building unbreakable units - richard d. hooker - military review, july-august 1995, 25-35

8/3/2019 Building Unbreakable Units - Richard D. Hooker - Military Review, July-August 1995, 25-35

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UnUni ts

Ma jor R ich a r d D. Hook e r J r ., US Arm y

bA S THE US ARMY painfully completes itsdrawdown, its senior leaders are thinkinghard about creative strategies that substitute quali~for quantity. While numbers always count, theremay be ways to significantly increase the quality andcombat power of a smaller Army, in particular, itstactical maneuver units that constitute the lethal endof the force. Human factors am crucial componentsof Americas Army that can be exploited to compen-sate for a loss of mass on the battlefield. However,traditional persomel management policies encour-age rapid turnover and an individual replacementsystem that work against the formation of powerfulsmall units. By recognizing and exploiting true sol-dier power, the Army can leverage human factors tobuild combat power even as force structure declinesto record lows.

Effective, durable combat units are largely theproduct of good morale, esprit and cohesion. Thoughrelated, these human factors have distinct meaningsand important differences. A40rale is a subjective endstate that subsumes many different factors such asleadership, suppoti services, unit history and tradi-tion, weather, casualty rates and exposure to combatdated stms. It can be defined as the enthusiasm andpersistence with which a member of a group engagesin the pmcribed activities of that group. 1Esprit is commonly defined as unit pride. Whilenot grounded in the small unit its presence can exert

tremendous influence over the individual and thegroup. Esprit complements and reinforces morale andcohesion through the mechanism of pride and devo-tion to the ~putation of the unit. It nAatesthe soldierto the unit or institution, while cohesion dates soldierto soldier.2 Implicit in the concept of unit pride is the

Theviewsexpvssed in thisarticlean thoseof theauthoranddo not puqoort to reflectthe position of the Departmentof theArrnJ theDepartmentofDefenseor anyothergovernmentofieor agency.-Editor

eCohesion k defied as the bondingtogether of unit membem to enhance andsustiin their commitment to each othe~ theunit and the mikswn Centnd to the coheswn

concept is the indivtiud desire h submit togroup norms. Khe soldier must feel a senseof responsibility to the group and subordinatepersonal concerns to the higher impe-veof group we&hre.

acceptance of externally derived and formalizedbehavior standads. These can extend to the minutiaof dress, military courtesy and drill, as well as insist-ence on prescribed modes of combat behavior oradherence to previously defined standards in battle.3

While morale, esprit and cohesion all relate to asoldiers willingness to fight at a given place andtime, cohesion is defined as the bonding together ofunit members to enhance and sustain their commit-ment to each other, the unit and the rnission.4 Centralto the cohesion concept is the individuals desire tosubmit to group norms. The soldier must feel a senseof niqmnsibility to the group and subordinate per-sonal concerns to the higher imperative of group wel-fare, In high-performing combat units, this impera-tive can demand extreme personal self-sacrifke forgroup survival or the achievement of group goals.sFurthermore, cohesion has a vertical, as well as hor-izontal, dimension. In first-rate combat units, bond-ing occurs between soldiers and their leaders throughdaily interaction. This phenomenon diminishes asdistance from soldier to leader incnmses. Whereas theplatoon sergeant or company commander may pro-foundly affect individual and group behavior in com-bat by direct influence, the brigade command ser-geant major and division commander are remoteleaders whose direct effect on small units is limited.

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Most available evidence suggests that cohesion,unlike morale and esprit, is fundamentally a primurygroup phenomenon and occurs at the small-unit

17zetrue test of cohesion k howwell unils perjiorm under extended combatstress. During the Gulf WW, most combatunih undkrwent a kmgthy precombat tminihgperiod in whikh unh were brought up tijidlstrength. . . and the diktmctions of gamisonlife were eliminated Actual combat wa ofextremely short duratib~ our opponents didnot fight weU and casualties were remarkablybw . . . . On @tw=e ba#le&ki%, SOM4?KSmayfight at the end of an extendkd and knuouslbgktk tail.. . and against weknnedopponents for lengthy perihdk

level in squads, crews and platoons.6 While soldiersmay draw real strength from unit pride, their abilityto persevere, endure and remain determined in theface of mounting combat stress is primarily a fi.mc-tion of small-group solidarity.

The crucial importance of small-unit cohesiontakes on greater meaning when one considers thefuture battlefield. In contrast to earlier periods whenweapon technology quired large troop formationsto deliver massed fu-es,warfare over the last centuryhas seen the progressive dispersion and decentraliza-tion of maneuver elements on the battlefield. As unitsand soldiem disperse to survive, they no longer fightunder the commanders direct influence. On morelethal battlefields, small-unit leadership and cohesionare defining characteristics for success in war.

