第讙第 21 1 券 (2005 6 )...

法學硏究

21 1第輯第券(2005 6 )年月

圓光大學校法學硏究所

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刊行辭

원광대학교 부설 법학연구소는 이번에 연구소 논문집인 법학연구 제 집 제21 1『권 을 발간하게 되었습니다.』원광대학교 법학연구소는 법학연구 논문집을 년에 창간호를 발간한 이래로1962법학연구 제 집 제 권 을 발간하게 된 것을 자랑스럽게 생각하고 법학연구21 1 ,『』논문집은 매년 꾸준하게 전문적인 법학저널로서 위상을 지켜왔다고 생각합니다.지금 정부에서는 로스쿨 법학전문대학원 제도를 년부터 시행하려고 입법화( ) 2008

를 준비하고 있으며 전국의 각 법과대학은 로스쿨인가를 받기 위하여 노력하고 있,습니다 우리 법과대학도 로스쿨 인가를 받기 위하여 인적요건과 물적요건을 파악.하여 착실하게 준비해 나가고 있습니다 앞으로 우리 법과대학이 로스쿨 인가를 받.도록 대학당국과 동문 선후배들께서 힘을 모아서 아낌없는 후원을 해주기를 바랍

니다.이번에 발간하는 법학연구 제 집 제 권 은 편의 투고논문중 엄격한 심사21 1 15『』

를 거쳐서 편의 논문만을 게재하기로 결정하였습니다 앞으로 독자제현의 많은 관9 .심을 부탁드립니다.

년 한해는 대학본부가 연구소에 대한 재정지원을 확충하면서 법학연구소를2005운영하는 데 큰 도움이 되었습니다 그러나 원광대학교 법과대학에 재직하는 동료.교수님들의 격려와 큰 호응이 없었다면 법학연구 제 집 제 권을 발간할 수 없었21 1을 것이다 기꺼이 합심하여 주신 법과대학 교수님들과 옥고를 내어 주신 집필자.여러분에게 감사의 말씀을 드립니다.또한 법학연구는 매년 회 발간하는 법학연구를 년부터 상반기와 하반기로1 2005

구분하여 연 회 발간하기로 하였습니다2 .

년 월2005 6

법학연구소장 홍 기 갑

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21第輯 1第券 2005 6年月

目次

◉ 연구논문 ◉

Wilful Misconduct in the International Carriage Conventions ············ 여 태 식/ 9취득시효기간완성과 대항력 ····································································· 원 상 철/ 37社會奉仕命令制度 ······················································································ / 57占承憲사외이사제도의 문제점 및 개선방안 ······················································ 박 강 익/ 89퍼블리시티권의 법적성격에 관한 연구 ················································· 박 홍 진/ 109법인형태의 다양화와 조합세제의 도입 ················································· 윤 현 석/ 129Billigkeitsentscheidung in der internationalen Handelsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit-unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des §1051 Abs. 3 ZPO- ········· 오석웅/ 151재판결정의 의무이행확보수단 ································································ 박 재 현/ 177

의 에 대하여最近日本刑事立法 ··········································· / 205大谷實洪太錫　 ․

◉ 부 록 ◉

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Contents


Wilful Misconduct in the International Carriage Conventions ····Yeo, Tae-Shig/ 9The Acquisitive Prescription of the Ownership of Real Property

·················································································Won, Sang-Chul/ 37A Sturdy on the Community Service Order System ··········· Jeom, Seung-Hun/ 57On the Problems and improvement of Outside Director ···········Park, Kang-Ik/ 89A study on the legal nature of the Right of Publicity ··········· Park, Hong Jin/ 109A Study on the Introduction of Partnership Taxation to go with

variety of Corporate Form ································Yoon, Hyun-Seok/ 129Billigkeitsentscheidung in der internationalen Handelsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit-unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des §1051 Abs. 3 ZPO- ·· O, Seog-Ung/ 151Les moyens de l'exécution des décisions de justice ············Park, Jae-Hyun/ 177New Criminal Legislation in Japan ··················Outani-Mi Hong, Tae-Seok/ 205․


◐ Wilful Misconduct in the International Carriage여 태 식Conventions -

◐ 취득시효기간완성과 대항력 원 상 철-◐ -社會奉仕命令制度占承憲◐ 사외이사제도의 문제점 및 개선방안 박 강 익-◐ 퍼블리시티권의 법적성격에 관한 연구 박 홍 진-◐ 법인형태의 다양화와 조합세제의 도입 윤 현 석-◐ Billigkeitsentscheidung in der internationalen

Handelsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit -unter besondererBerücksichtigung des §1051 Abs. 3 ZPO 오 석 웅- -

◐ 재판결정의 의무이행확보수단 박 재 현-◐ 의 에 대하여 -最近日本刑事立法大谷實洪太錫　 ․

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Wilful Misconduct in the International CarriageConventions

Yeo, Tae-Shig*1)

. IntroductionⅠ

. Historical Background of a clause barring limitation in the internationalⅡcarriage conventions. Wilful Misconduct and Intentional or Reckless Misconduct in theⅢWarsaw Convention and Hague Protocol.

. Wilful Misconduct or Equivalent Default under the CMR ConventionⅣV. Ntentional or Reckless Misconduct in Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules. ConclusionⅥ

《 CONTENTS 》

. IntroductionⅠ

It is a commonplace phenomenon that almost all the international conventionsrelating to carriage of goods have their own scheme of liability as a main featurein their texts. Usually for these liability clauses include limitation of liability onthe part of the carrier, some writers even noted that limitation clause for carrier’sbenefit in modern international carriage conventions is not an exception anymore,but rather a rule as a basic right of the carrier.1)* LLB(summa cum laude), LLM in Sungkyunkwan University; Member of the Suwon BarAssociation; Associate lawyer in Kong Pyong; As of now in LLM in Cardiff law school inthe UK.

1) Gaskell, N., "Damages, Delay and Limitation of liability under the Hamburg Rules 1978" in

21 1法學硏究第輯第券

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Whether or not the above statement is valid, yet it is inevitable to accept thatthe statement is at least based upon undeniable hard and fast facts2).Interestingly enough in parallel with the above limitation clause, every majorinternational carriage convention has a separate clause which gives a right to theclaimant to penetrate the limitation in cases where a certain act of the carrier isegregiously bad enough under the circumstances3).Roughly speaking in verbatim, the typical modes of conduct which have theeffect of barring limitation in each convention can be expressed as ‘wilfulmisconduct and intentional or reckless misconduct4).’The significance of the clause which gives power to the claimant againstcarrier to get rid of limitation is obvious in that it can have a disastrous effecton the carrier. In this sense it is of vital importance to appreciate the exactmeaning of each wording, condition and scope of application including legal effectin terms of differences in texts and authorities.More complicating factors in this context are that even though the wordingitself is identical or similar between clauses in conventions, the legal meaningsare not deemed identical especially due to variegated attitude of the courts inseveral jurisdictions.This kind of divergence is not desirable at all in that more than anything elseit is diametrically to fly in the face of uniformity which is the basic ground ofevery international convention. In addition it is likely to encourage unmeritoriouslitigations especially in the courts which are perceived as the most benevolentforum and as a result to promote more opportunistic behaviors among litigantsfrequently called as forum shopping5).Berlingieri, F. (ed), The Hamburg Rules: A choice for the E.E.C.? International Colloquiumheld on 18 and 19 November 1993 (1994, Antwerpen: MAKLU) 129 at 161.

2) Eg. Article 22 in Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol, Article 21 in MontrealConvention, Article ule 5(a) in Hague-Visby Rules, Article 6 in Hamburg Rules, ArticleⅣ23.3 in CMR.

3) Eg. Article 25 in Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol, Article 22.5 in MontrealConvention, Article rule 5(e) in Hague-Visby Rules, Article 8 in Hamburg Rules,ⅣArticle 29 in CMR, Article 44 in CIM 1980, Article 21 in the Multimodal Convention 1980.

4) Id.5) Haak, K.F., The liability of the carrier under the CMR (1986, The Hague:StichtingVervoeradres) 243.

Wilful Misconduct in the International Carriage Conventions/Yeo, Tae-shig

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In this article the focus is made first of all on historical background of theclause which plays a role as a countervailing counterpart against the limitationclause in the main carriage conventions in each transport area bearinginter-relationship between each clause in mind.

. Historical Background of a clause barring limitation inⅡthe international carriage conventions

From the chronological perspective in the 20th century, the first conventionwhich put this kind of clause which deprives the carrier of the limitation in itstext is none other than the Warsaw Convention 1929.It is not exactly clear what was real motive and intention of the drafters toinclude types of conduct which have the effect of penetrating limitation in theConvention, however, it seems possible to conjecture the picture from mainpurposes of the Convention. It hasbeen largely accepted that main purposes of theWarsaw Convention lie in both establishing a certain degree of uniformity in thelaw of international aviation and limiting the liability of fledgling air carriers inlate 1920s6). Based upon this it can be said that Article 25 of the WarsawConvention was a corrective clause to strike a balance against somewhat lopsidedclause which bestows the benefit on the carrier for the purpose of protecting airindustry.6) Bechky, P.S., "Mismanagement and Misinterpretation: U.S. Judicial Implementation of theWarsaw Convention in Air Disaster Litigation" (1995) 60 Journal of Air Law andCommerce 455 at 462-464;Staten, K.A., "The Warsaw Convention’s facelift: Will it meetthe Needs of 21st Century Air Travel?"(1997) 62 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 1083at 1084-1087;Pickelman, M.R., "Draft Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules forInternational Carriage by Air: The Warsaw Convention revisited for the last time?"(1998) 64 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 273 at 274-282;Cheng, B., "A New Era inthe law of International Carriage by Air: From Warsaw(1929) to Montreal(1999)" (2004)53 ICLQ 833;Wilensky, R.L., "Flying the Unfriendly Skies: The Liability of Airlines Underthe Warsaw for injuries Due to Terrorism" (1987) 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 249 at251-254;Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, "The United States and the Warsaw Convention"(1967)80 HARV. L. REV. 497 at 498-499.


