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BASE Biotechnol. Agron. Soc. Environ.201014(2),321-340

Cambodianpeasant’scontributiontoruraldevelopment:aperspectivefromKampongThomProvince

Jean-ChristopheDiepart

Univ.Liege-GemblouxAgro-BioTech.EconomyandruralDevelopmentUnit.PassagedesDéportés,2.B-5030Gembloux(Belgium)–GermanDevelopmentService.POBox628.PhnomPenh(Cambodia).E-mail:[email protected].

Receivedon9August2008;acceptedon4December2009.

ThepaperaimstoidentifytherationalityofpeasantcommunitiesandtheircontributiontoruraldevelopmentinKampongThomprovince.Todoso,aninterdisciplinaryanalyticalframeworkaddressesthedynamicsoflanduseandlandtenure,thestrategiesoflaborforceallocationaswellasthedeterminantsoflandandlaboragriculturalproductivitiesamongstpeasantcommunities.Itrestsondetailsfieldsurveysintwocommuneslocatedinverydistinctagro-ecologicalsettingsofKampongThomprovince.Alandusechangeanalysisbasedontime-seriesaerialphotosisconductedwithparticipatoryinventoriesofnaturalresources.Itshowsthatendogenousmanagementofforestandfisheriesresourcesgeneratesignificantincomesand,atthesametime,contributetomaintainingbiodiversity.Thepaperanalyseshowthiscontributionischallengedbythenon-peasantactorsinvolvedinmassiveStatelandprivatization.Aimingtofullemployment,peasanthouseholdsenjoyagreatflexibilityinthewaytheyallocatelaborforce,especiallyinlinewiththeageofactivelaborandthefluctuationoflaboropportunitycosts.Principallyduetoanunequallandholdingdistribution,agriculturalincomeisunfairlydistributedbutthisinequalityisactuallybalancedbytheaccesstocommon-poolresourcesofcrucialimportanceforthepoorestandbytherecoursetononfarmingactivities,whichisanimportantfactorofsocio-economicdifferentiationamongsthouseholds.Themaineconomicindicatorsofriceproductionconfirmthatpeasanthouseholdsalwaystrytomaximizetheirincomeinstepwiththeproductionfactortheyhaveinrelativelylessamount.Alandmarketsimulationstressesthat,contrarilytotheoreticalassumptions,landaccessthroughsale(andpurchase)doesnotresultinafairerlanddistribution.Nevertheless,landleasesamongstpeasanthouseholdsseemmorepromisingtoensureequitableaccesstolandastheyareembeddedincollectivesecuritymechanismsactivatedbypeasantry.Thepaperarguesthatpeasantcommunitiesinthestudiedareaconstituteasolidbasisforruraldevelopmentastheyofferaverygoodarticulationbetweeneconomicefficiency,socialjusticeandenvironmentalsustainability.Finally,recommendationsareformulatedtoproperlyaddresspeasantcontributiontoruraldevelopmentinthenewnationalagrarianpolicies.Keywords. Agricultural economics and policies, decision rules, farming systems and practices, geographic informationsystemandremotesensing,landtenure,ruraldevelopment,sustainablenaturalresourcesmanagement,rurallivelihoods,ruralsociology,Cambodia.

La contribution des paysans cambodgiens au développement rural : une perspective à partir de la province de Kampong Thom.L’articleviseàidentifierlarationalitédelapaysannerieetsacontributionaudéveloppementruraldanslaprovincedeKampongThom.Pourcefaire,uncadreanalytiqueinterdisciplinaireappréhendelesdynamiquesd’occupationdusoletdesrégimesfonciers, lesstratégiesd’allocationdelamain-d’œuvreet lesdéterminantsdelaproductivitédelaterreetdutravailagricole.Ilsebasesurl’étudeapprofondiededeuxcommuneslocaliséesdansdesenvironnementsagro-écologiquesbiendistincts.Uneanalysedechangementdel’occupationdusolàpartird’imagesaérienneschronologiquesestcoupléeàdesinventairesparticipatifsderessourcesforestièresethalieutiques.Ellemontrequelesmodesdegestionendogènedecesressourcesgénèrentdesrevenusimportantstoutenétantsoucieuxdumaintiendelabiodiversité.L’articleanalyseégalementcommentilssontmenacésparl’interventiond’acteursnonpaysansimpliquésdanslaprivatisationmassivedesterresd’État.Àlarecherchedupleinemploi,lesménagespaysansjouissentd’unetrèsgrandeflexibilitédansl’allocationdeleurmain-d’œuvre,enparticulierenfonctiondel’âgedesactifsetdelafluctuationducoutd’opportunitédutravail.Lavariable«revenuagricole»estfortementconcentréeenraisondelarépartitioninégaledelaterre.Cetteinégalitéestatténuéed’unepartparl’accèsauxressourcescommunesquiestcrucialpourlespluspauvresetlerecoursauxactivitésnonagricolesquiconstitueunvéritablemoteurdedifférenciationsocio-économique.Lesindicateurséconomiquesclésdelaproductionrizicoleconfirmentquelesménagescherchenttoujoursàmaximiserleurrevenuagricoleenfonctiondufacteurdeproductiondontilsdisposentenrelativementpetitequantité.Unesimulationdestransactionsfoncièresmontreque,contrairementauxsuppositionsthéoriques,

322 Biotechnol. Agron. Soc. Environ. 201014(2),321-340 DiepartJ.-C.

1. INTRODUCTION

Inthelast30yearsrelationsbetweentheState,peasantry,andthemarketshaveundergonedramaticchangesinCambodia.Therecenthistoricalcontextofagriculturaldevelopment isasuccessionof transformations,eachofthemdeterminedbyacompleterestructuringoftheinstitutional, socio-economic, cultural and technicaldimensionsofagrariansystems.

Between1975and1979,theattempttomodernizeagriculturebytheKhmerRougeregimewasnotdonein cooperation with the peasantry, but was imposedon them by the State. The political, ideologicaland technical means used during the DemocraticKampuchea (DK) period to force the peasantry to aprimitive accumulation in the agricultural sector led,ex nihilo, tomajor inconsistencies between theStateand thepeasantries, resulting in thestagnationof theagricultural sectorasawhole (Vickery,1984;Thion,1993).InthepostDKera, thetransitionfromwartopeacewasachievedmainlythroughthemodernizationoftheagriculturalsectoronthebasisofmoreflexibleproduction units, the Krom Samaki groups1, carriedmainly by a relatively strong peasantry if comparedto the roleof theState and themarkets (Grunewald,1987). Later, in the mid-eighties, the dismantling ofcooperative groups and the re-emergence of a freemarket economy has further modified the conditionsof the modernization of the peasantry through theimplementation of liberal policies, legitimated in thebelief thatproperty rights reform,price liberalizationand the gradual privatization of enterprises wouldresult in improved agricultural productivity and,consequently, the well-being of the rural population(Watts, 1998). Nowadays, the State is progressivelywithdrawingfromitsfunctionofregulatorandinvestor,while themarketand theprivatesectorhavebecomethemaindrivingforcesforruraldevelopment.

The current market-based agrarian transitionprocessesareaccompaniedbyanumberofinstitutionalshifts materialized in a set of new legal and policydocuments.Thecornerstoneofthesedocumentsisthenew land law, which defines different land propertydomains (MLMUPC, 2001; East-West ManagementInstitute,2003).Inlinewiththelandlaw,differentlandtenureregimesareenvisionedandcapturedinrelevantland or natural resources management policies. TheStatedomainiswhereappropriation,managementandcontrol of land and natural resources are carried outthroughtheStateagencies(Kirk,2000).TheStateprivatelandconsistsoflandthattheStatecanuseasaprivateasset and sell or lease to the private sector (nationalorinternationalcompanies)asconcessions.TheStatepubliclandconsistsoflandthatservespublicpurposesandcannotbesoldtotheprivatesectorassuch.Inruralareas,thislandconsistsmainlyofforestryandfisheriesresourcesanditsmanagementisintricatelylinkedtothereformsinthesesectors.Indeed,withtherecognitionoffailureofnaturalresourcesmanagementthroughtheforestryandfisherieslargeprivateconcessionssystemin the late1990s,and inaccordancewith theoverallgovernancepolicyofpromotingde-concentrationanddecentralization,theStatehasbeenpromotingcertainforms of devolved natural resources co-managementwithruralcommunities,namelyCommunityFisheriesand Community Forestry organizations. While thesecommunity-based organizations are granted certainrightsandprerogativesforthemanagementofforestryandfisheriesresources,theyremaindependentonStateagenciesfortheirowndecision-makingprocesses(VanAcker,2003;Maketal.,2005).Theprivatedomainofland encompasses land where peasant families canclaimownershiptitleonthelandtheyfarmorliveon.The land law promotes the titling of private land togrant securityof tenureand stimulate the investmentandtheaccesstoagriculturalinputsmarketstoboostagriculturalproductivity.Thelandmarkets(purchase,saleandlease)arealsopromotedinordertofacilitatelandtransferamongstruralhouseholdsandtoguaranteetheequityoflandaccessforthepoorestpeasants(CLP,2002;Deinigeretal.,2002).

Thechallengeatstakeisthedefinitionoftheplaceandroleofpeasantryinthenewinstitutionalsettings.At

lesachatsetventesdeterrenemènentpasàunedistributionpluséquitabledesterres.Lesmodesdefaire-valoirindirectssemblentcependantbeaucoupplusprometteursdanslaperspectived’unaccèsplusjusteàlaterrecarilssefondentsurdesmécanismes de sécurisation collective activés par les paysans. L’article montre que les communautés paysannes dans lesrégionsétudiéesconstituentunebasesolidepourledéveloppementruralpuisqu’elleoffreunetrèsbonnearticulationentrel’efficacitééconomique,lajusticesocialeetladurabilitéenvironnementale.Enfin,desrecommandationssontformuléespourvaloriseraumieuxlacontributiondelapaysanneriedanslesnouvellespolitiquesagrairesnationales.Mots-clés.Économieetpolitiqueagricoles,systèmed’informationgéographiqueettélédétection,gestiondurabledesressourcesnaturelles,régimefoncier,pratiquesculturalesetsystèmesdeproductionagricole,moyensd’existencedespopulationsrurales,développementrural,sociologierurale,règlesdedécisions,Cambodge.

