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U.Ü. FEN-EDEBİYAT FAKÜLTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER DERGİSİ Yıl: 14, Sayı: 25, 2013/2

BYZANTINE-OTTOMAN RELATIONS IN EARLY 1420’S

Şahin KILIÇ*

ABSTRACT

Until up to the Ottoman defeat in 1402 at the Battle of Ankara, the course of the relationships between the Byzantium and Ottoman Empire was defined by the expansionist policies of Ottomans against the Byzantium. During the reign of Beyazıd I, the attempts for transforming the Ottoman state into a centralized empire covering the Balkans had to be postponed until to the reign of Murad II. The policies pursued after the Interregnum period had also important impacts on the ways of relationships between Byzantium who was now confined within the city walls of İstanbul and Ottomans who were trying to recover. The early 1420’s was the beginning of a new era for the Byzantines. Emperor Manuel Palaiologos II who had managed to keep the state alive through his rational politics which gave direction to the Ottoman-Byzantine relations for three decades died in 1425 after a long period of illness. Ottoman Empire also entered a new period with the ascension of Murat II to the throne in 1422. Therefore, it can be said that the first years of the 1420’s was a turning point for both Ottomans and Byzantine Empire and the ways of their relationships. This article examines these changing relationships between the Byzantine and Ottoman Empire and the new balance of politics emerged after the Battle of Ankara primarily based on the contemporary sources of this period.

Key Words: Byzantine-Ottoman Relations, Byzantine, Ottoman, Manuel II Palaiologos, Bayezid I, Mehmed I, Murad II.

* Dr. Uludag Unversity, Department of History, Gorukle-Nilufer/Bursa.

E-mail: sahinkilic@yahoo.com

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ÖZET

1420'li Yılların Başlarında Bizans-Osmanlı İlişkileri Bizans-Osmanlı ilişkilerinin seyri, Osmanlıların 28 Temmuz 1402'deki

Ankara yenilgisine kadar Bizans aleyhine genişleme siyasetiyle belirlendi. I. Bayezid döneminde, Balkanları da içine alan merkezileşen bir imparatorluğa dönüşme çabaları, II. Murad döneminde yeniden canlanıncaya kadar ertelenmek zorunda kaldı. Fetret Devri'nden sonra izlenen siyaset, İstanbul'a sıkışmış Bizans ile toparlanmaya çalışan Osmanlıların ilişki biçimine de yansıdı. 1420'li yılların başları, Bizanslılar açısından yeni bir dönemin de başlangıcıydı. Son otuz yıl boyunca, Bizans-Osmanlı ilişkilerine yön veren çalışan akılcı siyasetiyle devletini ayakta tutmayı başaran II. Manuel Palaiologos, 1425'te uzun bir hastalık döneminden sonra öldü. Osmanlı Devleti ise, I. Mehmed döneminde toparlanan devleti, 1422'de tahta geçen II. Murad ile birlikte yeni bir döneme girdi. Dolayısıyla her iki devlet ve ilişkilerinin seyri bakımından 1420'lerin ilk yarısının kırılma dönemi olduğu söylenebilir. Bu makalede, Bizans-Osmanlı ilişkilerinin Ankara Savaşı'ndan sonra oluşan yeni dengeleri ve 1420'lerin ilk yıllarındaki yeni siyasetler, dönemin muasır kaynaklarına dayanarak tahlil edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bizans-Osmanı İlişkileri, Osmanlı, Bizans, II. Manuel Palaiologos, I. Bayezid, I. Mehmed, II. Murad.

On 28 July 1402, a major battle was fought on a plain called Çubuk

Ovası, north of Ankara. On one side was the army of Timur (Tamerlane, r. 1370-1405) who had spent the most time of his reign in creating a powerful empire in the central Asia. On the other was that of the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I (r. 1389-1402) who had spent the preceding decade in building a centralized empire at the region between the Danube and the Euphrates Rivers. In the west, Bayezid had brought Albania and Bulgaria under direct Ottoman rule and had crushed a crusader army at Nicopolis (1396). In the east, he had annexed the Turkish emirates (beyliks) of Karaman and Kadı Burhaneddin and since 1394, he was besieging Constantinople. During the rule of Bayezid the Ottoman menace for the neighboring powers was at its high point threatening mostly the existence of Byzantium. However, on the eve of the fifteenth century, the Ottoman expansion in to Anatolia brought Bayezid in to conflict with Timur. The latter, having declared himself as the heir of sovereign rights of the Ilkhanids at the area marched towards Ankara, where Bayezid tried to oppose him. But at the end, Bayezid’s army was defeated and the sultan himself was taken prisoner.1

1 On Timur’s rise to power and his expedition in to Anatolia see Beatrice Forbes Manz, The

Rise and Rule of Tamerlane, Cambridge: Cambrigde Canto, 1989; Marie Mathilde

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At the aftermath of the battle of Ankara, Timur restored the beyliks of Karaman, Aydın, Menteşe, Germiyan, Saruhan and Canık to their former emirs. What had remained from the Ottoman territory was: the Rumeli (the realms of the Ottoman State in the Balkans), the province of Bithynia with its capital Bursa and the province of Rum, the region around the cities of Amasya and Tokat. Actually, Bayezid’s centralized empire had been disintegrated and the Ottoman realm in Anatolia had been reduced to what it had been at the death of the Sultan Murad I (r. 1362-1389). However, one of the major unanticipated consequences of the Timurid invasion of Anatolia was the relief it provided for Byzantium. On 10 December 1399, the Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos had been embarked from Constantinople on a long trip to seek assistance against the Ottomans. In 1402, when Bayezid was defeated, his search was still fruitless. Therefore, the salvation for the city hadn’t come from west but from the east. The siege was lifted as Bayezid’s heirs were in struggle to piece together the remains of the shattered Ottoman State.2

Süleyman, İsa and Mehmed were the three sons of Bayezid who were able to escape from the battlefield, while Mustafa and Musa had been captured by Timur. In August, Süleyman accompanied by İsa and a sizeable army managed to make his way to Gallipoli. Upon his arrival he took the control of Rumeli which remained intact from the Timurid invasion and