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More specifically it is said that the above clause was triggered by "acte illiciteintentionelle (intentional illegal act)" in the draft but later the drafters chose toreplace this phrase with "wilful misconduct" based upon the suggestion of Britishdelegation7).However some difficulties were experienced by civil law jurisdictions inconstruing especially the concept of wilful misconduct8) and in many civil lawcountries this concept was extended to include "faute lourde"9) partly because ofthe misunderstanding of the drafters’intention and partly because of the realizationthat under the strict interpretation of wilful misconduct it is almost impossible forthis phrase to serve its purpose i.e., to get rid of the limitation, even in seriouscases10).With a view to rectifying this problem the diplomatic conference which washeld in the Hague in 1955 remoldedthe wording and that phrase is beingmaintained without any noticeable change in the current form of the MontrealConvention 199911).It was thought that the meaning of "wilful misconduct" in the WarsawConvention and "intentional or reckless misconduct"in the Hague Protocol shouldbe regarded as same regardless of the transformation in wording12).However the differences between jurisdictions nonetheless were never subsidedagainst the drafters’ expectation13).In the next year from the revision of original Warsaw Convention, the CMR

7) Clarke, M.A., Contracts of carriage by air (2002, LLP) 157;Mankiewicz, R.H., The LiabilityRegime of the International Air Carrier: A Commentary on the present Warsaw System(1981, KLUWER) 122 para. 163.

8) McGilchrist, N.R., "Article 25:an English approach to recklessness" (1983) LMCLQ 488 at489.Especially it is said that the French court applied objective test.

9) Mankiewicz, R.H., id;Faute lourde in French law can be roughly translated into grossnegligence. Messent, A. and Glass, D.A. (eds), Hill & Messent CMR: contracts for theinternational carriage of goods by road (3rd ed 2000, LLP) 224 para. 9.80.

10) Clarke, M.A., id.11) Article 22.5 of the Montreal Convention in 1999.However this clause only affects the

carriage of passengers and baggage unlike the Warsaw Convention and the HagueProtocol. For thehistory of the Hague Protocol, Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, id 497 at501-509.

12) Clarke, M.A., Contracts of Carriage by Land and Air (2004, LLP) 345.13) Clarke, M.A., op cit n 7. 157-158.


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Convention was signed at Geneva.The wording employed in Article 29 of CMR Convention is almost identicalwith Article 25 in original Warsaw Convention in every important respect and ithas been generally accepted that Article 29 of CMR Convention was modeledupon Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention14).One curious point as regards the adoption of the formula in Article 29 of CMRConvention was that the drafters selected old clause in the Warsaw Conventionrather than new one being considered in the Hague at that time. It might beinevitable decision in despair fatigued by the Babylonian confusion of concept andterminology put forwarded by various delegates during the final session15).Apart from the regrettable development from the viewpoint of uniformity, thewording itself i.e., ‘wilful misconduct or equivalent default’ in Article 29 wasexposed to divergent interpretation in each jurisdiction.After several years another clause to the same effect was put in place in theHague-Visby Rules which relate to carriage of goods by sea16).It is largely perceived that this clause is derived from Article 25 in the HagueProtocol17). Thus the discussions having been considered under the circumstancesof the Hague Protocol are also applicable in this area without major change dueto the fact that the main formulation is similar to that of the Hague Protocolexcept for some discrepancies. It is true, however, to say that some otherdiscourses are being advanced based upon the differences in wording and context.

14) Loewe, R.," Commentary on the Convention of 19 May on the Contract for theInternational Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR)" (1976) 11 E.T.L. 311, para 217Haak,K.F., id 242-243;Messent, A. and Glass, D.A. (eds), id 223-234 para. 9.79Clarke, M.A.,International carriage of goods by road: CMR (4th ed 2003, LLP) 286 para. 101Murray,V., "Wilful Misconduct under the CMR" (1999) 1 JBL 180Clarke, M.A., "The transportof goods in Europe: patterns and problems of uniform law" (1999) 1 LMCLQ 36 at58-59.

15) Id.16) The content of Article rule 5(e) in the Hague-Visby Rules is also containedto theⅣ

similar effect in Article 8 of the Hamburg rules.17) Gaskell, N., id 129 at 165;Gaskell, N. et al, Bills of lading: law and contracts (2000,

LLP) 520 para. 16.52.;Diamond, A., "The Hague-Visby Rules" (1978) LMCLQ 225 at244-245.


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. Wilful Misconduct and Intentional or RecklessⅢMisconduct in the Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol.

1. Original Warsaw Convention

If the claimant is to have the benefit of full compensation under the WarsawConvention, it must first be established that damage is caused by carrier’s wilfulmisconduct or by such default equivalent thereto18).Based upon the historical background of Article of 25, it has been argued thatin civil law jurisdictions the carrier’s limitation is removed in the instance of‘dol’and in common law jurisdictions in case of ‘such default as considered to beequivalent to dol (wilful misconduct),’ yet the attitude of the courts in civil lawjurisdictions was divided over whether faute lourdeis equivalent to dol inaccordance with their domestic laws19).As for burden of proof, the courts have indicated that one who alleges wilfulmisconduct has to prove on the balance of probabilities20). In addition where anact of a servant or agent is to be deemed as a wilful misconduct it should alsobe proved that the act is "within the scope of employment."21) It is true thatsince there are various positions as to the extent of the scope ofemploymentaccording to domestic laws it is somewhat difficult to draw thedefinite dividing line22). One sure thing is that if the act in question is the insidejob and necessarily connected to the general scope of assignment authorized bythe carrier, that act must be said to be within the scope of employment23).If the act of a carrier, his servant or agent has been proved wilful misconduct,

18) Article 25.1 of the Warsaw Convention.19) Mankiewicz, R.H., id.20) Horabin v. BOAC [1952] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 450 at 461. However the standard of proof canbe different according to the lex fori. Mankiewicz, R.H., id 126 para. 165.

21) Article 25.2 of the Warsaw Convention.22) Clarke, M.A., op cit n 7, 169-170; Clarke, M.A., op cit n 12, 349;Martin, P. et al(eds),Air law/Shawcross and Beaumont (4th ed 1977, Butterworths) 520-535.Ⅶ

23) Clarke, M.A., op cit 12, 349.


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then the carrier, his servant or agent can not invoke the limitation as well as allthe defenses conferred on him under the convention24).The interpretation of wilful misconduct which is the core concept in Article 25of the Warsaw Convention was dealt with in England in Horabin v. BOAC25).In an effort to claim damages in excess of 125,000 gold francs (GBP 2,937) forwhich the defendants admitted liability, the plaintiff alleged wilful misconduct onthe part of defendants and their servants or agents in that inter alia they failedto provide an experienced crew sufficiently familiar with the route to be flownand to provide adequate maps and plans of the airfields on the route and theareas around such airfields and more importantly pilot failed to land on such anairfield or an another airfield in the vicinity26).In summing up for the jury, Barry, J., instructed that wilful misconduct is"misconduct to which will is a party, and it is something wholly different in kindfrom mere negligence or carelessness, however gross that negligence orcarelessness may be.27)" He went on to say that "in order to establish wilfulmisconduct, the plaintiff must satisfy you(jurors), not beyond reasonable doubt,but satisfy you(jurors) that the person who did the act knew that he was doingsomething wrong, and knew it at the time, and yet did it just the same, oralternatively that the person who did the act did it quite recklessly not caringwhether he was doing the right thing or the wrong thing, quite regardless of theeffect of what he was doing upon the safety of the aircraft and the passengersfor which and for whom he was responsible."28)In addition Barry, J., in response to the question from the foreman epitomizedagain that "to be guilty of wilful misconduct, the person concerned mustappreciate that he is acting wrongfully, or is wrongfully omitting to act, and yetpersists in so acting or omitting to act regardless of the consequences, or acts oromits to act with reckless indifference as to what the results may be."29)

24) Article 25.1 of the Warsaw Convention.25) [1952] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 450. Even though this is related to the passenger, it also has animportant meaning in the case of cargo at least in terms of interpretation.

26) [1952] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 450 at 450-456.27) Id 450 at 459.28) Id.


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As for the criteria of whether a specific act is a wilful misconduct or not,Barry, J., took a hypothetical example in which two drivers went passing throughthe crossroads when the traffic light was turning from yellow to red, one byvirtue of going toofast not keeping the proper look-out, the other, being in ahurry, ignoring the lights against him under the self-rationalization that hardlyany traffic comes out of the side roads. Under this circumstance he said thatsince the latter driver "took a risk which he knew he ought not to take" heshould be regarded as having wilfully misconducted even though he had nointention to cause an accident.30)Admitting that at the present case there is any direct evidence as to the stateof mind or intention of relevant persons, however, he also recognized that thejury are "entitled to look at the whole of the facts to draw an inference fromthose facts as to the state of mind and intentions of the person who does someparticular act."31)From this we can at least make an educated-guess the fact that the basicattitude of the court is that the requisite state of mind should be established bysubjective criteria32).This kind of line of reasoning based upon the subjective criteria was continuedin later case before the English High Court in Rustenberg v. Pan AmericanWorld Airways Inc33).In this case Ackner, J., reaffirming the subjective test in Horabin said that "itis common ground that "wilful misconduct" goes far beyond any negligence, evengross or culpable negligence and involves a person doing or omitting to do thatwhich is not only negligent but which he knows and appreciates is wrong, and isdone r omitted regardless of the consequences, not caring what the result of his″carelessness may be."34)29) Id 450 at 489.30) Id 450 at 460.31) Id.32) Even though it was not clearly evident from the text of this case, it has been largelyconverged that subjective criteria were employed. McGilchrist, N.R., "Wilful Misconductand the Warsaw Convention" (1977) LMCLQ, 539 at 540.;Clarke, M.A., op cit n 7,160.;Clarke, M.A., op cit n 12, 347.

33) [1977] l Lloyd’s Rep 564;McGilchrist, N.R., op cit n 32, 539 at 541.


