bureaucratic effectiveness and influence in the legislature

7312019 Bureaucratic Effectiveness and Influence in the Legislature

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Bureaucratic Effectiveness and Inuencein the Legislature Jill Nicholson-Crotty Susan M Miller dagger

University of Missouri dagger Oklahoma State University

ABSTRACT

An extensive literature explores the correlates of bureaucratic inuence in the implementa-tion of public policy Considerably less work however has investigated the conditions under which bureaucratic actors inuence legislative outcomes In this article we develop the

argument that effectiveness should be a key determinant of bureaucratic inuence in thelegislative process and identify a set of institutional characteristics that may facilitate or constrain this relationship We test these expectations in an analysis of legislator perceptionsof bureaucratic inuence over legislative outcomes in the 50 US states The results suggestthat the impact of bureaucratic effectiveness on the inuence of the bureaucracy over legislative outcomes is greater in states with legislative term limits united governments andfragmented executive branches

For as long as bureaucratic actors have been recognized as important players in the gov-

ernance process rather than simply passive administrators of existing law scholars havesearched for the sources of bureaucratic power in both the administrative process (ie pol-icy implementation) (see Meier and Bohte 2007 Rourke 1984) and the legislative process(ie policy formulation) (see Carpenter 2001 Krause 1996) The former question has gen-erated a large well-developed literature and scholars have thoroughly investigated how theexercise of discretionary authority by bureaucrats inuences policy implementation Thelatter subject however has received considerably less attention (see Carpenter 2001 Nich-olson-Crotty 2009 Christensen Goerdel and Nicholson-Crotty 2011) and there is stilla great deal we do not know about the ways in which bureaucratic actors inuence policyformulation in the legislative branch In this article we address this question

The identied sources of bureaucratic inuence vary widely particularly in the imple-mentation literature and include both internal factors such as expertise and cohesion and external factors such as client support and the relative preference positions of other institu-tional actors (see Meier 2000 for a review) Recent work in this area has emphasized effec-tiveness as a potential source of bureaucratic inuence over both the administrative process

Address correspondence to the author at nicholsoncrottyjmissouriedu

doi101093jopartmur054Advance Access publication on August 22 2011ordf The Author 2011 Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Journal of Public Administration Researchand Theory Inc All rights reserved For permissions please e-mail journalspermissionsoupcom

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2 0 1 2

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D o wnl o a d e d f r om



and thelegislative process (see eg Carpenter2001) 1 In terms of inuence in thelegislative process this approach suggests that when agencies are perceived as competent policy imple-menters they can often parlay that reputation into inuence over the development of public policy Given that the widespread performance and results-oriented management reforms of

recent decades are explicitly targeted at making bureaucracies more effective we nd thisassertionparticularly interesting In this sense these typesof reforms which have sometimes been intended as a means of controlling bureaucratic action (Carroll 1995) may have in-creased the power that the institution exercises in the legislative process The impact of ef-fectiveness on bureaucratic inuence over legislative outcomes is the focus of our inquiry

We test the relationship between bureaucratic effectiveness and inuence in the leg-islative process in an analysis of the US states Specically we assess the impact of theMaxwell Schoolrsquos Government Performance Project (GPP) measure which we suggest isa good indicator of perceived bureaucratic effectiveness (or reputation for effectiveness)on state legislator perceptions of bureaucratic inuence over legislative outcomes We also

examine how other factors particularly legislative term limits divided government and executive fragmentation condition the impact of perceived effectiveness on perceived in-uence over legislative outcomes

With this project we contribute to theliterature by exploring bureaucratic inuence in thelegislative process which has received far less attention than bureaucratic inuence in theimplementation process Moreover by investigating the interactive effect of bureaucraticeffectiveness and other factors on the inuence of the bureaucracy in legislative policy devel-opment we outline conditions under which the impactof effectiveness is enhancedprovidinga deeperunderstandingof therelationshipofeffectivenessandinuenceThisprojectalsohigh-lights the potential link between reform and bureaucratic inuence In recent decades admin-

istrativereforms have becomeubiquitous in stategovernmentsandmany of these reforms aimtoimprovebureaucraticoperationsTheseeffortsmayaugmenttheroleofbureaucraticactorsin the legislative process

The essay proceeds in three sections The rst reviews the relatively limited literatureon bureaucratic inuence over legislative policy formulation highlighting recent work onthe importance of effectiveness and lays out our expectations The next section providesdetailed information about the data variables and methods employed in our statistical testsof the relationship between effectiveness and bureaucratic inuence over legislative policy-making Finally we discuss the results of those tests and draw some conclusions

PREVIOUS WORK ON BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE IN POLICY FORMULATIONThe relationship between the politics and administration of public policy is a key question in thestudy of public administration and democratic theory The tension (real or perceived) betweenthe ambitions of elected and nonelected ofcials in democratic systems has long created anxiety about the relative power that these actors enjoy in policymaking and inspired volumes of literature (see Stivers 2001 for a partial review) Authors interested in the politicsadministration nexus have used lsquolsquopowerrsquorsquo lsquolsquoinuencersquorsquo and lsquolsquoautonomyrsquorsquo (often

1 For simplicity we make a distinction between policy implementation and legislative policy formulation When we

refer to policy formulation we are strictly referring to the role of bureaucratic actors in determining legislative policyoutcomes We acknowledge that bureaucratic actors play other roles in policy formulation such as their rulemakingfunction

348 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory



2 0 1 2





interchangeably) to describe the bureaucratic inuence over legislative and administrativeoutcomes For example Meier and Bohte (2007 14) focus on administrative powerdening it as lsquolsquothe ability of a bureaucracy to allocate scarce societal resourcesrsquorsquo Alter-natively Carpenter (2001 4) explores bureaucratic autonomy which he denes as

lsquolsquobureaucrats securing the policies that they favor despite the opposition of the most powerful politiciansrsquorsquo This focuses on self-determined authority over policy outcomesAlthough distinct both denitions point to the active role of the bureaucracy in determiningwho gets what when and how (Lasswell 1936)

In this article we consider perceived bureaucratic inuence over legislative outcomeswhich we view as a reection of one (or perhaps a few) dimension(s) of bureaucratic powerThere have been many different conceptions of power and articulations of the faces of power (see Bachrach and Baratz 1962 Dahl 1961 Dahl and Lindbloom 1953 Lukes1974) Recently Carpenter (2010) lays out three facets of regulatory powermdashgatekeepingconceptual and directive The inuence that bureaucrats have over legislative outcomes

draws on all three Gatekeeping power which is the power to establish the agendas and de- bates that structure human activity in this context involves bureaucrats setting the legislativeagenda by calling attention to problems and inuencing where legislators devote their timeThis type of power also entails an anticipatory element in which legislators may decide todisregard an issue out of concern for the reaction of bureaucrats (see Friedrich 1941 Simon1953) Conceptual power in this setting involves shaping the concepts and vocabulariesemployed in legislative discussions and supplying the methods of analysis that legislatorsuse to learn about policy problems This type of power may be based on conscious or unconscious decisions of the bureaucracy that lsquolsquoshape fundamental patterns of thoughtrsquorsquosurrounding an issue (Carpenter 2010 64) Finally in some instances bureaucrats use

directive power to sway the give-and-take of legislative enactment and get legislatorsto do something that they would not otherwise do (see Carpenter 2001) Directive power is the traditional notion of power in which A lsquolsquocan get B to do something that B would nototherwise dorsquorsquo (Dahl 1957 202ndash3) These three facets are as Carpenter (2010) notes in-terrelated and overlapping Bureaucratic inuence (perceived or objective) over legislativeoutcomes is a reection of one or all of these different kinds of power and indicates bu-reaucratic actorsrsquo ability to mold either directly or indirectly the negotiations surroundinglegislation We specically focus on perceived inuence over legislative outcomes whichis an indication of the extent to which legislators think bureaucrats exercise these differentfacets of power and bureaucratic actorsrsquo reputation for molding legislative results