Alexandrescu Dersca, La Campagne de Timur en Anatolie (1402), Bucharest: Monitorul Oficial si Imprimeriile Statului, 1942; Nicolaos Nicoloudes, “Byzantine Historians on the Wars of Timur (Tamerlane) in Central Asia and the Middle East”, JOAS, 8 (1996), 83–93. On the Ottoman expansion during the rule of Bayezid and the aftermath of the Battle of Ankara see Halil İnalcık, “The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades (1329-1451)”, A History of the Crusades, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, vol. VI, The Impact of the Crusades on Europe, eds. Harry W. Hazard-Norman P. Zaccour, Madison-Wisconsin-London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989, 247-254; eadem, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age (1300-1600), London: Phoenix, 1994, 15-16; Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, Manuel II Palaeologus on the Strife Between Bayezid and Kadı Burhan al-Din Ahmad”, BSOAS, 18 (1980), 471–481; Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire 1300–1481, İstanbul: The Isis Press, 1990, 37–56; Alexios G. C. Savvides, Essays in Ottoman History, Third Edition with Additions and Corrections, Athens: Papazissis Publishers, 2007, 41-44; Dimitris J. Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid: Empire Building and Representation in the Ottoman Civil War of 1402-1413, Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2007, 41-50.

2 On the Emperor Manuel’s trip in to western Europe and the siege of Constantinople see, John W. Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus (1391–1425), A Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1969, 123-224; Donald M. Nicol, The Last Centuries of Byzantium 1261-1453, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 302-317; Dionysios Chatzopoulos, Η Πρώτη Πολιορκία της Κωνσταντινουπόλεως από τους Οθωμανούς (1394-1402), Athens: Eleutheri Skepsis, 1995; Alexios G. C. Savvides, History of Byzantium with extracts from the sources, Volume 3: The Later Byzantine Empire and Medieval Hellenism, 2nd Edition, with Additions, Athens: Patakis Publishers, 2006, 95-97.

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began peace negotiations with the Christian rulers of the Romania. A treaty was of crucial importance for his existence in Rumeli, an area in which the Ottomans were surrounded by many powers that were eager to gain some advantages from the Ottoman downfall. Furthermore, Timur was still plundering in Anatolia and nobody was able to foresee his future intensions. As a consequence, Süleyman was prepared to make significant concessions. By September 4, he offered his navy, Gallipoli and a large stretch of land in Rumeli to Byzantium in exchange for peace. The negotiations were carried on for some months. Eventually, the treaty was signed in January or February of 1403 by Ioannes and was reaffirmed by Manuel upon his return to Constantinople (9 June 1403). It was also included Venice, Genoa –with her colonies in the region- the island of Chios, the duke of Naxos and the Hospitallers of Rhodes. However, the main beneficiary was Byzantium which received the city of Thessaloniki and a land strip around the city including Chalkidiki, the area extending from Panidos on the Sea of Marmara to Mesembria on Black Sea and the Aegean islands of Skyros, Skiathos and Skopelos. Furthermore, the emperor was dispersed of his obligation to act as an Ottoman vassal and pay tribute (harac) to the sultan.3

In early 1403, the Ottoman territories were divided among the sons of Bayezid: Süleyman was in Rumeli, İsa had established himself in Bursa while Mehmed was at his province of Rum where he had been appointed as governor during his father’s reign. Timur’s armies had been withdrawn from Anatolia and there were three Ottoman princes (çelebi) contending with each other for the rule of the whole Ottoman State. At first, Mehmed defeated İsa who took refuge in Constantinople. But he was released by the Emperor Ioannes VII after the intervention of Süleyman and returned to Anatolia (18 May 1403). In the following months, İsa had a series of confrontations with Mehmed which ended by his defeat and death.4 Sometime after İsa’s elimination Süleyman Çelebi crossed the straits and took Bursa and Ankara from his brother Mehmed. He returned briefly to Rumeli but by July 1405 he was again in Anatolia exerting an increasing amount of pressure on the beyliks and Mehmed who had been pulled out to Rum. In 1409, when it appeared that Süleyman would emerge victorious from the Ottoman civil war a fourth brother, named Musa, made his appearance.5

3 George T. Dennis, “The Byzantine Turkish Treaty of 1403”, Orientalia Christiana

Periodica, 33 (1967), 72–88; Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, “Süleyman Çelebi in Rumili and the Ottoman Chronicles”, Der Islam, 60/2 (1983), 270-271 and 274-283; Savvides, Essays in Ottoman History, 44-45; Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid, 50-59.

4 Zachariadou, “Süleyman Çelebi 283-291; Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid”, 79-110. 5 Zachariadou, “Süleyman Çelebi”, 291-295; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 57-66;

Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid, 111-134.

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Musa’s appearance in Rumeli was a the outcome of concerted actions between Mehmed who had been keeping him under his custody since 1403, the beyliks of Karaman and Kastamonu, the Wallachian Voyvoda Mircea and probably the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos. The aims of these aliened powers were different: Mehmed and the Anatolian rulers were attempting to halt Süleyman’s expansion in the area, Mircea was trying to empower himself in Dodrudja while the emperor, perhaps, was regarding the situation as a chance for a decisive strike against the Ottomans. In mid 1409, Musa arrived in Wallachia and despite Manuel’s probable support he raided Byzantine territory and besieged Mesembria, the city that Süleyman had been gave up to Byzantium in the Treaty of 1403 (September 1409-January 1410). While Musa was gradually taking up Rumeli Süleyman hastened to return back from Anatolia and applied to the emperor. As Musa had been taken Gallipoli (February 1410) the emperor’s help was of crucial importance. Manuel once again decided to support Süleyman most probably due to immediate danger posed by Musa, who were around the walls of Constantiople in early June of 1410. Also, Süleyman renewed his alliance with the Emperor Manuel II by promising him some regions and giving his son Orhan as hostage. Süleyman and his army were ferried across the straits on Byzantine ships and the first great military confrontation between the two brothers took place near the Byzantine capital on the next day (14-15 June 1410). At first, Süleyman succeeded in pushing back Musa, however, in the winter of 1410-1411, the military balance shifted in the latter’s favor who occupied Edirne. Süleyman tried to flee to Constantinople but he was caught up by Musa’s men and killed on 17 February 1411.6

After the death of Süleyman Musa was the sole ruler of the Ottoman territories in Rumeli. He was a person of different temperament from moderate Süleyman who had sought to preserve the status quo in the Balkans by maintaining peaceful relations with the rulers there. Musa was an advocator of holy war (gazâ) and due to this policy at first he had obtained the support of the frontier lords (uc beyleri) and raiders (akıncı) of the area who were displeased by Süleyman’s “peace policy”. As for the Byzantines, they had to deal with a new ruler whose intention was to take back from them all the territories that Süleyman had ceded by the terms of the treaty in 1403. Shortly after coming to power Musa besieged Thessaloniki, Constantinople and Selymbria (August 1411). Consequently, the Emperor Manuel released Süleyman’s son Orhan who came around Thessaloniki and started a campaign for the Ottoman throne in the surrounding Ottoman

6 Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 252–254 and 282–283; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 67–

69; Zachariadou, “Süleyman Çelebi”, 295-296; Savvides, Essays in Ottoman History, 45, Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid, 135-158.

