C H A P T E R II

SINGAPORE 1 S FOREIGN POLICY

THE DETERMINANTS

74

CHAPTER II

SINGAPORE'S FOREIGN POLICY: THE DETERMINAlifTS

The foreign policy of a country is goverhed by certain

o~ective conditions such as its historical experiences,

socio-political setting, economic conditions, geopolitical

situation, and strategic location. Singapore is no exception.

Its historical legacy, the impact of British colonialism,

consequences of joining and later seperation ::Erorn Malaysian

Federation in 1965, experience during Indonesian Confronta-

tion (1963-66), its demography, geopolitical situation, and

$trategic location, it:s economic and strategic vulnerability

to the regional as well as world powers, and finally, decision

of withdrawal by the British, the major anchor power which had

guaranteed not only the security of the Republic but contributE f..-

a great deal to its economy, all in a combined fa~ion shaped

its foreign policy attitudes. Certain tendencies which had

grown out of historical experiences - as, for example, anti­

colonial~( anti-imperialism, anti-communism had been re­

inforced by its geopolitical and strategic location.

Singapore, with a population of 2.6 million and an

area of 620.5 square kilometres, was one of the smallest

countries in Asia. It consisted of the island of Singapore

and some 57 isle~s within its territorial waters, was sltuated

between latitudes 1 degree, 9 minutes Horth and 1 degree 29

minutes .. Horth, and lonqi tudes 103 degree 38 minutes !!last and

75

104 degree 6 minutes East,and lay about 137 kilometres north

of the 1 equator.

Despite its size, its economic growth after its

independence and the large measure of political stability

it had achieved,impressed the world. Its successes were

quoted as ideal not only for the Third World but also for the

advanced countries. Its gross national product had risen

steadilyo Its average annual.growth of Real Gross Domestic

Product per capita had also been impressive, averaging 12.7

percent and 10.7 percent between 1965 and 1973, 8.7 percent

and 5.8 percent between 1973 and 1979 and 8.6 percent and 7.3

percent between 1979-80 respectively. 2 Official foreign

reserves had shown a spectacular increase tog$ 12.6 billion

3 in 1979. These were rather impressive figures especially in

view of the fact that there were many who, after Singapore's

separation from Malaysia in August 1965, had opined that the

new Republic would crumble economically without the Malaysian

hinterland. Its singularly autonomous separate political

identity,. economic development and the large degree of

political stability acl:ieved over the years had been a source

of great satisfaction for its leaders, especially for its

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who had been guide as well as

1 1cited in Singapore, Facts and Pictures 1986(Singapore, Ministry of Comnication and Information, 1986), p.l.

2see Lawrence B Krause, Koh A; Tee and Lee (Tsao)Yuan, The Sin a re Econom Reconsidered(Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987 , p.6.

3 See Singapore Facts and Figures, (Singapore, 1968),p.70.

76

Chief articulator of Singapore's foreign policy since 1959.

It would be interesting to note that as early as March 1957,

he had observed during a legislative assembly debate that the

idea of an independent Singapore was 11 a political, economic,

and geographical absurdity 11•

4

The impressive economic growth and political stability

had taken place against the backdrop of considerable political

infighting and economic uncertainty. The 1950s had been

trying years for the island-colony. The struggle of the

Communist United Front for political supremacy coincided with

heightened nationalist fervour. It was against this background

that the People's Action Party (PAP) was born and ultimately

triumphed in the 1959 elections designed to mak~ Singapore

a self-governing colony. However, Lee Kuan Yew's victory

proved pyrrhic. This was mainly because the communists and

the non-commhnists, more precisely the left and moderates,

were united in a marriage of convenience to oust the British

colonialists and their local supporters. Following the

electoral victory where the PAP had won 37 out of 51 seatsJ,·the

internal struggle for control of Singapore began. In retros-

pect, Lee Kuan Yew came to deseribe the political setting as

ppe in whicha

4singapore, Legislative Assembly Debates, vol.2, 5 March 1957, col.1471.

77

We tacitly understood that communists ru1d their fellow travellers would be admitted into the ranks of the party in a united front for the struggle ~6r independence against the British •••• We were riding a tiger and we knew it. No non-communist faction in any united front of the communists had ever emerged in one piece, let alone retain its grip over the United Front organization. Hence many political correspondents believed we were more knaves than fools• (5)

The years between 1959 and 1963 proved to be politically

chaotic years for Singapore. In 1963, it joined Malaysia

and by doing so, the moderates in the PAP, under the steward-

ship of Lee Kuan Yew, Toh Chin Chye, Goh Keng Swee and S.

Rajaratnam succeeded with the help from government in Kuala

Lumpur to undedcut by various means the influence and image

of the Left. For instance, on 2 February 1963 'Operation

Cold Store' was carried out on orders of the Internal Security

Council, where more than a hundred pro-communist political,

trade unions and student leaders were arrested, including half

of the members of the Barisan Sosialis' Central Executive

Committee.

On the basis of massive electoral victory in the

Referendum for merger in 1962, Singapore had joined the new

Federation of Malaysia. This membership, however proved to be

a mistake for the long term political health of both Singapore

and Malaya. The difficulties lay in thB fact that both could

5Lee Kue.n Yew, "What of the Past is Relevant to the Future"?, Peo le's Action Part 1954-1979 Petir 25th Anni­versary Issue Singapore~ Central Executive Committee, PAP, .. _...,,.... \

78

not agree on the basis of their mutual relationship. Of greater

danger was the fact that during the tenure of its membership in

new Federation, Singapore had been gripped by communally­

oriented politics that culminated in the racial riots of 1961.

In the light of this experience, on 9 August 1965 Singapore was

separated from Malaysia and an independent Singapore became a

painful reality for the PAP. It was in these difficult circum-

stances, especially its unexpectedly sudden birth as an indepen-

dent state that the PAP leadership had to steer the Republic on

a course of political, economic and military survival.

Survival, according to the Singapore leaders, meant the

task of inculcating new values in a hetrogenious population,

which was often loyal to their countries of origin and which had

little sense of common national identity. Accordingly, after

1965, the PAP Government felt that it was important for the

Singaporeans to acquire non-ideological pragmatic values related

6 to the concepts of multiracialism and multilingualism. By

multiracialism, the Singapore leaders meant the practice of

mutual cultural tolerance towards one another and acceptance

of differences in religions practices. As regards multi-

lingualism, the Singapore leaders always advocated it as they

considered it unwise within the Southeast Asian context to

accord the Chinese language a predominant status in the Multi-

6 Lee Boon-Hock, "Singapore, Reconciling the Survival Ideology with the Achievement concept", Southeast Asian Studies, 1978, p.229.

