building resilience or providing sustenance: different ... · (peredo & chrisman, 2006). these...

r Academy of Management Journal2016, Vol. 59, No. 6, 2069–2102.http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2015.0682

BUILDING RESILIENCE OR PROVIDING SUSTENANCE:DIFFERENT PATHS OF EMERGENT VENTURES IN THE

AFTERMATH OF THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE

TRENTON A. WILLIAMSSyracuse University

DEAN A. SHEPHERDIndiana University

Disaster events threaten the lives, economies, and wellbeing of those they impact. Un-derstanding the role of emergent organizations in responding to suffering and buildingresilience is an important component of the grand challenge of how to effectively re-spond to disasters. In this inductive case study we explore venture creation initiated bylocals in response to suffering following the 2010 Haiti earthquake. In exploring sixventures we found that two distinctive groups emerged in terms of their identification ofpotential opportunities to alleviate suffering, their access to and use of key resources, theaction they took, and ultimately their effectiveness in facilitating resilience. We offer aninductive, grounded theoretical model that emerged from our data that provides insightinto and an extension of literature on resilience to adversity and the disaster literature onemergent response groups, opening pathways for management scholarship to contributein a meaningful way to this grand challenge.

You want me to tell you what the Haitians did tohelp Haitians after the earthquake? Not the NGOs?Well, nobody has ever asked me that! There is a lotwe did, so much that has gone untold. (Interview)

Transformation is only valid if it is carried out withthe people, not for them. Liberation is like a childbirth,and a painful one. (Pedagogy of the Oppressed,Freire, 2000: 56)

Organizations and communities face high-riskevents that are difficult, if not impossible, to preparefor (Gephart, Van Maanen, & Oberlechner, 2009).Natural disasters—“acute collectively experiencedeventswithsuddenonset” that result ina“catastrophicdepletion of resources” (Kaniasty & Norris, 1993:396)—are a particularly devastating form of high-riskevent. Disasters frequently (77% of the time) impactcountries that are most vulnerable to the economicand social consequences of such devastating events(Guillaumont, 2010;UN, 2015). Furthermore, disasters

often have a regional and even global impact, dis-rupting or destroying economic conditions (Oh &Oetzel, 2011), threatening business survival (Muller& Kraussl, 2011), and shaping business and society(McEntire, 2014). Despite representing an unlikelyevent for a specific community, disasters are quitecommon and occur once per day somewhere in theworld on average (Norris, Friedman, Watson, Byrne,Diaz, & Kaniasty, 2002). Given the challenges in pre-paring fordisastersandtheirdevastatingconsequences,responding to disasters represents a grand challenge(van der Vegt, Essens, Wahlstrom, & George, 2015).

Most of the research onmanaging disaster responsehas focused on the command-and-control approachof first responders—that is, coordinating individualsand organizations to respond to a disaster through“clearly defined objectives, a division of labor, a for-mal structure, and a set of policies and procedures”(Schneider, 1992: 138). However, recent research hashighlighted the challenges of implementing thecommand-and-control approach (e.g., Drabek, 2005;Marcum, Bevc, & Butts, 2012) and its inability tosufficiently protect communities from disasters(McEntire, 2014) and has begun to focus on the im-portance of building community-level resilience(McManus, Seville, Vargo, & Brunsdon, 2008; vanderVegt et al., 2015). Resilience is a process by whichindividuals and/or groups avert maladaptive

Wewould like to thankGerben S. van der Vegt and threeanonymous reviewers for their support anddevelopmentalcomments. We would also like to thank Watson Claire-Jeune, Thomas Davies, Benjamin Warnick, Ali Ferguson,and Indiana University’s Creole Institute for their valuableassistance. We also thank Indiana University’s Center forInternational Business Education and Research (CIBER)for providing financial support.

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http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2015.0682

tendencies and maintain “positive adjustment, oradaptability, under challenging conditions” (Sutcliffe& Vogus, 2003: 99).

To date, disaster-management research has largelyfocused on the attributes of societies (Aldrich, 2012)or groups (Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, &Pfefferbaum, 2008) that reflect resilience outcomesin the aftermath of disasters (Bonanno, Brewin,Kaniasty, & LaGreca, 2010;McEntire, 2014) but hasnot sufficiently explored why some (individuals,organizations, societies) are able to adjust to ad-verse conditions to maintain (or enhance) positivefunctioning while others fail to do so (van der Vegtet al., 2015). Specifically, there is more to learnabout how organizing—linking individuals andbroader communities—facilitates adjustment inthe aftermath of disasters (Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, &Hollingshead, 2007; Marcum et al., 2012).

Existingorganizations’ability to facilitate resilience(including those of first responder organizations)may be severely limited by a disaster’s destructionof their resources (Marcum et al., 2012; McEntire,2014). Thus, research would benefit from exploringhow local ventures are created in the aftermath ofa disaster to alleviate suffering. In the context ofdisaster response, the creation of local ventures re-fers to the arrangement of resources and organiza-tional structures in novel ways by those within thedisaster zone to alleviate the suffering of victimsand can take the form of de novo (new independent)or de alio (new corporate) ventures (Shepherd &Williams, 2014). This form of venturing is consis-tent with extant conceptualizations of entrepre-neurial venture creation, which is a process bywhich individuals “pursue opportunities withoutregard to resources they currently control . . .[where] opportunity is defined . . . as a future situ-ation which is deemed desirable and feasible”(Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990: 23). The purpose of thispaper, therefore, is to explore the processes throughwhich local ventures emerge following a disasterand the consequences these ventures have oncommunity members. Indeed, by focusing on theemergence of local ventures, we hope to provideinsights as a basis for actionable knowledge.

In this study, we examine how locals createdventures in Haiti following a disaster. In January2010,Haiti—already strugglingwith chronicpoverty(UN, 2015)—was hit with an earthquake that leveledapproximately 80% of its capital (Port-au-Prince),killing hundreds of thousands of people; displacinghundreds of thousands more; and significantly in-creasing the population’s vulnerability to disease,

poverty, and thus mortality (International CrisisGroup, 2013; Zanotti, 2010). The earthquake drewan enormous response fromoutside governments andnon-governmental organizations (NGOs) in an effortto alleviate victim suffering. Billions of dollars weredonated, and thousands of NGOs descended on Haitiin an attempt to address Haiti’s problems. In contrastto the focus placedonoutside organizations,we focuson howHaitians organized to help fellow communitymembers. Specifically, there is reason to believe thatHaitian-led organizing contributed to solutions to thegrand challenges presented by the large-scale suffer-ing. Indeed, as a recent report on the crisis in Haitisuggests, “the key to fixing Haiti is that Haitians haveto do it” (International Crisis Group, 2013: 14).

THEORETICAL GROUNDING

Based on the above broad objectives, we began byinvestigating the literature on disaster management.Given our interest in exploring locals responding todisaster, we focused on the literature on resilienceto adversity, particularly when disasters were thesource of adversity (Erikson, 1976; Gephart et al.,2009). The notion of resilience holds promise forgaining a deeper understanding of disaster manage-ment as it can occur at multiple levels as well asacross levels (van der Vegt et al., 2015).

Resilience to Adversity

Disasters are crises that create adversity for thosein their path (Bonanno et al., 2010; Turner, 1976).Disasters deplete resources (Kaniasty & Norris,1993), break up and isolate communities (Bonannoet al., 2010), and can be appraised as traumatic(Norris et al., 2002). Although disaster managementis often used to try to protect communities from di-sasters (McEntire, 2014; Turner, 1976), these at-tempts are rarely successful (Hewitt, 2013). Thus,rather than focusing on vulnerability and protection,a re-orientation toward resilience appears to pro-vide a path to a deeper understanding of the after-math of disasters (van der Vegt et al., 2015). Indeed,recently, much has been made of communities’ in-herent resilience—that is, the qualities a commu-nity possesses prior to a hazard that enhance itsability to mitigate threats and function positively inthe aftermath of a natural disaster (Cutter, Ash, &Emrich, 2014). Such qualities include their set ofnetworks (Norris et al., 2008), economic and socialcapital (Aldrich, 2012), local knowledge and values(Shepherd &Williams, 2014), and community capital

2070 DecemberAcademy of Management Journal

(Peredo & Chrisman, 2006). These resources are im-portant, yet resilience also involves processes forretaining “resources (cognitive, emotional, rela-tional or structural) in a form sufficiently flexible,storable, convertible, and malleable” (Sutcliffe &Vogus, 2003: 98) to dealwith the adversity created bya disaster. However, how are these processes con-structed and enacted in the uncertain environmentcreated by a disaster?

Emergent Response Groups—Post-DisasterVenturing

Disasters often generate such considerable destruc-tion that they motivate responses from a number ofactors, including governments, non-profits (e.g., theRed Cross, other NGOs), and emergency first re-sponders (e.g., police, fire departments) (Anderson,Compton, & Mason, 2005). However, despite theseorganizations’ best efforts, many needs go unmetgiven the often widespread scale of destruction(Drabek & McEntire, 2003). Indeed, disasters candisable first responders’ resources (e.g., destroyedequipment), and infrastructure damage can obstructthem from reaching victims. Furthermore, disasterevents are not always interpreted in the same way(Gephart, 1984): those immediately local to the de-struction might interpret needs and desired actionsdifferently than those on the outside (Shepherd &Williams, 2014; Williams & Shepherd, 2016). Givenestablished organizations’ limitations to address allpost-disaster needs (Drabek & McEntire, 2003;Marcum et al., 2012), it appears that impromptugroups are often formed to fill the void to help vic-tims (Majchrzak et al., 2007). Emergent responsegroups refer to a collection of individuals “with nopre-existing structures such as group membership,tasks, roles, or expertise that can be specified exante” and are characterized by “a sense of urgencyand high levels of interdependence” (Majchrzaket al., 2007: 147). These emergent response groupshave several attributes, including “unclear and fluidboundaries, fleeting and unclear membership, un-clear, fluid and dispersed leadership, highly un-stable taskdefinitions . . . andgeographicdispersion”(Majchrzak et al., 2007: 150). These attributes arebelieved to lead to self-organization, improvisation,and the generation of other novel actions to dealwiththe non-routine nature of disasters (Bigley &Roberts,2001; Drabek & McEntire, 2003; Erikson, 1976).

Although we have an increased understanding ofthe attributes of emergent response groups and thedesired outcomes of their actions,much remains to be

learned about their “internal dynamics” (Majchrzaket al., 2007: 151). Shepherd and Williams (2014)provided an important step in this direction by find-ing that new ventures (as emergent groups) were cre-ated in the aftermath of a bushfire in a country regionof Australia to alleviate the suffering of communitymembers (see also Williams & Shepherd, 2016). Theact of new venture creation and the notion of an op-portunity to alleviate suffering provide an importantbridge to entrepreneurship, where opportunity playsa central role in understanding venture emergence(McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Stevenson & Jarillo,1990).1 The benefits of opportunity exploitation canbe for the entrepreneur (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011), forstakeholders (Freeman & Phillips, 2002), the com-munity (Peredo & Chrisman, 2006), and/or nature(Dean & McMullen, 2007). However, there is stillmuch to learn about the different processes by whichnewventuresemerge in theaftermathof adisaster andthe ways these differences impact opportunities topromote the resilience of community members.

Therefore, there are two underexplored yet highlyimportant aspects of disaster management. First,what role do those in a disaster zone play in facili-tating the resilience of community members? Pre-vious work has focused on resources in preparationfor a disaster or resources provided by outsiders aftera disaster, but important implications are likely toarise from considering the processes by which re-sources are acquired, combined, and used by localsfor local victims. Thus, we hope to uncover localresilience processeswithin the adverse environmentcreated by a disaster. The second under-exploredarea involves entrepreneurial ventures that emergein the shadow of designated relief organizations.While previous research has acknowledged the im-portance of emergent response groups and compas-sion venturing to the resilience of a community, wewish to understand whether some of these localventures contribute more to resilience than othersand why. Our curiosity leads to the following:

(1) How do post-disaster new ventures acquire, com-bine, and use resources?

(2) How does venture creation facilitate the resilienceof community members, and why are some ven-tures more effective than others?

1 Although there is an ongoing debate about the episte-mological nature of opportunity (Davidsson, 2015;Suddaby et al., 2015), both sides agree that acting on anopportunity belief has the potential to generate valuablegains.

2016 2071Williams and Shepherd

RESEARCH METHOD

To address our research questions, we base ourwork on a qualitative inductivemethodology (Denzin& Lincoln, 2011; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This ap-proach enables a detailed exploration of how ac-tors behave in the aftermath of a disaster and towhat end. We used the method described by Gioia,Corley, and Hamilton (2013) (e.g., Corley & Gioia,2004; Sonenshein, 2014) to collect and analyze ourdata, focusing on the contextual interrelationshipsregarding new ventures to address existing theory.

Research Setting

Our research setting is venture creation for thealleviation of suffering in the aftermath of the Port-au-Prince, Haiti, earthquakedisaster,whichoccurredon January 12, 2010. Alleviation of suffering refers toefforts designed to reduce the pain of victims (fora review, see Dutton, Workman, & Hardin, 2014;Hansen & Trank, 2016). The 7.0 magnitude earth-quake was the worst in Haiti’s history, resulting inextensive loss of life (estimated at 316,000), injury(300,000), and displacement (1.5 million) andimpacting one-third of Haiti’s total population(Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010). The physical de-struction was widespread due to inadequate con-structionstandardsandaverypoorpopulation,whichcontributed to the destruction of more than 100,000homes; 1,300 schools; 50 medical centers; the StateUniversity of Haiti; and 15 out of Haiti’s 17 govern-ment ministries, including the presidential palace(Riddick, 2011). This destruction debilitated Haiti’salready “thin layer” of administrative structures(Zanotti, 2010: 756). Many Haitians faced “serioushousing, food, physical security, and health issues”(Riddick, 2011: 244), and the financial impact onHaitiwas catastrophic (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010),leading the Inter-American Development Bank tolabel the tragedy “the most destructive event [any]country has ever experienced” (Cavallo, Powell, &Becerra, 2010: F299).

To fullyunderstandHaiti’spost-disaster challenges,it is important to emphasize that Haiti was experi-encing extreme difficulties prior to the earthquake.Haiti is a least developed country that has gone fromcrisis to crisis since in 1804, as a colony populatedpredominantly by slaves, it successfully “overthrewboth its colonial status and its economic systemandestablished a new political state of entirely freeindividuals” (Knight, 2000: 103). However, thisnew political state struggled to fund the building of

schools, hospitals, roads, and other key infrastruc-ture in large part due to an agreement with France topay compensation to former slave owners for “loss ofproperty” (Schuller, 2007). Haiti has since enduredinstability in its government,whichhas beendefinedas “loose agreements . . . to stave off more seriousviolence or end an impasse, but none have reachedfar enough to construct [a solution]” (InternationalCrisis Group, 2013: 1).