Primary group cohesion is not the only importantcomponent of combat performance. Generalship,leadership, operational and tactical planning andexecution, logistics and intelligence are all criticalparts of the equation. But under the appalling hard-ships and stresses of combat, it is cohesion that keepsfighting units together and enables the other factorsto come into play.Evaluating CohesionUS combat performance in Grenada Panama andthe Persian Gulf suggests that cohesion is first rate inthe Army. By measurable standards, such as absentwithoutleave and desertion rates, combat disci-pline, assaults, drug and alcohol incidents and per-formance in battle, cohesion seems to have beenext.mmely high. However, without denigrating the

Armys impressive performance in these contin-gency operations, we can observe that real small-unit cohesion was not fi.dly tested. The true test ofcohesion is how well units perform under extendedcombat stms. During the Gulf War, most combatunits underwent a lengthy pmombat training periodin which units were brought up to fill stnmgth, per-sonnel allocations were stabilized and the distrac-tions of garrison life were eliminated. Actual combatwas of extremely short duration, our opponents didnot fight well and casualties were remarkably low.Additionally, popular support for the military washigh.7 On fiture battlefields, soldiers may fight atthe end of an extended and tenuous logistic tail, inunfamiliar terrain and against wellarmed opponentsfor lengthy periods. Under these conditions, we can-not assume numerical or fire superiority. Cohesion atthe small-unit level will be an important precondi-tion for success.

Scientific data suggests that small-unit cohesioncan be gRatly impmved.8 Numerous studies con-ducted in the 1980s concluded that although morale introop units was reasonably good-a result of higherquality soldiers, better leaders and more resourcesfor unit trainingstrong unit cohesion was lackin5due to the crippling effects of personnel turbulence.At the squad, platoon and crew levels, turbulencepersists at rates as high as 150 percent annually.l

Studies that evaluated stabilized tank crewsagainst standard crews revealed marked differencesin gumery and crew skills. Analysis conducted bythe Army Research Institute (AN) concluded thatover a five-year period, maneuver units at theNational Training Center (NTC) had achieved onlya 17percent success rate against opposing forceunits. Despite growing numbers of leaders who havecompleted multiple NTC rotations, there was nomeasurable improvement over a seven-year period.From 1983 to 1987, the NTC reported that only 6.5percent of training platoons exceeded standards,while the great majority were rated below standardorpoor.ll With fewer mources for extended fieldtraining, lower unit manning levels and more opera-tional deployments, improving performance stand-ards will be a difllcult challenge for our Army, giventhe current personnel management policies.Defining the ProblemFor mfiy years, Army personnel managers haveequated personnel fill with unit readiness. Unitsassigned their full complement of school-trainedsoldiers and leaders were rated filly combat xeadyfrom a personnel standpoint. While extremely effi-

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Vll Corpssoldiemduring theGulf War

Most avaikzble evidence suggests that coheswn, unMe mondk and esp& kjizndamentully a primary group phenomenon and occum ~ the snudl-unit level in squads,crews andplhtoons. While soldiem muy draw real strengthfiom unit pride, their abilityh pemevere, endk.re and remain determined in thefme of moutig combat stress k primarilyafinctilm of smull-group soliddy.

cient from a systems viewpoint, it is much less sowhen viewed from a capabilities perspective.

To reach their full potential, crews and squadsneed time to build strong, cohesive primary groups.Good equipment, training and leaders are not enough.Trust, confidence and group identity are basic m@re-ments for highperforming combat units. All toooften, personnel turnover defeats our best efforts tobuild effective, durable units. 12 Keep in mind thatthe more technologically advanced the equipmentand the smaller the crew, the more important inter-dependent skills become. It does not matter howgood the training is if the resulting collective skillsare thrown away by a personnel management systemthat values only efficiency.Beginning in the 1960s, the Department of De-fense adopted a systems approach to organizationalmanagement based on econometric modeling andcost and benefit analysis. This system continues infull force, encouraging unit evaluations based oneasily quantifiable performance indicators. Goodunits have high maintenance availability scores, gun-nery scores, school attendance and property account-ability. They have low accident rates, infrequent dis-ciplinary problems, few deadlined vehicles and

score well on external evaluations that search forquantifiable elements.This emphasis on the quantifiable is desirablefrom many points of view. It is objective and fair andlends itself to establishing clear performance stand-ards. It permits senior leaders to rapidly assess sub-ordinate units conditions. But it has one graveweakness-it cannot measure intangible, hard-to-rate human factors that often enable smaller forces towin against larger ones.

Tactical excellence, aggressiveness, inspirationalleadership and tenacity are difficult to assess numeri-cally. Nevertheless, they are more important than thepeacetime performance indicators previously cited.Since unit cohesion cannot be readily measured orexpressed numerically, it receives less emphasis thanother more tangible factors. 13The transition to the All-Volunteer Force and therise of occupationalism in the early 1970s alsocontributed to the decline of unit cohesion, Incen-tives such as increased pay, gradual relaxation in theauthority of fretline supervisors and emphasis onrapid promotion, vocational training and collegepreparation lent a marketplace flavor to militaryservice at variance with traditional professionalism

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Tutical excelkmce, aggressiveness, inspir&nal leademh@ and tenacity are di@ullto assess numeritaUy. Nevertheless, they are more impo~nt thun the peacetime performanceindicatom prevwudy cited. Since unit coheswn cannot be readily measured or expressednumeriixdly, it receives hss emphusis thaw other more tingible fwtom.

norms and subordination to group or unit goals. 14 Inessence, many incentives offered to attract recruitsinto voluntary service also serve to weaken tradi-tional sources of group bonding.