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regions (winter 1411-1412). Furthermore the Emperor Manuel played another card. This was Mehmed who had taken under his control the Ottoman Anatolia. The Byzantines applied to him offering alliance and support against Musa. Mehmed considered this offer on his advantage and came to Constantinople from where he was ferried to Rumeli. In the meantime Manuel secured from him an agreement to remain in peace with Byzantium if he were victorious. Mehmed, at his first confrontation with Musa lost the battle and took refuge in the walls of Constantinople (fall of 1411-spring of 1412). In late 1412, he returned to Rumeli but he was forced to retreat to Anatolia while in the intervening time Musa abolished Orhan. In following year, the emperor ferried again Mehmed to Rumeli. At this third and final attempt Mehmed defeated and killed his brother Musa (5 July 1413).7 In fact, this was the end of Ottoman civil wars, the period of interregnum (fetret devri) since the Ottoman State had been united under the rule of a sole sultan.

Apart from Byzantium, there were several powers both in Rumeli and in Anatolia that had played an essential part in Mehmed’s rise to power: the lord of Dulkadir with whom he had a marriage alliance and the Serbian rulers George Brankovič and Stefan Lazarevič. Also, the Rumelian frontier lords who were discontented by Musa’s centralist policies were on the side of the new sultan. Mehmed recognized that, at least for sometime, he had to renounce Musa’s policy towards the Christian rulers of the area. Sometime after his accession to the throne he received embassies from the Byzantine emperor, the despots of Serbia, the voyvoda of Wallachia and other states and renewed his oaths for peace and friendship. It was a period of time that the Byzantine-Ottoman relations had been reestablished on the base of the treaty in 1403.8

The Ottoman Sultan Mehmed I spent the following couple of years in Anatolia. After a series of campaigns he defeated Cüneyd Bey who had revived his beylik in İzmir and the Karamanoğlu Mehmed Bey who was the primary Ottoman rival in the area. Also İsfendiyar of Kastamonu and Menteşe accepted Ottoman as sovereignty.9 While Mehmed was occupied in

7 Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 283–288; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 69–73; Savvides,

Essays in Ottoman History, 45-46; Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid, 159-194. 8 Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 288–289; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 76; Halil İnalcık,

“Mehmed I”, EI2, 975. For the political alliances among the Christian powers and the Turks during the Ottoman civil wars see Dimitris J. Kastritsis, “Religious Affiliations and Political Alliances in the Ottoman Succession Wars of 1402–1413”, Medieval Encounters, 13 (2007), 222–242.

9 İnalcık, “Mehmed I”, 975; eadem, The Classical Age, 17; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 78-79; Irene Melikof, “Djuneyd”, EI2, 599.

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Anatolia the Emperor Manuel II Palaiolgos felt safe to pay a visit to the Byzantine realms. This was a period of peace as it was in the summer of 1408-early 1409 when he had visited Morea and Thessaloniki and had established his sons as rulers there. The emperor left in charge his son Ioannes and departed from Constantinople on 25 July 1414. He took under his control the island of Thassos and spent sometime in Thessaloniki attending the local affairs along with Demetrios Leontaris, the regent of his son Despot Andronikos. The next spring (1415) he arrived at Morea where he constructed Heksamilion, because he knew that the peace with the Ottomans was mainly depending on his personal relationship with the sultan. On his way back to Constantinople he stopped at Gallipoli (probably in March of 1416) to meet up with Mehmed who was facing multitude troubles.10

The Anatolian campaigns of the Ottoman sultan during the first years of his reign had alerted the status quo established in 1402. This situation challenged Timurid Şahruh who decided to release “Bayezid’s son Mustafa”. In January 1415, the latter came in Trebizond while his envoy began to negotiate with Venice and the emperor. Sometime later he bounded himself with Karamanoğlu Mehmed Bey, İsferdiyar Bey of Kastamonu and the Voyvoda Mircea. This was the revival of the alliance which had brought Musa in to Rumeli. With or without Byzantine’s help Mustafa went to Wallachia where Cüneyd Bey, who had been appointed by Mehmed as governor (sancakbeyi) of Niğbolu joined him. Rumeli was, once again, the scene of an Ottoman civil war.11 Furthermore, the appearance of Mustafa was combined with a series of social-religious insurrections: the one of Şeyh Bedreddin in Rumeli and that of Börklüce Mustafa in Anatolia.12 Moreover, the Ottoman fleet suffered a serious defeat and destructed at Gallipoli by Pietro Loredano, the Venetian Captain of the Gulf (29 May 1416).13

10 Denis A. Zakythinos, Le Despotat grec de Morée, Histoire politique, ed. Chryssa

Maltezou, London: Variorum, 1975, 167–172; Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 298–317; Nicol, The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 328; Savvides, History of Byzantium, 97.

11 Mustafa was the son of Bayezid who had been captured at the Battle of Ankara. When he appeared as a rival sultan he was accused of not being the real son of Bayezid and was named as “düzmece” or “cali”, in English “false”. For the discussion of this problem and the rise of Mustafa see, Colin J. Heywood, “Mustafa”, EI2, 710 and 712. İnalcık, “Mehmed I”, 976 suggests that he was released by Timurid Şahruh and aided by the Emperor Manuel. Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 340, no 80 points out that the Byzantines didn’t helped Mustafa. For Cüneyd see Melikof, “Djuneyd”, 599.

12 Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 82–87. For a detailed bibliography on Bedreddin’s revolt see Savvides, Essays in Ottoman History, 46 and 164–165.