An extensive literature explores bureaucratic power and inuence A large portion of thisresearchisdevoted toevaluatingbureaucraticpower andor inuence inpolicy implementation(egseeHedgeMenzelandKrause1989Khademian1992Maynard-Mooney1989Meier and Bohte 2007 Rourke 1984 Romzek 1985) Scholars have linked numerous factors suchas policy expertise bureaucratic effectiveness employee motivation and the support of cli-entele groups and the public to bureaucratic power over administrative processes There isalso scholarship considering in a broad sense bureaucratic inuence in the legislative process For example there have been numerous theoretical and case-based studies thatsuggest thatexpertise and the resultant information asymmetries allowbureaucratic lsquolsquocareer-istsrsquorsquo tohave meaningful inuence over certain policies (see egDurant1991Wilson 1989though see Rourke 1991 for the argument that this power is dwindling) Recent work alsoindicates the important role that bureaucrats play in legislative hearings which could lead

Nicholson-Crotty and Miller Bureaucratic Effectiveness and Inuence in the Legislature 349



2 0 1 2





to inuence over policy through problem denition and legislative agenda setting (Miller 2004 2007 May Sapotichne andWorkman 2009)Additionally isolated piecesof researchdemonstrate that bureaucratic actors attempt to inuence legislative behavior (see egFreeman 1958 Lee 2001) However research that directly addresses the question of bureau-

cratic inuence over legislative outcomes is rare (see Nicholson-Crotty 2009 ChristensenGoerdelandNicholson-Crotty2010)Thefollowingsection briey reviewsthisscholarship paying special attention to studies theoretical and empirical that emphasize the importanceof bureaucratic effectiveness

The literature on council-manager governments in US municipalities makes importantcontributions to our understanding of the role of appointed ofcials in determining policyoutcomes Regarding role perception Nalbandian (1999) nds signicant support for theidea that city managers perceive themselves participants in the policy development processnot as neutral policy implementers Further in some municipalities there is evidence thatcity managers wield greater political power and are able to have more inuence than elected

city council members (Svara 1990) This bureaucratic inuence is traced to the relativelylong tenures of city managers and their community support which is reminiscent of claimsregarding the role of expertise and clientele and public support in generating bureaucratic power in the policy implementation literature

InasimilarveintheroleofpolicyanalystsinthelegislativeprocesshasalsobeenexploredInthe Canadian provinces Howlett and Newman (2010) nd that provincial analysts are lessexperienced and have less training in formal policy analytical techniques than their nationalcounterparts which they suggest has lsquolsquosignicant implications for their ability to inuence policy deliberations in the direction of enhanced evidence-based policy-makingrsquorsquo (133) Thenotion that more effective experienced bureaucratic policy analysts are more inuential in

the policymaking process comports well with the argument that general bureaucrats who aremore competent have greater legislative inuence Comparably in a study of the US statesHird (2005a 2005b) nds that based on theperceptions of legislators larger more analyticalnonpartisanresearchorganizationshavesignicantlymoreinuenceoverpolicymakingthansmaller more descriptive organizations He also nds that legislators fromstateswith largermoreanalyticalnonpartisanresearchorganizationsviewtheseorganizationstohaveapositiveimpactontheiraccesstoqualityinformationforpolicymakingTakentogetherthesendingsindicate a link between the effectiveness of larger more analytical nonpartisan researchorganizations(ietheirprovisionofgoodpolicymakinginformation)andtheirinuenceover policymaking

City managers and policy analysts are admittedly somewhat atypical bureaucratsHowever a limited number of scholars studying bureaucratic actors more generally havealso addressed the question of bureaucratic inuence over legislative policy outcomesThese approaches often combine the internal and external sources of power in the imple-mentation process into relatively comprehensive models of inuence over policy formu-lation in the legislative realm Krause (1996 1999 12) builds his argument on the assertionthat

existing models of bureaucracy tacitly assume that political preferences may inuence agencyactivity but that the opposite possibility does not exist Such an assumption is tenuous at best given what has been established about how public policy is created

As an alternative he argues for a reciprocal relationship between bureaucrats and policymakers More specically he suggests that the expertise of bureaucracies allows them to




2 0 1 2





innovate mobilize interests in support of those innovations and force other political actors toadapt their positions in response to that support This adaptation brings the expressed preferences of political principals in line with those of the agents Thus bureaucraciesare able to inuence policy development by compelling other political actors to adjust their

positions and adopt those of the agencyCarpenter (2001) takes a similar approach but adds the concept of bureaucratic effec-

tiveness to his explanation of agency inuence in the formulation of policy He suggeststhat the power of bureaucracies is forged politically and that with established reputationsfor effectiveness bureaucracies can develop the independent power and autonomy to in-uence legislative policy formulation According to Carpenter bureaucracies build repu-tations for effective performances that help them assemble supportive coalitions which inturn lead to political inuence In this conception bureaucracies attain power by perform-ing well and networking with actors in the environment in order to build lsquolsquocoalitions of esteemrsquorsquo For our purposes the most important aspect of Carpenterrsquos (2001) work is

the signicance it affords a bureaucracyrsquos reputation for effectiveness in the developmentand exercise of bureaucratic power In his story agencies are able to pursue the policiesthey prefer in large part because they have proven themselves to be effective managers of policies that citizens and elected ofcials value

The argument that inuence is a product of constituent relationships that result from bureaucratic competence accords well with other work on bureaucratic involvement in the policy process Clarke and McCool (1996) argue that successful natural resource agenciesare able to inuence policy including the issues considered and ultimately adopted by Con-gress when they maintain control over valued information or expertise and develop rela-tionships with important groups As a specic example they highlight the Forest Servicersquos

recruitment and mobilization of clientele following the passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964 as an explanation for the agencyrsquos inuence over the outcomes mandated in the 1976Forest Management Act More generally they suggest that organizations like the ForestService and the Army Corps of Engineers were able to use constituency relationships to become and remain important players in the policy subsystem which enabled them to work effectively in the subsystem to produce outputs close to their preferences

THE CONDITIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EFFECTIVENESS ANDLEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE

The literature discussed above suggests that under certain circumstances bureaucraticactors may have inuence on legislative outcomes particularly when they can build supportamong important constituencies by being competent implementers of policy or being seenas the predominant experts in a given issue area Carpenter (2001) suggests that politiciansmay be compelled to accept bureaucratic policy innovation in the face of sufcient interestgroup pressure Even in less extreme cases it is relatively easy to imagine the mechanism by which effectiveness may translate into legislative inuence for bureaucratic actors

That mechanism rests heavily on the two primary motivations of legislatorsmdashreelectionand good public policy (Mayhew 1974) If we begin with the assumption that the behavior




2 0 1 2





of state legislators is driven by these desires then it follows that they need information todecide which policy alternatives will be most popular andor will produce the greatest net benet for their constituents 2 Work on the linkage between bureaucratic expertise and policy inuence speaks to the latter element with legislators turning to experts in the

bureaucracy for details about policy costs and benets (Clarke and McCool 1996 Krause1996 1999) Likewise the relationships that bureaucracies cultivate with important con-stituencies allow them to provide legislators information about the former Bureaucraciesgarner support from groups in society because those groups share similar preferences re-garding policy outcomes and think that the agency effectively produces those outcomesThe greater number of these relationships an agency has with important groups the morelegitimate it will appear when arguing that its preferred policy is also the preferred policy of key legislative constituencies In other words bureaucracies viewed as effective imple-menters andor as valued repositories of expertise should nd it easier to convince legis-lators that they not only know which policies are technically superior but also those that

hold the greatest political advantage Thus effective bureaucracies should have more in-uence in the legislative process (Hypothesis 1)