These changes were accompanied by progressiveconsolidation and centralization of important leader-ship functions at higher command levels. Organiza-tional autonomy and the small-unit leaders abilityto apply positive and negative incentives eroded assupply, military justice, promotion and messingfimctions were consolidated. 15 Company leaderswere increasingly viewed as place holders, not asautonomous decision makers exercising real author-ity. Over time, this process has degraded the linkagebetween soldiers and their prirrmy leaders. The shiftto private rooms, off-post housing and greater offduty freedom has loosened the bonds among smallunit members.One can say the Army has identified this problemand tried to compensate for the lack of small-unitcohesion in its organizational approach to warfare.The Cold War Army stressed big units, massive indi-vidual replacement systems and lavish resources, not

16 The Armys preference formall-unit excellence.mass and fmpower, overemphasis on technologicalsolutions, methodical and linear approaches to

operations and reliance on materiel superiority haveresulted in an organization built around its personnelsystem. 17In the near future, however, it will be hardto wage traditional war. Declining budgets, reducedforce structure and an eroding military-industrialbase are changing the rules of the game.Human factors, those hard-to-measure but criticaldeterminants of battlefield proficiency, will grow inimportance as our capacity to wage industrial agewar diminishes. In short, primary group bonding andsmall-unit excellence will gain importance as mate-riel resources decline. These factors will becomemore important in an information age Army, whichdemands highly perishable technical skills and evengreater dispersion and small-unit autonomy. Tomor-rows Army must win, not because it is bigger, butbecause it is better. 18A Bold InitiativeWhile official public assessments of Army readi-ness appropriately focus on positive force aspects,the ha.rmfd effects of excessive persomel turbu-lence have been recognized for some time. In 1980,Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyerannounced plans to revamp the Army personnelmanagement system to relieve these effects. Dubbed



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1stCaval Divis ion soldiers di defemve fightingr tosi tions Uring an annual NT training rotation. ad

* ,.- w~g

Analysis conducted by the&y Reseamh Institute conchuikd that over ajiv+yearperh@ maneuver units at the NTC had achieved only a 17-pement success mteagainst opposing fome units. Despite growing numbem of leaden who have complded nud@leNTC rotins, there was no measumble iinprovement over a seven-yearperiod From 1983to 1987, the iVTC repotied thti only 6.5percent of training pldoons exceeded standkrdk,whik?the great majority were tied belbw stindh# or pocm~

the New Manning System (NMS), Meyers initiativewas a revolutionary attempt to focus personnel sys-tems on unit cohesion.

The NMS was built around two complementaryprograms: The Regimental System (TM) and theCohesion, Operational Readiness and Training(COHORT) program. Meyer stated that the NMSwas designed to reduce unit turbulence by meetingmost fiture unit replacement needs by unit rotationrather than by individual replacement. 19 Whilediscussion and debate focused largely on the percep-tion that the NMS, and TRS in particular, aimed tobuild unit pride and esprit, Meyer clearly understoodthat the f~st and most important step was to buildstrong, cohesive primary groups and that the onlyway to do so was to stabilize soldiers in units forlengl.hy periods.m

TRS purpose was to provide the soldier with con-tinuous identification with a single ~gimen~ institu-tion or location throughout a career. Through re-peated assignments to the same ~gimental units andlocations, soldiers would experience recurring identi-fication with a relatively small circle of peers andleaders.21

The NMS concept envisioned permanent affili-ationwith a numbered regiment, homebasing at aparticular Continental United States (CONUS) loca-tion and periodic overseas rotations. TRS strived toenhance soldier identification with a regiment andcalled for permanent unit affiliation with emphasison unit heritage, traditions, memorabilia and distinc-tive uniform items.

Where TRS focused primarily on home-basingand aflliation, COHORT addressed the problems ofstabilization and unit movement. The basic ideabehind COHORT was to keep soldiers and leaderstogether through the life cycle of the unit-typicallya standard three-year enlistment. COHORT unitsrotated overseas as a unit from their CONUS homebase during the latter part of the unit life cycle.Implementation of the NMS began in late 1982with formal designation of several regiments andintegration of the first COHORT units into the ActiveComponent. Initially, these steps were taken on atest basis. Overnight conversion of the Army to thenew system was never seriously considered due tothe massive short-term disruption that would inevi-tably ensue. Army leaders assurnd that experience

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with the new initiatives would lead to more freetuning as the system adapted itself to the new per-sonnel model.The NMS went forwad with the energetic andpersonal backing of Meyer and the deputy chief ofstaff for Persomel (DCSPER), Lieutenant General

Good equipmen~ tnzining andleaden are not enough. lkus~ confidenceand group idenliiy are basic requirements forhigh+e~oiming combat unrls.AU too ofle~ pemonnel tuznover defeats ourbest effoti to builii effective, dumble uniks.Keep in mind that the more technologicallyadvanced the equipmen$ and the s&r thecrew, the more imponkmt inteniependentskilk become.

