California Robbery sentencing and punishment – California penal code 211

The punishment for robbery can be severe. The punishment for robbery will depend on whether the crime committed was first degree robbery or second degree robbery. Robbery is also considered a strike under the California Three Strikes law. (See California Penal Code Section 667, 1192.7(c)(19).)

First Degree Robbery

If the first degree robbery was committed in concert with two or more persons, and the robbery was committed within an inhabited dwelling house, an inhabited vessel, an inhabited trailer, or the inhabited portion of any other building, the robbery is punishable by imprisonment in state prison for three (3), six (6), or nine (9) years.

In all other cases of first degree robbery, the punishment is imprisonment in state prison for three (3), four (4), or six (6) years.

Second Degree Robbery

Robbery of the second degree is punishable by imprisonment in state prison for two (2), three (3), or five (5) years.

Attempted Robbery

A conviction for an attempted robbery is punishable by imprisonment in state prison for up to three (3) years.

Enhancements – Robbery Committed with a Weapon

Armed with a Firearm in the Commission of a Robbery – California Penal Code Section 12022(a)(1)

Any person who is armed with a firearm in the commission of a robbery or attempted robbery shall be punished by an additional term of imprisonment in state prison for one (1) year.

A firearm is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.

Armed with an Assault Weapon in the Commission of a Robbery – California Penal Code Section 12022(a)(2)

If the firearm is an assault weapon, machinegun, or a .50 BMG rifle, the additional term of imprisonment in state prison shall be three (3) years.

Actually Using a Deadly or Dangerous Weapon in the Commission of a Robbery -California Penal Code Section 12022(b)(1)

Any person who personally uses a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of a robbery or attempted robbery shall be punished by an additional term of imprisonment in state prison for one (1) year.

A deadly weapon is any object, instrument, or weapon that is inherently deadly or dangerous or one that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.

The penalties for robbery are severe. If you or a loved one is facing a charge for robbery, it is important that you speak with an experienced criminal defense attorney. At Wallin & Klarich, our attorneys have over 30 years of experience in handling robbery cases. Our attorneys will provide you with the quality representation you deserve. We will aggressively fight to get you the best possible result in your case. Call us today at (888) 749-0034 or visit us on our website at www.wklaw.com. We will be there when you call.

18 USC § 2113 - Bank robbery and incidental crimes

USC Prelim  is a preliminary release and may be subject to further revision before it is

released again as a final version.

Current through Pub. L. 112-207. (See Public Laws for the current Congress.)

(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from

the person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion any

property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody,

control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan

association; or

Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan

association, or any building used in whole or in part as a bank, credit union, or as a

savings and loan association, with intent to commit in such bank, credit union, or in

such savings and loan association, or building, or part thereof, so used, any felony

affecting such bank, credit union, or such savings and loan association and in violation

of any statute of the United States, or any larceny—

Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

(b) Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or

money or any other thing of value exceeding $1,000 belonging to, or in the care,

custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings

and loan association, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten

years, or both; or

Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money

or any other thing of value not exceeding $1,000 belonging to, or in the care, custody,

control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan

association, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or

both.

(c) Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of, any

property or money or other thing of value which has been taken or stolen from a bank,

credit union, or savings and loan association in violation of subsection (b), knowing the

same to be property which has been stolen shall be subject to the punishment provided

in subsection (b) for the taker.

(d) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in

subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life

of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined under this title

or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.

(e) Whoever, in committing any offense defined in this section, or in avoiding or

attempting to avoid apprehension for the commission of such offense, or in freeing

himself or attempting to free himself from arrest or confinement for such offense, kills

any person, or forces any person to accompany him without the consent of such person,

shall be imprisoned not less than ten years, or if death results shall be punished by

death or life imprisonment.

(f) As used in this section the term “bank” means any member bank of the Federal

Reserve System, and any bank, banking association, trust company, savings bank, or

other banking institution organized or operating under the laws of the United States,

including a branch or agency of a foreign bank (as such terms are defined in paragraphs

(1) and (3) of section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978), and any institution

the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

(g) As used in this section the term “credit union” means any Federal credit union and

any State-chartered credit union the accounts of which are insured by the National

Credit Union Administration Board, and any “Federal credit union” as defined in section

2 of the Federal Credit Union Act. The term “State-chartered credit union” includes a

credit union chartered under the laws of a State of the United States, the District of

Columbia, or any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

(h) As used in this section, the term “savings and loan association” means—

(1) a Federal savings association or State savings association (as defined in section 3(b)

of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813 (b))) having accounts insured by

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and

(2) a corporation described in section 3(b)(1)(C) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act

(12 U.S.C. 1813 (b)(1)(C)) that is operating under the laws of the United States.