In the context of internal government challenges,Haiti has also received extensive international in-tervention, including billions of U.S. dollars, secu-rity support, and thousands ofNGOsproviding a vastarray of services (International Crisis Group, 2013;UN, 2015). Haiti has earned the nickname the “NGOrepublic” given the “parallel state” made up of in-ternational government and NGO organizationsseeking to influence national outcomes in Haiti(Edmonds, 2013).2 As a result of the earthquake’s de-structionandat the request of theHaitiangovernment,nearly $14 billionof aidpoured into the country.Mostof this aid was directed through non-Haitian govern-ments, NGOs, and international government bodies.Indeed, in the aftermath of the earthquake, much ofthe traditionalmedia and academic focus centered ontheeffectivenessofnon-Haitian responders.Althoughthis focus is understandable given the scale of foreignaid, we wondered what efforts (if any) Haitians hadinitiated. As articulated by Edmonds (2013: 447), the“earthquake destroyedmany things inHaiti, but it didnot shatter the pride, determination, and spirit of re-sistance within the Haitian people.” This curiosityspawned the current research project.

Case Study Method and Selection

Our method for gathering data for analysis wasflexible and emergent as we collected informationfrom various sources (Gephart, 2013; Gioia et al.,2013). The selection of cases and data for analysisemerged from statements from individuals, organi-zational documents, and common “issues” identifiedby informants as our investigation unfolded. Thisprocess culminated in three primary steps. First, wedeveloped generic criteria for the phenomenon wewanted to explore: ventures initiated immediately

2 Prior to the earthquake, Haiti hosted an estimated10,000 NGOs, a number that ballooned after the earth-quake. Prior to the earthquake, Haiti had “the most priva-tized social-service sector in the Americas, with over 80percent of the country’s basic services provided by NGOs”(Edmonds, 2013: 440).


after the disaster by Haitians within the disasterzone focused on alleviating others’ suffering. At thisstage, we did not know if these types of ventureswere present. However, initial conversations withthose in the community, entrepreneurship theory,and reports of Haitian-led activities motivated us topursue the subject further. Second, we initiatedcontact with individuals in Haiti through Haitian-Diaspora LISTSERVs, contacts in the first author’sprofessional network and in the Creole Institute ofthe second author’s university. Through theseconnections, we began recognizing that there werea number of ventures created with a shared objec-tive of “responding to the disaster to help addresswidespread suffering, such as hunger, lack of shel-ter, and subsequent needs required to survive”(field notes). We conducted 10 exploratory inter-views over the phone and on Skype with thoseidentified from the sourcesmentioned above. Thesediscussions were promising, as one informantnoted: “it is a fact that very little has been said aboutself-initiated activities by Haitians themselves, andall the attentionwas given to international helpers.”Based on the initial interviews, we developeda working definition of these ventures but kept anopenmind about their nature to help guide ongoingtheoretical sampling (Yin, 2009). Specifically, itappeared that new ventures shared at least fourbroad characteristics that became our initial criteriafor conceptualizing our cases (i.e., objects of study[Gephart, 2013]): (1) the groups emerged after theearthquake in direct response to others’ pressingneeds, (2) they emerged within the first hours anddays after the earthquake, (3) they developed a rec-ognizable organization that included emergingroles and transactions, and (4) they were createdand operated in the area affected by the disaster.

Our third step for gathering data involved travel-ing to Haiti to observe organizations and interviewinformants face to face.The first author (who is fluentin English and French and has a background inmanagement and entrepreneurship) and a researchassistant (who is fluent in Haitian Creole and Frenchand is knowledgeable about the Haitian culture,history, and geography) traveled to Port-au-Prince,Haiti, to conduct interviewswith the initial contacts,identify additional ventures, and gather observa-tional data. As a result of this snowballing process(Lincoln & Guba, 1985), we identified a total of 14new local ventures. We then identified those that fitour emergent conceptualization of the specific phe-nomena of interest (consistent with Gephart [2013]).Eight of the new ventures were not oriented toward

alleviating others’ suffering and therefore did notmeet the study’s purpose. To protect the anonymityof the six remaining ventures, we created a name foreach: Sogeun, Seleco, Sagesse, Toujours, Tangage,and Travailleurs.

Data Collection

Our primary data collection spanned nearly twoyears, including preparation for data collection, inter-views, observation, follow-up interviews, secondarydata collection including real-time post-earthquakedata, and transcription activities. We used multiplesources of data (see Table 1) for the purpose of tri-angulation (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Lincoln &Guba, 1985).

Interviews. Consistent with most inductive re-search (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Gephart, 2013; Gioiaet al., 2013), our primary data source was semi-structured interviews. We purposefully sampled theinterviewees to obtainmultiple perspectives on howthe ventures emerged and operated; the sample in-cluded founders, co-founders, team members, em-ployees, and suppliers. We conducted interviews atthe informants’ places of operation in and aroundPort-au-Prince in 2012.3 This approach allowed us toask questions developed a priori as well as questionsthat emerged as each interviewunfolded. Informantswere invited to speak in their preferred language,and all selected Haitian Creole. The interviews weresemi-structured into several broad sections, whichincluded: (1) general background information on theindividual and a description of what happened theday of the disaster, (2) venture formation, (3) others’involvement in the venture, (4) communicationwithcustomers, (5) resource acquisition, (6) mindsetand emotions, (7) social and regulatory factors, and(8) perspectives on the future of the venture.

Interviews ranged from45minutes to twohours. Intotal, we identified and interviewed 41 individualsdirectly associated with the ventures as well as fourindividuals who provided support services to thoseventures. We continued identifying individualsto interview for each venture until we achievedtheoretical saturation. Including preliminary in-terviews, 23 of the informants were interviewed

3 This involved meeting in the back of an abandonedtruck with a venture’s leadership team, tents and othertemporary structures, church buildings and public spaces,and open fields. Only one interview was conducted inamore traditionalWestern concept of an “office” as nearlyall venture workspaces were in open-air structures.


TABLE1

DataSou

rces

forCases

a

Charac

teristic

Sog

eun

Seleco

Sag

esse

Tou

jours

Tan

gage

Trava

illeurs

Inform

ants

(role)

41in

total(51

0pa

ges)

Fou

nder

1(SO-F1)

aFou

nder

1(SE-F1)

aFou

nder

1(SA-F1)

aFou

nder

1(TO-F1)

aFou

nder

1(TA-F1)

aFou

nder

1(TR-F1)

a

Fou

nder

2(SO-F2)

aFou

nder

2(SE-F2)

aFou

nder

2(SA-F2)

aFou

nder

2(TO-F2)

aFou

nder

2(TA-F2)

aFou

nder

2(TR-F2)

a

Employe

e1(SO-E1)

aEmploye

e1(SE-E1)

Employe

e1(SA-E1)

aEmploye

e1(TO-E1)

aEmploye

e1(TA-E1)

aEmploye

e1(TR-E1)

a

Employe

e2(SO-E2)

Employe

e2(SE-E2)

Custom

er1(SA-C1)

Employe

e2(TO-E2)

aEmploye

e2(TA-E2)

Custom

er1(TR-C1)

Employe

e3(SO-E3)

Employe

e3(SE-E3)

Custom

er2(SA-C2)

Custom

er1(TO-C1)

Employe

e3(TA-E3)

Custom

er2(TR-C2)

Employe

e4(SO-E4)

Custom

er1(SE-C1)

Custom

er3(SA-C3)

Custom

er2(TO-C2)

Custom

er1(TA-C1)

Custom

er1(SO-C1)

Custom

er4(SA-C3)

Custom

er2(TA-C2)

Custom

er2(SO-C2)

Custom

er3(TA-C3)

Custom

er3(SO-C3)

Other

interviews

(14)

anddata

Foo

dsu

pplier

(1interview)

Materiala

ndhou

sego

odssu

pplier

(1interview)

Leg

alsu

pportfor

activists(2

interviews)

Pre-tripSky

peinterviews(10interviews)

Pre-tripem

aile

xchan

geinterviews(30pag

es)

Field

notes

(105

pages)

Archival

sources

(110

pag

es)

New

sarticles

(2)

New

sarticles

(3)

New

sarticles

(6)

New

sarticles

(6)

New

sarticles

(7)

New

sarticles

(3)

Ven

ture

reports

(4)

Ven

ture

reports

(2)

Ven

ture

reports

(6)

Ven

ture

reports

(4)

Ven

ture

reports

(2)

Ven

ture

reports

(3)

Email

correspon

den

ce(4)

Follow-upem

ails

anddiscu

ssion(4)

Other

files(Pow

erPoint,

etc.)(4)

Follow-upem

ails

and

discu

ssion(16)

Follow-upem

ails

and

discu

ssion(10)

Follow-upem

ails

anddiscu

ssion(8)

Follow-upem

ails

anddiscu

ssion(6)

Web

site

follow

-upem

ails

anddiscu

ssion(18)

aIndicates

that

theindividual

validated

theinductivemod

eleither

inperson,o

nSky

pe,

orviaem

ail.


twice, and four of them (founders) were inter-viewed three times. In total—including pre-travelinterviews—we conducted 82 interviews. All in-terviews were audio-recorded and transcribed inHaitian Creole. The research assistant verified theaccuracy of the transcriptions and oversaw thetranslation of the interviews into English (the as-sistant was completing a PhD on the Haitian lan-guage, linguistics, and culture and is an editor ofthe most accepted Haitian Creole–English dictionaryavailable). The interviews resulted in 510 pages(single spaced).

Observation data. We observed each venture byengagingwith and interviewing individuals in theirplace of business, watching how they heldmeetingsand made decisions, and riding along as they in-troducedus to their suppliers and customers (whomwe also interviewed). After each day of site visitsand interviews, the first author and the researchassistant engaged in discussions (which wererecorded) and took detailed field notes of the day’sactivities. A strict same-day rule was followed forfield notes to capture immediate impressions andinsights that could later shape, supplement, andconfirm emerging theoretical perspectives duringanalysis. We created a total of 105 pages (singlespaced) of field notes.

Secondary data. We purposefully sampled datafrom other sources (Gephart, 1993, 2013), whichincluded publicly available archival resources,such as news articles, news videos (in French,Haitian Creole, and English), and academic papers.Similarly, informants shared other data, includ-ing reports, marketing materials, business plans,PowerPoint summariesof their activities, andso forth.Archival data like these were mostly created in realtime,which helped in buildingmore robust timelinesof the organizing process. We identified these mate-rials with the specific objective of triangulating andassessing the validity of statements from intervieweesand establishing important timelines. Later in ouranalyses, we returned to these materials to provideevidence for (or against) the “current” version of theinductivemodel. Finally, following data collection inHaiti, the first author exchangedmanyemails andhadSkype conversationswith the original interviewees toask follow-up questions to clarify points and validatetheemergingmodel.Thesedata included110pagesofsingle-spaced text.

Having gathered data from each of the above sour-ces, we grouped the data by case (;120 pages percase), soall relevant informationwouldbeconsideredduring analysis (consistent with Gephart, 1993, 2013;

Yin, 2009). InTable 1,we summarize the data sourcesfor the cases.

Data Analysis

We structured our analysis following the methoddescribed by Gioia and colleagues (2013), whichbuilds on established procedures for open-ended in-ductive theory-building research (Glaser & Strauss,1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) and has been success-fully deployed in recent studies (e.g., Huy, Corley, &Kraatz, 2014; Kreiner, Hollensbe, Sheep, Smith, &Kataria, 2014; Nag & Gioia, 2012; Sonenshein, 2014).4

As is common in inductive research, our analysiswasiterative, overlappedwith data-collection efforts, andinvolved repeated comparisons of emerging data(Glaser& Strauss, 1967).While iterative in nature, ouranalysis progressed through several recognizablephases (described below).

Identifying provisional informant-centric cate-gories, or first-order codes. We began our analysisusing an open coding approach (Strauss & Corbin,1998), focusing on keywords reflecting how inter-vieweesperceived thedisaster,howventuresemerged,what was achieved, and so forth. At this stage, wekept an open mind to allow the data to speak to us(Suddaby, 2006) while categorizing and labeling in-formant statements (first-ordercodes). Codes emergedas we compared units of text and began categorizingand labeling similar groups of text (Glaser & Strauss,1967). The initial codes covered a range of topics, in-cluding motivations, venture resourcing, interactionwith “outsiders,” outcomes for those being helped,and so forth. As we progressed in this process, weidentified concepts that were “repeatedly present”in or significantly absent from our data (Corbin &Strauss, 1990: 7). We began noticing differences inhowinformantsdescribedkey factors in theiractivities,such as the overall objective (e.g., enable people to

4 The method proposed by Gioia and colleagues (2013)offers several practices that bring “qualitative rigor” and“comprehensibility” to our qualitative analysis (Suddaby,2006: 637). Specifically, we (1) analyzed our data workingfrom first-order codes to broader theoretical themes, (2) pre-viewed our major findings to help organize our report and toprovide clarity and structure to the reader (Gioia et al., 1994;Sonenshein, 2014) despite the fact that these findingsemerged from the study itself (Suddaby, 2006), (3) offeredinsights into ourdata bydisplaying representative quotations(Pratt et al., 2006; Sonenshein, 2014), and (4) offered a dy-namicmodel that integrates thestatic theoretical componentsas a primary contribution of the paper (Gioia et al., 2013;Huyet al., 2014; Schabram &Maitlis, 2016; Sonenshein, 2014).


work on their own; ensure the government provideshousing). These initial observations were captured infield notes. They later influenced follow-up interviewquestions as we sought to further clarify observedthemes. As we iterated between data and coding, weused theNVivo software to associate segmentsof text ineach interview and other data sources.We read and re-read our data and re-coded it many times according toour evolving understanding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998)following a recursive process (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).This allowed us to develop an initial classificationsystemtoreflectour informants’perspectives.Asa finalstep,we labeled the first-order codes (Corbin&Strauss,1990) to provide data-grounded insight into whatwould ultimately become our second-order themesand, eventually, our theoretical constructs. In this way,our first-order codes provided an integration of bothraw data and our initial interpretation of that data. Wethen updated the categories, detailing definitions andparameters for each code (similar to Treviño, denNieuwenboer, Kreiner, & Bishop, 2014) to provide uswith away to explore differences between cases acrosscodes. In the end,we re-coded the data four times in itsentirety and identified a total of 120 codes.

Having settled on the initial categorization and def-initions, we sought further clarification as to differentand similar themes foundacross cases byarranging thedata into tables, in which the rows represented thecodes and the columns represented the ventures. Thisprocess allows for the systematic exploration of dif-ferences and similarities across data segments (Strauss&Corbin, 1998).We then assessed a level for each codeattribute (i.e., low, medium-low, medium, medium-high, and high), whereby we compared the variousdata sources inastructuredmanner,paving theway forconcepts to be “arranged in appropriate classifica-tions” sowe could “systematically [seek] the full rangeof variation in thephenomenaunder scrutiny” (Corbin& Strauss, 1990: 13).5 We asked a PhD candidate withtraining in management who was unfamiliar with the

goals of this study to code one-third of the cases(Gersick, Dutton, & Bartunek, 2000). The agreementbetween the coders was 93%, with differences occur-ring at category margins (which were discussed untilresolved).