The discussion thus far also suggests however that the relationship between effec-tiveness and inuence might be moderated by the needs of legislators More precisely weexpect that the capacity of legislators to gather their own information regarding the meritand popularity of policy alternatives as well the structural relationship between the leg-islature and executive within each state (which may inuence the willingness to trust bu-reaucratic advice) will determine the degree to which bureaucratic effectiveness translatesinto inuence

Research suggests two legislative characteristics that may inuence the ability of legis-

lators to gather and utilize policy relevant information First scholars argue that legislativeterm limits reduce expertise institutional memory and the ability of lawmakers to crafteffective solutions to complex problems Instead of learning the intricacies of various policyareastermlimitsforcelegislatorstorelymoreheavilyonoutsideexpertssuchasbureaucratslobbyists andlegislativestafffor policyinformation(Berman 2004Cain andKousser 2004Carey et al 2006 Moncrief and Thompson 2001 Mooney 2007 Sarbaugh-Thompson et al2004 Straayer and Bowser 2004) Second research suggests that legislative professionali-zation typically proxied with some combination of compensation staff session length and institutional expenditures determines the ability of legislators to gather policy relevantinformation and bring expertise and focus to the policymaking process (Mooney 1994

see also Bowman and Kearney 1986 Squire 1992)In states with highly competent bureaucracies legislators with limited ability to gather policy relevant information due to the presence of term limits or low levels professional-ization may choose to take policy advice from bureaucrats more often giving them greater inuence over the development of policy We expect therefore that effective bureaucra-cies will be able to exercise greater inuence in the lawmaking process in states with termlimits or low levels of professionalization because the policy solutions that the bureaucraticactors offer are likely to be more unique sophisticated or sound relative to those of thelegislature (Hypotheses 2 and 3)

2 This is the premise for informational models of interest group inuence over legislation (see eg Austen-Smith1997)




2 0 1 2





Ourstoryalsosuggeststhattheinuenceofbureaucraticactorsoverlegislativeoutcomesdepends inparton theirability tofoster allianceswitha diverseandorimportantsetofpoliticalactors Previous research suggests that bureaucrats are better able to build these relationshipswhen they have discretion over the implementation of policy and the ability to innovate

(see Carpenter 2001 Clark and McCool 1996) The separation of powers literature whichenvisions a zone between political principals in which bureaucracies exercise discretionleads to the expectation that divided government increases bureaucratic discretion becauseof the large distance between political principals with divergent preferences (see Hammond and Knott 1996 McCubbins Noll and Weingast 1987) Thus we expect that governmentscontrolled by more than one party are likely to allow effectivebureaucracies more discretionover implementation and room to innovate policy solutions and thus a greater ability togarner support from important constituencies This in turn should provide greater leveragewhen bureaucratic actorsattempt to inuence legislationTherefore weexpect that effective bureaucracies will exercise more inuence in states where different political parties control

the major governing institutions (Hypothesis 4)Finally fragmentation in the executive branch may also enhance the relationship

between effectiveness and bureaucratic inuence in determining legislative outcomesStates vary greatly in the number of separately elected ofcials who serve in the executive branch In some states such as Maine and New Hampshire the governor (or governorlieutenant governor team) is the only elected ofcial in the executive branch and she appoints the other positions However in other states such as California and NorthCarolina other major executive ofcials such as the heads of the agriculture departmentand the education department are also elected directly by the people (Beyle and Ferguson2008) This difference has important implications for the power of the governor and the

operation of state governments (Beyle 1995 Robinson 1998) and may condition therelationship between bureaucratic effectiveness and the impact of bureaucrats in legislative policy formulation 3

When the executive is consolidated and the governor and agency heads are working asacollectivewholetheeffectivenessofthebureaucracymaynotbeasignicantsourceofbur-eaucratic inuence over legislative policy outcomesUnder thesecircumstancesbecause thewholeexecutivebranchmaybeviewedasanextensionofthegovernorrsquosofceotherfactorssuch as shared partisanship between the governor and the legislative branches may be moreimportant for bureaucratic inuence over legislative policyformulationHowever when theexecutive is fragmented and the governor and agency heads have individual agendas the

effectiveness of thebureaucracy maybe an importantdeterminant of bureaucratic inuenceUnder these circumstances the bureaucracy will be viewed less as an extension of thegovernorrsquos ofce and more as an independent actor and in order to gain inuence over legislative policy development bureaucratic agencies and their ofcials will need to dem-onstratecompetenceintheirownrightandearnthecondenceoflegislatorsThusweexpectthat effectiveness will have a greater positive impacton theinuence of thebureaucracy over legislative outcomes in states with fragmented executives (Hypothesis 5)

3 See Berry and Gersen (2008) for more information about plural executives in the US states and an argument that anunbundled executive is ultimately more effective




2 0 1 2





TESTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EFFECTIVENESS AND POWER

Data

To test the expectation that effectiveness leads to greater inuence over policy formulation

for bureaucracies we use state legislatorsrsquo perceptions of bureaucratic inuence on legis-lative outcomes that come from the 2002 State Legislative Survey (Carey et al 2002)These data offer an ideal opportunity to test our hypotheses The broader literature on in-terest groups has long acknowledged the difculty of identifying the actual inuence thatvarious groups have over the decisions of elected representatives and ultimately over pol-icy (see Smith 1995 for a review) Rather than look for a relationship between bureaucraticeffectiveness and policy differences across the states which would force us to contend withthe myriad alternative causes and counterfactuals that accompany such an approach thestate legislator data discussed above allow us to ask lawmakers directly about the inuencethat bureaucrats exert over policy formulation

The2002StateLegislativeSurveyisastratiedrandomsampleofstatelegislatorswithinall 50 states The data contain responses from 2982 legislators which represent a responserate of 401Thisis relatively standard forsurveys of state legislators (MaestasNeeley and Richardson 2003) The survey was originally designed to evaluate the potential composi-tional behavioral and institutional effects of term limits 4 It contains information aboutthe legislatorsrsquo campaigns and elections their districts their views on different aspects of the legislative process in their chambers their legislative behavior and demographic infor-mation The data are weighted in order to correct for differences in response probability onvariety of factors 5 We use the restricted-use version of the data which includes state iden-tiersandallowsus tomatchstatecharacteristicsto individual legislator responses Thesour-

ces for the data on state characteristics are discussed below

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in subsequent analysis represents the perceptions of legislatorsregarding the inuence of bureaucratic actors in developing policy This variable is created from legislator responses to the question lsquolsquoWhat do you think is the relative inuence of thefollowing actors in determining legislative outcomes in your chamberrsquorsquo We modelresponses regarding lsquolsquoBureaucratsCivil servantsrsquorsquo Potential responses range from 1 for lsquolsquoNo Inuencersquorsquo to 7 for lsquolsquoDictates Policyrsquorsquo This question allows us to capture the perceived inuence of bureaucrats in legislative policy formulation This measure captures how bureaucratic actors participate in inuencing the interplay surrounding legislative enact-ment instead of bureaucratic inuence over policy formulation in the broadest sense Thisis an important distinction and allows us to test the impact of bureaucratic effectiveness onthe give-and-take of legislative policy development Unfortunately this measure does notdifferentiate between the disparate types or degree of inuence that different agencies pos-sess and instead captures the general inuence of the entire state bureaucracy This generalmeasure enables us to test our hypotheses but leaves questions concerning specic types of inuence open for additional research The mean response is 335 with a standard deviationof 123 The complete descriptive statistics for these and other variables are listed in table 1

4 For more information about the 2002 State Legislative Survey see Carey et al (2006)5 These include chamber session length gender of the legislator district size and region