13 During the first years of Mehmed’s reign, the Ottoman fleet attacked several times the Venetian colonies in the Aegean. These actions alarmed not only the Senate but also, the

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In the mid-summer of 1416, when his rivals Mustafa and Cüneyd were escaped in Thessaloniki Mehmed had to deal with many crises. Even so, he encamped near the city walls and asked from Demetrios Leontaris to surrender them. Also, he declared that otherwise he would attack the city. Leontaris applied that he could not hand over the refugees without the permission of the emperor and he added that he would send an envoy to Constantinople in order to inform him and then that he would act according to this commands. Meanwhile, the Emperor Manuel sent a message to the sultan and declared that he was not going to hand over Mustafa and Cüneyd to him; instead he promised not to discharge but to keep them in prison. In the autumn, Manuel’s elder son Ioannes, arrived to Thessaloniki and handled the issue by sending away Mustafa. In the following months Mehmed suppressed Bedreddin’s revolt (December). At the end of 1416, Mustafa was under Byzantine custody, but since the sultan was still threatening Thessaloniki some more had to be done for the final settlement. Apparently, Manuel sent his envoys to Mehmed and requested from him to assume the expenses of the refugees. The sultan agreed to pay the annual sum of three hundred thousand akcas and in the return the emperor promised to keep Mustafa in prison during the lifetime of Mehmed. Upon this agreement Mustafa was transported to the island of Lemnos while Cüneyd was kept at Pammakaristos Monastery in Constantinople (early 1417).14

emperor who sent an envoy offering to negotiate a peace in the long war between Venice and Hungary. The Venetians, on their part, were trying to conclude an agreement with Mehmed and declined the emperor’s offer. But later, they ordered Pietro Loredano to attack the Ottoman fleet. See Kenneth M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571), vol. II, The Fifteenth Century, Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1978, 6-8; Donald M. Nicol, Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 353-355.

14 The Byzantine histories of Doukas and Chalkokondyles, the discourse of Symeon of Thessaloniki and the chronicle of Georgios Sphrantzes are the most important sources for these events. On Doukas see Vasile Grecu, ed., Istoria Turco-Byzantina (1361-1462), Bucharest: Editura Acedemici Republicii Populaire Romine, 1958; English translation by Harry J. Magoulias, Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks by Doukas, An Annotated Translation of “Historia Turco-Byzantina”, Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1975. On Chalkokondyles see Jeno Darko, ed., Laonici Chalkokandylae, Historiarum Demonstrationes I-II, Budapest: Academia Litterarum Hungarica, 1922-1927. On Symeon see David Balfour, ed. and trans., Politico-Historical Works of Symeon Archbishop of Thessalonica (1416/17–1429), Wien: Verlag Der Österreischen Akademie Der Wissenschaffen, 1979, 49-50 and 129-131. Turkish translation Ferhan Kırlıdökme Mollaoğlu, The Historical Discourse of Symeon Archbishop of Thessalonike, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Ankara: Ankara University, 1996. On Sphrantzes see, Riccardo Maisano, ed., Cronaca, Roma: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1990; English translation by Marios Philippides, The Fall of the Byzantine Empire, A Chronicle by George Sphrantzes 1401-1477, Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1980. When citing the history of Doukas and the chronicle of Sphrantzes I have adopted for providing chapter

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Mustafa’s struggle for the Ottoman throne overshadowed for a while the Byzantine-Ottoman relations. When the crisis resolved it was the emperor who had made the best of the situation. He had detained an Ottoman prince, who could serve, if properly used, as a useful instrument against the Ottomans. On the other hand the sultan recognized that he had to maintain the peace policy towards the emperor who had strengthen his position against him by having Mustafa under his control. Furthermore, peace with Byzantium was essential for the restoration of his rule. In the following years Mehmed focused his attention first in to Anatolia and then in to Rumeli. He forced to submission the rulers of Karaman, Kastamonu and Wallachia and expanded the Ottoman territories in Albania. Also, he signed a treaty with Venice (November 1419) and started to follow the developments on the eastern border of the Ottoman State. While Şahruh was entering in to eastern Anatolia Manuel and Mehmed had their last meeting.15

In early 1421, the sultan wanted to cross in to Anatolia and asked the emperor to ferry him across the straits. However, sometime earlier the emperor had received an undisclosed message from Mehmed’s some attendants: the sultan was going to Anatolia in order to secure his position there and when he would came back he was intended to attack Constantinople. Manuel entrusted this secret to his officials who urged him to seize the sultan. Among these were his son Ioannes and the party which will take action for the release of Mustafa some months later. The emperor was not persuaded but, then again, he handled the issue cautiously. Instead of his sons he sent Demetrios Leontaris and some other nobles to welcome Mehmed. The two rulers met up at their respective vessels and carried on a conversation until they reached the Anatolian shore of the Bosporus from where Mehmed took the way to İzmit.16

Mehmed spent a few months in Anatolia and returned back to Rumeli. Shortly after he felt ill and asked his son Murad, the sancakbeyi of Amasya, to come there. Also, he ordered the viziers keep his death secret

and paragraph numbers rather than page numbers. On Mustafa’s and Cüneyd’s actions in this period see Doukas, XII: 3-5; Chalkokondyles, I, 191-192; Balfour, Politico-Historical Works of Symeon, 49-50 and 129-131; Sphrantzes, IV: 4; Heywood, “Mustafa”, 710; İnalcık, “Mehmed I”, 976; Melikof, “Djuneyd”, 599; Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 340-344.

15 Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, “Marginalia on the History of Epirus and Albania (1380-1418)”, WZKM, 78 (1988), 209-210; Ferenc Szakaly, “Phases of Turco-Hungarian Warfare Before the Battle of Mohacs”, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientorum, XXIII/1 (1979), 78-80; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571), 8; İnalcık, “Mehmed I”, 976; eadem, The Classical Age, 18; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 87-90.

16 Sphrantzes, VII: 1-3; Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 351–353; Nicol, The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 331.