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In the meantime in Thomas Cook Group Ltd. v. Air Malta,35) Cresswell, J.outlined the approach of the English courts in the following."The starting point in considering whether the acts or omissions of a personentrusted with goods of another amounted to wilful misconduct was an enquiryabout the conduct ordinarily to be expected in the particular circumstances; thenext step was to ask whether such acts or omissions were properly to beregarded as ‘misconduct’ it was next necessary to consider whether themisconduct was wilful and what did and what did not amount to wilfulmisconduct; and finally it had to be considered whether the wilful misconductcaused the loss of or damage to the goods."36)However, it is said that in other jurisdictions especially in the US, moreobjective attitudes have been prevalent37). This can be confirmed from thestatement in the US case to the effect that "this (state of mind) must inevitablybe determined by reference to the data of practical experience Assessment of…state of mind is essentially a factual inquiry."38)This phenomenon can be explained from the traditional attitude of the US thatlimitation of liability especially in the case of personal injury is to be abolished.In short some US courts are circumventing the limitation through more readyinference from the objective evidence.

2. Revised Hague Protocol

Triggered by the divergence derived from the concept of wilful misconduct,article 25 of the Hague Protocol is worded in the following."The limits of liability specified in Article 22 shall not apply if it is proved thatthe damage resulted form an act or omission of the carrier, his servants or34) Id 564, 569.35) [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 399.36) Id 399, 407-408.37) McGilchrist, N.R., op cit n 32, 539 at 540-541;Wilensky, R.L., id 249 at 258-264.38) Koirala v. Thai Airways International1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1024;Recite from Clarke,

M.A., op cit n 12, 347;Similar line of stream also can be found in In Re Korean AirLines Diaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 289 U.S. App. D.C. 391;932 F. 2d 1475;1991 U.S. App.LEXIS 8539.


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agents, done with intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with knowledge thatdamage would probably result; provided that, in the case of such act or omissionof a servant or agent, it is also proved that he was acting in the scope of hisemployment."From the wording itself it seems evident that the onus of proof is on theclaimant39). However in cases where the relevant person has died,40) it is almostimpossible to achieve this. Under this realization some jurisdictions have easedburden of proof in special cases41).In regard to the scope of employment, the typical case in point seems to be thetheft out of hours. It is submitted that the central idea lies in the considerationthat who shall bear the burden of cost regardless of the fact that there are somediscrepancies between jurisdictions.42)If the act of the relevant persons can be regarded as intentional or recklessmisconduct, the persons in question will lose the benefit of the limitation,43)however, unlike the former Warsaw Convention, other defenses can be invoked onthe part of the carrier.44)As to the probability it is said that it means the results are likely to happen45).Thus mere for see ability is not acceptable46).Even under the Hague Protocol, the spectre of difficulty in interpretation hasrevived in similar form as it was in the Warsaw Convention, even though themajority view was inclined to follow the subjective line47). In particular courts indifferent jurisdictions saw the different direction over the matter whether theHague Protocol had imposed an objective or subjective criteria with regard to the

39) Clarke, M.A., op cit n 7, 158;Clarke, M.A., op cit n 12, 346;Martin, P. et al(eds), id Ⅶ497;Mankiewicz, R.H., id 118 para. 160.1.

40) Tondriau v. Air India 17.9.75 (1976) 11 ETL 907, 913-914.41) Connaught Laboratories v. British Airways (2002) 217 DLR (4th) 717;Clarke, M.A., op

cit n 7, 158;Clarke, M.A., op cit n 12, 346.42) Clarke, M.A., op cit n 7, 169-170;Martin, P. et al(eds), id 519-535.Ⅶ43) Antwerp United Diamond BVBA v. Air Europe [1996] Q.B. 317.44) Glass, D.A., and Cashmore, C., Introduction to the law of carriage of goods (1989, Sweet& Maxwell) 244 para. 6.76.

45) Clarke, M.A., op cit n 7, 167;Clarke, M.A., op cit n 12, 348.46) Koufos v Czarnikow [1969] 1 A.C. 350.47) Martin, P. et al(eds), id 500-515.Ⅶ


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interpretation of "done recklessly and with knowledge that damage wouldprobably result" in the text48).In this context advocates of a subjective interpretation argued that delegates tothe Hague Protocol, in a preferential vote, had rejected objective criteria in favorof subjective ones49).Others, however, contended that the minutes of the above conference did notexplain what the text ultimately adopted was intended to mean50).The leading case in England on Article 25 of the Hague Protocol was Goldmanv. Thai Airways International Ltd51). In this case it was evident that the pilothad not intended to injure the plaintiff. However the question whether the pilotwere reckless and with knowledge that injury was probable was not clear.Eveleigh, L.J., raising the hand of the defendants, noted that "I can not see thatwe are entitled to attribute to him knowledge which another pilot mighthavepossessed or which he himself should have possessed.52)"In short the Court of Appeal in Goldman favored the subjective test whichhad been the main stream in English courts. Furthermore with less confidenceEveleigh, J., pointed out that damage complained of should be the kind of damageknown to be the probable result53).After Goldman there were some cases in which Article 25 of the Hague Protocolwas considered. Especially in Nugent v. Goss54) it was argued that backgroundknowledge should be included in the caliber of actual knowledge without successeven though there was an acceptance from one judge55). Typical cargo damage48) Wilensky, R.L., id 249 at 259;Mankiewicz, R.H., id 115 para. 158.49) Recite from Wilenksy, R.L., id.50) Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, id 497 at 506.51) [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1186. At first instance Chapman, J., applying the objective test in

English criminal law cases in regard to recklessnessgave judgment for the plaintiff butit was revered in the Court of Appeal. McGilchrist, N.R., op cit n 8, 488 at490-493;Carr, I., International trade law (1996, Cavendish Pub.) 339.

52) Id 1186 at 1194.53) Id 1086 at 1196-1198. As to the extent of damage some argue that once some damagewas contemplated by the relevant party, it is immaterial that more serious damage wasactually sustained. Martin, P. et al(eds), id 497;McGilchrist, N.R., op cit n 8, 488 atⅦ492.

54) [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 222.55) Id 222 at 231;Clarke, M.A., op cit n 7, 161-162;Carr, I., id 339-340; Martin, P. et al(eds),


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case was dealt with in Australia in SS Pharmaceuticals v. Qantas56). In this casethe carrier’s servants or agents observed the marks on the cargo which indicatedthey should have been stored in a dry environment and in addition they could seethe poor state of the plastic wrapping on the cargo. For the worse it was rainingat those times, however, they left the cargo unattended in the open without takingany necessary measures. From this circumstantial evidence the court inferred that"such servants and agents must also have known that such ‘deplorably badhandling’ of the cargo would probably result in damage to the cargo."57)As mentioned before the revised wording of the Hague Protocol was thought ashaving the same meaning as wilful misconduct. If this is true intention ofdrafters, it is rather natural that the discussions as to the meaning of wilfulmisconduct will survive unless there is any Copernican change in mode ofthinking or attitude in each jurisdiction.Interestingly one writer has suggested that there have been some signs ofmovement in English courts towards the direction of the US position on theground of the statement of Auld, L. J. in Nugent58).

. Wilful Misconduct or Equivalent Default under the CMRⅣConvention

As has been mentioned Article 29 of CMR Convention has adopted the model

id 512-513.Ⅶ56) [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 288.57) Id 288-289, 293. This case also follows the subjectiveline in that one of main propositionof the majority judgments in this case was that the requirement of knowledge involvesthe proof of actual knowledge in the mind of the [actor] at the moment at which theomission occurs even though there is a dissenting judgment of Kirby, P., in the Courtof Appeals. McQueen, P., "Qantas Airways Ltd. v. S.S. Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd." (1991)LMCLQ 165;McQueen, P., "Articles 22 and 25 of the Warsaw Convention-An AustralianContribution" (1989) LMCLQ 145.

58) [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 222, 227;Clarke, M.A., op cit n 12, 347;Clarke, M.A., op cit n 7,165.


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of original Warsaw Convention.Quite naturally the conflicting views shown in those areas have re-surfacedwith some peculiarities.The main discussions in the arena of the CMR Convention regarding Article 29are as follows.First of all there are conflicting ideas among jurisdictions as to exact legalmeaning of "wilful misconduct or by such default considered as equivalent to…wilful misconduct" in Article 29 in CMR Convention.It is said that "wilful misconduct"is an inaccurate translation of the Frenchconcept "dol."59)The firstEnglish case to consider the wilful misconduct under CMR Conventionwas Jones v. Bencher60). In this case the court following the criteria in Horabindifferentiated distinctively between wilful misconduct and negligence61). Finally thecourt concluded the circumstances amounted to wilful misconduct in that thedriver in this case was well aware of the regulations relating to acceptabledriving times and of their purpose, but chose to ignore them even though heappreciated that he was acting wrongly62). This kind of distinction based uponthe subjective state of mind of the relevant person is also followed in the latercase of Texas Instruments Ltd. v. Nason (Europe) Ltd63), in which the act of thecarrier to have left the trailer unguarded was regarded as wilful misconduct64).Later in Lacey’s Footwear (Wholesale)Ltd. v. Bowler International Freight Ltd65).it was held by the majority of the Court of Appeal that the act of the driver to

59) McGilchrist, N.R., op cit n 32, 539 at 542;Clarke, M.A., op cit n 14, 287 para. 101;Clarke,M.A., op cit 12, 47;Loewe, R., id 311 para 217;Messent, A. and Glass, D.A. (eds), id 221para. 9.78.

60) [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 54.61) Messent, A., "Recent Developments on Wilful Misconduct under the CMR Convention"(1998) 1 S. & T.L.I. 24.

62) Id 54 at 60.63) [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 146.64) In Longmill Co. PLC v. Andrea Merzario Ltd (1995) Unreported, even though leaving

the vehicle unattended under the circumstances amounted to wilful misconduct, since theproximate cause of the loss was where the driver parked which did not wilfulmisconduct, causation was gainsaid. Messent, A., id 24 at 25.

65) [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 369.