2 0 1 2







Before moving on it is important to make the connection between perceived man-agement capacity our primary independent variable and perceived bureaucratic effective-ness our concept of interest Management practices like those measured by the GPP have been empirically demonstrated to increase effective government performance in a variety

of contexts Evaluating county welfare-to-work programs Sandfort (2000) shows a connec-tion between a number of service technologies and delivery structures and the proportion of a countyrsquos caseload that is working Similarly student achievement is linked to initiativesaimed at ending social promotion in public schools (Roderick Jacob and Bryk 2000)The relationship between management characteristics and effectiveness is also found inJob Partnership Training Act programs (Heinrich and Lynn 2000 Jennings and Ewalt1998) mental health networks (Milward and Provan 1998) and federal (Brewer 2005)and state agencies generally (Moynihan and Pandey 2005) Considering more generalmeasures of managementcapacityDonahueSeldenandIngraham(2000) ndthatlocalgov-ernmentsrsquohumanresourcesmanagementcapacityimprovesperformanceinhumanresources

and Coggburn and Schneider (2003) link capacity to a measure of government performance(ie state policy priorities) As Donahue Selden and Ingraham (2000) note there is lsquolsquoagrowing agreement that inuences associated with administrative arrangements do matter to the efcacy of the policy and program delivery systemrsquorsquo (384)

In addition to the association between capacity and effectiveness discussed above theGPPscores shouldserve as a powerful proxy for perceivedeffectiveness which is ultimatelywhat matters in the determination of power (Carpenter 2001) Bureaucracies with high man-agement capacityscorescanadvertise these andtheunderlying elements that produced themThis should help them to be perceived as more effective by legislators which we contend should allow them to wield more inuence over legislative policy formulation

Interactions

Given that there are a number of factors that could enhance the impact of bureaucraticeffectiveness on the policymaking inuence of bureaucracies we include a set of interac-tions drawn from both the literature on bureaucratic power in the implementation processand relevant work on legislative behavior First the information asymmetries that arisefrom bureaucratic expertise and foster bureaucratic inuence are relative and in partdetermined by the policy expertise of other institutional actors In states term limits have been shown to reduce policy expertise among legislators who typically have only 6 or 8

years in a given chamber to accumulate knowledge Therefore we include a measureindicating whether term limits were in effect in a state by 2002 and expect this measureto be positively associated with legislator perceptions of bureaucratic inuence in the pol-icy process In addition to this additive relationship term limits may magnify the impact of effectiveness on bureaucratic inuence on policy formulation by increasing the relativemerit of the policy solutions offered by the bureaucracy giving bureaucrats more swayin the negotiations surrounding legislative enactment In order to test for this moderatingeffect Model 2 includes a multiplicative interaction between our measure of effectivenessand the indicator of term limits which we expect to be positive and signicant

Research also suggests that low levels of legislative professionalization decrease the

expertise that lawmakers bring to the policy process which we suggest may make themmore likely to turn to competent bureaucratic sources We capture legislative




2 0 1 2





professionalization with a measure that includes legislative salary the number of days insession and the number of legislative staff all relative to the US Congress For details onthis measure see Squire (2007) Regarding the additive relationship we expect profession-alization to decrease the inuence of bureaucratic actors on legislative outcomes profes-

sionalized legislators have large staffs which may make them less likely to rely on the bureaucracy for input on legislation To capture the potential conditional relationship be-tween bureaucratic effectiveness and legislative professionalization we interact these twovariables the results for this test are presented in Model 3 We expect this interaction to benegative and signicant indicating that the impact of bureaucratic effectiveness on theinuence of the bureaucracy over legislative outcomes is greatest in the least profession-alized chambers

Scholarship on the implementation process also suggests that the relative policy posi-tions of political principals help to determine the discretionary decision-making power enjoyed by bureaucratic actors We proxy the relative positions of institutional actors

within a state with a measure of divided government When different political parties con-trol either the lower and upper chambers of the legislature or one chamber of the legislatureand the governorship the core within which bureaucrats have discretion to act should belarger Thus we expect this measure to be positively correlated with legislator perceptionsof bureaucratic inuence in the legislative process As noted above we also expect that therelative preferences of political principals will moderate the impact of effectiveness on bureaucratic power in the legislative process because bureaucrats in divided governmentstates work within a larger zone of discretion and may be able to foster relationships witha greater diversity of political principals Model 4 includes a multiplicative interaction between bureaucratic effectiveness and the indicator of divided government which we

expect to be signicant and positively signedResearch on bureaucratic power suggests that leadership and cohesion have an impacton the inuence that bureaucracies have in the policymaking process To capture the potentialdifferences in the motivation of agency leaders and the cohesion of the administrative en-terprise across states we include a measure of executive fragmentation Research suggeststhat fragmented executive arrangements within a state where the heads of major agenciesare elected rather than appointed decreases the power of the executive branch by elimi-nating a shared sense of mission and set of goals among agencies (Beyle 1995) Another obvious consequence is a substitution of electoral for administrative values among agencyheads who must answer to a constituency In order to capture these differences and their

potential impact on bureaucratic power we include a 5-point measure of executive frag-mentation This measure is the reverse of Beylersquos separately elected state-level ofcials(SEP) measure and ranges from 0 indicating that only the governor or governorlieutenantgovernor team are elected to 4 indicating that the governor is elected with no team and that7 or more process ofcials and several major policy ofcials are elected separately Weexpect this measure to be negatively associated with legislator perceptions of bureaucraticinuence Despite this negative main effect we expect executive fragmentation to enhancethe relationship between effectiveness and bureaucratic inuence in legislative policydevelopment We suggest that this should be the case because competency might be a moreimportant source of inuence when the bureaucracy is seen as less of an extension of thegovernor When bureaucratic agencies are viewed as more independent from the governorthe agencies will need to develop their own reputations for effectiveness and earn the




2 0 1 2





condence of legislators in their own right Thus bureaucratic effectiveness should bea more important source of bureaucratic inuence over legislative outcomes when the ex-ecutive is unbundled To capture our multiplicative expectation we include an interaction between bureaucratic effectiveness and executive fragmentation in Model 5 and expect its

coefcient to be positive and signicant

Controls

The models include various controls capturing legislator characteristics and features of thelegislative chamber and the state First we include controls for individual legislator traitswhich may inuence their perceptions of bureaucratic power in the legislative process Therst of these is political party coded 1 for Democrat and zero otherwise and separate indi-cators of whether the legislator is the same party as the governor and in the majority party inthe chamber We expect all these to correlate negatively with perceptions of bureaucratic

inuence We also include controls for ideology measured on the standard 7-point scalewith higher values corresponding to greater liberalism Analogous to party we expect thismeasure to correlate negatively with perceived bureaucratic power in the legislative pro-cess As a nal individual control we include legislator race coded 1 for nonwhite legis-lators We do not have an expectation regarding the impact of this variable on perceptionsData on party ideology and race are self-reported by legislators

Models also control for characteristics of the legislative chamber and the state Weinclude measures of chamber type (1 5 lower chamber) relevant chamber size which isgathered from the Book of the States the majority party of the chamber coded 1 for Democratic control and zero otherwise citizen ideology (Berry et al 1998) and the number

of state employees per 10000 state citizens Although we do not have expectations regard-ing the rst four control variables we expect the number of state employees to havea positive correlation with perceptions of bureaucratic inuence The number of stateemployees is a proxy for the resources that a state dedicates to the administration of policywhich may be an important source of bureaucratic inuence (Clarke and McCool 1996Meier 2000)

Finally all models contain a control for the differential use of Likert scales by dif-ferent legislators responding to questions regarding institutional power Some persons tend to mark higher values on these scales regardless of the subject whereas others systemat-ically favor lower values One way to address this bias is to lsquolsquonormalizersquorsquo the response on

the variable of interest relative to some obvious reference category For our model wecontrol for the differential use of Likert scales by including the respondents perceptionsregarding the power of another group involved in policymaking in their statemdashlegislativestaff The ndings reported below are unchanged if this control is left out of the model butthe positive and signicant coefcient suggests that it should be included