1 Krom SamakiistheKhmertranslationforSolidarityGroup.ThesystemofKrom Samakiwasthatagroupof10to15familiesworkedcooperativelyandsharetheirproduction.

Cambodianpeasant’scontributiontoruraldevelopment 323

timessubordinatetomarketsandattimessubordinateto State, Cambodian peasants are not, at this stage,clearlyidentifiedaskeyactorsinruraldevelopmentinCambodia.Theobjectiveofthearticleistoidentifythepeasant’srationalityandparticipationinthedevelopmentoftheagrariansystemsinKampongThomprovince.Inthe context of agrarian transition, keymessageswithpolicy implications will be formulated. The centralhypothesisunderlyingthepaperisthatpeasantmodesof development in rural areas offer greater potentialforruraldevelopmentintermsofeconomicefficiency,socialjusticeandenvironmentalsustainability.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. Study areas

KampongThomprovinceisoneofthefiveprovincesconnectedtotheTonleSapLake.ItsareadramaticallyincreasesintherainyseasonduetothereversaloftheMekong river water flow that seasonally becomes atributary riverof theTonleSap riverbasin.Figure 1(p326) shows an agro-ecological zoning of theprovince.ItstretchesfromtheflatTonleSapfloodplain(consistingofasequenceoffloodedforest,shrubandgrassland) to theagriculturalzonewhere thevillagesare located, to the slightlyundulatingdry shrub landandthentotheforestarea(amosaicofdry,semiandevergreen Dipterocarpacea forest). The researchprocessstartedwithadescriptionofagrariansystemsatprovinciallevel.Thisallowedthedifferentiationofcommunesformorefine-tunedfieldinvestigationsandsurveys.SrayovandTrapeangRusseicommuneswereeventuallyselectedbecause:– theycapturetheagro-ecologicaldiversityobserved attheprovinciallevel;– they are located not too far from KampongThom citytotacklerural-urbanlinkages;– because a forest cover change analysis detected recentlandcoverchanges.

2.2. Scope and methods

The research took place in three distinct phases,each focusing on specific dimensions of peasant’sdynamics.

ThefirstphasedealswiththedynamicsoflanduseandlandtenureonbothStateandprivateland.Ithasbeeninitiatedonthebasisoftimeseriesaerialphotosfrom 1992 (aerial photos from the eighties were notavailable)and2004.Thedigitizationandinterpretationofaerialphotos(atascaleof1/5,000)havegeneratedtwolanduselayersthatweretopologicallyintersectedinageographicinformationsystemtogeneratealandusechangelayer.Landuseinformationfrom2004wasupdated for the 2006 situation though detailed GPSsurveys.Afterpreliminarydataprocessing,consultativeworkshops(2dayspercommune)wereorganizedwithall local authorities at village and commune levelsin order to interpret the land use changes identified.The discussions are conducted by using qualitativeand quantitative questionnaires and by asking theparticipants to comment the land use changes mapsprintedonA0 sizepaper.They are facilitatedby theresearcher and a group of students from the RoyalUniversity of Agriculture. Then, participatory forestinventoryandvegetation surveys are conductedwithvillagerstounderstandtheirmanagementofforestandfisheriesresources.Theforest inventoryisconductedin Trapeang Russei on 11sample plots identified indifferent forest type areas (sampled area represent1% of the total forest area size) with participationof local community’s representatives who identifytimber and non-timber species, specify their use andcommenttheiravailabilitytrend.InSrayov,vegetationsurveysareconductedalongtwomaintransectwalksthat cross the flooded area from North to South andfromEasttoWest.Wetlandresourcesareinventoriedwithparticipationoflocalfishermen,whodescribethefloodpatterns,identifythekeyfishspeciesanddetailthe landusechange in theareaencirclingeachmainfishingground.Finally,householdinvestigationsusingsemi-structured questionnaires are conducted witha household sample selected in locations where landusechangesweredetectedduringthespatialanalysis(6villages,103households)(Table 1).Keyinformantsandlocalkeystakeholderswerealsointerviewedusinga semi-structured questionnaire (62people, 34 inSrayovand28inTrapeangRussei).

The second phase focuses on the organization offamily-basedlaborinfarming,off-farmandnon-farmactivities.Thispartoftheresearchisexclusivelybasedonhouseholdinvestigations(Table 1)usingastructured

Table 1. Householdsurveysdesign—Dispositif des enquêtes ménage.

Commune Total area Total population (2005) Household investigations (km2) People Households Phase 1 (2005) Phase 2 (2005) Phase 3 (2006) Total

Srayov 287.17 18,576 3,682 69 130 163 362TrapeangRussei 143.98 15,912 3,240 34 67 66 167Total 431.15 34,488 6,922 103 197 229 529


questionnaire. A stratified random sampling methodwasusedtoselectagroupofhousehold’srepresentativeof the whole commune (6villages, 197households).The investigation isconductedby the researcheranda group of 4students from the Royal University ofAgriculture.Inordertoassesstheexistingdifferencesin labor allocation strategies, primary occupationswere detailed through quantitative investigations forallactivemembersofhouseholds(n=1,818people).Apersonwasregardedasactiveinanygivenactivityifhe/shewasactiveforatleastsevendaysinthemonthandiscountedas1man.month.Forthecalculationofhouseholdincomes,thefamily-basedlaborcostswerenottakenintoaccount.

The third phase apprehends the determinantsof land and labor productivities for the rain-fed riceproduction. They are addressed in line with thestructureandfunctioningoflandmarkets.Thisphaseisalsoexclusivelybasedonhouseholdinvestigations,usingastructuredquestionnaireandconductedbytheresearcher and a group of 6students from the RoyalUniversity ofAgriculture. The surveys take place intwovillagesselectedaccordingtotheirdistancefromthenationalroad:onevillagealongthenationalroadNo6andonefurtherinthefloodplaininSrayovorintheuplandinTrapeangRussei(Table 1).Thesamplewas constituted by selecting a highly representativegroup of households in each village (4villages,229households). The database allows the structureandfunctioningofthelandmarkettobequantifiedinline with the land-labor endowment ratio. Differentmodalitiesofentryinthelandmarketsareenvisioned:landsale,landpurchase,landclearanceandlandrental.The database details, for each transaction, the landarea size, theyearand reasonof saleand theagreedprice.A land-labor simulation model was then builtto reconstruct the land trajectoriesof thehouseholdsat themomentwhen theyenter the landmarket.Theland/labor ratio is determined by the total land sizeareadividedbyahousehold’sweightedactive labor.Onepersonagedbetween8and17countsas0.5laborunit; one person aged between 17 and 60 counts as1fullunitoflabor;andpeopleagedolderthan60arecountedas0.5laborunit.

3. RESEARCH FINDINGS AND RESULTS

3.1. Dynamics of land use and tenure

Theuseofsubstantialareashaschangedbetween1992and2004inbothcommunes:15%and7%inSrayovand Trapeang Russei communes, respectively. Asillustrated in figures 2 and 3 (p 327), these changesmarkahugeprintinthelandscapes.Thisisregardedasevidenceofchangesinlocalagro-systemsandinland

governance. Types of land use change were furtheranalyzedaccordingtofourmaindrivingforces:– the demographic pressure increasing demand for rice;– the modalities of State withdrawal from its direct supporttopeasantry;– the endogenous management of common-pool resourcesbyruralcommunities;– the increasing influence of non-peasant actors in ruralareas.

State support to peasantry. In the context of thedramaticpopulationgrowththatoccurredintheearlyeighties after the Khmer Rouge regime, the mainchallenge for peasantry has been to increase foodavailabilityandfamilyincomes.Thismeansthattotalagriculturalproductionneeds to increaseatapaceatleastconsistentwiththepopulationgrowthrate.Inthestudiedarea,thiskeychallengewascombinedwiththedifferent forms of State intervention and, later, withdifferentmodalitiesofStatewithdrawal.

InSrayov,thepopulationgrewatanaverageannualrate of 1.57% between 1992 and 2005 (NIS, 2007).The need to produce more rice to feed this growingpopulationisassociatedwithStatewithdrawalfromitsdirectandindirectsupporttofarmers.Intheeighties,the State put considerable effort into supporting thefarmerstocultivatedeepwaterrice,aphoto-periodicvariety of late-maturing paddy well adapted to highwaterdepthandnotverydemandingintermsoflaborand capital input. The State largely subsidized theproduction (soil preparation and harvest) as well asguaranteed paddy prices at the farm gate (Pel et al.,2002).ThisdirectsupportwasdonethroughtheKrom Samaki production units. These were particularlyactiveinKampongThom(inSrayovinparticular)duethe large flooded areas and contributed a significantamount of rice for consumption inside the province.The production surplus was transferred through theKrom Samakisystemtononself-sufficientriceareas.Since the official disbandment of the Krom Samakiproduction units and its direct support to farmers,the peasant household had become the core unit ofagricultural development. Quickly, they decided toabandonthedeep-waterriceproductionandrelocatedtheir rice-production effort to the rice plains of thecommune in medium rice (Figure 2) due to securityreasons and the long time spent in accessing plotsometimeslocated30kmfromwheretheylived.

Household investigations focusing on theirevolution during these mutations revealed that thefamiliesreducedareasundercultivation,butwhilethedistance from plot to their habitation has decreased,theycouldsignificantlyincreasetheirlandproductivitybyintensifyingtheirlabor(numberofhoursperworker)and their cropping systems. The total production of


paddy per household showed an overall decrease butremainedsufficienttoprovidefoodforthepopulation.Anaverageof1,146kgperfamilyensuresricesecurityforoneyearforafamilyofsixpeople(500griceperdayperperson)(Table 2).

