Buddhist Theory of Perception by C. S. VyasReview by: Masaaki HattoriJournal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 119, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1999), pp. 498-500Published by: American Oriental SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/605947 .

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Journal of the American Oriental Society 119.3 (1999) Journal of the American Oriental Society 119.3 (1999)

already been included in the two editions of the Isvarapraty- abhijiavimarsini and in that of the Isvarapratyabhijiiavivrti- vimarsini of Abhinavagupta, and translated into English and

German; the Vrtti had never been translated before. The Isvara-

pratyabhijnavivrtivimarsini contains passages and paraphrases of the Vrtti; it was composed around 1015 and it is a precious source for this edition; Torella often quotes it in the footnotes.

In the bibliography Torella has overlooked the first critical edition and translation of the Spandasamdoha of Ksemaraja, which I published as supplement no. 59 to the ANNALI, vol. 49

(Naples: Istituto Universitario Orientale, 1989), even though he listed the Spandasamdoha among Ksemaraja's works, and even

though he supplied me with the single manuscript on which my edition is based, and indeed helped me translate it for my disser- tation! Moreover, the doctrine of spanda is discussed by Torella in his introduction (pp. xiii-xiv) with no mention of that work. Torella also includes in his bibliography the French translation

by A. Padoux of the Paratrimsikalaghuvrtti of Abhinavagupta (Paris, 1975), which he himself criticized in a review article

published in RSO (54 [1980]: 171-200); but he does not include this review among his own works in the present bibliography.

Within the so-called schools of Kashmir Shivaism there are teachers who climbed the highest peaks of religious specula- tion: Utpaladeva (900 or 925-950 or 975) and this work are

particularly important within these schools. Somananda is con- sidered the founder of the Pratyabhijia school and the transmit- ter of the Krama doctrine, which he learned from Govindaraja, to Abhinavagupta. Although his Sivadrsti is considered to be the first work of this school, in the text the term pratyabhijna, "recognition" occurs only once (SD IV, 120a) and, as Torella

points out (p. xx), with no pregnant meaning. The school is named after the work of his disciple Utpaladeva.

The Isvarapratyabhijiikdrikd is the "reflection" of the Siva-

drsti, as Abhinavagupta says in his commentary on this work

(IPV, I: 7), but Torella points out the "important novelties"

(p. xx) that are connoted by Utpaladeva's work, "not so much in the basic doctrine as in the far more aware and acute deter- mination of the aims proposed, the ways of attaining them and the ambit addressed."

The work is a philosophical treatise, purely theoretical, in which argument and rational proof predominate. Even though it is based on scripture, the religious proposition is circumscribed in a specific space, the third adhikara. The whole of Utpaladeva's work is focused on the recognition of the Lord, and his teaching. The Lord is identical with the "I," and the world of the knowable is nothing but his-the "I," the supreme knower's-manifesta- tion. This is the accomplishment of the fourth state and the state

beyond-the-fourth. Liberation in life is attained through the

overcoming of practical and mental activity (vikalpa) and the

recognition of the identity between the "I" and the Lord. Ut-

paladeva aims in this work gradually to show, through a series of arguments, this path for penetrating the nature of Siva. From

already been included in the two editions of the Isvarapraty- abhijiavimarsini and in that of the Isvarapratyabhijiiavivrti- vimarsini of Abhinavagupta, and translated into English and

German; the Vrtti had never been translated before. The Isvara-

pratyabhijnavivrtivimarsini contains passages and paraphrases of the Vrtti; it was composed around 1015 and it is a precious source for this edition; Torella often quotes it in the footnotes.

In the bibliography Torella has overlooked the first critical edition and translation of the Spandasamdoha of Ksemaraja, which I published as supplement no. 59 to the ANNALI, vol. 49

(Naples: Istituto Universitario Orientale, 1989), even though he listed the Spandasamdoha among Ksemaraja's works, and even

though he supplied me with the single manuscript on which my edition is based, and indeed helped me translate it for my disser- tation! Moreover, the doctrine of spanda is discussed by Torella in his introduction (pp. xiii-xiv) with no mention of that work. Torella also includes in his bibliography the French translation

by A. Padoux of the Paratrimsikalaghuvrtti of Abhinavagupta (Paris, 1975), which he himself criticized in a review article

published in RSO (54 [1980]: 171-200); but he does not include this review among his own works in the present bibliography.

