast, Leyden explained that it was hardly possible to say any-thing about the connection of Chinese and the other languages of theregion, since there was such a plurality of Chinese languages:

In the course of some enquiries that I made among the Chinese ofPenang, I found that four or five languages were current among them,which were totally distinct from each other, and the names of severalothers were mentioned. I was informed that the principal Chineselanguages were ten in number; but I have found that considerablevariety occurred in the enumeration of their names, and suspect thatthey are considerably more numerous in reality.86



After his return to India, Leyden asked Raffles to send him some copiesof the books of Confucius for further study. We do not know whetherLeyden would have developed into another ‘China-expert’ with a South-east Asian provenance had he not died five years later in Java at theage of 36.87

Leyden, in his background and his way of employment, is emblematicfor a number of those Britons who were involved in the British expan-sion in Southeast Asia. Like him, Colin Mackenzie and John Crawfurd,who were prominent in the context of the Java expedition and laterthe administration of Singapore, were Scottish and like him they haddone their first imperial service in India.88 Thomas Raffles had startedhis career in the East in Penang. Nevertheless, the patronage of LordMinto, Governor-General of Bengal, and his contact with further Anglo-Indians also soon connected Raffles to the Company’s rule in India andthe concepts that were evolved in that context. It was this group, as wellas the Protestant missionaries, who met with the Overseas Chinese inSoutheast Asia and from this encounter developed a specific meaning ofChina.

As in the other ‘contact zones’, the Chinese language, law, religiousbeliefs and the definition of Britishness were the main fields in whichthe meaning of China and the Chinese was developed in the encounterin Southeast Asia. In contrast to Canton and Bengal, in Southeast Asia,the British encountered a population of Chinese origin rather than theChinese Empire. It was here that the British first came to rule over aChinese population, but also to co-operate with them to further theirexpansion. The British attempt to see the Chinese population as distinctfrom Chinese rule was to become one of the characteristic elements ofthe British attitude in this period and of significant importance duringthe debate about the EIC’s monopoly, and, as we have seen, in the runup to the Opium War.89 The strongest development of this meaning ofChina emerged in Southeast Asia.

The ideas about Chinese language, tradition and population devel-oped in Southeast Asia had considerable influence on the formationof ideas on China in Britain itself. After all, the first ordinary profes-sor for Chinese at a British university, Reverend Samuel Kidd had neverentered China but had only studied Chinese in Southeast Asia.90 Thisnotwithstanding, this crucial contact zone has been mainly overlookedin the discussion of British attitudes to China.91

In the entrepôts of the European powers in Southeast Asia, twoexpanding networks met; the Chinese trade and labour immigrationand the European trade, missionary and colonial expansion.92 From the17th century onwards, Chinese immigration into Southeast Asia had



increased significantly. Only in the later part of the 18th century didthis migration become more entangled with the European presence inthe region.93 Carl A. Trocki has divided this migration into five peri-ods, from the 17th to the 20th century. According to him, the periodbetween 1800 and 1830 was marked by a rapid increase in Chinese set-tlements and the junk trade, following the impulses of the Europeanexpansion in the region. Particularly, British capital and British con-sumers enabled a massive increase in migration. In these years, theBritish also started to become increasingly aware of a numerous Chinesepopulation in Southeast Asia.

After 1830, Trocki argues, the junk trade gradually declined, pushedaside by European networks.94 At the same time, the colonial Europeanpowers in Southeast Asia increasingly tried to control the settlementsof the Overseas Chinese in their colonies and thus transformed theeconomic systems of the Chinese into one more integrated in theworld capitalist market. To achieve this control, they created the idea of‘respectable’ Chinese as collaborators, who would exercise control overtheir Chinese subjects.95 The Chinese migrants were organised in kong-sis, which according to Trocki, mainly served an economic purpose andgave the Chinese an institutional framework which allowed them tosettle and trade in Southeast Asia so successfully.96 The migrants werealmost entirely male. They often left a wife back in their Chinese villageto whom they sent money. It was also assumed that they would ulti-mately return to their place of origin. However, the Chinese migrantsoften took a second local wife and frequently remained abroad.97 Thechildren of these mixed marriages in most cases spoke the local lan-guage, for example Malay, but would still see themselves as Chinese.Thus, a Peranakan or Baba society came into existence, a society ofmixed Malay and Chinese background, who however still consideredthemselves to have a Chinese identity.98

British expansionist interests in Southeast Asia had started over 40years before Leyden’s journey to Penang with Alexander Dalrymple,a young Scottish writer for the EIC in Madras. He had studied travelreports intensively before going out, especially Edward Kimber’s Life andAdventures of Joe Thompson and Jan Nieuhoff’s account of the Dutchembassy to Peking.99 The promises as well as the difficulties of the Chinatrade were therefore already in his mind when he set out to India,combined with the idea of the struggle for dominance between Britain,France, Spain and the Netherlands. As his lifelong obsession with theSouthern Continent and the North-West passage showed, one of hisfundamental beliefs was the possibilities and advantages provided bydiscovery of land, people and new commodities. As an up-and-coming



young employee, he furthered these studies in a more systematic wayby reading the files of the EIC as well as travel reports in Madras. Oneof the most influential of these seems to have been a Spanish history ofthe Philippines, from which he learned that the Sulu Archipelago hadonce served as a trade centre for trade with China, Japan and SoutheastAsia.100 He devised new schemes to improve the trade of the EIC andpartly also the export of British manufactured goods.101

Driven by his wish for discovery, he pushed through a voyage to theSouth Eastern Islands, in the schooner Cuddalore, to explore a possiblenew route for the China ships of the EIC and a trading centre. The travelreports and EIC records had already convinced him of the necessity ofa British port in this area, a conviction probably encouraged by conver-sations with country traders in Madras. This journey was significant inseveral ways.

On the way to the Sulu Archipelago, Dalrymple had to stop over atCanton, where he encountered problems with the Chinese authorities,since he did not want to pay the duties applicable to trading ships. Thismight have reinforced his relatively negative opinion of the Chinesewhich he had formed in Madras.102 Furthermore, while at Sulu, heclosely observed the trade going on there, which did not quite meet theexpectations of a busy trading port which he had formed by reading theSpanish history of the region. He did however encounter two Chinesejunks which traded there, and was thus convinced that the decline ofthe trade was solely the fault of the Sultan.103 There, he could alsoacquire the information of what the supposedly self-sufficient Chineseempire was interested in buying, namely ‘Pearls, Mother of Pearl, Bird-Nest, Beetle-nut, Sea-Slug, Cockles, Lacka-wood, Ebony, Agal-Agal’.104

When he returned to Madras in 1762 he was sure that the solutionto the British trade in Asia was an entrepôt in the Sulu Archipelago,by which one could circumvent the problems with the Chinese atCanton.105 Rather than being discouraged by observing the meagre tradeat Sulu, he believed in what he had read and was convinced that it onlyrequired the British to transform this place back into the buzzing tradingknot it had once been. Dalrymple’s next move, the attempt to establishthis entrepôt at Balambangan, was an endeavour to give the British afoothold in this trading network. The main motive was to create aninvestment opportunity for the British in the Asian networks of com-merce, rather than providing an outlet for the products of the nascentBritish industry.106

Dalrymple however was also concerned with British manufactur-ing interests, employing the myth of the large demand for British



woollen goods in Northern China. He argued that if one could tradeBritish woollen goods to the Chinese junks at such an entrepôt, theChinese merchants could sell them directly at the northern Chineseharbours, where they would actually be needed. Dalrymple seems tohave got the idea of Chinese need for woollen goods from Prake’s ded-ication to Thomas Cavendish, in his 1588 translation of Juan Conzalezde Mendosa’s The History of the Great and Mighty Kingdom of China.107

Due either to a lack of better information or to the idea of an unchang-ing China, he merged this almost two hundred year-old informationwith scant bits of gossip from Canton108 and with the demands of theBritish manufacturers for new markets to create the idea of a tradingopportunity in China. Dalrymple returned to London in 1765 since hesaw no opportunity to further his scheme from India.

Dalrymple’s scheme was however only put into practice in 1772/1773,under the command of John Herbert. Dalrymple had lost his leadershipof the enterprise through a stubborn fight with the Directors over theconditions of his employment. During this episode, he published hisplan in order to increase the pressure on the Company.109

As the Dalrymple project showed, Southeast Asia had become inter-esting to the British as a possible door into the China market as well asan outlet for Indian products. However, it was only after 1780 that theefforts to establish a base in the region were increased, to a large extentdue to strategic considerations.110 The war with the French served as astrong impulse for this from the 1790s onwards. The British acquiredPenang in 1786. During the Napoleonic Wars, they occupied the Dutchcolonies Malacca in 1795 and Java in 1811, fearing that they mightotherwise fall into French hands. After the end of the war, these pos-sessions were returned to the Dutch to help the Netherlands to recovereconomically and thus create a buffer state against possible new Frenchaspirations on the continent. The temporary possession of these placeswas, however, crucial for further British involvement in the region.Thomas Stamford Raffles had been governor of Java from 1811 to 1815and this period had convinced him of the profit that could be made inthis area if the British could dictate the terms of trade. The final resultof this period of increased trade by British merchants in Southeast Asia,especially by the Indian agency houses, was the establishment of the EICfactory on Singapore in 1819.111 With the Anglo-Dutch treaty in 1824,Malacca was ceded again to the British.

This expansion was, in the first instance, dominated by politicalconsiderations during the Napoleonic Wars. Especially for the EICagents and the country traders in the region, however, the economic



advantages of possessions in the region also played an important role.Here the rhetoric of free trade was used to legitimise the British expan-sion against the Dutch monopoly, but sometimes also that of the EIC,in the region. Connected with this was the accusation that the Dutchhad neglected to improve the native population, or even worsened theircondition.112 The notion of an earlier, higher, civilisation which hadnow decayed was dominant in this context. The contemporary Malaysand Javanese were deemed to be at a very low stage of civilisation bynow, in contrast to their glorious past.113

Accordingly, the British justified their presence in the region byhighlighting that they would improve the condition of the native popu-lation. This argument could be directed not only against other Europeanrivals, but also against the Chinese. The reasoning, however, variedbetween the maritime entrepôts Malacca, Penang and Singapore on theone hand and the more agricultural Java on the other. The main actorsin this expansion were agents of the EIC, such as Thomas Raffles andJohn Crawfurd. Most of them had been formed in the service of the EICin the colonial Indian context, rather than in the more trade-orientedone of Canton. At the same time, the Protestant missionaries left Cantonfor Southeast Asia.

In Southeast Asia, they encountered next to the local populationsojourners, traders and recent settlers, such as the Arabs and the migrantChinese. The Chinese presented to them a non-indigenous population,who just very recently had started to flow into this region in larger num-bers as settlers and traders. Since there was no state power behind thisprocess, the Chinese were no direct competition to the British presencein Southeast Asia – in the sense that the Dutch and the French were.Quite in contrast, they provided the workforce and established tradelinks the British needed to fully use their new acquisitions in the region.As Carl Trocki has pointed out, the British thus did not understand themas a separate movement, with a pattern and history only marginallylinked to the Europeans, but rather they saw only how they related totheir own expansion.114

It was difficult for the British to make sense of the cultural diversitythey encountered in Southeast Asia.115 The British traders and ser-vants of the EIC could see both the Javanese and the Malay-speakingpopulation as natives who belonged to an ancient, but decayed,culture.116 In contrast, the Overseas Chinese were still clearly seen asmembers of the Chinese Empire, even though it was acknowledged thatsome of them had lived in the Straits for generations and intermarriedwith Malay women. Next to their distinction into native population,



sojourners and later settlers, the British ranked the different peoples theyencountered on a scale of civilisations.117

To describe the main characteristic of the Chinese, the British agentsof the EIC used the trope of the industrious worker.118 They weredescribed as perfect workers and colonial citizens. The industrious Chi-nese thus resembled the ideal of the working member of the lowerclasses, who was industrious and well behaved.119

The Chinese were considered to be naturally hard working and lawabiding. For example, John Crawfurd described how the Chinese arrivedin Southeast Asia with only ‘the coat on their backs, a bundle of oldclothes, and a dirty mat and pillow to sleep on’. However, according tohim, they quickly improved their situation through personal skill, dex-terity and ingenuity.120 One of the main explanations by the British ofthe industrious habit of the Chinese followed the Malthusian argumentof population pressure. ‘The abundance of population in China’ wasthus one of the main explanations for their emigration.121 For Crawfurd,the reason for the industry of the Chinese also followed the patternsanalysed by Malthus: the security of life and property in China, in com-bination with a fertile country, had produced ‘an immense population,and the pressure of population against the means of subsistence has,by necessity, begot a patient and systematic industry unknown to otherAsiatic nations.’122

He does not discuss, however, that for the newly arrived immigrantsfrom China, who often were bound to their employers through thecredit-ticket system, there was hardly any option other than to workextremely hard to re-pay their debts. In most cases, they had little choicebut to accept the employment they were assigned by those who had paidtheir passage. The kongsis, instead of giving new arrivals the option toquickly earn themselves a share in the plantation or mining enterprise,could turn into an instrument of repression by the better establishedChinese.123 Adaptations to economic necessity were thus described bythe British as inherent natural characteristics of the Chinese.

This view made it easier for the British to make use of the system ofChinese migration and not to feel morally obliged to intervene in theexploitation of the new Chinese immigrants. The Javanese and Malayswho refused to partake in these mining and plantation jobs were thusseen as lazy and indolent.124

Without support from their government, the local rulers or tradi-tional, localised social networks, the Chinese also presented the idealnew working population for the British possessions in Southeast Asia.It seemed to be possible to transplant the Chinese wherever they were



needed for the British imperial project.125 Some, such as the travel writerAlick Osborne, could imagine Southeast Asia might turn into a secondAmerica, attracting an industrious Chinese population, in the same wayAmerica had attracted European settlers. And as America had prosperedunder the European influence, the Chinese in Southeast Asia ‘mainlycontributed to excite and support the energies of the native popula-tion, and have diffused the impetus of their own activity whereverthey have settled, and that protection only is wanted to accumulatethem in any numbers, to create, it may be said, a second China.’126

The self-reliant Chinese thus needed no more than British protectionand would then sustain themselves and produce profit for the BritishEmpire.127 With a population like this, under British rule, the Britishcould succeed in improving this region and bring it to its full potential.Interestingly enough, the huge market and industrious agrarian pop-ulation of China served as a positive example, although this ‘secondChina’ would flourish under the benevolent protection of the Britishrather than Chinese despotism.

In the minds of those concerned with British trade and colonies, theChinese occupied a middle ground between slaves and British settlers.With the abolition movement gaining increasing momentum and theslave revolts in the French colonies, slaves were considered to be moreand more problematic.128 At the same time, the discussion about theEIC restrictions on immigration of Britons into India in 1813 and 1830sshows the doubts the British EIC servants had about the influx of theBritish lower orders into its Asian possessions. In accordance with thecontemporary debate about the uncivilised lower classes in Britain, theywere seen to be unruly – unable to live together with the Indian pop-ulation peacefully.129 In contrast, the Chinese were considered to beindustrious and law abiding, voluntarily moving to wherever one gavethem protection and the possibility to work.

The most extreme example of this image was the plan to introduceChinese workers in the West Indies. One of Raffles’s correspondents sawChinese plantation workers as a possible bulwark against revolutionaryAfrican slaves. As free cultivators they would be more industrious thanslaves and due to their diligent character they could become proprietorsthemselves under British guidance.130 They thus could build a commu-nity with a set of interests and habits that connected them more closelyto the British landowners than those of the slaves. In 1814, CaptainLayman published a similar proposition in the Gentlemen’s Magazine.After a failed first attempt in 1811, he suggested that the Chinese had to



be settled in the West Indies in groups, with Chinese wives, so that theycould keep their Chinese characteristics. He also claimed that duringthe first project, one had selected the wrong Chinese: Lazzaroni-menfrom Macao, who already had been corrupted by the Portuguese city.Only the real Chinese from the countryside, much like the idealisedBritish peasant, had the qualities that made him a good worker. His nat-ural habit of industry was at the same time supported by his wish forgain.131 This was a characteristic repeatedly ascribed to the Chinese; itcould be positive, as in this context, or negative, referring to the cor-rupt Chinese Mandarins. As settlers and immigrants, as well as traders,the Chinese were thus considered by some Britons to have a far greaterresemblance to the active Europeans than the lazy Malays or Javanese.Additionally, Alick Osborne thought that they adapted more easily tothe European culture than the Muslim Arabs or Malays.132 However,most British observers agreed quickly that the industry of the Chineselacked the moral quality of that of the British: the Chinese only pursuedgain, not improvement.133

In the context of cultural and ethnic diversity of Southeast Asia,Chinese physical characteristics became increasingly important.134 JohnCrawfurd, who had served the EIC in Penang, Java and later as Resi-dent of Singapore described the Chinese he encountered in SoutheastAsia thus: ‘A Chinese is at least two inches taller than a Siamese, and bythree inches taller than a Cochin Chinese, a Malay, or a Javanese; andhis frame is proportionably (sic!) strong and well built . . . . Their superi-ority in personal skill, dexterity, and ingenuity are still greater.’135 Thereseems to have been an agreement that while these physical characteris-tics, and also the mental quality, might have resulted from the specialcircumstances of the Chinese Empire, they were hereditary by now.

There were diverging opinions on how these characteristics wereaffected by intermarriage with Malay women in Southeast Asia: In thiscontext, it was debated whether interracial marriage was positive orrather destroyed the purity, and with it the positive characteristics, ofa group. Minto, during his visit to Malacca, considered the Chineseinfluence on the Malay population as an improvement:

The Chinese emigrants never bring women with them, but fore-gather with Malay females – mostly slaves – and leave them behindwhen they go home. At Malacca they have married the daughters ofthese Malay mothers and these, inter-marrying, have, in a number ofgenerations, converted the Malay coarse clay into fine China, . . .136



Crawfurd, in contrast, believed that these unions of Chinese and Malayswere only destroying the positive characteristics of the Chinese:

Many of the Chinese return to their own country, and the first inten-tion of every emigrant is probably to do so, but circumstances detaina number of them in the islands, who, intermarrying with the nativeof the country, generate a race inferior in energy and spirit to the orig-inal settler, but speaking the language, wearing the garb, professingthe religion, and affecting the manners of the parent country.137

The question of the inherent characteristics of the Chinese race hadbecome important in Southeast Asia, but never entered the debate inCanton.138 Here, it served mainly as an argument for the assessment ofthe different cultures the British encountered and their usefulness forthe British imperial project, rather than to classify the Chinese in thecontext of theories of race and the natural history of man, as it wouldbecome important in the metropolis in these years.

The British EIC agents had, for the moment, formed an idea of theChinese as ideal colonial subjects, which were useful objects as longas the native population had not developed enough. This idea wouldremain strong during the 19th century.139 Opium smoking was men-tioned occasionally, but the idea of the lazy, undisciplined ChineseOpium wreck would only develop gradually to become in certain con-texts a stronger trope than the idea of the industrious Chinese.140

Chinese agricultural and mining workers and small traders were notthe only members of the Chinese migrant community. Rich Nan yangChinese, Captain Chinas and Chinese landlords, however, did not fitvery well into the British idea of a perfect colonial subject. This becamea major issue for the first time during the British occupation of Java.This thus became an important ‘contact zone’ between the British andthe Chinese which shows the ambiguity of the early colonial encounterbetween the two groups and the way this shaped the British meaning ofthe Chinese, putting them into a more negative light.

4.3 Co-operator and corruptor

During the British occupation of Java, the role of the Chinese in theDutch colony played a crucial part in debates about British govern-ment of the island. This was one of the first places where the EIChad to come to terms with a significant and well-established Chinese



population in their endeavours to establish a strong colonial govern-ment. Java was also the first opportunity for Raffles, in the position ofLieutenant-Governor to recommend himself for further promotion inthe EIC service. Additionally, Lord Minto, who had led the attack onJava, and Raffles tried to defend this action before the Court of Direc-tors and the Board of Control by highlighting the economic potentialof Java.141 In his attempt to show that Java was a worthwhile colony, Raf-fles decided to introduce major reforms, during which he had to tacklethe strong position of the Chinese on the island, both as landholdersand tax farmers. To understand the way the British EIC agents shapedtheir idea of the Chinese in this context, we first have to understand theChinese–Dutch relations before Java fell into British hands, since in thecase of Java the transfer of ideas between the two European empires,the Dutch and the British, became important in assessing the Chinese.

The Dutch EIC had founded Batavia in 1619 and gradually became animperial power there, especially with control of the north coast of Java.At the end of the 17th century, increasing numbers of Chinese immi-grants came to Java.142 The Dutch, on the one hand, made use of theChinese for their trade and exercise of power on Java. On the other, theygrew increasingly suspicious of this separate force, especially after theuprising that led to the massacre of Chinese in Batavia in 1740.143 There-fore the Dutch government, for example, prohibited the regents to leasetheir villages to the Chinese or to let them settle in their Regencies.144

This did not mean, however, that in practice, the Dutch themselves didnot farm out large areas to the Chinese.145

The negative attitude towards the Chinese was reinforced during thereform attempts of the VOC (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie) atthe turn of the century. Here, British ideas about land revenue becameinfluential. They were especially made known through Dirk van Hogen-dorp, who had met Cornwallis in Bengal and had been impressedby his zemindari revenue system. Hogendorp mainly advocated thatthe Javanese cultivators should hold the property of the land theywere working, thus encouraging their productivity. Together with Raf-fles and H. W. Muntinghe, he connected British and Dutch ideas onimperial expansion and colonial administration.146 Marshall Daendels,Governor-General of Batavia under the French rule, also toyed withideas of land reform, but finally decided that the Javanese were notready for it.147 The transfer of some ideas on land possession and rev-enue from British Bengal into the arsenal of ideas of the Dutch reformersmeant that the Chinese proprietors and tax collectors were now con-sidered to be even more problematic. They were no longer needed as



intermediaries if the government wanted to collect the revenue directlyfrom those who cultivated the land. Moreover, they owned land whichthe Dutch especially preferred to see in European hands. Some Dutch,like Hogendorp, thus demanded that Chinese immigration should becontrolled, that they should pay higher taxes and only be allowed toacquire uncultivated land.148

These attitudes to the Chinese on Java also became crucial for theBritish position towards its new Chinese subjects after their conquestin 1811. Raffles collected all sorts of information during his time inPenang and Malacca on Dutch Java,149 picking up the Dutch ideas onthe Chinese there. The report ‘Considerations on how to deal withthe Dutch Possessions in the East Indies if they should be captured’,150

already warns of the Chinese in Java and includes all the negative char-acteristics the Dutch attributed to the Chinese. Not only due to theirdiligence and industry, but also because of their deceitful character anduse of corruption, the report claims, the Chinese had become extremelyrich and politically influential. Their strong position on the island, how-ever, brought it no good. The Chinese transferred most of their gainsback to China, thus draining the country of its riches. They also sup-pressed the native population, who being of a ‘slower though less craftygenius’ could not compete with them. In their treatment of these depen-dent natives, the Chinese were allegedly even worse than the Dutch:‘Bad as the Dutch have been, they rise high in the Scale in compar-ison with the Chinese, who in their gross and unfeeling treatmentof the unfortunate Native are guilty of overbearing and gripings thatEuropeans cannot acknowledge or even to the full extent be acquaintedwith.’151 The Chinese were thus not only a threat to the economic profitof the colonial government due to their greediness and export of money,but also because of their deceptive charm. Their victims would noticetoo late how they became dependent on the Chinese. From industriousworkers, the Chinese had turned into the dangerous ‘Other’, amoral andseductive.

After the surrender of Java to the British, Lord Minto appointed Raf-fles Lieutenant-Governor of Java. The Council, with whose support heshould govern, consisted of Colonel Gillespie, commander of the Britishforces, and the two Dutchmen H. W. Muntinghe and Jacob WilliamCranssen.152 Following Minto’s advice to introduce a land revenue sys-tem in Java based on the principles of free trade and cultivation tofinance the government, Raffles appointed a commission in 1812 tolook into these matters. Raffles hoped that through these reforms hecould make Java a profitable colony and persuade the Court of Directors



and the Board of Control not to hand it back to the Dutch.153 ColinMackenzie, who had already served as survey-general in Madras, wasappointed head of the Commission, while the other members wereDutch and had belonged to the Dutch colonial government: FrederikJacob Rothenbuhler, Jan Knops and Pieter Herbertus Lawick van Pabst.

The main aim of the Mackenzie Commission was to establish whetherthere was a system of land property and who held the rights to land andrevenue.154 From this, a new system of land rent could then establishdirect access to the land by the EIC revenue and control over the land,bypassing the Javanese regents. Influenced by British ideas on propertyrights, Raffles hoped that in the new system, which allowed a securesystem of land rent and taxes, the peasants would increase their produc-tivity because they could now be certain that they could keep a largeproportion of the results of their labour. Breaking the feudal power ofthe Javanese Regents would also allow the British to collect the revenuein cash.155 The reform should also ensure that the specie available onJava would circulate freely and could be ‘withdrawn from the hands ofChinese farmers and monopolists’.156

The result was thus a peculiar mixture of Dutch and British ideas onstate administration and the imperial project. The British mainly tried tointroduce the systems they had developed in India. Mackenzie seems tohave favoured the ryotwar system whereas Raffles preferred in the begin-ning the village system, in which the bekels, or village chiefs, wouldhold the land lease.157 As we have seen, similar ideas had already circu-lated amongst the Dutch on Java, through the tracts by van Hogendorp.Additionally, Raffles, Crawfurd and Mackenzie were convinced that theJavanese had originally been a Hindu culture, now corrupted by Islam.158

The principles of the organisation of society, which the British believedthey had discovered in India, constantly served as a foil to their studyof Javanese land rights. This made it possible for the British to quicklyconceptualise Javanese society as well as to transfer the systems they haddeveloped in India.159 The point of reference was the ancient Javanesesociety, which the new Chinese immigrants did not belong to. The lattercould thus only be seen as intruders, who did not possess the moral qual-ities of the British to support the Javanese in their improvement process.

Along with these influences, the Dutch mistrust of a strong Chinesepower in the Javanese countryside was again reflected in the reportsof the Dutch members of the Mackenzie commission and so foundits way into British governmental decisions. While Mackenzie hardlymentioned the Chinese in his final report, van Pabst, Knops andRothenbuhler were clear in their negative verdict on them. They all



agreed that the regents should receive a part of the land they hadruled over before as private property and that the rest should be sold;preferably to Europeans, but also to the Javanese and non-European for-eigners. The only exception to this should be the Chinese. The Dutchwere clearly worried about the large numbers of Chinese arriving eachyear and about the accumulation of land by certain Chinese families.They created the image of a never-ending stream of Chinese immigrants,who were mostly ‘the out Cast (sic!) of the Nation, robbers, gamblers &’.Also, their industrious habit and their ability to live frugally were con-sidered dangerous.160 Rothenbuhler took great care to dismiss the ideaof the very industrious Chinese as a myth, claiming that the districtsin their possession were only flourishing because the natives there werealready freed from the feudal services, not because of good managementby the Chinese.161

Nevertheless, Raffles recognised the sale of the lands of Besuki andPanarukan to the Captain China of Surabaya, Han Tjan Pit by Daendelsin 1810. Here, the idea of private property, and especially the eco-nomic problem of how to compensate the proprietor in the case of anannulment of the contract, overruled the wish to remove the Chineselandholder.162

As becomes clear from these accounts, there was a thin line betweenthe idea of the Chinese as a model workforce and as dangerous com-petitors. They could only be considered in a positive light for so long asthey helped the British to improve a country and increase their profit. Ifthey seemed to assume too much power themselves, they were describedto be even less capable than other European powers to do the bestfor the host country and therefore could claim no legitimacy to rulethe natives there. The British thus readily accepted the negative Dutchstereotypes of the Chinese on Java, especially of the moral inadequacyand oppressive nature of the Chinese.

This diminished the Chinese claim to land and trade, which theirindustry and skill in agriculture could give them. For, the British argued,unlike themselves the Chinese were using these positive attributes onlyfor self-gain and not for moral and scientific improvement. John Craw-furd, for example, who never completely joined Raffles and the Dutchin his condemnation of the Chinese on Java, thought of the Chineseas good traders, industrious workers and good middlemen between thenatives and the Europeans. Nevertheless, to him they were still on afar lower level of civilisation than the European nations, even if theywere number one amongst the ‘Asian nations’. Their commercial activ-ity, their manual skill and their ability to build ships might have been



superior to all other nations of Asia, but were still not comparable to theEuropeans.163 Above all, however, they lacked a moral agenda in theirindustry, such as the progress of science or the improvement of the peo-ple: ‘They are the least conscientious people alive; the constant prospectof gain or advantage must be presented to them to induce them to fulfiltheir engagements, which they will always evade when their judgmentis not satisfied that an adherence to them will be certainly profitable.’164

Crawfurd thought that the Chinese should not have too direct a powerover the natives. He believed that the Chinese were necessary since ‘theIndian islanders [are U.H.] quite unequal to the details of a businessof any degree of complexness’, but due to their moral depravity theyshould not collect taxes directly, but be allowed to hold revenue farms,provided these were sold publicly and competitively.165

At the end of 1813, Raffles adopted the ryotwar system, after favouringthe village system until this point.166 In this model, there was even lessroom for the Chinese as landlords or tax farmers, since it was based onthe idea of the village as the basic module of Javanese society, where thepeasants had had the right to vote for their bekels, or village headmen,from time immemorial.167 However, many of the reforms Raffles decidedupon were only partly introduced. Nevertheless, they set the tone forfurther developments under his Dutch successors.168

In their attempt to establish colonial rule over the island, the Britishwere more successful than the Dutch. For central Java this meant mainlythat they took over the administration of the toll-gates and markets.These were, after all, farmed out to the Chinese.169 Also, the demandby the British government of moneyed land rent instead of one paid ingoods meant that the Javanese became increasingly dependant on theChinese moneylenders170 who had been described as so morally corruptby the Dutch and British commentators.

British expansion in Southeast Asia did not stop with the return ofJava to the Dutch. In Penang, Malacca and especially Singapore theBritish continued to rule over a Chinese population. This brought withit a renewed effort to define the role of the Chinese in Southeast Asiaand ways to govern them.

4.4 British rule, Chinese societies

As in Java, the main attention of the EIC servants in Malacca, Penangand later in particular in Singapore was on the ‘native’ population.Raffles claimed that he had chosen Singapore for the new settlementdue to its supposed important role as the old capital of the ‘Malayan



empire’.171 In spite of this however, Singapore became mainly a‘Chinese’ city.

In Java, as we have seen, the idea of the industrious Chinese wasturned into a negative one, partly due to Dutch influence, partly becauseof the land reform which made them a disruptive element. After thereturn of Java to the Dutch, Penang and Singapore became the maincentres of British interest in Southeast Asia, where they again had todeal with an ever-increasing Overseas Chinese population.172 Malaccaremained important even after the return of the island to the Dutch dueto the networks of the British Protestant missionaries. These places weremainly seen as trading ports, thus issues of land property did not ini-tially play a significant role here. Also, the Chinese communities withwhich the British had to deal were mainly city dwellers, even though ofcourse Malacca, Singapore and Penang also had a population of Chineseagricultural and mining labourers.173

In their contact with these Chinese and in the process of governingthem on these islands, the dual question of the need for ‘industrious’Chinese and the danger of a too powerful Chinese population remained.At the same time, the study of Chinese language and culture was consid-ered to be important in this context. But without the strong influenceof Dutch reformers and the land property question, it took other forms.First of all, the idea of the Chinese as industrious mine workers, whocould be brought in according to need, was very strong. Accordingly,the British soon participated in the trade of Chinese workers, not just toTrinidad, but also within Southeast Asia.174

Equally important however was the categorising of the Chinese astraders with access to the network of the junk trade and especially toChinese harbours like Amoy which were closed to the Europeans. Dis-cussing the opportunities of Penang and other islands under the rule ofthe Siamese, Raffles mainly emphasised the trade with China from theseports.175 Here, he is clearly positive about the presence of the Chinese:‘the contiguity of its principal Port to China has led to the establishmentof a numerous Chinese population, which has given to its commerce thesame stimulus which that enterprising people produce wherever theyare allowed to colonize.’176 In his History of Java, Raffles demonstratedhis different attitudes to the Chinese as traders and as landholderson Java:

The objection which have been made to the political influence ofthe Chinese and Arabs in the Easter Islands, do not equally apply tothem as traders. In this last capacity, and subject to regulations whichprevent them from uniting the power of a chief with the temper of



a merchant, and despotism with avarice, their value cannot be toohighly rated.177

Crawfurd’s praise of the Chinese as traders was equally high. In con-trast to Raffles, he did not believe in a sufficient ability of the Malaysand Javanese to improve. Rather, he saw the Chinese as the only peoplewho had already advanced far enough through the stages of civilisa-tion to be able to conduct extensive trade. Following the arguments ofthe free trade adherents, whom he would support strongly during thedebate over the China monopoly of the EIC, he even made the Chi-nese traders a positive example for Europeans. The native governmentswere granting them the right to trade, he argued, because they followedonly commercial goals and had no political ambitions or monopolistictrading companies like the Europeans.178

Raffles, however remained extremely suspicious of the Chinese. Whilethey were welcome as traders, he noticed that they always tried to getthe farming of port duties into their own hands and quickly devel-oped a monopoly on trade. Raffles explained this phenomenon usingthe idea of the Chinese as the complete ‘Other’, the incomprehensible.The reason for the success of the Chinese and their monopolistic ten-dency was, according to him, that the Chinese formed a separate societywherever they went, due to their ‘peculiar language and manners’. Theonly way to check the ambitious Chinese was, he thought, to encouragethe native population to develop and become industrious and useful.179

The British thus sought diligent workers, opium-consumers and tradersfor their new colonial acquisitions, yet remained suspicious of thesehelpers whom they wanted to attract, but could not really understandor assimilate.

Closer contact with the Chinese in Southeast Asia also meant thatan image of a more pluralised Chinese culture developed. The Chineseimmigrants in Southeast Asia were mainly organised in kongsis. Often,however, the kinship which found its expression in surname groupsand language affiliations was equally important for the organisation ofChinese communities and distinct kongsis.180 Such cultural differencesbewildered the British, who had always imagined China as a unity. Oneof the main characteristics, which had startled enlightenment thinkerssuch as Hume, had been the unity of the Chinese character and cul-ture within such a large country.181 The politically interested, such asMacartney, had accepted the Manchu presence in China but hardly thediversity of the languages and cultures within China itself.182

Raffles felt that on Singapore he had to react to this difference withtown planning measures. When he returned to Singapore in October



1822 from Bencoolen, he ordered a series of changes through whichhe wanted to clearly express his authority over the place. His returnto Singapore was especially marked by his split with William Faquhar,who had been Resident there since 1819. Raffles changed several of theadministrative measures introduced by the latter, such as taxes on gam-bling and his allocation of land to new settlers.183 With regard to theChinese, Raffles directed that they were to settle in an area in west of theriver, adjoining the commercial quarters. By this time, he had resignedhimself to the fact that the Chinese were to constitute the major part ofthe population of Singapore. For the newly created Chinese campong,Raffles directed that in its organisation, it should differentiate betweenthe cultural and provincial distinctions of the Chinese immigrants aswell as the sojourners and the permanent settlers.184 This was to preventfights between the different groups. This categorisation also developedfurther the idea that Chinese from some provinces were more trouble-some than others, and that certain provinces produced better workers.185

This also meant that the British formed a categorisation of the Chinesebeyond Chinese–Manchu distinctions. These categories were used toidentify good workers for their empire and to attempt to create peacefulsubjects.

In the beginning, the British EIC employees gave the Chinese directgovernance. Each Chinese group had to appoint a ‘Captain China’ whowas to be responsible for the group, collected their taxes and in largeparts administered the law.186 While Raffles generally introduced Britishlaw in the colony, he wanted it to be modified according to the usagesand habits of the people.187 He also still considered the law of the QingEmpire to have some relevance to the Chinese. In his stand against thelegalisation of gambling, Raffles quoted Staunton’s translation of theChinese Penal Code to point out that gambling was prohibited evenin China and thus should not be allowed to the Chinese in Singa-pore either.188 This was to change over the years. The first full Englishtranslation of the Four Books of Confucius by David Collie at the Anglo-Chinese College at Malacca was greeted in 1828 by the Canton Registeras a step forward for the good government of Chinese subjects of theBritish in the Straits of Malacca. By this time, Singapore had beenmerged with Penang and Malacca into the Presidency of the Straits Set-tlement and had been granted the Royal Charter of Justice, abandoningthe concept of indirect rule over the Chinese community through the‘Captain China’ system as well.189 The Canton Register argued that itwas only a knowledge of Chinese and the Chinese classics by the gov-ernment officials that could prevent the oppression of the Chinese by



the ‘Captain Chinas’. Thus it was argued that the Chinese languageshould become more of a requirement for judges in the Straits.190 Thusthe thinking which had been characteristic for the ‘Orientalist’ attitudeof the British in India, held by such as William Jones, had arrived inthe Straits and was promoting British studies of Chinese. However, forthe time being, it had little influence on either judicial practice or theknowledge of Chinese by officials in the Straits Settlements.191 The studyof the Chinese language largely remained in the hands of Protestant mis-sionaries. It was also their fight against all ‘idolatrous’ societies whichfirst brought the idea of secret societies to the attention of the British.

The fact that the British now wanted to rule over the Chinese, incombination with missionary zeal, strengthened the development of theidea of the ‘secret societies’ or Triads as a typical expression of Chinesecunning. It was in the context of Southeast Asia that the British firstunderstood the kongsi and the Heaven-and-Earth societies as a centralpart of Chinese culture, which under the denomination of ‘Triad soci-eties’ were to become a crucial element in the image of the deceptive,secretive and cruel Chinese over the coming decades.