Robert M. Elton, attended by high hopes for stronggains in personnel effectiveness and unit cohesion.professional journals were awash with articles sup-portin NMS concepts and implementation strate-!gies.2 NMS cells in the offices under the DCSPER,the Military Personnel Center and other Army agen-cies proliferated. Mass redesignation ceremoniesbecame the order of the day.Yet, within five years, both TRS and COHORTlay dormant, stripped of institutional support. TheArmy returned to the individual replacement systemit had never @ly left, and the NMS found itselflabeled, privately if not publicly, a failure.

Why did the Army reject the Meyer initiative?Without going into a detailed analysis of the orga-nizational and bureaucratic politics surrounding theissue, one can surmise that the attempt to changefrom an individual to a unit replacement philosophyrequired a fundamental shift in the Armys organiza-tional culture. To be successful, the NMS requiredthe Army to look at itself in a different way. Evenwith the support of top Army leaders, this proved tobe too hard to do within the tenure of a singlechief of staff.

Following Meyers retirement, successive chiefsof staff were absorbed with organizational chal-lenges of their own such as the light division initia-tives, conversion to the Army of Excellence andforce modemization.23 Tactical commanders wereasked to administer both COHORT and existing per-somel programs concurrently b mixing individualand unit replacement schemes.& Veterans groupsprotested Army decisions to exclude some historic

regiments from TRS. Traditional emphasis on gen-eralist career patterns continued undisturbed asleaders migrated between light and heavy units athome and abroad.

But the most damaging blow to COHORT andTRS was personnel bureaucracy opposition. Localand Army-level personnel managers resisted takingthe necessary steps to make the concept a nmlity.Little was done to implement the NMS in the fieldbeyond redesignating certain units and notionallyaffiliating soldiem with regiments. By 1989, only fiveyears after TRS implementation, requests for mtumassignments to a soldiers affiliated regiment wentunheeded, and the signifkance of TRS was R&cdto wearing the unit crest on the uniform blouse.Getting What You Pay ForWhy should the Army alter fi.mdamenta.loperatingroutines and switch to a unit replacement system?Aside from the urgent need to find new sources ofcombat power for a smaller Army, the historicalrecord provides disturbing evidence of the failure ofthe individual replacement system in this centurysmajor conflicts. One can make a compelling argu-ment that the Army prevailed in these conflictsdespite its personnel management practices.

Military psychiatry has long known that continu-ous exposure to frontline combat stress makespsychological breakdown virtually inevitable.25Excepting sociopathy or other forms of aberrant psy-chological behavior, the average soldlers endurancein combat can be gauged with fair accuracy. Theleadership challenge is to extend the combat sol-diers endurance as much as possible. Experiencehas shown that the individual replacement system isthe least effective way to prottxt the soldier fkom thedebilitating effects of combat stress.

In World War II, the average combat soldier knewwith dreadful certainty that aside from death, seriouswounds or desertion, there was little chance of escap-ing from the awesome burdens of combat. Thissense of hopelessness was not materially affected bythe knowledge that the Allies had turned the comerand no longer feared defeat. The enormity of thisburden is revealed by the fact that in the fall of 1944,after the bm.kout from the Normandy beachhead,US infan~ E iments suffered 100-percent lossesfevery 90 days. 6 A high number were psychiatriccasualties.

With no unit rotation system and very high levelsof persomel turbulence, soldlers could rarely counton familiar associations or small-unit cohesion. It issmall wonder that so many combat soldiers-alone,

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One can say the Amy hus identified this problem and tid to compensatefor the hzck of smull-unit coheswn in its o~ani@ionul approach to warjiare. The Cold WwArmy stressed big units, massive individual replizcement systems and lhvhh resources, notsnudl-unit excellence. The Army k preference for mass dfiepowe~ overemplumis ontechnologkal solutions, methodiiid and linear approaches to opemtians and retie on materielsuperiin@ have resulted in an o~an&ation buill around & pemonnel system

friendless and cut off from the therapeutic effects ofcomradeship and communitybroke mentallywhen they were not wounded outright or evacuatedbecause of disease. While the personnel systemworked effectively to make up these losses, it tookscant notice of the woeful rate at which these combatreplacements soon became casualties themselves.

In recognition of the large-scale breakdown ofunits and soldiers who served in combat for theduration, Army planners limited service in Vietnamto 12 months. For most ofilcers, six months in thecombat zone was the norm. Despite lessons learned,the individual replacement framework remainedintact. Combat platoons and companies continued toresemble holding organizations, while soldiers andleaders rotated through in a never-ending cycle ofarrival and departure. Death, wounds, disease, druguse, psychological problems, disciplinary action,desertion and posting to nmr areas displaced manycombat soldiers before they could reach their normaldate eligible for return from overseas. Small-groupcohesion and morale began to erode with the depar-ture of the first iteration of regulars, who hadarrived in 1965 and 1966.