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deliver the goods to the person without checking the identity deliberatelydisregarding the instructions from the consignor amounts to wilful misconduct66).In continental European jurisdictions, somewhat difficult problems which haveno place in English law have to be tackled. It was the interpretation of defaultequivalent to wilful misconduct67).It can be largely said that there are two lines of stream regarding this problem.The one line is based upon the idea that default equivalent to wilful misconductonly can have a meaning as a substituting concept in cases where there is notsuch a concept at all in certain jurisdiction. The other, highlighting moreproactive role of each jurisdiction, argues that purpose of the reference to the lexfori in Article 29.l of CMR Convention is to leave the national law to decide whatdegree of default canbe deemed as equivalent to wilful misconduct in terms oflegal effect68).The first line was faithfully followed in Belgian courts. According to them thepurpose of introducing the concept of equivalent default in Article 29 was toenable the courts in those countries which do not have such a concept to apply ameaning which the court seised of the case considers to be equivalent to dol withthe result that wilful misconduct itself is essential before Article 29 can beapplied69).The second line was said to have been followed by the Austrian and Germancourts by equating the concept of "die grosse Fahrlassigkeit" with wilfulmisconduct(dol)70). Recently, however, the position in Germany has radicallychanged. Traditional test has been replaced by a new test which refers todamage done with intent or recklessly with knowledge that damage would

66) In this case Brooke, L.J., dissented from the majority and argued that the act in issueis just deemed as grossly negligent. In addition there is a comment that this case blursthe distinction between wilful misconduct and negligence. Messent, A., id 24 at 26.

67) In English law there is no concept such as default equivalent to wilful misconduct.Clarke, M.A., op cit n 14, 293 para. 102.

68) Haak, K.F., id 245-246.69) Messent, A. and Glass, D.A. (eds), id 225 para. 9.80;Clarke, M.A., op cit n 14, 293 para.102a;Haak, K.F., id 248.

70) Messent, A. and Glass, D.A. (eds), id 225-226 para. 9.81;Clarke, M.A., op cit n 14, 294para. 102b;Haak, K.F., id 248-249.


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probably occur under the Transport Law Reform Act on 1.7.1998., and it is likelythat this test will be applied in Article 29 of CMR Convention71).Under French law since the concept of faute lourde is treated as equivalent todol, i.e., there is no distinction between two notions, thus it is said that there isany confusion in French court with regard to this72).In short the various attitudes kept in European courts is essentially derivedfrom the phrase of "in accordance with the law of the court or tribunal seised ofthe case" in Article 29 of CMR Convention73).If the act in question of the carrier is proved wilful misconduct or equivalentdefault thereto, the carrier shall not entitled to avail himself of the provisionswhich exclude or limit his liabilityor which shift the burden of proof74), andadditionally the limitation period under the Convention will be extended to threeyears75).As for the extent of effect of wilful misconduct or equivalent default, generalconsensus seems that the presumption of Article 18.1 and the circumstancesspecified in Article 17.4 as well as Article 17.2 including Article 23.3 of CMRConvention can not be invoked for the benefit of the carrier76). In the case ofArticle 17.5 views are generally converged for the application of Article 2977).In Lacey’s Footwear78) it was held that Article 23.1 and 2 of the CMRConvention apply in the normal way based upon the idea that these provisionsare related to fixing the amount of compensation but the concluding phrase ofArticle 23.4 that "no further damages shall be payable" was held to amount to aprovision which excluded or limited liability. Furthermore it was held that Article29 did not prevent reliance on Article 27.2even though the exchange rate had71) Messent, A. and Glass, D.A. (eds), id 226 para. 9.82.72) Messent, A. and Glass, D.A. (eds), id 224 para. 9.80. For somewhat different explanation,Clarke, M.A., op cit n 14, 295-296 para. 102c;Haak, K.F., id 246-247.

73) This confusion has been worsened by the loose interpretation of dol in French text ofCMR Convention.

74) Article 29.1 in CMR Convention.75) Article 32.1 in CMR Convention.76) Haak, K.F., id 244.77) Haak, K.F., id;Loewe, R., id 311 para 216-217;Clarke, M.A., op cit n 12, 47;Clarke, M.A.,op cit n 14, 292;BGH 27.6.1985 (1986) 21 ETL 102.

78) [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 369.


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altered against the plaintiffs79).The burden of proof is the usual burden in such cases in the lex fori and, inEnglish law it should be proved on the balance of probability80). However it is saidthat in some jurisdictions the general burden of proof had been tempered where theevidence was overwhelmingly placed in the carrier’s sphere of activity81).Last but not least Article 29.2 of CMR Convention provides to the same effectwith Article 25.2 of the Warsaw Convention that the rule in Article 29.1 alsoapplies if the wilful misconduct or equivalent default is "committed by the agentsor servants of the carrier or by any persons of whose services he makes use forthe performance of the carriage, when such agents, servants or other persons areacting within the scope of their employment."82)

. ntentional or Reckless Misconduct in Hague-Visby andⅤHamburg Rules

Hague-Visby Rules has adopted provisions which divest the carrier of thelimitation in Article rule 5(e) somewhat belatedly among major internationalⅣcarriage conventions. The Hamburg Rules also have the provision to the similareffect in Article 8.1.It is thought that these provisions in both Rules were derived from the HagueProtocol83), therefore the interpretation of relevant misconduct is naturally liable

79) Id. 369 at 369-370, 376-377;Messent, A. and Glass, D.A. (eds), id 221-222 para. 9.73-9.75; Messent, A., id 24 at 26.

80) Clarke, M.A., op cit n 12, 46.81) Id.82) The servant or agent himself is also liable personally in the same manner as the carrierif his act is proved wilful misconduct or equivalent default. For examples in otherjurisdictions Clarke, M.A., op cit n 12, 48-49.

83) Gaskell, N. et al, op cit n 17, 520;Mankabady, S.(ed), The Hamburg rules on the carriageof goods by sea (1978, Leiden:Sijthoff) 72;Diamond, A., "The Hague-Visby Rules"(1978)LMCLQ 225 at 244;Gaskell, N., id 129 at 165;Tetley, W., Marine Cargo Claims (3rd ed1988, BLAIS) 123-124, 131.


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to follow the example under the Hague Protocol except for special occasions.As for the ‘intent to cause damage’ there seems little disagreement in thatcarrier should have a subjective intention to do wrong. In addition in the case of‘recklessness’ seen at least from the traditional majority view in otherinternational carriage conventions, it is quite natural to construe it as requiring asubjective realizationby the carrier that he is doing something wrong, with anindifference as to the consequences. In short it appears somewhat difficult to findany difference between these provisions and other previous ones84).As regards ‘knowledge that damage would probably result’, some commentatorssuggested based upon the hypothetical scenario that the knowledge in this contextshould be construed as referring to a situation in which the carrier hasdeliberately shut his eyes to an obvious means of knowledge85).In terms of burden of proof the wording in both Rules seems to indicate clearlythat the onus is on the cargo owner to demonstrate that the carrier is guilty ofrelevant misconduct86).In addition Article bis rule 4 of the Hague-Visby Rules provides that aⅣservant or agent of a carrier shall not entitled to avail himself of the provisionsof this article in the case of intentional or reckless misconduct on his part. Fromthe wording of "the provisions of this article" its extent of effect seems moreextensive than that "the limitation of liability provided for in this paragraph" -–of a carrier87).Relying on this difference in wording it is submitted that the protectionsconferred upon a servant or agent under the Rules e.g., reliance not only on thepackage or unit limitation, but also on the time bar and other exceptions where it84) Diamond, A., id 225 at 245.85) Id 225 at 246;Mankabady, S. (ed), id at 73. Even though this suggestion was directed atthe Hague-Visby Rules, it seems to be able to be extended to the Hamburg Rules. Thisconcept is somewhat similar in essence to that of ‘background knowledge’ which wasargued in Nugent v. Goss[2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 222 regardless of the expression.Moreover as it was expressed by the majority in Nugent, the distinction betweenconstructive (imputed) knowledge and shut-eye (background) knowledge does not seemto be accepted as a practical one.

86) Gaskell, N. et al, op cit n 17, 521;Gaskell, N., id 129 at 165;Tetley, W., id 123. He triesto lessen the claimant’s degree of burden of proof.

87) Article rule 5(e) in Hague-Visby Rules.Ⅳ


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might be relevant are wholly barred in case of intentionalor reckless misconducton the part of a servant or agent88).On the other hand even though the Hamburg Rules likewise have provisionscomparable to article bis rule 4 of the Hague-Visby RulesⅣ 89), the extent ofeffect in the Hamburg Rules is somewhat different from that of Hague-VisbyRules in that the former dovetails the scope of loss of benefit in the carrier withthat of a servant or agent.One noticeable difference with other previous international carriage conventionof other transport area is that in Hague-Visby rules there is no provision inwhich the carrier loses his limitation due to the necessary misconduct of hisservant or agent although there is a separate provision which indicates definitelythe possibility of disentitlement of limitation personally on the part of a servantor agent of the carrier. This kind of attitude is also continued in the HamburgRules.From this difference another discussion which did not put forwarded in othercarriage conventions has been advanced. This discussion presupposes thedistinction between vicarious liability which makes the carrier liable for thenegligent act of employee and limitation of liability in which the carrier usuallycan invoke his limitation irrespective of the negligence on the part of employee90).In deciding whose acts can operate to break the limitation on the part of thecarrier in the capacity as a company, the focus has been on the question ofwhether it is possible to identify a ‘directing mind and will’ in English law91).Relating to this it was held in the European Enterprise92) that since article ruleⅣ5(e) in the Hague-Visby Rules referred to the carrier and not its servants oragents, it will not be possible to deprive the carrier of the limitation simply byshowing the necessary misconduct on the part of the servants or agents; rather it

88) Treitel, G. and Reynolds, F.M.B., Carver on bills of lading (2nd ed 2005, Sweet &Maxwell) 539 para. 9-258.