According to Carl Trocki, kongsis could be formed on the basis of sur-name groups or the home province, but could also simply follow theeconomic and social needs of a group of Chinese from different back-grounds. While some of them were ‘secret’ and followed triad rituals,they were not identical to the ‘secret’ societies in China. This had, how-ever, been the image which European observers since the early 19thcentury created. They explained the unrests amongst the Chinese inSingapore as an overflow of ancient animosities between Triad societiesin China, thus ignoring the economic reasons behind these fights.192

The first to make the idea of Chinese secret societies prominent in theEnglish-speaking public was the Protestant missionary William Milne,who had come to Malacca in 1815 to establish the China mission there,outside of the restrictions of Canton.193 He seems to have somehowlearned about the ‘secret societies’ of the Chinese on Malacca. In theposthumously published article in the Transactions of the Royal Asiaticsociety, he mentions some Chinese, with whom he seems to have dis-cussed this topic, but it is not clear in which context and from whichsources he received his information. Milne established that the Secretsocieties originated from China, where they had been formed in theirstruggles against the Manchu. He particularly described the ‘Coelesto-terrestrial Society’, which, he wrote, had been formed to overthrow theEmperor Jiaqing.194 This rebellion had been closely followed by thoseBritish who had an interest in China. Milne saw several similarities



between this secret society and the freemasons in terms of secrecy andorganisation. Where, however, the British Freemasons consisted of a‘respectable body of men’, the Chinese aimed at overthrowing societyand had degenerated into an alliance of banditti. Milne thus arrivedat a very negative description of the purpose of the secret societiesin Southeast Asia: ‘In foreign colonies, the objects of this associationare plunder, and mutual defence. The idle, gambling, opium-smokingChinese (particularly of the lower classes), frequently belong to thisfraternity.’195

Most of the other Britons who were in contact with the OverseasChinese had noticed their organisation in kongsis. Up to this point,the secret societies played no important role for the British percep-tion of the Chinese. With Milne’s article, the notion of the secretive,deceptive Chinese was reinforced by the idea of these dangerous secretsocieties, which brought the conflicts of China to the European coloniesin Southeast Asia.

In the early years of the Straits Settlement, there seems to have beena certain amount of confusion over the distinction between ideas ofthe ‘kongsi’ and the secret societies. The problem for the colonial gov-ernment of a secret association of the Chinese was, however, quicklypicked up in the 1820s by Strait government officials. John Patullo, aStraits Settlement magistrate pointed out the threat of these societiesto the stability of the British government, but also described them as atypical characteristic of the cunning Chinese: ‘Indeed the very forma-tion of such societies indicate secret combinations, and amongst suchan intriguing race as the Chinese, opposition to law and good Govern-ment and the protection of their brethren under any circumstances.’196

The Chinese, from being seen as model workers slowly turned into acolonial population that inspired ‘information panics’ amongst theircolonial masters.

The Chinese, in the context of Malacca, Penang and Singapore thushad the image of a good and industrious working population and com-mercially aware traders. As soon as they assumed some sort of powerposition in trade or administration, the British still saw this as a prof-itable working arrangement, but also feared the structures they did notcomprehend. This was increased by their feeling of exclusion becausethe majority of them did not understand the Chinese languages andthe social organisations of the Chinese. This would become increasinglyimportant in the context of the Triad riots during the 19th century.

We cannot, however, understand the full significance of SoutheastAsia for the British meanings of China if we focus only on encounters



between the EIC agents and the Chinese in these places. The Protestantmissionaries were especially significant in this context. The evangelicalmindset and interests, together with the specific network the mission-aries belonged to, added a different element to the British meaning ofChina and the Chinese in Southeast Asia.

Evangelical sympathies and the circumstances of British communitiesin the periphery meant that the ideas developed by the missionariesalso became relevant for the other British groups. Raffles, for example,was strongly influenced by evangelical ideas and the Clapham sect, thuspartly providing the support of the EIC for the missionary efforts and aswe have seen in the context of the triad question, missionary opinioncould be very influential as apparently objective scholarship.

4.5 Educating the Chinese diaspora

In 1812, William Milne sailed from Britain to Asia. A fellow Scotsman,but in contrast to Leyden, he had not had the opportunity to study atEdinburgh University and to mingle with intellectual celebrities such asWalter Scott. Milne, born in 1785 in Aberdeenshire, had worked as ashepherd and farmhand before receiving the call to become a mission-ary. The LMS sent him to the Gosport academy in Hampshire, where hegot his only formal further education. After this, he was sent straightto China to support Robert Morrison, who had repeatedly asked foranother missionary to help him.

In the beginning, he seems to have planned to stay at Macao andCanton with Robert Morrison to learn Chinese, but the Portugueseauthorities did not allow him to remain in Macao, probably spurredon by the Catholic clergy. Morrison and Milne then resolved to put intopractice an idea Morrison had long cherished – to start the conversionof China with the Chinese settlers in the Malayan Strait. The missionar-ies thus chose the Strait as a missionary venue for the first time directlybecause of the Chinese living there. Soon afterwards, they would extendtheir missionary efforts to the Malays as well, but the Chinese wouldalways form an important part of their work in this region, aiming atmainland China.197

Milne’s first trip to Southeast Asia led him to Batavia. Without therestrictions of the Chinese authorities and the suspicions of the EIC,he was more free in his intercourse with the Chinese population andthus could report a successful interaction back to Morrison and theLMS.198 Consequently, the image he had of these Chinese, free from theoppressive Chinese government, was much more positive, describing



them as ‘diligent, sagacious people, well skilled in mechanical labours,and exquisitely so in commercial transactions. Their superiority to theJavanese and Malays in these respects is probably the cause of the com-petency which they enjoy.’199 He thus supported the idea that theChinese were diligent and industrious and perfect workers as soon asthey were freed from the bad influences of their despotic government.

In these regions, which were under European governments, the mis-sionary could move and interact more freely with the targets of hismission, and live according to his self-image as preacher to the heathens,and their improver. In this ‘contact zone’, the response of the ‘natives’and their refusal to be converted, of course remained a source of con-stant frustration,200 but the missionary could now imagine himself tobe doing everything he could to spread the message of the gospel. Oneof the methods for this was to set up charity schools, mainly for poorchildren. This missionary focus added to the construction of the Chi-nese as a subject population, shifting the emphasis from them as willingworkers to their necessary improvement. However, the circumstancesof the ‘contact zone’ obliged the missionaries to adopt their concepts ofeducation and improvement to the reaction of the Chinese, introducingChinese ideas about education into their system.

In March 1815, Milne, together with his wife and children, set out toMalacca, which was then handed over from the English to the Dutch.One of the first things Milne did when he settled in Malacca was to setup a school for Chinese children. The idea of the plurality of Chinesedialects was to become significant for the set-up of the schools. The firstwas for boys, who were taught reading, writing and arithmetic in theHokkien dialect, which most Chinese at Malacca spoke. In the followingyear, 1816, he opened a second school for Cantonese-speaking boys.201

The system he used for teaching was that of the Lancasterian plan.202

This was not simply an introduction of the ‘latest Western teachingmethods’ to the Chinese in the Malayan Strait.203 The Lancasterian sys-tem, designed by Joseph Lancaster, had been approved by the King andintroduced a new method of education based less on physical pun-ishment, and more on spurring the children on by competition. Tounderstand its implications for the Malayan Strait Chinese, one has toconsider the context in which it was invented.204 It was in particulardesigned for the education of the poor in Britain. It was cost effec-tive, being based on the ‘monitoring system’ in which older childrentaught younger ones. Due to the denomination of Lancaster, who wasa Quaker, the supporters of his system came mainly from the dissent-ing and evangelical circles, organised in the British and Foreign School



Society. The wide support it received resulted from the growing con-cerns of late 18th century Britain regarding the question of educatingthe poor. The increasing number of lower classes in English cities, com-bined with the unrests during the time of the radical reform movement,left parts of the middle and upper classes wondering whether educationmight not be the best medium to stabilise the social order. The curric-ula were therefore mainly restricted to writing, reading, basic arithmeticand Bible studies. Some still feared, as had been a common opinionduring the 18th century, that too much education for the poor wouldendanger the social order. But the new Sunday Schools and the schoolsafter the Lancasterian system were mainly seen to be forming the chil-dren of the poor into obedient, clean workers, who knew their place insociety.205

Apart from being seen as a good system to help and control theEnglish poor, the Lancasterian system was soon considered to be amodel for the schooling of British population abroad, for example inIndia, as well as for the education of those who had recently come underBritish control. The British and Foreign School society was foundedin 1814 to promote the new system, as its name indicated, not onlyin Britain but also abroad. Evangelical pressure resulted in a clause inthe East India Company Charter Act of 1813 which not only allowedmissionary activities in India but also acknowledged the ‘duty of thiscountry’ for the spread of ‘useful knowledge’ amongst the natives ofIndia.206 Non-European subjects should not only learn to read and writebut also to appreciate Western sciences and religion.207

Thus, when Milne introduced this system to educate the Chinese pop-ulation of Malacca, it had several implications. Even though Malaccawas first occupied by the British and then the Dutch, in the begin-ning the introduction of the missionary schools had little connectionwith colonial rule. Morrison and Milne saw education as an integralpart of preparations for the conversion of China, which would in theireyes lead automatically to an acceptance of British superiority in sci-ence and the arts by the Chinese. Conversion remained Morrison’s mainaim, even when he later supported Raffles’s plans for a secular schoolat Singapore.208 It was only later that the missionary schools in theMalaysian Strait, especially for the Malays, were seen as a duty of theBritish government for the moral improvement of its subjects.209 How-ever, the introduction of a new education system also meant that themissionaries saw the Chinese school system, formerly highly praised bythe Jesuits and the literati of the Enlightenment, as insufficient.210 Inthe first instance, the schools were justified on the ground that there



were not enough schools for Chinese children at Malacca, and thatthose existing, due to their distance from the Chinese mother coun-try, were of an inferior quality. The whole system of instruction wascriticised, especially the fact that the children had to learn Chinese clas-sics by heart, such as the Four Books of Confucius, without havingthem explained. Similarly, instruction in writing characters was seenas deficient, because the teacher did not explain the different compo-nents of the characters.211 The general and widespread education inChina itself could, at this time, still serve as a model for general edu-cation in England, despite its moral deficiencies which were due to itslack of Christian revelation.212 The missionaries in Malacca and Penang,however, did not try to bring the Chinese schools there back to thestandard of mainland China. Rather they de facto declared the British,Christian system to be better suited for education, thus underminingthe reputation of the Chinese system.

Due to this transfer from the home mission to the colonial contextof the Malayan Strait, the missionaries focused on the Chinese lowerclasses, which they wanted to shape into something like a model Englishpoor: modest subordinates with Christian morality. While the mission-aries thus also supported the idea of the Chinese as a subordinate group,they focused less on their industry and characterisation as good workers.In this context, the moral formation of the Chinese was the importantelement.

The adoption of the Lancasterian system meant that its focus onteaching through the Bible and with Christian texts was also trans-planted, aimed at dismissing the use of Chinese classical texts in schools.The main focus was not simply a philanthropic one, trying to teachthe children how to read and write so that they could improve theirprospects in life. Rather, it was important to the missionaries to exer-cise control and ensure that the Lancasterian system was used, which intheir view would root out the vices of the Chinese heathen traditions.This becomes evident from a number of statements of later missionariesin the region. Rev. Sam Dyer, missionary in Penang, delighted in 1828in the two schools after ‘the British system’ which he had managed tointroduce at his missionary station:

The children read nothing but Christian books, and not a singleobjection has been made to this. Not a word is said about their ownclassical works; indeed, the system effectually remedies the evil whichsubsisted in my former schools. The teachers allowed the children toread their own books in my absence. The schools can, also, be much



more vigorously superintended on the British system, and they aretenfold more under my control.213

However, especially in the early years of the missionary schools, it seemsto have been a great problem to teach without the Chinese classicaltexts. ‘Lucius’ (probably Milne) reported in the Indo-Chinese Gleaner, thatin the Chinese missionary schools at Malacca they had used the Chi-nese standard books as teaching material, because otherwise the parentswould not have allowed their children to visit the school.214 And eventhough he did not approve of this measure, because he thought theChinese classics too complicated for school children, he admitted thata Chinese should have some knowledge of these works.215 Thus, eventhough the aim might have been a well-educated, clean and ChristianChinese, who, like his English counterpart, would stay at the place insociety that the British thought proper for him, the missionaries hadto negotiate their ideal with the Chinese. They thus produced Chinesestudents well acquainted with the Chinese classics, who would usuallyrefuse to be converted.216

Setting up these schools, which were supposed to control and shapethe new generation of better Chinese, was only possible for the mission-aries in a colonial context of the Malayan Strait, which did not haveto be strictly British, but could be Dutch. The missionaries’ attempt tospread their Western religious world view needed European military andstrategic power behind it and even then their ideas quite often becamehybridised and changed against their will.217 In mainland China, whereno sympathetic Christian European government protected them, theseschools could not exist. The only attempt to set up a school there inthis period, by a converted Chinese, was soon ended by the Chineseauthorities.218

The Chinese Empire was also the main target of Morrison’s andMilne’s biggest project, the Anglo-Chinese College at Malacca. Mor-rison argued in favour of choosing Malacca as the position of theCollege, because there was a large Chinese community, which also hadgood trade contacts with China, thus making an infiltration of Chinapossible.219

One of the ideas for this College was to further educate the Chi-nese who had been taught in the missionary schools so that they couldbecome ‘native’ missionaries for the Mission in China.220 However, itwas also supposed to educate Europeans in Chinese language, historyand literature, so that they could serve as missionaries. And for this task,as Morrison described it, they had to transform themselves almost into



those whom they had to convert: ‘the teacher of Christianity must makehimself conversant with their opinions, their habits, their superstitions,their literature, and their history. If he knows not what they know, how-ever versed in the learning of Judea, Greece, and Rome, he will, to them,appear ignorant, and unqualified to be their instructor.’221 He thus partlytransformed the idea of the Dissenting Academies, especially at Gosport,where future missionaries were trained for their mission,222 into an insti-tution adapted to the circumstances of the China mission. Anothermodel for him was the College of Fort William in Calcutta.223 Further-more, there seems to have been some interchange with a similar insti-tution founded by the Baptist missionaries at Serampore.224 In its dualpurpose, the college was a typical product of the ‘contact zone’, tryingto transform the Chinese into European Christians and the Europeanmissionaries into people who could be accepted by the Chinese.

As these models show, the College always sat uneasily betweenworldly and religious claims to it. While Morrison and Milne assuredtheir superiors in London of the religious character of the College,they emphasised its worldly importance to financial supporters fromthe EIC.225 Thus it was a prime example of the entangled relation-ship of missionaries and EIC, philology and religion, Indian precedentsand European influence, expansionist interests and fascination with aforeign culture.

Despite the reciprocity in education Morrison advocated, as well asthe assimilation of the European missionaries, he still tried to ensure thedominance of the European character of the institution. It was mainlyEuropeans who were supposed to cultivate the Chinese culture, whileChinese teachers were only there to help them.226 In addition, Europeanstudents were supposed to learn the Chinese language, and then werefree to apply it to every field they wanted, be it religion, literature orcommerce. For the Chinese students however, there seems to have beena much stricter curriculum, consisting of the English language, ‘geogra-phy, history, arithmetic, and such other branches of learning or science,as time may afford, together with moral philosophy, and Christian the-ology, and Malay’.227 This referred of course to European history, scienceand geography. This showed that the aim of the program, in additionto preparing the scholars for Christianity, was to make them acceptthe European view of the world, or more particularly the ProtestantBritish one. They should recognise that Chinese achievements in historyand science were inferior to British, and that China was everything butthe ‘middle kingdom’. This becomes evident if one looks at the booksMorrison wrote in Chinese, partly for the College, partly for general use



for the mission, such as a book on general geography228 and one called‘A voyage round the world’, in which a Chinese man travels to Europeand discovers that China is neither the only nor the greatest civilisationon earth.229

Even though the Chinese were supposed to be taught English, Mor-rison still favoured the ‘orientalist’ approach of the English in India,making special reference to the topic of dissertation at the College ofFort William: ‘It is easier to diffuse the literature and science of thewestern nations among the natives of India, by translating Europeanbooks into their own tongue, than by instructing them in the Europeanlanguages.’230 Thus, the main emphasis was on learning the languageand culture of China in order to enable future missionaries and teachersto ‘point out his [men’s] errors, and to convey more correct informationto his mind’. The co-education of Europeans and ‘natives’ was supposedto increase the benefits of such an education. China, however, was alsostill a great unknown country, waiting to be explored by the Europeans.At the introductory speech for the College, it was described as: ‘theamplest field on the face of the globe, for the researches of the Naturalist,the Historian, the Antiquarian, and the Philosopher’.231

In a similar way, the set-up of the College showed that Morrisonstill saw the Chinese Empire as a civilised country, and therefore theapproach to its conversion, whether to Christianity, or an open tradepolicy, had to be based on rational argument and the enlightenment ofChina. It was not enough to identify the decaying state of China’s artand culture: for Morrison it was clear that the inhabitants of the empirehad to be convinced of the awful state of their art and culture and helpedout of it. Thus, they had to be educated, either at the Anglo-ChineseCollege at Malacca or through tracts distributed amongst travelling Chi-nese. In contrast, this task made it necessary for the British to learn moreabout the Chinese culture itself. This would enable them to point out itsflaws to the Chinese as well as to ‘translate’ this culture to their coun-trymen at home, always pointing out the defects which the British hadthe moral duty to diminish.

Thus, the missionary schools in the Malaysian Strait and the Anglo-Chinese College at Malacca brought to the forefront an idea of a Chinesepopulation that had to be improved in a similar way to the English lowerclasses or at least had to be educated in order to be saved from its degen-erated state.232 However, this was not simply for their own good, but wasalso to lead the Chinese Empire to acknowledge western superiority andto relinquish their superstitious views. It was intended to persuade themto accept the meaning the British missionaries assigned to them.



The Anglo-Chinese College remained the central focus point forthe Protestant China Mission and British Sinology until 1842. WalterMedhurst was trained at the College, who later founded the LondonMissionary Society Press in Shanghai and worked amongst the Chi-nese and Malay in Java. In his double role for the Malay and theChinese mission, he is a typical product of this contact zone in South-east Asia. Primarily interested in the China mission when he arrived,he also studied Malay and tried to spread the gospel amongst them.233

Next to his work on Malay language, he wrote books on the Chineseand worked on the second translation of the Bible into Chinese withCharles Gützlaff. His interest and understanding of the Chinese lan-guage resulted from the Southeast Asian contact zone. In Batavia, heproduced a dictionary for the Hokkien dialect.234 His justification wasthat amongst the Chinese he had met in Southeast Asia, almost nonespoke Mandarin, but rather their local dialect, in many cases Hokkien.235

He based his work on a local dictionary of the Hokkien dialect whichhe had acquired in Southeast Asia. He relied on native teachers ratherthan the works of Robert Morrison to assure its correctness.236 Printedwith the money of the EIC and supported by Olyphant & Co, a firminvolved in the country trade between India and China, this dictio-nary was mainly intended for the use of future traders and missionaries.The dictionaries and translations produced by Morrison, Milne andMedhurst served the pioneers of institutional Sinology in Britain aslearning material. Most of them were taught at the Anglo-ChineseCollege, focusing on these local dialects, including Samuel Kidd andJames Legge.237

In India, China could be an inscrutable power, potentially threateningthe expansions of the British power, a force much like the Sikhs, theAfghans or even the Russians. Here the idea of the Chinese emperor asa Buddhist monarch became important. At the other end, in SoutheastAsia, the immigrant population of this empire turned into the perfecttools for the British Empire.

In Southeast Asia, the assumptions about the inherent character ofthe Chinese were crucial, whether they were attributed to the stillhalf-civilised conditions in the Chinese home country or to racial char-acteristics. The Chinese language was studied to understand the lawsof this new colonial population, to break the power of the CaptainChinas’, and, as in the case of the Protestant missionaries, to morallyreform and educate the Chinese population. Here, the idea of a diverseChinese culture figured prominently and influenced the study of its lan-guage and culture. The rank of the Chinese on the scale of civilisation



became equally more important in order to determine the relation ofthe Chinese to those whom the British saw as native population ofSoutheast Asia. While the Chinese were still considered the highestranking Asian people on this scale, they nevertheless clearly had notachieved the heights of the European nations. In Southeast Asia, thus,the Chinese were created as the perfect subject people, as long as theywere ruled by the benevolent and good British government.

The EIC servants and missionaries spent a considerable portion oftheir life in Asia and communicated along the networks that connectedthe different points of British presence there. Their main fix point washowever still Britain itself, to which they eventually wanted to return.If they managed to survive the tropical climates long enough to comeback to Britain, they brought with them a meaning of the world shapedin contexts different from those who had remained in Britain. Next totea and porcelain they thus brought a different meaning of China andnewly created knowledge about it back home.


5Asian Networks and the British Isles

Thomas Stamford Raffles returned to Britain in 1824. A shipwreck on theway home destroyed all his papers, yet this did not hinder his furthercontribution to the production of knowledge on Asia in the metropo-lis. He became a founding member of the zoological society and oneof the presidents of the language institution which George Stauntonand Robert Morrison set up for the study of Chinese and other Asianlanguages.1 In July 1826, Raffles died of a prolonged illness, but his activ-ities during the short period he had in Britain after his return showshow the interests and activities of the periphery were brought backto the metropolis with the returning servants of the EIC, the militarypersonnel and the missionaries. Raffles, and later John Crawfurd alsocontinued to be spokesmen for British interests concerning China orthe Chinese, inspired by their encounters with the Overseas Chinese inSoutheast Asia.

In the years after the Macartney embassy, the meaning of China in themetropolis was more than ever before transformed by the new knowl-edge and new images of China which had been formed in the ‘contactzones’ of China and Southeast Asia. In Britain, especially in London, thedifferent networks which formed the British expansion came togetherand connected. They were joined by more traditional links with theEuropean continent, such as with France and Germany. This chapterconsiders Britain as a ‘contact zone’ to show how these different influ-ences shaped the British world. It discusses how the idea of the existenceof British ‘China experts’ and scientifically provable knowledge aboutChina crucially transformed the meaning of China in Britain on severallevels.

In this ‘contact zone’, two meanings of China existed, partially over-lapping. One was influenced by the aesthetic discourse on China in the

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Asian Networks and the British Isles 151

context of Chinoiserie, which could still be a signifier for pleasure, partlyexisting only in the realm of fantasy, which could however also be con-nected to critic on the society and monarch. This discourse still wasvery influential in the popular perception of China, but was now partlytransformed by new images coming from China, as discussed in the firstchapter.

The other meaning was connected to attempts to categorise and con-struct the political and historical entity China, which in the end couldincorporate China into the mental map of British expansion. Here wehave to determine the reasons why certain individuals and groups con-sidered it useful to attach themselves to this meaning of China, whichwas influenced by the encounter in Canton, India and Southeast Asia.2

The transfer of ideas from the ‘contact zones’ in Asia also meant thatthey were transformed to meet metropolitan needs and answer to theideas on Asia that dominated the discussion there.

One of the fundamental developments in this period, which influ-enced all these fields, was the development of a scientific Orientalism,creating Western scholars as authorities for Asia. Crucial to this wasthe institutionalisation of the study of Sanskrit, Hindi and Chinese asacademic disciplines as well as the foundation of various specialisedsocieties such as the Royal Asiatic Society. The European interest andresearch into Sanskrit and the ensuing comparative studies of the Indo-Germanic languages and its relationship to colonialism has been welldocumented and discussed.3 The renewed interest for the Chinese lan-guage and culture, its institutionalisation and its role in the discussionabout the nature of language in general in the early 19th century has,however, received little attention.4 In the second part, this chapter stud-ies therefore the beginning of a more academic study of China in themetropolis. The main focus of British interest in Asia was India, whichshaped the options available to those interested in institutionalisingthe study of China in Britain, but also increasingly influenced the wayChina was understood in the metropolis. In this context, the idea devel-oped that one could now establish an objectively true knowledge aboutChina. As will be argued, the conditions of the metropolis meant thatthis knowledge was only disputed within the European scientific com-munity, not between the British and the Chinese, as in the ‘contactzones’ of Asia.

Along with these developments, the British in the metropolis afterthe years of the Macartney embassy increasingly understood China to beconnected to Britain and the vital British interests and British role in theworld. Foremost amongst those who furthered this idea of China were



the Protestant missionaries and those who demanded free trade withChina. The debate about the abolition of the EIC monopoly in 1834was the high and turning point for this understanding, which is dis-cussed in the last part of this chapter. During this debate, two differentideas about the geo-political entity China were brought into the field.In the end, a meaning gained momentum which opened the way to theOpium War.

The new encounters with China in Asia shaped the understanding ofthe Britons in these local contact zones. When these Britons returnedhome, and in their letters to relatives and employers in the British Islesthey transported back and transformed it in the process. In Britain,especially in London, the early years of the 19th century saw the estab-lishment of institutions and societies which were dedicated to the studyof Asia and which were closely linked to Britain’s imperial interestin the region. The imperial networks spanned the metropolis as muchas the British presence in Asia. In the years after the Macartney embassy,the study of China received new interest in these contexts. The encoun-ters in Asia had created new ‘China experts’ who influenced the debatesabout the end of the EIC trading monopoly to China and the OpiumWar. These two debates highlight how ideas on free trade and the materi-alistic interests of the British in the East merged with the new knowledgeformed about China and resulted in the end in the idea that the ChineseEmpire, the former model state, could now be a legitimate target for warand conquest.

5.1 British Sinology

When Robert Morrison set out for China in 1806, he was the unknownson of a Scottish boot-tree maker.5 When he returned to Britain fora year in 1824, he was so well-known that he had trouble managinghis busy schedule, travelling the country from top to bottom. He alsotravelled to France to meet his fellow Sinologue Abel Rémusat and hisstudents Heinrich Julius Klaproth and Stanislas Julien.6 The highlight ofhis stay was certainly the audience with King George IV, to whom he pre-sented his translation of the Bible into Chinese. This audience had beenmade possible by Morrison’s friend from Canton, Sir George Staunton.Staunton himself, even though he was now working on his career asan MP, had relied in a similar way on his knowledge of Chinese for hissocial advancement. First, his rare knowledge had gained him a placeat the EIC factory in Canton. From there, he had hoped to become thenext ambassador to China, but had had to be content with the position



of secretary. After his return to Britain, he used his knowledge of Chineselanguage and culture to establish himself as an expert on all mattersrelating to China.

The likes of Morrison and Staunton shaped the new academic debateabout China, which partly followed the established themes such as ques-tions about Chinese language, civilisation and religion, but also addednew fields, such as race theory. The discussion on Chinese language inBritain was heavily influenced in this period by those who had partici-pated in the British imperial expansion in the East. With them they alsobrought the British ‘Canton’ school of sinology, which formed itself incontrast to the continental idea of the study of China.7 In Europe, how-ever, the study of Chinese language held a different meaning from thatin the ‘contact zones’ in Asia. Here, the academic discussion about thenature of the Chinese language and its incorporation into the study ofphilology became more significant.8

The first attempts to institutionalise the study of Chinese in Britainitself were closely linked to the formalisation of the education of EICemployees and their training in Indian languages in Wellesley’s Col-lege of Fort William. Governor-General Wellesley in 1800 set up thiscollege to train the employees of the EIC in Indian languages and to pro-vide them with further education. His rash execution of this institutionfound little support in the Court of Directors, not least because the Courtfeared losing control over the establishment and its patronage if theyagreed. Stricter control over the education of the young servants as wellas the wish to send them out to India later led to the first establishmentfor the teaching of Indian languages in Britain itself, at the East IndiaCollege at Haileybury. This was supposed to safeguard them from thetemptations of the Indian style of life and radical ideas at a young age.9

At Haileybury, the aspirants for EIC postings were taught a varietyof Eastern languages, such as Persian, Hindi and Sanskrit. However,Chinese was not included in the syllabus. Nor was there a separate insti-tution for teaching this peculiar language. In 1817, there had been asuggestion by the EIC Select Committee to establish such a school inBritain;10 the reasons in favour of learning Chinese in Britain, accordingto James Molony, President of the Select Committee at the time, werethe same as those given in the case of Indian languages: ‘I am not awareof any circumstance peculiar to the China Establishment, which doesnot apply to the Presidencies of India.’11 However, this argument didnot prove successful, and it failed in the same way as the idea of givingMorrison a professorship of Chinese at Hantford College.12 In Britainitself, there was still a difference between the need for knowledge about



India and China, which did not exist for those in the ‘contact zones’ inCanton, India and Southeast Asia.

When Morrison met Staunton in England in 1824 they decided tocombine their efforts to establish the teaching of Chinese language inBritain. Much like the Anglo-Chinese College in Malacca, the result-ing institution had a predominantly missionary background. It wasannounced that it should provide training in ‘all the languages of theheathen, with a view to the propagation of Christianity among them’.13

When the ‘Language institution’ was set up, its head personnel consistedof the evangelical interest in the EIC and in government: President wasBaron Bexley, Vice-presidents Sir George Staunton, Sir Stanford Rafflesand Sir George Henry Rose. William Wilberforce and Lord Teignmouthcompleted the set as contributors.14 Morrison donated his 1000 volumeChinese library to the institution as well as a museum. During his stayin England, he taught several people Chinese there.15

Soon after Morrison left Britain for China, this attempt to give Britainan institutionalised setting for the teaching of Chinese and Chinese cul-ture failed. Until his death in 1834, Morrison tried, from Canton, to finda new home for his library, in the end even advocating a sale of it forthe benefit of his family.16 Morrison had hoped, that since the King hadbuilt himself a retreat in Brighton in the Chinese style, he might alsopatronise Chinese studies in his country.17 However, neither royal inter-est, made visible by the audience, and nor the growing British interestin China were yet sufficient enough to sustain such an effort.

The King’s failure to take any interest in endowing a chair of Chineseat a British university despite his apparent interest in Chinoiserie showsthat the aesthetic sphere of contact with China was still very separatefrom the scientific one. As with Haileybury College and other insti-tutions, mainly private sponsorship was needed for their success. Themain possible sponsors – the EIC and the LMS, however seem to haveconsidered the language training for Chinese in Asia as sufficient. TheChinese language was not a major tool for the EIC to rule and thereforethe instruction in it did not have to be controlled in the metropolis.The knowledge of the Chinese language as a medium of power wasin the period before the Opium War only considered to be importantin the ‘contact zone’ in Canton, Bengal and Southeast Asia, where, aswe have seen, it played a crucial role in the struggle about power andidentity, which the Court of Directors did not approve of.

In France, matters were quite different. There, the first chair in Sinol-ogy had been established in 1814, with the young Abel-Rémusat asprofessor at the Collège de France. The creation of the chair had been



promoted by Silvestre de Sacy, the French orientalist. Already in 1813,Chrétien Louis Joseph de Guignes had published a Latin-French Chinesedictionary, in the completion of which Napoleon allegedly had heldsome interest.18 Institutionalised French Sinology thus had its founda-tion in the imperial interests of the state and was not initiated by theFrench who had had contact with China, be it in commercial or impe-rial context. Nevertheless, the missionary activities of the Jesuits and theresulting publications were still an important starting point for this newacademic Sinology, despite the loss of their reputation in France.19

Next to France, Russia had established itself as the second centre forEuropean studies of Chinese, due to its neighbourhood to the ChineseEmpire. It profited from the orthodox mission in Beijing, where Chinesewas studied and taught. A chair for Chinese language in Russia itself wasonly established in 1837 at the University of Kazan.20 Both Europeancentres of Sinology attracted the Germans who at the time discov-ered the study of Chinese and Tartarian languages. There were evenchairs established in Bonn (1816) and Munich (1833).21 The GermanJulius Klaproth was the most notorious of these European scholars.He had been a member of the Academy of Science and professor forAsian languages in St. Petersburg. As an interpreter he accompaniedthe Russian embassy to China in 1805. After his return to Germany, hewas appointed professor for Eastern languages in Bonn, but was allowedto study and work in Paris with Abel Rémusat and became a frequentcontributor and co-editor of the Journal Asiatique.22

These two centres of early Chinese studies were watched with atten-tion by some Britons regarding the question of an academic study ofChinese in Britain itself. Especially the French interest and progress inthe subject worried them. As in other fields, it was enmity with its Gal-lic neighbour that made it seem necessary in the mind of interestedBritons that Britain rather than France should excel in this field of schol-arship and master the language which could be so important in thefurther expansion in Asia. John Barrow, after his return from the Macart-ney embassy – a self-proclaimed spokesman on all matters relating toChina – was one of the first to be alarmed by the state of things:

The French, aware of the solid advantages that result from the knowl-edge of languages, are at this moment holding out every encour-agement to the study of Chinese literature; obviously not withoutdesign. They know that the Chinese character is understood fromthe Gulph of Siam to the Tatarian Sean, and over a very considerablepart of the great Eastern Archipelago: that the Cochin Chinese, with



whom they have already firmly rooted themselves, use no other writ-ing than the pure Chinese character, which is also the case with theJapanese.23

Even this rivalry, however, was not enough to promote a greater invest-ment in Chinese language studies in the metropolis. Trade with Chinawas deemed to be a sufficient contact with China, which should beenhanced by the establishment of diplomatic relations. Yet in the eyesof the Court of Directors and the Government neither the requirementsof trade nor of diplomacy seemed to necessitate the provision of large-scale Chinese language education in the metropolis. The LMS probablydeemed their involvement in the Anglo-Chinese College in Malacca assufficient for a field that was still largely closed to their mission. To thiswas added the still prominent idea of the difficulty and otherness ofChinese. Staunton and Morrison repeatedly had to argue against thosewho thought that it was impossible to study Chinese in Europe due toits difficulty. The lack of interest in comparative philology in Britainin the years before 1830 also contributed to the failure of interest inChinese from an academic point of view, in contrast to Germany andFrance, where the comparative study of languages for example inspiredWilhelm von Humboldt’s interest in Chinese and his ensuing debatewith Abel Rémusat.24

Only in 1837, did Staunton manage to persuade the University Col-lege London, against considerable resistance, to appoint a Professor ofChinese. This post however was given up again after the death of theappointed Professor, Samuel Kidd, in 1843.25

The lack of institutionalised study of Chinese in the metropolis didnot mean that the British were excluded from the transnational net-works of those who were about to lay the foundations for the academicand scientific study of Chinese in this period.

Morrison, as mentioned, visited the French sinologists in Paris. Themeeting itself seems to have been friendly enough, Morrison even pre-sented Rémusat and his students with some of his works.26 The previousand following battle in the pages of the Asiatic Journal and the Jour-nal Asiatique however shows that two very different scholarly traditionshad met each other. The debate was about how one had to study Chi-nese, and what constituted correct Chinese. This debate shows howthe participants tried to establish objective standards for the study ofChinese language and literature. Through these standards they coulddefine who had the true knowledge about China and its language. Theythus developed knowledge of China over which the Europeans could



consider themselves masters and which allowed them to make Chinaunderstandable, independent of Chinese mediators.

While this only had an effect in the European sphere of commu-nication, it nevertheless transformed the meaning of China in theEuropean mind, respectively to the different standards developed inBritain, France, Russia and Germany.

Already in a letter about the meeting in France, Morrison was quitederogatory about the quality of Rémusat and his students’ Chinese –they were only more zealous in their studies than the British.27 Lateron, especially Julius Klaproth would turn against Morrison, claiming,for example, that Morrison’s dictionary was not at all his own work,but rather that of his Chinese aides. Morrison, he implied, could nei-ther speak nor read Chinese sufficiently.28 When several people, likeP. P. Thoms, rushed to Morrison’s defence in the pages of the Asiatic Jour-nal, Klaproth countered that only the ‘senseless patriotism’ of Morrison’scountrymen and some incompetent judges had given Morrison a repu-tation which he did not deserve. He followed this by pointing out thatseveral Characters in the dictionary were assigned incomplete or wrongmeanings.29 His final judgement was telling beyond the rants Klaprothwas notorious for: ‘For this reason, Dr. Morrison’s work may do wellenough at Canton and Macao, whilst it provoked the dissatisfaction ofthe sinologists of Europe.’30 Klaproth’s teacher Abel Rémusat had madesimilar accusations in the preface of his Chinese grammar: Morrison, inhis opinion used too many Anglicisms and his dictionary was only madefor use at Canton or Macao, not for more literary and academic study.31

Morrison’s fellow missionary, Gützlaff, came to his defence and heldthe knowledge of those on the spot against European academic exper-tise: ‘Frequent blunders in the assertion of European sinologists shewthe vast superiority of those who are on the spot, and who, in case ofdoubt, can consult natives.’32

The chair in Paris was mainly dedicated to a theoretical study ofChinese by reading and translating its literature, thus creating a pre-sumably scientifically based knowledge about Chinese language, itsliterature, philosophy and religion. The education of personnel for theFrench expansionist interests in Asia was only of secondary concernuntil 1843.33 Rémusat’s main interest was the philosophical study oflanguages, especially the search for a universal grammar, which wouldexplain the relations between theory and language.34 Rémusat was inter-ested in describing Chinese according to its own grammatical terms. Hetried to extract the real, inherent structure of Chinese from the studyof Chinese classics.35 Nevertheless, he still used the Latin grammar as



a reference point to show that Chinese was not completely differentfrom all other languages, but also adhered to the principles of a uni-versal basic grammar.36 He thus established an authoritative set of rulesaccording to which Chinese could be understood. At the same time, herefused to accept the authority of the Chinese themselves to judge aboutthe grammatical details of their own language. One of his major pointsof criticism of Morrison’s grammar was that he had not taken the exam-ple sentences from the Chinese classical books and extracted the rulesof grammar from them, but rather relied on a Chinese teacher.

Rémusat and Klaproth were mainly interested in questions of gram-mar, the nature of ancient Chinese and the written ‘Mandarin’ Chineseand the translation of Chinese literature and philosophy. The dialectsand colloquial languages of China only played a minor role. Away fromthe conditions of the ‘contact zones’ in Asia, the French and Germanscholars had to rely on earlier works, mainly by the Jesuits, and Chinesethus turned into a language that could be studied in a similar way toLatin and Greek, addressing similar questions. Thus, an idea of Chineselanguage and a study of Chinese culture developed, that was influencedonly very indirectly by contact with Chinese, but based on the studyof ‘classical’, mainly historical, texts. The Chinese could not questionnor transform the discourse developed about China and the Chineselanguage under these circumstances.

The lack of political and private patronage meant that British Sinol-ogy remained centred in Canton and especially Southeast Asia. This,together with the missionary interest in reaching all levels of Chinesesociety, led to the fact that contemporary Chinese as well as dialectssuch as Cantonese and Hokkien were important parts of the study, alsoin its institutionalised manifestations in Southeast Asia. Additionally,the Chinese teachers and aids had a great influence on the work.