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until Murad’s arrival. In the meantime, Manuel sent Demetrios Leontaris in Edirne whose mission was to figure out sultan’s “future intentions”. Mehmed received Leontaris with great honor, but as he was not feeling well, he said that that he will be able to meet with him a few days later, when he will be recovered. The sultan died three days later (May 1421) while Leontaris waited to meet him. Mehmed’s viziers kept on serving as the sultan was alive and transferred the janissaries (yeniçeri) in to Anatolia by pretending that they are making preparation for a new campaign. However, Leontaris found out that the sultan was dead and attempted to inform the emperor. But his messengers failed to arrive in Constantinople because the land way towards the Byzantine capital had been blockaded on to the orders of the viziers. Afterwards, he forwarded another messenger by sea way via Mesembria and thus the Emperors Manuel II and Ioannes VIII became certain of the sultan’s death. On the other hand, Murad was on his way to Bursa when he heard that his father had died. Immediately, he sent a messenger to Bayezid Paşa and ordered him to transfer the sultan’s body there. When this messenger arrived in Edirne Bayezid announced the death of the sultan. He also declared that his elder son Murad was the successor of the throne. Mehmed’s body buried in Bursa where a few days later Murad II was proclaimed sultan (25 June 1421). The viziers had acted accordingly to Mehmed’s orders and had kept his death secret for almost forty days. Their main concern was to have an undisputed succession and for a moment it seemed that they had achieved their goal. 17

But the state of affairs in Constantinople was different. In January 1421, Manuel’s elder son Ioannes had been crowned as co-emperor. The latter had a diverse view from his father on the policy regarding the Ottomans. His officials were criticizing the Emperor Manuel because he hadn’t given his approval for the capture of the sultan a few months ago. Also, several Byzantines and the young emperor were discussing the release

17 On Mehmed’s death and the accesion of Murad to the Ottoman throne see, Âşık Paşa-

zâde,, Kemal Yavuz - M. A. Yekta Saraç, eds., Osmanoğulları’nın Tarihi, İstanbul: K Kitaplığı 2003, 162–163; Mehmed Neşrî, Faik Reşit Unat - Mehmed A. Köymen, eds., Kitâb-ı Cihan-nüma II, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 1957, 551–555; Anonymous Ottoman Chronicle, Necdet Öztürk, ed., Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği (1299–1512), İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2000, 66. On these narrative sources also see Savvides, Essays in Ottoman History, 158-163 and 179-181. On Mehmed’s death also see Doukas, XII: 8-11. On the date of this incident see Peter Schreiner, Die Byzantinschen Kleinchroniken I-II, Wien: Verlag Der Österreischen Akademie Der Wissenschaffen, 1976-1978, I, no. 72a/22, 91/9, 97/5 and II, 401; S. Kugeas, “Notizbuch eines Beanamten der Metropolis in Thessalonike aus dem Anfang des XV. Jahrhunderts”, BZ, (1914) 19, 151–152. On Leontaris see, Sphrantzes, VII: 4-VIII: 2. For the discussion of these incidents see, Halil İnalcık, “Murad II”, İA, 598; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 90–91; Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus (1391–1425), 353–354.

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of Mehmed’s brother Mustafa. While nothing was clear, the Emperor Manuel sent two envoys to Bursa. These were Lachanas Palaiologos and Theologos Korakas. They were assigned to forward two messages: First, they had to convey the emperor’s condolence for the death of Mehmed and his congratulations on the inauguration of Murad. Second, they had to declare that if Murad wished to continue to have good relations with Byzantium, as his father did, he had to concede to his father will and to entrust his two brothers, Yusuf and Mahmud to the emperor. Otherwise, the emperor would have the right to release Mustafa and install him as ruler in Rumeli. Anyhow, the envoys met with Bayezid Paşa who denied giving Mehmed’s sons but asserted that they will respect the treaties and they will not take any action to reverse the state at their common borders. According another version, the late sultan bestowed the Rumelian realms of the Ottoman State to Murad and the Anatolians to Mustafa. Perhaps, this was the draft of the agreement that the emperor was negotiating with the sultan, which somehow explains the urge of Manuel to send Leontaris in Edirne before Mehmed’s death. However, there isn’t enough evidence to figure out exactly what was Mehmed’s will. But there is no doubt that the sultan was even ready to make some concessions in order to avoid a civil war such he himself had experienced.18

The Emperor Ioannes and a number of officials should have been encouraged by Bayezid’s response to play Mustafa against Murad. Chalkokondyles provides the details: “The Emperor Ioannes considered that with two rival sultans, the one Rumeli and the other in Anatolia, he would always have the option to play an active role in amongst issues” and then the historian adds: “this could become real if state’s rule is going to be shared amid Murad and Mustafa.”19 Therefore the Byzantines started to negotiate with Mustafa, whose offers had many similar points with that of Süleyman in 1402. According to Doukas and the Anonymous Chronicle attributed to Ruhi, he agreed to entrust his son at the emperor’s custody and to deliver various territories in the region of Black Sea, on Chalkidiki and Gallipoli.20

18 Doukas, XXII: 10 and XXIII: 4; ChaIkokondyles, I, 203; Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus,

356, no. 102; İnalcık, “Murad II”, 598–599; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 91; Heywood, “Mustafa”, 711.

19 Chalkokondyles, II, 2. Partial Turkish translation Ferhan Kırlıdökme Mollaoğlu, Laonikos Chalkokondyles’ Demonstrationes of Histories, (Books V-VII), Translation and Commentary, Unpublished Dissertation, Ankara: Ankara University, 2005.

20 Doukas, XXIV: 1; An Anonymous Chronicle Attributed to Ruhi (Pseudo-Ruhi), Yaşar Yücel - Halil Erdoğan Cengiz, eds., “Ruhî Tarîhi - Oxford nüshası”, Belgeler, (1989–1992) XIV/18, 435; Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 356, no. 102; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 91.

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Ghillebert de Lannoy, the envoy of western sovereigns to the Byzantine Emperor, provides the further details of the agreement: “Mustafa also promised to surrender his fleet to the Byzantines and not to cross in to Anatolia, but to settle in to Rumeli and fight with Murad from there.”21 It seems that the Emperor Manuel had been contended by Bayezid’s words or probably, he wanted to act more carefully. Seen on this light, he had some serious objections and assessed the negotiations with Mustafa as “dangerous.” Besides he preferred Murad “because he had the state’s treasury and the janissaries under his control.” At the end, Manuel yielded and declared that it was his son, the emperor, who was going to deal with this affair.22