89) Article 8.2 of the Hamburg Rules.90) Gaskell, N. et al, op cit n 17, 521;Gaskell, N., id 129 at 168-171.91) Gaskell, N. et al, id.92) Browner International Ltd. v. Monarch Shipping Co. Ltd. (The European Enterprise)

[1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 185.


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will be necessary somebody fairly high up in the corporate structure in order forindividual act to be regarded as that of a company93).It is submitted that this conclusion should also be achieved in the HamburgRules94).Briefly it will be necessary to consider the functions which were performed bythe person or persons in question in addition to the reference to traditionalparagon such as members of board of directors or equivalents so as to decide therelevant individual or individuals in a corporate structure who can be deemed asalter ego of the company itself95).Other distinctions which seem quite unique at least in terms of wording in thearea of international carriage convention are that the Hamburg Rules have aqualifying word similar to that of the 1976 Limitation Convention96).On this basis it is submitted that unlike other conventions including theHague-Visby Rules, the phrase that it has to be shown that "such loss" wouldprobably result under the Hamburg Rules should be interpreted to the effect thatit is also necessary to show that the carrier anticipated that a particular kind ofdamage would result97).Also the Hamburg Rules have some peculiar provisions which indicate thepossibility of disentitlement of the carrier’s limitation in specific instances unlikeother conventions.Article 9.4 provides that if there is deck stowage contrary to an express underdeck agreement the carrier will lose the right to limitation. Furthermore Article17.4 provides that if a carrier issues a clean bill of lading by fraud in exchangefor an indemnity from the shipper, he will lose the right of limitation for lossesincurred by third parties who acted in reliance on the description of the goods inthe bill98).One final difficulty in applying intentional or reckless misconduct of both the

93) Id 185 at 185,191; Gaskell, N. et al, op cit n 17, 520.94) Gaskell, N., id 129 at 169.95) Gaskell, N., id 129 at 172-173;Gaskell, N. et al, op cit n 17, 521.96) Article 8 of the Hamburg Rules;Article 4 of the 1976 Limitation Convention.97) Gaskell, N., id 129 at 166;Gaskell, N. et al, op cit n 17, 520.98) Gaskell, N., id 129 at 167-168.


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Hague-Visby and the Hamburg Rules is whether and to what extent theseprovisions will alter the situations e.g., unjustifiable deviation formerly regulatedby the doctrine of fundamental breach99).

. ConclusionⅥ

It is prevalent even in usual circumstances of domestic contract to have alimitation of liability clause in the form of liquidated damages. The essentialpurpose to provide this kind of clause consists in the fact that through thismechanism contracting parties can anticipate future risks and fix these factorswhich are inherently unpredictable at least in terms of incidence as externalelements based upon the idea of ceteris paribus.Reasonable predictability of risks is of vital consequence especially in theinternational trade to enhance the development of related industry in a moresecure way and to prevent unnecessary dispute surrounding the difficult problemsof proof of real damage as well.However in cases where one contracting party has departed from his duty soegregiously that it can hardly be said that his breach of duty is to be condonedas mere negligence or under other doctrines such as force majeure, frustration,the limitation clause will be lackluster in the sense that it is now rather operatingas an easy means of rationalization for the party who seeks to flee from hissevere misdeed seriously derogating from real intent of the clause.Under this circumstance the concept of wilful misconduct and intentional orreckless misconduct can be said to have their meaning.In other words this concept plays a role of restoring the balance in thedistribution of risks between contracting parties.As we have seen in the above, however, at least in the case of theinternational conventions relating to carriage of goods, even the wording itself is99) Diamond, A., id 225 at 246-247;Wilson, J.F., Carriage of goods by sea (5th ed 2004,

Harlow:Pearson/Longman) 204-205, 223.


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not identical and for the worse even though the wording is the same, theinterpretation of it is somewhat different according to jurisdictions.This kind of divergence is even widened in some instances where theinterpretation itself is entrusted to each domestic court by the phrase of "inaccordance with the law of the court or tribunal seised of the case,"100) and thisdiscrepancy has been more complicated by the use of problematic phrase of "suchdefault as is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct" in some…conventions101).Roughly the main stream of interpretation of this typical mode of conductwhich breaks the limitation in each carriage convention is divided into two lines;one is inclined to rely on subjective criteria and the other is more readily acceptobjective yardsticks to infer a relevant state of mind102).As for the CMR Convention, without rectifying above situation, it seems be toalmost impossible to achieve uniform interpretation throughout Europeanjurisdictions. In this regard the Transport Reform Act of Germany appears to beable to give some hint in tackling these problems103).In the case of earlier Warsaw Convention, the similar problems under CMRConvention have also happened. Further this kind of contentious situation hasbeen continued relentlessly from the Hague Protocol through Hague-Visby Rulesto Hamburg Rules as has been mentioned.Between Scylla and Charybdis we should be careful not to fall easily prey tothe fallacy of unkempt or hasty generalization by jumping at the bait without anyserious consideration of original intent of each convention on the one hand andits practical adaptability at present on the other.More specifically to solve this kind of differences in interpretation in eachjurisdiction it must first be borne in mind by specific courts in question that theyare not dealing with domestic cases according to domestic law which they arewell versed in. In addition specific courts should try to harmonize their attitude in100) Article 29.1 of the CMR Convention, Article 25.1 of the Warsaw Convention.101) Id.102) These streams have continued from the Warsaw Convention to the Hamburg Rules

even though there have been some changes of wording and circumstances.103) Messent, A. and Glass, D.A. (eds), id 226 para. 9.82.


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interpretation with that of other jurisdictions which already have themselvesimmersed in earlier days except for the exceptional cases which seem torepugnant to the original intent of the convention in issue without doubt.In this context the purposive or teleological interpretation of internationalconventions104) which considers the original intent of drafters in the interest ofthe greatest harmonization in interpreting the international convention and thusmakes the least operation of purely domestic law possible, should be encouragedas an alternative in every municipal court which happens to have opportunity tointerpret international conventions especially relating to carriage of goods105).In terms of methodological alternatives, for the home-bound trend in domesticcourts to be kept abreast with the international standard, first of all the wordingof related international conventions should be aligned so as to reduce unnecessarydispute of real meaning of the clause. In addition from the practical point of viewthere should be a more extended online multilingual access system throughoutjurisdictions which has a database of authorities and other materials in variousjurisdictions relating to interpretation of international conventions in order for thejudge in hamlet not to make an inevitable mistake106).

104) James Buchanan & Co. v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping (UK) [1977] Q.B. 208, 213.105) [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 369.106) Clarke, M.A., "The transport of goods in Europe: patterns and problems of uniform

law" (1999) 1 LMCLQ 36 at 66.


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Carr, I., International trade law (1996, Cavendish Pub.)Clarke, M.A., Contracts of carriage by air (2002, LLP)Clarke, M.A., International carriage of goods by road: CMR (4th ed 2003, LLP)Clarke, M.A., Contracts of Carriage by Land and Air (2004, LLP)Gaskell, N., "Damages, Delay and Limitation of liability under the Hamburg Rules

1978" in Berlingieri, F. (ed), The Hamburg Rules: A choice for theE.E.C.? International Colloquium held on 18 and 19 November 1993(1994, Antwerpen:MAKLU)

Gaskell, N. et al, Bills of lading: law and contracts (2000, LLP)Glass, D.A., and Cashmore, C., Introduction to the law of carriage of goods (1989,

Sweet & Maxwell)Haak, K.F., The liability of the carrier under the CMR (1986, The Hague:Stichting

Vervoeradres)Mankabady, S. (ed), The Hamburg rules on the carriage of goods by sea (1978,

Leiden:Sijthoff)Mankiewicz, R.H., The Liability Regime of the International Air Carrier: A

Commentary on the presentWarsaw System (1981, KLUWER)Martin, P. et al(eds), Air law/Shawcross and Beaumont (4th ed 1977,

Butterworths)Messent, A. and Glass, D.A. (eds), Hill & Messent CMR: contracts for the

international carriage of goods by road (3rd ed 2000, LLP)Tetley, W., Marine Cargo Claims (3rd ed 1988, BLAIS)Treitel, G. and Reynolds, F.M.B., Carver on bills of lading (2nd ed 2005, Sweet &

Maxwell)Wilson, J.F., Carriage of goods by sea (5th ed 2004, Harlow:Pearson/Longman)


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JOURNALSBechky, P.S., "Mismanagement and Misinterpretation: U.S. Judicial

Implementation of the Warsaw Convention in Air Disaster Litigation"(1995) 60 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 455

Cheng, B., "A New Era in the law of International Carriage by Air: FromWarsaw(1929) to Montreal(1999)" (2004) 53 ICLQ 833

Clarke, M.A., "The transport of goods in Europe: patterns and problems ofuniform law" (1999) 1 LMCLQ 36

Diamond, A., "The Hague-Visby Rules" (1978) LMCLQ 225Loewe, R.,"Commentary on the Convention of 19 May on the Contract for the

International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR)" (1976) 11 E.T.L. 311Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, "The United States and the Warsaw

Convention"(1967) 80 HARV. L. REV. 497McGilchrist, N.R., "Wilful Misconduct and the Warsaw Convention" (1977)

LMCLQ, 539McGilchrist, N.R., "Article 25:an English approach to recklessness" (1983)

LMCLQ 488McQueen, P., "Articles 22 and 25 of the Warsaw Convention-An Australian

Contribution" (1989) LMCLQ 145McQueen, P., "Qantas Airways Ltd. v. S.S. Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd." (1991)

LMCLQ 165Messent, A., "Recent Developments on Wilful Misconduct under the CMR

Convention" (1998) 1 S. & T.L.I. 24.Murray, V., "Wilful Misconduct under the CMR" (1999) 1 JBL 180Pickelman, M.R., "Draft Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for

International Carriage by Air: The Warsaw Convention revisited forthe last time?" (1998) 64 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 273

Staten, K.A., "The Warsaw Convention’s facelift: Will it meet the Needs of 21stCentury Air Travel?" (1997) 62 Journal of Air Law and Commerce1083


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Wilensky, R.L., "Flying the Unfriendly Skies: The Liability of Airlines Underthe Warsaw for injuries Due to Terrorism" (1987) 8 NW. J. INT’L L.& BUS. 249

Key wordsWilful Misconduct, Intentionalor Reckless Misconduct, Exception to Limitationof Liability in International Carriage Conventions.