While the ‘Canton/Southeast Asian’ school and the continentalEuropean Sinologists differed in how Chinese should be studied, theystill had the common goal of forming knowledge which would allowunravelling the mysteries of the Chinese. Abel Rémusat’s grammarshould help future students to better understand the character of theChinese people.37 John Francis Davis similarly argued that the use oftranslations of Chinese literature would help to understand the char-acter of this peculiar people.38 In Europe, the knowledge of Chinesewas the ultimate tool to discover China, to finally make it available tothe penetrating eyes of the European observer, be it missionary or aca-demic. Thus, Henry Thomas Colebrook, at the opening session of theAsiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, explained how the progress



of knowledge of the Chinese language had opened China for the studyof the British (long before the Opium Wars would allow them to enterthe country):

This field of research, which is now open to us, may be cultivatedwith confident reliance on a successful result; making us betteracquainted with a singular people, whose manners, institutions,opinions, arts and productions, differ most widely from those of theWest; and through them, perhaps, with other tribes of Tataric race,still more singular, and still less known.39

For a different purpose, but in a similar trope, at the Annual Meetingof the LMS in 1824, Joseph Butterworth, a Methodist publisher andpolitician, praised Morrison who by the will of God had been able tolearn Chinese and thus provided the mission with a key to the ChineseEmpire, which had before been tightly sealed from their efforts.40 Whilethe mastery of the language was seen to open China to the Europeanobserver, in this context, the foreignness of China was once moreemphasised.

Linguistically, its complete otherness was the most importantfeature.41 But now Europeans could overcome this otherness with thehelp of their rational minds or God. The land that could thus be dis-covered ‘differ most widely from those of the West’. Its foreignness andstrangeness could now be demystified, described in linguistic terms andclassified. This re-invention of Chinese language in Europe could takeplace without the disturbances of the ‘contact zone’, where the Chineseauthorities refused to accept British re-interpretations of Chinese wordssuch as ‘barbarian’ and tried to hinder the foreigners in learning thelanguage in the first place. The contest in Europe was thus not withthe Chinese authorities about identity, representation and the powerover words, but rather between the eternal rivals France and Britain onwho could create knowledge about China, solve its secrets, which wouldallow Britons or Frenchmen to become the predominant scholars in thefield but also to gain influence in the region of East and Southeast Asia.

Language thus remained one of the prominent sites on which Chinawas defined. It was now a tool through which the secrets of China couldbe lifted and its claim to high civilisation either partly re-affirmed ordismantled, its difference described. The rank of Chinese civilisation wasthe other main interest of debates about Chinese culture, which mainlytook place within the Royal Asiatic Society and the Asiatic Journal. Aswith the debate about Chinese language, the discussions about Asia in



general in this period were dominated by those who had served theBritish expansionist interests in the East, be it as EIC employees, countrytraders or missionaries. The early years of the 19th century thus markedthe beginning of the domestication of knowledge formed during theBritish imperial expansion in the East.

The most prominent institution in this context was the Royal AsiaticSociety. More than 25 years after William Jones had founded the BengalAsiatick Society, its counterpart in the metropolis was finally inaugu-rated. As Colebrook made clear in his introductory remarks, the society’smain purpose was to assist Britain’s civilising mission.42 With the foun-dation of the society, the study of Asia found its first institutionalisedhome. While the respective chairs at the universities concerned them-selves mainly with the Biblical Orient, the Royal Asiatic Society couldbecome an authority for the study of greater Asia – including Australia.Its members were to a large extent men who either had been in EICservice in Asia or had worked for them at home. The study of Asia wasthus mainly not in the hands of those who had come to it throughacademic interest such as Wilhelm von Humboldt, but was conductedby those who had forged the Empire abroad.43 Societies like the RoyalAsiatic Society and the journals were protected areas in which the mate-rial ‘discovered’ in the contact zones could be turned into undisputableknowledge, stating facts about Asia without the possibility of responseby the Asians.

The main focus of the society certainly lay on India, but its co-founderhad been George Thomas Staunton, and matters concerning Chinaappeared repeatedly in the Transactions of the Society. China was inthis context by its geographical position and the link provided by theEIC and trade once more included in British ponderings about India.And as the problems with the establishment of a chair of Chinese stud-ies had shown, a larger British concern for China only existed if it wassomehow linked to greater Asia and the study of mankind. This equallyapplied to the far more political Asiatic Journal or mainly missionarysponsored institutions, such as the Oriental Translation fund. There wasa vivid exchange between the Asiatic Societies of Calcutta, London andParis. Where formerly Egypt or ancient Greece had formed the maincomparison, now India held this position. This was due to the Britishprominence in India, which had formed the experience of many as wellas the exchange with the Calcutta Asiatic Society. Connected with this,and of equal importance was the idea of India as the origin of civilisa-tion, which had begun with William Jones and had now mainly foundits adherents amongst the German romantics.44 Chinese history had



thus no longer necessarily to be aligned with the story of the Bible andthe distribution of mankind after the deluge. Rather, the question ofits connection to India became crucial to understanding its history andculture.

William Jones was the first to argue that the Chinese were descendantsof an Indian warrior caste.45 John Francis Davis supported this claim inhis paper for the Royal Asiatic Society in 1823. He used the Indian lawsof Manu as the authoritative point of reference and drawing on thisshowed the incoherence with the Chinese historical annals. Addition-ally, he took the position of an observer, gifted with superior logic, topoint out that Chinese historical accounts could not possibly be accu-rate. All claims by the Chinese to high antiquity of their civilisationthus had to be refuted.46 Even for somebody like Davis, who had livedfor years in the ‘contact zone’ of Canton and learned Chinese there, themain point of reference when addressing the metropolitan audience wasthus India.

This was even more important for Julius Klaproth. As a German, livingin Paris and St. Petersburg, whose articles in the French Journal Asia-tique were regularly translated and published in its British counterpart,he was a typical medium for the transfer of ideas. In his article in theAsiatic Journal in 1832, he clearly picked up the romantic notion of Indiaas the cradle of civilisation and its association with beauty and perfec-tion, but rejects a link between China and India. In order to refute theidea of a common origin between the Chinese and the Indians, he setthe romantic notion of the ‘poetic and speculative mind of the inhabi-tants of the banks of the Ganges and Jumna’ against the dry and prosaicgenius of the Chinese. Additionally, he argues that the Chinese accountsof their ancient history were probably quite adequate, since the Chineseotherwise would have invented a more flattering story.

As a proof of the total difference and unconnectedness of the Chinesewith the Indians, and thus the Europeans, he also used argumentsinspired by comparative physiognomy. For Klaproth, the different racialfeatures of the Indians and Chinese were the best proof against theircommon history. Further supporting the idea of the complete other-ness of the Chinese, he depicts them as ugly and entirely different fromthe Europeans, describing their exterior characteristics: ‘the pig-eyes, theprotuberant cheek-bones, the pug-nose, and the square flat face’. This, inhis opinion, stood quite in contrast to the Indians, ‘with whom, except-ing in respect to colour, we find the features of the European race.’47

For both of them it was clear that the Europeans had to be the judgesover the value of sources on Chinese history. Klaproth claimed that



the Chinese neglected some sources on their ancient history becauseConfucius did not mention them. This blinding veneration of theChinese sage could only be overcome by Europeans, who could valuethese texts despite the fables they contained.48 Davis equally set outto demonstrate which ‘facts’ could be relied on respecting Chinese his-tory, excluding most Chinese sources. Once these facts were known, heargued, the European researcher could conduct further targeted researchinto Chinese history.49

Closely linked to the debates of Chinese history were those aboutChinese religion. Both focused on the question of origin. Christianitywas also in the metropolis the main reference frame for the study ofthe Chinese religions. In the metropolis, their connection to India washowever of equal importance. The discussions about Chinese religionsin publications such as the Asiatic Journal or the Transactions of the RoyalAsiatic Society were not primarily conducted by the Protestant mission-aries, but by those EIC employees who had learned Chinese, or scholarsof Chinese, like Klaproth, and other self-styled experts on Asia. It wasthus more an historical interest that inspired these debates.

The idea of the ‘Three Chinese religions’, Confucianism, Buddhismand Taoism, had already manifested itself.50 With regard to both Bud-dhism and Taoism, the question of the connection between India andChina was the major field of enquiry. While it was accepted by nowthat Buddhism had come to China from India, the exact circumstanceswere still a matter of interest. In general, the accounts of the spreadof Buddhism in China were based on translations of old Chinese texts.According to them, Emperor Ming of the Han dynasty had dreamed ofa saviour from the West and sent an emissary to look for him, who thenbrought back the lore of Buddha from his travels. The Jesuits had alreadyincluded this account into their works, but now new translations weremade available to a wider public through prints and articles, such as inthe Asiatic Journal.51

The Indian origin of Buddhism therefore remained important forfurther attempts to reveal more about this religion. In the metropo-lis, Indian Buddhism served as the main point of reference to explainChinese Buddhism, rather than its Tibetan variation. A contributorin the Asiatic Journal, for example, stated that the Asiatic Societies ofCalcutta, Paris, London and St. Petersburg had done much to remove theerrors and insufficient knowledge that had prevailed in respect to Bud-dhism. Nevertheless, he refuted the latest attempt by Karl Neumann, aGerman Sinologue, by translating the ‘Catechism of the Shamans’ fromthe Chinese as flawed, due to the lack of Neumann’s understanding ofChinese as well as the Brahmanical system. He thus rejected Neumann’s



idea that Buddhism was the Lutheranism of the Hindus.52 While therewas no such obvious connection as with Buddhism, there were alsoattempts to trace Taoism to India, by comparing what was consideredto be Taoist doctrine with the scripts of Hinduism.53

History and religion had been prominent fields for the description ofChina since the early Jesuit reports. Klaproth’s allusion to the physiog-nomy of the Chinese marks the development of another category inthe way Europeans attributed meaning to the differences of mankindin this period and ranked the thus constituted groups. As Nancy Stepanand Roxanne Wheeler have shown, the turn from the 18th to the 19thcentury marked the beginning of ideas of race that would shape thiscategory until well into the 1960s. In the 16th and 17th century, thedifferentiation of mankind had mainly operated with the categories ofreligion, geography and clothing. In the late 17th and 18th century,attention was paid to the skin colour and physiognomy. Within theperiod discussed the idea developed that skin colour was fixed and notonly a result of the different climates on earth and its effect on the bod-ily fluids. In this context, the ranking of mankind according to the skincolour began, seeing white as the most perfect form, and black as thelowest.54 In addition, at the close of the 18th century, the new scienceof comparative anatomy studied the complexity of the mental organisa-tion and internal mechanisms of anatomical structures in man, whichcould also be read from the facial angle of the skull.55

Walter Demel has shown that the classification of the Chinese as ‘yel-low’ only developed in the 18th century finally becoming permanentin the 19th century.56 In the earlier period, the theorists still differedheavily as to which colour of skin they attributed to a people and in theconclusions they drew from this.57 Particularly in the 16th and 17thcentury, when the Chinese were still thought to be culturally equal,they were described as ‘white’ most of the time. As the opinion on theChinese became more negative they were increasingly seen as ‘yellow’or coloured in some way, normally ‘black’ or ‘brown’. Yellow probablyfinally became the colour that was attributed to the Chinese, becauseone saw them as not as civilised as the Western Europeans, but also notas primitive as the Africans and therefore looked for an intermediatecolour that suited this position. Furthermore, Demel points out, accord-ing to the psychology of colour, ‘yellow’ corresponded particularlywith ambivalence and lack of transparency which was often seen as adominant characteristic of the Chinese.58

John Barrow was one of the first Britons who were to pay closerattention to the physiognomy of the Chinese. In contrast to the othermembers of the Macartney embassy, he uses it as a factor to determine



the position of the Chinese amongst the different people. He describedthem as slightly taller than the Tartars, with small slant eyes, highcheekbones and pointed chins. In respect to the skin colour, Barrowstill defined it as ‘between fair and dark complexion, which we distin-guish by the word brunet or brunette’.59 He however also emphasised thatone of Chinese legates who accompanied the embassy had a face thatdiffered in nothing but the form of the eyes from that of a European.60

John Barrow was one of the first in Britain, who tried to position theChinese in relation to other peoples and migration patterns on accountof their physiognomy, and not just their language or religion.

Barrow assumed that due to similarities of physiognomy, characterand costumes between the peoples, the Chinese had made extendedsea voyages in earlier times and that some of the Indian tribes in SouthAmerica and California were descended from them, as well as the inhab-itants of the island Sakhalin and of some parts of Africa. He claimedthat the Chinese had the biggest similarities with the Hottentots. Heexplained this by common descent and justified his argument by obser-vation and study of their external characteristics: both peoples had,according to Barrow, an upper eyelid that was bent towards the nose anddid not have an angle there as the Europeans had. Furthermore, bothhad small limbs, flat noses and a long distance between the slantingeyes. The temperament, skin colour and the voices were also identical.Only the hair was different, which could be the result of mixing theChinese with the Mosambicans.61

In this way, the Chinese, as well as the Hottentots, had been defini-tively classified and were now distinguishable from other people. TheChinese may have shared common ancestors with the Hottentots, butclearly not with the Europeans.

In spite of classifying the Chinese according to external charac-teristics, this in themselves did not yet determine anything, as thecomparison between the supposedly barbarian Hottentots and the morecivilised Chinese showed. For Barrow the form of government and notracial characteristics determined the character and level of civilisation ofa people. In the case of the Chinese, this was oriental despotism, whichwas however already more civilised than the form of government of theHottentots. In this, Barrow was still part of the tradition of the 18th, notthe 19th century.62 His account was to be significant for the early Britishwriters about race and the new science of comparative anatomy.

For James Prichard, the early racial theorist, the Chinese formed a peo-ple on its own, distinct from the Mongolian race. Significantly, he didnot use a comparison of their external features nor of their anatomy to



prove this but rather the arguments of comparative philology. For him,the monosyllabic language of the Chinese and Indo-Chinese nationswere proof enough that they formed a race of their own. He adoptedBarrow’s description of their physiognomy, including the skin colour,which he thus saw as close to a European brunette, which could darkenthrough exposure to the sun.63

William Lawrence in contrast followed the German anthropolo-gist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach in grouping the Chinese with theMongolian race.64 His attention was mainly focused on what he callsthe Mongolian tribes, which he associated with Genghis Khan, Attilaand Tamerlan. To define the racial features of the Mongolian race, heused the skulls, skin colour and other physical features of the Calmucksand Burats. He also referred to Barrow’s description of the Tartars andthe Chinese and used them to show that both people clearly belongto the same race.65 In his discussion of the intellectual qualities of thedifferent races, the still high reputation of the Chinese and Japanesecivilisations stood in this context in uneasy relation to his derogativeview of all non-white races. It however led him to explain the presumedphenomenon of the lack of Chinese development for the first time withinherent, unchangeable racial characteristics:

While the empires of China and Japan prove that this race is suscep-tible of civilisation, and of great advancement in the useful and evenelegant arts of life, and exhibit the singular phenomenon of politicaland social institutions between two and three thousand years olderthan the Christian era, the fact of their having continued nearly sta-tionary for so many centuries, marks an inferiority of nature and alimited capacity in comparison to that of the white races.66

A scholarly discourse thus began to be formed about the physical char-acteristics of the Chinese and the rank that followed from this in thedevelopment of humankind. One should however not overestimate theimportance of this discourse. As we have seen earlier in Crawfurd’swritings, these Chinese physical characteristics were important in the‘contact zone’ of Southeast Asia to establish the relationship betweenthe Chinese and the other ethnic groups there. In the metropolitancontext, scholars tried to find a place for the ‘Asians’ in their theoriesof mankind, which were however primarily aimed at and derived fromthe study of Africans and American Indians. It also had seemingly noinfluence outside these scientific debates. The question of race, in this19th century sense of the word, played no role in the debates about



Chinese–British relations until the 1840s. The descriptions of the fewChinese visitors to Britain in the early 19th century paid very little atten-tion to their physical characteristics. No allusion is made to the colourof their skin being ‘yellow’, and only in one case their physiognomy isdescribed as ‘Of the Tartarian mould’.67

To assess the correct position of China on the rank of civilisation wasone of the prime objectives of these discussions about Chinese history,religion and race. The level of Chinese civilisation and the status of itsculture had long been a matter for debate, especially since most Britishcommentators felt it had been exaggerated by the Jesuits.68

John Barrow most prominently used his role during the Macartneyembassy to produce more legitimate knowledge about the Chinese toassess their rank on the scale of civilisations. As the subtitle of his bookon the Macartney embassy stated, in his report he wanted to ascer-tain the place of ‘[. . .] this extraordinary empire’ on the ‘[. . .] scale ofcivilised nations’. For this, Barrow looked at the typical criteria accord-ing to which one could classify a nation, like language, their religion,the development of their science, their arts and form of government.69

In this context, the new and allegedly more objective knowledge col-lected by the British in the ‘contact zone’, such as Staunton’s translationof the Chinese Penal Code, was deemed to be crucial. The use of thisnew information varied significantly in Britain from that in Canton. Inthe metropolis, it was mainly seen as a tool to better establish the stageof the development and nature of Chinese civilisation.70

The translation was supposed to improve British knowledge ofChinese civilisation, since, as Staunton established with reference toGibbon, ‘The laws of a nation form the most instructive portion ofits history.’71 He argued with Montesquieu and William Jones that lawsalways had to be culturally specific and had to be based on tradition.72

Precisely for this reason, the Chinese laws reflected the peculiaritiesof Chinese culture and could provide foreigners with a window ontothe underlying principles of this civilisation. Reviewers of Staunton’swork in the Asiatic Journal, 20 years after its first publication, in thecontext of the debates about the end of the EIC trading monopolycould identify similarities between Indian and Chinese law. Neverthelessthey emphasised the singularity of the Chinese system and the Chineseculture.73 For Staunton, the characteristic of Chinese culture was mainlythe patrimonial principle which he deemed to be the founding con-cept of Chinese society, government and law. The study of the laws of aculture was also used in this context to determine the level of its civil-isation. In Staunton’s opinion, the Chinese Penal Code clearly showed



that China was an ancient and advanced civilisation however charac-terised by Asian despotism. It still did not have the characteristics of acommercial society which the stage theory saw as the highest stage.74

In his preface, Staunton thus clearly argued against the ideas of theUtilitarians such as Bentham and Mill, who supported the idea of a uni-versal standard for the assessment of laws.75 The ideas of both WilliamJones and his Utilitarian opponents were to a large extent concernedwith the consolidation and legitimisation of British rule in India.76 How-ever, as in the Indian case, the attack on Chinese law, influenced byAnglicists and Utilitarian ideas, became increasingly predominant. TheAsiatic Journal thus raised the criticism that though the principles oflaw might have been formed in accordance with Chinese culture, theyinevitably led to despotism and corruption and therefore could notsimply be accepted as a cultural expression of the Chinese.77 Chinesecivilisation was thus more and more considered to be flawed and similarto other Asian despotisms.

Staunton’s translation of the Chinese law also influenced James Millin his assessment of the state of India’s civilisation.78 Mill relied on bothBarrow’s and Staunton’s texts, but significantly no longer on any Jesuitauthorities.79 He came to the conclusion that, like India and other Asiannations, China was a long way from being the advanced civilisation theJesuits had described. He considered it both to be deficient in the sci-ences and innovation, as well as treacherous, insincere and unclean. Insome aspects, the Chinese had an advantage over the Indians, specif-ically in their industriousness and in the progress made in relation tocrafts.80 This idea of China as the most advanced of the contemporaryAsian nations thus found its way also into the writings about Asia inthe metropolis. The industriousness of the Chinese was here however,in contrast to Southeast Asia, not seen in connection to their capabilitiesas settlers or workers, but rather as an advantage that could level someof the negative effects of their culture and explain why China had notyet decayed to the extent of India under Mughal rule.

This was also a position John Davis took in his memoirs on Chinadesigned for the metropolitan audience. For him, China clearly held theprime position amongst the nations of Asia, whose earlier achievementsin political stability and wealth were mainly due to its northern geo-graphic situation. However, similar to James Mill, China was in his eyeslargely in deficit in comparison to Europe. As for Barrow and Mill, hiscriteria were its retarded progress in science, the arts, the failure to pro-vide security of property, the rights of women and the lack of a goodand well-established moral and political philosophy.81



These debates meant a further shift in the meaning of China for theBritish in the metropolis. China was now more clearly located within anAsian context, mainly due to the new attention India received withinthe debates about the origin of civilisation. The knowledge formed inthe networks in Asia meant that the British now believed to have morevalid knowledge about it. Knowledge production about China for theBritish had to take place in the ‘contact zones’ of Asia, as the prob-lem of the study of Chinese language makes clear. A mere textual bases,which Rémusat and also Klaproth considered to be sufficient was lackingauthenticity in the eyes of the British.

The new knowledge about China was used to revisit the old sites ofdebate about China: its antiquity, religion and its link to other civilisa-tions and finally, its level of civilisation. The main tendency of the late18th century was continued here, supported by allegedly new and moreobjective knowledge. The claim by the Chinese and the Sinophiles inEurope to China’s antiquity and high civilisation was attacked, Confu-cianism and Taoism placed in one line with other superstitious Asianreligions. In terms of its civilisation, it was made clear that while Chinamight still be one of the most developed civilisations in Asia, it was farfrom reaching European or British level. This was crucial to support theidea that Britain was unquestionable on the highest level of civilisation,a status China to which long had been a claimant.

These discussions were also not only theoretical speculations likesome of its predecessors in the 18th century. As the next sectionsshow, they established a meaning of China that could seemingly objec-tively be shown to be at a lower stage of civilisation compared withBritain. This status thus could call for and allow an intervention inChinese affairs by the British. The Protestant mission created with theirown networks of information and knowledge distribution a meaningof China that resulted in an even more urgent call for British evan-gelical action in China. On the other hand, the debate about the EICcompany monopoly and later about the legitimacy to go to war withChina would revisit many of the topics addressed above and make thequestion of Chinese civilisation a crucial element in the discussionsabout British–Chinese relations.

5.2 Saving China

In the periphery, the missionaries faced frustration and isolation in theirmissionary enterprise. They co-operated with the EIC and the Britishand Dutch Residencies. They collected information on religion, but also



on day-to-day politics of the countries they were concerned with, espe-cially China. Their letters and reports, carefully edited, brought theseideas from China and Southeast Asia back to Britain, where they wereinserted in a context that reflected the concerns of the metropolis.

The audience which the missionaries reached was one which proba-bly had very little previous contact with China, whether by way of theJesuit reports or perhaps even by the fashion for Chinoiserie. As WilliamMilne formulated it, the Jesuit accounts had been written in a foreignlanguage, they were too long and too expensive to furnish the Britishpublic with information of China. This deficit had to be filled by themissionaries in his opinion.82 Through publications like the EvangelicalMagazine and the Missionary Chronicle, but also through a variety of soci-eties such as the British and Foreign Bible Society (BFBS), the British andForeign School Society, an Association in Manchester formed on behalfof the funds of the Anglo-Chinese College83 and the London Mission-ary Society and its local branches these people continuously receivedinformation about China. It seemed to them authentic and true, since itwas based on the local expertise of the missionaries and their religiousintegrity. The new knowledge about China thus became embedded in aset of reports from all countries of the world which had come into theinterest sphere of evangelicals. This gave the readership of these mag-azines the impression of a worldwide network which worked for thesalvation of mankind, with the English at its centre. The most promi-nent expression of this view were certainly the anti-slavery campaignand the fight against the sati in India.

The information brought to this audience from China was shaped tomeet the needs for fundraising, both of money and men, and the poli-tics of the periphery. Thus, even though the mission made little progressin terms of converts, most reports in the Missionary Chronicle and theEvangelical Magazine highlight the positive aspects and the supposedprogress of the mission. When the Chinese increased the prosecutionof Roman Catholics in the country and the emperor issued an edictagainst Christianity, Morrison decided to continue in Canton, but stillwas rather worried about the prospect of the mission. In his letters tothe LMS however, he asked not to publish this information, so as notto alarm the EIC’s Directors.84 The Evangelical Magazine even decided toprint a rather positive note on the edict, conjuring up the power of theword of God and claiming ‘that it will be impossible for the Emperorof China, or his officers, to prevent the circulation of the Scriptures inthat empire, as many thousands of the Chinese annually visit Penang,Java, and other parts of the world, where the Bible may be put into their



hands, and by them be introduced into the country.’85 In the annualreports of the LMS and the BFBS, the lack of converts was made up for bythe praise of Morrison’s translations and how he ‘mastered’ this difficultlanguage.86

The information the British evangelical audience received was how-ever not only a bit more positive but also concentrated to an extremeextent on a religious perspective. The very first report by Morrison whichwas printed in the Missionary Transaction was a description of the super-stitious practices of the Chinese.87 Even more focused is the letter serieswhich Morrison wrote for the Evangelical Magazine called ‘Remarks onthe language, history, religions, and government of China’, published in1825. It was the first really extensive coverage by a British magazine onChina, inspired by Morrison’s home visit in the same year. Even thoughthe title promised a wide range of information on the country, the letterswere only concerned with the religions of China, and the mission to it.88

However, when he tried to reach a broader audience, as with his‘China: A dialogue for the use of schools’, to gain more support for themissionary cause, and especially his Anglo-Chinese College at Malacca,Morrison included more details about Chinese history, language andsociety. In this little book for children, he translated Chinese historyinto a European-Christian history, equating events of the one with theother. By doing this, he completely dismissed the claim that the antiq-uity of Chinese history could question the chronology and validityof the Bible.89 The information he produced about China thus shouldmake this country more familiar and understandable to his audience.90

He also presented China as a civilised country, which had produceda lot of good learning, continuously emphasising that the British hadno right to despise the Chinese on accord of their ‘foolishness’ and‘vices’ but rather had to love them as one of God’s creatures that hadtaken the wrong way. Moreover, only those Britons who had ‘reformed’themselves into good and moral Christians had the right to point outthe faults of another people. A bad Englishman, who claimed to be aChristian was in Morrison’s eyes as bad as a pagan Chinese.91

Since the evangelicals were good Christians, China appeared on themental map of this part of British society as a country in need ofthe British benevolence. To show its inhabitants the message of theGospel, even against their will,92 was a divine duty for the British. Insermons which Morrison preached during his stay in England in 1825,he depicted the Chinese as imprisoned by Satan, prisoners who are ‘hug-ging their chains’.93 This necessity to help the Chinese did not just resultfrom the higher state of civilisation of evangelical British or the fact that



they had been Christians for centuries. Because they were Christians,they were sincere and good people, of whose involvement everybodywould benefit and whose benevolence towards ‘wretched creatures inall nations’ was a Christian duty.94 Morrison evoked the idea not of dif-ference between the different cultures and nations, but of unity, usingthe same language as the abolition for slavery campaign had done:

Do we too maintain the infidel opinion, that we are a superior race;and that God did not make of one blood all nations of men, and thuscontradict and blaspheme the Bible! Do we still hold the silly opinionthat geographical limits, a river, a mountain, or an imaginary line,destroys the brotherhood of the family of man?95

The only difference in his eyes lay in the amount of possibilities to learnabout the right faith in different parts of the world.96 This brotherhoodof the family of man meant, however, that the spiritual well-being ofthe Chinese had to be as important to a Christian as the salvation of theenslaved African or the Indian widow.

In Britain, there was certainly a stronger focus at the time on the anti-slavery question, the conversion of the Pacific islanders and the fightagainst the sati in India. Nevertheless, the Protestant Mission to Chinaand its reports back home meant that the moral improvement of Chinahad moved onto the agenda of the evangelicals. China was not a dis-tant, mythical country anymore. Its inhabitants were brethren sufferingin the darkness of ignorance. The influence of evangelical thought inthe political arena, as through the Clapham sect, made this meaningof China especially important during the debates on the renewal of theEIC charter in 1813, and even more so in 1832–1834 and in the run-upto the Opium War.

5.3 Forces of free trade

In the summer of 1831, a petition to the House of Commons ‘fromBritish subjects residing in China’ reached Britain. Headed by Matheson,Wright and John Robert Morrison, the country traders in Canton com-plained about the repressions by the Chinese Hong merchants andChinese government and the misrepresentation of the foreign mer-chants by them. Their main argument was that for the trade to continue,an international treaty with China was necessary and furthermore that‘a higher authority is required, emanating directly from his Majesty’,to show that the British at Canton had not lost the protection of their



sovereign.97 Resulting from the interests, dissatisfactions and discoursesof the Canton contact zone, it arrived in a country struggling with thepost-war situation and the call for reform. Most historians now empha-sise the continuities rather than the ruptures during what has beenlabelled ‘the Age of Reform’. They discuss how the reforms often safe-guarded the old order rather than the beginning of a trajectory towardsa new, mainly bourgeoisie, one.98 Nevertheless, the defining featuresof this period are certainly the debates on free trade, laissez faire andthe criticism of ‘Old Corruption’. Boyd Hilton and Anthony Watermanhave shown how some of these ideas on free trade were the result of amarriage between Scottish political economy and evangelical thought,which interpreted the law of the market as God given and as a moraltrial and incitement for moral improvement.99 These free trade ideascould be used to justify an ‘informal imperialism’ rather than peacefulanti-imperialism.100

However, as Anna Gambles has pointed out, this ‘Christian politi-cal economy’ and liberalism was not uncontested. Rather, there wasa substantial orthodox Tory, later Conservative opposition, which wasanti-individualistic, in favour of economic protectionism and monopo-lies of trade, with a historically based empirical approach to economicand social issues which contrasted with the more theoretical approach oftheir contemporaries.101 The debate about the end of the EIC monopolyfor the China trade was one of the prominent sites for these contro-versies between free trade advocates and their Conservative adversaries,even though it tends to be somewhat neglected in historiographies ofthis period.

When the EIC charter came up for renewal in 1833, the questionof the nature of the Indian government and the settlement of Englishpeople in India was central to the debate in the newspapers and parlia-ment. This time, however, the EIC trade monopoly with China, whichhad only been a peripheral issue in 1813, became one of the domi-nant topics. In the last decade before the 1830s, China had acquiredan economic importance for a number of groups whose financial andpatronage interests lay mainly outside of or at odds with the EIC system.The country trade became more and more profitable and the methodof remitting profits to London by the way of the EIC bills was nolonger satisfactory. Increasingly, the traders used other methods, suchas bullion or American bills on London, which to a great extent madethem independent from the EIC.102 Private merchants also increasinglyavoided the EIC monopoly by shipping British manufactures to Chinathrough continental European or American agents. In the eyes of many,



this dangerously strengthened the American China trade.103 In these cir-cumstances, it became even more interesting to have the tea trade as amedium of remittance. As the petition cited above shows, however, thecentral focus of the country traders was the question of the restrictionsthe EIC could impose in Canton and the lack of a voice that would sup-port their requests. An end to the EIC monopoly could at least end theirdouble status of illegality and provide their presence with some reliablebasis from the British side.

The most significant group fighting against the EIC monopoly wasthat of the Manchester manufacturers and businessmen. Especially afterthe successful opening of the Indian market to British cotton, they sawChina as the next huge market that they could export their productsto. This no longer stood mainly in the context of finding a way tocounterbalance the tea import, which had been the main question forDalrymple and his contemporaries. With new confidence in the qualityof British cotton products, the Lancashire manufactures and Manchestermerchants were looking for new markets for their products in the East.This went hand in hand with the concerns of the free trade advocateswho argued in favour of the necessity to abolish all trade restrictions toavoid the problem of a lack of domestic demand and in order to keepBritain’s growing population in work.104 At the same time, an openingof the tea import trade to all British merchants could increase the com-mercial profits of trading cities such as Liverpool and Manchester, whichwere mainly excluded from the tea import which the EIC conducted viaLondon.105 For these groups, China acquired the meaning of a perfectmarket that was now more detached from British interests in India, aninterest to which the EIC and its restrictions on trade were clearly seen asan obstacle. After all, in their eyes, the company had utterly failed in sell-ing British products to China. This was a typical position formed in themetropolis. Even the country traders, who supported the end of the EICmonopoly, did not expect an increase in the sale of British manufacturesto China.106

The end of the EIC trade monopoly to China has often been seenas the natural consequence of the trajectory of the ‘Age of Reform’,which generated little opposition.107 Recently, Anna Gambles pointedout that the supporters of the EIC did challenge the assumptions of thefree traders about the potential market for British goods in China.108 Byclosely studying both sides of the debate, we can gain an understand-ing of how two different meanings of China were used, shaped by thebeliefs of the different groups as well as their political and commercialinterests. The main lines were those of free trade involvement versus



monopolistic mercantilist distance from the Chinese state. Similar tothe academic debate about Chinese religion, literature and race in thepages of the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, this discussion was led bythose who had either served British interests in Asia or had strong finan-cial connections with the British expansion in the East. There could nolonger be an approach to China in the British public sphere that wasunconnected to the networks of Britain’s Asian Empire.

As much as being an economic argument the debate about the end ofthe monopoly on the China trade and the EIC administration in Indiawas therefore also a decisive debate about the nature of Britain’s rela-tionship with Asia. The Empire had by this time become an integratedpart of British self-definition, especially the new conquests in Asia.109

As the charter debate showed, however, there was no clear agreementabout the future expansion policy and Britain’s relation to Asia. Par-ticularly the question of the nature of international relations with anextra-European power and legality in this context became important.China thus became the test case of whether there were universal nat-ural laws dictating the market and international relations, or whetherthey were solely determined by the sovereign of a realm and historicaldevelopment.

The controversy over the EIC’s charter was one of the most promi-nent contact points between the knowledge and meaning producedoutside mainland Britain, in Asia, and the development of ideas whichmainly resulted from internal British politics, such as the Reform Billand the Poor Law. The campaign against the monopoly of the EIC onlyreally began with the agitation of James Silk Buckingham, who as edi-tor of the Calcutta Journal had so angered the EIC government with hisextremely critical articles that they finally evicted him from India.110

Back in Britain, he set out to rally the merchants and manufacturersin the industrial and commercial towns in the north against the EICcharter. He was joined by the advocates of free trade, who also cam-paigned for the Reform Bill, Catholic Emancipation and the repeal ofthe Corn Laws.111 The EIC was attacked as a prominent example of ‘OldCorruption’ and its supporters as the typical exponents of those forcesthat worked against parliamentary reform.112

Free trade per se included reciprocity, thus always implying a certainunderstanding of international relations, which was less defined by thesovereignty of the state or empire than by the natural laws of trade. Thisrequired a China that would open its gates to trade. For free trade sup-porters, the reciprocity of trade and the free competition were necessaryto reach the best possible outcome for mankind and of course the largest



profits for themselves. China’s constant refusal to bow to these theoriesor to British influence dominated British public discourse on China inthe 1830s. Those with economic and political interest in a different tradepolicy in Britain as well as in Asia gave room to the reports of those inthe contact zones in Canton and Southeast Asia who wanted free tradewith China, like Jardine, Matheson and Crawfurd.

They argued that until now the British had been deceived by theChinese assurances of power, their glamour and spectacles. Especiallythe embassies, which formerly had been hailed as bringers of newknowledge about China, were now seen as naïve and easily impressedbelievers.113 In their opinion, only the free, if illicit, trade of the countrymerchants with the Chinese population at Canton had finally revealedthe truth of the falsehood and lack of substance of any of the claimsmade by the Manchu government. Only the unfortunate adherents ofthe EIC system still believed these claims, partly because they were asfalse and full of corruption as the Chinese.114

The timid, but arrogant and false character of the Chinese govern-ment thus called for the use of force, which would be successful due tothe inferior and weak status of the Chinese government, both in termsof armament and its grip on its country. Here, in the metropolis, theanalogy with India, which Macartney had put forward for the first timeafter his embassy, became dominant once more. Crucial for the compar-ison was that the Tartars were again seen as a foreign power ruling overthe Chinese like the Mughals in India. An anonymous writer stated that

That government, like some of the governments which we havedestroyed, or but nominally preserved in India, is foreign to the peo-ple over whom it exercises dominion; and though some centurieshave elapsed since the Tartar progenitors of the actual ruling class inChina invaded that country, there still remains as marked a differencebetween the rulers and the ruled, as between the Mahomedan gov-erning class and the Hindoo people in some provinces of India.115

The only reason the Tartars were still in power was the ‘timidity of theconquered race’. To keep them in this state, the Tartars prohibited everyintercourse with foreigners. ‘All appearances are false, or a word fromso powerful a government as that of Britain, addressed to the people ofChina, would dissolve the Chinese government.’116

The supporters of free trade drew the conclusion that as the Chinesegovernment was weak, deceptive and not accepted by the population,consequently it was not deemed necessary to obey its laws. Another



line of argument was based on the idea of the natural laws of trade.Crawfurd in particular argued that monopolies could never hold: Britishrestrictions on the export of wool could not hinder the trade, thus an‘imbecile government’ like the Chinese would not be able to preventthe opium trade, even if they really wanted to. The ineffectiveness ofman-made laws in contrast with ‘natural laws’ of free trade was a suf-ficient argument for Crawfurd to justify the violation of Chinese tradelaws.117

However, this deconstruction of the Chinese government necessi-tated the construction of a new agent in British–Chinese relations. Hereagain the ideas from the contact zones in Canton and Southeast Asiawere imported into the metropolitan context. The free trade supportersfocused on the ordinary Chinese, who, according to the new knowl-edge about China, were not anti-commercial, but in contrast extremelyinclined to business. Thus, for example, Gützlaff or Hamilton Lindsayrecounted in the Asiatic Journal how they were cheerfully received bylocal Mandarins and businessmen during their trip up the China coastwhile the higher authorities called them ‘deceitful barbarians’.118 JohnCrawfurd promoted this idea, writing that ‘They [the Chinese] are in theEastern what the Hollanders are, or rather were, in the Western world.’119

Thus the Chinese were viewed as being hardly different from theBritish or Dutch, but restricted by their government and lacking anymoral development. The free traders in general created the idea of aChina that was not the complete other, not a ‘peculiar’ nation, but wassubject to the same laws of commerce and international relations as therest of the world. If its government did not comply with these laws, itwas unnatural, hindering improvement and, in extreme cases, justifyingthe use of force for the sake of Britain and of the Chinese population.The evangelical influence together with the commercial and strategicinterests of the periphery and the free trade ideas in Britain turnedBritish perception of China from one of the complete other into onethat one could attack, colonise and improve, because it was principallysubject to the same laws of nature and civilisation and thus could bejudged and understood by the British. This went hand in hand with theidea that through the study of Chinese language and history one couldnow understand China, albeit still seeing it as culturally very differentfrom Europe.