Title 18, section 2113 of the United States Code is the Federal criminal bank robbery statute. Section 2113 outlines and defines prohibited criminal conduct vis-a-vis federally protected financial institutions and concomitant penalties.Subsection (a) prohibits the taking or attempted taking by force, intimidation, or extortion, of any property, money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management or possession of any bank, credit union, or savings and loan association, which are defined in §  2113(f), (g), and (h), respectively. Furthermore, anyone who enters or attempts to enter any building used in whole or in part as a bank, credit union, or savings and loan association with the intent to commit any felony affecting such financial institution or any larceny is subject to a fine, twenty years imprisonment or both.Subsection (b) outlines the penalties for anyone who takes and carries away, with the intent to steal or purloin, any property or money or any thing of value in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or savings and loan. The maximum penalty for violation of this subsection is a fine and ten years imprisonment if the value of the property exceeds $100. The maximum penalty is a fine and one year imprisonment if the property's value is $100 or less.Subsection (c) makes it a crime to knowingly receive, possess, conceal, store, barter, sell or dispose of any property, money, or any thing of value which has been taken or stolen from a bank, credit union, or savings and loan association. Violators of this subsection are subjected to the penalties provided in subsection (b), supra, for the taker.Subsection (d) states that anyone who assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device while committing any offense described in subsections (a) or (b) is subject to a fine and up to twenty-five years imprisonment. Toy weapons and hoax bomb devices fall within the purview of this subsection.Subsection (e) provides penalties for anyone who kills another person or forcibly abducts another during the commission of any offense previously described in §2113, or while avoiding or attempting to avoid apprehension for the commission of, or attempting to free himself from arrest or confinement for such offense. The statutory minimum penalty for violation of subsection (e) is ten years. If death results during the criminal episode, the statute provides for the death penalty or life imprisonment. See USAM 9-10.000 et. seq. for the requirements relating to the death penalty.Subsection (f) defines the term "bank." A bank includes any member bank of the Federal Reserve System, and any other banking association, trust company, savings bank operating under the laws of the United States, including a branch

or agency of a foreign bank (as defined in paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978), and any institution in which the deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or "FDIC".The term "credit union" is defined in subsection (g). A "credit union" includes any Federal credit union and any State-chartered credit union the accounts of which are insured by the National Credit Union Administration Board, and any "Federal Credit Union" as defined in section 2 of the Federal Credit Union Act.Subsection (h) defines the term "savings and loan association." It includes any Federal savings association or State savings association (as defined in section 3(b) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. §  1813(b)) having accounts insured by the FDIC and any corporation described in section 3(b)(1)(C) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. §  1813(b)(1)(c)) that is operating under the laws of the United States.

Texas Penal Code

TITLE 7. OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY

CHAPTER 29. ROBBERY

Sec. 29.01.  DEFINITIONS. In this chapter:

(1)  "In the course of committing theft" means conduct

that occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission, or in

immediate flight after the attempt or commission of theft.

(2)  "Property" means:

(A)  tangible or intangible personal property

including anything severed from land; or

(B)  a document, including money, that represents

or embodies anything of value.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept.

1, 1994.

Sec. 29.02.  ROBBERY. (a) A person commits an offense if,

in the course of committing theft as defined in Chapter 31 and

with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he:

(1)  intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes

bodily injury to another; or

(2)  intentionally or knowingly threatens or places

another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.

(b)  An offense under this section is a felony of the

second degree.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept.

1, 1994.

Sec. 29.03.  AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. (a) A person commits an

offense if he commits robbery as defined in Section 29.02, and

he:

(1)  causes serious bodily injury to another;

(2)  uses or exhibits a deadly weapon; or

(3)  causes bodily injury to another person or

threatens or places another person in fear of imminent bodily

injury or death, if the other person is:

(A)  65 years of age or older; or

(B)  a disabled person.

(b)  An offense under this section is a felony of the first

degree.

(c)  In this section, "disabled person" means an individual

with a mental, physical, or developmental disability who is

substantially unable to protect himself from harm.

Canadian Criminal Sentencing

344. (1) Every person who commits robbery is guilty of an indictable offence and liable

(a) if a restricted firearm or prohibited firearm is used in the commission of the offence or if any firearm is used in the commission of the offence and the offence is committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal organization, to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of

(i) in the case of a first offence, five years, and

(ii) in the case of a second or subsequent offence, seven years;

(a.1) in any other case where a firearm is used in the commission of the offence, to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of four years; and

(b) in any other case, to imprisonment for life.