InTrapeangRussei,thesituationisdifferentasthearmed conflicts between theKhmerRouge resistanceand the national army ended very late in the area.Withtherealceasefireproclaimedin1998,peopleandespeciallytheKouyethnicminoritygroupwereallowedtore-settletheircommunitiesintheareastheyhadtoleaveasaresultofarmedconflictswiththeKhmerRougearmy. This had become shrub land in the meantime.Thesemigrationflowsoccurredinsideandoutsidethecommuneandhaveledtoaconsiderableredistributionofthepopulationacrossthewholeareaofthecommune.Coupledwithanaturalincreaseofthepopulation,thetotal demographic increase has been 0.77% per yearonaveragebetween1992and2006(14,249to15,912people). Besides the much-awaited socio-politicalstability,theceasefirehadseriousconsequencesforthedevelopment of the cropping system in the area.ThewaterdamthatkeptlargeagriculturalareasfloodedtopreventKRrebellionfromaccessingKampongThomcitywasdestroyedand,withinoneseasonlargeareasweremadeavailableagainforagriculture(Figure 3).Peasant families have spontaneously extended theirrice-basedcroppingsysteminthesenewlands.

Endogenous management of Common-Pool Resources. Anotherdrivingforcethathascontributedtoshapingtherural landscapes in thestudiedareas isthe endogenous management practices of common-poolresourcesbypeasantcommunities.TheTonleSapfloodplain inSrayov (southof thecommune)and themosaicofforestpatchesinTrapeangRussei(northofthecommune)constitutethesecommon-poolresourcesthat should be considered as Public State land underthe new land law. In both communes, the common-pool resources, thoughundergovernmentauthority ifreferring to thenew land law,weremainlyunder themanagementofpeasantcommunities.Thisisduetothefactthatthegovernmentusuallylacksbothfinancialandhumanresourcestomonitortheseresourceseffectively(Ostrom,1990).

InSrayov,thesouthernplainischaracterizedbyamosaicofpatchesinwhichbothincreaseddensityanddegradationofshrubandgrasslandscanbeobserved(Figure 2). Further investigations at the householdlevelandtransectwalksorganizedwithfarmershaveprovided detailed information on how peasants areactually managing this seasonally flooded area. Theplainischaracterizedbycontinuallychanginglandusepatterns ranging fromricecultivation (at theedgeoftheplain),grasslandusedforgrazingcattle,andshrublandwhereavarietyofnon-timberforestproductscanbecollected(Evansetal.,2005;Diepart,2007a).Thisdiversityoflanduseismaintainedthroughavarietyofpracticessuchasfire,plowing,allowinglyingfallow,orgrazingwiththeobjectiveofensuringaflexibleanddiversesupplyofnaturalproductsofcrucialimportancetothelocallivelihoods,whilemaintainingthefertilityoftheoverallagro-ecosystem(Diepart,2007a;2007b).The system is rational. The different rice croppingsystems are adapted for different water depths andencompassveryimportantaquaticbiodiversity(Balzeret al., 2002). The grass is crucial as fodder for thecattle that generate significant part in the farmingincome portfolio, and the shrubs are also importantfor the energy supply of households (i.e. firewood).Fishinginthepondsoftherecedingfloodplainispartandparcelofthismanagement,aimingatmaintainingmulti-functional agro-ecosystems. Tragedy of thecommon, in the sense of Hardin (1968) is avoidedduetolowpopulationpressureonland(64peopleperkm2 in Srayov), which enables the reproduction oflandfertilityandreducestheriskofconflictsbetweenresourcesappropriators.

In Trapeang Russei, the main feature was thediminution/increaseofforestcoverinthenorthernpartofthecommune(Figure 3).Aforest-basedslashandburn system was the norm in the area until the startof the sixties but started to decline afterwards. Thedecreasingfertilityof theoverall systemis the resultof increasing population density and reduction ofthe fallow period has prevented the reconstitution ofthe biomass (Mazoyer et al., 2002).The system wasprogressively converted into a permanent rice-basedandforestedsysteminwhichanextensivericecroppingsystem (i.e. one harvest a year) co-exists with forest

Table 2. Changes in rice cropping patterns between 1992 and 2005 in Srayov—Changement des itinéraires culturaux rizicoles entre 1992 et 2005 à Srayov.

Total commune (wet season rice) For sample from investigation (wet season rice) Population Total rice area Cultivated area Distance to Yield Total production per HH (numberofpeople) cultivated (ha) (kgperHH) habitation (km) (kg.ha-1) (kgperHH)

1992 14,768 14,965 3.2 10.2 595.3 1,898.52005 18,576 9,532 1.2 3.1 955.6 1,146.7

HH:household—ménage.

} }-36.3%+20.5%


Figure 1.LocationofKampongThomprovinceandstudyareas—Localisation de la province de Kampong Thom et des communes étudiées.Sources:MinistryofLandManagement,UrbanPlanningandConstruction,2003;JapaneseInternationalCooperationAgency,2002;MinistryofAgriculture,ForestryandFischeries,2003.

patchesusedforthecollectionofavarietyoftimberandnon-timber forestproducts.Verymuchdrivenby theroleofforestsinrurallivelihoods,ruralcommunitieshave progressively identified specific forest blockswhere protection and sustainable managementmeasures were initiated by them.These efforts werewellintrainwhenthecommunityforestrysub-decreewas released in 2003. This later piece of legislationwasinstrumentalinformalizingtherecognitionoftheprotectedareaasacommunityforest.Aparticipatoryforest inventory conducted with local dwellers(Diepart,2007a)wasconductedin2006toassessthediversity and productivity of the forest cover underthesedifferentforestmanagementsystems.Combinedwithtimeseriesaerialphotos, theresultof theforestinventoryshowsthatcontrarytotheopenaccessarea,in the forestblocks thatwereentirelycontrolledandmanagedbythecommunitybothdiversityandvolume

of timber aswell asnon-timber forestproductshaveincreasedovertime(Figure 3).Thesurvey,includingtime-series inventories that GTZ-Rural DevelopmentProgram(NaturalResourcesManagementcomponent)conducted to assess the impact of community-basednatural resources management in the 2000-2007period, shows similar results for community forestlocated in a similar agro-ecological and institutionalenvironment (Degens et al., 20072 cited by Diepart,2007a).Theforestareaisalsousedasgrazinglandforcattle thathasgraduallybecomeakeycomponentoflocalproductionsystemsforcashincome,fortractionin rice cultivation, for savings and for production ofmanurethatispaddy-fieldorganicamendments.

Thoughtherearecontrastsinthetypesofcommon-pool resources in both communes, the managementofcommon-poolresourcesbypeasantryisdetailedindiversification patterns and risk coping mechanismsthat enable them to make sustainable use of limitedresources and to reduce risk associated with theirreliance on a limited number of products in theirlivelihood. The management of these common-poolresources by peasant communities is thus a positivecontributiontothemaintenanceofbiodiversity.Inthissense,peasantcommunitieshaveatrulyenvironmentalfunction in their landscape. Figure 4 illustrates theshare of income generated from the common-poolresourcescombinedwiththeotherincomesources.Onaverage, the share of fisheries and forestry activitiesin the total added value is quite important (18% forfisheries inSrayovand15%for forestry inTrapeangRussei). These results stress that the integration ofagro-fisheries or agro-forestry activities, in additionofbeingenvironmentallysound,generatessignificantvalueaddinginthelivelihoodsofruralcommunities.

Influence of non peasant actors in agrarian development. The magnitude of new medium-scaleagro-industrial perimeters underlines the prevailingimportance of the economic environment in shapingrurallandscapes(Figures 2and3).Inbothcommunes,non-peasantactorsexertedastronginfluenceinthesenew land developments. In Srayov, for example,they are the driving forces of new water resourcesmanagement strategies in the Tonle Sap flood plain.As an illustration of this, in the late nineties, onelocal private entrepreneur started to build irrigationschemesconsistingofonewaterreservoirandonedryseasonriceperimetereach.Itsprincipleissimple.Thefloodwater is stocked in the upper reservoirs in therainyseasonandflowsbygravityfromthereservoirs

2 Degens P. & Choun D., 2007. Impact assessment of the NRM component. Phnom Penh: GTZ-Rural Development Program Kampot/Kampong Thom, Internal Paper.

0 50 km2512.5

N

Tonle Sap

Trapeang Russeicommune

Srayovcommune

Kampóng Chhnang

Kampóng Thom

Kampóng Cham

Provincial centreMain roadProvincial boundaryTrapeang Russei boundarySrayov boundaryPerennial river or lake

Flooded zoneMainly agricultural zoneMainly shrub zoneMainly forest zoneUrban zone

Legend

Agro-ecological zoning


Village land

Paddy fieldShrub land

Grassland

Water bodyFlooded shrub land

Irrigated dry-season riceperimeterFlooded landFlooded grassland

Land use changes in Srayov (1992-2006)

1992 2006

Land use in 2006 (ha) Village Water Flood Paddy Irrigated Shrub Grassland Total land body land field perimeter land

Villageland 479.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 480.5 Waterbody 1.6 805.5 0.0 5.9 1.4 2.7 20.7 837.7 Floodland 0.0 8.8 46.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.0 72.9 Paddyfield 0.0 34.1 3.4 8,663.4 268.3 642.1 5,359.0 14,970.2 Shrubland 0.0 0.6 0.0 16.7 0.9 640.8 456.7 1,115.7 Grassland 0.0 15.7 24.3 845.6 513.2 558.1 9,283.6 11,240.6

Total 480.6 866.3 73.8 9,531.6 783.8 1,843.7 15,138.0 28,717.6

Land use changes types

Dismantlement of rice fieldIncrease shrub cover associatedwith decrease grass coverDecrease shrub cover associated with increasegrass coverCreation of dry seasonrice irrigated perimeterGrassland converted intopaddy fieldOther changeNo change

Figure 2.LanduseandlandusechangesmapsinSrayovcommune—Cartes d’occupation du sol et de changement d’occupation du sol dans la commune de Srayov (1992-2006).Thetablequantifiesthelandusechangesthathaveintervenedbetween1992and2006—Le tableau quantifie les changements d’occupation intervenus entre 1992 et 2006.

