By LTG David G. Perkins

30 ARMY � June 2012

here has been a lot of discussion

recently on the doctrinal adop-

tion of mission command and the

adaptations to the force that come

with it. Army leaders have chron-

icled the development of mission

command doctrine, the establishment of the

Mission Command Center of Ex-

cellence at Fort Leavenworth,

Kan., and the creation of the mis-

sion command network. These

initiatives were begun to drive institutional

adaptation within our Army necessary to meet

today’s complex strategic environment.

While we need to continue

discussing mission com-

mand in academic, lead-

ership and other forums, we should recognize

that our Army has a certain familiarity with

mission command principles. Our entrance

into Kandahar and Baghdad marked the be-

ginning of a transition to decentralization and

empowerment for our Army upon which we

continue to build. Our collective experience

with mission command has

evolved over the past decade

of conflict, and mission com-

mand has emerged as one of

the central tenets underpinning how our

Army currently fights.

We evolved out of necessity. To meet and ex-

ceed the operational tempo of our enemy re-

quired a requisite decentralization of the formal

decision-making processes

June 2012 � ARMY 31

Dennis Steele

32 ARMY � June 2012

within our fighting units. Commandersrecognized that initiative and adapt-ability, guided by a firm understandingof intent, allowed their units to operateat a much quicker pace.

A Philosophical ShiftAs we collectively reflect upon our

experiences in both Iraq and Afghan-istan, we should consider how thesecritical lessons will shape how ourArmy emerges from this past decadeof conflict. These lessons should be in-stitutionalized quickly before the hard work and sacrificesof so many are lost. Mission command offers us the frame-work we need to institutionalize these hard-fought lessons.It is certainly not a new concept, and it is not without chal-lenges, but it does offer the best scenario for how our Armyfights in current and future operational environments.The doctrine of mission command has been a part of our

Army for years, and its inherent ideas—adaptability,agility and initiative—are as old as our Army. Missioncommand is, however, a philosophical shift that empha-sizes the centrality of the commander and the decentraliza-tion of capability and authority in increasingly complexoperational environments. It promotes disciplined initia-tive and empowers leaders to adjust operations withintheir commander’s intent. The philosophy of mission command accomplishes what

the terms battle command and command and control couldnot: the need for commanders to understand that, in to-day’s operational environment, the information comingfrom the lowest tactical echelon is as important as thatcoming from the highest strategic echelon. It’s a mind-setthat allows commanders to push capabilities and responsi-bilities to the edge, thereby ensuring that our Army canoperate at a pace equal to or faster than our enemy. Tomeet this objective, our Army needs to build upon andcontinue to grow the adaptive and agile leaders that haveemerged from this past decade of conflict.

Disciplined InitiativeAn example of mission command in action came with

the 3rd Infantry Division’s (ID) march to Baghdad in early2003. Although they certainly operated under a very spe-cific plan of action to achieve the desired end state, moreimportant than the plan was the commander’s intent un-

derpinning it. The unit conducted several limited objectiveattacks, or “thunder runs,” into Baghdad. The purpose ofthese missions was to create confusion within the Iraqiarmy and to establish bases from which to conduct furtherattacks into the heart of Baghdad. The V Corps and 3rd IDcommanders ensured that their subordinate commandersfully understood that the ultimate purpose was to renderthe regime irrelevant to the remaining elements of the Iraqiarmy and to the greater Iraqi society. As those brigadesfought their way into Baghdad, they saw an opportunity tomaintain the initiative of the attack and continue pressureon the enemy. Instead of remaining in the regime districtand slowing their progress, they continued moving down-town where they established a defensive position in thecity center. The presence of the U.S. Army in the center ofBaghdad struck a crucial blow to the regime’s claim ofownership over the city and proved it irrelevant over therest of the country. Shortly thereafter, the regime collapsedand major fighting ended.These thunder runs were successful because the corps

and division-level commanders established clear intent intheir orders and trusted their subordinates’ judgment andabilities to exercise disciplined initiative in response to afluid, complex problem, underwriting the risks that theytook. Their focus was not simply on the plan and the staffprocess that created it but also on their subordinate com-manders’ execution of that plan and the conditions on theground that necessitated adjustment. One of the strengthsof our Army is our ability to power-down responsibilityand decision making to our leaders on the ground, allow-ing them to exercise disciplined initiative within the com-mander’s intent. Looking back, it is clear that commanderswere exercising the mission command principles then thatour Army is adopting now.