Aggregating first-order codes into theoreticalthemes (second-order codes). After developing thefirst-order codes, we again refined our coding pro-cedures (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Specifically, weclustered the first-order codes into higher-orderthemes to develop, relate, and segregate categories(i.e., “axial coding”) (Strauss &Corbin, 1998). Aswiththe previous stages, this was an iterative process,whereby we repeatedly went back and forth betweenemerging theoretical themes and the data. We con-tinued this process until all the data were accountedfor and no new categories were produced. This pro-cess helped us integrate in vivo first-order codes intoa more coherent theoretical whole through the iden-tification of 22 second-order themes.

Theoretical coding, overarching dimensions, andtheoretical framework. As the final stage of ouranalysis, we abstracted the second-order themes intohigher-order theoretical dimensions, again iteratingbetween the data and the emerging dimensions forconstant comparison (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Spe-cifically,weused the rating systemdescribedabove tocompare and contrast cases onmultiple second-orderthemes to identify patterns and boundary conditions(Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Consistent with our overallinductive approach, we revisited the data from thetheoretical dimension perspective and began tracingsequences of and linkages between themes, trans-forming potentially static concepts into what becamea dynamic process model (consistent with Corbin &Strauss, 1990). In total, we identified five overarchingtheoretical dimensions that served as the foundationof ourmodel. Furthermore, we developed a completetimeline of events for each venture and mapped theemergent dimensions onto that timeline.

Figure 1 illustrates the data structure that resultedfrom our iterative data-analysis process (consistentwith Gioia et al., 2013), providing an overview ofwhat we just described and showing how two differ-ent groups emerged from our data primarily along thelines of different interpretations of similar concepts.Consistent with other studies using a data structure(e.g.,Harrison&Corley, 2011; Kreiner et al., 2014),weshowcase the data structure that emerged for bothgroups. Similarly, and in line with Gephart (1993),we again compared our data across these themesthat were repeatedly expressed by informants. Wenow discuss our findings.

5 We specifically selected a code-and-rate approach toexploring how cases differed across nodes because thegoal of the paper is to “expand and generalize theories(analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequen-cies (statistical generalization)” (Yin, 1994: 21). By usinga code-and-rate approach, we could assess the variousaspects of a case when rating a particular code as opposedto simply counting the number of codes. This approachsupports our goal of expanding theory by exploring dif-ferences across cases. This approach is also consistentwith other qualitative multiple-case study analyses thatexplore differences across cases (e.g., Davis & Eisenhardt,2011; Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012).


FINDINGS

Overview of Findings and Initial Identification ofDifferences Across Cases

All our informants described the scene immedi-ately following the earthquake as extremely chaoticand disorienting. This involved observing entirebuildings collapse; witnessing violent injury and thedeaths of friends, family members, and strangers;ongoing exposure to sickness and injury as victimssought medical attention; anxiety over the lack ofsecurity and exposure to violence, and so forth. Oneinformant explained, “As I was walking around thatday, I saw thosepeoplewhohaddied, and therewerepiles of dead bodies. There are no words to describethe things that I saw after the earthquake” (TR-E1).6

Similarly, another person explained the following:

We sawclouds of dustwhere houses had collapsed. . . .We saw amultiple-story school building that had beencompletely flattened. . . . We saw people passing us inthe street with concussions and injuries, and somepeople were carrying bodies of people who had beenkilled in the quake. . . . That night, and for some timeafter, people were afraid to enter buildings as they stillcollapsed for days due to aftershocks [and poor build-ing construction]. (SE-E3)

For all actors in our dataset, this scene of horrorprompted action to help others. This is not in itselfsurprising as Haitians have long learned to rely onthemselves when overcoming obstacles. Prior to theearthquake, Haiti had already been designated asone of the world’s 50 “least developed countries,”meaning its citizens are less likely to escape povertydue to insufficient infrastructure, government func-tioning, andaccess tobasic services (UN,2015). In thiscontext of economic vulnerability, the earthquakeaccentuated existing challenges.

Aswe analyzed our data, we recognized that in theearliest moments (i.e., hours and days) following thedisaster, founders of all six ventures engaged in somesimilar actions tied to the most pressing needs of

FIGURE 1Data Structure

1st-OrderCategories

2nd-OrderThemes

OverarchingDimensions

1st-OrderCategories

2nd-OrderThemes

Sustaining peopleAlleviation of

suffering

Isolated geographic scope

Small (if any) endowment ofsocial resources

Social resourcesExtensive access to and use of international ties

Reliance on local ties(1) Limited reliance on strong local ties,(2) heavy reliance on new relationships

(1) Haiti-only leadership team (2) internationalinteractions purely transaction-based (3)outsiders viewed as intruders

(1) Engaged strong ties as resources,(2) activated weak ties

(1) Multi-national team, (2) strong and weakties as resources, (3) outsiders viewed ascollaborators

Injustice mindset: right toresources as reparation

National patriotismFoundingmindset

Self-reliance through work

Prosocial mindset(1) Haitian heritage of resilience and defiance,(2) survival at all costs

(1) Injustice-motivated right to resources,(2) desire for reparations for historical wrongs

(1) Prosocial/simply doing the right thing(2) protect community group

(1) Retain self-reliance by engaging in work,(2) maintain and provide dignity as victim

Resourcefulness

Enduring resourcefulnessmindset

Resource-seeking to aninvestment mindset

Government, NGO, andforeign national lobbying

Appropriation of non-ownedresources for long term Temporary resourcefulness

(1) Lobby for external service providers,(2) provide information on rights to resources

(1) Temporary appropriation of non-ownedresources, (2) transition plan from day 1

Case Split: Alleviation of Suffering that is Sustaining or Transforming

Transforming people

Deviant behaviors

Customizing services tospecific needs

Legal, creative resourceacquisition

(1) Creative resource acquisition throughnetworks, (2) respect of property rights

(1) Offering need-oriented services, (2) micro-loans for sustainable businesses, (2) labor-fire-services, (3) career training

Power and improved socialstatus

Perpetual relief-stateopportunity Potential

opportunities toalleviate suffering Obligation to act and improve

community

Transitioning the community(1) Stagnant, long-term relief community

(1) Pursuit of personal influence and power,(2) chance to improve social status

(1)Staged, growth-oriented community

(1) Opportunity imposed obligation to act(2) provided chance for personal improvement

(1) Appropriation of non-owned resources forlong-term, (2) enduring resourcefulness

(1) Shelter-temporary as permanent, (2) spaceprovided to small businesses in tent-cities

(1) Illegal resource acquisition, (2) propertyseizure, (3) threats of violence

(1) Providing basic/physical needs, (2)proximal-oriented, (3) exclusively providingrelief

(1) Broad set of immediate and evolving needs,(2) long-term solutions, (3) multiple stages ofrecovery

(1) Timeline for resourcefulness, (2) transitionto investment mindset

6 Each informant is coded by the two letter acronym ofthe venture (i.e., Sagesse is SA) and then a letter andnumber indicating (1) the type of informant (i.e., founder,employee, or customer) and (2) that informant’s associatednumber. For example, Sagesse FounderNumber 2 is codedSA-F2. Table 1 provides a key for all these codes.


those around them: (1) searching for and rescuingpeople, (2) obtaining food, (3) providing rudimentarymedical care to the most severely injured, (4) re-moving and handling the deceased, and (5) providingsome form of stable shelter. At this early stage, theseactivities appeared to bemostly adhoc andmotivatedto facilitate survival. One informant (TA-C2) told usthat “immediately following the earthquake, wewereall just trying to survive the day. . . .Wehad to keeponfighting to survive no matter what.” As time pro-gressed, however, some individuals began to engageinmore organized efforts to attend to victim needs. Inexploring differences across informants (as describedabove),we began to recognize themes that underlinedhow ventures envisioned alleviating others’ sufferingover an extended period and how these differingperspectives influenced organizing and outcomes(see Appendix).

Case Separation: Sustaining and TransformingVentures

Sustaining ventures. Beyond the initial response,ventures differed in long-term efforts to alleviateothers’ suffering. Some ventures continued to em-phasize providing for basic survival needs (i.e., food,water, and shelter) in seeming perpetuity. Given thefocus on sustaining individuals’ most basic needs forthe long term, we began calling this category of casessustaining ventures. Threeof the ventures fell into thiscategory: Sogeun, Seleco, and Sagesse. Sogeun wasformed to provide a systematic approach to seekingresources and providing for others’ needs. This in-cluded establishing semi-permanent shelter struc-tures on farmers’ land; searching for and divertingresources to their location; and, eventually, organizingto have individuals provide services for sale, in-cluding food preparation, hair cutting, and so forth.The leadership team now comprises 20 individualswith defined organizational roles, regular meetings,and formal communication channels. While slightlyless structured organizationally (e.g., fewer leader-ship roles) and smaller in size, Seleco was foundedto organize shelter and food for victims in an openspace near Port-au-Prince. They too hold meetings,have clear roles, seek to provide for basic needs,engage in micro-commerce activities—e.g., sellingfood, water, and access to lavatories, and collec-tively organizing to keep one another safe. Sagessesimilarly helped victims move into tents and otherstructures for protection and worked to acquirefood, resources, and services to offer victims. Thefounding team operates out of a small office space

that, while rudimentary, is a substantial upgradefrom the work conditions of Sogeun and Seleco.This venture is structured, has an organizationchart, and delegates specified work roles.

As we considered our data, we explored patternsand common themes across the core activities ofsustaining ventures. Moreover, we interviewed cus-tomers of these ventures to gather their perspectivesonwhat they sought from these ventures andhow thatwasbeingdelivered.Oneofour informants related thefollowing:

We organized ourselves to obtain necessary resources,such as food, water, and housing. . . . We continue tolive in tent camps in unsatisfactory conditions. . . .People can live in temporary shelters for threemonths,but they should not have to live in such conditions forthree years (as we have) . . . but at least we have ourlives. (SO-F1)

These statements were reinforced by customerswho explained that they were living in tents (orga-nized by the venture) because it was “better thanother options” (SO-C2) and gave them an option tocontinue waiting for longer-term housing. We ob-served this firsthand as thousands of individualscontinue living in tents while relying on daily ser-vices nearly three years after the earthquake (fieldnotes). These ventures have an ongoing focus onproviding for basic needs.

Furthermore, one founder explained, “Each daywe get up, look for resources, and seek to survive. . . .Then we get up and do it again the next day. We arestuck like this” (SA-F1). Indeed, when we asked allthree sustaining ventures (SO, SE, and SA) to de-scribe their “daily, weekly, and monthly routines,”they explained that their routines were all “daily” innature, focused on “what they could get that day tosurvive” (field notes). Some informants evenwent sofar as to explain that if they obtained enough re-sources for thedayby latemorning, theywould ceaseresource-search activities, taking up the activityagain the following day. Therefore, the focus onbasic needs narrowed sustaining ventures’ orienta-tion to proximal objectives for enhancing victimsurvival (with little evidence of long-term planningor an envisioned positive future), which drove themto approach the situation “one day at a time.” Fi-nally, our informants explained that “instead ofprogressing and becoming richer, my people and Ihave become poorer . . . but our goal remains to pro-vide at least one meal a day for those in the camp. . . .I will keep doing this even if it takes years to helppeople” (SO-F1). It appeared that sustaining ventures


exclusively provided relief—and organized activitiesgeared toward addressing the symptoms of the prob-lems rather than the underlying causes of thoseproblems. Similarly, therewas no evidence that theseorganizations considered other services such as em-ployment assistance or training.

Transforming ventures. In contrast to the threeventures described above, another group of casesdescribed the alleviation of suffering as helpingindividuals transition toward autonomy and self-reliance, suggesting that “success” would meanthose they helped no longer needed the venture. Asthis group repeatedly emphasized the need to helppeople transform their lives toward self-reliance, webegan calling cases in this category transformingventures. While in the earliest days following thedisaster these ventures focused on survival, as timeprogressed, they transitioned to other activities. Thethree ventures that were inductively coded into thiscategory were Toujours, Tangage, and Travailleurs.These three ventures were established when in-dividuals gathered at local church grounds in threeseparate parts of Port-au-Prince to seek shelter in theopen space. All three ventures were similar in teamsize. Like the other cases, these ventures were foun-ded by disaster survivors, all narrowly escapingdeath and many losing family members.

While in the first few weeks after the earthquakethese transforming ventures all hosted victims onnon-owned property (i.e., church grounds, openfields), after one to two months (with the exceptionof Tangage,which took six months), these venturesshifted their focus to transitioning individuals outof a survival state to a path toward self-reliance.7

This involved coordinating ways for victims tomove out of tents and into homes and helping themfind work to support themselves over time. Toujoursorchestrated work programs through which peoplecould work for foreign agencies. Similarly, they of-fered work-for-tuition exchanges to local schools, so

schools could repair damaged property and chil-dren could attend school. Tangage developed anemployment service targeting those with varyinglevels of skills andmatching themwith appropriatejob options. Travailleurs offered medical care ser-vices, including psychological care, drawing on localprofessionals and recruiting visiting volunteers fromout of the country.

Our informants described their focus on allevi-ating suffering inways that contrasted substantiallyfrom sustaining ventures. One founder explained,“We analyzed people’s needs so we could helpthemmoving forward, including housing, jobs, andso forth” (TR-F1). Similarly, other founders (TO-1,TA-1) described that their goal was to identify“pathways” to autonomy, which would naturallyrequire altering activities and goals in parallelwith the progression of victims from a crisis stateto an autonomous state. Therefore, transformingventures provided for a broad set of immediateand evolving needs because while they recognizedthe initial need for resources simply to survive,they transitioned victims toward autonomy andself-reliance.

In terms of time horizon, one founder explainedthe following:

We had short-term and long-term projects. . . .Short-term included providing tents, hygiene kits,food, and medical care [first three months]. . . .Long-term [projects] involved plywood homes thattheywould help build—tomaintain their dignity—jobtraining, and psychological support. (TO-F1)

We confirmed these statements during field visits,observing how transforming ventures had all suc-cessfully transitioned from providing basic needsand now emphasized longer-term objectives—themeans to support oneself on a recurring basis (fieldnotes). Thus, transforming ventures offered long-termsolutions to victims that resulted in relief from thedisaster and often a substantial improvement frompre-earthquake circumstances.