Figure 3. Land use and land use changes maps inTrapeang Russei commune—Cartes d’occupation du sol et de changement d’occupation du sol dans la commune Trapeang Russei (1992-2006). Thetablequantifiesthelandusechangesthathaveintervenedbetween1992and2006—Le tableau quantifie les changements d’occupation intervenus entre 1992 et 2006.

Lan

d us

e in

1992

(ha)

Water bodyPaddy fieldForest (high density)

Village landPerennial cropForest (low density)

AirfieldRice and perennial cropForest andperennial crop

Land use changes in Trapeang Russei (1992-2006)

1992 2006

Land use changes types

Conversion of forest into perennial crop plantation (total)

Conversion of forest into perennial crop plantation (partial)

Conversion of forest into paddyfieldConversion of water bod into paddy field

Densification forest cover

Degradation forest cover

Other change

No change

Land use in 2006 (ha) Water Village Infra- Paddy Perennial Flooded Forest Forest Forest cover Total resources land structure field crop forest covera coverb + perennial crop

Water 587.4 1.3 0.0 175.7 0.1 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 773.76 resources Villageland 2.2 684.7 0.0 7.6 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 696.56 Infrastructure 0.0 0.0 28.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.80 Paddyfield 11.2 82.6 0.0 6,573.5 32.5 0.7 2.8 12.5 0.8 6,716.63 Perennialcrop0.0 7.1 0.0 12.6 42.5 0.0 0.6 3.3 0.0 66.13 Floodedforest68.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 94.21 Forestcover 1.2 24.2 0.0 137.5 313.3 0.0 2,115.6 477.2 324.2 3,393.14 Forestcover 0.5 5.5 0.0 156.5 153.8 0.0 125.8 2,159.5 27.6 2,629.22

Total 671.1 805.5 28.8 7,063.3 544.4 35.5 2,244.8 2,652.5 352.6 14,398.45ahighdensity—haute densité;blowdensity—basse densité.

Lan

d us

e in

1992

(ha)


tothelowerirrigateddryseasonriceperimeters.Theideaistocreatenewopportunitiestodevelopwhatiscommonlynamed“under-developed”land.InTrapeangRussei, one pioneer investor attached to a Vietnam-drivencashewnutcommoditychainacquireda largearea of degraded forest and converted it into a largecashew plantation. In both communes, these pioneeragricultural investors were integrated in the peasantcommunities following agreed principles. Peasantcommunities contributed in the time-consuming taskofpatrollingaswagelaborer.Overall,theywerewellintegrated in itsdailymanagement.Nevertheless, theintervention of these pioneer entrepreneurs has beenfollowed by less scrupulous investors who initiatedlargemovementofuncontrolledStatelandacquisitionfor speculation purposes. Kampong Thom’s urbanelitesarekeyactorsinthesemarkets(Diepart,2007a).

Theintegrationoftheseschemesinthecommunelandscape is double edged. On the one hand, theyrepresent new options for the development of theregion as well as new employment opportunitiesduring the dry season (as for 86% and 83% of thehouseholdsinterviewedrespectivelyinSrayovandinTrapeangRussei).Ontheotherhand,theyalsoupsetthemulti-functionalandintegratedlandusepatternsofpeasants’agrariansystems.Thepresenceoftheagro-industrialstructuremeansadecreaseintheavailabilityofnon-timberforestproducts(33%inSrayovand85%inTrapeangRussei).Access tograzingareas,fishing

ponds or forestland is more difficult because of themere existence of the massive perimeters within thesame territory (46% inSrayovand57% inTrapeangRussei). In Srayov in particular, all the respondents(n=69)acknowledgethatasignificantnumberoffishfingerlingsareevenbeingcaughtinsidethereservoirs,resulting in a decrease of their total fish catch,especiallyintherecessionpondslocatedinthevicinityofthereservoirs.

These agro-ecological impacts on agrarian andproduction systems are the visible expression ofdeeperissuesrelatedtotheStatelandtenurecontext.In both communes, the appropriation rules of thecommon-pool resourcesaresimplydependingon theuse of those resources as the demographic pressureon land isnothigh.These institutional arrangementsarelegitimizedandapprovedbyallunderthescrutinyof village and commune chiefs. Nevertheless, thesecollective rules are being challenged by the newpossibilityoflandownershipofferedbythejurisdictionofStatecontrol(StatepublicandStateprivate).State-controlled concessions overlap with the collectiverulesofpeasantcommunities,whichcreateconfusionon the appropriation of land and its resources. Theconcerned agencies and government officials derivematerialbenefitsfromthislegallimbosurroundingthemanagement of common-pool resources. Dependingon the land area involved, the provincial, district orcommunaladministrationgivesauthorization toeachindividualinvestorfortheconstructionofaperimeteror a plantation. This usually requires payment of acommission (Diepart, 2007a). The registration ofthose lands as private State land and the delivery ofan economic land concession should be the legalprocedure for the retentionbasins or plantations, butthe documents, including agreements available tosupport these transactions, do not mention on whatlegalbasistheseagreementsaremade(ProvincialHallofKampongThom,2005).Qualitative investigationswith various local stakeholders have shown thatthe rights to own State land as private property aregivenbylocaladministration(commune,district,andprovince) alongnorms that arewell structured alongelite appropriation norms that largely exclude thepeasantcommunities.Thesedynamics,whichmarkthere-emergenceofcapitalismintheagrariansystem,areeitherstronglyaffiliatedtotherulingpartyorstronglylinkedwithcommuneanddistrictauthorities throughinformalandpersonalizednetworks.

InruralCambodia,socialrelationsaretraditionallybasedonaformoftrustlinkedtothemoralobligationsbetweenapatronandaclient.Thesenormsconstitutekey social bonds in rural communities (Ledgerwoodet al., 2002). Even though based on dominance, theactionofapatronisrequiredfromapeasantperspective.Itprovidescertainformofsocialandphysicalsecurity.

Figure 4. Averageincomeperhouseholdinthestudyareas (by source of income)—Revenu moyen par ménage dans les communes étudiées (ventilé par source de revenu).1USD=4.100KHR,asof2006.

Trapeang RusseiSrayov

Ave

rage

inco

me

per

hou

seho

ld (K

HR

) 3,000,000

2,000,000

1,000,000

0

AgricultureLivestock

FischeriesForestry

Agricultural wage laborNon-farming, with migrationNon-farming, without migration


Nevertheless,thesetraditionalpatronagenetworksarebeingchallengedand transformedunder thepressureofpoliticalpower and the liberalizationof economy,resultinginveryweaklinkagesandtrustbetweenthecommunitiesandthepublicinstitutionswhichcolludewith private investors. In both Srayov and TrapeangRussei,tensionsandconflictsthathavearisenfromtheappropriationofStatepublic landby investorswere,atsomestage,alwaysnegotiatedandresolvedthroughthe mediation of community facilitators associatedwith the pagoda committee and entrusted by fellowvillagers. An important feature that characterizedcollectiveactioninthestudiedcommunitiesisindeedthere-activation,aftertheturmoilofrepeatedwars,oftheassociationscreatedandstructuredaroundpagodas.Thesesocialnetworksdevelopslowlyanddecisionsaretakenbyconsensus.Nevertheless,theyhavetheability,resources and competence to gather the stakeholdersandentrustdialogueforcollectiveaction(Pellini,2007;Diepart,2007a).Theseassociationsarefragilebecauseeasilydeviatedbypoliticaloreconomicinfluencesbut

theiractionsareconstructiveinmediationandconflictmanagement. They definitively represent a form ofpeasant historic governance that ensures collectivesecurity.

3.2. Organization of family-based labor and income formationThe recent evolution towards increased liberalizationofagricultural inputandoutputhas inducedgrowingdisparities between regions and within the peasantcommunities in each region. This evolution createsa tendency to redistribute theconditionsofaccess toresources (land, water, equipments, etc.) as well asthe labor allocation and income formation strategiesbetween different categories of producers (Lipton,2002;Peemans,2002;Diepartetal.,2005;2007a).

The monthly labor intensities (in men.month) arecomputedforallpeopleinvolvedineachactivityandpresented on a seasonal calendar (Table 3). It showsfirst the total laborperhousehold,whichcanbebestcompared with the average active labor force per

Table 3.Monthlyallocationoffamily-basedlaborperhousehold(combinedandforeachactivity)—Allocation mensuelle de la main-d’œuvre familiale par ménage (combinée et pour chaque activité).