The problems of the Vletnam+ra Army havebeen widely discussed and debated. Drug use, offi-cer assassinations, poor leadership, sterile tactics,faulty strategy and many other failings have beenascribed and condemned.27 In the search foranswers to dysfunctional performance in Vietnam,however, the Army personnel management systemdid not emerge as a central problem. In retrospect,it is difficult to see how anyone could expect poorlytrained conscripts fighting an unpopular war in thecompany of relative strangers to perform well. Per-haps, given the preference for bigunit operations,helicopter mobility and massive firepower thattypified US operations in Vietnam, no one reallydid.

Yet, there were alternative models to be studied.John Baynes classic history A40rale, an account of aBritish infantry battalion sent off to war in 1914,describes in detail the British approach to persomelmanagement in wartime, Virtually every leader andsoldier was a veteran. Despite long service in theline and a series of fearful engagements, the battal-ion continued to fi ht cohesively and effectively5throughout the war. 8



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Although by wars end ve~ few of the originalsoldiers remained, the British practice of periodicrotations out of combat, regular drafts of replace-ments from regimental training depots, use of re-called reservists with previous service in the regi-ment and return of wounded veterans to their oldunits all helped to sustain unit pride and cohesion.The esprit and cohesion of the mgimen~ with all itsfeatures of an extended family and unique customs,tmditions and codes of behavior, lent sanity and sup-port to young men engaged in the most sanguinaryconflict the world had yet seen. If, as many expertsassume, the people who really count in battle are thecommanders and fighters at battalion and below,then the regimental system practiced in British Com-monwealth armies sustained the will to fight to aremarkable degree.29 It did so, not because its fight-ing soldien transfemd their primary group loyaltiesto the regirnen~ but because the ~giment proved an

ideal instrument for promoting, protectingand sustaining primary groups amid theharshest conditions imaginable.

During World War II, the Wehnnachtrnan-aged to achieve similar performan~ levelsby following a sensible program of unit rota-tions out of the battle line. Untii n31ativelylatein the war, German divisions on the EasternFront (with an avemge strength of 12,000)we~ considered used up and withdrawnfor resg retraining and replacements whentheir mtion strength dropped below 1O,(XMI.In comparison, rifle companies in GeneralGeorge S. Patton Jr.ss US Third Army aver-aged 55-pement strength in 1944 despite theindividual ~placement system.m Most Ger-man divisions maintained training depots forthe reception and integration of ~placementsinstead of sending them piecemeal to thefront lines. As the war gmmd on, combatunits wem reduced in size, and veterans werecaxefidly distributed to form the nucleus forstrong primary groups.31

Strenuous measures were taken to ensurethat junior leaders were experienced andcompetent. For example, a US infantrycompany might boast 150 soldiers and fouror five inexperienced lieutenants; a Germaninfantry company might carry 50 to 70 sol-diers on its rolls with a single seasoned offi-cer in canmand.32 The German noncom-missioned officer (NCO) corps was notdiluted to Rplace offker losses, which mightlargely have destroyed the basis for smallunit cohesion, and lengthy NCO training courses

wem continued right up until the wars end.These practices stood in marked contrast to USArmy policy, which kept units in combat indefinitely

and replenished them with a continuous stream ofnew conscripts. Where the German army strove byall available means to nurture its small units, whichit considered the basis of its combat power, the USArmy seemed unaware of the relationship betweenunit cohesion and soldier performance. The virtuesof US military performance in World War II, Koreaand even Vietnam are many, yet we cannot ascribeour battlefield successes to the personnel system. Onthe contraty, many of our battlefield failure can bedirectly linked to an inability to grasp the signitl-cance and importance of small-unit cohesion.These lessons, purchased at gmt cost by earliergenerations of American combat soldiers, retaintheir impact today. They suggest that unit replace-



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ment systems and a true emphasis on cohesion areworth the organizational inconveniences and shortterm teething problems that inevitably accompanychanged operating routines and new initiatives.However, it should be noted that one replacementsystem will not work effectively for both a peacetimeand wartime Army.Toward a Personnel System that Works

The Army personnel system can provide the kindof stable supporting environment needed to makecohesion, esprit and morale a reality in the US Army.In theory, Army personnel management has oneoverriding purpose: to support the force so its unitswill fight to their maximum potential. The best wayto do this is to stabilize soldiers assignments to smallunits and provide leaders who are known, trusted andproved through long service together.

Pride in the unit is the glue that binds soldiers toone another, to their primary fighting units and to

their leaders. This same pride binds leaders to lead-ers. Cohesive units are made up of comrades, notstrangers. To live up to the standards of the unit andto the expectations of ones leaders and peers is aprofound source of motivation in combat. The trustand support of ones fellows is the best possibledefense against combat stress. Taken together, cohe-sion, esprit and morale enhance and sustain eachother by creating unit environments that breed confi-dence, durability and the expectation of success.Although stability and leadership are the keys tounit cohesion, other personnel system features canplay significant support roles. One organizationaldynamic that is often overlooked in combat perfor-mance studies is the horizontal cohesion shared byleaders within a unit.