Subsequent offences

(2) In determining, for the purpose of paragraph (1)(a), whether a convicted person has committed a second or subsequent offence, if the person was earlier convicted of any of the following offences, that offence is to be considered as an earlier offence:

(a) an offence under this section;

(b) an offence under subsection 85(1) or (2) or section 244 or 244.2; or

(c) an offence under section 220, 236, 239, 272 or 273, subsection 279(1) or section 279.1 or 346 if a firearm was used in the commission of the offence.

However, an earlier offence shall not be taken into account if 10 years have elapsed between the day on which the person was convicted of the earlier offence and the day on which the person was convicted of the offence for which sentence is being imposed, not taking into account any time in custody.

Sequence of convictions only

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), the only question to be considered is the sequence of convictions and no consideration shall be given to the sequence of commission of offences or whether any offence occurred before or after any conviction.

Bank robbery

Case CitationPr

vCrt

Sentenc

eSummary

R v Rudolph2012 SKQB

442(CanLII)SK SC 10 years

R. v. Zakis2012 BCCA

450(CanLII)BC CA 6 years asked bank teller for $10,000.

R. v.

Mohammed2012 ONSC 3072 ON SC 18 months

R. v.

Johnson2012 ONCA 339 ON CA 20 years

9 counts of bank robbery--prior record of 26 bank robberies--appeal from 26

years

R. v. Hassan 2011 ONSC 5128 ON SC 28 months

R. v.

Nembhard2010 ONCA 420 ON CA 7 years 2 bank robberies

R. v.

Evanson2009 BCCA 425 BC CA 39 months

R. v. Smith 2007 BCPC 198 BC PC 3 years series of 3 bank robberies; threatening note; no weapons visible

R. v. Dionne 2004 BCCA 275 BC CA 3 years masked bank robbery; no threats;

R. v. Carlson 2002 CanLII ON CA 17.5 years career bank robber; armed with firearm; masked

Case CitationPr

vCrt

Sentenc

eSummary

44928(ONCA)

R. v. Jenkins 2004 ABPC 48 AB PC 7 years

R. v. Corkum1997 CanLII 1466

(NS SC)NS SC 8 years

two counts of bank robbery--sentence divided between 3 and 5 years

consecutive

R. v. Helpard[1995] NSJ 426

(C.A.)NS CA 5 years bank robbery--no record

R. v. Leet(1989), 88 N.S.R.

(2d) 161NS CA 5 years

four counts robbery, of which three related to one bank--masked and armed

with imitation handgun--offender age 37, married, educated, and with four

children--divided between two years and three years consecutive

R. v. Brophy(1989) 89 N.S.R.

(2d) 417NS CA 5 years

two counts robbery--one bank and one store all on same day--used imitation

handgun--offender was 28-year-old --sentenced to 5 years and 3 years

consecutive

Philippines

Title Ten

CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY

Chapter One

ROBBERY IN GENERAL

Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. — Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take

any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence or intimidation of

any person, or using force upon anything shall be guilty of robbery.

Section One. — Robbery with violence or intimidation of persons.

Art. 295. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. — Any

person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person

shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the

robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.

2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua when

the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if by

reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in

subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have been inflicted; Provided, however, that when the

robbery accompanied with rape is committed with a use of a deadly weapon or by two

or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death (As amended by PD

No. 767).

3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery,

any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the

next preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted.

4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its

medium period, if the violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the

robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of

the crime, or when the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon

any person not responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries covered by

sub-divisions 3 and 4 of said Article 23.

5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its

medium period in other cases. (As amended by R. A. 18).

Art. 295. Robbery with physical injuries, committed in an uninhabited place and by a

band, or with the use of firearm on a street, road or alley. — If the offenses mentioned

in subdivisions three, four, and five of the next preceding article shall have been

committed in an uninhabited place or by a band, or by attacking a moving train, street

car, motor vehicle or airship, or by entering the passenger’s compartments in a train

or, in any manner, taking the passengers thereof by surprise in the respective

conveyances, or on a street, road, highway, or alley, and the intimidation is made with

the use of a firearm, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the

proper penalties.

In the same cases, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon the leader

of the band.