Thus it became almost the duty of the British to improve the lot ofthe Chinese population, which had suffered from the restrictions onthe benefits of a reciprocal relationship with the British both by theirgovernment and the EIC monopoly. Crawfurd wrote thus



This conduct [the monopoly U.H.] has not been more injuriousto ourselves, than to the nations it has so long deprived of theadvantages derivable from a free intercourse with Europe . . . That theimmeasurable superiority of the people of Europe in knowledge ofall sorts, should hitherto have had so little influence upon their Asi-atic brethren, is entirely owing to the jealous systems of commercialpolicy that have obtained amongst us.120

The question of abolishing the monopoly was thus not just a questionof economic and social benefit to the British, but also a measure for‘forwarding the civilisation of the Eastern world’, and it was the BritishParliament which had the opportunity and the duty to achieve this.121

The benefits of free trade for society were thus merged with the civilisingmission of the British, an issue over which evangelicals and free tradersjoined their efforts. The adherents of free trade have traditionally beenseen as victors in this debate. This does not mean, however, that theiropinions were unopposed at the time, nor that criticism of them ceasedafter 1834.

The EIC supporters belonged to the ideological spectrum of the ortho-dox Tories, later Conservatives,122 who had developed an alternativepolitical economy, adverse to the evangelical free trade liberalism oftheir fellow Conservatives, Lord Liverpool, Robert Peel, Henry Goulburnand the like. Their economic protectionism was aimed at preserving theconstitutional status quo. Therefore, any measures which might devalueproperty, such as a repeal of the Corn Laws, were seen as dangerousimpingements on private property by the state. In their eyes, it was notcompetition but rather experience and the continuation of the revolu-tionary settlement of 1688 that provided the best society. At the sametime, they believed that through tariffs the government could preservesocial stability by providing sufficient consumers for British products.Equally, they saw the Reform Act as dangerously unbalancing the sys-tem of virtual representation, which also included the residents in theBritish colonies. In addition to this, the abolition of the EIC’s adminis-tration in India would mean direct control by the British governmentover Indian patronage.123

In the context of the charter debates in 1813, but even more so in1834, the supporters of the EIC constructed the idea of a China thatcorresponded to their protectionist model of the state and internationalrelations. They thus tried to justify the continuation of the EIC tradingmonopoly with China, in which they frequently also held a personalinterest as employees or stockholders of the EIC.124 Like the Free Traders,



they claimed to have the only true knowledge about China, which dif-fered significantly from that of the former group. They claimed to havederived this knowledge from the experience of those on the spot. Forexample, Thomas Fisher, member of the London missionary society,clerk in East India House and a frequent correspondent with Robert Mor-rison, claimed the authority of the missionary as a prominent Chinaexpert in his essays about the EIC charter.125 This was despite the factthat he disagreed with Morrison precisely on the question of the advis-ability of the continuation of the EIC’s monopoly.126 In a similar vein,Montgomery Martin argued that the manufacturers, who were cam-paigning for free trade, had no knowledge about the real conditionsat Canton. This could only be acquired by those on the spot, mainlythe EIC servants. He conveniently ignored the support by some of thecountry traders for the position of the free traders.127

Since the Conservatives thought that it was the fundamental role ofthe state to protect and form its economy for the benefit of its citizens,it seemed only natural to them that China should have the right toexclude trade if it wanted to. Montgomery Martin, proprietor of the EICand author on colonial questions, arrived at this conclusion from typi-cal reasoning about the relationship of the state, liberty and free trade.According to him, liberty was maintained by the right balance of thelegislature and the institutions of a nation. In other words, the constitu-tional settlement secured property through the controlling power of theunreformed parliament. Free trade could never guarantee this freedom,since, by its nature, it is dependent on the will of another state, whichmight even be hostile, to allow reciprocal trade.128

In the mind of the Conservatives, free trade could not possibly bethe dominant guideline for external relations, since every state wouldtry to protect its economy in the event of hostilities. In their view,international relations were not defined by natural laws, due to whichreciprocity could be expected and demanded. Every state had the rightto decide that free trade was not the right measure at a particular time.China, Montgomery argued with references to Klaproth, was a state ofgreat antiquity, largely self-sufficient, which despised foreign trade. Anda sovereign of its realm could with all legitimacy decide to reject foreigntrade.129 Thus, Britain could hardly rely on China opening itself up forfree trade nor demand it. Similarly, Henry Ellis, who had accompaniedthe Amherst embassy, made it clear that there were no natural laws oftrade and international relations from which the British could deriveany legal claims against China. In arguing this, he used the increas-ingly predominant idea of a positive law of nations: since there were



no treaties with the Chinese, the British could not demand any liftingof the restrictions on trade.130 While the abolition of the EIC monopolyfor the trade to India might have really opened the market for Britishproducts, this could not serve as an example for the China market, sinceit was at the discretion of the Chinese government and the Hong mer-chants whether they wanted to import more British cotton and wool.The end of the EIC trade monopoly would thus hardly make any differ-ence in this respect.131 The Conservatives also vehemently criticised thesmuggling activities by the British country merchants and the attemptof Lindsay and Gützlaff to trade at other Chinese ports further up thecoast.132

The Chinese refusal to open its gates to reciprocal trade for themmeant that the trade on the British side could also only be conductedby a monopolistic company, such as the EIC. They were the only oneswho united the British interests on the spot and thus safeguarded themagainst the monopolistic actions of the Hong merchants.133

The claim that China had the full right to exclude from its territorywhomever it wanted went hand in hand with the argument of the EICsupporters that China was still a highly civilised country. The silent rea-soning behind this assertion was that in contrast to some Indian states,or the Australian tribes, China had such a high and still flourishing civil-isation that the British could hardly be so arrogant as to claim that theyhad a right to tell China how to act. Thus Thomas Fisher recalled tohis readers, ‘The Chinese, it will also be recollected, are not savages,though many of them are pagans; but are an educated and eminentlyliterary nation, having possessed the art of printing for now nearly 1000years.’134 The only way to interact with the Chinese was thus to appealto their reason, rather than resorting to the use of force.135 The nat-ural resources of China were quite well developed, leaving little forthe British to improve. An exception to this was, of course, the moralcharacter of the Chinese. Fisher agreed with other evangelicals that theChinese lacked the divine inspiration of Christianity. He vehementlyargued however that the mission could never be furthered by militarymeans, which would only damage the reputation of the British and withit that of Christianity.136

Thus, China was considered by the Conservatives to be a civilisedand sovereign country, and one which had the right to organise itstrade in whichever way it wanted. Nevertheless, it was made clear thatChina was very different from a European country. The trope of Chi-nese otherness was highlighted in this context in order to emphasisethe need of experts to deal with this country – experts only the EIC



could provide.137 Ellis saw the EIC as the only way to deal with a gov-ernment, ‘so totally different, from the rest of the civilized world, in thelaws and usages regulating international intercourse’.138 Martin also jus-tified the EIC monopoly and the costs of maintenance for the factoryat Canton, by arguing that the EIC servants worked under very specialconditions at Canton. He particularly emphasised the lack of diplomaticrepresentation and the hostility of the Chinese to commerce in general.In contrast to Fisher, he regarded the Chinese as only semi-civilised, dueto their mistrust of foreigners, highlighting the difficulties which theEIC servants managed to overcome.139 Chinese otherness was thereforeused as an important argument against the idea of the free traders thatinstitutions such as the EIC factory at Canton were unnecessary finan-cial burdens on the consumers, because they served no real economicpurpose.140

As Anna Gambles has pointed out, the Conservatives considered thefall of the EIC trade monopoly and the potential end of its administra-tion in India as a major constitutional issue, since direct rule over Indiaby the Crown brought the danger of increased patronage at the handof the Crown, thus threatening the balanced constitution of Britain.141

According to this argument, the monopoly on the China trade was par-ticularly important because it was crucial for the finances of the EICadministration in India. Thus, in the eyes of the Conservatives, consid-ering the question of the China trade solely under commercial aspectswas a crucial mistake the free traders made.142 Only by being indepen-dent, in terms of finances as well as political, could the EIC prevent theBritish Empire from the fate of the Spanish or Portuguese, where theCrown had gained too much power through its new possessions.143

In the context of the EIC monopoly, it was not anti-imperialismthe Conservative accused their adversaries of, but rather too aggres-sive an attitude towards the sovereignty of a foreign state. The EICsupporters had constructed the image of a mighty, sovereign and atleast a half-civilised empire with a government and a population thatwas averse to external trade. In addition, it was the complete otherin terms of its culture and character, so different that contact with itcould only be handled by experts, such as the EIC servants. Direct con-tact with this peculiar and arrogant people would only endanger Britishnational honour and the orderly conduct of trade which was so impor-tant for the welfare of the British Empire in India. In the Conservativeimage of China, there was no industrious commercial-minded popula-tion suppressed by its government. Nor did the idea of Tartar invaderssuppressing the Chinese play any significant role. While the supporters



of the end of a monopoly were quite open about the fact that they sawthe threat of force at least as the only way to deal with the Chinese, theConservatives argued against this. They argued that it would be contraryto international law to enter into such an unprovoked war. Secondly, intheir image of China, the Chinese were not so weak that they mightnot fight back, and thirdly, the Russians might profit most from suchan attempt by using the ensuing chaos to occupy parts of China in theNorth.144 From this perspective, there was no reason why China shouldopen its gates to free trade, nor why it could be forced to do so. TheEIC, which had conquered India under various pretences which wereintended to legitimise their meddling in the affairs of Indian states, nowinsisted on international law and the advisability of peace to safeguardtheir last and most profitable trading monopoly.

When the question of the renewal of the EIC charter came beforethe Houses of Parliament from 1829 onwards, it soon became clear thatthose supporting the trade monopoly of the EIC had lost the battle overthe continuation of the monopoly as well as the meaning of China.In February 1830, Select Committees of both Houses were appointedto look into the question of ‘the affairs of the Company and the tradebetween Great Britain and China’. All the way, the work of the Com-mittees and the discussion in Parliament were clearly overshadowed bythe question of the Reform Bill.145 The first, separate report on the ques-tion of the China trade, however, was already concluded in 1830. Itclaimed to lay down impartially the results of the interviews with tradersand former EIC servants. Nevertheless, it already displayed a clear biastowards ending the monopoly.146 In particular, the idea of the indus-trious and commercial Chinese population had clearly found its wayfrom Southeast Asia to London. On the character of the Chinese it saidthat they were ‘intelligent, industrious and persevering’. This charactermark was ‘strikingly manifested in the Chinese settler on the Easternislands, whose object in emigrating is the accumulation of wealth witha view of returning into their own country, to which they have a strongattachment.’147

The end of the monopoly for trade to China met with little resistanceduring the parliamentary debate, even from George Staunton and SirRobert Inglis in the Commons or Lord Ellenborough in the Lords, andwas passed by the Lords in August 1833.148

The end of the EIC’s trading monopoly was a decisive turning pointin the way the British saw their relation with China in the sense thatthe Crown was now immediately involved in the trade and diplomaticrelations with China. While the two embassies had failed to establish



a direct representative of the Crown in China, the government nowdecided to do so unilaterally in Canton. Of course the Trade Commis-sion was not yet a full-fledged diplomatic mission. Glenn Melancon hasargued that it was constructed with peaceful intentions to accommo-date the Chinese and it was claimed that it was established due to thewishes of the Viceroy of Canton.149 Nevertheless, it was to hold fullcontrol over British subjects in China, including jurisdiction and theright to levy duties.150 The establishment of a direct representative of theBritish Crown with jurisdictional powers had not been negotiated withthe Chinese, because the British government was convinced after theAmherst embassy that it would not be possible for diplomatic embassiesto China to be successful. Neither, however, did it choose to evade theproblems with the Chinese by re-locating the trade to an island outsidethe Chinese Empire, as Staunton had suggested. The end of the EIC’scommercial branch also had the effect of turning it into no more than amere administrative unit for the rule of India.151 Thus, it ended a specialearly modern way to conduct trade and foreign policy outside Europe.The British state took immediate control over its policy and representa-tion in this region, forcing a British representative upon the Chinese, ifnecessary.

Clearly, therefore, this diplomatic break cannot be seen as ‘China’sentry into international relations’, as Greenberg has put it, but ratherit must be construed as a one sided attempt by the British to establishrelations under the terms they thought proper. The Macartney embassyhad opened the possibility to negotiate with China within a Europeansystem of international relations, from sovereign to sovereign, while stillaccepting the Chinese as an equal partner. The second embassy underLord Amherst had resulted in a significant damaging of the image ofthe Chinese Emperor. In 1833, the British government tried to com-plete its control over the British trading to China and thus Britain’sChina relation, ignoring the special circumstances in Canton whichwould make it impossible for the new institution of Superintendencyto function without the use of British military power.152

This does not mean that the British government at this point hadalready decided on a ‘forward policy’ which would lead to openingChina by military means. An open war in the Far East was considered tobe expensive and might have the undesirable effect of opening Chinanot just to the British but also to its rivals, including Russia.153 Theintense public debate about the end of the EIC monopoly, the fact thatthere was now a representative of the British crown in Canton as well asthe opening of trade, however, did significantly increase the interest of



the British public in British relations with China. Over the course of thenext six years, new efforts were made to bring more knowledge aboutChina into the public sphere of the British Isles. The new publicationsand attempts to collect information on China followed the pattern setduring the period discussed.

John Davis returned from Macao in 1835 because he felt that thepresent system of superintendents was doomed to fail. In Britain, hebecame one of the prominent ‘China-experts’, and in 1836, he pub-lished a ‘General description of the empire of China’. Characteristically,while his claim was to write a systematic history of China, whichcould replace the works of Jesuits such as Du Halde’s, its main focusis not China as such, but rather the history of its interaction with theEuropeans, especially the English. He deals with this in the first threechapters and also in the more general discussion of Chinese geography,customs and manners. The English experience at Canton and during thetwo embassies is predominant.154

Equally, George Staunton continued to promote British study ofChinese.155 His translation of the Chinese Penal Code also remained theauthoritative reference work for all negotiations with China.156 The mis-sionaries in the periphery continued to play their role as mediators ofknowledge about China. Karl Gützlaff and William Medhurst both pub-lished histories and descriptions of China. Like Davis, Medhurst focusedto a considerable extent on the history of the relationship betweenEuropeans and China.157 Gützlaff in contrast attempted a historical, geo-graphical and ethnographical description of China that was more orless only focused on China itself. Nevertheless his book was also clearlysupposed to provide the British public with knowledge about Chinawhich could then form the basis for their judgement about the neces-sity and form of further interaction with that empire.158 His accountsalso re-introduced the image of the deceitful, debased Chinese opiumsmoker.159 More prominent, however, especially in his later works is stillthe idea of the commercially inclined and industrious Chinese.160

The ‘opening up’ of China was now the next step on the agendaof those who had worked for the repeal of the EIC monopoly. Thisbecame even more important since the opening of trade had increasedand diversified the British economic investment in trade to China.161

With the end of the EIC monopoly an internal goal for a campaignfor changed trading conditions had disappeared. The only remainingfactor was the Chinese government itself, which, according to the con-sensus after the Amherst embassy, could not be approached by way ofdiplomatic means.



News about the surrender of opium to Commissioner Lin reachedthe London Newspapers in August 1839.162 The country merchants andthose who had similar aims in Britain saw their opportunity to press fora military engagement by the British state. Melancon has shown howthis coincided with interests mainly resulting from British internal poli-tics which in the end led to the decision by Palmerston to go to war withChina.163 The alliance which had been formed to lobby for the repeal ofthe EIC charter between the country merchants in Asia and the man-ufacturing and trading interest in Manchester and Liverpool was nowused to press for a military solution to the conflict at Canton.164 Thedebate in favour or against the Opium War centred on the question ofits legality and its morality, focusing on the question of whether theopium trade in itself was immoral.165 It also put the question of Britishhonour into the foreground once more. In this context, the govern-ment and the parliamentary opposition argued as to whether a warwould reinstate Britain’s honour or rather further undermine it.166 Itthus emphasised certain aspects of ideas about China which had alreadybeen discussed during the debate in 1834 and before that in Canton. Thenotion that international law was not applicable to China since it itselfdid not act according to it became even more important.167 In this con-text, the British opium merchants and their supporters emphasised thatthe Chinese had tolerated the opium trade for years. Their attempt tofinally suppress it was therefore portrayed as a treacherous and hyp-ocritical act, showing the degraded nature of the Chinese culture assuch.168 Also the military weakness of the Chinese, an idea that hadfound its way into the metropolitan debate via the Macartney embassyand the reports about the conflicts in Canton, was now crucial.169 Morethan everything else, however, the actions of Commissioner Lin weredescribed as an attack on British honour and its position in the world.170

Succumbing to his actions might, according to George Staunton, evenendanger Britain’s Indian Empire.171

At the same time, missionary influence meant that the morality ofthe opium trade was increasingly discussed, even before the crisis in1839. Walter Medhurst decried the destructive effects of the drug on theChinese population. He drew his information from his experience inSoutheast Asia and one trip up the China coast and vividly describedthe harm inflicted by opium on the Chinese.172

In A. S. Thelwall’s publication, we can see evangelical zeal combinedwith the interests of those merchants unhappy with the competitionin the China trade through the opium smugglers. He described thedestructive effects of the drug strongly.173 The main thrust of his pub-lication was to reach a parliamentary decision against the British opium



trade, arguing that this decision would open China for the trade withother British goods. Like others connected to the evangelical cause hewas afraid that the association of the opium trade with Christian Britonswould bring the Christian cause into disrepute with the Chinese.174

The missionary environment and their supporters thus re-emphasisedthe image of a population that had to be saved by the British and thatwas no longer capable of doing so of its own accord. Medhurst and oth-ers drew parallels with the abolition of slavery to mobilise their fellowcountrymen against the opium trade.175 The Chinese population wasportrayed as mentally weak, undisciplined and craving for sensationalsatisfaction in this context, ready to succumb to the pleasures of opium,victimised by the opium trader.176 Far from the idea of the industriousworker, the Chinese and China were described as declining in produc-tivity, turning into a failing country.177 China and opium abuse withits dangers to the stability of society became synonyms in these years,which would become even stronger throughout the Victorian period.178

Despite the evangelical disapproval of the opium trade, the war that fol-lowed was not unwanted by them and the missionaries lobbied hard togain advantages for their mission from the peace settlement.179 In addi-tion to this, the missionary discourse on China in the context of opiumcreated the image of a population in need of British help, which wasunable to morally improve itself.

Those in favour of the war claimed that opium had no more harmfuleffects than gin in Britain and that the Chinese were well able to decidefor themselves whether or not they wanted to use the drug.180 Othersaccepted the destructive effects of the opium use and the problem-atic nature of the opium trade but thought that the war was necessarynevertheless to defend national honour.181

Next to the growing importance of the question of the morality ofthe opium trade, the opponents of the war used similar arguments tothose in 1834, emphasising the sovereignty of the Chinese empire andits right to regulate trade as it saw fit, while condemning the illegality ofthe opium smuggle.182 The supporters of the EIC saw the crises as proofthat the new system had failed, while at the same time justifying thecontinued revenue from Opium farming in India.183 The debate aboutthe Opium War therefore served as one of the last bastions in their fightagainst the free traders. In this context the Chinese served as a positivecounter-image to the free traders and Palmerston’s superintendents:

Throughout their while proceedings, the local authorities, and espe-cially the Imperial Commissioner, have, in the execution of a verydifficult measure, evinced a combination of firmness, gentleness, and



straightforwardness, which offers a mortifying contrast to the vacil-lation, intimidation, and hesitation, which have marked the conductof the British Superintendent from first to last.184

As we have seen, this was a position that did no longer exist amongstthe British in Canton, who had prepared a more aggressive policythroughout the 1830s.

As in 1833, the conservative forces supporting the rights of theChinese Empire as a sovereign country against the free traders lostthe battle for public opinion as well as the vote in parliament. Com-missioner Lin had allegedly insulted an officer of the British crown,and destroyed British Crown property. As Melancon has described, theMelbourne government finally decided to send troops to China to avoidthe accusation that they watched passively while British honour andproperty was attacked by the arrogant Chinese.185

In the decades after the Macartney embassy, the meanings of Chinaformed in the contact zones in Asia had become prominent at home.They shaped the ideas of British society and politics from the embassyto the Opium War and beyond. The idea of China in the metropolisbecame divided. On the one hand, it was perceived as a metaphor forentertainment, luxury and excess, on the other, as a central element inthe economic and power system of the British Empire. The genealogyof knowledge about China in the metropolis was fundamentally inter-linked with the British imperial expansion in the East. A separate set ofknowledge in the academic context, as on the European continent, didnot develop. China therefore became intrinsically associated with Indiaand British expansion in the mind of many Britons.

With the monopoly debate of 1834 the knowledge of China formedin the peripheral contact zones became for the first time prominent inBritish parliamentary debates and the accompanying public discussionin Britain itself. China, once mainly being associated with entertain-ment, leisure and utopian ideas was now firmly established as a politicaland economic interest for Britain and the trade in opium. The positionof a Superintendent, appointed by the British Crown itself, establisheda permanent direct political relationship on the British side with China,which also made the idea of a violation of British honour by the Chineseconceivable in London. Even if the government had no wish in 1834 topush for an opening of China with military means and thus potentiallyto disturb the status quo, a war with China had become imaginablein the metropolis as well. The massive publication activity of thosewho returned from Asia to Britain in the years after 1834 meant that



the idea ‘to open China’ gained a strong position in the British publicsphere. The debate, which had started with the goal of abolishing theEIC monopoly on the tea trade, therefore did not stop in 1834; rather itonly slightly changed its target until it found a new reference point inthe opium trade crisis of 1839.

The economic importance of the China trade for the British Empire,both opium and tea certainly cannot be overemphasised and it isunlikely that the British government would have passively witnessed itslong term suppression. Palmerston might not have wished for anotherexpansive war, but at the same time he was also adamant that theChinese Empire would at last have to accept British power in the world,expressed in the person of the Chief Superintendent. The contemporarydiscussion about the motives for war, however, shows how difficult itwas for the government to justify military action in order to provideprotection for an illegal traffic in drugs. Only the dramatic change ofthe British image of China in the metropolis, based on what was seen asthe new knowledge about China which had been formed in the episte-mological framework of the British imperial expansion, made it possibleto declare war on this former model of civilisation, the mythical Cathay.


6Epilogue

The first British–Chinese War ended with the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842.The Qing Emperor had to pay to the British compensation for the warcosts and for the destroyed opium. The Hong system was to be abol-ished, five ports opened to the British merchants and Hong Kong tobe ceded to the British Empire.1 The treaty also insisted on the equalitybetween officers of the British Queen and those of the Chinese Empire. Iteven stipulated exactly in which form the British officers and merchantswere allowed to address their Chinese counterparts. Never again shouldBritons be humiliated by Chinese officials demanding ‘petitions’.2

The webs of empire were prominent in the set up of the first Britishcolony on Chinese soil. The instructions for the governor of new CrownColony were adapted from those for New Zealand.3 A central ques-tion in the early discussion about the establishment of Hong Kongwas how to treat the Queen’s new Chinese subjects. The Chinese nego-tiators tried to achieve that all Chinese subjects should remain underChinese jurisdiction. It was a concept that was not wholly foreign tothe British. Raffles, after all, had first given the Chinese in Singaporethe right to live under Chinese jurisdiction. In the end, however, thishad been changed and the Straits Settlements as well as the Chinesediaspora population in Mauritius now served as examples for Chineseallegedly living happily under British laws.4 After a prolonged debatewith the Chinese negotiators and between Henry Pottinger and London,no mention of administration of Chinese law in Hong Kong by Chineseofficials was made in the Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue in October1843, as the British feared that this would undermine their sovereigntyin Hong Kong.5 However, the ordinance developed by John Davis,who became governor of Hong Kong in 1844, allowed punishment ofChinese criminals according to the laws of China, but by British courts.

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Epilogue 189

He justified this by pointing to the special cultural circumstance of thenew colony, where so many inhabitants came from mainland China.6

Questions, which had in a similar manner been debated in the con-text of the Straits Settlements, thus surfaced again in the context ofHong Kong. John Davis even described Singapore as the ‘prototype’ forHong Kong, not only as a free port, but also because it was populatedmainly by Chinese.7 Part of this legacy was to treat the Chinese as use-ful workers. However, they had to be closely watched and would onlyreally understand the language of their own culture when it came topunishment.

Hong Kong became a new ‘contact zone’ between Chinese and British,in which British ideas and knowledge about China were formed, as wellas slowly evolving into a new centre for the opium trade.8 Access to thetreaty ports and possession of some parts of Chinese soil meant that theBritish could now consider China ‘opened’. The British believed thatthey could define how the Chinese had to interact with European pow-ers and that they could impose their image of China on them. HongKong therefore attracted all those who had eagerly been waiting infront of the closed gates, bring with them the connections of the Britishimperial expansion.

The Anglo-Chinese College moved to the new British possession in1843. The original plan was to reorganise the College substantially andto add a preparatory school.9 When the new British government did notgive sufficient funds, it was transformed into the Hong Kong theologicalseminar. It was led by James Legge, who had come to Hong Kong fromMalacca and who would later become the first professor for Chinese atthe University of Oxford.10 In addition to this, the missionary societyset up branches in the various treaty ports. The first British governor, SirHenry Pottinger granted money to the Morrison Education Society withthe aim to educate the personnel needed for the new colony.11 Otherelements of a colonial society, such as a botanical garden, were soonestablished. As soon as possible those connected with the new Britishpresence in China ventured into the interior of the land to gather moreinformation about this ‘peculiar’ country. As Fa-ti Fan has described,the new power relations and ‘contact zones’ soon changed the way theBritish formed scientific knowledge about China.12

From the late 18th century onwards, the British have to be thoughtof as people, whose intellectual and cultural developments can onlybe understood in the context of its imperial expansion and the globalspread of the British people. The epistemology shaped during the Britishimperial expansion in the East was distributed through the networks of



those involved in British strategic, economic and missionary interestsin the region and adapted to the use in relation to other Asian cultures.It had seemingly become impossible for the British to think of and todescribe the Chinese culture, language, religion or its political entity ina different context.

The cultural and intellectual history of British–Chinese relationsemerged therefore from the 1760s within a field of British Asian inter-ests. It produced an image of the Chinese as either willing subjects of theBritish Empire or as an obstacle to progress. Knowledge of Chinese lan-guage, law and religion was formed to enable British influence on China,and ultimately, to justify the use of force against the Chinese. The ques-tion was no longer how China could serve as a model for Britain butrather how it fitted into British expansionist interests, militarily, cul-turally and economically. As a result, China and the Chinese had beenincorporated into the mental map of the British expansion in a varietyof ways long before the Opium War.

In this period, the meanings of China for the British developed in thedifferent ‘contact zones’ in Bengal, Southeast Asia, Canton and Britainin which the British encountered the Chinese Empire, the Chinese peo-ple, or their goods. While the intellectual developments in Britain orEurope clearly had an influence in these ‘contact zones’, the encoun-ters with specific groups of Chinese and the power relations on the spotwere just as important. The process by which the Chinese were assigneda specific position in the British world view was no simple one-way flowof ideas from the metropolis to the periphery. Knowledge created inthe context of discovery and colonial rule found its way back to Britain,where it influenced theories about the nature of mankind, which in turnshaped the perception of those who went to China and Southeast Asia.

India was at the centre of British Asian interests. It had an influenceon British understanding of China in several ways. For Lord Macartney,his encounter with the Indian situation shaped his political assessmentof China. The conquest of Singapore and other parts of Southeast Asiagrew directly out of the British bridgehead in Bengal and Madras. In adifferent way the relatively close British military presence in India meantthat the Britons in Canton felt they could present themselves with moreself-confidence. For the study of Chinese language and the educationof the Chinese, ideas formed in India, in the context of the Collegeof Fort William for example, could be as influential as those comingdirectly from the metropolis. Particularly in the field of education, expe-rience in India often served as a model for missionary activities inSoutheast Asia.


Epilogue 191

There was however never a unifying ‘Orientalism’, which equated allAsian countries. Ideas about China remained strongly indebted to theheritage of enlightenment thinking about China and influenced by theJesuit reports. Thus the meanings of China had quite a different intel-lectual genealogy from those, for example, of the Middle East. Chinaremained singled out as an ancient and high civilisation that mighthave been comparable to European ones, but which now had lost itsmomentum.

By separating the zones in which knowledge about China was pro-duced and used it becomes evident that it was only within a Europeansphere of communication that the British could develop the idea of aChina they could study, influence or even rule. In the context of South-east Asia, it became easier to see themselves as masters over the Chinese,and as possessing knowledge of their culture and language than inCanton, but even here the resistance of the Chinese, for example, toaccept the European education system unmodified and the multitudeof their dialects and secret societies led to the feeling that the Britishwere excluded from information vital for their security and interests. Anunchallenged ‘Orientalism’ could and did therefore only exist withinEurope itself.

The study of the different interactions of the Britons in the various‘contact zones’ has also highlighted the importance of the British self-image and its acceptance by other people during the Britain’s imperialexpansion. This was especially true with regard to China. Its former posi-tion as an equal or superior civilisation made it impossible simply toignore Chinese ideas about the British. By establishing the right imageof themselves the British hoped to influence this power without usingmilitary means and to ascertain their identity. The image could differ,however according to the circumstances. In the context of the Britishexpansion of power from Bengal, China was seen as a mighty power, awar with which would be potentially costly and a high risk. Accordingly,the British tried to present themselves to the Chinese in Tibet and Nepalas a great, but peaceful power, emphasising the idea that they only ledwars to defend themselves. A similar self-image was presented to theChinese Emperor in the Macartney and Amherst embassies. However,the EIC and the country merchants in Canton hoped to convince theChinese government that Britain was a great power with superior mil-itary means, which would protect its citizens under all circumstances.This found its expression in rejecting the use of the word ‘yi’ in officialdocuments as well as calling for warships if British honour was deemedto have been violated. The idea of Britain as a great Asian power thus



became a crucial element of British identity in the East, evolving duringthis period with the growing influence of the British in India and theirmilitary victories against Indian and French enemies.

At the same time, British identity was defined in contrast to theChinese. While the Chinese were seen to be as crafty and industrious asany good Briton, they were considered to lack the moral aptitude whichwould have made Chinese rule positive for the people of Southeast Asia.Here, a Briton, who through superior knowledge and his high moralstandard improved the lot of the native population, was clearly con-trasted with the Chinese, who had almost equal possibilities but onlyworked for self-gain.

In each of these ‘contact zones’ the British thus developed differ-ing ideas of what it meant to be British, depending on the ‘Other’they found themselves confronted with and the influence of the Britishpresence in the region. However, the view of Britain as a strong, mil-itarily victorious and just ruling power in India became central to theidea of Britishness in Asia, even if it was emphasised in differing ways.Those Britons who returned to Britain, often after having lived abroadhalf their lives, brought home with them the meanings not only ofBritishness formed in Asia, but also their networks, knowledge and inter-ests. The second British Empire therefore created a knowledge of Chinawhich spanned the different points of British imperial interest in Asiaand moved it away from the knowledge structures created by its Frenchand German contemporaries.

August 19, 2009 16:34 MAC/ASIA Page-193 9780230_200463_08_not01

Notes

1 Introduction

1. See: D. E. Mungello, Curious Land: Jesuit Accommodation and the Origins ofSinology (Stuttgart, 1985); D. M. Jones, The Image of China in Western Socialand Political Thought (New York, 2001), pp. 14–28; on the early modern con-tact between Europe and China and the Jesuit mission see also: J. D. Spence,Chinese Roundabout. Essays in History and Culture (New York, London, 1992),pp. 11–49, 78–84; J. D. Spence, The China Helpers. Western Advisers in China1620–1960 (London, Sydney, 1969), pp. 3–33; J. D. Spence, The MemoryPalace of Matteo Ricci (London, Boston, 1985).

2. D. Porter, Ideographia. The Chinese Cipher in Early Modern Europe (Stanford,2001), pp. 3–9, 34–132.

3. On Chinoiserie see: W. W. Appelton, A Cycle of Cathay. The Chinese Voguein England During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (New York, 1951);H. Honour, Chinoiserie: The Vision of Cathay (London, 1961), pp. 90–120;Porter, Ideographia, pp. 133–193.

4. L. Dermigny, La Chine et l’occident. La commerce a Canton au XVIIIe siecle,1719–1833 (4 vols., Paris, 1964), Vol. I, p. 19.

5. R. Markley, The Far East and the English Imagination, 1600–1730 (Cambridge,2006), pp. 4, 30–136.

6. P. A. Van Dyke, The Canton Trade. Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845 (Hong Kong, 2005), p. 5.

7. M. Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800–42 (Cambridge,1951), p. 3.

8. Dermigny, La Chine, Vol. III, pp. 931–934; H. V. Bowen, The Business ofEmpire. The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756–1833 (Cambridge,2006), pp. 241–246.

9. See: H. V. Bowen, ‘Tea, Tribute and the East India Company, c. 1750–1775’, in S. Taylor, R. Connors and C. Jones (eds.), Hanoverian Britain andEmpire. Essays in Memory of Philip Lawson (Woodbridge, 1998), pp. 158–177; R. Connors, ‘Opium and Imperial Expansion: The East India Companyin Eighteenth-Century Asia’, in S. Taylor, R. Connors and C. Jones (eds.),Hanoverian Britain and Empire, Essays in Memory of Philip Lawson (Wood-bridge, 1998), pp. 248–267; Bowen, Business of Empire, pp. 222–234. See alsofor an overview: G. Blue, ‘Opium for China: The British Connection’, inT. Brook and B. T. Wakabayashi (eds.), Opium Regimes. China, Britain, andJapan, 1839–1952 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2000), pp. 31–54, esp.pp. 32–36.

10. E. H. Pritchard, The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations, 1750–1800(Washington, 2000), pp. 121–141. See also for a detailed account, also of theflexibility of the system: Van Dyke, Canton Trade, pp. 5–33.

11. Greenberg, British Trade, pp. 10–12, 26–27.

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194 Notes

12. Bowen, Business of Empire, pp. 222–234.13. This is also true for Morse’s book on the history of the international rela-

tions of China and the west: H. B. Morse, International Relations of the ChineseEmpire (London, 1910–1918), pp. 41–117, see also: J. B. Eames, The English inChina (London, 1909), pp. 584–585, which was mainly written as a guide forfurther British policy towards China at the time.

14. G. Graham, The China Station: War and Diplomacy, 1830–1860 (Oxford,1978), pp. 12–64.

15. P. W. Fay, The Opium War, 1840–1842 (New York and London, 1975),pp. 2–98; H.-P. Chang, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War (Cambridge,1964), pp. 1–62; T. Chung, China and the Brave New World. Study of the Ori-gins of the Opium War (Durham, NC, 1978); B. Inglis, The Opium War (Londonet al., 1976), pp. 15–76; M. Collis, Foreign Mud: Being an Account of the OpiumImbroglio at Canton in the 1830’s & the Anglo-Chinese War that Followed (NewYork, 1947), pp. 9–88; J. K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast:The Opening of the Treaty Ports: 1842–54 (Cambridge, MA, 1953), pp. 57–73.

16. Greenberg, British Trade.17. H. B. Morse, Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China 1635–1834

(Oxford, 1929).18. Pritchard, Crucial Years, pp. 111, 118.19. Dermigny, La Chine.20. See for example: Chang, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, pp. 1–12.21. G. Melancon, ‘Honor in Opium? The British declaration of War on China,

1835–1840’, International History Review, 21, 4 (1999), pp. 854–874; G. Melan-con, ‘Peaceful intentions. The First British Trade Commission in China1833–5’, Historical Research, 72, 180 (2000), pp. 33–47; G. Melancon, Britain’sChina Policy and the Opium Crisis. Balancing Drugs, Violence and NationalHonour, 1833–1840 (Aldershot, 2003).

22. Compare especially W. R. Berger, China-Bild und China-Mode im Europa derAufklärung (Köln, 1990); A. Hsia, Chinesia: The European Construction of Chinain the Literature of the 17th and 18th Centuries (Tübingen, 1998); G. Blue,‘China and Western Social Thought in the Modern Period’, in T. Brookand G. Blue (eds.), China and Historical Capitalism. Genealogies of SinologicalKnowledge (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 57–110; J. Ching and W. Oxtoby (eds.),Discovering China. European Interpretations in the Enlightenment (Library ofthe History of ideas, Vol. VII, Rochester, 1992); J. D. Spence, The Chan’sGreat Continent (London, 1998), pp. 92–100; W. Demel, Als Fremde in China(München, 1992); S. Zhang, ‘British Views on China During the Time of theEmbassies of Lord Macartney and Lord Amherst (1790–1820)’, PhD thesis(Birkbeck College, University of London, 1990); R. Ballaster, Fabulous Ori-ents. Fictions of the East in England 1662–1785 (Oxford, 2005), pp. 193–252.For Asia in total see: J. Osterhammel, Die Entzauberung Asiens (München,1998).

23. R. S. Dawson, The Chinese Chameleon – An Analysis of European Conceptions ofChinese Civilization (London, 1967), pp. 132–154 mainly focuses on the laterperiod of the mission in China; Blue, ‘China and Western Social Thought’,p. 72.

24. C. Mackerras, Western Images of China (2nd edn., Oxford, New York, 1999),pp. 39–58.


Notes 195

25. Appelton, Cycle of Cathay, p. 140; see also: Dawson, Chinese Chameleon,p. 132.

26. Appelton, Cycle of Cathay, pp. 169–170.27. Spence, The Chan’s Great Continent, pp. 51–61.28. W. Demel, ‘Europäisches Überlegenheitsgefühl und die Entdeckung Chinas.

Ein Beitrag zur Frage der Rückwirkung der europäischen Expansion aufEuropa’, in T. Beck, A. Menninger and T. Schleich (eds.), Kolumbus’ Erben.Europäische Expansion und überseeische Ethnien im Ersten Kolonialzeitalter,1415–1815 (Darmstadt, 1992), pp. 99–145, esp. pp. 114–116.