79

lingual Singaporean society. The political strategy under­

lining these two concepts was determined by the realization

that for a predominantly Chinese island state to survive in

Southeast Asia, it was essential not to be labelled as third

China. 7

In terms of economic policy, the idea of survival was

linked to the concept of the "global city" first proposed by

• 'It'"\ lq 72...;. the Singapore foreign Minister s. RaJaratnamA ·~his concept

suggested that if Singapore had to survive, it must establish a

relationship of interdependence in the rapidly expanding global

8 economic system. This implied an economic policy which empha-

sised a world market for Singapore's products rather than the

one oriented towards the regional trade. However, after the fal

of Indochina to the communists, this "global city" concept had

been modified to allow for greater economic, and political co-

operation with the member countries of the Association of South­

east Asian Nations (ASEAN). Nevertheless in 1965 survival meant

that the economy would have to shift from one which relied on

shipping, insurance, an entrepot trade and the British military

bases, to one which stressed industrialization, banking, finance

and the tourist trade. 0..

This meant~shift in the economic policy

from one of import substitution to that of outward-looking

export-oriented policy of industrialization.

80

The political strategy of survival had taken many forms

on the domestic level. 13asically, the PAP government had

attempted to mould the nature and style of politics, economic

growth and social life into certain desired end-results. An

important objective had been the achievement of political

stab~ility in the island state which would remove much of the

uncertainty and turmoil in Singapore politics in the postwar

period. Political stability would, also, give foreign investors

considerable confidence that their investments would not be

adversely affected because of some unpredictable political event.

Chan Heng Chee, a well-known political scientis~ suggestec

three important elements in the survival ideology. The first

was the PAP's firm belief that Singapore's survival depended

on the "willingness and ability to adopt a new set of attitudes,

a new set of values, a new set of perspectivet in short, on the

creation of a new man". A second aspect of the ideology of

survival was the PAP Government's insistence on producing a

tightly organized society. In other words, the government

believed that the best chances for Singapore's survival lay in

its ability to mobilize to the maximum what it was capable ofe

The third theme of the survival ideology stressed the nation­

building task which was an important objective in the early

pays of the young Republic. The political theme of survival

had been, therefore, developed and utilized by the Singapore

Government to legitimise and justify their domestic policies

81

and its stance towards the outside world. 9

Keeping in view the immensity of problems of survival,

the early years of the independent Republic were made still

more trying because of the far from placid international

environment. The Americans, with some half a million soldiers,

were committed to fighting a war in Indochian. China was in

the throes of a cultural revolution. Sukarno's Indonesia was

committed to a policy of Konfrontasi' with Malaysia and

Singapore. The British had given early indication of a possib~e

withdrawal from 'East of Suez'. In due course it culminated in

the withdrawal of the British military presence from Singapore

a presence that had hitherto been crucial to the external

defense of the Republic. How did a small state, almost defense-

less and surrounded by large antagonistic neighbours survive?

It was in these circumstances that the PAP leadership had to lay

out its foreign policy goals and precepts. In this connection,

it would be necessary first to study the basic determinants

which shaped the countr~,-' s foreign policy.

Key Factors

Strategic Location

Being one of the two smallest states in Southeast Asia

(the other being Brunei), geography dominated the outlook of

Singapore's leaders. Located at the 9outhern end of the Straits

of Malacca, it is a focal point and hub of east-west, north-south

82

trade and air-sea communications. It is a gateway to both the

Indian and Pacific Oceans. Because of its location it acquired

the focal position as the crossroads between two oceans and two

continents and naturally became the meeting point of local and

international shipping routes. 1-\tsto'cically, it inherited its

position as a trading and business centre of Southeast Asia

possessing the deepest harbour and dock facilities within a

thousand-mile radius. Not surprisingly, it became the linchpin

of Southeast Asia. The location and modern infrastructure made

the Republic the second busiest port in the world after Rotterdam

Until the British implemented their ,,,i thdrawal from "East of Suez

the Republic had been the nexus of an important military base

which was pivotal to the whole system of Western defence in the

region. Because of its strategic location guarding one end of

the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the Republic's significanc0-

as a strategic asset did not recede following the British

Government's decision to close down its Singapore base in 1971.

Indeed Singapore had oecome one place in Southeast Asia where O.'W'\tl

the strategic interests of all the external powers met,~even

merged. This had further invited external attention to the

Republic. Added to its small size and strategic location,

the foreign policy perceptions of the leaders of the ·Republic

had been conditioned by its location between two large Malay

neighbours: Malaysia to the north and Indonesia to the south.

The proximity to these two states with divergent ethnic-

religious-political orientations and which had not always been

friendly had created complex security problems for the Republi.

At the same time, geography had also allowed the Republic

to play a predominant role in regional and global affairs

out of proportion to its size as it gave it a freedom of

83

0 action and choice in p~itical, social and economic matters.

In Lee Kuan Yew's words: "we are not landlocked. We are a

centre of great communications. The crossroads between the

northern and southern hemispheres between the East and West ••• I '

all centres of great learning and civilization. And it is

this factor which we must exploit". 10

Thus the sensitivity to regional and global develop-

ments had been an important aspect of Singapore's foreign

policy and this was something which had been regularly stressed

by the leadership since 1965.

Demography

According to the latest available data Singapore had a

population of 2.6 million in mid-1986, with the Chinese nwnbering

1.97 million (76.6 percent), Malays 387,400 (14.7 percent),

Indians 166,800 (6.4 percent) and others 60,000 (2.3 pereent). 11

Singapore became the only state in Southeast Asia to have

political power vested in the hands of the local Chinese after

independence. Inspi te of the racial heterogeneity, the pre­

dominantly Chinese population placed Singapore apart from its

Malay neighbours. In Singapore, not only were the Chinese in

10 Cited in Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew(Singapore, 1~68), p.641.

11 Monthl~ Digest of Statistics(Singapore, Department

of Statistics,ingapore), January 1987, pp.3-4.

84

a numerical majority, they were also dominant politically and

economically. In short, in Singapore the Chinese hegemony

prevailed. In addition to creating problems of nation building

and national identity, the Chinese majarity position in Singapore

created a natural racial barrier in the region. The Chinese in

Southeast Asia had been the object of envy, even persecution

and were perceived as a potential fifth column and a vanguard o~

expansionism by the Peoples• Republic of China. In view of

this racial perception, the prepondenence of Chinese demogra­

phic strength had created security problems and the Republic had

been charged with being a 'Third China'. Viewed largely as a

'Chinese state' in a 'H~tlay world •, the Republic faced acute

political, economic, and military problems vis-a-vis its larger

and often difficult and sensitive Malay neighbours and this

had played a crucial role in shaping the security perceptions

and foreign policy of Singapore. In short, the demographic

make up of Singapore placed constraints on the Singapore

leadership and had invoked the need to be cautious in order to

reduce concern in Malaysia and Indonesia that the city-state

might become a satel~te of the PRC or even give hope to the

Chinese minorities in the two states. It was to reduce the

"Chineseness" of Singapore that since independence the

Republics• leaders had been stressing on a multi-racial,

multi-cultural and multi-religious Singapore. More importantly,

the Prime Minister had warned the Chinese majority in Singapore:

"If you want a Chinese chauvinist society, failure is assured.