Without delay Ioannes made some arrangements. He appointed Demetrios Leontaris as the commander of a fleet and sent him to the island of Lemnos with the order to release Mustafa and Cüneyd. He was further instructed to install Mustafa as ruler as he was the real son of the Sultan Bayezid.23 They arrived to Gallipoli on 15 August, 1421.24 The Emperor Ioannes came also there for the verification of the agreement that he had negotiated with Mustafa.25 When the Byzantine fleet came in to the harbor of Gallipoli Murad’s officers under Şah Melih Bey secured the citadel.26 First Cüneyd and the Byzantine troops were landed. Afterwards Mustafa invited the people of Gallipoli. He addressed to them and declared that he was the real son of Bayezid and therefore their sultan. Moreover, he said that he would be tolerant to the people as his father on the condition that the way leading to Edirne was opened for him. Upon his speech the Turks from the regions around of Gallipoli acclaimed him their ruler. Even so, Gallipoli was not surrendered and while Mustafa made some preparations to advance northwards to Edirne Leontaris continued to besiege the citadel.27

Meanwhile the Sultan Murad and his viziers Bayezid, Çandarlı İbrahim and Hacı İvaz Paşa were in Bursa. They met in a council and discussed the measures that they had to take in order to prevent Mustafa’s advance in Rumeli. Çandarlı İbrahim and Hacı İvaz Paşa claimed that Bayezid Paşa should be appointed for this mission because he was the

21 Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the Danube Frontier (1420–1424)”,

Harvard Ukranian Studies, VII (1983), 685. 22 Chalkokondyles, II, 3; Sphrantzes, VIII: 3; Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 355–356. 23 Doukas, XXIII: 7. 24 Kugeas, “Notizbuch eines Beanamten der Metropolis in Thessalonike”, 152. 25 Sphrantzes, IX: 1; Chalkokondyles, II, 3; Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 357. 26 Pseudo-Ruhi, 435. 27 Doukas, XXIV: 2; İnalcık, “Murad II”, 599; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 91.

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commander (beylerbeyi) of Rumeli and up to now he had benefited a lot from region. Apparently, the two other viziers at the second rank after him were not very keen on Bayezid.28 Whatsoever, Murad gave the task to Bayezid. The grand vizier was ordered to negotiate an agreement with the emperor and to return back to Rumeli. It seems that, Murad was informed about the agreement that the emperor had made with Mustafa and in order to obtain the “neutrality” of the Byzantines, he was ready to make some concessions. When Bayezid came at Hieron Stomion, a place near Constantinople,29 he dispatched his envoys to the Byzantine emperor. According to Chalkokondyles who provides the details of this mission: “he offered to entrust at emperor’s custody twelve children from noble families, to pay two hundred thousand akcas, and to cede some regions around Gallipoli-but not the city-on the condition that the Byzantines would renounce Mustafa.”30 But the Emperor Ioannes didn’t accept the offer, perhaps, due to the initial success of Mustafa at Rumeli. Then Bayezid arrived in Edirne, where he assembled the Rumelian army (Rumeli ordusu) and marched out to fight with Mustafa who was approaching to the city. At what time the troops came face to face and the battle was about to commence, Mustafa raised himself to a high place and addressed to the Rumelian frontier lords at Bayezid’s army. He declared that he was the real son of the sultan and not a “pretender” as Bayezid Paşa had claimed. To exploit their warrior spirit –as Musa did a few years earlier- he promised not to deprive them of anything, instead to add new possessions to the one’s that they have already owned. After this speech the frontier lords made their submission to Mustafa. Bayezid also obeyed to him but later, on Cüneyd’s orders, he was seized and executed. Mustafa advanced towards Edirne where he was acclaimed as sultan (October 1421).31

Upon this incident Gallipoli was surrendered to Mustafa and Leontaris started to make preparations to take it over. Initially, Cüneyd Bey arrived. He observed that the Turkish populace was in a state of confusion by the unexpected occupation. Therefore, he stated that he will not hand over the citadel because as he mentioned, it was against the will of the people of Gallipoli. After Cüneyd’s denial Leontaris applied to Mustafa.32

28 Âşık Paşa-zâde, 164; Neşrî, 557; Anonymous Ottoman Chronicle, 66-67. 29 In Turkish Güzelcehisar. Doukas, XXIV: 4; Sphrantzes, IX: 2; Pseudo-Ruhi, 435. 30 Chalkokondyles, II, 2; Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 356 no. 102; İnalcık, “Murad II”,

599. 31 Doukas, XXIV: 4-10; Chalkokondyles, II, 4; Âşık Paşa-zâde, 164–165; Neşrî, 557–559;

Anonymous Ottoman Chronicle, 67; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 92; Heywood, “Mustafa”, 711.

32 Doukas, XXIV: 11; Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 358; İnalcık, “Murad II”, 599; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 92.

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Chalkokondyles says that “Mustafa was intended to deliver Gallipoli.”33 However, he also denied ceding it because as stated by Sphrantzes “All the Turks believed that Gallipoli was belonging to them.”34

In the late autumn of 1421, Mustafa was the sole ruler of the Ottoman realm in the Balkans. Following the surrender of Gallipoli the Ottoman fleet and the sea passage between Rumeli and Anatolia was also under his control. 35 On his behalf Murad, was in touch with an ally who could provide him assistance to cope with Mustafa’s advantage on sea. This was Giovanni Adorno, the Genoese podesta of New Phokaia. Their negotiations had started probably in June, when Adorno had offered to convey him across in to Rumeli, while he was on his way to Bursa. Apparently, after the surrender of Gallipoli Murad dispatched one of his officers -named Taharetsiz Hatib- to Adorno with a sum of fifty thousand akcas and asked him to set up a fleet. He also promised to cancel Adorno’s unpaid debt on the alum that he was running in Phokaia.36 Moreover the sultan made some diplomatic steps. His envoys concluded an agreement with Benedetto Emo, the Venetian bailo in Constantinople and the Serbian Despot Stefan Lazarevic.37 Also, he dispatched Çandarlı İbrahim Paşa, the newly assigned grand vizier, to Constantinople as he knew that the Byzantines were disturbed from Mustafa after his denial to surrender Gallipoli. In the winter of 1421-1422, when Çandarlı İbrahim met with the emperor he blamed Bayezid Paşa for the past troubles and declared that the Emperor Manuel could help Murad as he helped his father. Then, as Bayezid a few months ago, he didn’t accept to hand over Mehmed’s sons and Gallipoli.38 Meanwhile, Mustafa decided to cross in to Anatolia and in order to restore his relations with Ioannes he sent his envoys to Constantinople. When they met with the emperor they stated that Mustafa wanted to maintain his friendship with the Byzantines and to give up Gallipoli after his victory over Murad. Murad’s envoy İbrahim Paşa was still in Constantinople, thus for sometime the emperors negotiated with both sides. Their initial plan to divide the rule of the Ottoman State among two sultans had been failed since both Murad and Mustafa was making preparations to attack each other.