When leaders know, trust and understand eachother through long association, a true synergisticeffect magnifies the contribution of individual lead-ers and makes the whole more than the sum of its

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parts. Coordination is simpler, decision aqd actioncycles are faster, task organization is smoother andbattlefield friction is reduced. In short, the prospectsfor effective teamwork are greatly improved.

To achieve these results, the Army must wrestlewith some of its strongest institutional truths. Itmust concentrate its best leaders in combat units and

/l%e New Manning System of 1980]was a nwohdhuzry attempt to fmus pemonnelsystems on unit coheswn . . . . [and] wasdesigned to reduce unit turbulence bymeeting most fiture unit rephzcement needsby unit rotition rather than by individualreplacement. YTmtical CO~ wem asked

to dnh-kter both COHORT and tw&ingpe~fwmelpm- concummlly by miringuuhdhal and unit repkwement schemes . . . .llvulitkmal emphasis on genendist cawerp~erns continued undisturbed as leadenmigmted between light and heavy unitsat home and&mad But the most&unagingblow to COHORT and IRS was pexsonnelbureaucracy opposition

keep them them. When due for troop duty, soldiersand leaders will return to the same brigade. Genuinevertical and horizontal cohesion demands an end tomigration between branch communitieslight,heavy, armor, cavalry-and calls for long-term serv-ice in one brigade within a combined arms frame-work. Training units must be aligned with combatunits. Replacements will come to combat brigades inpackages instead of as individual ~placements, withready-made fi-iendships and socialization into theunits history and traditions long before they amive.

There me arguments against this kind of reform.Some feel that leaders cannot be professionallydeveloped without exposure to many differentassignments and experiences.33 Others worry that insuch a system it may not be possible to expose everyleader to the jobs needed for fhture success. Manydetractors believe that efficient persomel manage-ment would go out the window or that the effectsassociated with transitioning from an individual to aunit personnel management system would breakthe fome.

These criticisms have merit, but they must beweighed against the potential gains. The success of

many senior leaders who served exclusively in onecommunity demonstrates that professional school-ing, self~evelopmen~ combined arms training andtalent are perhaps more important than a successionof tours which expose leaders to multiple environ-ments while denying them real opportunities to trulymaster any particular one.34

Also, it is useful to bear in mind that other armieshave wrestled with these problems and ovemomethem. Wkh modem data processing systems, per-sonnel managers can administer this system moreeffectively, especially when much of the burden isborne by the units themselves.

I suspect that the true basis of dissent is an unwill-ingness to move away from cherished organizationalroutines. Despite the warning signs-loss of fhndi.ng,fome stmcture and advanced bases oveme.aswhichalert us to the fact that business as usual isno longerpossible, decades of institutional muti.ne have cmtedan inertia that makes d change extremely diflicuk.

It is possible to change the way entrenched bureau-cmcies function, but the obstacles to change shouldnot be undenxstimated. Sustained commitment and adetailed implementing strategy must complementgood ideas. An Army personnel system that valueshuman f~tors and strong, proud units is one goodidea that deserves to succeed.

Small-unit excellence matters in a smaller Army.Even in aggressive offensive operations, smaller,weaker armies have oflen triumphed because theywem better. Encouragingly, the transition to a unitreplacement system need not be expensive, and itneed not disturb the tactical organization and func-tioning of combat maneuver units. Soldiers can putdown roots in local communities, build equity intheir own homes and develop professionally in thecompany of known and trusted comrades.

But the ultimate payoff is battle, where we mightconfidently expect the greatest return. For combatsoldiers, trust in one another and their leaders is thef~e that welds successful units together and makesthem winners. A new look at this old idea can showus how to build real combat power at little cost.

As the Army completes the final stages of thedrawdown, stabilization should increase dramatic-ally with a largely CONUS-baSed Army, elimi-nating many of the associated problems alreadydiscussed. Stable, cohesive units represent a sim-ple, cornmonsense strategy for improving combatpower. While it maybe difficult to measure result-ing improvements in cohesion, morale and espritquantitatively, they will be A, tangible and lasting.A revised persomel management philosophy s~s-

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BAITLE COMMAND

[Human futam] willgain imponlznce as nuu@til resomes decklne. l%ese fmtomwill become more iinpo~ ih an infonnatiun age by, whikh dkmandk highly petihubli?techniad skilk and even greater dtipemwn and small-nil autonomy.me success of many senwr kadem who served exclusively in one communilydenumstnztes tipmf~swnul schootig, se&ievelbpme@ combined arms tnzining and takmt

are perhaps more important thun a successwn of toum whzkh expose leaden to mullipleenvironments whilk denytig them real oppotintis to truly master any putkukr one.ing unit replacement can go far to offset 10ssof com- are not prohibitive surely the gains are worthbat power due to a smaller force structure. The costs nxhing for. Ml?