85

Singapore will surely be isolated. But even if you are

not isolated and you extend your chauvinistic influence to

our neighbour (Malaysia), they will if they find no way out,

join up with another big neighbour (Indonesia) to deal with

you."12

Thus the racial tolerance in domestic politics had been

emphasised as this had been seen to have widespread foreign

policy implications, especially vis-a-v!s the two Malay

neighbours.

Bconomy

Since Stamford Raffles founded Singapore in 1819,

entrepot trade had been mainly responsible for the island's

economic growth. Lacking in almost all natural resources,

the Republic thrived economically by using the region as its

hinterland. Besides its excellent geographical position, its

other major asset economically had been its hardworking, highly

skilled population. Historically, its population had inherited

an immigrant zeal which bestowed the people with qualities of

hardwork and togetherness in extrer~ly difficult and ever

changing circumstances. Singapore's role as an entrepot centre

c~e under threat as its neighbours began to market their produc

directly and thus reduced the need for a middleman. This

reality was recognized by the PAP from the very start. The

12 The Straits Times, 6 March 1966.

86

Republic was forced to diversify its economy. The successful

diversification was well reflected in the net foreign exchange

earnings in 1979. Out of a total income ofS$ 19.5 in 1979,

manufacturing accounted for 31 percent, transport and commu­

nications 25 percent, finance, business and other services 1.2

percent, and trade 13 percent. 13 This was a far cry from the

pre-1965 era where trade was the principal foreign exchange

earner. Economic nationalism of the neighbouring states and

later the British military withdrawal were mainly responsible

for forced transformation of the Republic's orientation from

being a 1 regional' to a 1 global city'. On 6 February 1972,

foreign minister s. Rajaratnam explained Singapore's 'global

city• role in the following terms: "It is my contention that

Singapore is becoming a component of that system (global citles)­

not a major component but a growingly im0ortant one. It is in

this sense that I have chosen to describe Singapore as a global

city. This is why all the gloomy predictions about the future

of an independent Singapore have been proved wrong. The

pessimistic scenario was written on the assumption that an

independent Singapore would be a self-contained city state~

that it would, at the most, be a regional city and therefore

its fate and fortunes would depend wholly on the economic climate

0£ the region. The economic climate would have consequences

for us economically, politically and militarily.

13 Singapore, Facts and Pictures, Singapore, 1980, pp.58-9.

87

But we are more than a regional city. We draw sustenance

not only from the region but also from the intern.3tional economic

system to which as a global city we belong and which will be

the final arbiter of whether we prosper or decline.

If we view Singapore's future not as a regional city

but as a global city then the smallness of Singapore, the

absence of a hinterland, or raw materials and a large domestic

market are not fatal or ittsurmountable handicaps. It would

explain why, since independence, we have been successful eco-

nomically and, consequently, have ensured political and social

stabili ty 11•

14

As a result Singac)ore became a major financial and

banking centre and depended on world trade for its economic

viability and buoyancy. The total lack of natural resources

and its near total dependence on world trade had rendered the

Republic's economy vulnerable to the vagaries of world trade

cycles. This in turn affected the country's political health

and generated serious implications for security. It was in

this regard that foreign policy had come to be viewed as an

important tooi for the advancement of the country's economic

growth. As a result of the successful economic strategy,

Singapore had attained a standard of living which was second

only to Japan in Asia. From this success came peace and

14cited in Chan Heng Chee and Obaid Ul Haq, (eds.), The Prophetic and the Political: Selected Speeches & Writings of s. Rajaratnam(Singapore, 1987), pp.226-7.

88

stability. Nevertheless, despite the economic !)regress, the

lack of raw materials and resources, the limited size of the

domestic economy and the dependence on foreign trade and

investments had made Singapore exceptionally vulnerable to

external pressures, which in turn placed constraints on the

country's foreign policy and hence forced it to be excessively

concious of international developments.

Political Experience

Over and above geography, demography and economy, the

Singapore leadership's foreign policy perception had been influ­

enced to a considerable degree by its political experiences.

Before Singapore became an independent and sovereign state, the

PAP leaders believed that an independent Singapore was a

political joke. 15 This belief was largely shaped by the cons-

traints imposed by geography, lack of natural resources and

demography which would have made Singapore unviable as an

independent state. Equally significant was the turbulent period

through which the PAP initially guided the country, especially

with reference to the violent labour strikes, racial riots and

communist and non-communist struggle for power.

The PAP was the sole political party to have held power

ever since Singapore had become a self-governing state in 1959.

Since October 1966, when all the Barisan Sosialis MPs had

resigned and vowed to take their fight to the streets, the PAP

15see Bilveer Singh, of a Small State(Occasional

l

89

had emerged and remained without an opposition in the Parlia­

ment. Although the PAP's rule in Singapore had since then be­

come the most prominent feature in the polity, Opposition

parties were allowed to function and they did, in fact, contest

16 the general elections.

Nevertheless the opposition parties in Singapore had

been clearly in disarray. This was despite the fact that in

the 1972 elections seven opposition candidates (five belonging

to the opposition parties and two independent candidates) had

managed to win thirty percent of the votes. The leading opposition

party, the Barisan Sosialis (which, according to the PAP govern­

ment had been a pro-communist party) had been weakened. This

had resulted from detention of their leaders, their conversion

during the period of imprisonment, or expulsion from the country.

In addition they were at a disadvantage because of the intra­

party personality conflicts and ideological disputes.17

16 It should be noted, however, that none of the opposition parties candidates was returned in any of these elections. Use­ful news paper accounts and party statements in the three elect­ions held in 1968, 1970 and 1972 could be found in the works compiled by Alex Josey: The Crucial Years Ahead: Republic of Singapore General Elections 1968(Singapore, 1968)1 Democracy in Singapore: The 1970 By-Election§(Singapore, 1970)7 The Singapore General Elections 1972(Singapore 1972). Pang Cheng Lian in her study of the PAP suggested that it was very m1.1.Ch similar to the party of Revolutionary Institutions of Me~ico which was "a dominant non-dictatorial party''~-~- Chan Heng Chee asserted that Singapore was a de-facto one~s~ate. See Pang Chen Lian Sin a re•s Peo les' Action Part - Its Histor , Organization and Leadership Singapore, 1970 , p.77, and Chan Heng Chee, Singayore: The Politics of survival, 1965-1967 (Singapore, 1971 , p.51.