29. Spence, The Chan’s Great Continent, pp. 41–80.30. P. J. Marshall and G. Williams, The Great Map of Mankind (London, 1982),

pp. 67–74, esp. pp. 91–94.31. Porter, Ideographia.32. N. J. Girardot, The Victorian Translation of China. James Legge’s Oriental

Pilgrimage (Berkeley et al., 2002).33. C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914. Global Connection and

Comparison (Oxford et al., 2004).34. T. Harper, ‘Empire, Diaspora and the Languages of Globalism, 1850–1914’,

in A. G. Hopkins (ed.), Globalization in World History (New York, 2002),pp. 141–166; see the volume in general for a new approach by historiansto globalisation: A. G. Hopkins (ed.), Globalization in World History (London,2002).

35. K. Wilson (ed.), A New Imperial History. Culture, Identity and Modernity inBritain and the Empire, 1660–1840 (Cambridge, 2004); C. Hall (ed.), Culturesof Empire. Colonizers in Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth and TwentiethCenturies. A Reader (Manchester, 2000); D. Kennedy, ‘Imperial History andPost-Colonial Theory’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 24, 3(1996), pp. 345–363.

36. T. Ballantyne, Orientalism and Race. Aryanism in the British Empire(Basingstoke, New York, 2002).

37. A. Lester, Imperial Networks. Creating Identities in Nineteenth-Century SouthAfrica and Britain (London, New York, 2001), p. 5.

38. C. Hall, ‘Histories, Empires and the Post-Colonial Moment’, in I. Cham-bers and L. Curti (eds.), The Post-Colonial Question. Common Skies, DividedHorizons (London, New York, 1996), pp. 65–78, esp. pp. 70–76; see also onthe importance of different spaces and places in the empire: M. Ogbornand C. W. J. Withers (eds.), Georgian Geographies. Essays on Space, Place andLandscape in the Eighteenth Century (Manchester, 2004).

39. P. Howell and D. Lambert, ‘Sir John Pope Hennessy and Colonial Gov-ernment: Humanitarianism and the Translation of Slavery in the ImperialNetwork’, in D. Lambert and A. Lester (eds.), Colonial Lives Across the BritishEmpire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 2006),pp. 228–257; L. Brown, ‘Inter-Colonial Migration and the Refashioning ofIndentured Labour: Arthur Gordon in Trinidad, Mauritius and Fiji (1866–1880)’, in D. Lambert and A. Lester (eds.), Colonial Lives Across the BritishEmpire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 2006),pp. 204–227; Z. Laidlaw, ‘Richard Bourke: Irish Liberalism Tempered byEmpire’, in D. Lambert and A. Lester (eds.), Colonial Lives Across the British


196 Notes

Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 2006),pp. 113–144.

40. P. D. Morgan, ‘Encounters Between British and “Indigenous” Peoples,c. 1500–c. 1800’, in M. Daunton and R. Halpern (eds.), Empire and Oth-ers: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600–1850 (London, 1999),pp. 42–78, esp. pp. 56–62.

41. T. R. Metcalf, Imperial Connections. India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860–1920(Berkeley et al., 2007), esp. pp. 1–15.

42. C. Hall, Civilising Subjects. Metropole and Colony in the English Imagina-tion, 1830–1867 (Cambridge, 2002), see also: K. Wilson, The Island Race.Englishness, Empire and Gender in the Eighteenth Century (London, New York,2003).

43. F. Cooper and A. L. Stoler, ‘Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking aResearch Agenda’, in F. Cooper and A. L. Stoler (eds.), Tensions of Empire.Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1997),pp. 1–58.

44. H. Kaelble (ed.), Vergleich und Transfer. Komperatistik in den Sozial-, Geschichts-und Kulturwissenschaften (Frankfurt, 2003), esp. pp. 369–468.

45. M. Werner and B. Zimmermann, ‘Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung. DerAnsatz der Histoire croisée und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen’,Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 28 (2002), pp. 607–636.

46. H. Saussy, Great Walls of Discourse and Other Adventures in Cultural China(Cambridge, MA, London, 2001), esp. pp. 1–15, 15–34.

47. E. Said, Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient (4th edn., London,1995).

48. See on this also: Girardot, Victorian Translation, pp. 14–15.49. H. Hägerdal, ‘The Orientalism Debate and the Chinese Wall: An

Essay on Said and Sinology’, Itinerario, 21, 3 (1997), pp. 19–40, esp.p. 27.

50. Jones, Image of China, esp. pp. 1–14, 37–64, 67–96.51. E. F. Irschick, Dialogue and History. Constructing South India, 1795–1895

(Berkeley a. o., 1994).52. H. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London, 2004), esp. pp. 102–122.53. C. A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Commu-

nication in India 1780–1870 (Cambridge, 1996).54. C. Windler, La diplomatie comme expérience de l’autre. Consuls francais au

Maghreb (1700–1840) (Genève, 2002), pp. 30–31.55. M. S. Dodson, ‘Orientalism, Sanskrit Scholarship, and Education in

Colonial India, ca. 1775–1875’, PhD thesis (University of Cambridge, 2003),pp. 25–26; M. S. Dodson, Orientalism, Empire, and National Culture. India1770–1880 (Basingstoke, 2007).

56. B. Latour, Reassembling the Social. An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory(Oxford, 2005); B. Latour, Science in Action. How to Follow Scientists andEngineers Through Society (Cambridge, MA, 1987).

57. For further reflections on the importance of location for the productionof knowledge see: P. Burke, A Social History of Knowledge. From Gutenberg toDiderot (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 53–80.

58. M. L. Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New York,1992).

59. Wilson, Island Race, p. 4.

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Notes 197

2 The Decline of Mythical China

1. See: L. M. Brockey, Journey to the East. The Jesuit Mission to China, 1579–1724(Cambridge, MA; London, 2007).

2. See on the question of translation of culture: Saussy, Great Walls of Discourse,pp. 15–34.

3. See on the early period of information transfer through the Jesuits and theJesuit mission: Mungello, Curious Land: Jesuit Accommodation and the Ori-gins of Sinology; Berger, China-Bild, esp. pp. 52–85; Spence, The Chan’s GreatContinent, pp. 83–88, 95–99; Spence, Memory Palace. See also for the Britishcontext, how China could be imagined as a positive model: R. Batchelor,‘Concealing the Bounds: Imagining the British Nation Through China’, inF. A. Nussbaum (ed.), The Global Eighteenth Century (Baltimore, London,2003), pp. 79–92.

4. On the natural world see R. Drayton, Nature’s Government. Science, Impe-rial Britain, and the ‘Improvement’ of the World (New Haven, London, 2000),pp. 67–78; Marshall and Williams, Map of Mankind, pp. 85, 91–94, 175–176.

5. A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (2 vols.,London, 1776), Vol. II, Book IV, pp. 279–280.

6. See on this issue: C. A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empireand the World, 1788–1830 (London, 1989); Drayton, Nature’s Government,pp. 69, 85–94.

7. H. Home, Lord Kames, The Gentleman Farmer Being an Attempt to ImproveAgriculture, by Subjecting It to the Test of Rational Principles (Edinburgh, 1776),p. xiv.

8. On the idea of progress in the enlightenment and its influence on the ideaof language see: D. Spadafora, The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-Century Britain(New Haven, London, 1990).

9. For the ideas about Chinese language in the 17th and early 18th centurysee: Porter, Ideographia, pp. 34–49; J. Knowlson, Universal Language Schemesin England and France 1600–1800 (Toronto, Buffalo, 1975), pp. 23–27.

10. Porter, Ideographia, pp. 133–192. While Porter makes some interesting inter-pretations of the phenomenon of Chinoiserie, he does not convincinglyprove why the associations with Chinoiserie should give a better explana-tion of the decreasing evaluation of Chinese than a study of the change ofthe epistemology at the time.

11. Knowlson, Universal Language, pp. 143–149. Only in this context the idea ofa universal language, derived from a common primitive one, found somesupporters.

12. U. Ricken, Sprachtheorie und Weltanschauung in der europäischen Aufklärungzur Geschichte der Sprachtheorie des 18. Jahrhunderts und ihrer europäischenRezeption nach der Französischen Revolution (Berlin, 1990), p. 22.

13. See: H. Aarsleff, The Study of Language in England, 1780–1860 (Minneapolis,London, 1983), pp. 17–24.

14. J. Harris, Hermes, or a Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Language and UniversalGrammar (London, 1751), pp. 372, 407–425. See also: Ricken, Sprachtheorie,pp. 41–42.

15. The search for an universal language continued however also at the end ofthe 18th century, esp. during the French Revolution: Knowlson, UniversalLanguage, pp. 143–209.


198 Notes

16. W. Warburton, The Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated. In Nine Books (4thedn., 3 vols., London, 1765), Vol. III, p. 91.

17. T. Percy, Miscellaneous Pieces Relating to the Chinese (London, 1762), p. 11.18. Ricken, Sprachtheorie, p. 44.19. L. Monboddo, Of the Origin and Progress of Language (2 vols., Edinburgh,

1774), Vol. II, pp. 5–6, 20–21.20. Ricken, Sprachtheorie, pp. 43–44; Monboddo, Origin, pp. 86–93.21. Monboddo, Origin, Vol. II, p. 426.22. See W. P. Klein, ‘Die linguistische Erfassung des Hebräischen, Chinesis-

chen und Finnischen am Beginn der Neuzeit. Eine vergleichende Studiezur frühen Rezeption nicht-indogermanischer Sprachen in der traditionellenGrammatik’, Historiographia Linguistica, 28, 1/2(2001), pp. 7–39, 53–54.

23. Monboddo, Origin, Vol. II, pp. 438–439.24. Ibid., pp. 434–439.25. Percy, Miscellaneous Pieces, p. 10.26. See also: A. Gerbi, The Dispute of the New World. The History of a Polemic,

1750–1900 (rev. and enl. edn., Pittsburgh, 1973), p. 152.27. A. Appadurai, The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective

(Cambridge, 1986), esp. pp. 3–63.28. Maxine Berg has argued that the creation of a consumer market in novelty

goods through Asian trade stimulated European invention and thus aidedthe industrial revolution: M. Berg, ‘In Pursuit of Luxury: Global History andBritish Consumer Goods in the Eighteenth Century’, Past and Present, 182(2004), pp. 85–142; CLXXXII (2004), pp. 85–142, esp. pp. 99–132.

29. O. Goldsmith, The Citizen of the World; or Letters from a Chinese PhilosopherResiding in London, to His Friends in the East (2 vols., Dublin, 1762), Vol. I,p. 56.

30. Honour, Chinoiserie, pp. 68–82.31. On English Rococo Chinoiserie see: Ibid., pp. 125–143.32. See for example the title of the design books: W. Halfpenny, New Designs

for Chinese Temples, Triumphal Arches, Garden Seats, Palings etc (London,1750); W. Halfpenny, Rural Architecture in the Chinese Taste (London, 1752);W. Halfpenny and J. Halfpenny, Chinese and Gothic Architecture ProperlyOrnamented (London, 1752); T. Chippendale, The Gentleman and Cabinet-Maker’s Director (London, 1755); S. W. Chambers, Designs of Chinese Buildings,Furniture, Dresses, Machines and Utensils (London, 1757); P. Decker, ChineseArchitecture, Civil and Ornamental (Farnborough, Gregg, 1968). See also:Porter, Ideographia, p. 141.

33. Honour, Chinoiserie, pp. 153, 155.34. J. Cawthorn, ‘Of Taste’, Poems (London, 1771), pp. 110–118, esp. p. 115.35. Porter, Ideographia, pp. 134–135.36. J. Pillement, The Ladies Amusement or Whole Art of Japanning Made Easy. Illus-

trated in Upwards Fifteen Hundred Different Designs . . . Consisting of Flowers,Shells, Figures, Birds, Insects, Landscapes, Shipping, Beasts, Vases, Borders, etc.(Facsimile edn., London, 1959), p. 4; Porter, Ideographia, pp. 139, 171.

37. Chambers, Designs, p. 15.38. S. W. Chambers, A Dissertation on Oriental Gardening (Dublin, 1773), p. 63.39. See also on the distinctive foreignness Chambers evokes: Porter, Ideographia,

pp. 174–181.


Notes 199

40. W. Mason, An Heroic Epistle to Sir William Chambers, Author of a LateDissertation on Oriental Gardening (London, 1773), p. 16.

41. See also: I. Chase, ‘William Mason and Sir William Chambers’ Dissertationon Oriental Gardening’, Journal of English and Germanic Philology, 35 (1936),pp. 517–529, esp. p. 528f.

42. The World, XXVI (28 June 1753), quoted in: Porter, Ideographia, p. 171.43. On 18th century ideas on taste see: J. Brewer, The Pleasures of the Imagination.

English Culture in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1997), pp. 88–94, 98–111.44. See also: P. Lawson (ed.), ‘Tea, Vice and the English State, 1660–1784’,

A Taste for Empire and Glory. Studies in British Overseas Expansion, 1660–1800(Aldershot, 1997), pp. 13–15.

45. Greenberg, British Trade, p. 3.46. J. B. Du Halde, The General History of China: Containing a Geographical,

Historical, Chronological, Political and Physical Description of the Empire ofChina . . . (4 vols., London, 1736), Vol. II, p. 10.

47. H.-C. Mui and L. H. Mui, The Management of Monopoly: A Study of the EnglishEast India Company’s Conduct of Its Tea Trade, 1784–1833 (Vancouver, 1984),p. 133.

48. J. Hanway (ed.), ‘An Essay on Tea. Considered as Pernicious to Health;Obstructing Industry; and Impoverishing the Nation . . .’, A Journal of EightDays Journey from Portsmouth to Kingston Upon Thames; Through Southampton,Wiltshire etc. . . . (London, 1756), pp. 200–361.

49. On the balance of trade idea in mercantilism see: D. A. Irwin, Against theTide. An Intellectual History of Free Trade (Princeton, 1996), pp. 34–38.

50. B. Kowaleski-Wallace, ‘Tea, Gender, and Domesticity in Eighteenth-CenturyEngland’, Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, 23 (1994), pp. 131–145, esp.pp. 135–138.

51. J. S. Taylor, Jonas Hanway. Founder of the Marine Society. Charity and Policy inEighteenth-Century Britain (London, Berkeley, 1985), esp. pp. 52–57.

52. Porter, Ideographia, p. 198.53. Ibid., pp. 194–198.54. Hanway, ‘An Essay on Tea’, p. 300.55. On the insecurity about the British expansion in this period and the wealth

that came with it see: Wilson, Island Race, pp. 49–51, 56; P. J. Marshall,‘A Free Though Conquering People’. Britain and Asia in the Eighteenth Cen-tury. An Inaugural Lecture in the Rhodes Chair of Imperial History Delivered atKing’s College London on Thursday 5 March 1981 (London, 1981), pp. 6–10;T. W. Nechtman, ‘A Jewel in the Crown? Indian Wealth in Domestic Britainin the Late Eighteenth Century’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 41, 1 (2007),pp. 71–86.

56. P. Pindar (ed.), ‘Ode to Coffee’, Works (London, 1812), Vol. 4, pp. 183–185.57. J. Simmons (ed.), Robert Southey: Letters from England (Gloucester, 1984),

p. 192.58. J. Morley, Regency Design 1790–1840. Gardens, Buildings, Interiors, Furniture

(London, 1993), pp. 342–343.59. Ibid., p. 336.60. J. Oinkel, The Royal Pavilion Brighton (New York, 1983); pp. 34–38; J. Morley,

The Making of the Royal Pavilion, Brighton: Designs and Drawings (London,1984), pp. 114–119.


200 Notes

61. W. Alexander, The Costume of China (London, 1805); W. Alexander, Pic-turesque Representations of the Dress and Manners of the Chinese (London,1814).

62. G. H. Mason, The Costume of China (London, 1800); G. H. Mason, ThePunishments of China (London, 1801).

63. M. Archer, ‘From Cathay to China. The Drawings of William Alexan-der, 1792–4’, History Today, December (1962), pp. 864–871, esp. p. 870f.,M. Archer, ‘Works by William Alexander and James Wales’, in S. Simmondsand S. Digby (eds.), The Royal Asiatic Society: Its History and Treasures (Leiden,1979), pp. 118–122, esp. p. 119.

64. F. Wood, ‘Closely Observed China: From William Alexander’s Sketches to HisPublished Work’, British Library Journal, 24, 1 (1998), pp. 98–121, esp. p. 108;P. Connor and S. Legouix Solman, William Alexander: An English Artist inImperial China (Brighton, 1981), p. 27.

65. G. L. Staunton, An Authentic Account of an Embassy from the King of GreatBritain to the Emperor of China (2 vols., London, 1797), Vol. II, p. 233.

66. Peter Manson has pointed out the importance of exotic and ethnographicpainting in the 16th and 17th century. Even though the drawings for exam-ple by Albert Eckhout (1607–1665) are partly already ethnographic and notjust exotic representations, the difference to the pictures of the late 18thcentury is evident. The earlier paintings still stood in the symbolic traditionand they were less relevant for the exploration of the world. See: P. Mason,Infelicities. Representations of the Exotic (Baltimore, London, 1998), pp. 43–63;B. Smith, Imagining the Pacific. In the Wake of the Cook Voyages (New Haven,London, 1992), pp. 28–36, 81; B. Stafford, Voyage into Substance. Art, Science,Nature and the Illustrated Travel Account, 1760–1840 (Cambridge, MA, 1984),p. 51.

67. B. F. Tobin, Picturing Imperial Power. Colonial Subjects in Eighteenth-CenturyBritish Painting (Durham, London, 1999), pp. 146–147.

68. Pratt, Imperial Eyes, p. 64.69. Alexander, Costume, No. 2.70. W. H. Pyne, The Costume of Great Britain (London, 1808).71. Alexander, Costume, No. 42.72. Ibid., No. 12.73. Ibid.74. Mason, Costume.75. C. Clunas, Chinese Export Watercolours (London, 1984), pp. 11, 24.76. Ibid., p. 32.77. Tobin, Picturing Imperial Power, pp. 140–143.78. Alexander, Costume, No. 2.79. Alexander, Picturesque Representations, No. 23.80. William Alexander: A young Chinese Scholar (Paul Mellon Centre for Studies

in British Art, London); William Alexander: Chinese girl (Paul Mellon Centerfor Studies in British Art, London).

81. Times, 9 April 1827, p. 1, Issue 13248, col. A; Times, 8 May 1827, p. 1, Issue13273, col. A; Times, 21 May 1827, p. 2, Issue 13284, col. E.

82. J. Dinkel, The Royal Pavilion Brighton (New York, 1983), pp. 34–38; J. Morley,The Making of the Royal Pavilion, Brighton: Designs and Drawings (London,1984), pp. 114–119.


Notes 201

83. Dinkel, Royal Pavilion, p. 43.84. Ibid., pp. 43, 51–53.85. L. Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation 1707–1837 (3rd edn., London, 1996),

pp. 220–223, 243–250.86. Dinkel, Royal Pavilion, p. 46.87. Ibid.88. See also on the satirical attacks of George: M. Paris, ‘Contestation ou consol-

idation du pouvoir? Aspects de la manipulation de themes traditionels dansla satire politique, Londres 1819–20’, History of European Ideas, 3, 3 (1982),pp. 273–280, esp. p. 275f. Paris notes that the satirists mainly play with themoral theme of the King who is not able to fulfil his role as good and moralKing, father of the nation and his family, a stereotype which will becomepredominant during the reign of Queen Victoria.

89. S. Parissien, George IV. The Grand Entertainment (London, 2001), pp. 339–354.90. On ‘Fum’ as a nickname for George see: Ibid., p. 351.91. On the Prince’s and his brother’s attempt to style themselves as heroes of

the British nation and their failure to appeal to the same sense of Britishnessas the majority of the population see as well as on the cartoon by WilliamWilliams: Ibid., pp. 268–281, 351.

92. At this point, the Edinburgh Review, however, in contrast to the members ofthe embassy, still gave a positive image of a father-like Chinese Emperor inorder to highlight the failings of the embassy and the EIC with which it wasconnected: Brockey, Journey to the East, Vol. LVIII, February 1818, p. 438.

3 At the China Coast

1. Bayly, Imperial Meridian, pp. 98–99.2. H. V. Bowen, ‘British India, 1765–1813, the Metropolitan Context’, in

P. Marshall, J. (ed.), The Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 2001), Vol. II,pp. 530–551.

3. C. H. Philips, The East India Company, 1784–1834 (Manchester, 1961),pp. 23–34.

4. Bowen, Business of Empire, pp. 222–234.5. ‘Instructions to Lt.-Col. Cathcart, Nov. 30th 1787’, in H. B. Morse (ed.), The

Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834 (Oxford,1926), Vol. 2, pp. 160–167, esp. p. 160; H. Dundas, ‘Instructions to LordMacartney, Sept. 8, 1792’, in H. B. Morse (ed.), The Chronicles of the EastIndia Company Trading to China 1635–1834 (5 vols., London, 1926), Vol. 2,pp. 232–242, esp. p. 232.

6. On the role of the scientific instruments during the encounter of theembassy see: S. Schaffer, ‘L’inventaire de l’astronome. Le commerced’instruments scientifique au XVIIIe siècle (Angleterre-Chine-Pacifique)’,Annales Histoire, Sciences sociales, 60, 4 (2005), pp. 791–816, esp. pp. 796–807; J. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar. Qing Guests Ritual and the MacartneyEmbassy of 1793 (London, 1995), pp. 77–78, 147–148.

7. ‘Cathcart Instructions’, p. 164; Dundas, ‘Instructions to Lord Macartney,Sept. 8, 1792’, p. 238.


202 Notes

8. J. L. Cranmer-Byng, ‘Russian and British Interests in the Far East, 1791–1793’, Canadian Slavonic Papers, X, 3 (1968), pp. 357–375.

9. Drayton, Nature’s Government, pp. 66–81.10. P. J. Marshall, ‘Britain and China in the Late Eighteenth Century’, in

R. A. Bickers (ed.), Ritual and Diplomacy: The Macartney Mission to China1792–1794 (London, 1993), pp. 11–30, esp. p. 15.

11. See also: Ibid., p. 15.12. See for example: R. A. Bickers (ed.), Ritual and Diplomacy. The Macartney

Mission to China 1792–1794, Papers Presented at the 1992 Conference of theBritish-Association-for-Chinese-Studies Marking the Bicentenary of the MacartneyMission to China (London, 1995); A. Peyrefitte, L’Empire immobile ou le chocdes mondes (Paris, 1989); A. Singer, The Lion and the Dragon: The Story ofthe First British Embassy to the Court of the Emperor Quian Long in Peking,1792–1794 (London, 1992); H. H. Robbins, Our First Ambassador to China:An Account of the Life of George, Earl of Macartney (London, 1908) to namejust a few. Additionally, it has been mentioned in almost every book onSino-British relations.

13. Osterhammel, Die Entzauberung Asiens, p. 380.14. Especially: Peyrefitte, Choc; Pritchard, Crucial Years, pp. 379–384;

J. L. Cranmer-Byng (ed.), ‘Introduction’, in An Embassy to China. Beingthe Journal Kept by Lord Macartney During His Embassy to the Emperor ofCh’ien-lung 1793–1794 (London, 1962), pp. 1–60, esp. pp. 34–38.

15. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar.16. M. Mancall, Russian and China. Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728

(Cambridge, MA, 1971), p. 223, for details on the Treaty of Nerchinskbetween the Russian and the Qing Empire (1689) see: pp. 156–158.

17. ‘Cathcart Instructions’, p. 161. As Mark Mancall mentions briefly, theBritish based their demand for an embassy in Beijing on the precedent ofthe Russian ecclesiastical mission: Mancall, Russian and China, pp. 272–273;Demel, Als Fremde in China, pp. 142–143.

18. B. J. L. Cranmer, ‘Russian and British Interests in the Far East, 1791–3’Canadian Slavonic Papers, X, 3 (1968), pp. 357–375, esp. p. 375.

19. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar, p. 78.20. I. George, ‘Letter from King George III to the Emperor of China’, in

H. B. Morse (ed.), The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China1635–1834 (5 vols., London, 1926), Vol. II, pp. 244–247.

21. H. Dundas, ‘Instructions to Lord Macartney, Sept. 8, 1792’. Ibid., pp. 232–242, esp. p. 240.

22. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar, esp. pp. 76, 80–82; I follow Hevia’s argu-ment of the importance of the ritual in the Macartney embassy for theBritish side, even though diplomatic relations before 1815 did not neces-sarily require the ‘recognition of the equality of their sovereigns’ but quiteoften also the recognition of their different status.

23. Ibid., pp. 62–65; P. J. Marshall, ‘Lord Macartney, India and China: The TwoFaces of the Enlightenment’, South Asia. Journal of South Asian Studies, 19(1996), pp. 121–133.

24. On earlier distrust of the Chinese and Jesuits as interpreters see S. R. Sti-fler, ‘The Language Students of the East India Company’s Canton Factory’,Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, LXVIII(1937),


Notes 203

pp. 46–82, esp. p. 49, n 9; G. Anson and R. Walter, A Voyage Round the Worldin the Years 1740–1744 (London, 1748), pp. 417, 424–425.

25. D. Ludden, ‘Orientalist Empiricism: Transformations of Colonial Knowl-edge’, in C. Breckenridge and P. van der Veer (eds.), Orientalism and thePostcolonial Predicament. Perspectives on South Asia (Philadelphia, 1993),pp. 250–278, esp. p. 255; Bayly, Empire and Information, p. 288.

26. Staunton, Account, Vol. I, pp. 39–41, 395–396.27. Stifler, ‘Language Students’, p. 46.28. Staunton, Account, Vol. I, p. 451; Vol. II, pp. 14, 142–143.29. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 592.30. Cranmer-Byng, Journal, p. 210.31. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar, pp. 90–94.32. Cranmer-Byng, Journal, p. 236.33. Ibid., p. 237.34. Ibid., pp. 222–223.35. Ibid., pp. 239–240.36. Ibid., pp. 212–213.37. See quote from his notes in: Marshall, ‘Lord Macartney, India and China:

The Two Faces of the Enlightenment’, p. 127.38. Dundas, ‘Instructions to Lord Macartney, Sept. 8, 1792’, p. 236.39. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar, pp. 74–79.40. On the history of European embassies and the kowtow question see: Demel,

Als Fremde in China, pp. 127–136. Windler, Diplomatie, p. 435.41. Demel, Als Fremde in China, pp. 132–133; J. Bell, Travels from St. Petersburg

in Russia, to Diverse Parts of Asia (2 vols., Glasgow, 1763), Vol. II, pp. 3–4.42. Thus also the argument in Staunton, Account, Vol. II, p. 131.43. Cranmer-Byng, Journal, pp. 84–85, 99–100.44. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar, pp. 30–56; for a critic of this position and

Hevia’s reply to it see: J. W. Esherick, ‘Cherishing Sources from Afra’, Mod-ern China, 24, 4 (1998), pp. 135–161; J. W. Esherick, ‘Tradutore, Traditore’,Modern China, 24, 3 (1998), pp. 328–332; J. Hevia, ‘Postpolemical Histori-ography: A Response to Joseph W. Esherick’, Modern China, 24, 3 (1998),pp. 319–327.

45. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar, pp. 163–166.46. J. Barrow, Travels in China Containing Descriptions, Observations, and Com-

parisons, Made and Collected in the Course of a Short Residence at the ImperialPalace of Yuen-Min-Yuen, and on a Subsequent Journey Through the Countryfrom Peking to Canton (London, 1806), p. 118.

47. For the European context see on this: J. Paulmann, Pomp und Politik:Monarchenbegegnungen in Europa zwischen Ancien Régime und Erstem Weltkrieg(Paderborn, 2000), esp. p. 17.

48. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar, pp. 170–178, 223–224.49. Cranmer-Byng, Journal, p. 214.50. Ibid., pp. 152–153.51. See a map of one part of China with the provinces: ‘A Chart, on Mercartor’s

Projection Containing the Track and Sounding of the Lion, the Hindostan,and Tendres, from Turon-Bay in Cochin-China to the Mouth of the Pei-ho River in the Gulph of Pe-tche-lee or Pekin by J. Barrow’, in Staunton,Account, Vol. III; see also the maps by J. Barrow and Henry William


204 Notes

Parish in Staunton, Account, Vol. III; Cranmer-Byng, Journal, pp. 66–67, 83,106; British Library, Manuscript Department: Mss Add. 35174 (Alexander,William: A journal of the Lord Macartney’s Embassy to China, 1792–94.Journal of a Voyage to Peking, the Metropolis of China, in the IndostanIndiaman, accompanying Lord Macartney as Ambassador to the Emperorof China), p. 22a; Staunton, Account, Vol. II, pp. 165–167; Vol. II, pp. 21–22,274–276.

52. T. M. Tsao, ‘Representing China to the British Public in the Age of FreeTrade, ca. 1833–1844’ (State University of New York, Stony Brook, 2000),pp. 28–33.

53. E.g. Staunton, Account, Vol. I, pp. 517–518; Vol. II, p. 384; S. Holmes, TheJournal of Mr. Samuel Holmes, Sargent-Major, During His Attendance, as Oneof the Guard on Lord Macartney’s Embassy to China (London, 1789), p. 98;A. Anderson, A Narrative of the British Embassy to China (Basilea, 1795), p. 95.

54. Cranmer-Byng, Journal, pp. 104–105.55. See especially: Barrow, Travels, pp. 3–4.56. P. Pindar (ed.), ‘Odes to Kien Long I, II, III’, Works (London, 1812), Vol. 2,

pp. 361–374; P. Pindar (ed.), ‘A Lyric Epistle to Lord Macartney, Ambas-sador to the Court of China’, Works (London, 1812), Vol. 2, pp. 349–358;Anderson, Narrative; W. Winterbotham, An Historical, Geographical andPhilosophical View of the Chinese Empire. To Which Is Added, a CopiousAccount of Lord Macartney’s Embassy, Compiled from Original Communications(London, 1795).

57. G. T. Staunton, Memoirs of the Chief Incidents of the Public Life of Sir GeorgeThomas Staunton (London, 1856), pp. 3–27.

58. China through Western Eyes, Manuscript Records of Traders, Travellers,Missionaries & Diplomats, 1792–1942, Part 2: Sources from the WilliamR. Perkins Library, Duke University, Reel 27, Papers of George Leonard& George Thomas Staunton, 1743–1801: George T. Staunton, Letter tomother, Canton, 25 January 1811; Staunton, Memoirs, pp. 25–26.

59. Morse, Chronicles, Vol. IV, p. 164.60. Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 346.61. On the employees of European East India Companies in Canton until 1833

see also: Dermigny, La Chine, Vol. I, pp. 353–369.62. Pritchard, Crucial Years, pp. 133–134.63. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, pp. 10–13.64. For the development of maritime trade in China see: W. E. Cheong,

The Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade(Richmond, 1997), pp. 1–17.

65. BL, APAC, CFR, Secret Consultations, IOR/G/12/273, dated 29 November1820; 4 December 1820; 5 December 1820; 6 December 1820; 8 December1820; 13 December 1820.

66. Morse, Chronicles, Vol. III, pp. 9–13, 67–68.67. Canton Register, 26 May 1831.68. Ibid., Vol. 3, No. 4, dated 15 February 1830, p. 13.69. Ibid., Vol. 3, No. 24, dated 4 December 1830, pp. 105–106.70. For example: Ibid., Vol. 1, No. 8, dated 18 February 1828, p. 31.71. For example: BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/196, Separate Secret Letter to China

from the Court of Directors, dated 12 March 1817.


Notes 205

72. Morse, Chronicles, Vol. II, pp. 94–110.73. Demel, Als Fremde in China, pp. 109–111.74. F.-T. Fan, British Naturalists in Qing China. Science, Empire, and the Cultural

Encounter (Cambridge, MA; London, 2004), p. 32.75. Ibid.76. On the background for the general insolvency of the Hong merchants for

the period till 1798 see: Cheong, Hong Merchants, pp. 246–289.77. On the image of the treacherous Chinese merchant see: Demel, Als Fremde

in China, pp. 152–160; see also Mui and Mui, The Management of Monopoly,pp. 19–20.

78. BL, APAC, CFR, Secret Consultation, IOR/G/12/27, dated 1 March 1817.79. For example: BL, APAC, CFR, Secret Consultation, IOR/G/12/272, dated 20

February 1818.80. On the suspicion of the Qing government of Hong merchants see also: F. J.

Wakeman, Strangers at the Gate. Social Disorder in South China, 1839–1861(2nd edn., Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1997), p. 48.

81. BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/196, Extract Secret Letter to China, dated 7 April1818; BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/196, Separate Secret Letter to China fromthe Court of Directors, dated 12 March 1817.

82. The corruption of local officials in general was certainly a problem that sev-eral Chinese literati of the time were concerned about. See: J. M. Polachek,The Inner Opium War (Cambridge, MA; London, 1992), esp. p. 37. On thewide spread of corruption and its partial acceptance by the emperor dur-ing the Qing dynasty see: N. E. Park, ‘Corruption in Eighteenth-CenturyChina’, The Journal of Asian Studies, 56, 4 (1997), pp. 967–1005.

83. Morse, Chronicles, Vol. III, pp. 202–203; BL, APAC, CFR, Secret Consultation,IOR/G/12/196, Letter from Charles Grant and Thomas Reid to the Earl ofBuckinghamshire, dated 28 July 1815; BL, APAC, CFR, Secret Consultation,IOR/G/12/273, dated 11 November 1821. For a very positive view of theCanton system see the American writer W. C. Hunter, The ‘Fan Kwae’ atCanton Before the Treaty Days 1825–44 (Taipei, 1965), p. 26.

84. See also: G. W. Keeton, The Development of Extraterritoriality in China(London et al., 1928), pp. 47–70.

85. On the debate about the law in India see: E. Stokes, The English Utilitariansand India (Oxford, 1959), pp. 1–80, 140–233; Metcalf, Imperial Connections,pp. 17–18.

86. On Vattel and his influence see: F. Ruddy, International Law in the Enlight-enment. The Background of Emmerich de Vattel’s Le Droit des Gens (New York,1975), esp. pp. 111–115, 281–285. On the development of ideas on the lawof nations in this period see also: A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Lawsof Nations (New York, 1954), pp. 147–185.

87. J. D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (London, 1990), pp. 123–128.88. BL, APAC, CFR, Consultations, IOR/G/12/79, dated 4 February 1785.89. BL, APAC, CFR, Consultations, IOR/G/12/79, dated 4 February 1785;

Keeton, Extraterritoriality, p. 42.90. Ibid. In 1787 an Act 1787 finally gave the EIC this right: Keeton, Extraterri-

toriality, p. 44.91. Keeton points this out in a footnote: Keeton, Extraterritoriality, p. 42.92. Ibid.


206 Notes

93. BL, APAC, CFR, Consultations, IOR/G/12/128, dated 22 March 1800.94. On a further example, the Neptune affair, see: P. Tuck, ‘Law and Disorder

on the China Coast: The Sailors of the Neptune and an Affray at Canton,1807’, in R. Harding, A. Javis and A. Kennedy (eds.), British Ships in ChinaSeas. 1700 to the Present Day (Liverpool, 2004), pp. 83–98, esp. pp. 92–93.

95. On the increased rejection of Chinese law by the Europeans see also:Keeton, Extraterritoriality, pp. 47–70. However, he mainly fails to notice theconflict between the EIC in Canton and Court of Directors in this point.

96. BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/196, Extract Secret Letter to China, dated 7 April1818.

97. BL, APAC, CFR, Letter by the Select Committee, Secret Communications,IOR/G/12/272, dated 2 December 1818.

98. BL, APAC, CFR, Secret Communications, IOR/G/12/272, dated 25 July 1819.99. BL, APAC, CFR, Secret Consultation, IOR/G12/273, dated 22 Novem-

ber 1821. See on the cruelty of the Chinese legal system also: Mason,Punishments.

100. Canton Register, Vol. III, No. 8, dated 15 April 1830, p. 31. See on theirattitude to Chinese law also: Canton Register, Vol. I, No. 21, dated 24 May1828, p. 82; Canton Register, Vol. I, No. 24, dated 14 July 1828, p. 72; CantonRegister, Vol. III, No. 17, dated 25 August 1830; Canton Register, Vol. V, No.10, dated 18 July 1832, p. 69.

101. See also Keeton, Extraterritoriality, pp. 69–70.102. B. S. Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of knowledge: The British in India

(Princeton, 1996), p. 21.103. See for example: J. J. Klor de Alva, ‘Language, Politics, and Translation:

Colonial Discourse and Classical Nahuatl in New Spain’, in R. Warren (ed.),The Art of Translation. Voices from the Field (Boston, 1989), pp. 143–162;A. Pennycook, English and the Discourses of Colonialism (London, New York,1998); J. Fabian, Language and Colonial Power. The Appropriation of Swahili inthe Former Belgian Congon, 1880–1938 (Cambridge, 1986); G. Viswanathan,Masks of Conquest. Literary Study and British Rule in India (Dehli, 1998);M. S. Dodson, ‘Translating Science, Translating Empire: The Power of Lan-guage in Colonial North India’, Comparative Studies in Society and History,47, 4 (2005), pp. 809–835; D. Lelyveld, ‘The Fate of Hindustani: ColonialKnowledge and the Project of a National Language’, in C. Breckenridgeand P. van der Veer (eds.), Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament.Perspectives on South Asia (Philadelphia, 1993), pp. 189–214.

104. See: Wakeman, Strangers at the Gate, p. 49.105. Stifler, ‘Language Students’, p. 48.106. See for example: Ibid., p. 49, n. 9; Anson and Walter, Voyage Round the World,

pp. 417, 424–425. On the system of linguists see: Van Dyke, Canton Trade,pp. 77–93.

107. Anson and Walter, Voyage Round the World, p. 425.108. Stifler, ‘Language Students’, p. 50.109. See for example: A. Q. Montucci, The Answer of A. Montucci . . . to the Conduc-

tors of the Critical Review and Monthly Magazine, Concerning Their Review of aTitle-Page and Prefatory Letter, Accompanying Proposals for a Treatise on the Chi-nese Language (1801); J. Hager, An Explanation of the Elementary Characters ofthe Chinese . . . Anlysis . . . Ancient Symbols and Hieroglyphics (London, 1801).


Notes 207

110. See for example: W. Milne, A Retrospect on the First Ten Years of the ProtestantMission to China (Now, in Connection with the Malay, Denominated, the Ultra-Ganges Missions. Accompanied with Miscellaneous Remarks on the Literature,History and Mythology of China) (Malacca, 1820), pp. 43–48.