Methods

The models discussed below are estimated as weighted ordinary least squares regressionsAs noted above the weighting parameter ensures that legislators from all states regionsgenders chambers etc have proportional inuence on observed relationships The depen-dent variable is a 7-point scale which is a sufcient number of categories for OrdinaryLeast Squares (OLS) to produce very similar results to an ordered logistic regression




2 0 1 2





(Jaccard and Wan 1996) As a robustness check we estimate the models as ordered logitsand the ndings remain unchanged 8 We also ran a simultaneous equations model to con-sider the potential for simultaneous causation between perceived bureaucratic effectivenessand perceived bureaucratic inuence and conducted a matching analysis The results of

these analyses are available at the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theoryonline Thus we report OLS models because it makes the interpretation of results moreintuitive The models report standard errors that are clustered by state

FINDINGS

The models considering the impact of perceived effectiveness and perceived bureaucraticinuence are presented in Table 2 The results are presented in ve separate models For each model we review the ndings for the key independent variable bureaucratic effec-tiveness and any interaction Because the results for the control variables are stable across

the models we discuss the control variables at the end of this section Model 1 presents theresults for the additive model considering the direct effect of perceived bureaucratic ef-fectiveness as measured by the GPP management capacity score on legislatorsrsquo percep-tions of bureaucratic inuence over policy outcomes As expected bureaucraticeffectiveness positively inuences perceived bureaucratic power Substantively shiftingthe effectiveness measure from its minimum (4) to its maximum value (10) or movingfrom Alabama to Michigan increases bureaucratic inuence by 026 on the perceived in-uence scale which about the same effect on perceived bureaucratic inuence as movingfrom a term-limited to a nonterm-limited state This nding suggests that bureaucracieswith greater perceived effectiveness enjoy enhanced perceived inuence over legislative

outcomes and corroborates previous scholarsrsquo notions about the relationship between ef-fectiveness and inuenceIn Model 2 we examine whether term limits enhance the positive impact of effec-

tiveness on bureaucratic inuence by considering the interaction between perceived bu-reaucratic effectiveness and term limits As expected the interaction is positive and signicant indicating that in states that have implemented legislative term limits effec-tiveness has a larger impact on the perceived inuence of bureaucrats over legislative out-comes Substantively in states with term limits holding all else constant as bureaucraticeffectiveness moves from is minimum value (4) to its maximum value (10) bureaucratic policymaking inuence increases by 071 which is almost a 10 increase in the total range

of the perceived inuence scale As indicated by the coefcient for the bureaucratic effec-tiveness component in states without term limits bureaucratic effectiveness still has a pos-itive effect on bureaucratic inuence just of a lesser magnitude Holding all else constantas bureaucratic effectiveness moves from is minimum value to its maximum value bureau-cratic policymaking inuence increases by 020 in nonterm-limited states 8 The impact of bureaucratic effectiveness is close to four times greater in states that have term limits thanin those that do not Taken together the results suggest that effectiveness is an importantsource of bureaucratic inuence for over policy formulation regardless of term limits how-ever the effect is much greater in states that have implemented this legislative reform

8 The coefcient for term limits is negatively signed which is somewhat counter intuitive It is important toremember however that this represents the impact of this reform in states where bureaucratic effectiveness is 0 whichnever occurs in our data




2 0 1 2





Table 2Determinants of Perceived Bureaucratic Inuence

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 ModeCoefcient

(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coef

(robuPerceived BureaucraticEffectiveness

00439 (00175) 00326 (00170) 00192 (00415) 00589 (0

Term Limits 0322 (00856) 2 0249 (0202) 0318 (00873) 0321 (0Term Limits 3 PerceivedBureaucraticEffectiveness

00862 (00296)

Professionalization 2 1504 (0333) 2 1550 (0313) 2 2426 (1375) 2 1524 (0Professionalization 3

PerceivedBureaucraticEffectiveness

0142 (0224)

Divided Government 2 0114 (00732) 2 00933 (00726) 2 0103 (00810) 00694 (027Divided Government 3

Perceived BureaucraticEffectiveness

2 00255 (003

Executive Fragmentation 2 00422 (00312) 2 00357 (00302) 2 00417 (00309) 2 00372 (003Executive Fragmentation3 Perceived BureaucraticEffectivenessState Employees 0000555 (0000634) 0000585 (0000627) 0000613 (0000637) 0000602 (000065Chamber Size 0000140 (0000472) 0000101 (0000454) 408 Acirc 10

2 05 (0000530) 975 Acirc 102

Member of Majority Party 2 0263 (00454) 2 0261 (00460) 2 0262 (00462) 2 0264 (0Member of Governorrsquos

Party

0107 (00472) 0110 (00475) 0107 (00477) 0109 (00465

Democratic Chamber 0151 (00775) 0157 (00764) 0156 (00760) 0152 (00777) Chamber 0111 (00816) 0105 (00802) 0115 (00817) 0113 (00813)Legislator Ideology 00490 (00213) 00491 (00210) 00499 (00214) 00494 (00214 Nonwhite Legislator 0198 (00932) 0193 (00927) 0196 (00930) 0198 (00933Democratic Legislator 2 00331 (00669) 2 00303 (00668) 2 00350 (00674) 2 00341 (00

a t H u n t e r C o l l e g e L i b r a r y o n S e p t e m b e r 4 2 0 1 2 h t t p j p a r t o x f o r d j o u r n a l s o r g n l o a d e d f r o m



Table 2 (continued)Determinants of Perceived Bureaucratic Inuence

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 ModeCoefcient(robust SE)

Coefcient(robust SE)


Coef(robus

Citizen Ideology 2 977 Acirc 102 5 (000214) 2 0000281 (000215) 2 0000140 (000214) 2 964 Acirc 10

Perception of LegislativeStaff

0244 (00184) 0244 (00185) 0244 (00185) 0244 (0018

Constant 2141 (0262) 2207 (0250) 2284 (0324) 2018 (0316Observations 2705 2705 2705 2705 R2 0121 0122 0121 0121 p 01 p 05 p 10 two-tailed test Note Bold entries indicate our key independent variables




Model 3 considers the potential interaction between legislative professionalizationand bureaucratic effectiveness The coefcient for professionalization is negative and sig-nicant indicating that legislators in more professionalized chambers are less likely to perceive high levels of bureaucratic inuence in the policy process when bureaucratic ef-

fectiveness equals 0 (an effectiveness value that does not exist in our data) Contrary to our expectations the interaction term is not statistically signicant suggesting that the level of professionalization does not moderate the impact of effectiveness on perceived bureau-cratic inuence in the legislative process We offer some discussion of the potential explan-ations for this nding along with an acknowledgement of the need for further research inthe conclusion

The impact of bureaucratic effectiveness on perceived inuence as moderated by di-vided government is considered in Model 4 In this model we do not nd the expected relationship Effectiveness does not have a greater impact on bureaucratic inuence over policy formulation in states with divided government It is actually states with united gov-

ernments where effectiveness enhances bureaucratic inuence In united governmentstates holding all other variables constant perceived bureaucratic inuence increases by 035 as effectiveness shifts from its minimum to its maximum value This suggests thatin states where there is no party competition between the branches or chambers effective bureaucracies enjoy greater policymaking inuence than ineffective bureaucracies How-ever when the branches and chambers are engaged in partisan battles effectiveness is nota source of bureaucratic inuence