17 See Thomas J. Bellows, "The Singapore Party System",

Journal of Southeast Asian HistoSY, vol.8, No.1 March 1967, pp.122-381 Thomas J. Bellows, The Peoples Action Partn of Singapore : Emerg~nce of a Dominant Party System(Newaven:

90

As regards other opposition parties, one observer described

them as being "implausible and faction ridden groups of mal­

contents with no political base. Most are led by western.h:ed

liberals who meet with little sup:)':)rt in the population at

large for their complaints about infringements of civil

18 liberties".

The PAP government had aisplayed a rather ambivalent

19 attitude towards the role and desirability of an opposition •

. . . . . . . Yale University Southeast Asian studies, Monograph series No.14, 1970); and P. Naidu, "Why the Barisan Socialis Failed in its constitutional struggle for power", Journal of the Political Science Society, No.1, November 1971, pp.19-22.

18see Dick Wilson, The Future Role of SingaporeJLondon, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 197~), p.19.

19The two statements made by s. Rajaratnam, the foreign minister and director of the PAP's political bureau, were indi­cative of the PAP's outlook. "In a living democracy theJre must be a government and there must be an opposition. And the OPPP­sition must learn to play its role. To do this, two things are necessary. There is the image that an opposition party should project to the people. First, that it is capable of effective and intelligent criticism, can make articulate the dissatisfa­c·tions, the aspirations of the people ••• Second, it mast present itself as a practical alternative to the ruling party •.. #It must put forward ideas, suggestions, within the framework of a par­liamentary system ••• We hope there will be an effective opposition which will give us a run for our money. We are not going to create an opposition. Nothing could be more insulting to the country and voters ••• That means we will fight every election, and concede victory only to an opposition which has the mettle, the guts, the intelligence, to outwit us". Opposition for the sake of opposition is meaningless. It has nothing to do with promoting or strengthening democracy ••• only an opposition which can come out with better solutions to problems offered by the ruling party can become a genuine and meangiriiEul opposition •••• I don't believe that a one-party Parliament can endanger democracy or neglect the interests of the people, any more than a multi­party Parliament can safeguard de~ocracy and promote the welfare of the people". From his speeches in 1966 and 1971, quoted in Alex Josey, ~cracy in Singapore:The 1970 By-Elections(Singapore 1970), pp.1-2.

91

on the one hand, it had recognised that "in a living democracy •••

there mas:t be an opposition", and had deplored the lack of one.

On the other it stated that more important "than parliamentary

democracy on western lines, was good government by good men,

and that outside of the PAP there was no other group of "able,

honest, and dedicated men" capable of ".Safeguarding the conti­

nued stability and progress" of Singapore. 20

Various measures taken by the PAP government seemed to

indicate its desire to perpetuate its own rule and to work

against any opposition candidate aspiring for the office.

These measures included:(a) deliberately causing internal di­

ssention and disruption by infiltrating opposition parties1 21

(b) unfavourable campaign tactics such as allowing only the

legally minimum number of days (nine working days) for campaign­

ing, and choosing a date of election most suitable for the PAP; 22

(c) limiting air time on television and radio to recognised

political parties fielding ten or more candidates, and strictly

controlling party rallies, and the number, size and location of

banners, and posters each candidate could display1 23 (d)

controversial electoral laws such as those requiring the taking

down of voters' numbers on the counterfoil of serially numbered

2°From statements of the Lee Kuan Yew and s. Rajaratnam in Alex Josey, The Singaoore's General Elections, 1972, pp.57-9.

21Alex Josey, Singapore General Elections 1972, pp.83-4. Wilard A Hanna,"How to win a clea~ sweep in Free elections", AUFS Reports:Southeast Asia Series, vol.20, No.ll(November 1972)

22 See Alex Josey, ~, pp.l-2.

23~, p.109o

!12

ballots (and thereby making it possible to trace how a par·ti­

cular voter voted and requiring political parties to submit

24 their accounts for periodic inspection1 and (e) inhibiting

the opposition's campaign by closely mmnitoring all statements

and swiftly issuing summons when speeches crossed the limits of

25 tolerance.

The attitude of the PAP governmentcould be ascribed,

at least partly, to the fact that it viewed members of the

underground Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to be its real

opponents. Although the MCP had only a limited influence in

Singapore, the PAP had always been reminding the public

24 The former law was still a matter of some controversy

even among high officials and PAP supporters. See for example the exchange of letters between the Dean of the Law Faculty of the University of Singapore and others in the Straits Times, 14 January 1974, 15 January 1974, 17 January 1974 and 21 January 1974.

25 After the 1972 elections the Secretary General of the Peoples Front Party was imprisoned for six months for writing about the President of Singapore as "Slavish" and "a puppet". A Barisan Sosialis candidate was also imprisoned for six months for "criminally defaming", the Prime Minister by calling h:lm "one of the biggest scoundrels in the world, not only in Singapore", the Barisan Sosialis to pay exemplary damages of $ 50,000 to Lee Kuan Yew for other "scurrilous, vicious and unfounded attacks". Alex Josey, n.16, pp.17, 62, 87 and "Singa­pore Survey", Financial Times, 1 October 1975, p.17.

93

that "they should not ~orget that it is the primary objective

of the Malayan Comnunist Party to bring about economic decline

through civil disturbances 11•

26

In addition, the PAP government had later on identified

the "New L .. eft" as its another rei'!l opponent. According to

Finance Minister Goh K~ng Swee and Foreign Minister S Rajaratnam

these 11 non-co;Tu!w.nist subversives included: .ti) "crack pot

academics", ( ii) "groups and people in search of a movement •••

who bear some resemblance to the hotch potch of contending

radical movements that swept through western Europe and the

Americans in the sixties and early seventies and which have

now degenerated into openly criminal and terrorist insurrect­

ionist groups", (iii) "foreign intellectuals and journalists

who are unhappy to witness successful Asian experiments in self-

government", and ( i v) 11 a clandes·tine organization ••• operating

in Singapore to generate and sustain rumours 11•

27

The concept of democracy for the Lee Kuan Yew meant

11 the principle that the people should at periodic elections

elect their representatives who had then the mandate to govern

for a fixed number of years in accordance with their programne

policy". 28 Besides this fundamental right of the people to choose

26 Far Eastern Economic Review, vol.85, No.26, 1 July 1974, p.lS.

27 See FEER, vol.85, No.36, 13 September 1974, pp.18-25~ 26, vol.85, No.33;-Allgust 23, 1974, p.32. See also S Rajaratnam, 11 The New Left", The Mirror, vol.lO, No.49, 9 December 1974, pp.1-6.

28 Statement by Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, Legislative Assembly Debates, vol.18(June 12- July 6, 1962), vol.684.