Srayov Households Labor intensities (in men.month per household) involved (%) Dry season Rainy season Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average

Total 100 1.16 1.20 1.16 1.00 2.98 3.07 3.08 3.16 3.21 3.24 3.22 2.69 2.43Agriculture/ 95 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.21 2.47 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.37 1.84 1.68livestockFisheries 34 0.89 0.96 0.80 0.46 0.30 0.37 0.50 0.70 0.78 0.78 0.93 0.87 0.70Agricultural 3 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.63wagelaborNonfarmwith 18 1.39 1.39 1.35 1.30 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.17 1.30 1.30 1.28 migrationNonfarmwithout 34 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.93 0.75 0.77 0.70 0.73 0.77 0.86 0.95 0.93 0.87migration

Trapeang Russei Households Labor intensities (in men.month per household) involved (%) Dry season Rainy season Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average

Total 100 1.68 1.58 1.62 1.61 2.01 2.61 2.83 2.83 2.80 2.50 2.28 2.00 2.20Agriculture/ 88 0.28 0.17 0.21 0.21 1.07 1.98 2.28 2.28 2.16 1.48 1.16 0.81 1.17livestockFisheries 4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.67 1.00 0.72Forestry 15 1.40 1.20 1.20 1.30 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.60 1.10 1.20 1.10 0.83Agricultural 15 1.40 1.50 1.50 1.40 1.30 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.60 1.30 1.40 1.45wagelaborNon-farmwith 40 1.19 1.22 1.22 1.19 0.96 0.74 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.96 1.04 1.00 0.97migrationNon-farmwithout40 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 0.96 0.74 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.93 1.07 1.11 0.97migration


household, which is 3.7 active labor/household inSravoy and 3.8 active labor/household in TrapeangRussei.Table 3 alsopresents theaverageoccupationofthelaborforceforeachandeveryactivity,includingthe cases where only the households are involved ineachspecificactivity.

Rain-fed rice production is the pivotal activityofnearlyall theproductionsystems in termsofbothlabor requirements andnumberof families involved.Rice production is an intensive activity in terms oflabor requirements during the crop cycles that arecoveringatotalperiodofeightmonthsduetospecificagro-ecological contexts. During this period, ricecultivationemploysalmostalltheactivelaborforceofthefamilies.Nevertheless,inbothcommunes,farmingoccupationsdonotcompletelyoccupylaborthroughouttheyear.This isprincipallydue to the inexistenceordeficiency of hydraulic infrastructure that does notguaranteethecontrolofwaterandthereforelimitstheintensificationordiversificationopportunities fordryseasonagriculture.

In the dry season, households face a problem oflaborsurplusandunderemployment,andtherice-basedproductionsystemsinthestudiedareaareengagedindiversificationpatterns.Theneedtodiversifyfarmingactivitiesismadeevenmoreacuteastherisksassociatedwithlowharvestsarehighduetoclimateirregularities(pronouncedfloodanddrought).Thefactorgoverningthediversificationofactivitydependsonthelocalagro-ecologicalcontext,theagestructureofthehousehold(i.e.dependencyratio),theopportunitiesofferedbythelocalorregionallabormarketaswellasthecapacityforpeasanttograsptheseopportunitiesthroughnotablytheirintegrationinad hocsocialnetworks.Duetoweaklabor productivity, very low levels of mechanizationandtheself-subsistentcharacterofriceproduction,thediversificationoptionsthathouseholdscangraspdependlargely on their demographic structure and potential.The reference to the demographic differentiation ofChayanovisthencrucialtodistinguishtheproductionsystem in the studiedarea.Household laborcapacityand the ability to diversify labor vary along thepeasant life cycle as shown in figure 5. It increasesuntil the households heads are aged 50-55 years oldanddecreaseslogicallyafterwards,whenthechildrenestablishtheirownhouseholds.Whilericeproductionremains overall crucial for all, the households withgreater labor capacity (aged 45-65 years old) arelogicallybetterpositionedonthelifecycletocapturenon-farmingemploymentopportunities.

InSrayov,twoequallyimportantactivitiesofthesediversificationpatternsarefishing(principallyfishingactivities in theso-called recession-pondsconstitutedafter the flood water recedes) and self-employednon-farming activities within the commune (e.g.construction,handicraft,transport,smallbusiness,etc.).

TheproximitytoboththefloodplainandtoKampongThom urban centre is a key factor that explains theinterests and choice of households for extra-farmingactivities. Agricultural wage labor in the irrigatedperimeters has a rather limited impact in terms oflaboroccupationforthehouseholdsinvestigated.For18%ofthehouseholds,diversificationtakestheformofnon-farmingactivitiessuchasmigrationtoPhnomPenh to work in garment factories or to Thailand towork in factories or plantations. Computation ofbi-variate correlations shows an actual negativeassociation between household farming incomesand household income generated from non-farmingactivities(correlationcoefficientr2=-0.174**,highlysignificant).Whilethecorrelationbetweenthefarmingincome is logically highly correlated with the landarea(r2=0.809**),thisnegativeassociationisviewedasan incomesubstitutioneffectof farmingandnon-farmingactivities,non-farmingincomecompensatingtheweaknessofthefarmingincome.Therecoursetonon-farmingactivity concernsmainlyyoungmaleorfemale labor of each family and is less seasonally-dependentthanfarmingsensu stricto.Itconsistsofaninvestment strategy that engageshouseholds inmorethan simple reproduction. The importance of rural-urbanmigrationssuggeststhatmigrantsfrompeasantcommunitiesarekeybridgesbetweenruralandurban

Figure 5. Family-based labor allocation per householdand per class of household chiefs’ age (by activitytypes)—Allocation de la main-d’œuvre familiale par ménage et par classe d’âge de chefs de ménages (ventilé par type d’activité).

Age classes of household chief (years)

Age classes of household chief (years)

Ave

rage

am

ount

of l

abor

(men

. mon

th p

er

year

per

hou

seho

ld)

40

30

20

10

0

< 25[25-35]

[45-55]

[35-45][55-65]

[65->]

Farming/livestockFisheries

Forestry

Agriculturalwage labor

Non-farming, withmigrationNon-farming, withoutmigration

< 25[25-35]

[45-55]

[35-45][55-65]

[65->]

Srayov Trapeang Russei


territories.Ontheotherhand,thereisnosignificantlinkbetween farmingandfisheries incomes (r2= -0.061).Fisheriesneedtobeunderstoodasaseasonaltactictograspthespecificseasonalopportunitiesofferedbythenatural resources and to allowutilizing family labor.Theseactivitiesprovidemoreacomplementarysourceof income rather than a substitute for weak farmingincome. Access to fisheries grounds depends on aquiterobustlaborforceduetoimportantdisplacement(11kmperhouseholdonaverage).

InTrapeangRussei,thediversificationpatternsareslightlydifferentduetolargeragriculturalwagelaboropportunities in the cashew plantation. The recourseto non-farming activities is also more important dueto more difficult cultivation environment. The soilsaremuchmoreweathered(Acrisols)andnotannuallyenrichedwithalluviumsasinSrayov.Asimilarincomesubstitution effect is highlighted between farmingandnon-farmingactivities.Thebi-variatecorrelationcoefficient between the farming and non-farmingincomeis(r2=-0.208**,highlysignificant).Aswithfisheries activities in Srayov, the income from forestresources (open-access and common property) is notassociated with farming income (r2 = - 0.05), whichsuggeststhataccesstoforestsisalsomoreaseasonaltactic.Theseactivitiesdonotnecessitatesucharobustlaborforceasforfisheries,andchildlaborissignificantinthissector.

An analysis of income concentration usingLorenz curves andGini indexes shedother lights onthe diversification of productive activities. The firstobservation is the very strong concentration of cashincome from agriculture (Gini coefficient of 0.51 inSrayov and 0.50 in Trapeang Russei), which is dueto the concentration of agricultural land in the firstplace.The income generated from the common-poolresourcesandnon-farmingactivitiesinbothcommunesshows higher levels of concentration (Figure 6) dueto the fact that a smaller proportion of householdsactually practice these activities, which result inmoresignificantconcentration.But, interestingly, theconcentration of the total income presents a lowerlevel of concentration (Gini coefficient of 0.41 and0.43inSrayovandTrapeangRusseirespectively).Themodalities of distribution of the added value withinthepeasantcommunities results ina reduction to thedisparitiesinfarmingincome.

Thisbalancingeffectoffarmingincomedisparitiesresults from a combined effect of two differentdynamicswhosenatureissimilarinbothcommunes.Firstly, though the access to common-pool resourcesmainly depends on the household demographicstructure, the share of fisheries and forestry incomeis most important for the poorest households. TheGini Index of farming and common-pool resourcesincomes are respectively 0.48 and 0.47 in Srayov

and Trapeang Russei. This suggests that the pooresthouseholdsactuallycompensatetheweaknessoftheirtotalincomebyaccessingthecommon-poolresourcesand the value-added from the integration of farmingandnaturalresourcesmanagementactivitiesresultinginamoreevenincomedistributionthanfromfarmingincome alone. Secondly, the access to non-farmingactivities is conditioned by the age structure of thehouseholds but also depends on the availability ofup-frontcapital to invest innon-farmingactivitiesaswell as the access to information existing in specificsocialnetworks.Thelateriskeywhenconsideringtheimperfect labor market situation. Results show thatnon-farming income distribution follows a differenttrend, as the non-farming incomes represent anincreasinglyimportantshareoftheincomeasthetotalincome rises (thehigher the total income, thehigherthenon-farm income).Thenon-farming income alsocompensatestheweaknessofthesolefarmingincomebutitgoesbeyondthisincomebalancingeffect.Accessto non-farming is a long-term strategy for peasanthouseholds and is a driving force of socio-economicdifferentiation.

3.3. Determinants of land and labor productivities in rain-fed rice production

Land access and land holdings differences.Thethirdphaseofthesurveyswasconductedwithalargesampleofhouseholdswithlandholdings(n=229).Amongstthose,theagriculturallandareaisunevenlydistributedin both Srayov and Trapeang Russei (in Srayov:mean= 1.66ha, standard deviation: 1.35 and GiniIndex:0.41and inTrapeangRussei:mean=1.25ha,standard deviation: 1.03 and Gini Index: 0.41). Thedatabaseallowsdifferentiating,fordifferentclassesoftotalagriculturallandarea,oftherelativeimportanceofthedifferentmodesofacquisition(Figure 7).

Figure 6. Concentration – Gini indexes – of householdincomes(bysourceofincome)—Concentration – indices de Gini – des revenus par ménage (ventilés par source de revenu).