33 Chalkokondyles, II, 4; Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 358, no. 104. 34 Chalkokondyles, II, 4; Sphrantzes, IX: 4; Doukas, XXIV: 12; Barker, Manuel II

Palaeologus, 358; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 92. 35 Doukas, XXV: 2; Âşık Paşa-zâde, 165; Neşrî, 558-559; İnalcık, “Murad II”, 600. 36 Doukas, XXV: 8; Âşık Paşa-zâde, 168; Neşrî, 565; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 93. 37 İnalcık, “The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades (1329-1451)”, 255; eadem, “Murad II”,

600; Hüseyin Mevsim, trans., Stefan Lazareviç, Yıldırım Bayezid’in Emrinde Bir Sırp Despotu, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2008, 88-89.

38 Doukas, XXV: 3; Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 358; İnalcık, “Murad II”, 599–600.

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Mustafa was offering Gallipoli which was a part of this plan. Therefore, they decided to support Mustafa and sent back İbrahim Paşa. Apparently, Mustafa’s envoys stayed at the city to negotiate the further details of the agreement.39

On 20 January 1422, Mustafa and Cüneyd went across in to Anatolia with a large army and advanced towards Bursa. Murad and his viziers took counsel on how to exploit the divisions within Mustafa’s army. Then, they departed from Bursa to the area around Ulubad, where Mustafa arrived three days later marching through a mountainous passage.40 Then Murad sent a message to Cüneyd Bey with his brother Hamza and declared that would permit him to return in Aydın and rule there as an Ottoman vassal. Cüneyd believed to Hamza and left Mustafa’s camp.41 Also, the sultan released Mihaloğlu Mehmed Bey, who before the battle started to call the Rumelian frontier lords by their names and accused them with betrayal. As soon as the lords heard his voice, they decided to obey to Murad.42 Furthermore, when Murad’s envoys came back from Constantinople they shouted to Mustafa’s camp saying that they concluded and agreement with the emperor and that the Byzantines would not permit them to cross back in to Rumeli. Since Mustafa’s envoys hadn’t arrived yet the Rumelian lords believed to what they heard.43 Eventually, Sultan Murad and his viziers achieved their goal: Cüneyd Bey and the frontier lords deserted Mustafa, who escaped in to Rumeli. Immediately Adorno ferried Murad to Gallipoli from where he advanced to Edirne. Murad’s troops continued to follow Mustafa whom they captured sometime later (January/February 1422).44

After Mustafa’s elimination Murad became the sole sultan of the whole Ottoman State. However the situation in Anatolia was somehow as it was after Timur’s invasion in 1402 since Anatolian beys had grasped the opportunity to reestablish themselves in their former principalities or to deny Ottoman suzerainty. The Sultan Murad had no other choice rather than

39 Doukas, XXV: 3; Chalkokondyles, II. 5; Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 358, no. 105;

İnalcık, “Murad II”, 600. 40 Doukas, XXV: 10; Âşık Paşa-zâde, 166; Neşrî, 558–559; Anonymous Ottoman Chronicle,

68; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 92. 41 Doukas, XXVI: 1-4; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 93; Melikof, “Djuneyd”, 599. 42 Âşık Paşa-zâde, 165–166; Neşrî, 559–561; Anonymous Ottoman Chronicle, 68–69; Imber,

The Ottoman Empire, 92–93. 43 Chalkokondyles, II, 5–6. 44 Doukas, XXVII: 1-7; Chalkokondyles, II, 6–7; Âşık Paşa-zâde, 167–169; Neşrî, 563–565;

Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 93–94; Heywood, “Mustafa”, 711 suggests that he fled to Wallachia and from there to Caffa.

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accepting it. 45 Therefore he spent the winter in Edirne waiting for the spring to attack Constantinople. The Emperor Manuel, who apparently took over the “foreign affairs” from Ioannes conveyed two embassies-Theologos Korakas in April and Lachanas Palaiologos and Markos Iagares sometime after- in order to negotiate an agreement with Murad. But all the efforts were in vain: the sultan had made his decision and adopted an aggressive policy against the Byzantines who had released a rival sultan. Murad didn’t even listened to the envoys and had treated them badly.46 The Ottoman attack on Constantinople started on 10 June, when the new commander of Rumeli Mihaloğlu Mehmed Bey encamped next to the city walls and plundered area. At the same time Evrenosoğlu Barak Bey was sent to Thessaloniki to blockade the city.47 On 22 June, the Sultan Murad arrived along with the janissaries and the Anatolian army and laid siege at the land walls of Constantinople. The besieging army was consisted of people from all around the Ottoman territory, because the sultan had declared gazâ and in accordance with its rules all the wealth and the people of the city could be looted. The Ottomans were using every kind of siege machine and every instrument to conquer the city.48

The Ottomans continued to siege the city for almost three months, but on September 6, the Ottoman sultan departed from the city walls, leaving behind him some troops. For some eyewitnesses of the siege this was a “miracle”.49 But the actual situation was different: a new claimant of the Ottoman throne had made his appearance in Anatolia. This time, Murad’s rival was his younger brother Mustafa, the sancakbeyi of Hamid-ili, who he had been prompt up by the Anatolian beys and the Emperor Manuel. In mid-summer of 1422, the emperor applied to Şarabdar İlyas, the tutor of Mustafa to whom he gave a large amount of money in order to hire an army and conduct Mustafa to Bithynia. Sometime later, Mustafa’s troops besieged Bursa and because of his initial success the sultan made a final attempt to

45 For situation in Anatolia after Murad’s succession to the throne see Âşık Paşa-zâde, 163-

164; Neşrî, 555-557; Anonymous Ottoman Chronicle, 66; İnalcık, “Murad II”, 599. 46 Doukas, XXVIII: 1-2; Sphrantzes, X: 1; Ioannes Kananos, ed. Bekker, Διήγησις περί του

εν Κωνσταντινούπολει γεγονότος πολέμου, Bonnae: Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae, 1838, 465; Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 360.

47 Kugeas, “Notizbuch eines Beanamten der Metropolis in Thessalonike”, 149; Balfour, Politico-Historical Works of Symeon, 153.

48 Kananos, 457–464; Chalkokondyles, II, 7; Schreiner, Die Byzantinschen Kleinchroniken I, no. 13/1–2, and II, 414; Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 360–364; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 94.