Finally, after initially helping individuals moveback into homes, transforming ventures providedentrepreneurship training to those with limited ed-ucation (i.e., to sell items on the street) while orga-nizing computer and language training and otheropportunities for those with stronger educationalbackgrounds (TO-F2, TO-E1, TA-E2, TR-F1, TR-C1,TA-E3). In thisway, transformingventures alleviatedsuffering by pursuing multiple stages of recovery,which involved providing customized solutions thataligned to people’s specific skills and capabilities

7 We observed several locations where a transformingventure had previously housed victims in tents (similar tosustaining ventures), but they had transitioned these in-dividuals to greater self-reliance. This observation pro-vided important evidenceof thedifferences betweencases.Thus, what had been “tent cities” were now (1) an emptyfield used for recreation (TO), (2) a church parking lot, and(3) an open space (TA, TR). We documented when thesetransitions had occurred and confirmed them with sec-ondary data (local news reports) as well as through in-terviews with customers. Sustaining ventures remain intent cities today.


while promoting ever-progressing autonomy forthose being helped.

As we considered these initial findings, we soughtto better understand the differentiating featuresamong these groups of cases. In exploring the dif-ferences systematically (as described in our analysissection), we uncovered four primary dimensionsthat our informants identified as influencing howthey organized suffering alleviation andwhy. Table 2contains supporting evidence that is specificallykeyed to the initial case separation. In the sectionsthat follow, we report on themajor dimensions thatemerged from the data.

PROCESSES OF VENTURE CREATION IN THEAFTERMATH OF A DISASTER

Identification of Potential Opportunities toAlleviate Suffering

In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, a widerange of crises emerged that required intervention.Informants described a scene where houses weredestroyed, and those that were not destroyed weretemporarily abandoned (people had left their homesfor fear of staying in the structures), leaving thehomes and property at risk (field notes). Many suf-fered physical injury and, without access to propercare, were exposed to disease and ongoing threats. Inmany cases, much of the nation’s capital and sur-rounding areas were accessible only on foot (motor-cycles, when used, had to be carried at certain pointsjust to navigate debris [SO-F1]). Indeed, with manyinstitutional structures disabled (e.g., governmentagencies in crisis, the collapse of the headquartersof the primary security force in Haiti) (UN, 2015)and chaotic uncertainty surrounding whether peopleweremissing, killed, or injured (Riddick, 2011), thereweremany immediate unmet potential opportunitiesto alleviate suffering (POTAS).POTAS refer to a beliefthat conditions are favorable to introduce services orproducts that help address victims’ needs. This def-inition is consistent with and a natural extension ofStevenson & Jarillo, 1990: 23) definition of entre-preneurial opportunities as future situations thatare “desirable and feasible.”Aswe began exploringour data, we recognized that ventures differedsubstantially in how they viewed the scope of theirPOTAS and the methods used to pursue theseopportunities.

Sustaining ventures’ potential opportunities toalleviate suffering. When conducting our inter-views, we were struck by how sustaining ventures

described their decision to offer relief with “no endin sight,” how their customers shared this view, andhow they arrived at this decision almost from dayone (field notes). Specifically, these ventures begantheir operations by performing basic (yet essential)post-disaster activities, such as burying the dead,procuring water, and helping people obtain shelteronnearby land (SO-F1, SE-F2, SA-F2).We found thatafter engaging in these initial activities, sustainingventures organized to access basic resources (fromdonors) in perpetuity. One venture trained individ-uals in how to speakwith aidworkers to facilitate theperpetual acquisition of resources (SA-F1), and an-other venture taught people “not to rush the aidworkers . . . [as] rushing them will make them notwant to come back” (SO-E1). The most basic needswere the easiest to identify andwere always themosturgent. One founder explained, “The first immediateneed was water and food, but . . . people also neededshelter [tents] because they can’t sleep with theiryoung babies in the streets. . . . We recognized thisneed and continue to provide it today; this is whyweorganized ourselves” (SO-F2).

Following the earthquake, Haiti experienceda near complete failure in its ability to provide basicservices, such as policing, governance,medical care,and so forth.8 As a result, there was an opportunityfor enterprising individuals and ventures to fill theleadership vacuum. As we observed and as wasrevealed from our informants, providing these ser-vices gave ventures substantial power in their com-munities. One founder explained the following:

I had experience with campaigning and mobilizationwork before starting this organization, so it was notoverly difficult for me to get the hang of organizingpeople in the camp. . . . I organized various groups ofpeople here, seeing the government had a weakenedcapacity. . . . Now, whenever something needs to bedone, they call me because I’m the boss. (SO-F1)

While helping others, sustaining ventures identi-fied POTAS to essentiallymake themselves informalgovernment bodies (or the equivalent) of large tentcities, making all important decisions on food andwater procurement, judging crimes, guiding visitors,

8 The earthquake further paralyzed analready strugglingsystem making a very difficult situation even worse. Onesupplier explained how prior to the earthquake suppliescould be distributed with armed trucks. After the earth-quake they required businesses to come to a central depot(protected by armed guards as we observed) to pick upsupplies due to security challenges.


and so forth. This was on full display during our sitevisits as all activity in the camps had to go throughtheir “chief” (i.e., the founder of the venture). Thenarrowscopeof thePOTAS thus influenced thewayssustaining ventures viewed and realized their goalsof alleviating suffering.

Transforming ventures’ potential opportunitiesto alleviate suffering. In the earliest stages of thedisaster’s aftermath, transforming ventures acknowl-edged theneed for immediate relief; however,we alsofound that they recognized that they could not (andshould not) support people with basic needs over thelong run (TR-F1, TA-F1, TO-F2). Rather, they neededto empower victims to “stand on their own feet”(TR-F1). As one founder described, “Initially, wegave people hygiene kits, food, andmedical care. . . .This was intended to be done in the short term. . . .Our focus on everything [food, shelter, etc.] wastransitional”—that is, moving people from onestage of recovery to the next until victim autonomywas realized (TO-F1, TR-C2, TA-E2). Therefore, incontrast to the POTAS identified by sustainingventures, transforming ventures had a broader,longer-term orientationwhen responding to others’suffering. This is consistent with hopes from theinternational community that Haiti could experi-ence a “re-imagination” in the aftermath of the earth-quake as opposed to returning to the “dysfunctional,unsustainable ways of the past” (Riddick, 2011: 250).Similarly,we foundthat transformingventure foundersexpressly diffused decision making to other com-munity members, citing the importance of multipleperspectives on needs and developing autonomy(field notes).

Furthermore,we found that transforming venturesfocused on providing services like job and careertraining as second and third stages of their response,recognizing this would help victims quickly regainpositive functioning andperhaps even improve theirpre-disaster life situations. This focus was specifi-cally customized to the local environment,matchingindividuals’ pre-disaster skill levels with appropriategrowth opportunities to help with career mobility.These ventures recognized that there were consid-erable opportunities for locals to obtain some formof employment given the influx of international aidorganizations. Therefore, rather than focusing onlobbying donor organizations for resources on along-term basis, they sought to position communitymembers as workers, such as translators, laborers,and so forth, to provide services to these donor or-ganizations and to support local victims with jobsand (potentially) careers. This orientation toward

others (i.e., partners and employers as opposed todonors) andvictims (working toward self-help ratherthan continued reliance on others’ help) influencedhow transforming ventures gathered and distributedresources to alleviate suffering.

Finally, our informants described the situation asseeing a need to “help preserve the community”(TO-E1) and fulfill an obligation to others sincethey had been spared (field notes). One founderexplained, “I knew it was my responsibility to help[those in my community]” (TA-F2). Similarly, a ven-ture employee who is a nurse by profession stated,“I tookanoath toact, and I take that seriously” (TA-E2).As transforming ventures acted on the obligationthey felt to help others, they engaged in an array ofactivities that later positioned them well for moreextensive entrepreneurial action. During our sitevisits, the founders were often deferential, pointingus toward other actorswho helpedwhile repeatedlystating, “We were just doing the right thing forothers.” The common theme across these ventureswas that the opportunity to help was manifest as anobligation to act and to rescue and then to improvethe community.

Social Resources

As highlighted previously, Haiti has a long historyof crisis and has relied on outsiders for a range ofservices (International Crisis Group, 2013). In theaftermath of the disaster, these resource providersincreased their presence, providing locals with po-tential resources. In our data, we found that foundersexpressed contrasting views on the nature of rela-tionships with potential resource providers (fieldnotes, consistent with Gephart, 1984). We use thelabel social resources to refer to relationships thatprovide access to or use of resources to alleviatesuffering.

Sustaining ventures and social resources. Sus-taining ventures described their relationship withpotential resource providers as “distant,” “trans-actional,” and even “hostile.” While this did notpreclude these ventures from pursuing and access-ing resources, it did alter the nature of the resources(and the conditions of distribution timing and vol-ume) outsiders were willing to offer (SO-F2, SA-F1,field notes). We found that sustaining ventures hadlimited influence and control over resources sourcedboth locally and internationally (SO-F1, field observa-tions) and were therefore highly reliant on transactionpartners (as opposed to mutually reliant partners).That is, despite sustaining ventures’ heavy reliance


TABLE 2Alleviation of Suffering and Case Separation

Theme and representative quotations Theme and representative quotations

Alleviation of Suffering through Sustaining People Alleviation of Suffering through Transforming People

Providing basic/physical needs Broad set of immediate and evolving needsSO-F1: “We tried to organize various groups of people here so as to

prevent chaos and delinquency . . . we organized ourselves toobtain resources such as food, water, and housing.”

TO-F1: “There were people who were depending on rentalproperties to send their kids to school. . . we came up witha variety of programs like helping to repair some schools thatagreed to enroll the children [of affected people] that couldn’tafford it.”

SE-F1: “In reality people have had to organize themselvesindividually in whatever way they could to survive. So we havesquatted here and this is where we attempt to survive, byproviding clean toilets and access to lower cost water and food . . .

[for example], we got together and managed to buy a water truckand shared it.”

TA-F1: “Beyond just basic needs, we tried to put good principles topractice, such as housecleaning, personal hygiene, and otherimportant daily routines.”

SA-F1: “After the earthquake we rescued people from under therubble . . . we distributed supplies such as water and food . . . wealso set up mobile health clinics.”

TR-F1: “Relief efforts were guided by the notion that people hadmultiple needs . . . we first provided food, and then after sentpsychologists to work with patients and explain what hadhappened and what they should do.”

Proximal-oriented Long-term solutionsSE-F2: “Our leadership committee isworking to apply for assistance

for thepeople [fromthegovernmentandotherorganizations].Youknow that hygiene and sanitation are pressing needs for peopleright now [three years on], and so we are working to secure aid inthis domain.”

TO-F2: “There were many jobs available but the problem was that[people] didn’t have the qualifications to get them . . .[specifically], they didn’t know English or computers, and manyof themhadneverworked.Wedecided to address those problems[with career training].”

SE-E2): “The 22nd Article of the Constitution states that the Haitiangovernment recognizes the right of its citizens to have a house inwhich to live. We realized that many Haitians were not aware ofthis constitutional right . . . we fight to force the government tokeep its word.”

TA-F2: “There were some people whose homes were still standing,but they had the idea that the longer they stayed in the camp, themore chance they had at getting aid. They thought that they couldgetmore food, tents,mattresses, and evenmoney if they stayed . . .but things don’t work like that, our goal was not to becomea long-term camp, but to get back to normal.”

SA-F1: “We looked for people who had water trucks, tanks, andother materials available, and we asked them to give to us . . .Wepressure the government [for a] water project in our area.”

TR-E1: “We helped people prepare resumes to get jobs with NGOs. . . we helped people find jobs as interpreters . . .medicalassistants . . . removing concrete blocks, iron bars, and otherrubble from streets and building sites, and so forth.”

Exclusively providing relief Multiple stages of recoverySE-F2: “Women and children are in a bad condition . . . because as

wesay inHaiti: ‘birdsdonotwork, but theyeat anddrink’ . . .Sincethe earthquake we look for someone to give them a littlesomething to tide them over, that puts them in a better situation.”

TR-F2: “Since the earthquake I have traveled Haiti extensively andthis has helped me to better understand the unemploymentsituation in Haiti. This understanding has enabled me to knowhow to better help people secure employment . . . this allows themto be self-sufficient, or their ownmaster . . .So that is basicallyme,who I am andwhat I do, going beyond basic needs to help thembeautonomous.”

SO-E2: “I was here from the beginningwhen the committeewas firstformed . . . We are still continuing the fight today for food andhousing, and we will not become discouraged, even when wesearch and do not find anything . . .Our role in this community asa leadership team [in this capacity] is long-term.”

TO-F2: “First people lived in tents on the church lands, but aftera time, they transitioned to subsequent stages of recovery, such assmall wooden houses covered by tarps, which they later replacedwithwood and sheetmetal roofing . . . temporary tarps only last solong . . . we always met to discuss the next stage of transition forpeople.”

SO-E1: “Ourmissionhas alwaysbeenproviding basicneeds to thoseliving in the tents, likehousingand food.People arenot just askingfor houses, they are asking for public housingwith access to socialservices. The people want the government to provide theseservices so they can enjoy adequate living conditions . . . weprovide a space towait for those serviceswhilewe lobby [going onthree years].”

TR-F1: “We provided relief in stages . . . first people neededpsychological help or counseling to prevent mental andemotional trauma, and food . . . next people needed long-termsolutions forhousing . . .Wethenworked to transitionpeople to bepositioned for jobs . . .”


on outsiders for donations, equipment, and regularsustenance (as we observed onsite), these interac-tions were not relationship based, making the long-term presence of services or resources uncertain.As sustaining ventures struggled to survive and pro-vide for others, they desperately sought to establishconnections to bring in critical resources and, under-standably, often had to rely on extreme measures toachieve their objectives. Given the lack of establishedties to outsiders, these ventures continue (as of thewriting of this study) to pursue daily resource dona-tions. One founder explained his situation:

On January 12, 2010, I was right over there across theway [motions across the field]. The majority of thesepeople lived across the street as well. . . . I was here inthis area right when the earthquake hit. . . . I ledcampaigns to bury the bodies—there was no time tosit around and reflect because we had a problem onour hands. . . . I had to perform amputations in thefield. . . . Since all the people were around, I tookinitiative to form a committee to continue acting, andwe are still here today. (SO-F1)

This venture, like other sustaining ventures, be-gan identifying POTAS not as the result of priorrelationships as sources of information (on suffer-ing or available resources) but based on the creationof new connections with individual victims. Asanother informant explained, “We heard of otherorganizations by word of mouth as we had no priorcontacts” (SA-E1). Without established contacts,the transaction-based nature of these relationshipstook its toll: “Manyorganizations [NGOs]have come tovisitus,but thenweneversee themagain.Weneverseethem, you understand?We need people to collaboratewith us, but we don’t have access to those people”(SA-F1). Although these ventures acknowledged that

they needed new social ties, attempts at connectingwith both local and international groups were metwith only limited success. As a result of this lim-ited progress, outsiders were often blamed andviewed negatively and with distrust, which had animpact on subsequent resource acquisition and thescope of the POTAS. Therefore, while these ven-tures were given important resources from the out-side, the lackof long-term relationshipswith outsidersappeared togenerate a senseof resentment for the verygroups (e.g., NGOs, foreign governments) that pro-vided the resources, albeit sporadically.