94

their own leadership and government, the various aspects of

the democratic system inherited from the British had to be

"adopted, adjusted, and amended", to meet local conditions

29 and changing circumstances. In 1967, Lee Kuan Yew had

publicly stated: "He have departed in quite a number of

material aspects, from the 0rinciples of justice, and the

liberty of the individual .. .620 criminal detainees on whom the

due processes of law were unable to place even an iota of

evidence. To let them out would be to run the very grave

risk of undermining the whole social fabric ••• we have had to

adjust, to temporarily aeviate from ideas and norms. This is

a heavy price. We have over a hundred political detainees, men

against whom we are unable to~ove anything in a court q~ law.~~·

However, certain additional measures taken by the PAP

government since 1965 made some observers more concerned with

0 what they called "a g~wing trend of authoritarianism and

31 regimentation" in Singapore. There were Singaporeans who

dubbed the PAP rule as "fascist" or "police state". They

mentioned among other things, the ab~tion of trial by Jury,

the suppression of two newspapers (in 1971), the pressure for

family planning, the requirement of a "suitability certificate"

29 Alex Josey, n.16, p.18.

30 Quoted in Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew(Singapore, 1968), First edn., pp.42-3.

31For two highly critical studies of such developments in

Singapore, see Iain Buchanan, Sin aoore in Southeast Asiaz An Economic and Political A raisal London, 1972 , and T.J.S. George, Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore London, 1973).

95

(security clearance) for university entrance, the loss of

autonomy of Singapore's two universities, and the detention

without trial of 50 to 100 political prisoners. A vehement

cri 1;icism of the PAP rule was reflected in the following state­

ment made by lain Buchanans "Today the tiny Republic is perhaps

as regimented a society as that of either North or South Korea ••••

The extent and nature of this regimentation is ••• tangibly expre­

ssed in the nation's everyday life--in education, in industrial

relations, in public housing , in the Press, in the operation

of an extensive governmental cadre-system and the well

developed secret police network ••• legislation has strongly

emphasized social and political discipline, the introduction of

compulsory expression of loyalty to the state and the expansion

of martial organization in schools, the introduction of campul-

sory national service, rigid limitation of employee's bargaining

power, and the abolition of trial by Jury were among measures

1132 taken in the later half of 1960s.

Though the Singapore government had not been very tolerant

of any kind of oppesition, the Republic was still a relatively

open society and not a "police state". Even though, in their

quest for security, stability and economic progress, the PAP

leaders had passed laws and resorted to action which appeared

harsh and undemocratic, it would be necessary to look at these

measures :1ot as operating in a western socio-cultural milieu but

32Ibid, pp.274-81o

96

in a society which did not have a long history or tradition of

politics, and whch was composed of various races, cultures, and

subcultures with different perceptions of the political process.

Certain scholars came out with justifications as to why p/(.p

government became quite undemocratic in its practice, while

maintaining the facade of democracy. They observed that& ~~

11 democratic regimentation" should be seen in t.he wider con·text

of the external and internal political, economic and communal

pressures within which Singapore was placed. In addition to

the problems of a young plural society with language and cultural

differentiation and loyalty, creating diverse focus of identity,

Singapore with its predominantly Chinese population had been often

regarded with suspicion and referred to as a "Third China" in

the region. This may be because of the poor image of itself as

Singapore had prlbjected in the past that of a "middle man"

living off the resources of its neighbours. It had been a fact

that Singapore had no natural resources apart from its harbours,

its gee-strategic position at the major international cross-

roads, and the intelligence, skill and determination of its people.

The PAP government's tbugh attitude toward persons

suspected of procommunist activities was consistent with its

political ideology of survival. Such an attitude was also

consistent with the notion of a £ightly organized society where

certain limits of freedom of speech, political action are pre­

defined by the government. Individuals whose actions might de­

stabilise the political system, particularly if the actions were

communist-inspired or racialistic in intent, were not tolerated

by the PAP government.

97

The PAP's approach to the problems of the polity caused

concern in the neighbouring countries and added ':o ~~he initial

problems between an independent Singapore and j_ts immediate

neighbours. It also created a sense of political fear which

dominated the Singapore leaders' thinking. As a result, a

strong belief got embedded in the leadership's world view that

the country could not afford to make mistakes or falter in any-

way and if it did, it would not be able to recover. This 'do

or die' attitude was vividly expressed by the Prime Minister

when he warned: "This time we are playing for keeps and if we

make a mistake there is no safety n~t underneath. You will

fall and the chances are you will never get up again". 33

This fear of failure had its impact on the country's foreign

policy and largely explained the cautious stance in its external

relations.

Factors Relating to Security

Singapore had always run the risk of political and

military conflict and had been vulnerable to the pressures of

exogenous powers. That sense of vulnerability could be ascribed

to many factors: location in a politically turbulent region,

limited territory, no physical ~esources, and only a pool of

human resources. Historically, this vulnerability had been

proved many times. After Singapore was founded in 1819 there

33 The Mirror, vo1.2. No.29, 18 July 1966.f.l.

98

was constant fear that the colony would be overrun by the

Dutch, then based in Batavia (present day Jakarta). There

was a three-and-a-half years of control by the Japanese during

World War II, and from 1948 until 1960, Singapore, together

with the Malay peninsula, was subjected to insurgency directed

by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). From 1954 to 1963, a

period that overlapped with the insurgency, Singapore endured

the violent activities of the Conununist United Front Organiza-

tion. More .acently, there was the 'confrontation' with Indo­

nesia during 1963-65 when Singapore was a part of Malaysia. 34

Since the end of World War II, the island had experienced a

series of ethnic or quasi-ethnic disturbances, at times fanned

by ideological considerations to such an extent that they became

a taboo subject not to be discussed in public. There could be

no public discussion on subjects such as commun~~m and

communism. The fear about security heightened when Singapore

was separated from Malaysia in 1965 and British government o} S.v.e -z...

1

took decision in 1968 to wi':hdraw its forces 'East!.. by 1971.

It was these experiences that made Singapore leaders highly

conscious of the possibilities and potentialities of insurgency

and regional conflict.

34 Between September 1963 and May 1965, a total of 37 bomb explosions in Singapore, and on at ~ast five occasions bombs were rendered harmless by the authorities. The worst incident occurred on 10 March 1965 when a bomb was exploded in a bank ~illing three persons and wounding thirtyfive. The threat of communist infilteration and subversion was demons­trated again by several less publicised events in the second part of 1977. The first was the arrest and conviction, ln September 1977, of a twenty-three, year old woman employee, Teo Geok Tin, at Chartered Industries Singapore Private Limited (The Singapore arms factory), for stealing explosive substances

•••

99

contrary to foreign policy or internal security problems,

defense was a completely nPw area of responsibility that

Singapore government had to handle after Singapore's indepen­

dence in 1965 in general and from 1968 in particular. From

the time of its founding in 1819 till 1963 Singapore defense

had been the responsibility of the British government and of

the Malaysian government from 1963 to 1965. In 1967, however,

Singapore with only two infantry Battalions (of 1,600 men) and

without a navy or airforce found itself in a really precarious

position as regards external defence and security.