Art. 296. Definition of a band and penalty incurred by the members thereof. — When

more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of a robbery, it shall

be deemed to have been committed by a band. When any of the arms used in the

commission of the offense be an unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be imposed upon all

the malefactors shall be the maximum of the corresponding penalty provided by law,

without prejudice of the criminal liability for illegal possession of such unlicensed

firearms.

Any member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the band,

shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the band, unless it

be shown that he attempted to prevent the same.

Art. 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain circumstances. —

When by reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is

committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal

in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall

deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.

Art. 298. Execution of deeds by means of violence or intimidation. — Any person who,

with intent to defraud another, by means of violence or intimidation, shall compel him

to sign, execute or deliver any public instrument or documents, shall be held guilty of

robbery and punished by the penalties respectively prescribed in this Chapter.

Section Two. — Robbery by the use of force upon things

Art. 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to

worship. — Any armed person who shall commit robbery in an inhabited house or

public building or edifice devoted to religious worship, shall be punished by reclusion

temporal, if the value of the property taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and if:

(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery was

committed, by any of the following means:

1. Through a opening not intended for entrance or egress.

2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window.

3. By using false keys, picklocks or similar tools.

4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority.

Or if —

(b) The robbery be committed under any of the following circumstances:

1. By the breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or sealed

furniture or receptacle;

2. By taking such furniture or objects to be broken or forced open outside the place of

the robbery.

When the offenders do not carry arms, and the value of the property taken exceeds 250

pesos, the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed.

The same rule shall be applied when the offenders are armed, but the value of the

property taken does not exceed 250 pesos.

When said offenders do not carry arms and the value of the property taken does not

exceed 250 pesos, they shall suffer the penalty prescribed in the two next preceding

paragraphs, in its minimum period.

If the robbery be committed in one of the dependencies of an inhabited house, public

building, or building dedicated to religious worship, the penalties next lower in degree

than those prescribed in this article shall be imposed.

Art. 300. Robbery in an uninhabited place and by a band. — The robbery mentioned in

the next preceding article, if committed in an uninhabited place and by a band, shall be

punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided therefor.

Art. 301. What is an inhabited house, public building or building dedicated to religious

worship and their dependencies. — Inhabited house means any shelter, ship or vessel

constituting the dwelling of one or more persons, even though the inhabitants thereof

shall temporarily be absent therefrom when the robbery is committed.

All interior courts, corrals, waterhouses, granaries, barns, coach-houses, stables or

other departments or inclosed places contiguous to the building or edifice, having an

interior entrance connected therewith, and which form part of the whole, shall be

deemed dependencies of an inhabited house, public building or building dedicated to

religious worship.

Orchards and other lands used for cultivation or production are not included in the

terms of the next preceding paragraph, even if closed, contiguous to the building and

having direct connection therewith.

The term “public building” includes every building owned by the Government or

belonging to a private person not included used or rented by the Government,

although temporarily unoccupied by the same.

Art. 302. Robbery is an uninhabited place or in a private building. — Any robbery

committed in an uninhabited place or in a building other than those mentioned in the

first paragraph of Article 299, if the value of the property taken exceeds 250 pesos,

shall be punished by prision correccional if any of the following circumstances is

present:

1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for entrance or

egress.

2. If any wall, roof, flour or outside door or window has been broken.

3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys, picklocks or other

similar tools.

4. If any dorm, wardrobe, chest or by sealed or closed furniture or receptacle has been

broken.

5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, has

been removed even if the same to broken open elsewhere.

When the value of the property takes does not exceed 250 pesos, the penalty next

lower in degree shall be imposed.

In the cases specified in Articles 294, 295, 297, 299, 300, and 302 of this Code, when

the property taken is mail matter or large cattle, the offender shall suffer the penalties

next higher in degree than those provided in said articles.

Art. 303. Robbery of cereals, fruits, or firewood in an uninhabited place or private

building. — In the cases enumerated in Articles 299 and 302, when the robbery

consists in the taking of cereals, fruits, or firewood, the culprit shall suffer the penalty

next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.

Art. 304. Possession of picklocks or similar tools. — Any person who shall without

lawful cause have in his possession picklocks or similar tools especially adopted to the

commission of the crime of robbery, shall be punished by arresto mayor in its

maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who shall make such tools. If the

offender be a locksmith, he shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its

medium and maximum periods.

Art. 305. False keys. — The term “false keys” shall be deemed to include:

1. The tools mentioned in the next preceding articles.

2. Genuine keys stolen from the owner.

3. Any keys other than those intended by the owner for use in the lock forcibly opened

by the offender.