111. J. F. Davis, Chinese Novels. Translated from the Originals; to Which Are AddedProverbs and Moral Maxims, Collected from Their Classical Books and OtherSources. The Whole Prefaced by Observations on the Language and Literature ofChina (London, 1822), pp. 1–2.

112. Barrow, Travels, p. 615.113. Davis, Chinese Novels, p. 5. See also: J. Marshman, ‘The Works of Confucius;

Containing the Original Text, with a Translation’ to Which Is Prefixed a Disser-tation on the Chinese Language and Character (Serampore, 1809), pp. ii–iii.

114. Milne, First Ten Years, p. 50.115. G. Cannon, The Life and Mind of Oriental Jones: Sir William Jones, the Father

of Modern Linguistics (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 25, 39, 46.116. Aarsleff, Study of Language, p. 127.117. W. Jones, A Grammar of the Persian Language (London, 1771), pp. iv, xiv–xv.118. See also: Ballantyne, Orientalism, p. 26.119. W. Jones (ed.), ‘The Fifth Anniversary Discourse, on the Tartars’, Discourses

Delivered at the Asiatick Society 1785–1792 (with a new Introduction by RoyHarris edn., Tokyo, 1993), pp. 71–102, esp. p. 71.

120. Aarsleff, Study of Language, pp. 129–134.121. W. Jones (ed.), ‘The Seventh Anniversary Discourse, on the Chinese’, Dis-

courses Delivered at the Asiatick Society 1785–1792 (with a new Introductionby Roy Harris edn., Tokyo, 1993), pp. 95–113, 137–161.

122. W. Jones (ed.), ‘Discourse the Ninth on the Origin and Families of Nations’,Discourses Delivered at the Asiatick Society 1785–1792, with a New Introduc-tion by Roy Harris (Tokyo, 1993), pp. 185–204, esp. p. 186. See also: Aarsleff,Study of Language, p. 136.

123. See, esp. for the following years: J. Joseph, E., ‘A Matter of Consequenz:Humboldt, Race and the Genius of the Chinese Language’, HistoriographiaLinguistica, XXVI, 1/2 (1999), pp. 89–148, esp. p. 96.

124. Aarsleff, Study of Language, p. 139. See also: R. Schwab, La Renaissanceoriental (Paris, 1950), pp. 52–53.

125. Stifler, ‘Language Students’, pp. 50–65.126. On the new triad: Joseph, ‘Consequenz’, p. 93.127. Davis, Chinese Novels, p. 38.128. Ibid., pp. 1–2; General Plan of the Anglo-Chinese College Forming at Malacca

(Malacca, 1818), p. 7.129. W. W. Moseley, The Origin of the First Protestant Mission to China (London,

1842), p. 20.130. Ibid., p. 113.131. See for example: Milne, First Ten Years, p. 356; British and Foreign Bible Soci-

ety, The Second Report of the British and Foreign Bible Society (London, 1806),p. 77.

132. Bayly, Imperial Meridian, pp. 142, 150.133. E. Morrison, Memoirs of the Life and Labours of Robert Morrison (London,

1839), Vol. II, Appendix, p. 14.134. See for example: Milne, First Ten Years, p. 89.


208 Notes

135. Stifler, ‘Language Students’, p. 66.136. BL, APAC, CFR, Select Committee Consultations, IOR/G/12/274, dated

17 January 1822. See on a further discussion of the problematic of the trans-lation of yi/barbarian: L. H. Liu, The Clash of Empires. The Invention of Chinain Modern World Making (Cambridge, MA; London, 2004), pp. 31–69. Asthis paragraph shows, she is however wrong in dating the beginning of thisconflict to 1832, see pp. 41–42. Rather, it was already problematic at leastfrom the Macartney embassy onwards.

137. BL, APAC, CFR, Select Committee Consultations, IOR/G/12/274, dated 17December 1822.

138. Ibid.139. BL, APAC, CFR, Select Committee Consultations, Draft Letter to Hong

Merchants, IOR/G/12/274, dated 17 December 1822.140. BL, APAC, CFR, Select Committee Consultations, IOR/G/12/274, dated 24

December 1822.141. Ibid.142. Canton Register, Vol. III, No. 23, dated 15 November 1830, p. 99.143. Ibid., Vol. III, No. 21, dated 24 May 1828, p. 82.144. Ibid., Supplement to the Canton Register, dated 21 June 1828.145. T. H. Barrett, ‘Chinese Religion in English Guise: The History of an Illusion’,

Modern Asian Studies, 39, 3 (2005), pp. 509–534, esp. pp. 511–516.146. Marshall and Williams, Map of Mankind, pp. 108–111, 116–117.147. P. Harrison, ‘Religion’ and the Religions in the English Enlightenment

(Cambridge, 1990), p. 3.148. Ibid., pp. 130–146 et passim.149. Marshall and Williams, Map of Mankind, p. 98.150. For the importance of the pre-history of the mission during the 18th

century see: A. Porter, Religion Versus Empire? British Protestant Missionariesand Overseas Expansion, 1700–1914 (Manchester, 2004), pp. 15–38.

151. D. W. Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain (London, 1989), p. 5.152. W. W. Moseley (ed.), ‘A Memoir on the Importance and Practicability of

Translating and Printing the Holy Scriptures in the Chinese Language’, TheOrigin of the First Protestant Mission to China . . . (London, 1842), pp. 95–116,esp. pp. 98–99.

153. Ibid., pp. 96–98.154. B. Stanley, The Bible and the Flag: Protestant Missions and British Imperialism

in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Leicester, 1990), pp. 58–61.155. Porter, Religion Versus Empire, pp. 11, 316–330 and passim.156. S. Thorne, Congregational Missions and the Making of an Imperial Culture in

Nineteenth-Century England (Stanford, CA, 1999), esp. pp. 36–44, 73–79.157. Thorne’s simple equation of the missionary movement with the rising

middle class is however problematic, see also: A. Burns, ‘CongregationalMissions and the Making of an Imperial Culture in Nineteenth-CenturyEngland by Susan Thorne (Review)’, The Journal of Imperial and Common-wealth History, XXIX, 2 (2001), pp. 172–174.

158. Porter, Religion Versus Empire, pp. 64–90. Porter is right to remark thatdespite this the priority of missionaries was never to build the BritishEmpire, but rather only to use it for their purpose. See: Porter, Religion VersusEmpire, pp. 116–117.


Notes 209

159. On the relationship between the missionaries and trade, see: A. Porter,‘ “Commerce and Christianity”: The Rise and Fall of a Nineteenth-CenturyMissionary Slogan’, Historical Journal, XVIII (1985), pp. 76, 597–621. Stanleyattributes this combination of Christianity and Commerce not to a linkbetween the missionaries and the middle-class opposition, but rather tothe intrusion of Benthamite ideas into the belief of the nineteenth-centuryChristians (pp. 74–76). In the earlier period under discussion here the mis-sionaries did not yet believe in the benefit of commerce for the spread ofthe Gospel and often tried to disassociate themselves from the traders.However, they still sometimes, as in this case, tried to show where thegeneral benefits of a mission to Britain could be [see Porter, ‘ “Commerceand Christianity”: The Rise and Fall of a Nineteenth-Century MissionarySlogan’, esp. pp. 601–602; Porter, Religion Versus Empire, p. 95].

160. Moseley, ‘Memoir’, p. 98, footnote 4.161. Milne, First Ten Years, pp. 64–65; B. Harrison, Waiting for China. The

Anglo-Chinese College at Malacca, 1818–1843 and Early 19th Century Mis-sion (Hong Kong, 1979) p. 52; Morrison, Memoirs of Robert Morrison,pp. 187–189.

162. Harrison, Waiting for China, p. 52; SOAS, CWM, South China. IncomingCorrespondence, Box 1, 1803–1817, R. Morrison to G. Burder, dated 11December 1809.

163. Morrison, Memoirs of Robert Morrison, p. 188; Milne, First Ten Years, p. 64.164. SOAS, CWM, South China. Incoming Correspondence, Box 1, 1803–1817,

R. Morrison to G. Burder, dated 11 December 1809.165. The Select Committee at Canton would even defend his presence against

their superiors in London, who were much more suspicious of the pres-ence of a missionary who might irritate the Chinese. His knowledge ofChinese was indispensable for the periphery. BL, APAC, Secret Consulta-tion, IOR/G/12/271, dated 12 October 1815.

166. M. A. Rubinstein, The Origins of the Anglo-American Missionary Enterprise inChina, 1807–1840 (London, 1996), pp. 83–87, 92.

167. Morrison, Memoirs of Robert Morrison, Vol. I, p. 163.168. SOAS, CWM, South China. Incoming Correspondence, Box 1, 1803–1817,

R. Morrison, dated 1 April 1809. On these services see also: Rubinstein,Origins, p. 82.

169. Morrison, Memoirs of Robert Morrison, pp. 200, 202, 211, 382; Milne, FirstTen Years, pp. 123–127.

170. B. Stanley (ed.), ‘Christian Missions and the Enlightenment: A Reevalu-ation’, Christian Missions and the Enlightenment (Cambridge et al., 2001),pp. 1–21, esp. p. 12.

171. His earlier language teachers were Roman Catholics, which seems to haveit made easier to hire them (Rubinstein, Origins, p. 78). Even if Morrisonsometimes saw the Catholic missionaries as fellow soldiers for Christ, heoften enough tried to teach his Chinese teachers that Protestantism wasthe only true religion: Morrison, Memoirs of Robert Morrison, pp. 165–166,168–169.

172. See for example: SOAS, CWM, South China. Incoming Correspondence,Box 1, 1803–1817 (Duplicate from and abstract of the original letter)R. Morrison to LMS, dated 14 December 1809.


210 Notes

Kate Teltscher has described a similar pattern for the Lutheran missionar-ies in India in the 18th century: K. Teltscher, India Inscribed. European andBritish Writing on India (Dehli, 1995), pp. 96–97.

173. B. Hilton, The Age of Atonement. The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social andEconomic Thought, 1795–1865 (Oxford, 1988), pp. 19–20.

174. SOAS, CWM, South China. Incoming Correspondence, Box 1, 1803–1817,R. Morrison to LMS, dated 2 April 1815.

175. SOAS, CWM, South China. Incoming Correspondence, Box 1, 1803–1817,R. Morrison to the BFBS (British Foreign and Bible Society), dated 27January 1814.

176. See: Transactions of the London Missionary Society, Vol. IV, 1818, p. 377. A dif-ferent version of the translation of Christianity into the Chinese contextcan be seen by the first Protestant Chinese convert, Liang Fa, whose reli-gious tracts were patterned according to Ming-Ch’ing’s morality books, andwere inspired by concepts of his Confucian and Buddhist upbringing, suchas the idea of personal failure, sin and salvation (see: R. P. Bohr, ‘LiangFa’s Quest for Moral Power’, in J. K. Fairbank and S. W. Barnett (eds.),Christianity in China: Early Protestant Missionary Writings (Cambridge, MA,1985), pp. 35–47, esp. p. 46). On the adaptation of the form of traditionalChinese texts for the publication of Christian ones for a later period seealso: E. S. Rawski, ‘Elementary Education in the Mission Enterprise’, inS. W. Barnett and J. K. Fairbank (eds.), Christianity in China. Early Protes-tant Missionary Writings (Cambridge, MA; London, 1985), pp. 135–151, esp.p. 146; on Liang Fa and the influence of his tracts on Hong Xiuquan, theleader of the Taiping Rebellion, see: J. D. Spence, God’s Chinese Son. The Taip-ing Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan (London, 1996), pp. 16–18, 30–33,51–78.

177. Missionary Chronicle, October 1827, p. 441.178. Transactions of the London Missionary Society, Vol. IV, 1818, p. 124.179. Teltscher, India Inscribed, p. 105.180. On the anti-Christian tradition in China and the political background

to the edicts and persecutions of Christians in the late 18th and early19th century see: P. A. Cohen, China and Christianity: The Missionary Move-ment and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism 1860–1870 (London, 1966),pp. 20–34, esp. 33–34. Next to the fear of heterodoxy and its associationwith moral as well as political unrest, the association of Christianity withthe expanding European powers in the region seems to have been onemajor reason for the persecution of Christianity by the Chinese state.

181. See also: Rubinstein, Origins, p. 81.182. SOAS, CWM, South China. Incoming Correspondence, Box 1, 1803–1817,

R. Morrison to LMS, dated 22 December 1812; Printed in: Transactions of theLondon Missionary Society up to 1817, London, 1818, pp. 123–124.

183. Ibid., pp. 7–8.184. See on this in the context of the American Mission to China also:

M. A. Rubinstein, ‘The Wars They Wanted. American Missionaries’ Use ofthe Chinese Repository Before the Opium War’, American Neptune, XLVIII,4 (1988), pp. 271–282, esp. pp. 277–279.

185. Transactions of the London Missionary Society, Vol. III, London, 1813, p. 340.186. Ibid., Vol. IV, London, 1818, p. 377.


Notes 211

187. See also: Evangelical magazine, August 1825, p. 323 and Milne, First TenYears, p. 27. See Dawson, Chinese Chameleon on a brief statement on mis-sionary attitudes to Confucius, p. 134 and on later missionary verdicts andon Jones, Image of China, p. 63.

188. Indo-Chinese Gleaner, Vol. VI, October 1818, p. 198.189. Transactions of the London Missionary Society, Vol. IV, 1818, p. 261.190. Ibid., pp. 150–152.191. Indo-Chinese Gleaner, Vol. IX, July 1819, p. 170.192. Transactions of the London Missionary Society, Vol. III, London, 1813, p. 273.193. SOAS, CWM, South China. Incoming correspondence, Box 1, 1807–1817,

R. Morrison to G. Burder, dated 16 January 1817.194. Milne, First Ten Years, p. 6. See also p. 16. For this combination of political

as well as religious ideas, see for example: SOAS, CWM, China. Personal,Box 3, R. Morrison to T. Fisher, dated 24 February 1831.

195. Published in: Transactions of the Missionary Society, Vol. III, London 1813,p. 457.

196. SOAS, CWM, China. Personal, Box 3, R. Morrison to T. Fisher, dated9 December 1830.

197. Missionary Chronicle, May, 1820, p. 211.198. On the connexion of Morrison’s judgement of the Chinese and their lack

of the Christian religion see also: L. Kitzan, ‘The London Missionary Soci-ety and the Problem of Conversion in India and China, 1804–34’, CanadianJournal of History, 5, 2 (1970), pp. 13–41, esp. p. 34.

199. Greenberg, British Trade, p. 85.200. BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/196, Letter from John Barrow to the Earl of

Buckinghamshire, dated 14 February 1815.201. BL, APAC, CFR, Secret Meeting Court of Directors, IOR/G/12/196, dated 19

April 1815, Letter from W. F. Elphinstone and John Inglis to the Earl ofBuckinghamshire, dated 3 March 1815.

202. Letter from the Right Honble Lord Castlereagh to the Right Honble LordAmherst, dated 1 January 1816, in Morse, Chronicles, Vol. III, p. 279.

203. George, ‘Letter from King George III to the Emperor of China’, p. 244.204. Ibid., p. 278.205. BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/196 Copy of Letter from Secret Commercial

Committee to Lord Amherst, dated 17 January 1816.206. H. Ellis, Journal of the Proceedings of the Late Embassy to China (2nd edn.,

2 vols., London, 1818), Vol. I., p. 76; BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/196, CopyLetter from Lord Castlereagh to Lord Amherst, dated 1 January 1816.

207. BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/196, Copy Letter from Lord Castlereagh to LordAmherst, dated 1 January 1816.

208. BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/196, Copy of a Secret Commercial Letter toChina, dated 27 September 1815.

209. BL, APAC, CFR, Secret Consultation, IOR/G/12/272, dated 24 November1817, Letter from the Select Committee at Canton to the Secret Committeeof the Court of Directors.

210. R. M. Healey, ‘Ellis, Sir Henry (1788–1855)’. Oxford Dictionary of NationalBiography (online edn., Oxford, 2005).

211. Ellis, Embassy, Vol. I, p. 79.212. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 77.


212 Notes

213. G. T. Staunton, Notes of Proceedings and Occurences During the British Embassyto Pekin in 1816 (P. Tuck, Britain and the China Trade 1635–1842, London,New York, 2000), Vol. X, pp. 31–32.

214. Ellis, Embassy, Vol. I, p. 80.215. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 129.216. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 106–107, 148, 161.217. BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/197, W. Amherst to George Canning, President of

the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, dated 22 March 1817.218. Ellis, Embassy, Vol. I, p. 139.219. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar, pp. 223–224.220. See for example: Ellis, Embassy, Vol. I, pp. 135–136.221. BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/197, W. Amherst to George Canning, dated 8

March 1817.222. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar, pp. 214–216.223. Ibid., p. 214.224. BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/197, W. Amherst to George Canning, President of

the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, dated 22 March 1817.225. BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/197, W. Amherst to George Canning, dated 8

March 1817.226. BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/197, G. Staunton to the Chairman of the Court

of Directors, not dated; Ellis, Embassy, Vol. I, pp. 277, 437–439; R. Morrison,A Memoir of the Principal Occurrences During an Embassy from the British Gov-ernment to the Court of China, in the Year 1816 (London, 1820), pp. 179–181.

227. BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/198, W. Amherst to Chairman and deputyChairman of the Court of Directors, dated 3 May 1817.

228. Ibid.; see also: BL, APAC, CFR, Extract Canton Secret Consultation,IOR/G/12/196, dated 12 February 1816.

229. BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/197; Staunton to the Chairman of the Court ofDirectors, not dated.

230. R. Travers, ‘Ideology and British Expansion in Bengal, 1757–72’, Journal ofImperial and Commonwealth History, 33, 1 (2005), pp. 7–27.

231. Greenberg, British Trade, pp. 35–37.232. Ibid., pp. 85–103.233. On the development of the private trade and its relation to the EIC in

Canton see: Ibid., esp. pp. 18–40; on the nationality issue: p. 83.234. Tsao, ‘Representing China’, pp. 36–37.235. See amongst others: Canton Register, Vol. I, No. 2, November 1827, p. 6;

Canton Register, Vol. I, No. 8, dated 18 February 1828, p. 31; Canton Register,Vol. II, No. 9, dated 2 May 1829, p. 43.

236. Canton Register, Vol. I, No. 11, dated 15 March 1828, p. 41. See also CantonRegister, Vol. I, No. 7, dated 11 February 1828, p. 26; Canton Register, Vol.III, No. 15, dated 2 August 1830, pp. 63–64.

237. See for example: Canton Register, Vol. I, No. 41, dated 13 December 1828,p. 3.

238. Ibid., Vol. I, No. 11, dated 15 March 1828, p. 42; Ibid., Vol. I, No. 20, dated17 May 1828, p. 79; Canton Register, Vol. III, No. 21, dated 16 October 1830.

239. Greenberg, British Trade, pp. 136–141.240. See for example: Canton Register, Vol. I, No. 38, dated 3 November 1828.

Despite this image which they used, the country traders had to admit that


Notes 213

Canton was one of the best places to transact business in the world. See:Greenberg, British Trade, p. 61.

241. Canton Register, Vol. I, No. 18, dated 3 May 1828, p.71.242. See also: Greenberg, British Trade, pp. 41–42.243. Canton Register, Vol. III, No. 18, dated 6 November 1830, p. 76.244. Ibid., Vol. IV, No. 10, dated 13 May 1831, p. 41.245. Greenberg, British Trade, pp. 112–143.246. Polachek, Inner Opium War, pp. 101–125; D. A. Bello, Opium and the Limits of

Empire. Drug Prohibition in the Chinese Interior, 1729–1850 (Cambridge, MA;London, 2005), pp. 115–138.

247. Greenberg, British Trade, p. 84.248. Stokes, English Utilitarians, pp. 150–168.249. Morse, Chronicles, Vol. IV, pp. 199–200.250. Greenberg, British Trade, p. 177.251. See also: Ibid., pp. 176–177.252. BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/281, Letter from the Select Committee to the

Court of Directors, dated 18 October 1830; 14 December 1829.253. BL, APAC, CFR, Secret Consultation, IOR/G/12/276, dated 25 December

1829.254. BL, APAC, CFR, Secret Consultation, IOR/G/12/276, dated 11 January 1830,

Select Committee, letter to Lord Cavendish Bentinck, dated 11 January1830.

255. Ibid.256. BL, APAC; CFR, IOR/G/12/281, Letter from the Select Committee to

The Court of Directors, dated 24 February 1830. For a detailed account ofthe occurrences see also: Morse, Chronicles, Vol. IV, pp. 197–221; Indeed, thetwo governor-generals in this period, Li Hung-pin and Lu K’un were ratherconciliatory towards the British and turned a blind eye on their involve-ment in the opium trade in contrast to the wishes of the emperor. This wasalso true of the main supporter of the 1836 campaign to legalise opium,Juan Yuan, who had been Liang-Kuang viceroy between 1817 and 1826;see: Polachek, Inner Opium War, pp. 109–112, 115–116; on the problematicof opium smoking and its prohibition in this period see also: J. D. Spence,Opium Smoking in Ch’ing China (reprint in Britain and the China Trade1635–1842, London, New York, 2000), Vol. XI, 2, pp. 158–161.

257. See also: Greenberg, British Trade, pp. 72–73, Melancon, ‘Peaceful Inten-tions’, p. 37.

258. BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/281, Letter from the Select Committee to theCourt of Directors, 15 December 1830.

259. Canton Register, 16 October 1830, No. 21.260. BL, APAC, CFR, Canton Consultations, IOR/G/12/244, dated 19 October,

1830.261. Ibid.262. BL, APAC, CFR, Canton Consultations, IOR/G/12/244, dated 20 October,

1830.263. BL, APAC, CFR, Canton Consultations, IOR/G/12/244, dated 23 October

1830; 25 October 1830.264. BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/287, Letter from the Select Committee to the

Court of Directors, dated 31 May 1831; Morse, Chronicles, Vol. IV, p. 282.


214 Notes

265. BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/287, Letter from the Select Committee to theCourt of Directors, dated 7 September 1831.

266. BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/287, Letter from the Select Committee to theCourt of Directors, dated 7 November 1831.

267. See: Polachek, Inner Opium War, esp. pp. 103–109; Bello, Limits of Empire,pp. 115–116.

268. PRO, FO 17/476, Memorandum by Mr Hepper on the China Act.269. J. K. Laughton; rev. Lambert, Andrew, ‘Napier, William John, Ninth Lord

Napier of Merchistoun (1786–1834)’. Oxford Dictionary of National Biography(online edn., May 2007, Oxford, 2004).

270. Greenberg, British Trade, p. 191; Inglis, The Opium War, p. 89; Collis, ForeignMud, pp. 107–125.

271. Melancon, Britain’s China Policy.272. Greenberg, British Trade, p. 175.273. Ibid., p. 178.274. Ibid., p. 187.275. Ibid., pp. 187–188.276. Ibid., pp. 188–191.277. On the increasing opium trade and its links with British revenue in India

see: Inglis, The Opium War; Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914,p. 137.

278. Chang, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, p. 85; Polachek, Inner OpiumWar, p. 104.

279. Z. Yangwen, The Social Life of Opium in China (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 87–97.280. Polachek, Inner Opium War, pp. 103–120.281. Greenberg, British Trade, p. 191.282. PRO, FO 17/13, Palmerston to Elliot, dated 22 July 1836.283. Laughton, ‘William John Napier’.284. For a narrative account of the episode see: Fay, The Opium War, 1840–1842,

pp. 67–79.285. Greenberg, British Trade, p. 192; Fay, The Opium War, 1840–1842, p. 69.286. Melancon, Britain’s China Policy, p. 37.287. See chapter 5.3.288. PRO, FO 17/476, dated 25 January 1834.289. PRO, FO 17/476, Napier to Palmerston, Canton, dated 9 August 1834.290. PRO, FO 17/476, Napier to Palmerston, London, dated 28 December 1833.291. PRO, FO 17/476, Palmerston to Napier, London, dated 30 December 1833.292. See for example: PRO, FO 17/4/6, Napier to Palmerston, Canton, dated 9

August 1834; PRO, FO/677/3, Napier to Palmerston (Private), Canton, dated14 August 1834.

293. Fay, The Opium War, 1840–1842, p. 73294. PRO, FO 17/6743, Napier to Palmerstion, dated 14 August 1834.295. PRO, FO 17/6/43, Napier to Palmerston, dated 14 August 1834.296. PRO, FO 677/3, Napier to Palmerston, Private, dated 14 August 1834.297. PRO, FO 17/7, Proceedings of the Superintendents of British Trade in China,

dated 29 August 1834.298. PRO, FO 17/7, dated 1 September 1834.299. Melancon, Britain’s China Policy, pp. 49–55; Graham, The China Station: War

and Diplomacy, 1830–1860, p. 65.


Notes 215

300. PRO, FO 17/09, Robinson to Palmerston, dated 27 February 1835.301. H. Schlyter, Der China-Missionar Karl Gützlaff und seine Heimatbasis (Lund,

1976), p. 17; C. Gützlaff, Journal of Three Voyages Along the Coast of China in1831, 1832, & 1833 (London, 1834).

302. Gützlaff, Three Voyages, p. 75; PRO, FO 17/09, dated 21 February 1835,‘Observations on the Stoppage of Trade at Canton’; PRO, FO 17/10, Macao,dated 1 July 1835, ‘Remarks on Official Correspondence with ChineseGovernment’.

303. Ibid., pp. 174–189, 205–206, esp. pp. 249–250, 297–309; Chang, Commis-sioner Lin and the Opium War, pp. 82–83.

304. Chang, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, pp. 83–84.305. PRO, FO 17/09, dated 21 February 1835, ‘Observations on the Stoppage

of Trade at Canton’; ‘Statistical Account of the Chinese Empire’; ‘Essayon the Present State of Our Relations with China’; ‘An Essay Upon theMilitary Power of the Chinese Empire, It’s Means to Defence etc.’; dated12 April 1835, ‘Trade to All the Ports of the Chinese Empire’; dated 16April 1835, ‘Financial System of the Chinese Empire’; dated 1 August 1835,‘Remarks on Official Correspondence with the Chinese Government’; PRO,FO 17/10, Macao, dated 1 July 1835, ‘Remarks on Official Correspondencewith Chinese Government’.

306. PRO, FO 17/09, ‘An Essay Upon the Military Power of the Chinese Empire,It’s Means of Defence etc’.

307. PRO, FO 17/09, ‘Proceedings Relative to the Formation of a Society for theDiffusion of Useful Knowledge in China, Canton 1835’.

308. Ibid.309. PRO, FO 17/09, 25 February, Canton, Minutes of the Establishment of the

Morrison Education Society.310. PRO, FO 17/09, Robinson to Palmerston, Macao, dated 22 April 1835.311. Polachek, Inner Opium War, p. 120.312. Greenberg, British Trade, pp. 199–201; Chang, Commissioner Lin and the

Opium War, p. 91.313. PRO, FO 17/15, Elliot to Palmerston, Macao, dated 27 July 1836; FO 17/20,

Elliot to Palmerston, Macao, dated 21 February 1837; PRO, FO 17/26, Elliotto Palmerston, Macao, dated 20 April 1838.

314. Polachek, Inner Opium War, pp. 103–113.315. PRO, FO 17/10, Macao, dated 26 July 1835, Minute.316. PRO, FO 17/13, Palmerston to Elliot, dated 22 July 1836.317. PRO, FO 17/27, Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, dated 31 December 1838.318. Graham, The China Station: War and Diplomacy, 1830–1860, pp. 73–83; PRO,

FO 17/27, Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, dated 31 December 1838; Chang,Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, pp. 69–81.

319. Greenberg, British Trade, p. 196; PRO, FO 17/27, Elliot to Palmerston,Canton, dated 31 December 1838.

320. Polachek, Inner Opium War, pp. 127–135.321. Melancon, Britain’s China Policy, p. 77; PRO, FO 17/31, Elliot to Palmerston,

Canton, dated 30 March 1839.322. For a narrative of the events, see: Graham, The China Station: War and

Diplomacy, 1830–1860, pp. 65–87 and PRO, FO 17/31, Elliot to Palmerston,Canton, dated 30 March 1839.


216 Notes

323. Chung, China and the Brave New World. Study of the Origins of the OpiumWar; Greenberg, British Trade; Inglis, The Opium War, pp. 167–205; Fay,The Opium War, 1840–1842, pp. 180–195; Chang, Commissioner Lin and theOpium War, pp. ix–xii; Collis, Foreign Mud.

324. For the latter position, see for example: Chang, Commissioner Lin and theOpium War; Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy; Morse, International Relations ofthe Chinese Empire.

325. Melancon, Britain’s China Policy, pp. 1–6.326. PRO, FO 17/31, Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, dated 18 May 1839.327. PRO, FO 17/22, Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, dated 19 November 1837.328. PRO, FO 17/32, Elliot to Palmerston, Hong Kong, dated 27 August 1839.329. PRO, FO 17/31, Memorial by British Merchants to Lord Palmerston,

Canton, dated 23 May 1839.330. PRO, FO 17/20, Elliot to Palmerston, Macao, dated 21 February 1837; FO

17/22, Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, dated 19 November 1837.331. PRO, FO 17/32, Memorandum by Elliot on 11 September 1839 to Comman-

ders of British Vessels; FO 17/32, Elliot to Palmerston, Macao, dated 18 July1839.

332. PRO, FO 17/20, Elliot to Palmerston, Macao, dated 21 February 1837.333. PRO, FO 17/25, Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, dated 15 June 1838.334. See also: Fay, The Opium War, 1840–1842, pp. 80–97; P. W. Fay, ‘The Protes-

tant Mission and the Opium War’, Pacific Historical Review, 40, 2 (1971),pp. 145–161; Rubinstein, ‘Wars They Wanted’, esp. pp. 279–282.

335. Polachek, Inner Opium War, pp. 131, 151.336. Canton, dated 3 April 1839, Foreign Dept, Consultation No. 74, dated 26

June 1839, No. 18, FO 17/31.337. See also: PRO, FO 17/31, Canton Elliot to Palmerston, dated 18 May 1839.338. Graham, The China Station: War and Diplomacy, 1830–1860, pp. 94–95.339. Ibid., pp. 95–119.340. Ibid., p. 119; S. Mann and P. A. Kuhn, ‘Dynastic Decline and the Roots

of Rebellion’, in J. K. Fairbank (ed.), The Cambridge History of China(Cambridge, 1978), Vol. X, pp. 107–162, 158–160.

4 South and Southeast Asian Encounters

1. C. A. Trocki, Opium and Empire. Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800–1910 (Ithaca, London, 1990), p. 15.

2. On the concept of ‘information panic’ see: Bayly, Empire and Information,p. 143.

3. See also: K. Labh, ‘China as a Factor in the Policy of British India TowardsNepal’, Journal of Indian History, 55, 3 (1977), pp. 177–188; esp. pp. 177–183.

4. Bayly, Empire and Information, pp. 56–57.5. On the Gurkha conquest of Nepal see: K. Pradhan, The Gorkha Conquests.

The Process and Consequences of the Unification of Nepal, with Particular Refer-ence to Eastern Nepal (Calcutta, 1991), pp. 89–152; L. F. Stiller, The Rise of theHouse of Gorkha (New Dehli, 1973).

6. See for example: Bayly, Empire and Information, esp. pp. 56–142.7. C. R. Markham, Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle to Tibet, and of the

Journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa (London, 1876), pp. clviii, 278–280.


Notes 217

8. D. Woodman, Himalayan Frontiers. A Political Review of British, Chinese,Indian and Russian Rivalries (London, 1969), pp. 22–34.

9. See on the Bogle mission: K. Teltscher, The High Road to China. George Bogle,The Panchen Lama and the First British Expedition to Tibet (London, 2006).

10. BL, APAC, MSS EUR E 226/1.11. A. Lamb, British India and Tibet, 1766–1910 (2nd revised edn., London, New

York, 1986), pp. 4–7.12. BL, APAC, MSS EUR E 226/5.13. BL, APAC, MSS EUR E 226/7, on Bogle and the mission see also: K. Teltscher,

‘Writing Home and Crossing Cultures: George Bogle in Bengal and Tibet,1770–1775’, in K. Wilson (ed.), A New Imperial History. Culture, Identity, andModernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660–1840 (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 281–296; Teltscher, High Road to China.

14. E. S. Rawski, The Last Emperors. A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1998), pp. 244–263.

15. BL, APAC, MSS EUR E 226/23; BL, APAC, MSS EUR E 226/1; BL, APAC, MSSEUR E 226/30; BL, APAC, MSS EUR E 226/11; see also: K. Teltscher, ‘TheLama and the Scotsman: George Bogle in Bhutan and Tibet, 1774–1775’,in F. A. Nussbaum (ed.), The Global Eighteenth Century (Baltimore, London,2003), pp. 151–164, esp. pp. 157–161.

16. Markham, Narratives, pp. 45–46 (Report to Warren Hastings, Tassisudon, 16July 1774).

17. Ibid., p. 132.18. Teltscher, ‘The Lama’, esp. pp. 157–161.19. Markham, Narratives, pp. 151, 134, 194–196.20. Teltscher, High Road to China, pp. 85–86.21. BL, APAC, MSS EUR E 226/11.22. BL, APAC, MSS EUR E 226/31; BL, APAC, MSS EUR E 226/34; BL, APAC, MSS

EUR E 226/23.23. S. Cammann, Trade Through the Himalayas. The Early British Attempts to Open

Tibet (Princeton, 1951), pp. 70–74; Teltscher, High Road to China, p. 220.24. S. Turner, An Account of an Embassy to the Court of the Teshoo Lama, in Tibet:

Containing a Narrative of a Journey Through Bootan, and Part of Tibet (London,1800), pp. 253, 367, 373.

25. A. Lamb (ed.), Bhutan and Tibet. The Travels of George Bogle and AlexanderHamilton, 1774–1777 (Hertingfordbury, 2002), Vol. I, Extract from Bogle’sletter to Hastings, written on 27 April 1775 from Paro in Bhutan, p. 222.

26. BL, APAC, MSS EUR E 226/31; BL, APAC, MSS EUR E 226/34.27. Rawski, The Last Emperors, pp. 261–262.28. BL, APAC, MSS EUR E 226/31.29. Cranmer-Byng, Journal, pp. 232–233. Rawski, The Last Emperors,

pp. 247–249, 263.30. BL, APAC, MSS EUR E 226/23.31. Ibid.32. Stiller, Rise; Pradhan, The Gorkha Conquests.33. For a new interpretation of these conflicts see: B. A. Michael, ‘Statemaking

and Space on the Margins of Empire: Rethinking the Anglo-Gorkha War of1814–1816’, Studies in Nepali History and Society, IV, 2 (1999), pp. 247–294.

34. K. C. Chaudhuri, Anglo-Nepalese Relations. From the Earliest Times of theBritish Rule in India Till the Gurkha War (Calcutta, 1960), pp. 34–65.


218 Notes

35. R. Dhanalaxmi, British Attitude to Nepal’s Relations with Tibet and China(1814–1914) (New Delhi, 1981), pp. 17–23; Lamb, British India, p. 19.

36. W. Kirkpatrick, Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul: Being the Substance of Obser-vations Made During a Mission to That Country, in the Year 1793 (London,1811), p. vii.

37. Ibid., p. vi.38. Ibid.39. J. Barrow, Some Account of the Public Life and a Selection from the Unpublished

Writings of the Earl of Macartney (2 vols., London, 1807), Col. II, pp. 203–204.40. Turner, An Account of an Embassy, p. 442.41. Dhanalaxmi, British Attitude, pp. 25–31; on the war see also: Michael,

‘Statemaking’; N. R. L. Rana, The Anglo-Gorkha War (1814–1816)(Kathmandu, 1970).

42. Lamb, British India, pp. 30–37.43. BL, APAC, IOR/H/644, F. Buchanan to J. Adam, dated 19 August 1814.44. BL, APAC, IOR/H/516, W. Moorcroft to J. Adam, in Papers Respecting the

Nepaul War (London, 1824), p. 89.45. The British accused the Nepalese to be of such a treacherous character that

they pretended to have British troops towards the Chinese, dressing theirtroops in red, and to have Chinese support towards the British by assum-ing the dress of Chinese officials: BL, APAC, IOR/H/644, Letter from Capt.Hearsey to J. Adam, dated 24 August 1814.

46. BL, APAC, IOR/H/516, Secret Letter from Lord Moira to the Secret Commit-tee, dated 2 August 1815, in Papers Respecting the Nepaul War, p. 722.

47. Labh, ‘China as a Factor’, p. 182; Dhanalaxmi, British Attitude, p. 27.48. BL, APAC, Board’s Collection, Bengal Political Letter, F4/552, dated 16

November 1816, Narrative of Proceedings Connected with the Advance of aChinese Force Towards the Frontier of Nipaul; Lamb, British India, pp. 34–36.

49. BL, APAC, Board’s Collection, Bengal Political Letter.50. On Hodgson see: G. Van Driem, ‘Hodgson’s Tibeto-Burman and Tibeto-

Burman Today’, in D. M. Waterhouse (ed.), The Origins of Himalayan Studies.Brian Houghton Hodgson in Nepal and Darjeeling 1820–1858 (London, NewYork, 2004), pp. 227–247; K. L. Pradhan, Brian Hodgson at the KathmanduResidency, 1825–1843 (Delhi, 2001).

51. See for example: BL, APAC, F/4/1485, f293; F74/1384, Extract Political Letterfrom Fort William, dated 15 December 1831; BL, APAC, MSS EUR Hodgson9 (159); BL, APAC, R/5/50, B. Hodgson to W. Maddock, dated 22 November1839; IOR/R/5/50, B. Hodgson to H. Torrens, dated 10 October 1840; Seealso: Dhanalaxmi, British Attitude, pp. 32–50.

52. BL, APAC, MSS EUR Hodgson 3 (43).53. BL, APAC, Board’s Collection, Fort William’s Political Consultations,

F4/1324, dated 26 March 1830.54. BL, APAC, Board’s Collection, Fort William’s Political Consultations,

F4/1380, dated 28 October 1831; 26 March 1830.55. BL, APAC, Board’s Collection, Fort William’s Political Consultations,

F4/1380, dated 28 October 1831.56. BL, APAC, Board’s Collection, Fort William’s Political Consultations,

F4/1324, dated 10 June 1831; 10 December 1830.57. BL, APAC, MSS EUR Hodgson 9; MSS EUR Hodgson 6.