In order to meet the challenges in this field, Singapore

government designed and executed a "Security Policy". While

describing the essence of it, the then foreign minister s.

Rajaratnam observed that it was "a judicious mixture of well-

trained and well-equl:pped defence force, friendly alliances,n-

and giving as many countries as possible a tangible stake in the

security, prosperity and integrity of Singapore". 35

• • • • • •

and mortar components for the use of the Communist Party of Malaya (MCP}. In October 1977, a statement by the Home Affairs Ministry revealed a new series of a•~sts by the Internal Security Department (ISD) since July 1977. By the end of confrontation, a total of 48 Indonesian infiltrators and saboteurs had been captured. See People's Action Party: The Record of Treason, Betratal of the People, and Criminal Acts of the Barisan Socialis Singapore: PAP, 1965), p.4; "Intensification of Intrusions into Singapore and Malayaa Official Report, 1964", in Boyce, Malaysia and Singapore in Internation=Jl Diplomacy, pp.83-84; Lau Teik Soon, ·Malays!.§.:: Singapore Foreign Policies in Southeast Asia, 1965-70, pp. 167-711 and Lee Boon Hiok, Singapore: Reconciling the Survival Ideology with the Achievement Concept", South East Asian Studies, no.?, 1978, pp.233-34.

35 . The Straits Times, 16 December 1970.

100

As could be seen from this statement, there were three

basic elements of this policy. The first element of Singapore's

security policy ,.,as to develop and maintain a "credible 11 (though

limited) self-defence capability. According to Singaporf:~·~

strategic thinking, it could not, given the limitations of its

size, and resources, prevent being overrun by a larger and

determined aggressor; but what it could do to deter any such

attempt by making it sure that it could jnflict intolerable

lGvel of darlage on the aggressor. It was also felt that the

city-state could not take advantage of the competing interests

in the event of military threat. It must be able to resist

any such action to bring about an effective response from the

great powers.

In order to implement this aspect of its security stra-

tegy, Singapore had since 1967 been spending upto 11 percent of

36 its national budget on building up its armed forces. After

separation in 1965, it was assumed by Singapore leaders that

the newly inde~)endent Republic would have at least a decade of

British military support in the form of the British army, naval

and air bases which had been L~built in the postwar period. 37

In July 1967, however, the British Labour Government announced

that its ~orces in Malaysia and Singapore would be reduced by

one half over a period of four years and would be withdrawn

altogether by the mid-1970s six months later, in January 1968,

36 Derek McDougall, "The Wilson Government and the British

Defense Commitment in Malaysia and Singapore", Journal t>f South­east Asian Studies, vol.4, No.2, September 1973, pp.229-40.

37 Straits Times(Singapore), n.d. 1967, p.13.

101

the British government decided to accelerate the withdrawal of

its forces which was rescheduled to be completed in 1971.38

Faced with this impending British Military withdrawal,

the Singapore Government assigned priority to create by 1972,

an elite national defense force which would corrm1and the respect

of its neighbours. It also initiated compulsory National

Service Scheme in 1967 and introduced new tax measures. Such

as ceiling on spending on social services, health and education

39 to increase revenue for defense expenditure.

The Singapore military structure was, in fact, an

adaptation of the Israeli model with an emphasis on quality

to compensate for numbers, quality of men, mobility, moral,

training, and equipment. Indeed, between 1965 and 1974, Israel

became instrumental in the bui ldi.ng u~) of the Singapore Ar·med

torces. 40 Israeli assistance included sending technical

missions and providing some 45 resident military advisors who

helped se1c up the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute

(SAFTI) and lent their expertise on such matters as logistics,

training schools, maintenance bases, manpower, general staff,

and the Armed Forces Technical Institute.

38 David Hawkins, The Defense of Malaysia and Singahbre:

From AMDA to k~ZUK(London, 1972), pp.28-32.

39Ministerial broadcast by the Minister of Defense, Lim

Kim San, and the Minister of Finance, Goh Keng Swee, in March 1968, reprinted in Alex Josey, The Crucial Years Ahead: ~public of Singapore General Elections 1968(Singapore, 1968), pp.44-53.

40see 11 Last Three Israeli Advisors Leaving in May"(an article in Straits Times), 14 April 1974, pp.1~81 Goh Keng SWee, "National Service and Defense Policy 11

, in Towards Tomorrow, n.d. pp. 56-611 and Willard A Hanna, "'!'he New Singapore Armed Forces" AUFSa Southeast Asia Series, vol.21, No.1, January 1973, p.73.

102

The Israeli assistence, however, drew some criticism

from Singapore's two immediate neighbours, Malaysia and Indo-

nesia. Newspaper from Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta considered the

choice of Israeli advisors "tactless" "Singapore knew that two

of its neighbours-Malaysia and Indonesia-were the enemies of Is-

rael, because Israel had violated the rights of the Palestinian

people and desecreted the Holy Islamic centres in Jerusalem".

Questions were also raised as to "why Singapore's military

advisors were being imported from Israel whose defense strategy

is offensive, to attack first before being hit? Why did Singa-

pore's instructors not come from Britain? Would Singapore in

"41 the future adopt an offensive defense strategy like Israel?

It was, however, economic considerations which made

Singapore take the decision to seek Israeli assistance in the

defense field. Another reason was that Israel was the only

country willing to provide the assistance when Singapore required

it. The Singapore leaders chose the Israeli model of defence

also because they saw Israeli problems similar to their own and

were impressed by the Israeli concepts of "ruggedness and self-

reliance", and their "determination to survive and prosper in

an unfriendly world on the basis of superiority and desctpline

of mind and muscle". 42

41cited in Dick Wilson, The Future role of Singapore (London, 1972), p.65.

p.l.

42willard A. Hanna, "The New Singapore Armed Forces~' n. ~~ ·;

103

The decision to create an 11 elite" and 11 credible"

defense force was carried 0ut with full determination.

By mid-1971, the active armed forces (15,000 men) were fully

operational and the reserved units (9,000 men) were building

up fast. 43 By 1973, the Singapore Armed Forces (an integrated

force without a seperate army, navy, or air force) had a total

44 of 18,000 on active duty. The army had 16,000 men organized

into 3 battalions and a brigade of armour. The Singapore Air

Defence Command had 15,000 men, 2 squadrons Hanker fighter-

bombers (which were to be ,gradually replaced by refurbished

skyhawks bought from the United States), and a blood hound

surface-to-air missile (SAM) squadron (with a total of 60

missiles). Singapore's maritime command had 500 men and a

total of 8 seaward defense crafts and 6 fast 100-foot long

patrol boats. In addition to the regular armed forces and the

reserves there were also three other para-military or auxiliary

organizations-the vigilante corps (Home Guard) with 25,000 men,

the Special Constabulary (Police Auxiliary) with 10,000 men,

and the Peo Jles' Defence Force(another larger Home guard consis-

ting of both men and women, youth and adults, and volunteers and

43 \'b,,\.P.2.