This contrary result may suggest that when the government is divided particularly between the executive and legislative branches bureaucratic actors become less inuentialin the policymaking process regardless of competency 9 Despite the fact that the bureau-

cracy has more room to maneuver in the implementation process when the branches and chambers are divided by partisanship a partisan lter may devalue bureaucratic expertiseand limit the bureaucracyrsquos inuence in legislative policy discussions The negative and signicant effect of divided government in Model 5 is suggestive of this explanation

Model 5 presents the results for the interaction between perceived bureaucratic effec-tiveness and executive fragmentation The results suggest that when the executive branch isconsolidated (ie fragmentation 5 0) effectiveness does not play a signicant role in de-termining bureaucratic inuence as indicated by the null coefcient for the bureaucraticeffectiveness variable 10 However as the executive branch becomes more fragmented ef-fectiveness becomes an important source of bureaucratic inuence over policy formulation

which is evidenced by the signicant coefcient for the interaction This relationship isconsistent with our expectations and suggests that when bureaucracies are not viewed as extensions of the governorrsquos ofce and agency ofcials have to cultivate their own rep-utations effectiveness becomes increasingly important for determining bureaucratic inu-ence over policy formulation

9 When including a measure of divided government only between the executive and legislative branches (ie onlydivided if the governor is from one party and the two chamber majorities are from another party) and the interactionwith bureaucratic effectiveness the results are consistent with those presented10 The coefcient for fragmentation is negatively signed which indicates that when bureaucratic effectiveness equals0 executive fragmentation diminishes perceived bureaucratic inuence It is important to remember that bureaucraticeffectiveness never equals 0 in our data




2 0 1 2







inuence over legislative outcomes if agency ofcials seek legislative inuence then theyshould be conscious of their agencyrsquos reputation for competency and expertise Managers

can work not only to improve their agencyrsquos effectiveness in the implementation of policy but also to advertise their accomplishments because reputations for excellence function ascurrency purchasing inuence in the legislative process

The relationship between perceived effectiveness and perceived inuence over leg-islative outcomes is enhanced by three state characteristics Expert bureaucrats have greater inuence in states with term limits a united government and high levels of executive frag-mentation table 3 provides point estimates for the level of bureaucratic inuence and sum-marizes the impact of effectiveness as it shifts from its minimum to maximum value under each of these conditions Term limits amplify the impact of effectiveness to the greatestextent with fragmentation and united government being associated with a more modest

change in the impact of effectiveness on bureaucratic inuence over legislative outcomesThe larger impact under term limits makes sense given that term limit completely alter theexperience level of legislators leaving a void of expertise whereas the other two factorshave a less pronounced potential connection to inuence over legislative outcomes

As a nal method for putting the results discussed above in context we compare our empirical predictions to the actual responses from legislators in states with different mixesof characteristics This allows us to visualize the impact of more permutations of effec-tiveness and institutional characteristics on perceived inuence than does an examinationof predicted values because we estimate interactions of these variables in separate equa-tions It is also a nice check of the accuracy of our theoretical and empirical story Our

models suggest that bureaucracies should have greater perceived inuence in states withhigh levels of bureaucratic effectiveness ( 7) term limits unied government and frag-mented executives ( 2) and that is exactly what we nd The mean level of perceived inuence in states with these characteristics (eg Michigan and Florida) is 361 Compared to states that t all four of the criteria the models also suggest that perceived inuenceshould be diminished if all these conditions are met except the state does not have termlimits the average perceived inuence score of 348 in these states (eg North Carolina and Kansas) conrms this expectation As a nal example the models suggest that perceived inuence should be at its lowest levels in states with ineffective bureaucracies ( 6) noterm-limits divided government and consolidated executives ( 1) On average legislatorsin the states where these conditions hold (eg Alaska and New Hampshire) place perceived

Table 3Table 3 Impact of Perceived Effectiveness (Minimum to Maximum Change)

Estimated Level of Inuence

(Effectiveness5

4)


(Effectiveness5

10) DifferenceTerm limits 313 384 071 No term limits 303 323 020United government 306 341 035Fragmentation(highest level)

276 328 052




2 0 1 2





bureaucratic inuence over legislative outcomes at 32 which again highlights the impor-tance of these factors for bureaucratic inuence in the legislative process 11

Before moving on to the conclusions it is important to discuss the effect of the controlvariables on bureaucratic inuence Term limits consistently increase the perceived inu-

ence of bureaucrats which is in line with the arguments that term limits diminish the power of the legislature relative to other institutional actors (Carey et al 2006) As mentioned above in Model 5 divided government reduces the perceived inuence of bureaucratssuggesting that when the branches and chambers are engaged in partisan conict bureau-cracies have less inuence over policymaking presumably because of their role in the ex-ecutive branch Liberal legislators members of the governorrsquos party and legislators servingin Democratic chambers perceive bureaucrats as more inuential In addition nonwhitelegislators view bureaucrats as possessing greater inuence than their white counterpartsand the perceived power of legislative staff positively affects perceived bureaucratic in-uence Alternatively professionalization decreases perceived bureaucratic inuence in-

dicating that more professionalized chambers view bureaucrats as less important tolegislative outcomes Also members of the majority party hold bureaucratic inuenceas less meaningful than their minority colleagues

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In this article we explore the relationship between perceived bureaucratic effectiveness and the perceived inuence of this institution in legislative policy formulation We also con-sider factors that may moderate the impact of effectiveness on bureaucratic inuenceWhen looking across the US states we nd that greater effectiveness enables bureaucracies

to exact a more meaningful inuence on outcomes in the legislative arena This supportsCarpenterrsquos (2001) claim regarding the link between effectiveness and bureaucratic auton-omy in the policymaking process and the argument that competency is an important an-tecedent to bureaucratic power Importantly this nding also indicates that the effect holds(1) for assessments of the bureaucracy as a whole (rather than just for singular agencies) and (2) across 50 distinct governments

The ndings are also signicant because they suggest that the link between bureau-cratic effectiveness and inuence over legislative policy formulation is moderated by in-stitutional features of a government We nd that term limits enhance the positive impact of effectiveness on bureaucratic inuence in the legislative process This indicates that when

legislators do not have time to develop their own expertise on policy matters they are in-creasingly reliant on competent bureaucratic actors for their knowledge giving bureaucratswith a reputation for effectiveness an even greater role in formulating policy In other words the results suggest that in term-limited states effective bureaucracies are becomingeven more essential to the policy process This also signals that states with naturally high

11 As additional examples we would expect values of perceived bureaucratic inuence somewhere in the middle of those mentioned here when (1) the government is united but legislators are not term limited and the executive branch isrelatively consolidated or when (2) the executive is fragmented but legislators are not term limited and the government

is divided even if the bureaucracy is effective Again the actual responses of legislators bear out these expectationswith a mean level of perceived inuence of 332 for states tting the former description (eg Maryland and Utah) and 328 for states meeting the latter criteria (eg Delaware and Texas)




2 0 1 2











Governmental Accounting Standards Board 2000 State and local government case studies and the effectsof using performance management for budgeting managing and reporting Available at httpwwwseagovorg (accessed February 11 2011)

Hammond Thomas H and Jack H Knott 1996 Who controls the bureaucracy Presidential powercongressional dominance legal constraints and bureaucratic autonomy in a model of multi-institutional policy-making Journal of Law Economics and Organization 12119ndash66

Hedge David M Donald C Menzel and Mark A Krause 1989 The intergovernmental milieu and street-level implementation Social Science Quarterly 70285ndash99

Heinrich C J and L E Lynn 2000 Governance and performance The inuence of Program Structureand Management on Job Training Partnership Act (JPTA) Program Outcomes In Governance and performance New perspectives ed Carolyn J Heinrich and Laurence E Lynn 68ndash108Washington DC Georgetown Univ Press

Hird John A 2005a Power knowledge and politics Policy analysis in the states Washington DCGeorgetown Univ Press

mdashmdashmdash 2005b Policy analysis for what The effectiveness of nonpartisan policy research organizationsThe Policy Studies Journal 3383ndash105