Transforming ventures and social resources.One founder explained that he “immediately ralliedwith those in his community . . . identifying themissing and the dead while setting up plans for thefuture” (TA-F1). Similarly, another founder explainedthat “friends in theU.S. contactedme asking ‘what canwe do?’ I told them, and they acted immediately . . .ranging from medical supplies to transportation andtraining” (SE-F2). Consistent with these quotations,our transforming venture informants emphasized thatfounders relied on strong local and international re-lationships as well as loose connections throughmutually shared groups (e.g., church membership,NGOs, etc.). Consistent with theory on social net-works (Burt, 2005), the founders of transformingventures highlighted their use of and heavy relianceon deep connections with locals (i.e., local ties) aswell as their extensive access to and use of both strong(i.e., long-term, reciprocal interpersonal relationships)and weak (i.e., limited-time acquaintance-orientedrelationships) (Granovetter, 1973) international ties.These connections resulted in multi-national teamsled and directed by locals, with locals and outsidersseen as key collaborators, allowing ventures to lever-age personal relationships toward new ends. As

TABLE 2(Continued)

Theme and representative quotations Theme and representative quotations

Alleviation of Suffering through Sustaining People Alleviation of Suffering through Transforming People

Field note observations Field note observations“As observed in our recent visits, the [sustaining ventures] appear to

be in a constant state of crisis, living day to day and attempting tomaintain the relief model in perpetuity. They have an entireinfrastructure in place that only seems to deepen their model.While some in leadership speak loosely about future plans thatinvolve progress, all of those living in the community who benefitfrom the model explained that their plan is to wait until thegovernment buys them a house. We are told by others that thisoutcome is highly unlikely.”

“The contrast we observed in visiting the [transforming ventures]from the [sustaining ventures] is quite stunning. For starters, theyno longer support people living in tents. But most importantly,they seem to have managed to get people through difficulttransitions. That is, getting people to leave the tents was hard andscary but ultimately was viewed as essential to make changes.They made similar adjustments along the path including jobtraining, supporting people to take courses, connecting peoplewho had certain skills with outsiders, and so forth.”


noted in our field observations, this set of socialresources allowed for a broader perspective inestablishing these ventures’ orientation—thinkingbeyond the founders’ immediate surroundings, de-veloping relationship-oriented interactions with localand non-local stakeholders, and broadening the scopeof potential services for both the short and long term.For example, one founder explained how his access tolocalconnections influencedthe fundingofhisPOTAS:

Weuseda lot of local contacts. For example, therewasa man who had helped with previous constructionprojects, including working on all of our churchbuildings, and he has an engineering company. Thisman opened up his house for our use in relief efforts,and we housed groups of foreign volunteers therewhen they came to Haiti to help out. . . . He also hada large depot full of constructionmaterials that he lentto us for our use. We used the depot as a receivingpoint for all of the food trucks that came from the DR[Dominican Republic]. (TO-F2)

Similarly, another founder explained that his ven-ture’s international network provided access to re-sources: “I was already friendswith these people [fromtheUnited States] since before the earthquake. . . . Afterthe earthquake, they just askedmewhat they could doto help. I told themwhat to do, and theywent right intoaction” (TA-F2). One customer described the collabo-rative approach taken by a transforming venture: theventure worked with “the Americans, French, andCanadians, who genuinely showed interest in learningwhowewere as a Haitian people and what we neededbefore they got towork” (TA-C1),which resulted in theformation of POTAS. The nature of social resources(i.e.,beingrelationshipbasedversus transactionbased),therefore, was critical in helping ventures identify andresource POTAS for transforming ventures in that theywere directed and controlled by locals and were ex-changed through relationships based on trust. Theserelationships likely helped reduce the extreme uncer-tainty, provided clear and consistent access to externalresources, and enabled transforming ventures to focuson stages of goals as they built momentum with part-ners. In contrast to sustaining ventures, transformingventures described relationships with outsiders as“collaborative,” “long term,” and “rooted in similargoals and belief systems” allowing them to go beyondtransactional exchanges (field notes).

Founding Mindset

Each of the informants we interviewed mentionedfactors that motivated and “framed” their actions.

When analyzing our data, we revisited these re-sponsesandbegan recognizingcommonexplanationsfor founders’ motivators, goals, and orientations astheir ventures emerged. We labeled these themesfounding mindset, which refers to the founders’ pri-mary motivation, frame of mind, or “driving force”(field notes) for creating a new venture in the after-math of the disaster. We found that all ventures hada baseline mindset of helping those in need, but be-yond this general perspective, there was a substantialdifference in how informants explained why theytook action and how that action influenced venturedecisions and operations.

Sustaining ventures’ founding mindset. Foundersof sustaining ventures explained that their motivationwas “natural” because “We are Haitian! The Haitianpeople will always keep their heads up and keep onfighting to survivenomatterwhat because ournationalidentity is what makes us strong as a Haitian people”(SA-F2). Several founders began the initial interviewexplaining that their story “could not be understoodwithout first explaining Haiti’s unique history of over-coming adversity” (field notes). They then recountedHaiti’shistory leadingup to theearthquake toput it (theearthquake)—and their response—in proper perspec-tive. This perspective is understandable given Haiti’sunique history of having the first successful slave-ledrevolution and ongoing resilience in the face of in-stitutional failures and extremepoverty (Knight, 2000).As one founder contextualized:

Despite the horrible events that had transpired . . . Thehistory of the Haitian people does not allow one tobecome discouraged because we knowwe have to dowhat is necessary to survive. . . . Our ancestors sur-vived crossing theAtlanticwithout food to arrive here[on slave ships]. That experience was more terriblethan an earthquake. . . . The former slaves won inde-pendence and were never discouraged. Thus, a smallthing such as an earthquake cannot make me, a de-scendent of thesepeople, becomediscouraged. (SO-F1)

When we asked other sustaining ventures aboutthis unique “Haitian spirit” they confirmed that “thisspirit is in us as well” and emphasized how thisHaitian patriotism motivated their actions (SA-E1,SA-E2, SO-E1, SO-E2, SE-E1, SE-E2). One founderexplained, “My motivation was that I am a Haitian,and I amapatriotic person. I couldn’t stand there andwatch my country in crisis” (SA-F1). Similarly, an-other founder first introduced himself by describinghis ancestry, a process he always follows whenexplaining his work to others. He explained, “I alwaysintroducemyself in the context ofmyancestry because


I amvery proud ofmy country’s history” (SO-F1). Thispatriotism was tightly intertwined with a distrust ofthe government and non-Haitian organizations andcountries—even to the extent of blaming these insti-tutions for the earthquake itself (SE-F1, SO-F1, SA-F1,SA-F2). This national pride led sustaining ventures to“dowhatever it takes tosurvive” (SA-F1,SE-F1,SO-E1),just as their ancestors had. They saw deep connec-tions between their post-earthquake actions andHaiti’s history of overcoming tragedy.

Our informants also referenced a troubled historywith corruption, which influenced and shaped aninjustice mindset—a strong belief in the need to“battle to fight for justice for [our] people,” including“vacant land thatwas supposed to be for the people,”housing, and more (SO-F1). As this insight emergedfrom our data, we were intrigued at an apparentcontradiction: whereas sustaining ventures spokestrongly about their independence and nationalpride, they also expressed an entitlement to outsideresources as “reparations” for historical injustices(SO, SA, and SE ventures):

We are not here to start fights . . . but we demand thatvictims receive reparations for the injustices theyhave suffered [He saw the earthquake itself as a crim-inal act]. . . . The Haitian government along with for-eign governments need toprovide landonwhich thoserendered homeless by the earthquake can resettle. . . .I have found that there is a lot of land, andwe demandthat these people receive it for reparation. (SO-F2)

Similarly, another founder explained, “There is noorganization that takes care of us in reality. . . . If for-eignerswould just get us the suppliesmost necessary,the population’s needswould bemet” (SA-F2).Whileseemingly contradictory, this attitude is consistentwith research on equity theory, which suggests thatindividuals in inequitable relationships (as a benefi-ciary or a victim) can feel distress; that is, “recipients[of aid] react negatively to a benefit,”which can resultin resentment or anger toward benefactors (Hatfield &Sprecher, 1983: 118).

The distress and distrust of sustaining ventures’founders coincides with Haiti’s “historical and currentallegationsof corruptionof various levels in theHaitiangovernment [and international governments and orga-nizations]” (Margesson&Taft-Morales,2010:4);historyof foreign oppression, including slavery and its asso-ciated atrocities; and ongoing distrust and dysfunc-tion pertaining to property ownership, distribution,and use (Knight, 2000; USAID, 2015). This mindsetled sustaining ventures to focus on real and perceivedinjustices, and they saw their role as demanding

resources as a patriotic duty, soliciting outsiders to“do more” to assist them in addressing the mostpressing and visual forms of suffering.

Transforming ventures’ founding mindset. In-formants from transforming ventures describedtheir mindset andmotivations for action in terms of“doing what was right,” “fulfilling obligations tothe community,” and “helping those who sufferedmore than we had” (field notes). Even after repeat-edly asking these informants if national pride orhistorical injustice factored into their foundingmindset, they all responded with a similar response:they were just “doing the right thing to help otherpeople” (TO, TA, and TR) as “people from all coun-tries help one another; Haitians are no different fromothers in this sense” (TO-E2). Informants explained:

I have a passion for helping people; it is what I love todo. I am not someonewhowill only help others out formoney because I feel that if I am getting paid for what Ido, I am not really helping the person. If I’m going tohelp someone, I need to do itwith allmyheart. (TR-E1)

I should have died [when the roof collapsed inchesfrom my head]. . . . This has been pretty hard to dealwith.However, nomatterwhat obstacle is presented . . .this [helping others] always gives me strength anddrives me. . . . This mentality is shared by those in ourorganization. (TO-F1)

Finally, another founder explained, “My approachwas to help enable [people] to change their ownsituation—to obtain food, housing, and other neces-sary resources [long term] through their own ingenuityand capabilities. . . . This was my desire—to help myown people!” (TA-F2). Given the direct and persistentemphasis on helping people at various stages of re-covery, we labeled this a prosocial mindset, in whichmotivationsandactionsweredrivenbyadesire tohelpothers progress toward autonomy, which influencedthe identification and pursuit of POTAS.

Another informant of a transforming ventureexplained, “Many people are waiting in tents for apayout9 that may never come.We encouraged people

9 Nearly all informants referenced government programsthat offered financial incentives for leaving tent cities.Theseprograms had facilitated closure of tent cities in the first 18months after the disaster, and some believed more payoutswere coming. As a result, many were motivated to awaitpayouts; in some cases, individuals moved into tent citiesfrom outside the disaster area in the hopes of obtaininghousing funds. In other cases, someoccupiedmultiple tentsin hopes of higher payouts. These are some of the reasonsthe government slowed such programs (field notes).


towork and improve their situation. This helped themfeel courage andmanyhave improved their lives” (TR-E1). Indeed, one founder explained how the desire tohelp others achieve autonomy shaped his venture’sactionsandhowthat contributed topositiveoutcomes:

[Although] there haven’t been any huge changes orimprovements [nation-wide], we are still better offthan we were in January 2010, and I know that thingswill continue to get better. Today, more people havejobs and businesses than back then, and this was themotivation I had all along! . . . This is something thatHaiti andHaitianswant—a chance to find a job and tobe independent instead of constantly having to ask forfood and other forms of international aid. (TR-F1)

As documented in our field notes and observationsfrom site visits, transformingventureshadmanaged tomove victims through stages, including offering per-manent housing solutions, job training, educationoptions, and so forth, going well beyond providingbasic sustenance. As we conducted second-round in-terviews with transforming ventures, we asked aboutthe importance of self-reliance in their model. Allventures explained that thiswas essential as their goalwas not tomeet individuals’ basic needs long termbutto enable them to get backon their feet and, if possible,make something more of their lives than before theearthquake (TO-F1, TA-F2, TR-F1). This foundingmindset led transforming ventures to draw on a wideset of resources to identify and exploit POTAS thatreflected a longer-term perspective on help.

Resourcefulness

From Haiti’s resourceful revolution to becomea self-governing republic to the present, Haitians havefoundaway to survive andovercomeobstacles.Asweconducted our interviews,weobserved this firsthand,watching individuals harvest spare metals, cultivatefood, repurposematerials for shelter, anddowhateverit takes to live. Similarly, given high levels of govern-ment and institutional corruption and uncertainty,individuals are often left on their own to obtain basiceducation, food, housing, and healthcare.10 As we

interviewed informants and visited sites, we recog-nized that nearly all our informants came up withcreative solutions to challenges despite possessingfew, if any, resources. We labeled these creative ac-tions resourcefulness (consistentwithBaker,Miner, &Eesley, 2003; Baker & Nelson, 2005). Indeed, whileconducting our interviews, it was not uncommon toobserve individuals arriving with raw materials thatthey had found nearby or team members interactingwith international collaborators in the hopes ofaccessing unique skills or insights (field notes).

Sustaining ventures’ resourcefulness activities.As we analyzed our data, we recognized manyfounders of sustaining ventures indicated that theypursued resources in ways their ancestors had, fight-ing for rights through peaceful (yet aggressive) meansto enable survival (field notes). Indeed, the appropri-ation of non-owned resources was the most signifi-cant observation we had when visiting sites. Onefounder explained the issue:

We faced a problem, which was that [our operations]were set up on private lands, and the landownerswanted to reclaim their lands. The proprietors startedpressuring us to make all the people leave. . . . Thiswas a big problem we faced and overcame by stayingon the land. (SA-F1)

Sustaining ventures viewed the appropriation ofothers’ land as “a right” that was “owed to us by thegovernment and wealthy land owners” (SO-F1,SO-E1, SE-F1, SA-C1). This attitude needs to be un-derstood in the context of the uncertainty surroundingland ownership, the sheer number of homeless vic-tims, and the means by which a small number of elitehad come into possession of much of the land sur-rounding Port-au-Prince (Riddick, 2011). In takingresourceful action, these ventures entrenched theirclaim to the land by creating a degree of infrastructureon the land that reduced the likelihoodof returning theland to legal owners: building meeting “houses” forgroup gatherings (SO-F1, SE-F1), funding “liquorshops” where people could procure boot-leg alcohol(SO-E2), and so forth. One founder explained, “Wewould like tobuildouta reservoir forwater. . . .Wealsowant to have a fish hatchery; we believe strongly inanimal husbandry. People coulduse this fishhatcheryas a business and also a source of food” (SE-F1).