NOTES~iP:h~&~&L-Ga~ - ES@I CQW:~otw.and AD. Mertgesdcd Lmdon :John Vvi ley&Sins, Ltd.,1 1),455. Seeatso Kevh R.SmWi,UndmstsdkJouma/ (Ma /June 1=) , w, md JohnBayne-s,Mcfa&: A & Of%%%-tifr%rNaw York ram PuMiirs, 1967), 104.2. Manning, 456.3. FwmX, ~Wd N~D*m W~m@@~b Wti Wrlldaiithat%o otmcfgahect wasewrrebqukhed;an& suethatceu sedfrictimv4wnMG Matbaw ~R %%attle ofthe Bulge. ywaaordemd tovdlhdrawfrom thevicWtyofSt.VnhdurhgthaClay Blair,R@Jw@s Paratrtwers (New Ydc Wflii Mcmw& co.,Inc., 1965), 394. -

4. John H. Johns. et al.. @heaim b M U.S. MWarv (Washir@on DC Nat iialDefense MivarWy %ea! 1Q84), 4 . . .

S. L J%Marshall as propments ofthe primarygroufYtheory. Sae-Hmdars&, CuheakM:7ha Human Hwrent h &m&t (Washiim, DC: National Defense Uniwaity Press,1985), 4+7 . A semiorreti redArmy leaderkWviewd b thiss oberved fhaveamalcm-cem thatwell draw the ~ bSSOOS fro [@aratim] Qcwn. The real lesson~tiat~xmmtis htim~wm-tiwdgrwp~ ,hmii%%%%%%%%%=- The--=&m~m~catlonaon shortnrmceandbe futfyreadytogo. wneekf thoseixmonihs.8. InterviewwithCOL Rii Manrha, waker Read ArmyInetkuteforReaearcfI, 5 June1!391.9. Henckrsm, fOfW dlii, Army -d k@tUtS (~t), 7bS ~bWAry(%%St-pdo cTTGre#woOd Press, Inc., 1990), 77-90.11. Seeti Endbttmd Earl Pmce, WC W Trainii Center] badwshbssms Lawn@ (unpubkhed USArmyTra in ii and Doctrha Command P$wE.W,~~ti~mY-dW*tiTmtiWM (AFUFMunit, i%aidii of tdrmterey la~ and Robert HOIZ ARfTechnicalAma Reporton WCFtdabl M (Alemndr&, v+ AM, ma), dtadMHmdarsm,* 2 AseniorNTcObssmw/arntmtbneMewad~tis s tudYcu lf ir ad tha th t cmtinus%aaicat fy what vmra m istrabihg ndtdduals, pdrnarf tyIaedacs. S%months afteramtatbn,hesenitsdontexistanymore. There isno cdlactii group experiem tobrhgback the nexltimearound. ,E~ unitgoes throu@ hareforihefirsttime. Andthatsusu-ally notgoodw w2. Intervbw GEN Edward C. Meyer , 6 June 1991.13. Aconsequance of accfromstric anat@sis todovmplay theless tan$Jibleamno-rnetrk fackcs and value4fWn aap@s ofmili iry organizat ion. . . [and this] approach

tends to defhe iss~ that are amenable to exbthg methodd@ka and thus wwentratesm narr owty Cuwewad arrnparisons of vadaMea to the

Yof themoredfficult

issues. Chartes C. Moako5 et al. , 777sA4Mary.kbre h ust a J9b? (V@hhgtm,DC: Pergammm+eeeq% 1966), 4.14. , lb Id .,17 . Where soidi i pwwou I lvad m aquad rooms under c icse _?fti-s, tiymtih tiWmswm*vutiti hou~~Manyyoungsok5ers aremanfed , andacmehdd r%41ian jobaa ft erdutyhcurs . -~~-m~ a-tib ~ r .~fromtheunit anWonmmt,asdo. . tit~i~mb~fiati ~~tititimmti~ti-m day=- initiitiws, suth as barracks pdii in US /umy Europa (USAR-EUR) that kwease soldierautmomy k?the barracks, send marrrbiguous s@aJs h thii~5?W#ii J .Tay lorJ r. ,Leadqthe Amy; 7he Wash@br r @artedy(Winter 1963) ,42.18. Cart Buikterprovidesan knpressti analysisc4dWinctk aewice culturesm Masksof War (Balt imore, MD The Johns Ho@s UrI&wsity Press, 1X9).

Alm#~=ge~&m@@~7. Fora provocativeexplicationoftha q~, 7?wArmyand V%marrr(Batt ir rme, MOa.18. Thisiandto sqest that t -?zz=~.==f~heccntrary, bebwaceti pcint , thaq

ofowvhetn numbers. See Anfhmy Kaltett CcxnfwtMXva@r:.77re~ti@~diers#rBatt@%m, MkKluwerNijhotlPuk4shiCiassic study, vm-fara k fundamentally about s$lA?%#%%l%%?&_ systeqw. ~ w+docurnanted em@ms15m tedmobg ic al a speds ofwarfarecbscuresccmderatxm ofthe htsnan dsnansims ofcombat. Anctthese areall+mtant.19. Regimental UnitPlan WIII Be@r TM Year,Army Tines (25 January 1982) , 1.20. Ibid., 17.21. Assessment of the tJnledS7i#esAnrry Ra@nantalSystam, Volume 1, BDM Corp.,II-3.~. See Robert M. Eftm, r3hwon and UrM Pride A*5 ofNew Manning System,ARw(0cto4w 1W4 ).23. BDM Corp. at , 1%.24. lnte rvW with% FrerbrWt Biadc, -, _c4 the General Staff, 25thInfantry D* (L@t), 7 A@ 1992. Menagrentlyat the aarna mstdatii waaa pmbb!X%%/X%%%%!P*%Lm the basis ofpersonnel f il l. Falling personnel levels in some units required cros-levelii , whiif raqudy trrc@uplaedarah@h Cohedon, Uperatimal Readiness andTrainhg unitsh the htereat ofmeeting unitstatusrepcnthgcetagwy ona (hi@eat madi-