49 Kananos, 466–479; Chalkokondyles, II, 11–12; Schreiner, Die Byzantinschen Kleinchroniken I, no. 9/49, 13/4, and II, 414; Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 364–366; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 94.

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capture the city (24 August). As mentioned above, Murad left Constantinople. But he sent Mihaloğlu Mehmed Bey along with the Rumelian army in to Anatolia. Mustafa felt threatened and concealed himself in the Byzantine capital. The next day he met with the emperors and a few hours Manuel suffered a serious stroke (30 September/1 October 1422). Because of this incident Mustafa spent sometime in the city. Afterwards, he advanced towards Selymbria, where he was attacked by the Rumelian army for a second time. Therefore, he retreated to Constantinople from where the Emperor Ioannes ferried him in to Anatolia. Mustafa marched through the area and occupied İznik and some places around Bursa. Murad waited for a while in Edirne and then he made an arrangement with İlyas by promising him to assign as commander (beylerbeyi) of Anatolia. In exchange, he asked him to hand over Mustafa. In January of 1423, Murad crossed the straits and besieged İznik. İlyas acted according to their agreement and betrayed to Mustafa, who was strangled on Murad’s orders (20 February 1423).50 In early 1423, Murad had been remerged from a civil for a second time.

Initially, Mustafa’s rise to power was the result of concerted actions between the Anatolian beys and the Byzantine emperor. However, it offered an opportunity to the Wallachian Voyvoda Dracul to attack the Ottoman territories in the Balkans. As soon as he eliminated his brother, Murad adopted an aggressive policy. He led a campaign against İsfendiyaroğlu of Kastamonu and Karaman and obliged them to pay submission. Meanwhile, the sancakbeyi of Niğbolu Firuz raided Wallachia and a couple of months later the voyvoda became Ottoman vassal.51 As for the Byzantium, the other partner of this alliance, the situation was more complicated because Murad altered his strategy by shifting his main military actions towards the Byzantine realms in the Balkans. Although he continued to besiege Constantinople, he intensified his assaults on Thessaloniki. The Despot Andronikos applied to Constantinople for aid, but since Byzantine capital was also under attack the emperors were not able to send any help. Meanwhile, the situation in the city worsened. There were shortages in food and supplies and the people were unrest. The Despot, the Archbishop of the city Symeon and some other nobles were heavily criticized by some

50 Doukas, XXVIII: 6; Sphrantzes, XI: 1-3; Chalkokondyles, II, 12–13; Âşık Paşa-zâde,

171–172; Osman Turan, ed., İstanbul’un Fethinden Önce Yazılmış Tarihi Takvimler, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1954, 22–23 and 60–61; Neşrî, 569–573; Schreiner, Die Byzantinschen Kleinchroniken I, no. 13/5–6, 91/10 and II, 416–417; İnalcık, “Murad II”, 600–601; Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 366–368; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 95.

51 Âşık Paşa-zâde, 173-175; Neşrî, 575-579; Anonymous Ottoman Chronicle, 71-73; İnalcık, “Murad II”, 601; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 95-96.

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Thessalonians. Moreover, the pro-Turkish fraction was in cooperation with the sultan to give up the city to the Turks. According to Symeon, Andronikos felt desperate and offered to cede Thessaloniki to Venice (May 1423).52 At what time, Murad sent the sancakbeyi of Thessaly Turahan in to Morea. On 21 May, the latter attacked Heksamilion and destroyed it. Then he advanced towards Mistra, the centre of the Despotate, and looted Leontarion, Gardiki and Davia. A couple of weeks later he retreated in Thessaly without occupying and land. Nevertheless, he achieved his aim because the Despot Theodoros also, became unable to provide any help to Thessaloniki.53 Consequently, Andronikos continued to negotiate with the Senate which leaded to the surrender of the city to Venice (13 September 1423).54

The surrender of Thessaloniki, of the second important city of Byzantium which had come on Byzantine hands with the Treaty of 1403, was a significant concession. This diplomatic action was a message that had to be correctly understood by Murad. The policy implemented for the city could be used for the other lands of Byzantium, such as Constantinople. The Byzantine diplomacy made one more step. On 15 November 1423, the Emperor Ioannes left Constantinople to seek help against Murad. He was going to negotiate a peace between Venice and Hungary, the two main rivals of the Ottomans on land and sea.55 On this occasion or sometime earlier Murad abandoned the siege of Constantinople. The sultan and the emperor started to negotiate an agreement. As far as we understand from Sphrantzes’ account the negotiations were carried out for sometime. Eventually, three Byzantine envoys: Loukas Notaras, Manuel Melachrinos and Georgios Sphrantzes were dispatched to the sultan and on 22 February 1424, a treaty was concluded. According to its terms, the Byzantines had to cede the cities along the Black Sea, except for the fortresses which the Ottomans were unable to take by force, such as Mesembria, Derkoi and others, as well as, Zeitounion and the lands along the river Strymon. Moreover, they had to pay

52 Balfour, Politico-Historical Works of Symeon, 54-56 and 159-161. 53 Chalkokondyles, II, 16–17; Schreiner, Die Byzantinschen Kleinchroniken I, no. 32/37,

33/34–35, 36/15, 40/2, 72/5, 76/1; II, 419–420; Sphrantzes, XII: 1; Zakythinos, Le Despotat grec de Morée, 196–197; İnalcık, “Murad II”, 601; Savvides, History of Byzantium, 125.

54 Balfour, Politico-Historical Works of Symeon, 57-59 and 161-166; Ioannes Tsaras, «Η Θεσσαλονίκη από τους Βυζαντινούς στους Βενετσιάνους (1423-1430), Μακεδονικά, 17 (1977), 85-122. For the establishment of the Ottoman rule in Thessaloniki see Melek Delilbaşı, “Selanik ve Yanya’da Osmanlı Egemenliğinin Kurulması”, Belleten, LI/199 (1987), 75-91.

55 Schreiner, Die Byzantinschen Kleinchroniken I, no. 13/10, 34/2; II, 424–425; Sphrantzes, XII: 3; Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 375.

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an annual sum of three hundred thousand akcas as tribute.56 In early 1424, the period of crisis was ended, except that the conditions of peace had been reversed. The Byzantines had lost all the advantages that they had gained in the Treaty of 1403 and they were, once again, a tribute paying state of the Ottomans.

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