One customer who is a recipient of the venture’sservices toldus the following (whichwasconfirmedbyother customers): “Where will we be in five years? . . .We will still be here in two, three, four, 10, even 30years from now [living the same way on this land]”(SO-C3). These ventures were following a pattern of

10 As indicated previously, billions of dollars have floo-ded into Haiti over the years with very few institutionalresults. In 2006, “Haiti was only ahead of Burma and Iraq asthe countries with the most widespread corruption” (Roc,2009), which has resulted in stagnated efforts to addressHaiti’s “basic needs such as shelter and basic medical care”as well as “long-term needs such as education, good gov-ernance, and economic reconstruction and growth” (Wilets& Espinosa, 2011: 181).


land acquisition in a way consistent with Haiti’shistory: seizing property by occupation.11 As oneinformant explained: “it is OK for us to occupythese lands because they are under the control ofthe rich elite . . . All of us here are children of theland, and we all should have the right to a place tolive.” Therefore, sustaining ventures resourcefullyappropriated non-owned resources for the longterm, which influenced both the subsequent iden-tification of POTAS and entrepreneurial actions.While these actions offered victims access to ser-vices that provided some of the basics of life, theyalsomade it less likely that people would leave thislargely “makeshift” setup.

Second, we found that as individuals engaged inadaily search for basic resources, thePOTASbecamefurther entrenched in providing relief. For instance,one founder told us:

[After getting settled on the land] we bought a truck-load of water, put it in the container, and then sold itto the population at a low price. . . . This is a way toensure that we will always have money for water tocontinue filling up the storage tankwithwater. . . .Wesell it for 4 gourdes [$.08] a bucket, but on the street, itis sold for 5 gourdes [$.10] a bucket. (SE-F1)

Similarly, one employee explained how he begantaking action:

We constantly searched for food. . . . Every time youfind someone who gives you a little something to tideyou over, you are in a better situation—you keepsearching every day. (SO-E1)

Thus, sustaining venturesmaintained an enduringresourcefulness mindset—searching for resourcesdaily, constantly repurposing readily available re-sources, and living in the present.

Third, as noted by an employee of a sustainingventure, “Abig part of what we do is bringing people[NGOs, government agencies, etc.] to the camp toprovide resources” (SO-E2). Similarly, a founderexplained the importance of lobbying for the deliv-ery of resources:

We tried tohelppeople findactivities andprograms toparticipate in. . . .Wehelpedpeople learnaboutwhereto get aid, including food,money for leaving tents, andso forth. . . . We helped people get food in an orderlyway. . . . We even did this with vaccinations. We hadan organized system for distributing all types of ma-terials and supplies. (SA-F1)

As time progressed, sustaining ventures becamemore sophisticated, organized, and entrenched inproviding housing and increasing the number of“businesses” in the tent citieswhile lobbying anyoneand everyone (including the research team) for re-sources. Thus, sustaining ventures engaged in exten-sive government, NGO, and foreign national lobbyingto secure resources.

Finally, we observed deception in resource ac-quisition. One founder described accessing essentialmaterials this way:

I dressed in a manner similar to a military personneland went to the military to get gasoline. . . . Theyassumed I was part of the military. . . . I told them Ineeded gasoline, and they told me no problem, theyhad a lot of gasoline. There were obstacles, but Iovercame them. . . . Many people were afraid of themilitary . . . but not me. I told others I’m not afraid ofthemilitary because I am in themilitary too! I did thisoften to get resources. (SA-F1)

Similarly, an employee described his actions inprocuring water:

I found gallons of water in destroyed stores and brokedown the walls with a tractor I took. I then took thegallons and brought them back. . . . We had to actquickly and resourcefully because we felt a sense ofresponsibility to find solutions to all of these prob-lems. (SO-E1)

Other accounts described commandeering watertanks (SE-F1), deceiving foreign NGOs into drop-ping off food trucks (SA-F2, SO-F1), and stealingvehicles and other equipment to survive (SO-E2,SA-F1). Some founders (SA-F1, SO-F1, SE-F2) de-scribed how they threatened NGOs, border agents,and others with violence unless they gave up foodcontainers. The perpetual, permanent, and oftendeviant resourcefulness of sustaining venturesshaped ongoing activities and ultimately had animpact on how they pursued POTAS. Importantly,while sustaining ventures’ deviant behaviors—non-sanctioned activities to accomplish their ends(consistent with Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon,2009)—provided resources to sustain victims andenabled ongoing survival in an incredibly hostile

11 Property rights in Haiti are very uncertain, leadingsome to take matters into their own hands. “[N]o oneknows howmuch land is still owned by the government . . .which could be as much as two-thirds of the entire coun-try” (Riddick, 2011: 255). Similarly, a “small elite ownsmost of the land in and around the capital,” which pre-sented considerable problems when attempting to housethe millions of homeless as the government could not ac-count for which land it owned (Riddick, 2011: 261).


environment, they did not provide upward mobilityfor those being served.

Transforming ventures’ resourcefulnessactivities.Similar to sustaining ventures, transforming venturesalso describedmany actions that could be identified asresourceful activities that they argued were criticalduring the recovery process.

First, as ventures used existing organizationalstructures and resources in early resourceful actions,informants continuously acknowledged that this usewas intended to be temporary. One founder told usthat “The church ground [which we temporarilyoccupied] was supposed to be primarily a place ofworship and not a long-term camp” (TO-F2). Simi-larly, one founder explained how he helped set upa surgical center in a nearby building to provide im-mediate care to thosewith severe and life-threateninginjuries as hospitals were “overflowing and mostlyfull of dead bodies” (TA-F1). This attitude about thetemporary occupation of property influenced howtransforming ventures approached the problem ofshelter: they transitioned individuals out of tents in aslittle as three months (and no later than one year) afterthe earthquake. For those who had titles or verifiableclaims to property, transforming ventures helped themrebuild their homes, and for those who had been rent-ing, these ventures helped them find new rentalproperties. Transforming ventures accessed, used,and then returned non-owned resources, includingland, medical equipment and facilities, and build-ings (TO-F2).

Second, an employee of a transforming ventureexplained that he and his team worked tirelessly tohelp people make incremental transitions towardautonomy, with a focus on making investments inthe future through education or other solutions thataddressed the root cause of victim suffering (in-cluding poverty). He explained the following:

Each time the problems or issues changed, we had tomeet together to plan how we were going to resolvethe root causes of the new problems that had comeup. . . . We continued holdingmeetings with the needsevolving until our primary goal was met, which waspeople were again living in their own homes and ontheir own lands [living autonomously]. (TO-E1)

Similarly, one founder stated:

[Many other groups believed that] NGOs would con-tinue giving them things for free [indefinitely]. . . .Because of this, there are groups of people who arestill living in tents even to thisday [on land theydonotown]. . . . We did not function this way toward thosewehelped;wewanted them to be self-reliant by getting

training, education, orwhat theyneeded to functionontheir own. (TR-F1)

Transforming ventures recognized that a stateof perpetual resource seeking would not lead toa long-term resolution of suffering. As such, thesebeliefs about POTAS had a strong influence onimplementing difficult transitions, such as encour-aging people to leave camps and begin autonomousliving—a transition from resource seeking to resourceinvestment.

Third, some transforming ventures provided as-sessments of houses’ safety, allowing some individ-uals to repair homes that were damaged but notdestroyed (TO-F1, TA-F1):

We conducted surveys and found that not everybodyhad lost their houses. For example,myownhousehadcracks in thewalls, but itwasnot actuallydestroyed inthe earthquake. . . . Some people were in similar sit-uations and simply needed shovels andmops to cleantheirhomeandpatch cracks. . . .Otherswerehelped tofind new rentals if they had been renting. . . . Otherswere helped to replace homes they owned on newlands after showing proof of title. (TR-F1)

This customization did not come without chal-lenges. In many cases, people had hoped for newhomes or a payout from the government despite therelatively limited damage to their homes. In thesecases, transitions were important but difficult to en-act. For example, one customer noted:

It was hard leaving the tents; thingswere desperate . . .but I [got help fixing] up my house and later helpedwith other projects like delivering food and water. . . .This led to a job with an NGO, which would not havehappened if I stayed in a tent! (TO-C2)

Therefore, we found that transforming ventureswere resourceful in customizing their approach tomeeting critical basic needs with a focus on help-ing individuals rebuild their lives in such a way thatthey were better off than before the disaster—“buildback better.”

Finally, one founder explained that rather thanraiding others for resources, such as food and water,individuals pooledwhat they had on hand tomake itthrough the most difficult times:

Imagine that you have flour, I have salt, and someoneelse has oil, and a fourth person has rice—it doesn’tmake sense for us to each try to make food with ourlimited resources. Instead, we pooled all of our foodsupplies together and cooked food for everyone; wedistributed it equally among everyone even if each


person got only one or two spoonfuls. . . . You have toknow each person’s talents and capabilities . . . Youneed doctors to form a medical committee, and youneed lawyers to form a legal committee. . . . We knewpeople’s capabilities, deploy them. (TR-F1)

Another founder explained that his team wouldbring resources into Haiti from the Dominican Re-public at night to avoid having the materials stolen.Given the extreme uncertainty and lack of food it wascommonfor food trucks tobeattacked,overrun,and/orredirected to other areas:

We traveled to another commune called La Vallee deJacmel.We finally arrivedat 4:00a.m., droppedoff thesupplies, and then turned right around to go backwithout a break. . . . There was nobody around on theroads to see that we were carrying valuable foodsupplies—wewere able to travel with no hindrances.(TO-F2)

These creative approaches to resource access anddistribution allowed transforming ventures to accessand activate their relationships to gain critical re-sources to pursue POTAS. Thus, transforming ven-tures displayed both creative and legal techniquesfor resource acquisition.

Therefore, transforming ventures emphasized theimportance of transitioning from a resourcefulnessmindset to more of an investment mindset (TO-F1,TR-F1). That is, they recognized that creativelymaking do with what they had could only take themso far and that for people to truly recover, theywouldneed to make difficult transitions requiring money,time, and other investments (field notes).

In Table 3, we summarize the representative quota-tions that illustrate the categories and themes that wedeveloped in inductively arriving at our overarchingdimensions described above. These quotations wereselected because they highlight the preponderanceof evidence.

DISCUSSION

Webegan this paper seeking tounderstand if, how,and why emergent ventures contribute to resiliencein the aftermath of disasters. Specifically, we asked:(1) how do post-disaster new ventures acquire, com-bine, and use resources, and (2) how does venturecreation facilitate the resilience of community mem-bers, andwhyare someventuresmore effective thanothers? Indeed, as one founder exclaimed (and aswas reaffirmedbynearly all our informants), “Muchof the story of the earthquake . . . is missing theHaitian story, the story of locals who rose up to help

fellow Haitians in need” (SA-F1). In detailing theanswers to these questions that emerged from ourdata, we first summarize our findings (see Figure 2and Table 4) and then discuss the theoretical andpractical implications. In particular, we explainhow this study contributes to the grand challenge ofunderstanding “the role and functioning of organiza-tionsduringadversenaturalandsocialevents” inorderto “better deal with disasters and ultimately benefitsociety as a whole” (van der Vegt et al., 2015: 971).

How Do New Ventures Access Resources to PursuePost-Disaster Opportunities?

We found that Haitian-led initiatives emerged in re-sponse to the earthquake disaster and created value byalleviating victims’ suffering. New ventures emerged asa response to gaps in the recovery system as broaderinstitutional actors (e.g., Haitian and international gov-ernments and NGOs) struggled to address the needs ofhundreds of thousands of suffering people.

As illustrated in Figure 2 (and also Table 4), ourfindings reveal two important mechanisms for howventures accessed resources to organize a responseto alleviate suffering: engage available social re-sources (Path 1a) and act on their founding mindset(Path 1b). These actions toward pursuing an op-portunity are somewhat similar to extant researchon venture founding, which has highlighted howgreater access to social resources (Davidsson &Honig, 2003) and founders’motivations can influenceopportunity exploitation. Specifically, we found thatsocial resource relationships served as a catalystfor subsequent resource acquisition techniques andplayed an important role in shaping whether a ven-ture became transforming or sustaining in nature. Asventures drew upon resources through either strongsocial connections (transforming ventures) or trans-actional interactions (sustaining ventures), differ-ences emerged in these ventures’ ability to addressdiverse types ofneeds.Transformingventureswere ableto leverage relationships to transition to satisfy addi-tional needs, whereas sustaining ventures appeared tobe stuck in a cycle of establishing new transactional re-lationships to extract resources to satisfy the most basicofneeds.Therefore, in apost-disaster context, thenatureof existing ties influences the boundaries of the POTASand the strategies ventures pursue to obtain addi-tional resources. These insights extend theory onthe social resources of entrepreneurship onwhetheror not strong and/or weak ties facilitate ventureemergence (Davidsson & Honig, 2003); the currentstudy provides an understanding of how the nature


TABLE 3Representative Quotations

Surviving cases: 2nd and 1st orderthemes and representative quotations

Transforming cases: 2nd and 1st order themesand representative quotations

Dimension: Identification of potential opportunities to alleviate suffering (POTAS)

SE-E1: “While we sit here waiting for someone to give ussomething, it is almost like we are children . . . we have heardthrough television and radio that the government has plans toget us all out of these camps . . . So we wait and live in the tentcommunity.”

TA-E2: “You have to put yourself in [others’] shoes . . . you have to doeverything in your power to show them that they are surrounded bypeople who love them and who will stand by them.”

SO-E1: “As Iworked cleaningup andburying bodies people seemedto followme. I set up camp here and have taken charge ever since. . . I know have a large following.”

Field Notes: “After interacting with several of the [sustaining ventures]wemade sure in followupquestions to ask aboutwhether [they]wereinterested in enhancing their community power. However, evenwhen directly asked they deferred and said ‘we were just doing theright thing, we were obligated to protect our community, our moralscall for it and we simply answered the call like anyone else wouldhave.’ Pretty remarkable. Also, they placed a huge emphasis ongetting people on their own feet. They even ceased providing foodearly in the recovery process because they felt that was notsustainable: they needed to enable others to become self-reliant.”

Field Notes: “Today, they talked a lot about their status and role inthe community. The others around us also emphasized thisrepeatedly saying ‘well, the founder is the boss, we doeverything he says.’ Similarly, the way they described thefounding was interesting, emphasizing how they wereimportant and capable . . .”

Dimension: Social resources

SO-F1: “Foreigners who call themselves friends of Haiti have inreality stolenmillions of dollars from our country. Thus, it wouldonly be just for these countries to finance the cost of newhouses—those who committed such odious crimes against theHaitian people should be the ones to finance and build houses forthe population.”

TA-C1: “The foreign aid workers were very committed to the Haitianpeople and they gave support and relief with all of their hearts and allof their might . . . the Americans, French, and Canadians didgenuinely show interest in learningwhowewere as a Haitian peopleand what we needed before they got to work.”

Field Notes: “There seems to be a contradiction . . .While they relyheavily on outside resources for survival, they are bitter and evenangry toward those resource providers, demanding even morefrom themallwhile calling them ‘invaders’or ‘intruders.’Theydonot seem to have long-standing relationships and every attempt atresources seems transactional, as if done for the first time.”