Non-farming in Srayov: 0.72Non-farming in Trapeang Russei: 0.65Total non-farming activities income (including wage labor)

Income derived from Common-Pool resourcesFisheries in Srayov: 0.63Forestry in Trapeang Russei: 0.71

Agriculture/livestockincomeSrayov: 0.51Trapeang Russei: 0.50

Total incomeSrayov: 0.41Trapeang Russei: 0.43


The acquisition of land by the State distribution(fromKrom Samaki)andbyinheritanceare themostimportant ones. They are negatively correlated witheachotherastheyareassociatedwiththedemographiccycle of the households.This phenomenon is visibleinbothSrayovandTrapeangRussei.Theprogressivedisbandment of the Krom Samaki system in the mideighties has resulted in the formal distribution oflandto thehouseholds.Thisdistributionconsistedofredistributingthelandtohouseholdsaccordingtothenumber of active laborers in family. Equitable in itsprinciple 20years ago, the distribution has initiateddifferences in land holdings that are visible today.Households with larger land holdings mainly gottheir land throughState redistribution.Thebi-variatecorrelationsbetweentheageofthehouseholdleader,the total land area and active labor are significant.It is noteworthy that the distribution of agriculturalequipmentanddraughtanimalsfollowedlogicallythesamepatternsasmostfarmingcapitalwasredistributedto the households together with the land. Thecorrelationbetweenthevalueoftheagriculturalcapitalandtheagriculturallandareaarehighlysignificantforbothcommunes.Conversely,householdswithsmallerlandholdingsareyoungandacquiredtheirlandmainlythrough inheritance (negatively correlated with land

areareceivedbyKromSamaki).Thedoubleage-biasedphenomenon of land concentration and atomizationis observable in Srayov and Trapeang Russei andconfirmedstudiesconductedinsimilaragro-ecologicalenvironments(Ballardetal.,2004).

Nevertheless, if these relationships are robuststatistically,thelevelsofcorrelationareweak,whichsuggeststhatotherpatternsoflanddifferentiationareatstake,suchasthecapacityofhouseholdstoacquirelandbyforestclearance(inTrapeangRussei)andlandpurchase.Immediatelyafterthewar,forestareaswereactuallyallocatedinlotstofamilieswhowereabletoclearitprogressivelyaccordingtotheirlaborcapacity.Eventhoughthisruleenabledfamiliestoacquirelargeland holdings, it has been abandoned since 2000 inthenameofimprovedforestmanagement.Permissionfromlocalauthoritiesisnowneededtogetadditionalland,whichinvolvesfinancialcontribution(virtuallyalandpurchase)andstrongconnectionswithcommuneand/ordistrictauthorities.Intenselandspeculationbycompanies or individuals onState land, as describedearlier, has made access to additional land throughclearingmoredifficult.

Agricultural productivities and profitability of rice production.Thecroppingsystemsinthestudiedareasconsistmainlyofrain-fedrice.Thecropdiversificationindexisverylow(0.096inSrayovand0.058inTrapeangRussei)meaningthatriceislargelydominant.Atotalof 2% of the total cultivated by peasant householdsconsists of dry-season recession rice, and benefitsfromanaturalirrigationsystemwiththerecessionofTonleSapfloodwater.Theabsenceofad hocirrigationequipment/drainage accessible to peasants limits thepossibilityofriceproductiontoonecroppingseason.The rice intensification index is 1, meaning that oneplot bears one and only one crop a year. For thesereasons,onlyrain-fedriceproductionindicatorswerecomputed and presented in table 4. The very weakcontrol of water flowing in and out from May toOctobercausesriceproductiontofluctuatelargelywithclimatic conditions. Due to a much-diversified agro-ecologicallandscape,theimpactofclimatecanbeverydifferentfromonehouseholdtotheother.Risk-copingmechanismsarepartandparcelofproductivetacticsofthepeasant household.Thoughproduction indicatorsare highly variable due to theses erratic conditions,trendanalysisisstillpossible.

Firstofall,theresultsforbothcommunesconfirmthewell-knowninverserelationshipbetweenlandsizeandyield(Binswangeretal.,1990).Householdswithasmallerlandholdingproducemoreperhectarethanones with larger land holdings. Though they enjoyhigherlandproductivity,householdswithsmallerlandholdings produce relatively less rice and sometimesacknowledgefoodshortages.Thisissueconcerns45%

Figure 7.Distributionofagriculturallandsizebymodeofland acquisition for different classes of total agriculturallandsize—Distribution de la taille des superficies de terre agricole pour différents modes d’acquisition et par classe de superficie agricole totale.

Classes of total agricultural land size (ha)


Land

are

a in

per

cent

of t

otal

land

siz

e 100

80

60

40

20

0

[0-0.5][1-2]

[0.5-1][2-3]

[3-<]

Srayov Trapeang Russei

[0-0.5][1-2]

[0.5-1][2-3]

[3-<]

Acquired by inheritanceAcquired by State distribution (Krom Samaki)Acquired by purchase

Acquired by forest clearanceAcquired by lease

Acquired by pawning


ofhouseholdsinSrayovand65%inTrapeangRussei.Thehigheryieldobservedforthesmallerlandholdinghousehold is explained by a combination of twointensificationfactors:theuseoflaborandtheuseofagriculturalinputs.

The intensity of labor is largely dependent onthe household’s land-labor ratio. Households withrelatively smaller land holdings are less limited bythelabortheycanprovideontheircropthanbytheirlandsize,whichisinthiscasethedominantproductiveconstraint. These labor-abundant households arethen in a position to use the productive factor theypossessinrelativelygreaterquantity.Asthelandareaincreases,thebalanceoftheland-laborratioshiftsandlaborbecomes the limitingfactor.The land-abundanthouseholdswillhaveatendencythentouserelativelyless labor per hectare as a larger area provides foodsecurityforthefamily.

Thetrendoflaborintensificationwiththedecreaseoflandareaissimilarlyobservedforfamilylaborandfor external labor. Furthermore, the database allowsdifferentiation of two kinds of external labor: cash-paidexternallaborandexternallaborthatispartofthetraditionalexchangegroupbetweengroupsoffamilies(“Provas Day”)(Figure 8).Accesstowagecashlaboris preponderant for households with smaller landholdings,whileexternallaboraspartofatraditionallyexchange group is more important for larger landholdings. Their logic will be to finalize, as fast aspossible, the rice cultivation work without having toprovidelaborservicestootherpeople’sland.Thefreedlaborcanbeallocated tootheractivities.Hereagain,this logic will be followed by those peasants whoactuallyhavetheopportunitytoallocatetheirlabortootheractivity.

For households with larger land holdings, foodsecurityismoreeasilyensuredduetohigherlevelsofproduction.Thehigheruseof“Provas Day”isjustifiedto limit monetary expenditure in the form of cash.On the basis of purely theoretical reasoning aiming

to project on a temporal scale what is observed in aspatialscale,apossibleconsequenceofdemographicpressureandlackofaccesstoadditionallandwillbethe tendency towards decreasing areas of cultivatedlandaccompaniedbythereinforcingoftheemergenceofwage laborerpool.Recent researchon reciprocityand social interactions underlines this trend (Kim,2001).

The second factor of intensification that explainsthe higher yield for smaller land holding is a moreimportant use of agricultural inputs (Table 4).Theseagriculturalinputsconsistmainlyofequipmentrental,purchase of seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. On

Table 4. Productivity, efficiency and profitability of wet season rice production by class of cultivated areas inSrayov—Productivité, efficience et rentabilité de la production de riz pluvial par classe de superficies cultivées à Srayov.

Land Frequency Total Total Production Productivity Efficiency ProfitabilityClass* of households production labor** costs*** Land Labor Cost price Gross margin(ha) (%) (kg) (men.days (KHR.ha-1) (kg.ha-1)(kgper (KHR.kg-1)(KHR) (KHR.ha-1) (KHRper perha) men.days) men.days)

[0-0.5] 18.8 447 141 368,123 1,207 9 305 178,743 482,958 3,425[0.5-1] 26.2 708 68 102,462 966 14 106 283,036 386,428 5,683[1-2] 32.9 1,404 65 101,724 994 15 102 561,420 397,444 6,115[2-3] 12.1 1,578 44 65,688 690 16 95 631,200 275,990 6,272[3->] 10.1 3,180 31 82,672 798 26 104 1,272,000 319,166 10,296

*harvestedland—superficie récoltée;**family+externallabor—travail familial + travail extérieur;***cashcostsdonotincludefamilylabor—les couts de production ne comptabilisent pas les couts de main-d’œuvre familiale.

Dis

trib

utio

n of

ext

erna

l lab

or

(as

per

cent

of m

en.d

ays)

100

80

60

40

20

0

Classes of cultivated areas (ha)

[0-0.5] [0.5-1] [1-2] [2-3] [3->]

Cash paid external labor per haExchanged external labor as «Provas Day» per ha

Figure 8. Distribution of external labor modalities forrain-fedriceproduction(byclassofcultivatedareasforallvillages)—Distribution des modalités de travail extérieur pour la culture de riz pluvial (par classe de superficies cultivées pour tous les villages).


average, they will agree to higher costs per hectarebecause:– theyarethemselvesendowedwithlessagricultural capital,andsoneedtohireequipmentduetoanage biasedland/equipmentendowment;– for tactical reasons aiming to reduce the amount offarmingworkthatcannotguaranteefoodsecurity anywayandtoallocatethelaborforcetonon-farming activitiesduringalongerpartoftheyear.

Thisintensificationinagriculturalinputsrepresentsanadditionalcostforhouseholdsandthisexpenditureisusefulonlyforthehouseholdswhohavetheopportunitytoallocatetheirlabortonon-farmingactivities.