44By 1973 the total annual intake into the national ser­vice was on the order of 11,000- the top 50 percent in academic and physical qualifications of t.he 22, 000 young men who reached the age of 18. Of these 11,000, about half were actually called up for full-time service in the Singapore Armed Force(SAF). The rest were assigned to part-time training and duty in the various para-military and auxiliary services-the special consta­bulary, the vigilants corps and the Peoples' Defense Force. Of the half of the 22,000 eligibles not called up, exemption was given for hardship cases (i.e., sole supporters of families) and for those who were the "inadequate education, physique or ....

45 conscripts).

104

Singapore's defence preparedness in 1980 was like this:

The army consisted of 9 full-time infantry battalion and

1 commando battalion organised in 3 brigades. These were

complemented by artillery, engim~ers, signals, armour and ser-

vice units. The operational elements of the Republics' air

force comprised 2 squadrons of hunters, 2 squadrons of skyhawks,

1 squadron of F-5E's, a transport squadron of skyrans and C 1

30s and a helicopter squadron of illi-1 Hs and Bell 212s, supported

by a radar unit and a squadron of bloodhound surface-to-~tr

missiles. The Navy had 6 patrol craft, 6 sophisticated missiles

gunboats and 2 squadrons of 12 coastal patrol craft. These were

used for coastal patrols, air/sea rescue operations and fisheries

protection. A squadron of 4 landing ship tanks and a squadron

of 2 mine-sweepers and 3 miscellaneous craft were used for the

46 support role.

. . . . . . character". After full-time national service of 2 years for non-officers and two-and-a-half years for officers conscripts were required to remain in the r.eserve for ten years. Part­time national servicemen underwent one year basic training (part-time evening training) and served for eleven years on a part-time basis.

45 The above information on the Singapore Armed Forces

(the number of men, and equipment etc.), has been obtained from Robert c. Sellers (ed.), Armed Forces of the World: A Reference Hand Book(Third ed, New York, 1971)1 The Military Balance 1971-72, ~London) 1 and the two articles by Kevin Rafferty, "Dependence on U.s. Might", and "Nervously Awaiting the British Defence Review" "Singapore Survey", Financial Times, 1 October 1973 and 30 Sept. 197 4 ¥'U pH·\-'," L\j•

46All these figures of defence capability of the Republic

during 1980 has been taken from Singapore, Facts and Pictures, Singapore, 1980, pp.166-67;

105

Thus, the whole military set-up was rather large and

powerful for a small state like Singapore. The second element

of Singapore's security strategy- 11 friendly alliances"~ was

based on the fact that, regafdless of the expansion of its

armed forces, Singapore would never be in a position to be

engaged in a long-term conflict with its much bigger neighbours.

The most Singapore could do militarily, was to threaten a 11 Short

but sharp retaliation" and to put up a resistance that would

hopefully be costly to the aggressor. Therefore, it was impor-

tant for Singapore to be able to draw upon the strength of its

powerful allles in the event of any conflict with its neighbours.

Singapore's security and defense were covered by the 1967

Anglo-Malayan (later Malaysian) Defence Agreement, when it was

part of Malaysia. After the seperation in August 1965, these

defense arrangements with Britain continued pending a new

agreement in which not only Singapore, Malaysia, and Britain,

but also New Zealand and Australia were to be participants.

It was also writeen in the declaration of Seperation between

Singapore and Malaysia that a mutual defense agreement would be

negotiated. 47 This never materialized and it was in fact, six

years before the five-power defpnse arrangement was eventually

concluded in April 1971. The 1971 arrangement 9opularly known

as the Five-Power Defense Agreement, was a more flexible, and

47 For text of Article v of the Separation Agreement of 7 August 1965, see Singapore, Government Gazette Extraordinary, vol.2, No.66, 9 August 1965,

106

in a sense, weaker and more vague agreement than the previous

48 Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement. It was not a formal pact

put- rather an evolving (and hence frequently misunderstood)

understanding that the parties involved will coordinate their

individual defense measures and thereby compensate for the c

British military withdrawal which was initially (in 1967) intend

to be total but since 1970 provided for a continuing "limited

presence". The key clause in the agreement was the declara-

tion by the five governments that in relation to the external

defense of Malaysia and Singapore ••• in the event of any form of

armed attack externally organized or supported or the threat of

such attack against Malaysia or Singapore, their governments

would immediately consult together for the purpose of deciding

what measures would be taken jointly or seperately in relation

to such attack or threat. 49

It was clear from the communique outlining the agreement

that none of the parties was committed to come to the aid of

Singapore. The only commitment was to consult, with no guaran-

tee that subsequent action would be taken. The agreement, how-

ever, did provide a "consultative framework" as a basis for the

continuing "limited pros•!nce" of ANZUK l:orces in Singa.rorc and

48 Chin Kin Wah pointed out that the more accurate term was the "Five Power Defense Arrangements" since two different sets of agreements were involved, one between the ANZUK powers and Singapore, and the other between the ANZUK powers & Malaysia. See Chin Kin Wah, The Five Power Defense Arrangements and AMD~, (Singapore, 1974), pp.1-3.

49 Section v of the "Communique issued at the conclusion of the Five Power Mi!l.tste

1fial Meet:Lng on the External Defense of

Malaysia and Singapore, r,ondon, April 15-16, 1971.

107

and Malaysia, and this restructured ANZUK military presence

(replacing the ANZUK presence under the old Anglo-Malaysian

Defence Agreement) was worked out via two sets of "exchanges

of notes 11 between Singapore and ANZUK, and Malaysia and

ANZUK.SO

The continued ANZUK 11 limi ted military presence 11 was

indeed li!ni ted a:nd was recognized as being primarily of psy-

chological value rather than of military significance. The

Singapore Defense Minister openly stated: "They represent no

more than a token acknowledgement of these three governments

that they have an interest in peace and stability in the region.

They prefer not to close one important option by pulling back

all their troops". 51

Prior to the Australian Labour Governments decision to

withdraw its ground forces (whi retaining its air and naval

contributions) from the ANZUK presence, the combined ANZUK

forces (mostly based in Singapore except for the air force

component stationed at the Butterworth Base in Malaysia)

totalled 7,000 men (3,300 Australians, 2,550 British, and 1,150

New Zealanders). Besides the infantry component, the ANZUK

forces included 8 warships and 1 submarine and two (Australian)

52 air force squadrons.