Agile and Adaptive LeadersSince those first thunder runs of 2003, our Army has op-

erated in complex and challenging environments that havetested the adaptability and agility of our force. We have

LTG David G. Perkins is the commanding general, U.S. ArmyCombined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Previ-ously he commanded the 4th Infantry Division and was theU.S. Division-North commander in northern Iraq.

Infantry soldiers, backed by Bradley fightingvehicles, practice combat drills. Experiencein Iraq and Afghanistan has contributed to

the evolution of mission command.

Dennis Steele

34 ARMY � June 2012

operated in areas that require the simultaneous executionof combined arms maneuver in one area and the steadied,patient employment of wide-area security in another. Ourleaders have partnered in intergovernmental, interagencyand multinational environments, seeking to use the capa-bilities of those actors who operate outside their direct au-thority and control.This was the type of environment we encountered as our

Army began Operation New Dawn several years later.While the strategic consequences of the mission were justas important as the thunder runs, the human terrainlooked much different. Command responsibility hadevolved from one of homogenous units training and de-ploying together to one marked by modularity. Now, simi-lar to other division-sized areas of operation, representa-tives from seven of the Army’s 10 divisions operated innorthern Iraq, working together to achieve a common pur-pose. This was a challenging endeavor and required a re-newed emphasis on building trust and relationships acrossthe organization. Establishing trust was a performancemultiplier, enabling organizations to move with incrediblespeed. Because of the strategic limitations placed upon ourArmy during that time, mission success also came throughcollaboration with and support of our interagency, inter-governmental and multinational partners. Developing

solid relationships with these actorsbased upon mutual trust and under-standing was crucial to ensuring last-ing security and civil capacity in Iraq.These are the complex environmentsin which our Army will continue tooperate in the future, making the in-stitutionalization of mission com-mand an ever more pressing require-ment.Our leaders have had to learn how

to become adaptable and, more im-portantly, how to create adaptableunits that can adjust to changes on theground. The difference between a goodbattalion commander and a great onewas the adaptability and agility of the

unit or, to put it in more doctrinal terms, the degree towhich those commanders exercised mission commandprinciples. Those units that could easily anticipate andmanage transitions were the units that commanders couldtrust to operate within their intent and at a pace needed tocombat an evolving enemy force. They took great care totrain adaptability in their units and rewarded agility intheir soldiers. Likewise, our Army must take the same careto foster adaptive, agile leaders capable of operating in therigorous, complex environments of today and tomorrow.Mission command offers our Army the framework onwhich to build that type of force.

As we continue this important discussion about missioncommand in our Army, we cannot lose sight of thevaluable lessons we’ve learned over the past decade.

These are lessons that have shaped our collective approachto command and should continue to shape how our Armyemerges from these conflicts. Over the past two years, ourArmy has adopted mission command within its doctrine,established the Mission Command Center of Excellence atthe Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, and appliedmission command to its leader education curriculum. Thesewere all important and necessary steps to establish theframework for institutionalizing mission command in our

Army, but it will be our commanderswho will execute these mission com-mand principles each day and whowill continue to shape the Army webuild for the future. As we continue to discuss mission

command from this point forward, weshould reflect on the command ap-proach that our Army has used withsuch great success in Iraq and Afghan-istan. These are the same principlesand vision offered by mission com-mand and will be the foundation forhow our Army emerges from a decadeof conflict. �

During OperationNew Dawn, a

mission that calledfor agile and

adaptive leaders,1LT Michael Sexton(right), 12th CavalryRegiment, conducts

key leaderengagements in

Kirkuk Province inMay 2011.

Soldiers assignedto 3rd Armored

Cavalry Regimentand Iraqi soldiersstand at paraderest during thetransfer of JointSecurity Station

Husayniya, KarbolaProvince, Iraq, to

the Iraqigovernment in

support ofOperation

New Dawn.

U.S. Army/SPC Nathan Franco

U.S. Army/SPC Sara Wakai