Responses to the Problem of Bank RobberyAnalyzing your local problem will give you a better understanding of the factors that contribute to it. Once

you have analyzed your local problem and established a baseline for measuring effectiveness, you can

consider possible responses to the problem.

The following strategies will provide a foundation for addressing your particular bank robbery problem.

These strategies are drawn from a variety of studies and police reports. Several may apply to your local

problem.

It is critical that you tailor responses to local circumstances and that you can justify each response based

upon reliable analysis. In most cases, an effective strategy will involve several different responses.

Because law enforcement alone is seldom effective in reducing or solving the problem, do not limit

yourself to considering only what police can do; rather, carefully consider whether others in your

community share responsibility for the problem and whether they can help respond to it. Remember that

you are more likely to succeed if you can enlist the support of the actors and organizations that have the

capacity to implement the most effective responses. For more detailed information on shifting and sharing

responsibility, see Response Guide No. 3, Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety Problems.

General Requirements for an Effective Strategy

1. Enlisting the support of banks. Reducing bank robbery often requires that branches alter their

properties or management practices. To justify this shift, police should analyze bank robbery data to

distinguish between high risk and low risk properties, providing individual branches with explicit

guidance on preventive measures. Because most branches are guided by corporate policies and

practices, police need solid information to justify the recommended changes, particularly those that

may be costly. It is also important to secure the cooperation and involvement of as many banks as

possible, to ensure that banks nor branches feel unfairly targeted. For more detailed guidance on

shifting responsibility, see the companion guide to this series, S hifting and Sharing Responsibility for

Public Safety Problems.

2. Adopting a multijurisdictional approach. Because bank robberies are infrequent in smaller

jurisdictions, multijurisdictional efforts may be needed to provide sufficient data and to guide the

development of effective responses.

Multijurisdictional data about bank robberies—preferably several years worth—will provide a better

basis for statistical analysis. Because they are not common, the bank robberies within a single

jurisdiction can spike where the robberies are the result of a crime spree involving one or more

repeat offenders. In the short term, a serial robber can cause substantial fluctuations in the number

of bank robberies within a city or even a state; using longer term data adjusts for this phenomenon.

Because bank robbers travel farther than other criminals, often taking advantage of major

transportation corridors, regional or even statewide approaches have the potential to be particularly

effective. In addition, collating multijurisdictional data can provide a basis for increased cooperation

between banks, the FBI, and local police agencies.

3. Focusing on high risk branches. While basic preventive measures should be applied to all

branches, some special preventive measures should be focused on high-risk branches. It is critical

that you acknowledge the legitimacy of a bank’s profit motive.

It is unlikely that all branches will need to adopt a standardized set of preventive measures; some

branches will need different measures while others may need none. Insisting that all branches adopt

security practices that may be expensive is likely to create conflict between police and the financial

industry.

Branches that have already been successfully robbed face the highest risk of robbery in the future,

and this risk is most acute in the short term. Thus, prevention efforts should be implemented quickly

to increase the difficulty of future robberies. While such tactics may be short-term, immediacy is key;

the amount of preventive efforts should be increased proportionally based on the number and

success of previous robberies.

4. Focusing on specific types of bank robbery. Although it is tempting for police to focus

predominately on violent takeover robberies—and this reflects much of the federal interest in bank

robberies—robberies committed by unarmed, solitary offenders occur more often and may be easier

to deter.

Specific Responses to Bank Robberies

Because bank robbery prevention efforts can involve a variety of responses, it may be difficult to assess

the effectiveness of each individual strategy. The following section describes specific responses that can

be combined to form an effective bank robbery prevention strategy. Despite the importance of multiple

interventions, you should avoid trying a little bit of everything; instead, try to employ complementary

tactics.

Reducing Rewards to Robbers

5. Limiting cash access. Cash in banks is available at teller windows—the most frequent target of

robbers—and safes. Most banks have cash management policies, such as removing cash from teller

drawers when it reaches a predetermined amount. Some banks use vacuum systems to quickly and

efficiently remove cash from teller drawers. Although such cash management procedures can be

troublesome for tellers, they can help limit robbery losses.