50 For the set involving Singapore see, Singapore, Exchanqe of Notes and Annexes Between the Government of Singapore and the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the Uniteq Kingdom on 1 December 1971 in Relation to the Five Power Defense Arrangements.

51 Goh Keng Swee, Straits Times, 31 December 1970. 52see T.B. Miller, "The Five-Power Defense Arrangement

and Southeast Asian Security 11, Pacific Community, vol.3, No.2

•••

108

The immediate value of the Five Power Defense

Agreement and the presence of ANZUK forces to both Singapore

and Malaysia was that it provided "a breathing space", for

them to build up their defence capabilities·. Furthermore,

it provided a necessary counterweight to Indonesia as demons-

trated by the crucial role played the ANZUK forces in with-

standing president Sukarno's policy of confrontation. For

Singapore, in addition, the arrangement provided a counter-

weight in its relations with Malaysia. According to one

observer: "One of Singapores neightmare is a possible, tacit

or open alliance between Malaysia and Indonesia to take advan-

tage of a "neutralized" Southeast Asia no longer patrolled

by British or American ••• warships and aeroplanes, in order

to put the "squeeze" on the heart of the hated overseas

Chinese commercial power in the region". It is hoped by some

circles in Singapore that, "If these were serious internal

violent clashe~ there or in Malaysia, the presence of •••

ANZUK troops would •••• force public opinion in Britain,

Australia and New Zealand to come to their rescue". 53

Singapore had no other military agreement or internal

defence a.rrangements besides this fi.ve power defence arranqe-

ment nor it had ever joined SEATO.

The third element was concerned with pursuing a multiple

involvement in, or a "multilateral supp·1rt for, Singapore's

security. It was essentially a balance-of-power strategy . . . . January, 1972,p.344: and Chin Kin Wah, n.45, pp.3-4.

53Dick Wilson, The Future Role of Singapore, p.71.

109

involving a constant effor~ by Singapore's leaders to convince

great and medium powers both eastern and western that they

had a stake-strategic and economic-in the existence of a viable

and independent Singapore. According to one analyst: "One of

the basic tenets of Singapore's policy for survival in a harsh

international environment is to develop a balance-of-power

structure favourable to its survival .. o.In Singapore's case this

depends on the big powers being convinced1 (i) that Singapore

is of considerable strategic and/or economic value to each of

them1 (2) that the direct interests of each big power can be

adequately served without bringing Singapore under its sole

domination to the exclusion of other big powerst and (3) that

the interest of each can be served only by preventing the sole

domination of Singapore by others". 54

TJJ~ m~ )Singapore pursuing a policy designed to make itself

into a neutral regional oenter (of trade, shippng, i.nvestment,

manufacturing, and distribution) useful to all powers and cap-

able of absorbing their presence and influence, and to encourage

these competing foreign interests to prevent any one of them

from achieving a predominating role. A clear statement of this

aspect of Singapore's security policy and its underlying assumptic

was made by an Assistant Secretary of the Singapore Foreign

Ministry and is worth quoting:

54Yuan-L~u, Strategic Significance of Singapore: A Study a,n Balance of Power(Wash:i.ngton, D.C. :American Enterprise I'1stitutE for Public Policy Research, Foreign Affairs Study, 1972), pp.3-1.

110

Since time immemorial, external forces have exerted themselves on the lands and people in the area; it would be idle to wish for a cessation of outside involvement in the region, in one guise or another •••• As of now these seems little prospect of a complete withdrawal of the major powers from Southeast Asia strategically economically or dip­lomatically. The most one could postulate is that ideological considerations have apparently been subsumed by more hard-heated calculations of self­interest ••• The immediate reality is that of external involvement and the iml)Otencc oE the c-egion ·to stop larger and more powerful states ••• in pursuit of their policies •••• Rather than trying to keep out all outsiders, therefore, it would be better for as many interested powers as possible to come in and develop a stake in the region, thereby ensuring that no single great power gets into a dominant position •••• In our actions, we are not only friendly to the Big Powers, but we also facilitate their presence in the region. American and Russian ships come into our waters openly for servicing; the Chinese have money-making emporia in various parts of the Republic in addition to a bank; British, West European and Japanese groups participated in our industrial, commercial and financial development~(5:

External Environment

In addition to the geography, demography, economy,

security, and political experiences in the past, the external

environment had also been a key factor in shaping Singapore's

foreign policy and its security concerns. Moreover, besides

an open market economy, Singapore leaders desired for political

~tability in the Southeast Asian region. In the face of the

intended British military withdrawal from Singapore, American

decision to disengage from Indo-China and the probable threat

of communist spread over into the southeast Asia, the Republic

55Goh Kiah Chee, "Regional Perspectives for Singapore", in Towards Tomorrow: Essa s on Develo ment and Social Trans­formation in Singapore National Trade Union Congress Singapore, 1 Q7~)

lll

joined ASEAN in 1967 which provided a useful platform to

project its views and interests. From the time of British

colonial rule to independence and even after, through its

membership of Five Power!! Defense Arrangements, Hepublic had

maintained a special relationship with Malaysia. Close

political, economic, and cultural, ties had ensured that the

Republic must always take particular notice of Malaysia in its

foreign policy.

The Republic's location at the centre of strategic sea

communications made the Republic a useful window of Southeast

Asia. The strategic im:1ortance of the resource-rich region had

invited the attention of all the major powers. While ,.,elcoming

them to further their int.erests, the Singarore leaders had at

the same time considered it necessary to keep a comfortable

distance from unwelcome influences where necessary. Being small

and vulnerable, the Republic's leaders realized that it could

not wish among the great powers, since they had vital interests

in the region. In a speech at the Asian Business Brieftng

Seminar in Bangkok on 28 June 1976, Foreign Minister s.

Rajaratnam declared: "we in Singapore accept the fact of great

powers and the fact of great power rivalry in Southeast Asia.

We might wish things were otherwise but we console ourselves

with the thought that if the~e were no great power rivalry

in the region, then, if pre-European history in the area is

any guide, we might be confronted with less manageable small

112

u56 power rivalries. Again, in a major speech on 12 June 1976

s. Raj aratnam reiterated: "we accept the existence of great

powers and their rivalri.es as an immutable fact of inter-

national life. We do not subscribe to the prevailing belief

that great powers are necessarily wicked, dangerous and ~e.Y(.

immoral. They are no moreA.than are small nations. Since we

cannot wish away greater power rivalries in the region then in

Singapore's view, the next best thing for small nations is the

presence of all great powers ••• when there is a multiplicity

of suns the gravitational pulls of each is not only weakened

but also, by a judicious use of the pulls and counter pulls

of gravitational forces, the minor planets have greater freedo~

/J57 0f navigation.

56The Mirror, vol.12~ No.28, 12 July 1976, p.l.

57 Straits Times, 13 June 1976, p.4.

1 1 ! 1 1