Notes 219

58. BL, APAC, Board’s Collection, Fort William’s Political Consultations,F/4/1330, dated 31 July 1827.

59. B. H. Hodgson, Essays on the Languages, Literature, and Religion of Nepal andTibet (London, 1874), pp. 30–33; MSS EUR Hodgson 6.

60. Hodgson, Essay on the Languages, p. 68.61. Ibid., pp. 76–82.62. See also: BL, APAC, IOR/R/5/50, B. Hodgson to H. Torrens, dated 20 October

1840.63. On the Serampore mission and its link to the EIC see: D. Kopf,

British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance. The Dynamics of IndianModernization, 1773–1835 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1969), pp. 55, 71–74.M. A. Laird, Missionaries and Education in Bengal, 1793–1837 (Oxford, 1972),pp. 44–178.

64. BMS, IN/19A, J. Marshman to J. Ryland, dated 20 August 1806.65. BMS, IN/19/A, J. Marshman to J. Ryland, dated 25 May 1806.66. E. H. Cutts has pointed towards some of the political implications of this

position, mainly arguing that it was meant to equip the next embassy toChina with a translator: E. H. Cutts, ‘Chinese Studies in Bengal’, Journal ofthe American Oriental Society, 62 (1942), pp. 171–174; esp. p. 174. For exam-ple, Marshman dedicated his translation of Confucius to Minto: Marshman,Confucius, p. iii.

67. T. H. Barrett, Singular Listlessness: A Short History of Chinese Books and BritishScholars (London, 1989), pp. 61–62.

68. Marshman, Confucius, p. iii.69. Cutts, ‘Chinese Studies’; p. 174.70. J. Marshman, Elements of Chinese Grammar, with a Preliminary Dissertation on

the Characters and the Colloquial Medium of the Chinese Ta-hysh of Confuciuswith a Translation (Serampore, 1814), p. 170.

71. Letter Marshman (Periodical account to Ryland, Serampore, dated 20August 1806, Angus Library, Baptist Missionary Society, IN/19A).

72. BMS, IN/19/A, J. Marshman to J. Ryland, dated 24 July 1811.73. BL, APAC, IOR/G/12/274, Select Committee Consultations (24 December

1822); Lamb, British India, p. 42.74. Marshman, Confucius.75. Hodgson, Essays on the Languages, p. 110.76. See on this: Woodman, Himalayan Frontiers, pp. 37–83.77. Pradhan, Brian Hodgson, p. 105; BL, APAC; IOR/R/5/50, B. Hodgson to

H. Torrens, dated 18 June 1840.78. Dhanalaxmi, British Attitude, pp. 42–48; Pradhan, Brian Hodgson, pp. 110,

137; BL, APAC, IOR/R/5/51, B. Hodgson to India, W. H. Macnaghten, dated5 September 1841; 6 September 1841; BL, APAC, IOR/R/5/50, B. Hodgsonto H. Torrens, dated 20 October 1840.

79. Lamb, British India, pp. 53–57.80. On the term ‘Southeast Asia’ see: J. D. Legge, ‘The Writing of Southeast

Asian History’, in N. Tarling (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia(Cambridge, 1992), Vol. 1, pp. 1–50; esp. pp. 1–2.

81. On John Leyden see: J. Reith, Life of Dr John Leyden. Poet and Linguist(Galashiels, 1908); V. M. Hooker and M. B. Hooker (eds.), ‘IntroductoryEssay’, John Leyden’s Malay Annals (Kuala Lumpur, 2001), pp. 1–80.


220 Notes

82. J. Leyden, ‘On the Language and Literature of the Indo-Chinese Nations’,Asiatic Researches, 10 (1808), pp. 158–290; see on the essay also: Hooker andHooker, ‘Introductory Essay’, pp. 26–30.

83. See also: Van Driem, ‘Hodgson’s Tibeto-Burman and Tibeto-Burman Today’,pp. 233–235.

84. R. Morrison, Vocabulary of the Canton Dialect (Macao, 1828).85. R. Morrison, A Dictionary of the Chinese Language, in Three Parts (Macao,

1815). Morrison only adds a table that should help readers to find words inthe dictionary according to their Cantonese pronunciation (p. xv).

86. Leyden, ‘On the Language and Literature of the Indo-Chinese Nations’,pp. 266–267.

87. Hooker and Hooker, ‘Introductory Essay’, p. 11.88. See: C. M. Turnbull, ‘Crawfurd, John (1783–1868)’. Oxford Dictionary of

National Biography (online edn., Oxford, 2004); P. G. Robb, ‘Mackenzie,Colin (1753–1821)’. Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (online edn.,Oxford, 2004).

89. Tsao, ‘Representing China’, p. 42; Du Halde also already made a short noticeof the industrious habit of the Chinese workers, but sees it mainly as a resultof their hardship in live: Du Halde, General History, Vol. II, pp. 123–126.

90. Barrett, Singular Listlessness, p. 7191. Zhang, ‘British Views’, pp. 159–160. Only takes note of the 1807 scheme

to bring Chinese workers to Trinidad and the positive reception of the Chi-nese in this context without further discussing the circumstances of theseendeavours.

92. See also: Trocki, Opium and Empire, p. 27. On the system of Chinese junktrade with Southeast Asia at the example of Siam see: J. Cushman, Fieldsfrom the Sea. Chinese Junk Trade with Siam During the Late Eighteenth andEarly Nineteenth Centuries (Ithaca, 1993).

93. Trocki, Opium and Empire, p. 15, for an overview see also: L. Pann, Sons ofthe Yellow Emperor (London, 1990), pp. 23–42.

94. Mark Frost has recently pointed out that while European maritime tech-nology became more important in the trade in Southeast Asia, the Chinesejunk trade remained significant in several areas and many links betweenSoutheast Asian trading places with Chinese settlements in Southeast Asiaequally stayed in the hands of the Chinese. See: M. R. Frost, ‘Empo-rium in Imperio: Nanyang Networks and the Straits Chinese in Singapore,1819–1914’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 36, 1 (2005), pp. 29–66; esp.p. 37.

95. Trocki, Opium and Empire, pp. 30–35.96. Ibid., pp. 11–28.97. For a later period, the global network nature of Chinese emigration has

been emphasised, breaking down the opposition between the idea of assim-ilation of emigrated Chinese on the one hand and their preserving of theiroriginal culture on the other. See for example: A. McKeown, ‘Conceptualiz-ing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949’, Journal of Asian Studies, 58, 2 (1999),pp. 306–337.

98. See for Singapore: M. Freedman, The Study of Chinese Society. Essays byMaurice Freedman (Standford, 1979), pp. 84–89; G. Wang, The ChineseOverseas. From Earthbound China to the Quest for Autonomy (Cambridge, MA;


Notes 221

London, 2000), esp. pp. 55–60; G. Wang, China and the Chinese Overseas(2nd edn., Singapore, 1992), pp. 4–6; Frost, ‘Nanyang Networks’, esp.pp. 33–37.

99. H. T. Fry, Alexander Dalrymple (1737–1808) and the Expansion of British Trade(London, 1970), p. 2.

100. Ibid., p. 21.101. Ibid., p. 5.102. Ibid., p. 36.103. Ibid., p. 48; A. Dalrymple, Oriental Repertory (London, 1793), Vol. 2, p. 567;

on the Chinese trade at Jolo see: J. F. Warren, The Sulu Zone 1768–1898(Singapore, 1981), pp. 1–9.

104. Dalrymple, Oriental Repertory, Vol. I, p. 567.105. BL, APAC, MSS/EUR/Orme Mss/67, Memoir of Sooloo.106. A. Webster, Gentlemen Capitalists. British Imperialism in South East Asia 1770–

1890 (London, New York, 1998), p. 20 and passim.107. Fry, Alexander Dalrymple (1737–1808) and the Expansion of British Trade,

pp. 27, 44.108. A. Dalrymple, A Plan for Extending the Commerce of This Kingdom, and of the

East-India-Company (London, 1769), p. 7.109. Ibid., pp. 66–93.110. See also: A. Frost, The Global Reach of Empire. Britain’s Maritime Expansion in

the Indian and Pacific Oceans, 1764–1815 (Carlton, Victoria, 2003), pp. 165–180, 189–207.

111. On the British interest in Southeast Asia see: N. Tarling (ed.), ‘The Estab-lishment of the Colonial Régimes’, The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia(Cambridge, 1992), Vol. 2, pp. 5–78, esp. pp. 13–19; N. Tarling, Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World 1780–1824 (Cambridge, 1962); Webster,Gentlemen Capitalists. British Imperialism in South East Asia 1770–1890,pp. 42–77.

112. Tarling, ‘The Establishment of the Colonial Régimes’, p. 13; J. Crawfurd,History of the Indian Archipelago. Containing an Account of the Manners, Arts,Languages, Religions, Institutions, and Commerce of Its Inhabitants (3 vols.,London, 1967), Vol. III, pp. 219–254, 267–268.

113. M. C. Granroth, ‘European Knowledge of Southeast Asia: Travel andScholarship in the Early Modern Era’ (University of Cambridge, 2003),pp. 222–226; A. Reid, ‘Historiographical Reflections on the Period 1750–1870 in Southeast Asia and Korea’, Itinerario, XVIII, 1 (1994), pp. 77–89,esp. pp. 79–80.

114. Trocki, Opium and Empire, p. 24.115. Granroth, ‘European Knowledge of Southeast Asia’, p. 4.116. Ibid., pp. 222–226.117. BL, APAC, Raffles Collection, MSS/EUR/D/199/6, Considerations on the Com-

merce and Policy in the Indian Archipelago, 1817, pp. 189–284. See also: M. C.Quilty, Textual Empires. A Reading of Early British Histories of Southeast Asia(Clayton, 1998), esp. pp. 41–82.

118. Alexander Dalrymple had already begun to use this trope. See: A. Dalrym-ple, Journal of the Schooner Cuddalore, Oct. 1759 on the Coast of China (3rdedn., London, 1787), pp. 9–14, 96–97; this is a trope with a long duree:for a discussion of these ideas on Chinese in contrast to the native Malay,


222 Notes

and the effect of this discourse on British rule in Southeast Asia later inthe 19th century see: Metcalf, Imperial Connections, pp. 50–56. However, inthe early 19th century, the ‘lazy Malay’ is contrasted with the ‘industriousChinese’ rather than the Indian.

119. J. De Vries, ‘The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution’, TheJounral of Economic History, 54, 2 (1994), pp. 249–270, esp. pp. 258–260.

120. Mr. Crawfurd’s statement (Extract from the Third Report of the Select Com-mittee on the Affairs of the East India Company), Appendix to: Anonym,The Foreign Trade of China Divested of Monopoly, Restriction, and Hazard byMeans of Insular Commercial Stations (London, 1832), p. 106.

121. A. Osborne, Notes on the Present State and Prospect of Society in New SouthWales with an Account of Manilla and Singapore (London, 1833), p. 92.

122. Crawfurd, History of Indian Archipelago, Vol. III, p. 157. On Malthus’ ideaon immigration, the Chinese and the growth of their population see: T. R.Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (8th edn., London, 1878),pp. 98–111.

123. Trocki, Opium and Empire, p. 46.124. See: S. H. Alatas, The Myth of the Lazy Native. A Study of the Image of Malays,

Filipinos and Javanese from the 16th to the 20th Century and Its Function inthe Ideology of Colonial Capitalism (London, 1977), pp. 83–85; Trocki, Opiumand Empire, p. 46.

125. See also the British plans to settle Chinese in Assam for the tea productionin the late 1830s. The Chinese as the more civilised and more industriouspopulation were believed to be able to cultivate the tea plant better than theindigenous, savage population. In addition, the tea plant that was native toAssam was also considered to be a wild species, useless for professional teaplantation. It was thus believed that only the Chinese tea plant was culti-vated enough and that only the Chinese could bring the cultivation to thewildness of Assam (J. Sharma, ‘The Making of “Modern” Assam, 1826–1935’PhD dissertation (University of Cambridge, 2002), pp. 54–56); J. Sharma,‘British Science, Chinese Skill and Assam Tea: Making Empire’s Garden’,The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 43, 4 (2006), pp. 429–455,esp. pp. 444–446.

126. Osborne, Notes, p. 94.127. See also Raffles’s opinion on the industrious Chinese in this context:

Memoir, Appendix, pp. 9–10.128. On the debate about the idea of the free Chinese labourer as a substitute for

African slaves in the metropolis see for example: J. Macqueen, The ColonialControversy, Containing a Refutation of the Calumnies of the Anticolonists . . . ina Series of Letters (Glasgow, 1825), pp. 133–144; Anonym, ConsiderationsSubmitted in Defence of the Orders in Council for the Melioration of Slavery inTrinidad . . . (London, 1825), pp. 113–114, 185.

129. Asiatic Journal, Vol. I, New Series, January–April 1830, pp. 25–28, 224.130. BL, APAC, Raffles Collection, MSS/EUR/E/109.131. The Gentleman’s Magazine, June 1814, pp. 33–40, 561–568.132. Osborne, Notes, pp. 92–95.133. See for example: Crawfurd, History of Indian Archipelago, Vol. I, p. 136;

T. S. Raffles, The History of Java (2 vols., London, 1817), Vol. I,pp. 224–225.


Notes 223

134. A more detailed account of the ideas on the Chinese in the early race theorywill be discussed in the last chapter.

135. J. Crawfurd, ‘Mr. Crawfurd’s Statement. Extract from the Third Report of theSelect Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company’, in Anonym(ed.), The Foreign Trade of China (London, 1832), pp. 105–110, esp. p. 106.

136. Quote from: C. W. Wurtzburg, Raffles of the Eastern Isles (London, 1954),p. 140.

137. Crawfurd, History of Indian Archipelago, Vol. I, p. 135.138. See also on Crawfurd’s Racism: Quilty, Textual Empires, pp. 76–82.139. R. J. C. Young, Colonial Desire. Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race (London,

New York, 1995), p. 69.140. Trocki establishes the image of the opium wreck as the dominant one for

the 19th century: Trocki, Opium and Empire, p. 1. See also: Spence, TheChan’s Great Continent, pp. 124, 146.

141. J. Bastin, The Native Policies of Sir Stamford Raffles in Java and Sumatra. AnEconomic Interpretation (Oxford, 1957), p. 9.

142. L. Blussé, Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women, and the Dutch inVOC Batavia (Verhandelingen van het Koniklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde, 122, Dordrecht, Riverton, 1986), pp. 80, 90–91. On theChinese on Java in this from the late 17th to the early 19th century see:P. Carey, ‘Changing Javanese Perceptions of the Chinese Communities inCentral Java, 1755–1825’, Indonesia, 37 (1984), pp. 1–49.

143. Blussé, Strange Company, p. 5; A. Kumar, Java and Modern Europe. AmbiguousEncounters (Richmond, 1997), pp. 30–32, 199–201.

144. Bastin, Native Policies, p. 27.145. V. Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia (2nd edn., London, 1980),

p. 408. See also on Dutch attitudes to Chinese: Kumar, Java, pp. 372,437–438.

146. Bastin, Native policies, pp. 13–15.147. Ibid.148. Ibid., p. 22; Dirk van Hogendorp quoted in: Raffles, History of Java, Vol. I,

pp. 226–227.149. Wurtzburg, Raffles, pp. 127–128.150. BL, APAC, MSS/EUR/E/104, Raffles Collection: Considerations on How to

Deal with the Dutch Possessions in the East Indies If They Should Be Captured,pp. 33–110.

151. Ibid., pp. 97–98.152. Wurtzburg, Raffles, p. 173.153. J. Bastin, ‘Sir Stamford Raffles’s and John Crawfurd’s Ideas of Colonizing the

Malay Archipelago’, Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society,XXVI, 1 (1953), pp. 81–85, esp. pp. 82–83.

154. Bastin, Native Policies, p. 32.155. Ibid., pp. 23–25, 44.156. T. S. Raffles, Substance of a Minute . . . on the Introduction of an Improved System

of Internal Management and the Establishment of a Land Rental of the Island ofJava (London, 1814), p. 18.

157. Bastin, Native Policies, p. 33.158. On Raffle’s romantic notions of Javanese past see: Quilty, Textual Empires,

pp. 63–70.


224 Notes

159. See for example: BL, APAC, MSS EUR/Mack/Private/21, Observations on theNature and Resources of the Territories Under the Authority of the Sultan ofMataram . . . by John Crawfurd, 1812; BL, APAC, MSS EUR/Mack/Private/35,Report of the President, dated 11 August 1812, J. Mackenzie to S. Raffles;Raffles, Substance of a Minute, pp. 98–115.

160. BL, APAC, MSS EUR/Mack/Private/24, Summary of a Report on the State ofJava by Mess Knops & van Pabst, pp. 85–87.

161. BL, APAC, MSS EUR/Mack/Private/35/6, F. J. Rothenbuhler to LieutenantColonel Mackenzie, dated 30 May 1812.

162. J. Bastin, Raffles’ Ideas on the Land Rent System in Java and the Mackenzie LandTenure Commission (Verhandelingen van het koninklijk instituut voor Taal-,Land-, en Volkenkunde, S-Gravenhage, 1954), Vol. XIV, pp. 30–33.

163. Crawfurd, History of Indian Archipelago, Vol. III, pp. 170, 178.164. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 136.165. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 73.166. On this change, see: Bastin, Native Policies, p. 35.167. See for example: Raffles, Substance of a Minute, pp. 34–35.168. M. Kuitenbrouwer, ‘Aristocracies Under Colonial Rule: North India and

Java’, in C. A. Bayly and D. H. A. Kolff (eds.), Two Colonial Empires(Dordrecht et al., 1986), pp. 75–94; esp. p. 84; Bastin, Native Policies,pp. 52–58.

169. M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200 (3rd edn.,Basingstoke, 2001), pp. 148–149. On the ambivalence between Raffles’sideas about the Chinese and their continuing influence and position onJava see: L. E. Williams, ‘Indonesia’s Chinese Educate Raffles’, Indonesie, 9,4 (1956), pp. 369–385, esp. pp. 375–379. However, it is difficult to con-clude that this was the fundamental cause of a change in Raffles’s attitudeto the Chinese. See on this critique of Williams’s article also: J. Bastin,‘Raffles and the Chinese of Indonesia and Singapore’, Indonesie, 10 (1957),pp. 259–261.

170. Bastin, Native Policies, p. 57.171. Granroth, ‘European Knowledge of Southeast Asia’, pp. 246–251.172. N. Tarling, British Policy in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago, 1824–1871

(Oxford, 1969), pp. 9–18.173. J. C. Jackson, Planters and Speculators. Chinese and European Agricultural

Enterprise in Malaya, 1786–1921 (Singapore, 1968), pp. 1–22.174. See for example: BL, APAC, IOR, Home Miscellaneous, H/669, from

D. Maingy to R. Fullerton, dated 23 April 1826.175. See on Raffles’s different attitude to the Chinese in Singapore also the brief

discussion by Bastin: Bastin, ‘Raffles and Chinese’.176. BL, APAC, Raffles Collection, MSS/EUR/D/199, Considerations on the Com-

merce and Policy in the Indian Archipelago.177. Raffles, History of Java, Vol. I, p. 204.178. Crawfurd, History of Indian Archipelago, Vol. III, p. 186.179. Raffles, History of Java, Vol. I, pp. 226–228.180. Trocki, Opium and Empire, p. 16; Jackson, Planters and Speculators. Chinese

and European Agricultural Enterprise in Malaya, 1786–1921, p. 3; Y. Ching-Hwang, ‘Early Chinese Clan Organization in Singapore and Malaya, 1819–1900’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, XII, 1 (1981), pp. 62–92.


Notes 225

181. D. Hume (ed.), ‘Of National Characters’, Essays Moral, Political and Literary(Oxford, 1963), pp. 123, 202–221.

182. Cranmer-Byng, Journal, pp. 221–230.183. C. M. Turnbull, A History of Singapore 1819–1988 (2nd edn., Singapore et al.,

1989), pp. 17–21.184. On the different groups of Chinese who migrated to Singapore in the early

days see: Wang, China, pp. 167–171. Wang notices, that most of themcame from other parts of the Southeast Asia, a fact the British only partlyacknowledged.

185. Wurtzburg, Raffles, pp. 609–611, see also Crawfurd on this: Crawfurd,History of Indian Archipelago, Vol. I, p. 137.

186. Freedman, Chinese Society, p. 94.187. Turnbull, History of Singapore, p. 22.188. T. S. Raffles, ‘Regulation, No. IV of 1823. A Regulation Prohibiting Gaming-

Houses and Cockpits, and for Suppressing the Vice of Gaming at Singapore’.Singapore. Local Laws and Institutions, 1823 (London, 1824), pp. 10–12.

189. Turnbull, History of Singapore, p. 33. See also on the relation of English lawand Chinese custom law: Freedman, Chinese Society, pp. 94–95.

190. Canton Register, No. 28, dated 19 June 1828, p. 112.191. Turnbull, History of Singapore, p. 36; Freedman, Chinese Society, p. 95.192. Trocki, Opium and Empire, pp. 11–28.193. Trocki is thus wrong to assume that ‘The European literature on secret soci-

eties began with T. J. Newbold’s article in The Journal of the Royal AsiaticSociety in 1841.’ Ibid., p. 20; K. Bolton and H. Christopher (eds.), SelectedWritings (Western Accounts of the History, Sociology and Linguistics ofChinese Secret Societies, 6 vols., London, New York, 2000), Vol. I, p. xiv.

194. W. Milne, Some Account of a Secret Association in China Entitled: The TriadSociety (London, 1825), pp. 241–248.

195. Ibid., p. 241.196. Patullo to Anderson, ‘Report on the Hoeys’ (1829), SSR, X 5, p. 173, quoted

in: Trocki, Opium and Empire, p. 23.197. See on this Milne: Milne, First Ten Years, pp. 137–170; Harrison, Waiting for

China, pp. 11–14, 20; W. H. Medhurst, A Dictionary of the Hok-Keen Dialectof the Chinese Language (Macao, 1832) pp. v–vi.

198. This pattern would stay the same for his successors as Missionaries toPenang, Java, Malacca and Singapore: Missionary Chronicle, April 1820,pp. 170–171.

199. Transaction of the London Missionary Society, Vol. IV, 1818, p. 256.200. See for example: Missionary Chronicle, June 1820, p. 307.201. See also: Harrison, Waiting for China, p. 24, on the importance attached to

teach at local schools in the vernacular see: Porter, Religion Versus Empire,pp. 105–106.

202. Transactions of the London Missionary Society, 1818, p. 450.203. Harrison, Waiting for China, pp. 134–135.204. Since this work deals with ideas on the Chinese, the question of the

Malayan population and the missionary efforts directed towards them willnot specifically be dealt with.

205. Laird, Missionaries, pp. 5–11.206. Ibid., pp. 67–68.


226 Notes

207. S. Sivasundaram, Nature and the Godly Empire. Science and Evangelical Missionin the Pacific, 1795–1850 (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 66–71; Laird, Missionaries,pp. 68–71.

208. SOAS, CWM, South China. Incoming Correspondence, Box 2, 1818–1829,R. Morrison to A. Hankey, dated 14 November 1822.

209. Missionary Chronicle, March, 1828, p. 118; Harrison, Waiting for China,p. 139.

210. For a later period in Singapore see for this argument: Missionary Chronicle,February 1828, p. 74. R. Morrison, Dialogues and Detached Sentences in theChinese Language; with a Free and Verbal Translation in English (Macao, 1816),pp. 114–115.

211. Indo-Chinese Gleaner, Vol. XI , January 1820, pp. 265–270.212. The Gentleman’s Magazine, May 1833, p. 388.213. Missionary Chronicle, August 1828, p. 364.214. On the importance of a classical Chinese education for the communities of

overseas Chinese see: Wang, Chinese Overseas, pp. 81–82.215. Indo-Chinese Gleaner, Vol. XIII, July, 1820, p. 377.216. On the adoption of the Chinese school system in the missionary schools,

see: Rawski, ‘Elementary Education’, esp. pp. 135–140. She states the neces-sity to include the Chinese curriculum into missionary schools, especiallyat the beginning of the missionary schools, whereby she concentrates in herstudy on the time after 1840 and on the Chinese mainland, not the begin-nings in the Malayan Strait. On the general ambivalence of missionaryeducation in the context of empire see a.o.: Porter, Religion Versus Empire,pp. 317–320.

217. On the appropriation of missionary education by the local population inother areas see also for example: Sivasundaram, Nature, pp. 59–64.

218. Evangelical Magazine, June 1829, p. 263.219. Missionary Chronicle, January 1821, p. 41.220. Milne, First Ten Years, p. 138.221. Missionary Chronicle, January 1821, p. 43.222. Ibid. August 1824, p. 369. See on Gosport also: Sivasundaram, Nature,

pp. 71–74.223. Missionary Chronicle, January 1821, p. 43.224. Harrison, Waiting for China, pp. 151–154.225. See for example: SOAS, CWM, South China. Incoming Correspondence,

Box 2, 1818–1829, R. Morrison to LMS Headquarter, dated 14 November1820; BL, APAC, CFR, IOR/G/12/273, R. Morrison to Select Committee,dated 18 March 1822. See also: Ibid., pp. 46–53.

226. Harrison, Waiting for China, pp. 46–53.227. Ibid., p. 2.228. SOAS, CWM, South China. Incoming Correspondence, Box 1, 1803–1817,

R. Morrison to BFBS, dated 27 January, 1814.229. SOAS, CWM, South China. Incoming Correspondence, Box 2, 1818–1829,

R. Morrison to G. Burder, dated 9 March 1819; also: Missionary Chronicle,April 1820, p. 169.

230. Anglo-Chinese College, at Malacca. General Plan of the Anglo-Chinese College,Forming at Malacca (Malacca, 1818), p. 6. For the continuing impor-tance of Indian language teaching in India as well as the importance of


Notes 227

translations or writings in ‘native’ languages in the Indian context see:Dodson, ‘Translating Science’, esp. pp. 819–832.

231. Anglo-Chinese College, at Malacca, p. 7.232. See also: Harrison, Waiting for China, p. 152.233. R. A. Bickers, ‘Medhurst, Walter Henry (1796–1857)’, in H. C. G. Matthew

and B. Harrison (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford,2004), Vol. 37, pp. 686–687.

234. Medhurst, Hok-Keen Dialect.235. Ibid., pp. v–vi.236. Ibid., p. ix.237. Girardot, Victorian Translation, pp. 36–42.

5 Asian Networks and the British Isles

1. Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stanford Raffles, FRSb,Particularly in the Government of Java 1811–16, and of Bencoolen and Its Depen-dencies 1817–1824, with Details of the Commerce and Resources of the EasternArchipelago and Selections from His Correspondence, By His Widow (1829),pp. 568–574, 584–600.

2. Drayton, Nature’s Government, p. 171.3. See for example: Aarsleff, Study of Language, pp. 129–134; Cannon, Orien-

tal Jones; Said, Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient, pp. 123–150;S. Pollock, ‘Deep Orientalism? Notes on Sanskrit and Power Beyond theRaj’, in C. Breckenridge and P. van der Veer (eds.), Orientalism and thePostcolonial Predicament (Philadelphia, 1994), pp. 76–134.

4. See however: H. Walravens, Aleksej Agafonov: ein unbekannter russischerOstasienwissenschaftler des 18. Jahrhunderts: eine Biobibliographie (Hamburg,1982); H. Walravens, Zur Geschichte der Ostasienwissenschaften in Europa.Abel Rémusat (1788–1832) und das Umfeld Julius Klaproths (1783–1835)(Wiesbaden, 1999); H. Walravens, Julius Klaproth (1783–1835) Leben undWerk (Wiesbaden, 1999); P. Demieville, ‘Apercu historique’, Acta Asiatica,11 (1966), pp. 56–110; V.-V. Barthold, La découverte de l’Asie. Histoire del’Orientalisme en Europe et en Russie (Paris, 1947), pp. 150–176; H. Franke,Sinology at German Universities (Wiesbaden, 1968); Stifler, ‘Language Stu-dents’; Barrett, Singular Listlessness.

5. Morrison, Memoirs of Robert Morrison, Vol. I, p. 1.6. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 251–281.7. These different approaches are thus already evident at the beginning of the

19th century, while Girardot dates them to the second half of the century:Girardot, Victorian Translation, pp. 524–526.

8. I use the term ‘Sinology’ to describe the beginning of a specialised study ofChina and the Chinese language in Europe which started to supplant theJesuit scholarship on China by advocating new standards for the produc-tion of knowledge and slowly establishing ‘China studies’ as an academicfield. The term itself seems only to have come into use later in the 19thcentury: see: H. Franke, ‘In Search of China: Some General Remarks onthe History of European Sinology’, Europe Studies China. Papers from anInternational Conference on the History of European Sinology (London, 1995),pp. 11–26, esp. p. 12.


228 Notes

9. On Fort William see: Kopf, British Orientalism, pp. 71–74; S. K. Das, Sahibsand Munshis: An Account of the College of Fort William (Calcutta, 1978);B. B. Misra, The Central Administration of the East India Company, 1773–1834(Manchester, 1959), pp. 386–393. On Haileybury see Ibid., pp. 297–402.

10. BL, APAC, CFR, Secret Consultation, IOR/G/12/271, dated 17 February1817.

11. Ibid.12. SOAS, CWM, South China. Incoming Correspondence, Box 1, Morrison,

1803–1817, R. Morrison to Headquarters, dated 5 July 1815.13. Missionary Chronicle, January 1826, p. 41.14. Ibid., January 1826, p. 41.15. SOAS, CWM, Home. Incoming Correspondence, Box 4, 1822–1826,

R. Morrison to Headquarters, dated 8 December 1825.16. After Morrison’s death, George Staunton gave it to the University College,

London, as an incentive for the establishment of a Chair in Chinese studiesin 1837. Today, it forms part of the collection of the SOAS. See: Barrett,Singular Listlessness, pp. 68–69.

17. Anonym, China: A Dialogue, for the Use of Schools Being Ten Conversations,Between a Father and His Two Children, Concerning the History and PresentState of That Country, by an Anglo-Chinese (London, 1824), pp. 118–119.

18. Demieville, ‘Apercu historique’, pp. 78–79.19. On the beginning of Abel Rémusat’s study of Chinese see Walravens,

Geschichte der Ostasienwissenschaften, p. 14.20. Barthold, La décourverte de l’Asie, p. 305.21. See Walravens, Geschichte der Ostasienwissenschaften on Julius Klaproth and

the circle of German scholars in Paris at the time, esp. p. 177. On the estab-lishment of a chair for Chinese and Armenian in 1833, see Walravens, JuliusKlaproth, p. 8.

22. Walravens, Julius Klaproth, pp. 6, 14–21.23. Barrow, Travels, p. 615.24. J. Rousseau and D. Thouard, Lettre édifiantes et curieuses sur la langue chinoise.

Un débat philosophico-grammatical entre Wilhelm von Humboldt et Jean-PierreAbel-Rémusat (1821–1831) (Villeneuve-d’Ascq, 1999).

25. Barrett, Singular Listlessness, pp. 68–72.26. Morrison, Memoirs of Robert Morrison, pp. 282–284, 316–317.27. SOAS, CWM, Home. Incoming Correspondence. Box 4, 1822–1826,

R. Morrison to Headquarter, dated 14 January 1824.28. Asiatic Journal, Vol. II, 1830, pp. 201–204; Vol. III, pp. 223–227.29. Ibid., Vol. III, 1830, p. 227.30. Ibid., p. 317.31. J. P. A. Rémusat, Elémens de la grammaire chinoise, ou Principes généraux du

kou-wen ou style antique, et du kouan-hoa c’est à dire, de la langue communegénéralement ustiée dans l’Empire chinois (Paris, 1822), p. xviii.

32. Asiatic Journal, Vol. VIII, 1832, p. 96.33. Demieville, ‘Apercu historique’, p. 83.34. This interest becomes especially evident in his discussion with Humboldt

about the Chinese language: Joseph, ‘Consequenz’, p. 93–104.35. Rémusat, Elémens de la grammaire chinoise, p. xx.36. Joseph, ‘Consequenz’, pp. 102, 118.37. Rémusat, Elémens de la grammaire chinoise, p. xx.


Notes 229

38. Davis, Chinese Novels, pp. 9–15. See also on Abel-Rémusat: Asiatic Journal,Vol. VIII, 1832, pp. 294–295.

39. H. T. Colebrooke, ‘A Discourse Read at a Meeting of the Asiatic Society ofGreat Britain and Ireland, on 15th of March 1823’, Transactions of the RoyalAsiatic Society, 1 (1823), pp. xvii–xxiii, esp. p. xxi.

40. Missionary Chronicle, August 1824, p. 371.41. For the later 19th century see also: Girardot, Victorian Translation, pp. 2–5.42. Colebrooke, ‘Discourse’, p. xviii.43. See for example the list of donation for the Royal Asiatic Society: Transac-

tions of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. I, 1827, pp. 600–640.44. K. P. Murti, India. The Seductive and Seduced ‘Other’ of German Orientalism

(Westport, London, 2001), p. 4.45. Jones, ‘Seventh Discourse’, pp. 140–147.46. J. F. Davis, ‘Memoir Concerning the Chinese’, Transactions of the Royal

Asiatic Society, 1, May (1827), pp. 1–19, esp. pp. 1–3.47. Asiatic Journal, Vol. VII, 1832, pp. 31–33.48. Ibid., p. 41.49. Davis, ‘Memoir’, pp. 1–3.50. See for example: Asiatic Journal, Vol. 9, 1832, pp. 302–316. See also: Barrett,

‘Chinese Religion’, pp. 516–519.51. Asiatic Journal, Vol. 5, 1831, p. 71.52. Ibid., Vol. 6, 1831, pp. 260–266.53. See for example: Ibid., Vol. IX, 1832, pp. 302–316.54. R. Wheeler, The Complexion of Race. Categories of Difference in Eighteenth-

Century British Culture (New Cultural Studies Series, Philadelphia, 2000),pp. 14–32, esp. p. 28; W. Demel, Wie die Chinesen gelb wurden. EinBeitrag zur Frühgeschichte der Rassentheorie (Kleine Beiträge zur europäischenÜberseegeschichte, Bamberg, 1993), pp. 16–24; N. Hudson, ‘From “Nation”to “Race”. The Origin of Racial Classification in Eighteenth-CenturyThought’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 29, 3 (1996), pp. 247–265, esp. p. 256.

55. N. Stepan, The Idea of Race in Science: Great Britain 1800–1960 (London,1982), pp. 9–15. On the emergence of the skull as a focus point in this studyof human variety and the context of the natural history of the late 18th andearly 19th century see also: B. Dietz and T. Nutz, ‘Naturgeschichte des Men-schen als Wissensformation des späten 18. Jahrhunderts. Orte, Objekte,Verfahren’, Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung, 32, 1 (2005), pp. 45–70, esp.pp. 51–61.

56. Demel, Rassentheorie.57. Ibid., p. 20.58. Ibid., pp. 27–30.59. Barrow, Travels, p. 184.60. Ibid., p. 184.61. Ibid., pp. 48–49.62. See on the idea of the possibilities for foreign people to develop, a.o.

Wheeler, Race, esp. pp. 289–290.63. J. C. Prichard, Researches into the Physical History of Mankind (2nd edn., 2

vols., London, 1826), Vol. II, pp. 320–323.64. See: T. Bendyshe (ed.), The Anthropological Treatises of Johann Friedrich Blu-

menbach, Late Professor at Göttingen and Court Physician to the King of GreatBritain. With Memoirs of Him by Marx and Flourens, and an Account of His


230 Notes

Anthropological Museum by Professor R. Wagner, and the Inaugural Dissertationof John Hunter, M.D. on the Varieties of Man (London, 1865), pp. 264–270.

65. W. Lawrence, Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of Man(London, 1819), pp. 530, 557.

66. Ibid., p. 483. See also: p. 315 on the association of the Chinese to the Mon-golian race and p. 290 as well as on the idea of the yellow skin colour ofthe Mongolian race.

67. See: Times, 13 July 1824, p. 2; Times, 9 April 1827, p. 1; Times, 11 April1831, p. 2.

68. Marshall and Williams, Map of Mankind, pp. 85, 91–94, 175–176.69. Barrow, Travels, pp. 3–4; See on the categories for placing a nation on the

scale of civilisations: H. M. Höpfl, ‘From Savage to Scotsman. ConjecturalHistory in the Scottish Enlightenment’, The Journal of British Studies, XVII,2 (1978), pp. 19–41, esp. p. 20.

70. Edinburgh Review, No. 32, August 1810, pp. 477–478; The Canton registermainly addressed the question of the Chinese civilisation in relation to itsattitude towards trade. One commentator even complained about the lackof a comparative discussion of the rank of Chinese civilisation in Canton.See: Canton Register, No. 37, 18 October 1828.

71. E. Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Dublin,1788), Vol. II, p. 3; G. T. Staunton, Ta Tsing Leu Lee: Being the Fundamen-tal Laws and a Selection from the Supplementary Statutes, of the Penal Code ofChina (1810), p. xv.

72. Staunton, Penal Code, pp. xvii–xix, xxiv–xxv.73. Asiatic Journal, Vol. VI, 1831, pp. 101, 140.74. Staunton, Penal Code, p. xi; Edinburgh Review, No. 32, August 1810, pp. 481–

489.75. J. Majeed, Ungoverned Imaginings. James Mill’s The History of India and

Orientalism (Oxford, 1992), p. 125.76. Ibid., pp. 16–19, 22.77. Asiatic Journal, Vol. VI, 1832, p. 141.78. On the theory of the scale of civilisation and Mill’s History of British India

see: L. Zastoupil, John Stuart Mill and India (Stanford, 1994), pp. 12–13.79. See also: Zhang, ‘British Views’, p. 127.80. J. Mill, The History of British India (H. H. Wilson, 5th edn., 10 vols., London,

1858), Vol. II, pp. 154–155. See also on Mill’s ideas about China: Zhang,‘British Views’, pp. 128–130, 226–227; Jones, Image of China, p. 67.

81. Davis, ‘Memoir’, pp. 16–17.82. Milne, First Ten Years, pp. 45–49.83. Evangelical Magazine, November 1824, p. 493.84. SOAS, CWM, South China. Incoming Correspondence, Box 1, Morrison,

1803–1817, R. Morrison to Headquarters, dated 1 May 1816, and dated 2April 1812.