Costspriceforrain-fedricecultivation,whichgivesa combined effect of the yield and production costs,is a reliable indicator of rice production efficiency(Table 4). The differential between the sale price atfarm gate (435KHR.kg-1 in Srayov and 407KHR.kg-1 in Trapeang Russei) is always positive, whichemphasizes that rice production is always efficient.Costspricevaluesalwaysshowthehighestscoreforland-scarce households. For households with smallerlandholdings, thedouble intensification in laborandagriculturalinputdoesnotmakericeproductionmoreefficienteventhoughyieldsarehigher.Over-expensesarecriticalinexplainingtheweakcompetitivenessofriceproductioninthesehouseholds.Forlandabundanthouseholds, the efficiency of production is better,though the results show important variability withineachclassidentified.Overall,moreregularandquality-driven extension services in agricultural support tofarmersisgenuinelyneeded.

In order to maximize their benefit, the peasantsfollowdifferentproductionlogic,instepwiththemeansofproductionthattheyhaveinrelativelylessamount.The gross margin that gives the combined effect ofdifferential of sale price and cost price and yieldenable todistinguish these logics (Table 4).The riceproductionrationalityofland-scarcehouseholdswillbetomaximizetheirriceincomeinstepwiththeirlandarea(KHR.ha-1).Theywilldosobyuseofrelativelyabundantlaborandagriculturalinputsiftheyhavethemeanstodo so. In turn, households with larger land holdingswilllooktomaximizetheirincomeinstepwithlabor(KHRpermen.days).Theywillbemoresensitive tolaborproductivitythantolandproductivity.The land reformassistedbymarket as envisioned inCambodiaislegitimizedbytheassumptionsthat:– landtitlingwillincreaselandsecuritytohouseholds whowilluselandascollateraltoborrowmoneyin ordertoimprovelandproductivity;– thelandmarketwillensurethereallocationofland tothosewhoarethemostefficientincultivatingit, supposedly the household with the smaller land- holding. These are the foundations of the so

called“growthwithequity”developmentparadigm. Nevertheless, it must be made very clear which kind of efficiency is considered. Efficiency must beaddressedinstepwiththelimitingfactorsofthe households.

3.4. Influence of land and credit markets

Theoretical assumptions of land markets.Cambodiaisanindustrializingeconomy.Althoughtheindustrializationisstillmainlyfocusedonfoundationindustriessuchasthegarmentandtourismindustries,the job opportunities offered to the rural populationoutside the purely farm sector are increasing (Chanet al., 2002). The labor markets outside agricultureare still very much imperfect in rural areas and thisimperfectionhasdifferenteffectsonruralhouseholds.For land-scarce and labor-selling households,imperfectlabormarketsmeanunderemploymentandamarginalvalueoflaborbelowthemarketwageinthefarmingsectororoutsideagriculture.Inturn,forland-abundant and labor-buying households, imperfectlabormarketsmeanthatthemarginalcostsoflaborareabove the market wage. Land-abundant householdsfind themselvescultivating their landwith relativelyexpensivelabor.Andgiventheexcessvalueoflandtoland-scarcehouseholds,itisexpectedthatthecreationoflandmarketswouldleadland-abundanthouseholdsto sell or rentout land to land-scarcehouseholds, ifaccess to technologyandotherfactorsofproductionwereequalbetweenthesetwogroupsofhouseholds.Land-scarce households would find themselvesacquiringlandthroughthemarketandland-abundanthouseholdswouldfindthemselvesprovidinglandonthemarkets.The landmarketswould thushave twoimpacts: anaggregateproductivityeffect thatwouldresult as land was transferred from lower valued tohighervaluedusesandanincomedistributioneffectresulting from the improved livelihood and theincomesoflandscarcehouseholds(Carter,2002).

Land trajectories simulation.The land trajectoriessimulationhasbeendevelopedtotest thevalidityofthetheoreticalassumptionsthatlandmarketswillleadtoafairerlanddistributionamongsthouseholds.Thesimulationallowsvisualizingthelandtransactionssothattheycanbeunderstoodaccordingtothehouseholdland-laborratioatthemomentofthetransactionandthenbecomparedwiththeoreticalassumptions.

Figure 9 shows that land purchase cases areactually more important for landscarce households.Thisreflectsthenecessityforland-scarcehouseholdstoincreasetheirlandholdingsforlivelihoodpurposes.Even though thisobservation seems in linewith thesuggestion of the theoretical assumptions, it shouldbe emphasized that the possibility of acquiring land


though land purchase depends for these householdson the availability of capital in the first place. Thisis corroborated by a highly significant correlationbetweenthetotalincomeandthetotalpurchasedlandareainbothcommunes.

Compared with land purchase transactions,land sales are less frequent. Nevertheless, the effectforeseenbythetheoryisnotobserved,aslandsalesaremore frequent for land-scarce households.Actually,74%of landsale transactionsaremotivatedbynon-productive purposes (18% for health reasons, 46%forbasichouseholdexpenditureand10%toactuallyreimburse a debt).The factors that trigger land saleare, in the first place, associated with a context ofvulnerabilityanddoesnotdependontheequalizationof factors prices. Only 26% of the land sales aremotivated by productive purposes, generally toconstitutetheup-frontcapitaltolaunchanon-farmingactivity. Due to low natural fertility and weaknessof public investment in agriculture, land-scarcehouseholdscannotensuretheirfoodsecuritythroughlandresourcesonly.Theyareobligedtorelyonothersourcesofincometosecuretheirlivelihood.Intheseconditions, rice production has strong opportunitycost ifcomparedwithotheractivities.And ifaccessto up-front working capital is restricted, land-scarcehouseholdsprefertoselltheirland.Carefulattentionshould be given to both of these land sale contexts.In the absence of social security and with landfragmentation on the way (structural decrease ofland holding per household due to inheritance), thephenomenoncouldleadtomassivelandsalesresultinginexacerbatingthericeproducer/consumerratiowithamajorfoodsecurityproblem.

Observations on both land purchase and salesuggest strong linkages between land and financialmarkets.

Thehighutilizationrateofcreditisindeedakeyfeature of rural communities in the studied areas(Figure 10). Households contract a loan, use themoney according to their needs, and pay it backwheneverandwhereverthereisasurplus.Atthetime

Classes of land size/active(at the time of the transaction)

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Figure 9. Frequencyof landpurchaseandlandsale,simulatedat the timeof transactions(byclassof land/laborratio)— Fréquences d’achat et de vente simulées au moment des transactions (par classe de ratio terre/travail).

Figure 10. Average amount of credit contracted perhousehold and by class of total agricultural land size (byuse of credit)— Volume de crédit moyen contracté par ménage et par classe de superficie agricole totale (ventilé par utilisation du crédit).

1USD=4,100KHR,asof2006.

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oftheinvestigation,similarpercentagesofhouseholdshad outstanding credit in similar average volumes(48.3%/ 546,638KHR and 48.4%/ 482,967KHRin Srayov and Trapeang Russei respectively).Households with smaller land holdings borrowedmorefrequentlythanothersbutinrelativelysmalleramounts. They share this characteristic with mostotherruralcommunitiesalloverthecountry(Chanetal.,2002).Indebtednessandreimbursementsarepartof the life cycle of the households and show signsof the vulnerability of peasant communities. Creditis accessible through various sources: 37% frominformalsources(usurer,relatives,savinggroup)and63%fromformalsources (banksorNGOs).Accessto credit is spatially differentiated: formal credit ispreponderant in villages along main transport axes,whileinformalsourcesaredominantinmoreremoteareas. When possible, households opt for formalcreditbecauseoflowerinterestrates.

Credit is always contracted for different reasonsbutthedatabasecapturedonlytheprimaryuseforit.Twoimportantlessonscanbelearnedfromfigure 10.Creditisland-biasedasthecreditcontractsarehighlycollateralizedandlandisahedgeagainstdefaulting.Secondly,astrikingfeatureistheimportantvolumeof credit contracted for non-farming productiveactivitiesforhouseholdswithlargerlandholdings.Ifnotconstrainedtodoso,itisverylikelythattheland-abundanthouseholdswillnotselltheirlandinordertokeepthecollateralsecurityitrepresentsforfutureinvestments,includinginthenon-farmingsector.Theuseoflandascollateraloffersbeneficialinteractions.

Creditrepresentsasubtlelinkbetweenland-basedandnon-farming activities. The beneficial interactionsofferedby landascollateral representboth securityfor non-productive credits and opportunities forinvestment for productive credits. By a combiningeffect, credit can thus lead to accumulation in thefarmingandnon-farmingsectors,being in thiscasea key factor of socio-economic differentiation as itprovides a mean of capitalization and a way out ofpovertyforthehouseholdsinthestudyareas.

Land rental markets, contrary to land purchaseandsale,are lesswealthbiasedandseemtoofferamuch more promising perspective for equal accessto land (Figure 11). Households with smaller landholdingsrelativetoactivelabortendtoacquirelandthrough land rental more than the households withlargerlandholdings,whotendmoretoallocatetheirland to others through rental. Rental markets arein this case a factor that balances the disparities ofland-laborendowmentamongsthouseholdsandactsas a more equitable way to ensure access to land.Up-front working capital is also needed for thesetransactionsbut,interestingly,theobservationshowsthat sharecropping is largely preferred to cash rentin all villages of the studied areas. Sharecroppingmechanisms allow for both households involved intherentaltransactiontosharetheriskassociatedwithpossible crop failure due to irregular rainfall. Thisrisksharingbehaviorisakeyelementofsafetynetsestablished by peasant communities to collectivelyface climate irregularities and the lack of Stateinvestmentinagriculturalinfrastructures.

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Figure 11. Frequency of land leases (rent-in and rent-out), simulated at the time of transactions (by class of land/laborratio)—Fréquence des transactions foncières de location, simulées au moment des transactions (par classe de ratio terre/travail).


4. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Inbothcommunes,householdshavebeenconfrontedwith institutional or technical constraints whentryingtoaddressincreasingfooddemandduetohighpopulation increase.Thecontextsaredistinct inbothstudyareasthough.InSrayov,theStatehascompletelywithdrawn its direct support to peasant communitiesafterthedismantlementofKrom SamakisystemwhileinTrapeangRussei,theStatesomehowwithdrewwhenthearmedconflictsceasedinthearea.Nevertheless,inbothcommunes,thepeasantryhasmanagedtoabsorbthecostsassociatedwithStatewithdrawalandmanagedtomaintainorevenincreasetheirpaddyproduction(oryield)byadaptingtheirrice-basedcroppingsystemstothenewinstitutionalandenvironmentalsituation.Thisadaptation is due to the strength andgreatflexibilitypeasants have in their decision-making processes.Coupled with an acute knowledge about local agro-ecologicalsettings,thisreflectsstrongadaptivecapacityinacontextofquickinstitutionalchange.

In both communes, peasantry also showsconsiderable flexibility in the way they allocate thelabor force to productive activities. The decisionof labor allocation and consumption varies alonglife cycles and depends on the evolution of thedemographic dependency ratio of the families.Theirflexibilityindecision-makingandintimateknowledgeoftheirenvironmentallowthemtorespondquicklytoopportunities and constraints in their agro-ecologicaland institutional environment in order to maximizetheemploymentleveloftheirfamilymembers,whichistheirfinalaim.Inthecontextofanimperfectlabormarket, this flexible allocation of labor occupationaccording to the seasonal and random character ofagricultureactuallyresultsfromapermanentfluctuationof labor opportunity costs due to the emergence ofspecific opportunities for self-employment or wagelabor. The genuine asset of peasantry is to adapt tothe evolution of the labor opportunity costs and torelocate their family laboraccordingly. In this sense,peasantcommunitiesarekeymanagersofrural-urbanmigration flows. Arguably, this flexibility allowspeasantry investing time in non-profitable activitiessuchastheritualcelebrationsduringtheKhmerNewYear in April which are crucial in building peasantcollectivity and strengthening the social capital inpeasantcommunities.Overall,thepeasantcommunitiesoffer modalities for labor allocation that are sociallyjust,as the total incomederived from the integrationoftheseactivitiespresentsconcentrationvalueslowerthan for any activities considered individually. Fromtheperspectiveofsupportingcommunityforestryandcommunityfisheries,thispointdeservesspecialfocus.Criticalattentionshouldbeplacedontherelationshipbetweencommon-poolresourcesandpovertytoavoid

community-based natural resources managementorganizations becoming an instrument for localpowerfulpeopletobecometooinfluentialinresourcesappropriationandprocessing.Ontheotherhand,fromalandtenureviewpoint,thedevelopmentofcommunityforestryorcommunityfisheriesorganizationsaimstotransformthemanagementofcommon-poolresourcesfrom an open access regime to a common propertyregime (Ostrom, 1990). The resources appropriatorsagreedtomanageandsharethebenefitsoftheresourceswithinaspecificboundaryandalongregulationsandmechanisms theyhaveagreedupon incommon.Thegroupofmemberscanexcludeothersfromaccess totheresources.Giventhedifferentfunctionsplayedbythe common-pool resources, the important territorialaddedvaluetheygenerateandtheoverallmanagementpractices by peasantry that contribute to maintainingbio-diversity,itseemscrucialforthecommunitylandtobestrategicallydesignedasmultifunctionalareasbothgeographicallyinitsdemarcation(includingamosaicofagro-ecologicalfeatures)andalsointhedocumentthat regulates the access, the use and control of theresources.Fishingorforestryactivitiesdonothavetobe considered independently of grazing or collectionof non-timber forest products. The time-consuminginvolvement in fisheries grounds or forest protectionbythemembers,whichisamainconstraintforthesekinds of common property institutions, would mostlikely be recompensed by the possibility of derivingother benefits. A compartmentalized approach thatresults from a sector vision should be avoided, as itwould not address the problems associated with theinteractionsofruralactivities,whichisthetruenatureofanagrariansystem.

This endogenous management of the so-calledStatelandiscriticallychallengedbytheinvolvementof non-peasant actors in rural development. Undertheirinfluence,largepartsofStatedomainoflandarebeing privatized for agro-industrial or speculationspurposes.TheStateagenciesatprovincial,districtandcommunelevelareactuallynotwithdrawnfromthesedynamics.Bycolludingwiththesenewinvestors,theyevenhavebecomekeyactorsoftheStatelandmarkets.In the studiedareas, their actionactually results in adecrease in land security for peasant communities.This paradox illustrates the inadequacies of a veryquick conversion of natural and social capital intoeconomic capital, on the one hand, and, at the sametime, avery slowmaturingofproperty rightson theother. Combined with steady demographic pressureon land and subsequent land fragmentation due toinheritance, thismodeofState landmanagementhascreated a structural land access problem for peasanthouseholdswhostilllargelydependonagriculturefortheirlivelihood:theirlandholdingsizedecreaseswhilelargeareasofState land remainunder-utilized in the


nameof concessionsorbecauseof speculation.Thismarksahistoricalshiftastheagrariansystemdynamichasbeensofartoextendthecultivatedareasinordertoincreasethericeproduction.

The peasant tends always to maximize theirincomeinstepwiththeproductionfactortheyareableto dispose in relatively less quantity.The productivelogic of land-scarce or land-abundant households isdifferent,butbotharesomehowlookingtomaximizetheirincomeandcanbeconsideredasefficientinthecontextofthestudiedarea.Nevertheless,asdiscussedearlier,itshouldbeemphasizedthatlaborandlandarenotpurelysubstitutablemeansofproductionenablingustojustcomparetheirmarginalproductivitywithoutconsidering the factors thatdetermine thefluctuationof their opportunity costs (Dufumier, 2004). Theincomemaximization in stepwith landor laborwillalwaysbeadjustedandconditionedbytheevolutionofthelaboropportunitycostandalsobythecapacityofthehouseholdtograsptheseopportunities.Itdependsultimately on two factors: the access to credit forup-frontcapitalandtheintegrationintoad hocsocialnetwork.

Land purchase and sale markets are very wealth-biasedanddependtoalargeextentoneconomicpower.Itisnotlikelyindeedthatlandpurchasesandsaleswilllead to a more equal land distribution. Nevertheless,peasantryoffersthroughlandrentalmarketsasystemofaccesstolandthatstrikesabetterbalancebetweenlanddistributionamongsthouseholdsandtheircapacitytoactuallycultivateit.Thisiscrucialinacontextwhereland-based foodsecurity isnoteasilyensureddue tolandfragmentationanddifficultyingainingaccesstoadditionallandbyclearanceorpurchase.Transfersofsecondary right through land leases amongstpeasanthouseholds seem promising to ensure equitableaccess to land also because they are embedded incollective security mechanisms activated by peasantcommunities themselves. In the context of market-assistedlandreform,mechanismsofregularland-laborendowmentre-assessmentbetweenhouseholdsshouldbeinstitutionalized.Itshouldaddressalltypesofmoda-lities to access land, including secondary rights suchaslandleases.

5. CONCLUSION

Relations between the State, the peasantry and themarkets lie in an institutional crisis. Recent ruraldevelopment policies offer a poor synthesis ofpeasant rationalities and capture only poorly thereal dynamism of peasant communities. Thus far,the peasant contribution to the development of therural landscape has been largely underestimated. Amarket-based approach has been preferred, leaving

thepeasantcommunitiesalonetoswallowthecostsofthetransitiontomarkets.Nevertheless,peasantmodesofproductionshowrationalities.Thecreationofhighterritorialaddedvalueanda logicalmaximizationoftheir income in step with their most limiting factorofproductionareeconomicallysound.Inagraduallyindustrializing economyand in anoverall context oflow agricultural labor productivity, peasantry tendstomaximize theemployment rateof theirhouseholdlabor force. They do so according to fluctuations inthe costs of labor. Peasant communities offer viableoptionsforsocialjusticeinthedistributionoftheaddedvalue generated by different activities. Endogenouspractices for common-pool resources managementareenvironmentallysound.Peasantcommunitiesalsooffer spaces for collective action that are culturallybalanced.Thekeyaspectsofpeasant’s rationality liein the nexus between production and consumption.Peasantsaimatmanagingtheaccesstoadiversityofproductiveandnon-productiveactivitiesandpracticeswhose norms are local, regional or internationalin order to ensure a good individual and family lifein the frame of a collectivity that is able to ensuresecurityandsustainability.Thisbeingsaid,itisclearthatpeasantcommunitiesareexposedtofactors,bothendogenousandexternal, thatchallenge the integrityof communities and upset the potential of peasantmodesofdevelopment.Thelegal tools inplaceneedtobetranslatedintoproperpoliciesinordertoidentifypeasantryasthekeyactorforruraldevelopment.Thisdepends on the strong political will of national andinternationalinstitutionswhichinfluencesthecontentofruraldevelopmentpolicies.

Acknowledgements

The study was initiated in the frame of a university co-operation program (“Research and Training in RuralDevelopment”, 1999-2003) implemented by two Belgianuniversities [Univ. Liege - Gembloux Agro-Bio Tech(GxABT)andCatholicUniversityofLouvain(UCL)]andtwo Cambodian universities (Royal University of PhnomPenh and Royal University ofAgriculture). The programwas supported by the Belgian University Commission forDevelopment (CUD). We are grateful to all Belgian andCambodian partners of this program for their support. Inthecontinuation,specificsurveyswereconductedbetween2005and2007inKampongThomwherewewereworkinginaRuralDevelopmentProgramsupportedbytheGermanTechnicalCooperation(GTZ)andtheGermanDevelopmentService(DED).SincerethanksareaddressedtoProfessorsPh.Lebailly(GxABT)andJ.-Ph.Peemans(UCL)fortheirconstantacademicsupport.WewouldalsoliketothankDr.Michel Jancloes, Dr. Arnaldo Pellini, Prof. John Pilgrimand an anonymous reader who made relevant and usefulsuggestionstoimprovethepaper.


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