Access to cash can be further limited through the use of an automatic cash dispensing unit (CDU),

which is positioned so that tellers must leave their stations to withdraw currency. The CDU limits the

amount a teller can withdraw, thus capping the amount that can be stolen. More importantly, the

CDU requires the teller to leave the window, thus reducing the exposure to violence and also

delaying the commission of the robbery. A longer robbery increases the risk of apprehension.81 One

Canadian bank reduced robberies 65 percent in two years by using such machines.82

Although most bank robberies target teller windows, takeover robberies may involve the vault; losses

in these robberies are usually much higher. Some banks have responded by limiting the amount of

cash they keep in their in their vaults or by using time delay safes that cannot be quickly accessed

by employees, even those under duress.

6. Using dye packs. Dye packs are widely used by banks to prevent stolen money from being used.

Dye packs stain both the robber and the cash, preventing use of the money and aiding in the

detection of the robber. Many dye packs are supplemented by tear gas which is triggered by an

electromagnetic field near the bank exit door; when tear gas explodes, the robber is effectively

immobilized. Dye packs and tear gas systems cost about $4,000 to install and about $500 per

pack.83 Dye packs are used by many banks, including 29 percent of banks that were robbed in

2000.84

Dye packs that stain both the robber and the cash are widely used by banks. Credit: 3SI Security Systems,

www.3sisecurity.com

Increasing Perceptions of Risk

7. Slowing the robbery. Because bank robbers want the crime to proceed quickly, some banks have

adopted strategies that are intended to slow the pace of the robbery. A slow robbery may increase

the suspect’s perception of risk and will sometimes cause him to abandon the crime.85

Resistance by bank employees can both thwart attempted robberies and limit the amount of cash

taken 86 Resistance can be active—refusing the robber’s demands, walking away from the teller

window, calling out for assistance, activating an alarm—or passive, as when employees act

hesitantly or otherwise slow down the robbery.87 Because there is some concern that employee

resistance can increase violence, the type and level of recommended resistance should relate to

specific conditions, such as the presence of bandit barriers88 or the absence of customers.

Interior obstacles such as revolving doors or customer service counters can slow the robber’s

escape; timed safes and withdrawal limits on cash dispensing machines can further increase  the

duration of the robbery.

8. Banning disguises. Some banks require that customers remove hats, sunglasses, or other apparel

that can be used as a disguise. Such a policy reduced the robbery rate 3 percent at bank branches

in Massachusetts.89 However, this policy may be impractical if customers are likely to be wearing

coats, scarves, or hats due to inclement weather.

9. Employing greeters. Bank employees known as greeters welcome customers and reduce the

anonymity of a would-be robber; this face-to-face interaction may discourage a robbery before it

occurs. Greeters should be trained to be alert to suspicious behavior. Greeters were part of a

package of measures that reduced robberies substantially at a Canadian bank.90 The response is

more likely to discourage amateur robbers than professionals.

10. Hiring security guards. There is disagreement regarding the effectiveness of bank security

guards.91 Guards are expensive, generating recurring costs for banks of about $50,000 per year.

They also may create an environment that makes customers fearful. Some research suggests that

guards reduce the risk of bank robbery,92 although 7 percent of banks robbed in 2001 had

guards.93 On the other hand, some studies suggest that armed guards increase the risk of violence

during a robbery.94 For this reason, some banks only use armed guards in branches with high

robbery rates.95

11. Warning likely offenders. Bank robbers tend to overestimate the amount of money they will get

from a robbery, to underestimate the likelihood of arrest, and to be unaware of the sentences they

face if convicted.96 Thus, some banks and trade associations have developed publicity campaigns

designed to educate would-be offenders about the low take, high capture rate, and other perils of a

career in bank robbery.97 This may be effective, depending upon the expectation of the robbers.

However, would-be robbers who know of offenders who have made big scores and have gone

undetected are unlikely to be deterred by publicity.

Increasing Risk of Apprehension

12. Using tracking devices. Some banks hide electronic tracking devices in the robbery money, thus

aiding police in locating offenders. Tracking devices use low voltage transmitting microchips with

transponders. So slim that they can be hidden in special packets of currency, these devices emit an

electronic signal that can be tracked by police. There have been no evaluations of the effectiveness

of these devices, but one FBI official stated that the system reduced bank robberies in his region by

55 percent.98 Since tracking devices are intended to increase the chance of apprehending

offenders, they are not likely to prevent robberies from occurring.

13. Using bait money. Bait money is cash with sequential serial numbers that are recorded by the

bank. When the money reenters circulation, police track its use in hopes of locating the suspect. Bait

money is already widely used by banks, even those that are robbed; 90 percent of banks robbed in

2001 used bait money.99

14. Offering rewards. Some banks actively publicize “most wanted” bank robbers, displaying their

surveillance photos and offering rewards for information leading to their capture. An initiative in

Massachusetts included the use of a website to post photos of most wanted offenders.100 Since

1991, one bank has paid out 166 rewards that resulted in the capture of 228 offenders at an average

cost of just over $3,000.101 Banks use websites, local silent witness programs, and tip lines to

publicize crimes and to seek out offenders. There are also national tip organizations that coordinate

information about highly mobile robbers.