85. Evangelical Magazine, 1813, p. 37.86. Ibid., July 1824, pp. 314–315; Annual Meeting of the Bible Society, May 1814.87. Transactions of the London Missionary Society, Vol. III, London, 1813, p. 271.88. Evangelical Magazine, July 1825, pp. 273–276; August 1825, pp. 322–325;

September 1825, pp. 365–369; October 1825, pp. 410–412; November 1825,pp. 455–457; December 1825, pp. 501–504.


Notes 231

89. Anonym, A Dialogue for the Use of Schools (London, 1824), pp. 9–19.90. See for example: Ibid., pp. 72–74; on the responsibility of the British

towards them: pp. 3, 101–103.91. Ibid., pp. 23–24, 102–103.92. R. Morrison, Regard to the Affairs of Others. A Discourse, Delivered at Hoxton

Academy Chapel, February 6, 1825 (London, 1825), pp. 37–38.93. Ibid., p. 33.94. Ibid., pp. 6, 12–13.95. Ibid., p. 28.96. Ibid., p. 32.97. Petition to the house of commons from British subjects residing in China,

24 December 1830, in: Anonym, The Foreign Trade of China, pp. 95–104.98. See a summary in: P. Harling, The Waning of ‘Old Corruption’: The Politics

of Economical Reform in Britain, 1779–1846 (Oxford, 1996), pp. 5–6; M. J.Turner, The Age of Unease. Government and Reform in Britain, 1782–1832(Stroud, 2000), pp. 250–255, 270; P. Mandler, Aristocratic Government in theAge of Reform. Whigs and Liberals, 1830–1852 (Oxford, 1990). See for anopposite view: J. Phillips and C. Wetherell, ‘The Great Reform Act of 1832and the Political Modernization of England’, American Historical Review,100, 2 (1995), pp. 411–436. They show that the Great Reform Act indeedcan be interpreted as the beginning of consistent partisanship.

99. Hilton, Age of Atonement; A. M. C. Waterman, Political Economy and ChristianTheology Since the Enlightenment (New York, 2004), pp. 88–162.

100. B. Semmel, The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy, theEmpire of Free Trade and Imperialism, 1750–1850 (Cambridge, 1970).

101. A. Gambles, Protection and Politics. Conservative Economic Discourse, 1815–1852 (Suffolk, Rochester, 1999).

102. Greenberg, British Trade, pp. 156–165.103. Bowen, Business of Empire, pp. 256–357.104. B. Hilton, Corn, Cash, Commerce. The Economic Policies of the Tory Govern-

ments 1815–1830 (Oxford, 1977), pp. 76–77.105. M. J. Turner, ‘Before the Manchester School: Economic Theory in Early

Nineteenth-Century Manchester’, History, 79, 256 (1994), pp. 216–242, esp.pp. 218–224; A. Redford, Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade, 1794–1858(reprint 1973 edn., Manchester, 1934), pp. 108–118.

106. D. Eyles, ‘The Abolition of the East India Company’s Monopoly, 1833Unpubl. PhD Thesis’ (University of Edinburgh, 1955), p. 103

107. Philips, The East India Company, 1784–1834, pp. 276–298; Tsao, ‘Represent-ing China’, p. 58; Eyles, ‘Abolition’, pp. 304–305.

108. Gambles, Protection and Politics, pp. 188–189.109. See also: B. Gordon, Economic Doctrine and Troy Liberalism 1824–1830

(London, Basingstoke, 1979), pp. 67–69; K. Wilson, Sense of the People:Politics, Culture and Imperialism in England, 1715–1785 (Cambridge, 1995),p. 277.

110. Philips, The East India Company, 1784–1834, p. 289.111. Eyles, ‘Abolition’, p. 173.112. On ‘Old Corruption’ see: Harling, The Waning of ‘Old Corruption’: The Politics

of Economical Reform in Britain, 1779–1846; Eyles, ‘Abolition’, p. 184.113. Anonym, The Foreign Trade of China, p. 15.


232 Notes

114. Edinburgh Review, No. CIV, January 1831, pp. 292–295; Anonym, ChineseMonopoly Examined (London, 1830), pp. 27–46.

115. Anonym, The Foreign Trade of China, pp. 12–13.116. Ibid., pp. 13–16.117. Observations on the Influence of the East India Company’s Monopoly on

the Price and Supply of Tea; and on the Commerce with India, China, etc.Reprinted, . . . , with Corrections and Amendments, from the Edinburgh Review,No. CIV (London, 1831), p. 15.

118. Asiatic Journal, Vol. XIII, 1834, p. 101. See also: Tsao, ‘RepresentingChina’, pp. 41–50; Westminster Review, Vol. XX, No. 39, January 1834,pp. 27–37.

119. Observations, p. 14.120. Ibid., p. 31.121. Ibid.122. This work follows the general usage of the term ‘Tory’ before 1830 and the

term ‘Conservative’ for the 1830s and later; see also: Gambles, Protectionand Politics, p. 6.

123. Ibid., pp. 2–22, 161.124. Fisher, for example was a writer in the EIC house, Montogomery Martin

proprietor of the EIC.125. The Gentleman’s Magazine, April 1833, p. 291.126. SOAS, CWM, China. Personal. Box 3, R. Morrison to T. Fisher, dated 10

October 1833.127. M. Martin, The Past and Present State of the Tea Trade of England, and of the

Continents of Europe and America, and a Comparison Between the Consumption,Price of, and Revenue Derived from, Tea, Coffee, Sugar, Wine, Tobacco, Spirits,etc. (London, 1832), pp. 10–11. A similar attempt to disqualify the petition-ers and other public opponents of the EIC: Asiatic Journal, Vol. II, 1830,pp. 187–191.

128. Martin, Past and Present State, pp. 4–5.129. Ibid., pp. 6–10. On a similar view see: The Gentleman’s Magazine, February

1834, p. 124.130. H. Ellis, Series of Letters on the East India Question, Addressed to the Members

of the Two Houses of Parliament, Letter 1 (2nd edn., London, 1830), p. 29. Ondevelopment towards positive law of international relations see: Nussbaum,Law of Nations, pp. 164–185.

131. Ellis, Series of Letters on the East India Question, p. 35.132. The Gentleman’s Magazine, February 1834, pp. 126–129.133. Martin, Past and Present State, pp. 5–11.134. The Gentleman’s Magazine, February 1834, p. 123.135. Ibid., May 1833, p. 389.136. Ibid., April 1833, p. 296; May 1833, p. 392. See also: Asiatic Journal, Vol. I,

New series, 1830, p. 108.137. Similarly, the difference of Indian culture was also stated as a reason in sup-

port for the continuing EIC administration of India. See: W. S. O’Brien,Considerations Relative to the Renewal of the East-India Company’s Charter(London, 1830), pp. 25–30.

138. Ellis, Series of Letters on the East India Question, p. 41.139. Martin, Past and Present State, pp. 128–129.


Notes 233

140. Similar views were frequently expressed, see for example: Asiatic Jour-nal, Vol. XXVII, January 1829, pp. 2–3; Vol. XXVIII, December 1829,pp. 678–685.

141. Gambles, Protection and Politics, pp. 159–161.142. Ellis, Series of Letters on the East India Question, pp. 22, 55; Martin, Past and

Present State, p. 1; Asiatic Journal, July 1829, p. 57.143. See for example: Martin, Past and Present State, p. 11.144. The Gentleman’s Magazine, 1 February 1834, pp. 126–128; Martin, Past and

Present State, p. 203.145. Philips, The East India Company, 1784–1834, p. 287.146. Report from Committees: Seven Volumes; East India Company’s Affairs,

session 5.2–23.7. 1830, Vol. V, No. 644: First Report from The SelectCommittee on the Affairs of THE EAST INDIA COMPANY (China Trade).

147. Ibid., p. iv.148. Ibid., Vol. XX, 20 August 1833, sp. 790; Vol. XIX, 5 July 1833, sp. 210;

Eyles, ‘Abolition’, p. 260. See also: Melancon, Britain’s China Policy,pp. 17–22.

149. Ibid., pp. 35–37.150. Eyles, ‘Abolition’, pp. 294–295.151. Philips, The East India Company, 1784–1834, p. 295.152. Act to Regulate the Trade to China and India, 28 August 1833.153. Melancon, Britain’s China Policy, p. 58.154. J. F. Davis, The Chinese: A General Description of the Empire of China and Its

Inhabitants (2 vols., London, 1836), Vol. 1, p. 2; passim.155. Barrett, Singular Listlessness, pp. 68–72.156. PRO, Manuscript, FO 97/96 Copy of Communicated by Sir Alex Johnston

to the Duke of Wellington, 3 March 1835.157. W. H. Medhurst, China: Its State and Prospects, with Special Reference to the

Spread of the Gospel (London, 1838), pp. 220–545.158. C. Gützlaff, China Opened; or, A display of the Topography, History, Customs,

Manners, Arts, Manufactures, Commerce, Literature, Religion, Jurisprudence, etc.of the Chinese Empire (London, 1838), pp. iii–iv; C. Gützlaff, A Sketch ofChinese History, Ancient and Modern; Comprising a Retrospect of the ForeignIntercourse and Trade with China. Illustrated by a New and Correct Map of theEmpire (London, 1834).

159. Gützlaff, Three Voyages, pp. 103–158.160. Ibid., see voyages two and three, pp. 159–321.161. See Greenberg, British Trade, pp. 196–197.162. Times, 2 August, 1839, p. 3, Issue 17110, col. A.163. Melancon, Britain’s China Policy, pp. 83–130.164. Greenberg, British Trade, p. 195.165. J. F. Murray, The Chinese and the Ministry. An Inquiry into the Origin and

Progress of Our Present Difficulties with China and into the Expediency, Justice,and Necessity of the War (London, 1840), pp. 11–23; Anonym, Some Pros andCons of the Opium Question with a Few Suggestions Regarding British Claims onChina (London, 1840).

166. Melancon, Britain’s China Policy, pp. 115–130.167. H. Lindsay, Is the War with China a Just One? (London, 1840), pp. 6–7,

38–40; Anonym, The Rupture with China and Its Causes; Including the


234 Notes

Opium Question, and Other Important Details: In a Letter to Lord ViscountPalmerston . . . By a Resident in China (London, 1840), p. 43.

168. A. Graham, The Right, Obligation, & Interest of the Government of Great Britainto Require Redress from the Government of China, for the Late Forced Surren-der of British-Owned Opium at Canton (Glasgow, Edinburgh, London, 1840),pp. 3–5, 9–19; Anonym, Pros and Cons, pp. 18–20; S. Warren, The OpiumQuestion (London, 1840), p. 76.

169. Barrow, Travels, pp. 405–412; Warren, The Opium Question, p. 107.170. Anonym, Pros and Cons, pp. 29–43; Warren, The Opium Question,

pp. 108–113.171. G. T. Staunton, Corrected Report of the Speech of Sir George Staunton on Sir

James Graham’s Motion on the China Trade in the House of Commons, April 7,1840 (London, 1840), pp. 14–15.

172. Medhurst, China, pp. 56–57, 83–85.173. A. S. Thelwall, The Iniquities of the Opium Trade with China; Being a Devel-

opment of the Main Causes Which Exclude the Merchants of Great Britain fromthe Advantages of an Unrestricted Commercial Intercourse with That Vast Empire(London, 1839), pp. 1–21.

174. Ibid., pp. 124, 173–178; Medhurst, China, pp. 90–92.175. Medhurst, China, p. 94.176. Ibid., pp. 83–87; Asiatic Journal, The Opium Trade, Vol. XXX, New Series,

September–December 1839, p. 228.177. Medhurst, China, pp. 85–88.178. T. Brook and B. T. Wakabayashi, ‘Introduction: Opium’s History in China’,

in T. Brook and B. T. Wakabayashi (eds.), Opium Regimes. China, Britain, andJapan, 1839–1952 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2000), pp. 1–30, esp. p. 8.

179. R. Philip, Peace with China! Or, the Crisis or Christianity in Central Asia: A Let-ter to the Right Honourable T.B. Macaulay, Secretary at War (London, 1840); onthe ambivalent relationship between the missionaries and the opium tradesee also Rubinstein’s analysis of the American and British publications inCanton: Rubinstein, ‘Wars They Wanted’, esp. pp. 279–282.

180. Anonym, Rupture with China, p. 33; Warren, The Opium Question, pp. 83–86;Anonym, Rupture with China, pp. 4–8.

181. Staunton, Corrected Report, pp. 9–11.182. Murray, The Chinese, pp. 7–11; Asiatic Journal, China, 1840, Vol. XXXII, New

Series, May–August, pp. 61–66; T. H. Bullock (ed.), The Chinese Vindicated,or Another View of the Opium Question; Being in Reply to a Pamphlet by SamuelWarren . . . (London 1840), esp. p. 2; pp. 88–94.

183. Asiatic Journal, China, 1840, Vol. XXXII, New Series, May–August, p. 60.184. Ibid., p. 64.185. Melancon, Britain’s China Policy, pp. 83–130.

6 Epilogue

1. Melancon, Britain’s China Policy, pp. 83–130.2. PRO, CO 129/1, Article XI, Treaty between Her Majesty and the Emperor of

China, Signed, in the English and Chinese Language, at Nanking, 29 August1842.


Notes 235

3. G. B. Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841–1962. A Constitu-tional History (Hong Kong, 1964), pp. 23, 36.

4. PRO, CO 129/3, Extract of a letter from Sir Henry Pottinger to the Impe-rial Commissioners and Viceroy, Hong Kong, 17 September 1842; PRO, CO129/3, Extract of a letter from the Imperial Commissioners and Viceroy toSir Henry Pottinger, Taokwang, 7 September 1842.

5. PRO, CO 129/3, Pottinger to Aberdeen, Hong Kong, 13 June 1843.6. Endacott, Government and People, pp. 27–38; PRO, CO 129/7, Sir John Davis

to Lord Stanley, Hong Kong, 21 October 1844; Ordinance to establishsupreme court of judicature at Hong Kong, 21 August 1844, Paragraph 3.

7. PRO, CO 129/4, John Davis to Lord Stanley, Athenaeum, London, 21 Decem-ber 1843; see also: PRO, CO 129/4/64, Memorandum upon constitutingHong Kong a Free Port, with reference more immediately to the privilegesat present enjoyed by Singapore.

8. C. Munn, ‘The Hong Kong Opium Revenue, 1845–1885’, in T. Brook andB. T. Wakabayashi (eds.), Opium Regimes. China, Britain, and Japan, 1839–1952(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2000), pp. 105–127, esp. p. 107.

9. PRO, CO 129/2, Samuel Dyer et al. to Henry Pottinger, Hong Kong, 18 August1843.

10. Girardot, Victorian Translation, p. 42.11. Harrison, Waiting for China, pp. 103–115.12. Fan, British Naturalists in Qing China. Science, Empire, and the Cultural

Encounter, pp. 61–90.

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August 20, 2009 10:58 MAC/ASIA Page-254 9780230_200463_10_ind01

Index

absolutism, enlightened, 7Adam Smith, 37, 84aesthetic discourse on China, 150age of reform, 172–3Alexander, William, 28–30, 33Altangi, Lien Chi, 22, 24American China trade, 93, 172–3Americans, 48, 76, 85, 103American War of Independence, 35Amherst embassy, 33–4, 76–81, 115,

178, 182–3Amoy, 136Anglo-Chinese college, 145, 147, 156,

169–70, 189Anglo-Dutch treaty, 125anti-slavery campaign, 169, 171Appelton, William, 7Asiatic Journal, 156, 159–60, 167, 176

Baba society, 123Balambangan, 124Banks, Joseph, 37Barrow, John, 39, 58, 75–6, 155, 163–7Batavia, 131, 141, 148bekel, 133, 135Bencoolen, 138Bengal, 4, 22, 58–60, 87, 106–14, 116,

120–1Bengal Asiatick Society, 160Bentham, Jeremy, 51, 83Bentinck, Lord Cavendish, 85, 90BFBS, 169Bhutan, 108, 109Bible

Chinese Bible, religions, Conficius,64–5, 72, 119

chronology of the, 3, 17, 19–20,161, 170

distribution of the, 70, 84, 169education, 99, 143–4translation, 60–1, 66, 69–70, 118,

148, 152Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich, 165

BMS, 119board of control, 35, 76Bogle, George, 108–12Bogue, Supplementary Treaty, 188Bombay, 86Bradshaw, 114Brighton, 27–8, 31–2, 104, 154British Empire, 6–13, 35, 101–3,

180–6, 188–92British and Foreign Bible Society, 169British and Foreign School Society,

169British honour, 101, 184, 186British imperial expansion, 1–2, 7–8,

13, 33, 105, 113, 122, 126, 131,151, 186–91

British Isles, 1–2, 152, 183British merchants, 6, 63, 88, 93, 97,

101–2British missionaries, see under

missionariesBritish navy, 47, 95, 103Britishness, 14, 57, 81–2, 90, 122British Parliament, 27, 172, 174, 177,

181, 184, 186British peasant, 129British products, 173British Residency, 116, 168British trade, 92British treasure, 26Brown, Capability, 24Buchanan, Francis, 114Buckingham, James Silk, 174Buckinghamshire, Earl of, 76Buddhism, 64, 72, 110, 162–3buddhist monarch, 148bullion, 172bullionist, 26–7Burder, Dr., 73Burma, 106, 118–19

cabinet makers, 23Calcutta, 14, 34, 118, 146

254


Index 255

Calcutta Asiatic Society, 160, 162Calcutta Journal, 174California, 164Calmucks, 165Campong, 138Canning, George, 80Canton, 12, 14, 34, 55, 92, 102

British representatives, 5, 47–8, 81,91–6, 182

Chinese authorities, 50, 81–2, 86–91Chinese language, interpreters,

57–8, 61, 63–4, 121–2, 142,153, 158

Chinese law, 51–5, 85country traders, trading houses,

82–3EIC employees, 45–6mission, 67–70Opium trade, 100–3trade, 4, 36, 46, 50, 82–3, 85, 93

Canton Register, 55, 63–4, 83–5,97, 138

Captain China, 130, 138–9, 148Carey, William, 1, 117caricaturists, 32Carlton House, 27–8Cathay, 7, 16, 187Cathcart embassy, 38Cavendish, Thomas, 125Cawthorn, James, 23Central Asia, 46, 115, 119Chambers, William, 23–5charity schools, 142Chengede, 111chief superintendent, 91, 94, 96, 187chief of trade commission, 99China Act, 91China experts, 104, 150, 178, 183China image

Canton and embassies, 37, 47, 49,70, 74, 92, 94–5, 97, 103

diaspora, 120, 128, 134, 139, 140–1Europe and Britain, 16, 17, 32, 180,

182–3, 185, 190mytical, enlightened, 17–18, 80, 98

China’s north-west expansion, 108China trade, see EIC China tradeChinese army, 116Chinese character, 87, 164

Chinese classics, 145Chinese diaspora, 5, 97, 120, 141, 188Chinese immigration, 106, 123, 127,

131–4, 137Chinese language, 57, 60Chinese law, 45, 51–5, 83, 85, 166–7Chinese Penal Code, 51, 53, 56, 138,

166, 183Chinese proprietors, 130–1Chinese religions, 3, 16, 64–5, 71–2,

75, 110–11, 119, 162Chinese school system, 143Chinese settlements, 123Chinese societies, 135Chinese students, 146Chinese tax collectors, 131Chinese traders Southeast Asia, 85–6,

90, 122, 129, 134, 136–7chinoiserie, 7–8, 16, 18, 21–34, 151,

154, 169Chippendale, Thomas, 22christian political economy, 172civilisations, scale of, 7, 14, 127,

164, 166Clapham sect, 141, 171Clive, John, 27coastal frontier, 46Coelestoterrestrial Society, see heaven

and earth societyCohn, Bernhard, 56cohong system, 4, 104Colebrook, Henry Thomas, 158College of Fort William, see Fort

WilliamCollie, David, 138colonialism, 9, 151Commissioner Lin, see Lin,

CommissionerCommutation Act, 35comparative anatomy, 161, 163–4comparative philology, 59, 151, 156,

161, 165comparative study of religions, 65Condillac, Etienne, 19Confucianism, 64, 72, 110, 162, 168Confucius, 3, 23, 64–5, 72, 110,

118–19, 122, 138, 162, 168Conservatives, 172, 177–81constitution of Britain, 180


256 Index

contact zones, 1, 11–15, 33, 186,189–92

Cooch Behar, 108Cook, James, 29, 36Cooper, Frederick, 9Coqua, 49Corn Laws, 174, 177Cornwallis, Charles, 112, 131costume of the Chinese, 29–30costumes, 164cotton, 86, 173, 179country merchants, 63, 84–6, 90–1,

93, 96–8, 102, 104, 124, 171, 173,175, 179

country trade, 47, 50, 63–4, 75, 81,83–4, 88, 124, 148, 160,171–3, 178

Court of Directors, 36, 47–8, 50, 53,76, 78, 81, 87, 89, 91, 108, 131,153, 156

Crace, John, 28Cranmer-Byng, J., 36Cranssen, Jacob William, 132Crawfurd, John, 122, 126–37, 150,

165, 175–6cruelty and injustice, 54–5Cuddalore, 124Cumberland, 23Cunningham, J. D., 120Cutts, Elmer H., 118

Daendels, Herman Willem, 131, 134Dalai Lama, 109–12, 119Dalrymple, Alexander, 120,

123–5, 173Danish, 48, 83Davis, John Francis, 58, 60, 77, 89–90,

96, 158, 161–2, 167, 183Defoe, Daniel, 7Descartes, 18–19despotism, 7, 51, 82, 167diligent workers, 137Dilkes, John, 52diplomacy, 5–6, 31, 45, 75dissenting academies, 146divine duty, 170Doris affair, 76Dravidian elements, 117drawings, ethnographic, 28–30

Du Halde, Jean-Baptiste, 183Duke Ho, 80Dundas, Henry, 35–41, 121Dutch, 48, 97, 123, 125, 131–6, 142Dyer, Sam, 144

East Asia, 118Eastern Islands, 136, 181East India, 132

Agency House, 82College, 153Company Charter Act, 143

East Indies, 132economic protectionism, 172edict against Christianity, 169Ee, 62–3Egypt, 16, 18, 20, 160EIC

bills, 172Calcutta, 34charter, 171–8China Trade, 3–6, 23–6, 35–6, 48,

75, 83, 86, see also tradeemployees, 47employees in canton, 2, 47–54,

84–5, 88–91, 104headquarters, 24, 87in India, 4–5, 34–9, 82, 107–16,

126, 177monopoly, 4, 14, 56, 75, 81–5, 91–3,

152, 172–83Select Committee, 48–52, 68,

81–5, 97Southeast Asia, 125–30, 135, 138

Eight Trigrams, 79Ellenborough, Lord, 181Elliot, Charles, 99–103Ellis, Henry, 78, 178, 180Elphinstone, John Fullarton, 61embassy, 5, 34–7, 61, 78, 118, 175English law, 51, 53Enlightenment, 16–17, 69, 75,

137, 147European imperialism, 8European scientific community,

151Evangelical Magazine, 169–70evangelicals, 66–9, 84, 142,

169–72, 177


Index 257

Evans, Lacy de, 84extraterritorial law, 52

Fa, Liang, 70Faquhar, 138Father Rodriguez, 59–60finance committee, 92Fisher, Thomas, 178–9Fitzherbert, Mary, 28Flint, James, 57, 61Fo, 111foreign office, 5–6, 95–7Fort William, 61, 90, 118, 146–7, 153Four Books of Confucius, 72, 138, 144

see also ConfuciusFrance, 67, 123, 150, 154, 157Freemasons, 140free trade, see tradeFrench, 36, 48, 75French Revolution, 6Fu-k’ang-an, 114Fukien, 97Fum, 32

Ganges, 73, 113, 161garden architecture, 22garden, Chinese, 24–5Genghis Khan, 165genre-painting, 30George III, 23, 36, 38, 61, 79George IV, 152German, 192Germany, 150Gesub Rimboché, 109Gibbon, 166Gillespie, Robert, 132Girardot, Norman J., 8, 10Goldsmith, William, 22gosein, 110gospel, 74Gosport academy, 141, 146Goulburn, Henry, 177Governor of Canton, 55Governor-General in India, 47Greece, 16, 23, 146, 160Greek, 58, 64, 118Greek grammar, 20Greenberg, Michael, 5, 92, 182Guignes, Louis Joseph, 155

Gurkha Kingdom, 112, 116Gurkhas, 106, 107, 112–14Gützlaff, Karl, 63, 84, 96–9, 148, 157,

176, 179, 183

Haileybury, 153–4Han Chinese, 117, 162Hantford College, 153Hanway, Jonas, 26–7Harris, James, 19Hastings, Warren, 27, 35, 108–10, 120heaven-and-earth societies, 139Herder, 59Hevia, James L., 37, 42, 79hieroglyphic writing, 19Himalayas, 112–16Hindi, 58, 153Hindu culture, 133Hinduism, 163histoire croisée, 9history of man, natural, 7, 17, 130Hodgson, Brian Houghton, 116–19Hogendorp, Dirk van, 131–3Hokkien dialect, 142, 148, 158Holland, 67Holland, Henry, 28Hong Kong, 58, 104, 188–9Hong Kong theological seminar, 189Hong merchants, 4, 46–9, 62–3, 84–7,

93, 100–1, 171, 179Hong system, 51, 83, 188Hoppo of Canton, 62Hottentots, 164Houses of Parliament, 181Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 156, 160

India, 82, 90–1, 101–7, 116, 151, 160,168, 175

India Act, 35Indian agency houses, 85, 125Indian law, 51Indo-European language, 60Indo-Germanic languages, 151industrious Chinese, 127–8, 134, 136,

142, 181, 183informal imperialism, 172Inglis, Robert, 181inhumanity, 54international law, 53–6, 181, 184


258 Index

interpreter, 56Chinese, 40, 57truthfulness, 39

Irschick, Eugene, 10Islam, 133Ismailov, 37, 42

Japanese pirates, 46Jardine, 5, 83–4, 92–7, 175Java, 120, 125–6, 130–6, 169Jehol, 39, 42Jesuits

China image, 6, 28, 49, 55, 64,98, 143

and Chinese religion, 64–5, 72–3as interpreter, 39–40, 57, 61–2, 167mission to China, 3, 10, 16, 39, 63–4reports, 7, 17, 26, 59, 71, 169, 183

Jiajing, 79–80Jones, William, 10, 39, 58–60, 64,

139, 160–1joss, 32Journal Asiatique, 156, 161Julien, Stanislas, 152junk trade, 123, 125, 136

Kames, Lord, 18Kathmandu, 114–16Kew, garden of, 23Kidd, Samuel, 122, 148, 156Kimber, Edward, 123Kirkpatrick, Colonel, 112–13Klaproth, Julius, 152, 155, 157–8,

161–3, 168, 178Knops, Johannes, 133Knox, Captain, 114Kol, 117kongsi, 123, 127, 137, 139–40kowtow, 37–8, 41–2, 77–80

lacquers, 3, 21Lady Hughes Affair, 36, 48, 50, 52, 55Lambert, David, 9Lancashire, 173Lancasterian system, 142–4landlords, Chinese, 135land reform, 131, 136land rent system, 133landscape garden, 24

language, 2, 17–20, 56–63, 121,137–40, 145–8, 152–67

original, 3, 19, 60universal, 3, 18–19, 26

Lassar, Joannes, 118Latin, 58Latin-French Chinese dictionary, 155Latour, Bruno, 11law of the market, 172law of nations, 51–6Lawrence, William, 165laws and customs of China, 52Layman, Captain, 128Lazzaronimen, 129legal trade, 102Legge, James, 8, 148Leibniz, Gottfried, 17letter to the Chinese Emperor, 39Leyden, John, 120–3, 141Lhasa, 109–10, 115Liberalism, Liberals, 51, 172, 177Lin, Commissioner, 99–103, 184, 186Lindsay, Hamilton, 97, 176, 179linguists, 39, 57Lintin, 84Liverpool, 173Liverpool, Lord, 177LMS, 66

Anglo-Chinese College Malacca,156, see also Anglo-ChineseCollege

Gosport academy, 141mission to China, 118, 141mission to Southeast Asia, 96–7, 141Morrison, 71, 73, 159, 169–70, see

also MorrisonLocke, John, 19London Missionary Society, see LMS

Macao, 4, 46, 75, 84, 97, 99, 103,118–19, 129, 141

Macartney embassy, 28, 34, 37, 40–3,45, 182

British self image, 191drawings (Alexander), 28–9, 33interpreters, 39–40, 76kowtow, 37, 41–2scientific expedition, 36, 43–4

Mackenzie, Colin, 88–9, 120, 122, 133


Index 259

Mackerras, C., 7Madras, 106, 124, 133, 190Malacca, 120, 125–6, 129, 132,

135–47, 154, 156, 170Malayan Archipelago, 120Malayan Strait, 142, 145Malthus, Thomas Robert, 84, 127Manchester, 173Manchu, 40, 95–8, 105, 119, 137, 139,

175, see also QingMandarin (linguistic), 121, 148, 158Mandarins (admin.), 23, 38, 44, 80,

97–8, 103, 105, 129, 176Manning, Thomas, 60, 77, 107Marco Polo, 16Marshman, Joshua, 117–21Martin, Robert Montgomery, 180Mason, George, 25, 28–31massacre of Chinese in Batavia, 131Matheson, 5, 83–4, 92–7, 175Mauritius, 188M’Culloch, 84Medhurst, William, 96, 148, 183–5Melbourne government, 101,

104, 186Mendosa, Conzalez de, 125merchants, see trademetropolis, 2, 8–9, 82, 150, 156, 173,

175, 186Middle East, 191Mill, James, 83, 85, 167Milne, William, 60, 68–74,

139–48, 169Ming, 51, 162Minto, 118, 122, 129–32missionaries, 50, 77, 103–4, 146

baptist, 117, 146British, 74–5and British expansion, 67Catholic, 40, 71, 76French, Portuguese, 36and influence on the British Isles,

168, 183–5, 189Jesuit, 3, 39, 63, see also Jesuitsprotestant, 2, 58, 60, 64–6, 68–73,

84, 122, 136, 152at Serampore, 117–18, 146in Southeast Asia, 122, 126,

139–45, 154

Missionary Chronicle, 70, 169Moira, 114–15Molony, James, 49, 153Monboddo, Lord, 19, 20moneylenders, Chinese, 135Mongolians, 109, 116–17, 165monopoly, see EICmonosyllabic language, 165Montesquieu, 166moral philosophy, 167Morrison Education Society, 99Morrison, Robert, 60–3, 68–79,

96–9, 118, 121, 141–59,169–71, 178

Morse, H. B., 6Mosambicans, 164Moseley, William, 61, 66–7Mughal empire, 31Mughal rule, 167Mughals, 40, 105, 175Munda, 117Muntinghe, H. W., 131–2Muslim Arabs, 129Mysore, battle of, 27, 120

Nan yang Chinese, 130Napier, William John, 5, 91–6,

100, 103Napoleonic Wars, 5, 66, 75, 94–5,

106, 125Nash, John, 31natural history of man, 17natural laws, 176–8nature of mankind, 190naval forces, 90Nepal, 76, 106, 107–18Nepalese war, 114–15Netherlands, 123, 125Netherlands Missionary Society, 96networks, 8, 99, 150, 168, 174, 189Neumann, Karl, 162Newar culture, 117Nieuhoff, Jan, 123north-eastern border, 107

Oceania, 117old corruption, 174opium, 4, 93, 101opium abuse, 137–40, 183–5


260 Index

opium import, 99opium merchants, 99opium prohibition, 93, 99–101opium smuggling, 81, 92, 100, 102,

184–5opium trade, 4–5, 54, 83–5, 90–3,

99–103, 176, 184–9Opium War, 1–5, 92–3, 101–5, 119,

152, 184–90oriental despotism, 32orientalism, 8, 10, 27, 151, 191origin of civilisation, 168orthodox mission in Beijing, 155Osborne, Alick, 128–9‘other’, 11–12, 23, 51, 72, 74, 132outside merchants, 86Overseas Chinese, 12, 106, 122–3, 126

Pabst, Lawick van, 133Pacific islanders, 171Palmerston, Lord, 5, 94–6, 99–102,

184–7Panarukan, 134Panchen Lama, 108–12parliament, see British ParliamentParsee, 4, 46, 86patrimonial principle, 166Pavilion, Royal, 31–3Peel, Robert, 177Penang, 120–6, 129, 132, 135–40,

144, 169Penny brothers, 22peranakan society, 123Percy, Thomas, 19–20periphery, 2, 8–13, 58–9, 99, 141,

150, 190persecutions of Christianity, 71Persian language, 58–9, 153Persian literature, 58Philippines, 124philosopher king, 35physiognomy, 163–5Pigot, Mr., 46pin, 100Pindar, Peter, 27, 44Pit, Han Tjan, 134Pitt, William, 35–7, 44Plowden, H. C., 86–8, 91, 94Plumb, Mr, 40, 76

political economy, 84, 172political philosophy, 167Poor Law, 174porcelain, 2–3, 21–6, 149Porter, David, 3, 7, 24, 26, 66Portuguese, 36, 75, 129, 141, 180Pottinger, Henry, 188–9Pratt, Mary Louise, 11Prichard, James, 164Prince Regent, 27–8, 31, 76, 104Pritchard, Earl, 6prosecution of Roman Catholics, 169protestant missionaries, see under

missionariesprovidence, 52Prussia, 83Puankequa, 48Purangir, 110

Qianlong, 27, 32, 43, 80, 106,110–12, 115

Qing, 36, see also ManchuEmpire, 27, 41, 91, 106–7, 109, see

also Chinese Empireguest ritual, ceremony, 42, 79, see

also kowtowlegal system, penal code, 51–3, 138trade restrictions, 1, 4, 46

Quaker, 142Qua, Pu, 30Quesnay, Francois, 3

race, 163–4racial characteristics, 161, 164–5Raffles, Thomas, 121–2, 125–6, 128,

131–43, 150, 154Raja of Segwin, 114Reform Act, 177Reform Bill, 174, 181Rémusat, Abel, 119, 152, 154–8, 168representative, see under CantonRepton, Humphry, 31rights of women, 167rites controversy, 17, see also QingRoberts, William, 69Robinson, George Best, 96,

99–100, 103Rothenbuhler, Frederick Jacob, 133–4Royal Asiatic Society, 151, 159–60, 174


Index 261

royal charter of justice, 138Royal Pavilion, 28, 32–3, 104Russia

activities in Asia, 36–8, 116,119, 181

Catharina II, 38–9embassy to China, 37, 42, 78, 155Peter the Great, 37sinology, 155trade connections, 116

ryotwar system, 133, 135

Sacy, Silvestre de, 155Said, Edward, 10Sakhalin, 164salvation of mankind, 169Sanskrit, 39, 58–60, 118, 151, 153sati, 169, 171satire, 32Schlegel, Karl Wilhelm, 59Scott, Sir Walter, 120, 141secret societies, 139, 140Sedan chairs, 88–90Select Committee, 46, 47, 50, 52–3,

62–3, 68–9, 76–7, 81–7, 96–7,102, 153

self-image, British, 12, 32, 71, 113,142, 191

Serampore, 117–18settlers, 126Shigatse, 112shopmen, 84Sikhs, 119, 148silk, 2–3, 16, 21–2, 26silver bullion, 4, 26silver famine, 93Singapore, 120, 122, 125–6, 129,

135–43, 188–90sinology, 148, 152–5, 158sinophilia, 6, 17, 168skin colour, 163, 165skulls, 165slave revolts, 128Smith, Adam, 17, 83Socrates, 3sojourners, 126South America, 164Southeast Asia, 4, 60, 95–6, 105–6,

121–9, 140, 148, 151, 169

South Eastern Islands, 124Southey, Robert, 27South Sea Voyages, 36sovereignty, Chinese, 52, 180Spain, 123, 180Spence, Jonathan, 7spring purification party, 100stadial theory, 17, 19, 44Stanley, Brian, 66Staunton, George, 29, 39, 113Staunton, George Thomas, 39, 45, 69,

76–81, 91, 150–6, 160, 166–7,181–4

Stepan, Nancy, 163stereotypes, 30Strait magazines, 83Straits of Malacca, 138–41Straits settlement, 138–40

see also Chinese immigrationSulu Archipelago, 124Supercargoes, 4, 52superintendent, 92, 96, 98, 100–3,

182, 186Szechuan, 116

Tamerlan, 165Taoism, 64, 72, 110, 162, 168tapestrie, 23Tartar, 40–1, 59, 80, 109, 111,

175, 180Tashilhunpo, 112Tassisudon, 109Ta Tsing Leu Lee, 53tax farmers, Chinese, 135Teignmouth, 1st Baron, 154Thelwall, A. S., 184theories of mankind, 165Tibet, 13, 106–7, 109–10, 116Tibetan Buddhism, 109, 119Tientsin, 97Tiger of War, 29Tippu Sultan, 27, 39Toone, Francis, 77Tories, 172, 177trade

disruption, 57, 78, 86, 99, 103free trade, 66, 77, 83–4, 126, 132,

152, 171–8, 181, 185–6monopoly, see under EIC


262 Index

trade – continuednatural laws of, 174, 178opium trade, 54, 77, 83–5, 90–3,

99–103, 176, 184–7restrictions, 57, 173, 179, 185with Southeast Asia, 123–6tea trade, 25–7, 36, 50, 83, 91–2,

101, 108, 173, 187through Nepal, Tibet, 108, 110,

116–17see also country trade

trade commission, 99, 182Treaty of Nanjing, 104, 188Treaty of Segauli, 115triad riots, 140triad societies, 139Tse-hsu, 100Turner, Samuel, 110

Ultra-Ganges Missionary Union, 73Unitarians, 72universal grammar, 157University College London, 156university of Kazan, 155Utilitarianism, 51, 84, 167

Vattel, Emmerich de, 51Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie,

48, 131

Viceroy, 52, 84, 86, 96, 100, 182Vietnam, 106village system, 133, 135VOC, see Vereenigde Oostindische

CompagnieVoltaire, 17

Warburton, William, 19–20Wealth of nations, 17Wellesley, Marquis of, 153West Indies, 22, 129Whampoa, 86Wilberforce, William, 154Wilkins, John, 18Winterbotham, William, 44women, 90Wright, Matheson, 171

Xinjiang, 106Xuehai Tang, 104

yi, 62–3, 191Yuan, Ruan, Governor-General, 104Yuen Kih, 62

zemindari revenue system, 131Zorawar, 119

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