Howlett Michael and Joshua Newman 2010 Policy analysis and policy work in federal systems Policyadvice and its contribution to evidence-based policy-making in multi-level governance systems Policy and Society 29123ndash36

Huber John D Charles R Shipan and Madelaine Pfahler 2001 Legislatures and statutory control of bureaucracy American Journal of Political Science 45330ndash45

Ingraham Patricia W and Amy E Kneedler 2000 Dissecting the black box revisited Toward a modeland measures of government management performance In Advancing public management Newdevelopments in theory methods and practice ed Jeffrey L Brudney Laurence J OrsquoToole Jr and Hal G Rainey 235ndash52 Washington DC Georgetown Univ Press

Jaccard James and Choi K Wan 1996 LISREL approaches to interaction effects in multiple regression Thousan Oaks CA Sage

Jennings Edward T Jr and Jo Ann G Ewalt 1998 Interorganizational coordination administrativeconsolidation and policy performance Public Administrative Review 58417ndash28

Khademian Anne M 1992 The SEC and capital market regulation The politics of expertise PittsburghPA Univ of Pittsburg Press

Krause George A 1996 The institutional dynamics of policy administration Bureaucratic inuence over securities regulation American Journal of Political Science 401083ndash121

mdashmdashmdash 1999 A two-way street the institutional dynamics of modern administrative state Pittsburgh PAUniv of Pittsburgh Press

Lasswell Harold D 1936 Politics Who gets what when how New York NY Whittlesey HouseLee M 2001 Looking at the politics administration dichotomy from the other direction Participant

observation by a state senator International Journal of Public Administration 24363ndash84Liner Blaine Harry P Hatry Elisa Vinson Ryan Allen Pat Dusenbury Scott Bryant and Ron Snell

2001 Making results-based state government work Washington DC Urban InstituteLukes Stephen 1974 Power A radical view London PalgraveMcCubbins Mathew D Roger G Noll and Barry R Weingast 1987 Administrative procedures as

instruments of political control Journal of Law Economics and Organization 3243ndash77Maestas Cherie Grant Neeley and Lilliard Richardson 2003 The state of surveying legislators

Dilemmas and suggestions State Politics and Policy Quarterly 390ndash108May Peter J Joshua Sapotichne and Samuel Workman 2009 Widespread policy disruption and interest

mobilization The Policy Studies Journal 37793ndash815Mayhew David R 1974 Congress The electoral connection New Haven CT Yale Univ PressMaynard-Mooney Steven 1989 Beyond implementation Developing an institutional theory of

administrative policy making Public Administration Review 49137ndash41Meier Kenneth J 2000 Politics and the bureaucracy Policymaking in the fourth branch of government

4th ed New York Harcourt




2 0 1 2







Stivers Camilla 2001 Citizenship ethics in public administration In Handbook of administrative ethics ed T L Cooper 435ndash55 New York Marcel Dekker

Svara J 1990 Ofcial leadership in the city Patterns of conict and cooperation New York Oxford Univ Press

Wilson James Q 1989 Bureaucracy What agencies do and why they do it Boulder CO Basic Books




2 0 1 2





and thelegislative process (see eg Carpenter2001) 1 In terms of inuence in thelegislative process this approach suggests that when agencies are perceived as competent policy imple-menters they can often parlay that reputation into inuence over the development of public policy Given that the widespread performance and results-oriented management reforms of

recent decades are explicitly targeted at making bureaucracies more effective we nd thisassertionparticularly interesting In this sense these typesof reforms which have sometimes been intended as a means of controlling bureaucratic action (Carroll 1995) may have in-creased the power that the institution exercises in the legislative process The impact of ef-fectiveness on bureaucratic inuence over legislative outcomes is the focus of our inquiry

We test the relationship between bureaucratic effectiveness and inuence in the leg-islative process in an analysis of the US states Specically we assess the impact of theMaxwell Schoolrsquos Government Performance Project (GPP) measure which we suggest isa good indicator of perceived bureaucratic effectiveness (or reputation for effectiveness)on state legislator perceptions of bureaucratic inuence over legislative outcomes We also

examine how other factors particularly legislative term limits divided government and executive fragmentation condition the impact of perceived effectiveness on perceived in-uence over legislative outcomes

With this project we contribute to theliterature by exploring bureaucratic inuence in thelegislative process which has received far less attention than bureaucratic inuence in theimplementation process Moreover by investigating the interactive effect of bureaucraticeffectiveness and other factors on the inuence of the bureaucracy in legislative policy devel-opment we outline conditions under which the impactof effectiveness is enhancedprovidinga deeperunderstandingof therelationshipofeffectivenessandinuenceThisprojectalsohigh-lights the potential link between reform and bureaucratic inuence In recent decades admin-

istrativereforms have becomeubiquitous in stategovernmentsandmany of these reforms aimtoimprovebureaucraticoperationsTheseeffortsmayaugmenttheroleofbureaucraticactorsin the legislative process

The essay proceeds in three sections The rst reviews the relatively limited literatureon bureaucratic inuence over legislative policy formulation highlighting recent work onthe importance of effectiveness and lays out our expectations The next section providesdetailed information about the data variables and methods employed in our statistical testsof the relationship between effectiveness and bureaucratic inuence over legislative policy-making Finally we discuss the results of those tests and draw some conclusions

PREVIOUS WORK ON BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE IN POLICY FORMULATIONThe relationship between the politics and administration of public policy is a key question in thestudy of public administration and democratic theory The tension (real or perceived) betweenthe ambitions of elected and nonelected ofcials in democratic systems has long created anxiety about the relative power that these actors enjoy in policymaking and inspired volumes of literature (see Stivers 2001 for a partial review) Authors interested in the politicsadministration nexus have used lsquolsquopowerrsquorsquo lsquolsquoinuencersquorsquo and lsquolsquoautonomyrsquorsquo (often

1 For simplicity we make a distinction between policy implementation and legislative policy formulation When we

refer to policy formulation we are strictly referring to the role of bureaucratic actors in determining legislative policyoutcomes We acknowledge that bureaucratic actors play other roles in policy formulation such as their rulemakingfunction




2 0 1 2














2 0 1 2

















2 0 1 2

















2 0 1 2
















2 0 1 2
















2 0 1 2






Data





Dependent Variable






2 0 1 2











Interactions








2 0 1 2














2 0 1 2







Controls







Methods





2 0 1 2







FINDINGS










2 0 1 2







(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coef


00439 (00175) 00326 (00170) 00192 (00415) 00589 (0


00862 (00296)



0142 (0224)



2 00255 (003


2 05 (0000530) 975 Acirc 102


Party

0107 (00472) 0110 (00475) 0107 (00477) 0109 (00465









Coef(robus



0244 (00184) 0244 (00185) 0244 (00185) 0244 (0018

















2 0 1 2















(Effectiveness5

4)


(Effectiveness5


276 328 052




2 0 1 2



















2 0 1 2




































2 0 1 2













2 0 1 2














2 0 1 2

















2 0 1 2

















2 0 1 2
















2 0 1 2
















2 0 1 2






Data





Dependent Variable






2 0 1 2











Interactions








2 0 1 2














2 0 1 2







Controls







Methods





2 0 1 2







FINDINGS










2 0 1 2







(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coef


00439 (00175) 00326 (00170) 00192 (00415) 00589 (0


00862 (00296)



0142 (0224)



2 00255 (003


2 05 (0000530) 975 Acirc 102


Party

0107 (00472) 0110 (00475) 0107 (00477) 0109 (00465









Coef(robus



0244 (00184) 0244 (00185) 0244 (00185) 0244 (0018

















2 0 1 2















(Effectiveness5

4)