15. Upgrading electronic surveillance. Bank surveillance cameras are in widespread use: 98 percent

of robbed banks have interior surveillance cameras.102 However, cameras do not appear to reduce

robberies. Many bank robbers are not deterred because they simply do not believe they will be

caught. Others believe that cameras can be thwarted with a disguise or by covert behavior or that

cameras can be disabled such as with spray paint; or they simply do not think about cameras at

all.103

Surveillance images are valuable for police in identifying and apprehending suspects and can aid in

prosecution as well. The use of good quality photographs during news broadcasts and on reward

programs has contributed to the apprehension of a number of offenders.

There are a variety of different types of surveillance, including constant imaging surveillance,

surveillance cameras that must be activated by employees, two-way surveillance cameras—visibly

located in lobbies to remind would-be offenders that they are under surveillance—and broad-band

internet video feeds directly to police.104

Although cameras have been credited as the key factor in about 25 percent of bank robbery

arrests,105 police are often critical of the quality of surveillance images, attributing poor images to

inferior or outdated equipment, failure of employees to activate cameras, or poor camera

performance in recording images, sometimes because of poor camera placement.106

Exterior surveillance cameras have not been widely used but have the potential to record license

tags or to document other details of an offender’s escape. Similarly, automatic license plate readers

have the potential to record the license plate of the offender’s getaway car.

16. Rapidly activating alarms. Alarms are in widespread use by banks but do not appear to reduce

robbery: 98 percent of banks robbed in 2001 had alarm systems.107 As early as 1986, research

found that robbers were not deterred by alarms, as they expected that the crime would proceed

quickly and that they would escape before the alarm was activated or before the police arrived.108

While alarms lead to the arrest of bank robbers in only about 6 percent of crimes,109 there is

evidence that prompt activation increases apprehension rates.110 Some bank employees do not

activate alarms until after the robber has left the premises, reflecting concerns about the safety of

employees and customers, lest police trap the robber inside the bank and provoke violence. In other

cases, the delay might be due to panic or to comply with instructions made by the robber.

Increasing Difficulty of Offending

17. Installing bandit barriers. The FBI recommends that banks install bullet-resistant glass barriers

between tellers and customers.111 While most of these are permanent installation, some bandit

barriers “pop-up” when activated by tellers or when an object crosses the counter. The prevalence of

bandit barriers and the extent of their effectiveness is not known. In the late 1970s, 44 percent of

banks in the Washington D.C. area had bandit barriers; these, however, did not prevent

robbery.112 Among robbed banks, 10 percent in the United States and 85 percent in Germany had

bandit barriers.113 In one bank, the installation of barriers reduced the risk of robbery by 25

percent.114 Even if bandit barriers do not prevent robberies, some research suggests that they

reduce the success of bank robberies. In the United Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland robberies

at banks with bandit barriers were less successful.

Some banks believe that bandit barriers increase robbery violence. Indeed, robbers took hostages in

17 percent of German banks with bandit barriers.115 Other banks are concerned that such barriers

adversely alter the banking environment.

Bandit barriers are relatively expensive—about $1,000 per linear foot116—and may put customers

and unprotected employees at a higher risk of violence. However, bandit barriers do prevent some

types of robbery (such as jump-over robberies) and may also reduce losses in individual robberies

as well.

Bandit barriers may discourage some bank robbers and also increase the safety of bank employees. Credit: Clear

Security Systems, www.clearsecuritysystems.com

18. Limiting bank access. Access to bank lobbies can be limited by keys, entry cards, or other special

identification systems, such as personally encoded cards or identification numbers. Such systems

can be overridden by bank employees to permit access. Another method of limiting access is the

use of a revolving door that is timed to restrict the number of customers who can enter the bank.

19. Installing access control vestibules. Access control vestibules—also known as man-catcher

vestibules or man-traps—are a specialized form of access control device. These devices can be

used to scan potential customers for weapons before they access the bank interior; others are

designed to be manually activated by tellers. All contain bullet-resistant glass and range in price from

$10,000 to $20,000.117Although these devices may prevent armed robbers from gaining entrance,

they do not guarantee that a robbery will not occur.