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국문초록< >

국제물건운송협약상의 개념에 대한 소고Wilful Misconduct

여 태 식

국제항공운송협약인 바르샤바 협약 제 조에 규정됨으로써 그 기나긴 여정을 시작25한 소위 라는 개념은 당시 걸음마 단계에 있었던 항공산업을 보Wilful Misconduct호 육성하고자 하는 각국의 의도에 기초를 둔 항공운송인의 책임제한조항의 문제점,을 완화하기 위한 제도적 장치의 일환으로써 고안되었다.그러나 최초 입안 당시의 의도와는 달리 각국 법원이 이를 자신의 법 개념에 근거

하여 해석하는 과정을 거치면서 위 개념 자체에 대한 각 법역간의 이해의 차이가 극

명하게 노정되었고 그로 인해 이후 위 개념을 둘러싼 논쟁은 합일점을 찾지 못하고

있는 실정이다 이러한 문제점을 해결하기 위해 바르샤바 협약상의. Wilful조항을 좀 더 명확한 내용으로 개정한 헤이그 의정서가 발효되기도 하Misconduct

였으나 각 법역간의 해석상의 차이를 일소하지는 못하였다.이에 더하여 위 바르샤바 협약 및 헤이그 의정서상의 관련조항이 거의 동일한 문

언으로 인접운송협약들인 국제도로물건운송협약 헤이그 비스비 규칙 함브르(CMR), - ,크 규칙 등의 관련조항들에 반영되면서 결국 개념을 둘러싼 논쟁Wilful Misconduct이 최초 항공운송분야를 넘어 육상 해상분야까지 확대되었다고 할 수 있다, .

개념은 프랑스법상의 이라는 개념의 번역이라고 알려져 있Wilful Misconduct dol는데 애초 그 번역상에 문제가 있었음을 별론으로 하더라도 프랑스 자체에서도 위, ,이라는 개념 속에 개념이 포섭될 수 있는가의 논의가 있었으며 독dol faute lourde ,

일의 경우에도 개념이 이에 포함된다는 논의가 전개되면the grosse Fahrlassingkeit서 소위 개념과 개념과의 경계를 획정하기 곤, gross negligence Wilful Misconduct란한 문제가 대두되었다 이는 특히 헤이그 의정서상의. intentional or reckless

개념의 이해를 둘러싸고 극명해지는데 바르샤바 협약상의misconduct , Wilful개념에 대한 오해를 바로잡기 위하여 규정된 위 개념이 당연히 종전개Misconduct

념과 동일한 의미로 이해되어야 한다는 입안자의 의도와는 달리 한국을 포함한 일부

대륙법계 국가들의 경우에는 특히 개념을 자국 국내법상의 중과실개념recklessness


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으로 이해하는 현상이 발생하였으며 이는 등의 개념과, Wilful Misconduct gross개념을 준별하는 영국 등의 입장과 대비되었다negligence .

이에 더하여 구체적 사안에서 운송인 측의 행위가 개념에 포섭Wilful Misconduct되는지의 여부를 판단하는 기준과 관련하여서도 입장이 통일되지 못하는 문제가 발

생하였다 특히 동일한 체계에 속하는 영국과 미국간에 그 차이가 두. common law드러지는데 영국의 경우 주관설적 입장이 우세한 것에 비해 미국의 경우에는 특히,국제항공여객운송분야에서 객관설적 입장이 우위를 차지하고 있다.결국 각국의 법체계상의 차이 및 이해관계의 불일치에 기인하는 이러한 해석상의

부조화는 국제통일협약의 존재의의를 무색케 하는 심대한 결과를 야기하는 것은 물

론 국제운송협약상 운송인의 책임제한 예외조항의 적용을 둘러싼 이해당사자간의 분

쟁을 조장하는 역할을 하고 있다고 하겠다.다만 이러한 각 법역간의 차이를 제어할 국제적 구속력이 부재한 상태에서 필연적

으로 야기될 수 있는 부작용인 현상을 방지하기 위한 현실적 대안forum-shopping은 각국 법원이 기존의 경향에서 벗어나 목적론적인 시각에서 통일협home-bound약의 취지를 살리려는 노력을 배가하는 것이며 이를 실질적으로 지원할 수 있도록,각국 법원의 판례 및 관련 자료를 손쉽게 이용할 수 있는 다언어 데이터 베이스가

폭넓게 구축될 필요가 있다고 사료된다.

주제어

국제항공운송협약 바르샤바협약 제 조 국제도로물건운송협약, 25 ,

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취득시효기간완성과 대항력

원 상 철*

I. 시작 글 시효취득의 성질과 소급효.Ⅳ.Ⅱ 취득시효제도의 기능 및 입법례.Ⅲ 시효취득자의 법률관계 맺는 말.Ⅴ

《目次》

시작 글.Ⅰ

취득시효 란 물건 또는 권리를 점유 또는 준(Ersitzung, erwerdende Verjaharung)점유하는 사실상태가 일정기간동안 계속되는 경우에 그것이 진실한 권리관계와 일치

하는가의 여부를 묻지 않고 그 사실상태를 존중하여 점유 또는 준점유자로 하여금

권리취득의 효과를 생기게 하는 시효제도를 말한다 시효제도는 취득시효제도와 소.멸시효제도가 있는데 그 중 취득시효제도는 권리를 행사하고 있는 것과 같은 외관이

일정한 기간동안 계속하는 경우에 권리취득의 효과가 생기는 것으로 하는 시효제도,로서 소멸시효에 대응하는 개념이다.1) 이 제도는 로마법의 사용취득 과 장(usucapio)기점유의 항변 에서 유래된 것으로 오늘날 각국의 입법이(praescriptio lomgitenporis)이를 채택하고 있으며,2) 우리 민법도 제 조 이하에서 이를 규정하고 있다245 .우리 민법 제 조 제 항은 년간 소유의 의사로 평온공연하게 부동산을 점유245 1 “20 ․하는 자는 등기함으로써 그 소유권을 취득한다 라고 규정하여 일반취득시효를 제.” , 2법학박사원광대학교 법학과 강의교수＊ ․

1) 이영준 한국민법론 박영사, , , 2003, p.670.2) 그 연혁 및 입법례에 관하여는 김욱곤이기용 주석 물권법 상 한국사법행정학회, ( ), , 1991, p.․

이하 참조543 .


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항에서는 부동산의 소유자로 등기한 자가 년간 소유의 의사로 평온공연하게 선“ 10 ․의이며 과실 없이 그 부동산을 점유한 때에는 소유권을 취득한다 라고 규정하여 등.”기부취득시효를 각각 규정하고 있다 일반취득시효는 등기부취득시효와는 달리 취득.시효가 경과된 것만으로 자주점유자의 소유권취득이 바로 인정되는 것이 아니라 자,주점유자에게 등기청구권이 발생할 뿐이고 이 청구권에 기초하여 등기함으로써 소유

권취득의 효력이 인정된다 이와 같이 등기함으로서 소유권을 취득하는 것으로 규. “ ”정함에 따라 점유자의 등기청구권의 본질 등기하는 경우 등기의 종류 그리고 시효,기간완성의 효과가 무엇인가하는 점이 문제된다 또한 법률규정에 의한 물권의 취득.은 등기를 요하지 아니한다는 민법 제 조와의 관계를 어떻게 이해할 것인지 하는187문제가 제기될 수도 있다.3) 이에 대한 학설은 많지 않으나 민법 제 조의 규정에245의하여 등기청구권이 발생한다고 하는 견해가 있고 취득시효의 완성으로써 물권적,기대권이 생기고 그 물권적 기대권의 효력으로 등기청구권이 발생한다고 한다.판례4)도 시효완성 후에 등기부상 소유자변동이 생기면 시효취득자는 제 취득자에3대하여 시효완성으로써 대항할 수 없다는 판결을 유지하고 있는 것을 보면 채권적

의미에 접근하고 있다고 할 수 있다 그러나 또한 판례. 5)는 부동산소유자가 시효완성사실을 알 수 있는 상태에서 처분한 경우에는 원칙적으로 손해배상책임이 문제될 뿐

점유자가 시효완성을 원인으로 소유권을 취득할 수가 없게 된다 다만 제 자가 사정. , 3을 잘 알면서 소유자의 배임처분행위에 적극 가담한 경우에는 반사회질서에 해당하

는 법률행위로서 무효로 하고 제 자에의 소유권이전등기는 원인무효의 등기로 함으, 3로써 예외적으로 점유자가 부동산소유권을 취득할 수 있다 이처럼 거래행위가 시효.완성시점 이전에 이루어졌는가 이후에 이루어졌는가에 따라 진정한 권리자와 거래한

자의 보호를 완전히 달리하는 것이 과연 타당성이 있는지 확신이 가지 않는다.그리하여 본고에서는 일반취득시효의 요건을 갖추었을 때 즉시 소유권을 취득하는

것이 아니라 등기청구권이 발생하고 그 등기청구권을 행사함으로써 소유권을 취득하

는데 이 경우에 원 소유자 및 제 취득자와의 법리문제를 어떻게 해석하는 것이 취, 3득시효제도의 본래적 취지에 비추어 타당한지를 비판적으로 검토를 해 보기로 한다.

3) 하경효 부동산일반취득시효에 있어서 자주점유자와 제 취득자와의 관계 고시연구, “ 3 ”, , 1993.이기용 부동산취득시효에 관한 연구 박사학위논문 성균관대학교 대학원10, p. 98; , “ ”, , , 1989

참조.4) 대법원 선고 다 판결 등 참조1993. 9. 28. , 93 22883 .5) 대법원 선고 다 판결, 1994. 4. 12. , 93 60779 .

취득시효기간완성과 대항력원상철/

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취득시효제도의 기능 및 입법례.Ⅱ

취득시효제도의 기능1.