(Effectiveness5


276 328 052




2 0 1 2



















2 0 1 2




































2 0 1 2













2 0 1 2

















2 0 1 2

















2 0 1 2
















2 0 1 2
















2 0 1 2






Data





Dependent Variable






2 0 1 2











Interactions








2 0 1 2














2 0 1 2







Controls







Methods





2 0 1 2







FINDINGS










2 0 1 2







(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coef


00439 (00175) 00326 (00170) 00192 (00415) 00589 (0


00862 (00296)



0142 (0224)



2 00255 (003


2 05 (0000530) 975 Acirc 102


Party

0107 (00472) 0110 (00475) 0107 (00477) 0109 (00465









Coef(robus



0244 (00184) 0244 (00185) 0244 (00185) 0244 (0018

















2 0 1 2















(Effectiveness5

4)


(Effectiveness5


276 328 052




2 0 1 2



















2 0 1 2




































2 0 1 2













2 0 1 2

















2 0 1 2
















2 0 1 2
















2 0 1 2






Data





Dependent Variable






2 0 1 2











Interactions








2 0 1 2














2 0 1 2







Controls







Methods





2 0 1 2







FINDINGS










2 0 1 2







(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coef


00439 (00175) 00326 (00170) 00192 (00415) 00589 (0


00862 (00296)



0142 (0224)



2 00255 (003


2 05 (0000530) 975 Acirc 102


Party

0107 (00472) 0110 (00475) 0107 (00477) 0109 (00465









Coef(robus



0244 (00184) 0244 (00185) 0244 (00185) 0244 (0018

















2 0 1 2















(Effectiveness5

4)


(Effectiveness5


276 328 052




2 0 1 2



















2 0 1 2




































2 0 1 2













2 0 1 2
















2 0 1 2
















2 0 1 2






Data





Dependent Variable






2 0 1 2











Interactions








2 0 1 2














2 0 1 2







Controls







Methods





2 0 1 2







FINDINGS










2 0 1 2







(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coef


00439 (00175) 00326 (00170) 00192 (00415) 00589 (0


00862 (00296)



0142 (0224)



2 00255 (003


2 05 (0000530) 975 Acirc 102


Party

0107 (00472) 0110 (00475) 0107 (00477) 0109 (00465









Coef(robus



0244 (00184) 0244 (00185) 0244 (00185) 0244 (0018

















2 0 1 2















(Effectiveness5

4)


(Effectiveness5


276 328 052




2 0 1 2



















2 0 1 2




































2 0 1 2













2 0 1 2
















2 0 1 2






Data





Dependent Variable






2 0 1 2











Interactions








2 0 1 2














2 0 1 2







Controls







Methods





2 0 1 2







FINDINGS










2 0 1 2







(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coef


00439 (00175) 00326 (00170) 00192 (00415) 00589 (0


00862 (00296)



0142 (0224)



2 00255 (003


2 05 (0000530) 975 Acirc 102


Party

0107 (00472) 0110 (00475) 0107 (00477) 0109 (00465









Coef(robus



0244 (00184) 0244 (00185) 0244 (00185) 0244 (0018

















2 0 1 2















(Effectiveness5

4)


(Effectiveness5


276 328 052




2 0 1 2



















2 0 1 2




































2 0 1 2













2 0 1 2






Data





Dependent Variable






2 0 1 2











Interactions








2 0 1 2














2 0 1 2







Controls







Methods





2 0 1 2







FINDINGS










2 0 1 2







(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coef


00439 (00175) 00326 (00170) 00192 (00415) 00589 (0


00862 (00296)



0142 (0224)



2 00255 (003


2 05 (0000530) 975 Acirc 102


Party

0107 (00472) 0110 (00475) 0107 (00477) 0109 (00465









Coef(robus



0244 (00184) 0244 (00185) 0244 (00185) 0244 (0018

















2 0 1 2















(Effectiveness5

4)


(Effectiveness5


276 328 052




2 0 1 2



















2 0 1 2




































2 0 1 2













2 0 1 2











Interactions








2 0 1 2














2 0 1 2







Controls







Methods





2 0 1 2







FINDINGS










2 0 1 2







(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coef


00439 (00175) 00326 (00170) 00192 (00415) 00589 (0


00862 (00296)



0142 (0224)



2 00255 (003


2 05 (0000530) 975 Acirc 102


Party

0107 (00472) 0110 (00475) 0107 (00477) 0109 (00465









Coef(robus



0244 (00184) 0244 (00185) 0244 (00185) 0244 (0018

















2 0 1 2















(Effectiveness5

4)


(Effectiveness5


276 328 052




2 0 1 2



















2 0 1 2




































2 0 1 2













2 0 1 2














2 0 1 2







Controls







Methods





2 0 1 2







FINDINGS










2 0 1 2







(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coef


00439 (00175) 00326 (00170) 00192 (00415) 00589 (0


00862 (00296)



0142 (0224)



2 00255 (003


2 05 (0000530) 975 Acirc 102


Party

0107 (00472) 0110 (00475) 0107 (00477) 0109 (00465









Coef(robus



0244 (00184) 0244 (00185) 0244 (00185) 0244 (0018

















2 0 1 2















(Effectiveness5

4)


(Effectiveness5


276 328 052




2 0 1 2



















2 0 1 2




































2 0 1 2













2 0 1 2







Controls







Methods





2 0 1 2







FINDINGS










2 0 1 2







(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coef


00439 (00175) 00326 (00170) 00192 (00415) 00589 (0


00862 (00296)



0142 (0224)



2 00255 (003


2 05 (0000530) 975 Acirc 102


Party

0107 (00472) 0110 (00475) 0107 (00477) 0109 (00465









Coef(robus



0244 (00184) 0244 (00185) 0244 (00185) 0244 (0018

















2 0 1 2















(Effectiveness5

4)


(Effectiveness5


276 328 052




2 0 1 2



















2 0 1 2




































2 0 1 2













2 0 1 2







FINDINGS










2 0 1 2







(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coef


00439 (00175) 00326 (00170) 00192 (00415) 00589 (0


00862 (00296)



0142 (0224)



2 00255 (003


2 05 (0000530) 975 Acirc 102


Party

0107 (00472) 0110 (00475) 0107 (00477) 0109 (00465









Coef(robus



0244 (00184) 0244 (00185) 0244 (00185) 0244 (0018

















2 0 1 2















(Effectiveness5

4)


(Effectiveness5


276 328 052




2 0 1 2



















2 0 1 2




































2 0 1 2













2 0 1 2







(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coefcient

(robust SE)

Coef


00439 (00175) 00326 (00170) 00192 (00415) 00589 (0


00862 (00296)



0142 (0224)



2 00255 (003


2 05 (0000530) 975 Acirc 102


Party

0107 (00472) 0110 (00475) 0107 (00477) 0109 (00465









Coef(robus



0244 (00184) 0244 (00185) 0244 (00185) 0244 (0018

















2 0 1 2















(Effectiveness5

4)


(Effectiveness5


276 328 052




2 0 1 2



















2 0 1 2




































2 0 1 2













2 0 1 2









Coef(robus



0244 (00184) 0244 (00185) 0244 (00185) 0244 (0018

















2 0 1 2















(Effectiveness5

4)


(Effectiveness5


276 328 052




2 0 1 2



















2 0 1 2




































2 0 1 2













2 0 1 2

















2 0 1 2















(Effectiveness5

4)


(Effectiveness5


276 328 052




2 0 1 2



















2 0 1 2




































2 0 1 2













2 0 1 2















(Effectiveness5

4)


(Effectiveness5


276 328 052




2 0 1 2



















2 0 1 2




































2 0 1 2













2 0 1 2



















2 0 1 2




































2 0 1 2













2 0 1 2




































2 0 1 2













2 0 1 2













2 0 1 2



bureaucratic effectiveness and influence in the legislature

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