Field Notes: “What surprised us today was the diverse resourcesaccessed through their networks. They had connections in the USand in the Dominican Republic that they were able to immediatelyaccess. . . . [they] transitioned as rapidly as possible off internationalsuppliers to locals. As they explained to us (and showed us), thisallowed them to impact the community in multiple ways—helpingvictims, but also helpingHaitian businesses get going again by usingthem for supplies.”

Dimension: Founding mindset

SO-F1: “I am a politician and consider myself both a centrist and arevolutionary . . . I borrow a little from Dessalines, GeorgeWashington, and Joseph Stalin . . . I tell you this so you knowwhere I’m coming fromwhen I say the earthquake was a criminalevent . . . I must continue to fight for justice for the people becausethe earthquake was a criminal event.”

TR-F1: “Our philosophy andmotivation is this: we believe it is better toteach someone to fish instead of just giving people a fish when theycome to youand say that they arehungry . . . this helpspeople becomemore self-sufficient.”

Field Notes: “. . .many individuals from today’s interviews spenta lot of time explaining their Haitian heritage and fighting spirit.While they didwant to help people, many viewed the earthquakeas a small (but significant) extension of a history of Haitiansuffering. In their minds, it was their chance to fulfill their duty asHaitians. . . . These feelings ran very deep.”

FieldNotes: “Today,we interviewed several people from [TO] and theyall said things like ‘well Haitians are like other nations, so nothingabout that really influenced things’ or ‘we met amazing people fromall nations, we’re no better or worse than them.’ Rather, theyemphasized themoral obligation anddesire they felt to help others inneed. This is what they repeatedly offered as the main driver of theiractions.”


of a social resource influences the types of entre-preneurial activities undertaken and the extent towhich these activities return people to positivefunctioning over time.

Furthermore, ventures’ founding mindset servedas an important framing of the issues at hand, in-cluding how to interpret the activities of other ac-tors (e.g., governments, NGOs) and how to engageboth those they helped and essential resource pro-viders (Path 1b). Sustaining ventures interpretedthe response from key institutional actors withinthe context of Haiti’s long history of suffering,which resulted in an emphasis on patriotism anda push to obtain justice for historic abuses. In par-ticular, the disaster further highlighted Haiti’stroubled history with property rights, as onlya small number of elites laid claim to much of theland surrounding Port-au-Prince. Understandably,many sustaining ventures “took a stand” on prop-erty rights by occupying the landwhile lobbying forfundamental changes in Haiti’s ongoing housingand property situation. This mindset ultimatelyshaped the identification of POTAS—it was a keymechanism in explaining why sustaining venturesfocused on satisfying only the basic needs of thosewho were suffering. In contrast, transforming ven-tures’ founding mindset was more detached fromHaiti’s long history of injustices and more orientedtoward solving current and future issues from one’scurrent situation—no matter how good or bad—bytransitioning victims to a state of autonomy. Thismindset served as a framing for subsequentaction—there was no need to “hold out” for gov-ernment action as there was no mindset that gov-ernment action was critical; rather, transforming

ventures emphasized the need to move forward withthe resources on hand.

How and Why Venture Creation FacilitatesResilience?

As individuals accessed resources and took ac-tion, they began identifying POTAS. This model oftaking action as a pathway to identifying opportu-nities contributes to the extant research on ventureformation, highlighting the iterative and action-oriented perspective of opportunity identificationand pursuit (Sarasvathy, 2001; Shepherd, 2015).What is novel in our inductivemodel is the focus onopportunities to alleviate others’ suffering and theways differences in the potential opportunitiesexploited influenced ventures’ impact on victims’functioning. Sustaining ventures pursued potentialopportunities to provide continuous relief throughsatisfying victims’ basic needs (i.e., food, water,and shelter), improving founders’ social standing (ascommunity leaders), and allowing for a continuedpush for justice for historic grievances. These POTASfacilitated the entrenchment of early actions, theemergence of new power roles, and deviant actions(Path 2). In particular, sustaining ventures continuedto engage resource providers with an injustice mind-set, demanding resources but simultaneously rein-forcing the transactional nature of resource exchanges.Combined, these efforts resulted in victims’ long-termdependence on the ventures to meet their most basicneeds (Path 3).

In contrast, transforming ventures engaged increative and legal approaches to acquiring and dis-tributing resources, which enhanced their role as

TABLE 3(Continued)

Surviving cases: 2nd and 1st orderthemes and representative quotations

Transforming cases: 2nd and 1st order themesand representative quotations

Dimension: Resourcefulness

SO-E2: “We recently found an organization that gives elderlyparticipants 2,000 gourdes ($40), and we helped our elderlyresidents become beneficiaries of this program.”

TA-F2: “While initiallywe staged our operation on the church grounds,this was not a permanent solution [it was not our land]. Theearthquake hit on January 12 . . . everyone had cleared the churchgrounds during the month of February.”

Field Notes: “All ventures were resourceful, that much is certain. Infact, it seems thatmost peoplewehavemet inHaiti are resourceful.However, akeydifferencewithsomeventures [sustaining] take it toanother level, doing things that are deviant at best, and illegal atworst. This includes occupying land for years, stealing resources,deceiving others, and so forth. They seem to have built this intotheir tasks as an organization as they appear in a perpetual state of‘survival mode’, which seems to transcend other moral codes.”

Field Notes: “Resourcefulness appears to be everywhere, however insome cases that can preclude investment in the future. However,some of the ventures appear to have overcome this by focusing ontransition from resourceful actions to more investment-orientedactions. This is manifest in their view of others’ property (to beborrowed and returned, not taken), how they can help people (helpthem step up as opposed to giving them handouts), etc.”


adaptive need finders and fulfillers (Path 3). In takingthis approach, transforming ventures identifiedPOTAS to transition members of their communitiesfromcrisis to recovery to “building back better.”Thisapproach reaffirmed social relationships as opposedto “burning bridges” with resource providers.Transforming ventures realized that pursuing re-sourceful action with their social connections couldgenerate subsequent interactions to allow victims tocontinue to grow (autonomously) (Path 2). That is,each interactionwas treated as a possible investmentin the future as opposed to a one-time consumableexchange. Therefore, these ventures avoided in-teractions with resource providers that could beperceived as “exploitive” or “overly demanding,”and instead sought to develop sustainable relation-ships where resource providers functioned as“partners” rather than transactional donors. Com-bined, these efforts shaped a transformational long-term effort that facilitated resilience in victims whosuffered in the aftermath of the disaster (Path 3).Therefore, although all the ventures studied were

entrepreneurial in that they were innovative, tookrisks, and were proactive (Covin & Slevin, 1989),their entrepreneurial orientation was either directedat “forcing someone’s hand” to help the venture al-leviate suffering (sustaining ventures) or at “takingthe situation into their own hands” to take actionsthat put autonomy “back into the hands” of victims(transforming ventures).

Contributions to Theory

The primary contribution of the current study isa venturing model of disaster resilience. This con-tribution builds on the importance of understandingprocesses of resilience (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003),particularly in response to disasters (McEntire, 2014;van der Vegt et al., 2015). Here, we provide an im-portant step in better understanding how new ven-tures’ different activities generate alternate forms ofresilience after a disaster. Studies have suggestedthat resilience “reflects the ability of systems to ab-sorb and recover from shocks, while transforming

FIGURE 2Model and Pathways of Alleviating Suffering Through Sustaining or Transforming Peoplea

Potential opportunities toalleviate suffering (POTAS)

Social resources Accessed and engaged strongand weak local and internationalties; perceived outsiders aspotential collaborators

Founding mindset Prosocial/doing the right thing;protecting immediate community;retain self-reliance, dignity through work

Transforming venture pathways

Sustaining ventures

Feedback loops reinforcing relationships

Opportunity for power,improved social status,systematic, long-termrelief

Opportunity wasobligation to act to help, staged, growth oriented

Sustaining: Providing mostbasic needs, short-termoriented, single-stage

Transforming:Comprehensive physical/ psychological needs, long-term oriented, and multi-staged

Social resources Limited reliance on established local and international ties, perception of outsiders as intruders

Founding mindset Cultural heritage of resilience anddefiance, survive at all costs,injustice mindset and rights toresources as a reparation for wrongs

Alleviation ofvictim suffering

Path 1a

Path 1a

Path 1b

Path 1b

Path 2

Path 2

Path 3

Path 3

Deviant resourcefulness Appropriation of non-owned resources, enduringresourcefulness mindset, government and NGO lobbying, and illegal resource acquisition

Staged resourcefulness Temporary appropriation of non-owned resources,transition to investment mindset, customizingservices to needs, creative but legal resourcing

a See Table 4 for supporting data on pathways.


their structures and means for functioning in theface of long-term stresses, change, and uncertainty”(van der Vegt et al., 2015: 972). We extend theseconceptualizations to emphasize gradients of pro-moting functioning in the aftermath of a disasterevent. Sustaining ventures provided for basicneeds (enabling functioning) that enhanced sur-vival but resulted in victims developing a con-tinued reliance on the venture, whereas whiletransforming ventures also initially provided forbasic needs they transitioned victims to increasinglevels of self-reliance. These findings provide an im-portant theoretical contribution to understanding dif-ferences in the process and outcomes of resilience.While initial venturing activities that promote sur-vival are necessary, they are not sufficient for thecomprehensive alleviation of victim suffering—that is,to return victims to normal functioning or for post-disaster growth.

This study also contributes to theory by identi-fying new venture competencies that influenceresilience—specifically, the nature of social re-sources and engagement in resourcefulness. Socialresources are essential for neworganizations as theyare generally resource constrained and require ex-ternal support (Burt, 2005; Stinchcombe, 1965).Therefore, it might be assumed that most relation-ships are useful, especially in the aftermath ofdisasters when seemingly any available resourcewould be valued. However, we found that when itcame to alleviating others’ suffering and promotingthe preservation and development of resources, thenature of social relationships in the study’s contextplayed a critical role in determining whether vic-tims could achieve normal functioning—buildingon emerging research that emphasizes socialnetworks and how those function in contextsrequiring “high-reliability” (Berthod, Grothe-Hammer, & Sydow, 2015; Saz-Carranza & Ospina,2011). Those who possessed strong and weak tieswith outsiders and who viewed outsiders as col-laborators and partners (as opposed to meretransactional donors) were able to mobilize re-sources that helped develop, build, and eventransform those they helped. Interestingly, sus-taining ventures faced (or created for themselves)a paradoxwhere they recognized the importance ofresources from outsiders yet were unable (througha lack of connections) and unwilling (through dis-dain for resource providers) to form effective re-lationships with these outside resource providers.These findings contribute to our knowledge of theobstructions to resource flow from outsiders to

victims—some ventures are not well positionedsocially to be brokers and do not have a mindsetconducive for developing the relationships neces-sary to become such brokers.

Prior research has generally assumed that the pos-session of extensive and diverse resource reserves(i.e., resource slack) is useful in weathering chal-lenging conditions (Meyer, 1982).We found that evenin the most constrained of resource environments,ventures were created to alleviate suffering. In allcases, ventures were highly creative in what theyperceived to be an available resource (consistentwithbricolage [Baker & Nelson, 2005]). Our findings sug-gest that these resource perceptions (and subsequentactions) influence the alleviation of suffering. Crea-tive, resourceful actions that were within legalbounds influenced stable and sustainable resourcerelationships and allowed transforming ventures toborrow and return resources. These actions not onlydeveloped strong resource partnerships but also fa-cilitated the transforming ventures’model of movingpeople toward self-reliance, autonomy, and—thus—resilience outcomes. In contrast, sustaining venturesused any and all means to obtain resources to achievetheir ends, which resulted in fragmented resourcerelationships and a limited chance for victims totransition beyond basic “survival mode” while si-multaneously creating a dependence on the venture.This finding suggests that there are forms of resource-fulness that have diminishing returns on the allevia-tion of suffering.

Although much of the research on resilience af-ter disasters has focused on enhancing individualwellness, providing for basic needs, and helping torestore order (Bonanno et al., 2010; Norris et al.,2008), we found that an effective response to alle-viating suffering involved a prosocial mindset thatwas focused on venturing to generate victim au-tonomy and self-reliance. While all ventures hadsome degree of prosocial orientation, transformingventures repeatedly expressed that helping otherswas the primary reason for action and that their“true” motive was to put victims on a path to self-reliance. In contrast, sustaining ventures providedfor victims’ basic needs but had no real plans forturning that work over to those they helped—beyond waiting for widespread institutional re-form. Although prosocial motivation does notpreclude the actor from also benefiting from hisor her actions (Grant, 2007), this study extendsthe theory on prosocial behavior by offering amore “extreme” form of prosocial behavior: help-ing people so they no longer need help through


TABLE4

Rep

resentative

QuotationsDem

onstratingPathway

sto

Allev

iatingSuffering

Path1:

(a)S

ocialR

esou

rces,(b)

→POTAS

Path2:

POTAS→

Resou

rcefulness

Path3:

Resou

rcefulness→

Allev

iation

ofSuffering

Transforming

Ven

tures

1a:“

WeusedSky

peto

communicatewith

connection

sin

[theDom

inican

Rep

ublic]a

nd

othersin

theUnited

States...W

ewereab

leto

findfood

through

contactsin

theDom

inican

Rep

ublic

...weactually

had

(tem

porarily)

anairplanean

dahelicop

terav

ailableforuse

...

weusedtheseto

shuttle

themostc

ritically

injuredpeo

ple

totheDom

inican

Rep

ublic

for

treatm

ent.

..Ithinkthat

ifthey

had

not

been

able

togo

mosto

fthem

wou

ldhav

een

ded

up

dying.”TO-F2

“Ourview

was

wenee

ded

tohelppeo

ple

beco

me

self-reliant,otherwiseneedswou

ldpersist.F

orex

ample,ifI

amthirstytoday

and[som

eone]

give

smewater,b

utI

know

Iwillb

ethirstyagain

tomorrow

andIh

avenoidea

whereto

goto

find

water

todrink.

Thus,they

helped

meforash

ort

amou

nto

ftim

e,bu

tthesameroot

problem

isev

entually

goingto

resu

rface.”TR-F1

“W

eco

nstructed

tents,show

ers,an

dinstalled

ligh

tson

borrow

edland...how

ever,this

was

not

theen

dgo

alof

ourac

tion

s—ea

chproject

step

had

anen

ddate...after

whichwestartn

ewprogram

s[that

address

curren

tnee

ds].”

TR-F1

1b:“

Ithinkthat

weas

committeemem

bers

were

soab

sorbed

intryingto

solveother

peo

ple’s

problem

sthat

weforgot

abou

tourow

nissu

es;

fore

xample,m

yfamilywas

nev

erherewithme

duringtheday

sfollow

ingtheearthqu

ake,

butI

was

nev

erpreoc

cupiedwiththou

ghts

ofmissingthem

andwishingthey

wereherewith

me,

beca

use

Iwas

sobu

syhelpingou

twith

relief

efforts.”TO-E1

“Weiden

tified

somesatellitephon

esthat

helped

usco

nnec

t.Itwas

because

ofthem

that

wewere

ableto

contactthoseou

tsideHaitithatwekn

ew.