일반적으로 취득시효는 일정한 사실상태가 일정기간 계속된 경우에 그 상태가 진

실한 권리상태와 합치하는가의 여부를 묻지 않고 그 사실상태를 그대로 존중하여 이

를 권리관계로 인정하려는 제도이다 일반적 법이론에 의하며 비권리자로 하여금 권.리를 취득하게 하고 권리자의 권리를 상실하게 하는 것은 생각할 수 없다 그런데.취득시효제도는 이러한 일반적 법이론에 반하는데도 불구하고 우리 민법이 인정하고

있는 것은 아닌가 하는 의문이 생긴다.우리 민법이 취득시효제도를 규정하고 있는 입법취지에 관하여 일반적으로는 사회

의 법률관계의 안정 증거보전의 곤란구제에 있다고 한다, .6) 그리고 특히 등기부취득시효는 부동산의 거래안전에 그 목적이 있다고 강조하는 견해도 있다.7) 판례8)도 등기부취득시효에 있어서 전자의 등기기간의 합의를 인정하여 등기부취득시효제도를

부동산의 거래안전제도로 기능할 수 있도록 하고 있다 이처럼 취득시효제도는 그것.이 일반취득시효이든 등기부취득시효이든 다 같이 사회의 법률생활의 안정 증거보,전의 곤란구제 거래안전을 목적으로 하고 있다 특히 부동산등기에 공신력을 인정하, .지 않고 있는 우리 법제에서는 취득시효제도가 중요한 부동산거래의 안전제도로 기

능한다.

각국의 입법례2. 9)

우리나라는 부동산물권변동에 있어서 당사자간의 물권적 합의 외에 등기를 요하는

점에서 이른바 형식주의를 취하고 있다 그런데 형식주의를 취하는 입법례에 있어서.는 등기부취득시효를 일반적으로 인정하고 있으나 우리 민법 제 조 항 내용과, 245 1같은 일반취득시효제도를 두고 있지는 않다.

6) 곽윤직 물권법 재전정판 김용한 물권법론 김증한 물권법강의, ( ), 1986, p. 299; , , 1985, p. 269; , ,1986, p. 111.

7) 고상용 취득시효와 소유권이전등기청구방법 고시계, “ ”, , 1997. 10, pp. 42~43.8) 대법원 선고 다카 판결 전원합의체, 1989. 12. 26. , 87 2176 ( ).9) 하경효 앞의 논문, , pp, 97~ 참고99 .


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독일(1)

독일민법은 년간의 자주점유를 요건으로 이른바 등기부취득시효를 인정하고 있30다 제 조 그러나 장기간의 점유계속을 기초로 한 부동산소유권취득은 제권판결( 900 ).

을 구한 자주점유자에게 부동산 선점유를 인정하는 제도에 의하여(Ausschlu urteil)β그 가능성을 인정할 뿐이다 독일민법 제 조는 부동산의 소유권이 등기되지 않은, 927채 타인이 그 부동산을 년간 자주점유한 경우에 소유권은 공시최고절차30

에 의해 배제될 수 있다고 규정하고 있다 소유권효가 등기된(Aufgebotsverfahren) .경우에는 이러한 요건에 부가하여 등기된 소유효가 사망하거나 실종되어 있어서 그

소유효의 동의를 요하는 등기가 년간 행해지지 않은 경우에 한해서만 동일절차에30의한 소유권취득이 허용된다 동조 제 항 제권판결을 얻은 점유자는 자신을 소유권( 1 ).자로 등기함으로써 소유권을 취득한다 동조 제 항 제권판결 이전 제 자가 소유권자( 2 ). 3로서 또는 제 자의 소유권을 이유로 이의를 제기한 때에는 판결은 그 제 자에 대하3 3여 효력을 발생하지 않는다 동조 제 항( 3 ).독일민법에서는 미등기부동산 또는 등기된 부동산소유자의 사망 또는 실종으로 30년 동안 새로운 등기가 행하여지지 않은 경우에 한하여 공시최고절차에 의한 제권판

결을 얻어 소유자의 권리를 배척할 수 있다 이로 인해 무주물이 된 그 부동산에 관.하여 자주점유자가 배타적 선점권을 가지게 되고 소유자로 등기함으로써 소유권을

취득할 수 있게 하고 있다.

스위스(2)

스위스민법도 독일민법과 마찬가지로 등기부취득시효를 원칙으로 한다 다만 그.요건을 년간의 선의자주점유로 하고 있다 스위스 민법 제 조 등기 없이 점유10 ( 661 ).․계속을 기초로 하는 소유권취득이 극히 제한적으로 허용되고 있는 점도 독일민법과

기본적으로 유사하다 스위스민법 제 조에서는 미등기부동산을 년간 자주점유한. 662 30자는 소유권자로 등기해 줄 것을 요구할 수 있도록 규정하고 있다 동조 제 항 등기( 1 ).부상에 소유자가 명백하지 않거나 취득시효개시시에 소유권자가 사망 또는 실종선고

된 경우에도 마찬가지이다 동조 제 항 그러나 년간의 자주점유를 근거로 한 등기( 2 ). 30는 공시최고기간 중 이의가 제기되지 않았거나 제기된 이의가 기각된 후에 법관의

처분에 의해서만 행해질 수 있도록 하고 있다 동조 제 항( 3 ).스위스민법에서도 미등기부동산 또는 등기된 소유권자가 사망실종했거나 불분명․


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한 경우라는 극히 제한된 요건과 공시최고절차에 의해서만 점유자의 소유권취득을

허용하고 있다.이처럼 우리 나라와 같이 물권변동에 등기를 요하는 이른바 형식주의를 취하는 독

일이나 스위스민법은 등기부취득시효를 원칙으로 하고 점유를 기초로 한 소유권취득

의 가능성을 극히 한정적으로 인정하고 있다.10)

일본(3)

일본민법은 당사자의 의사표시에 의하여 물권변동의 효력이 발생하도록 하고 일민(제 조 등기를 제 자에 대한 대항요건으로 하고 있다 제 조 취득시효에 관하여176 ), 3 ( 177 ).는 총칙편에서 년간 자주점유했거나 년간 선의무과실의 자주점유의 경우에 인20 10 ․정하고 있다 일민 제 조 이와 같이 일본민법은 의사주의 대항요건주의 를 취하는( 162 ). ( )결과 등기부취득시효에 대한 규정을 별도로 두지 않고 일률적으로 소유권취득시효를

규율하고 있다.

우리 나라(4)

우리 민법 제 조 항에서 규정한 부동산일반취득시효의 내용은 부동산물권변동245 1에 관한 형식주의 입법례에서는 볼 수 없는 특유한 것이다 형식주의를 취하는 나라.에서는 미등기부동산이나 권리공시는 있으나 권리자가 불분명한 경우의 부동산을 대

상으로 공시최고절차 및 법원의 허가에 의한 등기와 같은 특별한 절차와 요건하에서

자주점유자의 소유권취득가능성을 규정하고 있기 때문에 우리 나라의 일반취득시효

와는 다른 것이다.11) 우리 나라의 일반취득제도는 부동산의 등기여부와 내용에 상관없이 자주점유자가 년간의 시효기간이 만료되면 등기명의소유자에게 등기청구권을20행사할 수 있도록 하고 있다 우리 나라에 있어서 부동산에 대한 공시방법은 점유가.아닌 등기이므로 이를 갖추고 소유의사로서 점유한 사실에 따라 취득시효를 인정하

는 것은 당연하나 등기 없이 단지 자주점유에 기초하여 취득시효를 인정하는 것에,는 별도의 요건과 절차로서 제한적으로 할 필요가 있다.

10) 민법 제 조의 입법에 영향을 준 것으로 추측되고 있는 만주국 민법 이기용 앞의 박245 ( ,사학위논문 이하 도 스위스민법 제 조의 내용과 유사하게 구성되어 있다, p. 54 ) 662 .

11) 곽윤직 편집대표 민법주해( ), ( ), p. 367.Ⅴ


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시효취득자의 법률관계.Ⅲ 12)

일반취득시효와 등기청구권1.

우리 민법 제 조 제 항의 취득시효는 법률행위가 아니므로 취득시효로 인한 부245 1동산 소유권의 취득에는 등기를 필요로 하지 않는 것이지만 제 조 민법은 여기에( 187 ),유일한 예외를 두어 등기 를 하여야 그 소유권을 취득하는 것으로 규정하고 있다“ ” .한편 등기를 한다고 하더라도 시효로 인한 취득은 원시취득이므로 이 때의 등기는,종전의 등기부를 폐쇄하고 새로이 등기부를 개설하는 방식으로 하여야 하겠지만 부,동산등기법은 그 등기절차에 관해 아무런 규정을 두고 있지 않다 그런데 판례는 점.유자가 취득시효완성 당시의 소유자에 대하여 소유권이전등기청구권을 가지는 것으‘ ’로 보아 결국 취득시효를 원인으로 점유자와 소유자의 공동신청으로 소유권이전등,기가 행하여지는 것으로 해석된다.따라서 일반취득시효의 경우에도 법률의 규정에 의한 물권변동의 요건으로 요구하

여도 물권변동에 있어 공백상태를 초래할 염려가 없다 그렇다면 형식주의의 원칙에.입각하여 등기를 그 요건으로 요구하는 것이 타당하고 또 그렇게 하는 것이 일반취

득시효의 경우 법률관계의 명확을 꾀할 수 있을 것이다.13)일반취득시효가 완성되면 점유자는 소유자를 상대로 등기청구권을 가지고 그 성,질은 채권적 청구권으로 해석된다 따라서 취득시효를 원인으로 그 등기를 하기까‘ ’ .지는 등기부상의 명의자가 소유자이고 그가 제 자에게 부동산을 양도하여 소유권이, 3전등기가 경료되면 제 자는 유효하게 소유권을 취득하게 되며 점유자는 제 자를 상3 , 3대로 취득시효를 주장할 수는 없다.14) 즉 판례는 위 경우 부동산의 이중매매에 있어서와 같은 법리를 전개한다.15)

원소유자와의 법률관계2.