20. Hardening targets. Studies show that physical and perceptual objects that seem as if they might

slow a robber’s escape tend to reduce a bank’s attractiveness as a target.118 Thus, banks have

employed a wide variety of target-hardening strategies that are designed to make the bank interior

appear inhospitable to would-be robbers. These include revolving doors, increased distances

between entrances and teller stations, higher teller counters, queuing and other physical barriers,

and single door entrances and exits.119 Other strategies include increasing the visibility within and

into the bank by avoiding physical features such as columns that block sight lines. Although such

environmental strategies seem promising, they have not been carefully evaluated.

Responses With Limited Effectiveness

21. Increasing criminal sanctions. Convicted robbers, especially habitual offenders, already face stiff

penalties. Once convicted, about 80 percent of robbers are incarcerated; the average prison

sentence is 137 months.120 Use of a firearm during the commission of a robbery further increases

the punishment. Although some robbers assess the severity of punishment in committing a crime,

research suggests that criminals give more weight to potential rewards than to increases in

punishment. Consequently, further penalty increases are unlikely to have an added deterrent effect.

22. Limiting media coverage Some jurisdictions limit media coverage of bank robberies to reduce the

likelihood of copycat crimes. Although such measures are inexpensive and have little downside,

there is no evidence that copycat bank robberies actually occur.121

23. Training employees to spot suspicious behavior. To deter robbers, police often advise bank

employees to watch for suspicious behavior. Branches, however, have such predictable designs and

consistent operations that less than 20 percent of robbers even case their targets. In fact, many

robbers do not even go inside the bank prior to robbing it,122 [bb] making it unlikely that suspicious

behavior will be detected. This is true regardless of the type of offender: amateur robbers can be

difficult to detect because they strive to blend in with other customers, whereas takeover robbers act

too quickly for their behavior to become noticeable. Although a bank employee in hindsight may

describe a robber’s behavior as suspicious, robbery is such a rare event that most employees will be

unable to do so prospectively.

Federal law requires that all U.S. bank employees receive training about bank security, including

what to do in the event of a robbery; how to deal with hostage situations; how to activate alarms and

cameras; how to use dye packs and other tracking devices; and how to be a good witness and

preserve evidence. Employee training can help assuage the emotional effects of victimization, may

help reduce robbery violence, and can assist in investigations. Such training can include videos or

simulated scenarios that are intended to provide employees with something of a realistic robbery

experience. In settings with high employee turnover, frequent training may be needed.

Employees do not always closely follow policies or comply with training and some police have

developed additional training to reinforce the importance of employee behaviors during and after a

robbery. For example, police in New York developed special training after noting that many bank

employees failed to notify police or to activate surveillance systems in a timely fashion, failed to

safeguard crime scenes, and were unable to provide useful suspect descriptions.123

24. Increasing police efforts to deter and apprehend bank robbers. There is little evidence that extra

police presence is an effective or efficient use of resources, although arresting a prolific robber can

halt a short-term robbery pattern. Although some robbers assess the environment and are deterred

by frequent patrols or by the close proximity of banks to police stations,124 this deterrent effect is

likely slight. Police stakeouts and other undercover operations are very expensive and have not

been found effective in reducing bank robberies. The primary purpose of stakeouts is to observe a

robbery in progress, but the specific timing of a bank robbery is hard to predict; there were no

robberies or attempts in 20 high risk banks during a seven week police undercover operation that

required the effort of 40 officers.125

Historically, much police effort to reduce bank robbery has focused on improving security practices

that result in investigative evidence. These practices include improving the quality of surveillance

images and employing tracking devices. Although these techniques can aid police after a robbery

has occurred, they are unlikely to reduce the incidence of bank robberies.

Bank robbery arrests appear to arise from a variety of factors: surveillance photographs, rapid

response to alarms,126 tips from citizens or informants, or a patrol officer spotting a license

tag.127 Police blockades are sometimes employed to catch robbers; these involve securing the

geographic area around a robbed branch to prevent the robber from fleeing the scene. Because

police may have descriptions of offenders or escape vehicles, such practices can be effective when

transportation corridors are limited. In dense urban areas with many avenues for escape, however,

blockades are not effective.128 Physical evidence can also play a role in the arrest and conviction of

robbery suspects. Not only can physical evidence obtained from demand notes and other robbery

tools be used to convict individual robbery suspects, but separate robberies may be linked through

forensic evidence,  handwriting analysis, the repetition of specific wording in notes or verbal

commands, or similarities in modus operandi.