Itallowed

usto

hav

eco

nstan

tcom

munication

before

things

returned

tonormal,sowewere

able

toform

aloca

lcom

mitteeto

direc

tour

operation[asop

posed

tohav

ingitdirectedfrom

theou

tside].”

TO-F2

“W

ewerecreative

inge

ttingpeo

ple

totake

step

stowardself-reliance,such

asofferingthem

rice

andbe

ansto

leav

ethetents

...wealso

worke

dwiththem

tohelpthem

findem

ploym

ent.Som

eof

thesepeo

ple

livingin

theca

mpwereab

leto

gorenta

hou

sewiththeiro

wnmon

eyon

cethey

secu

redajob,

andthey

mov

edou

t.”TR-F1

“Theuse

ofmaterials

that

werenot

ours

was

alway

stemporary.For

exam

ple,w

edid

not

stay

ontheproperty

long-term

.Sim

ilarly,w

emad

esu

rethat

peo

ple

werenot

buildinghom

eson

landthey

did

not

own,a

practicethat

beca

me

very

common

aftertheea

rthqu

ake.”TR-F2

“Peo

ple’ssituationswereso

different.

..im

agine

ifyo

uhad

aseve

redlimbor

nee

ded

tran

sportto

ahospital

that

was

overflow

ed?Other

peo

ple

had

nofood

toea

t,they

had

nohom

eto

live

in,

mem

bers

oftheirhou

seholdhad

perished

...

andthey

had

absolutely

nob

odyto

helpthem

...

Thisiswhywewereso

absorbed

asaco

mmittee

intryingto

understan

dnee

dsan

dad

dress

the

differentp

roblem

s...wenee

ded

multiple

lead

ersh

ippositionswhoco

uld

allw

ork

toge

ther.”

TO-E1

“W

ehelptheseyo

ungpeo

ple

tobe

reintegrated

into

society,

andtheinsecu

rities

andworries

that

gothrough

theirmindsan

dhearts

rega

rdingwhether

ornot

peo

ple

willa

ccep

tthem

arehea

ledwhen

they

seethat

weac

cept

them

...L

ifego

eson

whether

youhav

eally

our

limbs

orifyo

uaremissingon

e.Theseactivities

hav

ehelped

both

thedismem

beredch

ildren

andmeto

hea

landfunctionat

thesametime.”

TA-E2


TABLE4

(Con

tinued

)

Path1:

(a)S

ocialR

esou

rces,(b)

→POTAS

Path2:

POTAS→

Resou

rcefulness

Path3:

Resou

rcefulness→

Allev

iation

ofSuffering

Sustaining

Ven

tures

1a:“

Ourmostp

ressingnee

dis

toge

touto

fthese

tents

...bu

twehav

enoco

nnection

sto

getu

ssh

elter...an

dId

on’twan

ttorenta

room

,rentingdoe

snot

even

interest

me,

Iwou

ldprefertobu

yaroom

...soweco

ntinueto

waitin

thetents

search

ingforfood

,usingtarpsan

dtents.”

SE-E1

“Lifeas

alead

eris

fullof

sacrifices,I

hav

esacrificed

alotinsearch

ingforresou

rces

...b

ut

this

buildsmyreputation

,whichis

theon

lythingyo

uca

npossess

...reputation

canmak

eyo

urich

intheen

d,b

utw

earepoo

rat

the

present.”SO-E1

“Toob

tain

food

wewen

ttotheIndustrial

Park

withtheve

hicle

andpressuredthem

,andthey

saw

that

wewereseriou

sbe

cause

wehad

[falsified

]bad

gesalread

y...W

ewereob

liga

ted

touse

forceto

gettheseresources

...w

ehad

no

other

choice

buttouse

forceto

obtain

these

supplies

forou

rco

mmunity.”SO-E2

1b:“

Wherewillw

ebe

intw

oye

ars,in

five

years?

Well,wearewaitingforthosein

charge

tofulfill

theirduties

inregardsto

us...so

weco

ntinue

search

ingan

dsu

rviving.”SA-C1

“W

ego

ttog

ether

andman

aged

tobu

yawater

truck

andsh

ared

it.W

ehad

todoitthat

way

toke

epsu

rviving...E

versince

thefoundingthere

has

been

alead

eran

dev

eryb

odykn

owsthat

individualisthelead

er,h

edecides

onresources

like

water

that

keep

ustogether.”

SE-F1

“Thereweresomepeo

plewhogave

upan

drefused

toeat,be

cause

they

figu

redthat

they

werego

ing

todie

anyw

ays.When

things

startedlook

ingup

againdueto

ouraction

,andwestartedfinding

moreresources,then

thesepeo

ple

became

interested

ineatingagain.”SO-E2

“Asthepresiden

tofthis

organization,I

dem

and

that

ourso-calledfriendsor

ally

countriesof

Haitiwhoclaim

that

they

like

Haitish

ould

help

take

allo

fthesepeo

ple

out.”SO-F1

“Id

ressed

inaman

ner

similar

toamilitary

personnel

andwen

ttothemilitaryto

get

gasoline...they

assu

med

Iwas

parto

fthe

military...Itoldthem

Inee

ded

gasolinean

dthey

told

menoproblem

,they

had

aloto

fga

soline.

Therewereob

stac

les,bu

tIov

ercame

them

...m

anypeo

plewereafraid

ofthemilitary

...b

utn

otme,Itoldothers‘I’m

not

afraid

ofthe

military,

beca

use

Iam

inthemilitarytoo!’Id

idthis

oftento

getresou

rces.”

SA-F1

“Becau

sewehelped

peo

ple

findfood

,they

wou

ldco

meupto

mean

dpickmeupin

theair...for

exam

ple,o

neman

picke

dmeupin

theairan

dsaid

‘wow

,hereisthegu

ywhosave

dmylife,h

esave

dmylife!’Peo

ple

reco

gnizewesave

dthem

from

starva

tion

anddea

th...thisishow

weare

resp

ected.”

SA-E1


a relentless focus on enabling autonomy to obtainself-reliance.

Our findings also contribute to the managementliterature on disaster response, which focuses onthe immediate impact of emergent response groupsin developed economies (e.g., the United States[Majchrzak et al., 2007], Australia [Shepherd &Williams, 2014]). In this developing stream ofmanagement research, less has been offered re-garding the internal dynamics of emergent ven-tures and the various ways these ventures’activities influence people in the longer term, es-pecially those in less developed countries. Overand above contributing to theory through a deeperunderstanding of the internal dynamics of an im-portant form of emergent response group(i.e., transforming ventures), this study providesinsights into the mindset of some that seem tocreate a vicious cycle in less developed countries.Because of past injustices, some ventures are un-able to create the sort of relationships in the presentthat will help victims grow for the future—that is,they fail to “build back better.” This can createa deleterious spiral where distrust obstructs the for-mation of strong relationships, and the lack of strongrelationships obstructs resource flow, which furtherfuels distrust and so on. However, some (trans-forming) ventures appear to be able to break this cycleby developing strong relationships with outside pro-viders (given a different foundingmindset) and usingthose resources to help victims in a way that givesthese victims autonomy and builds self-reliance,which reinforces the founding mindset and socialcapital. This extends research on the effectiveness ofemergent responses and lays a foundation for futureresearch to explore how to enable and support emer-gent activities that show the greatest promise for al-leviating suffering.

Finally, this study provides an important addi-tion to the conceptualization of entrepreneurialopportunity by extending it to POTAS. This con-tributes to extant research on opportunity, whichsuggests that opportunities are future scenariosthat are desirable and feasible and usually focuson creating economic, social, or community value(Fauchart &Gruber, 2011; Peredo&Chrisman, 2006;York & Venkataraman, 2010). By extending thescope of entrepreneurial opportunity to the allevi-ation of suffering in the aftermath of a disaster, weopen new pathways to add to the conversation onthe nature of entrepreneurial opportunities (Suddaby,Bruton, & Si, 2015) and the diverse ways in whichentrepreneurial actors can create value. Indeed, not all

potential opportunities, once exploited, are equally aseffective in alleviating victims’ suffering in the after-math of a disaster. In extending theory on the valuecreated by POTAS, we highlight that while venturescreated to alleviate suffering pursue opportunities toenhance victims’ survival chances in the immediateaftermath of a disaster, some ventures create addi-tional value by enabling transitions for individuals toachieve post-disaster resilience and growth.

Taken together, these findings have importantpractical implications, especially in terms of ad-dressing the “grand challenge” of responding to di-sasters. Specifically, traditional response groupsand resource providers might be well served in sup-porting emergent, grassroots, locally-led venturesseeking to develop resilience. This support couldinclude assisting transforming ventures with diffi-cult transitions and/or sustaining ventures in theirimmediate objectives (e.g., providing food and shel-ter). Similarly, recognizing ventures’ different objec-tives can guide resource providers and policymakersinprioritizingneedswhilealso informing institutionalactors (e.g., governments andNGOs) onhow to interactwith new local ventures. These actions can be orientedtoward generating long-term resilience by encouragingpathways to self-reliance. Finally, various actors inpost-disaster responses can consider important trade-offs associated with different forms of action. For ex-ample, our data suggest that sustaining ventures’decision to “hold out” for others’ support resulted inreduced resilience outcomes for many victims of thedisaster. In contrast, transforming ventures focused onmoving people forward while explicitly avoiding theapproach taken by sustaining ventures. Understandingthe various tradeoffs associatedwith different responseoptions could lead tomore “strategic”decisionmakingand result in the alleviation of more suffering and thepromotion of greater resilience.

Generalizability and Future Research

Although the purpose of our study is consistentwith other qualitative research—to provide “local(i.e., realistic and precise) interpretations of a phe-nomenon, which the researcher then places withina theoretical frame to provide the wherewithal forextension and advancement of the current theory”(Harrison & Corley, 2011: 410)—we can still begin tothink about how the theory can be transferred out-side the context in which it was induced (Lincoln &Guba, 1985). Indeed, we believe that the current in-ductive model can serve as a basis for a more gener-alizable theory of venturing to alleviate suffering.


That is, we believe that the creation of ventures toalleviate suffering in the aftermath of the Haitiearthquake is representative of a larger set of emer-gent responses to disasters in least developedcountries (Guillaumont, 2010; UN, 2015) by locals inthe “eye of the storm.” Ventures are created to re-spond to disasters (e.g., Shepherd &Williams, 2014)and our inductive theoretical model directly appliesto explaining how these ventures are organized andtheir impact on victim suffering. Furthermore, re-sponses to disasters in least developed countries alsocome from outside organizations, such as the UnitedNations, foreign governments, the Red Cross, andothers that actively try to engage locals to customizeand speedily deliver resources to alleviate sufferingin the aftermath of disasters (primarily in least de-veloped countries). Our model helps explain howa venturing perspective for alleviating victim suffer-ing can provide insights into the resource-investmentstrategies of these organizations and the human im-pact of those investments.

As the management research in this context is inits earliest stages, we anticipate many opportunitiesfor future research to address aspects of this grandchallenge. Future research can make a contributionby: (1) identifying how to support and facilitatetransforming ventures through disaster-preparationand response programs, especially in less developedeconomies. For example, how can other emergencyresponders interact with and support local venturesas part of a broader approach to addressing disaster-caused suffering? Research can also: (2) explore dif-ferences across disaster types (i.e., human-causedversus natural disasters) and economic environ-ments. For example, do more developed economieshave a lower tolerance for living in “sustaining”conditions such that there is a more rapid transitionto a “transforming” path, or is “sustaining” simplymanifest in a less extreme way? Next, research can:(3) investigate how transforming firms sequenceand/or balance activities that promote survival andresponse speed with those that provide autonomyand self-reliance and can: (4) highlight how networkdevelopment facilitates both disaster response andlocally-organized responses to ongoing poverty andeconomic crises. Contributions are also likely tocome from: (5) exploring how individuals can de-velop a prosocial mindset to facilitate venturing thataids those in need by helping them help themselves.Recent research emphasizes the importance of pro-grams that engage local participation in “povertytargeting, [improving] service delivery, [expand-ing] livelihood opportunities and [strengthening]

demand for good governance” (Mansuri & Rao,2012: 1). These programs typically focus on sup-porting governments and organizations in de-veloping institutions. Future research can build onour findings to improve responses to long-termneeds. In addition: (6) comparing entrepreneurialaction in the context of post-disaster venturing withthat in more traditional contexts can advance ourtheories on the nature of entrepreneurial opportu-nities, the processes of organizational emergence,and the forms of value creation.

Finally, although we highlight the benefits oftransforming ventures over sustaining ventures, thiscould be a function of this study’s time horizon. Allsustaining ventures described in this study still oc-cupy landwithout thepermission of the legal ownersof that land.With a longer time horizon, wemay findthat sustaining ventures fundamentally challengeand change the nature of property rights and/or leadto a redistribution of those rights in a way that hasa profound and positive impact on reducing thesuffering caused by poverty in Haiti. Future researchcan explore the possibilities of this institutionalentrepreneurship.

CONCLUSION

While disasters pose a great challenge to society atlarge, management scholarship likely has much toadd in providing solutions that facilitate networkand organizational development, leadership train-ing, entrepreneurship, foreign investment, for-profitmarket development, and so forth. Specifically, aswe found in this paper, locals—even in the mostdifficult of circumstances—are capable of pursuingpotential opportunities to alleviate suffering andbuild resilience in communities to varying degrees.Recognizing how these ventures identify and utilizeresources and to what ends can facilitate better co-ordination and organizing to alleviate suffering inthe aftermath of a disaster. Moreover, least de-veloped countries are in the greatest need of atten-tion as their inhabitants endure the lowest levels ofglobal economic privilege and are the most suscep-tible to the risks associated with disasters. However,as we found, they have much to offer in developingsolutions that facilitate resilience.

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Trenton A. Williams ([email protected]) is an assistant pro-fessor at the Whitman School of Management, Syracuse

University. He received his PhD from Indiana University’sKelley School of Business. His research focuses on organiza-tional emergence under resource constraint, resourcefulness,resilience in facing adversity, and entrepreneurial decisionmaking.

DeanA. Shepherd ([email protected]) is a professorand the David H. Jacobs Chair of Strategic Entrepre-neurship at the Kelley School of Business, Indiana Uni-versity. He received his PhD from Bond University(Australia). His research focuses on entrepreneurialopportunity, entrepreneurial cognitions and decisionmaking, entrepreneurial strategies, and the failure ofentrepreneurial businesses.


mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

APPENDIX

CaseDescription

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Ven

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building resilience or providing sustenance: different ... · (peredo & chrisman, 2006). these...

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