12) 김대규 우리 민법상 부동산소유권의 일반취득시효와 등기 민법학의 회고와 전망, “ ”, :민법시행 주년기념논문집 한국민사법학회 에서 재인용30 , , 1993, p. 305 .

13) 김대규 앞의 논문, , p.302.14) 대법원 선고 다카 판결, 1986. 8. 19. , 85 2306 .15) 김준호 부동산 점유취득시효와 대상청구권 고시연구, “ ”, , 1997. 6, p.168.


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문제의 소재(1)

시효취득자는 상대방에 대하여 취득시효완성을 원인으로 소유권이전등기를 청구할

수 있다 그런데 시효취득자의 점유개시시부터 등기부상에 소유자로 되어 있던 원소.유자는 취득시효기간종료로 인하여 시효취득자에게 발생된 등기청구권의 상대방이

된다는데 의심의 여지가 없다 다만 점유자는 점유 자체를 취득하는 것이 아니고. , ,소유권취득을 위한 등기청구권을 가질 뿐이므로 원소유자의 소유권은 아직 상실되지

않는다 따라서 이론상으로는 시효취득자가 취득시효기간의 종료로 인하여 소유권이.전등기청구권을 행사하는 경우에 원소유자는 법률상 엄연한 소유자이므로 그의 소, ,유권에 기하여 소유물반환청구권을 행사할 수 있다 이 경우에 원소유자의 물권적.청구권과 시효취득자의 등기청구권은 어느 것이 우선하는가 하는 점이 문제된다.일반적인 이론에 의하면 물권적청구권은 채권적 청구권보다 우선하기 때문에 시효

취득자가 행사하는 등기청구권은 채권적 청구권이기 때문에 원소유자는 시효취득자

가 행사하는 등기청구권에 대하여 협력해 주지 않아도 된다 시효취득자는 취득시효.기간이 종료되었을지라도 당해 부동산을 반환해 주어야 하는데 이는 타당하지 않다.만약 그렇게 해석한다면 시효취득자는 취득시효기간의 종료 여부를 떠나 언제든지,당해 부동산을 반환해 주어야 하고 시효취득자는 어느 경우에도 소유권을 취득할,수 없는 결과가 되어 결국 민법 제 조 제 항은 사문화되고 만다245 1 .

판례의 태도(2)

대법원은 원판례에 의하면 원심은 피고 정읍군은 년 월 일에 본건 토지에“ 1944 8 19대하여 취득시효완성으로 인하여 그 소유명의자인 원고에게 그 소유권이전을 청구할

권리를 취득한 것이라고 설시하고 있는 것이고 바로 소유권을 취득하였다고 설시하,고 있는 것은 아니며 피고가 원고에게 대하여 위와 같이 취득시효기간종료로 본건,토지의 소유권이전등기를 청구할 권리가 있고 원고는 이에 응할 의무가 있는 것인,이상 피고가 아직 소유권을 취득하지 못하였고 원고에게 소유권이 남아 있다 하더, ,라도 원고는 피고에게 대하여 소유권에 의한 본건 토지의 인도를 청구할 수 없,다”16) 라고 판시하고 있으며 또한 부동산취득시효기간을 경과한 점유자가 그 소유, “명의자에게 대하여 확정적으로 그 부동산에 대하여 취득시효기간종료로 인한 소유권

16) 대법원 다 판결, 1972. 1. 31. 71 2416 .


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이전등기청구권이 있는 경우에는 그 점유자는 아직 소유권을 취득하지 못하였다 하,여도 소유명의자는 소유권이전등기절차를 이행하여 그 점유자로 하여금 점유를 개, ,시한 때에 소급하여 점유권을 취득하게 할 의무가 있으므로 그 부동산의 점유로 인,한 손해배상청구를 할 수 없다”17)라고 판시하고 있으나 그에 대한 명확한 논거는 제시하지 않고 있다.

학설의 입장(3)

그러면 이의 법리구성을 어떻게 해야 할 것인가는 다음 세 가지로 나누어서 생각

해 볼 수 있을 것이다.원소유자의 물권적 청구권이 소멸시효에 걸리는 것으로 볼 수 있을 것인가?①

결론적으로 그렇게는 볼 수 없다 왜냐하면 취득시효로 인하여 타인의 권리를 원.시적으로 취득하는 경우에는 그 결과로 원권리자가 타인의 권리를 상실하게 되는데,이는 취득시효의 직접의 효과가 아니고 반사작용에 불과하므로 취득시효로 인하여

원권리가 소멸시효에 걸린다고 생각하는 것은 잘못이다.18) 뿐만 아니라 우리 나라통설은 소유권으로부터 파생하는 물권적 청구권은 소멸시효에 걸리지 않는다고 하

며,19) 만약 소멸시효에 걸린다고 한다면 부동산점유자 년간 점유하였다 하더라도20취득시효의 요건을 갖추지 못한 경우 예를 들면 소유의 악의가 인정되지 않는 경우(등 에는 점유자는 시효취득자는 아니므로 원소유자는 점유자를 상대로 소유권에 기)한 목적물반환청구권을 행사할 수 있어야 하는데 이 권리는 년간 행사하지 않았, 20으므로 해서 이미 소멸시효가 완성되어 소멸되었으므로 반환청구권을 행사 할 수 없

는 부당한 결과가 초래되어 지기 때문이다.원소유자의 물권적 청구권을 실효의 원칙에 의하여 실효시킬 수 있는가?②

결론을 내리기 전에 먼저 실효의 원칙을 우리 민법 하에서 인정할 수 있는가에 대

한 학자들의 견해를 살펴보고자 한다.실효의 원칙은 독일 판례에 의해 형성된 이론으로서 우리 나라에서는 이 이론이

아직 생소한 형편이고 법원도 이를 고려하지 않는 것 같다, 20)고 보여진다 우리 민법.의 경우 권리에 관하여 소멸시효와 제소기간을 인정하므로 별도 권리실효의 원칙을

17) 대법원 다 판결, 1966. 9. 20. 66 1125 .18) 김기선 소유권의 취득시효 고시계, “ ”, , 1979. 4. p. 23.19) 이에 관하여 자세한 것은 김용한 부동산등기청구권에 관한 약간의 연구 논문집 단, “ ”, (국대 제 집), 3 , 1969. 12, p. 40.

20) 곽윤직 민법총칙 박영사, , , 1990, p. 119.


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인정한다는 것은 권리행사기간 내에는 그 불행사로 인해 권리가 소멸하지 않는다는

기대를 갖는 권리자의 이익을 해할 위험이 있으므로 부정함이 타당하다고 하는 견해

가 있다 그러나 우리 민법상 소멸시효의 대상이 되는 권리는 독일 민법의 경우와는.달리 그 범위가 넓고 또한 원칙적으로 기간이 단기이고 실효의 기초를 뒷받침하게

하는 상대방의 신뢰가 쉽게는 형성되지 않는다는 것을 생각할 수 있지만 우리 민법,의 해석론으로서도 권리실효의 원칙을 신의칙의 한 작용의 측면에서 긍정할 수 있다

고 하는 견해도 있다.실효의 원칙을 우리 민법의 경우에 인정한다고 하더라도 소유권반환청구권이 실효

에 해당한다고 까지는 인정할 수 없고 만약 인정한다고 하더라도 앞서서 살펴 본,소유물반환청구권이 소멸시효에 걸린다고 볼 때에 발생하는 문제점이 이 경우에도

발생하기 때문에 실효의 원칙에 의해서도 해결할 수 없다.원소유자의 물권적 청구권을 항변권에 의하여 저지할 수 있는가?③

원소유자가 물권적 청구권을 행사하여 부동산의 반환을 청구할 때 시효취득자에게

항변권을 설정하여 이를 저지할 수 있을 것인가 만약 이를 인정한다면 그 근거는.어디서 찾을 수 있을 것인가 인데 민법 제 조는 그 본문에서 소유자의 반환청구, 213권을 규정하고 그 단서에서 점유자가 그 물건을 점유할 권리 가 있는 때에는 반환, “ ”을 거부할 수 있다고 규정하고 있으므로 여기에서 시효취득자의 항변권을 인정하는

근거를 찾을 수 있을 것이다 즉 시효취득자는 취득시효기간 종료 전에는 점유할 권.리가 있는 것이 아니므로 원소유자가 그의 소유권에 기하여 부동산의 반환을 청구하

면 반환해 주어야 한다 그러나 취득시효기간이 종료되면 등기청구권이 발생되고 그.점유자의 점유는 정당한 권리에 의한 점유로 전환되어 민법 제 조 단서의 규정에213의하여 항변권이 발생된다고 할 수 있을 것이다.

소결(4)

일반취득시효가 완성하면 점유자는 소유자를 상대로 등기청구권을 가지고 그 성,질은 채권적 청구권으로 해석된다 따라서 취득시효를 원인으로 그 등기를 하기까‘ ’ .지는 등기부상의 명의자가 소유자이고 그가 제 자에게 부동산을 양도하여 소유권이, 3전등기가 경료되면 제 자는 유효하게 소유권을 취득하게 되며 점유자는 제 자를 상3 , 3대로 취득시효를 주장할 수는 없다.21) 즉 판례는 위 경우 부동산의 이중매매에 있어

21) 대법원 선고 다카 판결, 1986. 8. 19. , 85 2306 .


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서와 같은 법리를 전개한다.그러면 취득시효가 완성된 점유자의 지위는 어떠한가 판례는 기본적으로 등기청‘ ’ .구권의 발생 이외에 취득시효기간의 완성만으로 당연히 점유자에게 일정한 법익이 발

생하는 것으로는 보지 않는다 즉 부동산에 관한 취득시효가 완성하였더라도 그 점유. ‘자가 취득시효를 주장하거나 이로 인한 소유권이전등기를 청구하기 전에는 소유자로’서는 특별한 사정이 없는 한 시효취득 사실을 알 수 없는 것이므로 따라서 소유자가,그 부동산을 제 자에게 처분하였다 하

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