%.%- trenches, a mans wil@wer was hs capital and he was always spendi~,mtiat S~ti~m~_Mtti be_uredm~~~Mtirmm went t xmknpt . When their c .@a l was done, they were f in ished. Sea Bar reCharfes hk+domn Wiism m (LorxlMoran) , 7ba Awmxr?y c+fC@rage (Garden COPark, NJ: Avery Publishirr Grou , 1967) , M.L6. Jchn Englii, CM h my (L York Praeger PubIii, 1964),36.27. Sea Rchard A Get@ md Paul L savage, CriaIs b C#rnr~ (New York: H ill2=9~b$b~$.%m~~=dS%%$1915 mdher166 a t R ii@eatuberl hwrmmths later, w decimated again at the !30rhme andThird Ypresandbat636members in 10 days ~ting dur ingthe German FridmsfurmOf fenWa d 1918. See Baynes.29. GEN Frido von Sanger wrd Ettelii , Ne#her Fear nor HP (Lmdm: Macdo@d,1960) . 198 and =3.3 0. E Ii sh , 13 6.a%l%%%?%$: %%?&?X%%?%%?k$%%?w%N-, 1967), wWdmaMy thedstandii pmonalmemoirofwortdk +hr llfromthaperswrdiveftheGermanokfii.32. Bywars end, the Gemwmoffbrc orpswaafarbelwa~ lawts Xr.6 W-osnf o f an Germm offimrs were killed outngtt with man we W- md mieaiw3Sea Gatxielmct Savage,38. Ssjerpmvidesam dvivktiKMatkmo4theGarrnancompany off kxrrh the persm c#Hauptmann Wesre idau and &w German Mitu ti i o fKanreradesdra.fi (officer/soldiercunradeship) n 7ba FT3. One former tank brigade commander interviewed thisstudy remarked: 1hada heflo f a t ine withmy pung hfant ry capta ins. Armypdii ensured lhey came f romerrdushmly l it backgrounds ,and they needed too *M brealdngh to the tankand~adley ant irmments. Ccmmand ofa tankor BT company team ishard stuff. Thegoodmestook aboutayeartoreallygat hthesadd +ongenough t0se8abe@hhgatleastmce. l?wywerefulfy produdiifor aixmonthsbeforB lloettham. Buttheawageoneswerealwaysiabifii. If y ou bel ii , l ike I do, that sma ll units h wars, i t saheilofapfcetopay todevefopfuture leaders~ Thaaubrobaemeda aknilsrphanome-nm when tiai thg an@my fi@ drdeiqn . W ile w hfant ry brigade commanders had

y~~~al~ti~~~b,fh$tii~%%%%!%% @?t Unltabefore. This O fficsrw Unrvar?+t ~u~ --d&hs Ieedwship abilityand atikistrath.e mmpabwe-tnrt &wrnpar-y-gradeofficemrnthedi visimfwh61a ckofexperima %ndgraspof ilfantry@tirX, capabilitbs and -4. hWview wi th COL Gbra I land, Offke d the Chief of Parat~ and Infantry,Israeli Defense Forceq January 1966. Many Israeli mrnmanders, such as Raful Eitanand Ariel Sharm, haver iasntoarmofed divisii command after longaervicehnm-medwked hfantty unks (ha Israeli dMskrn or ugda k exclusively an annorad forma-tim). ~am*atiwm flhtti~l _dam@mks, Mbwkmg shce mast ered combined a rms t act ica md cpera ti or rs t hrough a cn rnbha ti on dservice schooling, unittrahiig programs and habitual task organization.

Major Richmd D. HookerJr is the deputy commana!q 3d Battalwfi 325thAirborneBatkdionCombatTeaq VfcenzgItaly He receiveda B.S.fknn the USMilitaryAcaakmyand anM.A. anda PkD.@m the Universityof I&ginia He hasservedti a varietyofcommand and stafpositions,to includen%, weaponsand antitankunitsin the82dAirborneDiviswfi FortBragg, North CluV-lti; associatedimctir of DefensePolicy,National SecurityCouncilStafi Wmhingto~ D.C; andmilitiry asstitant u the USAmbassaabr in Somahh during OperationRestoreHope. Hti articleRe&fi@ Maneuver W?#am appearedin the February 1992 issue ofMilitaryReview.


building unbreakable units - richard d. hooker - military review, july-august 1995, 25-35

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