Within the so-called schools of Kashmir Shivaism there are teachers who climbed the highest peaks of religious specula- tion: Utpaladeva (900 or 925-950 or 975) and this work are

particularly important within these schools. Somananda is con- sidered the founder of the Pratyabhijia school and the transmit- ter of the Krama doctrine, which he learned from Govindaraja, to Abhinavagupta. Although his Sivadrsti is considered to be the first work of this school, in the text the term pratyabhijna, "recognition" occurs only once (SD IV, 120a) and, as Torella

points out (p. xx), with no pregnant meaning. The school is named after the work of his disciple Utpaladeva.

The Isvarapratyabhijiikdrikd is the "reflection" of the Siva-

drsti, as Abhinavagupta says in his commentary on this work

(IPV, I: 7), but Torella points out the "important novelties"

(p. xx) that are connoted by Utpaladeva's work, "not so much in the basic doctrine as in the far more aware and acute deter- mination of the aims proposed, the ways of attaining them and the ambit addressed."

The work is a philosophical treatise, purely theoretical, in which argument and rational proof predominate. Even though it is based on scripture, the religious proposition is circumscribed in a specific space, the third adhikara. The whole of Utpaladeva's work is focused on the recognition of the Lord, and his teaching. The Lord is identical with the "I," and the world of the knowable is nothing but his-the "I," the supreme knower's-manifesta- tion. This is the accomplishment of the fourth state and the state

beyond-the-fourth. Liberation in life is attained through the

overcoming of practical and mental activity (vikalpa) and the

recognition of the identity between the "I" and the Lord. Ut-

paladeva aims in this work gradually to show, through a series of arguments, this path for penetrating the nature of Siva. From

Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta learned these teachings and trans- mitted them to later authors. They have been appropriated by other schools as well (see pp. xxxvi-xl).

The importance of Torella's book is obvious. First of all, there is the text itself; then, the edition based on new manu-

scripts, and, finally, the translation of the never-before-translated Vrtti of Utpaladeva.

This work is an excellent example of Torella's intellectual in-

tegrity and, I should say, of the whole "Roman Oriental School." It represents an important contribution to the study of Kashmir Shivaism.

ENRICA GARZILLI

UNIVERSITY OF PERUGIA

Buddhist Theory of Perception. By C. S. VYAS. New Delhi:

NAVRANG, 1991. Pp. ix + 177. $18.

The present book has the subtitle: "with special reference to Pramana-varttika of Dharmakirti." In the preface (p. v) and in a section in chapter 2 (p. 19), the author claims that the present work is an attempt to explore the doctrines of the Dignaga- Dharmakirti school in the light of the Pramdna-varttika (PV) and its commentaries. It, however, does not seem that the author was well prepared for making such an attempt.

It is unfortunate that the author is not well informed on im-

portant achievements in the field of Dharmakirti studies pub- lished from the 1960s onward. In the section intended to

explain "the place of PV in Dharmakirti's seven works" in

chapter 2 (pp. 16-18), the author makes the following remark: Since the Pramdnaviniscaya (PVin) is a summary of PV which is an extensive commentary on Dignaga's Pramanasamuccaya, "the limitations of a commentary are conspicuous" in it; on the other hand, the Nyayabindu (NB), which is an independent trea- tise on the principles of logic, "is free from the fetters of the self-chosen loyalty to the master." Thus he states, "it is proba- bly because of this that the term abhrantam (non-illusive) has been unmincingly added in the NB definition of pratyaksa. .. " Had the author referred to T. Vetter's work on PVin, ch.. 1, which appeared in 1966, he could have ascertained that the term abhrdntam is adopted also in the PVin definition of praty- aksa.1 Regarding the relation of PVin to PV and that of NB to

1 Tilmann Vetter, Dharmakirti's Pramanaviniscayah, 1. Kapi- tel, Pratyaksam: Einleitung, Text der tibetischen Ubersetzung, Sanskrit-fragmente, deutsche Ubersetzung. Sitzungsberichte, phil.-hist. Kl. (Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1966). Wien: Hermann B6hlaus Nachf.

Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta learned these teachings and trans- mitted them to later authors. They have been appropriated by other schools as well (see pp. xxxvi-xl).

The importance of Torella's book is obvious. First of all, there is the text itself; then, the edition based on new manu-

scripts, and, finally, the translation of the never-before-translated Vrtti of Utpaladeva.

This work is an excellent example of Torella's intellectual in-

tegrity and, I should say, of the whole "Roman Oriental School." It represents an important contribution to the study of Kashmir Shivaism.

ENRICA GARZILLI

UNIVERSITY OF PERUGIA

Buddhist Theory of Perception. By C. S. VYAS. New Delhi:

NAVRANG, 1991. Pp. ix + 177. $18.

The present book has the subtitle: "with special reference to Pramana-varttika of Dharmakirti." In the preface (p. v) and in a section in chapter 2 (p. 19), the author claims that the present work is an attempt to explore the doctrines of the Dignaga- Dharmakirti school in the light of the Pramdna-varttika (PV) and its commentaries. It, however, does not seem that the author was well prepared for making such an attempt.

It is unfortunate that the author is not well informed on im-

portant achievements in the field of Dharmakirti studies pub- lished from the 1960s onward. In the section intended to

explain "the place of PV in Dharmakirti's seven works" in

chapter 2 (pp. 16-18), the author makes the following remark: Since the Pramdnaviniscaya (PVin) is a summary of PV which is an extensive commentary on Dignaga's Pramanasamuccaya, "the limitations of a commentary are conspicuous" in it; on the other hand, the Nyayabindu (NB), which is an independent trea- tise on the principles of logic, "is free from the fetters of the self-chosen loyalty to the master." Thus he states, "it is proba- bly because of this that the term abhrantam (non-illusive) has been unmincingly added in the NB definition of pratyaksa. .. " Had the author referred to T. Vetter's work on PVin, ch.. 1, which appeared in 1966, he could have ascertained that the term abhrdntam is adopted also in the PVin definition of praty- aksa.1 Regarding the relation of PVin to PV and that of NB to

1 Tilmann Vetter, Dharmakirti's Pramanaviniscayah, 1. Kapi- tel, Pratyaksam: Einleitung, Text der tibetischen Ubersetzung, Sanskrit-fragmente, deutsche Ubersetzung. Sitzungsberichte, phil.-hist. Kl. (Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1966). Wien: Hermann B6hlaus Nachf.

498 498

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Reviews of Books

PVin, an acceptable explanation is given in E. Frauwallner, "Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakirti's," in Asiatica: Festschrift Friedrich Weller (Leipzig, 1954), 142-54.

Obviously the author is unaware of this article. In the same section, the author mentions the names of some

post-Dharmakirti scholars of the logico-epistemological school of Buddhism, but he states nothing about the mutual relation-

ship between them. It is evident that he derived his information from D. Malvania's introduction to Pandita Durvekamisra's

Dharmottarapradipa (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Inst., 1955), pages xxvii ff., because wrong information contained in it is kept by the author unaltered. Karnagomi should be changed to

Karnakagomin. Kalyanaraksita is a name wrongly reconstructed

by S. C. Vidyabhusana from the Tibetan dGe (b)srun(s). The correct name is Subhagupta (cf. E. Frauwallner, "Dignaga und anderes," in Festschrift fir Moritz Winternitz [Leipzig, 1933]; M. Hattori, "Bahyarthasiddhikarika of Subhagupta," JIBK 8.1 [1960]: 395-400). The author could have obtained much im-

proved information from the following publications: R. Gnoli, The Pramanavarttikam of Dharmakirti: The First Chapter with the Autocommentary (Roma: IsMEO, 1960), xviii-xxvii; E. Frauwallner, "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic," WZKSO 5 (1961), 125-48. On the basis of Malvania's infor- mation, the author states that Prajfinkaragupta's PV-bhasya "lays great emphasis on the contents of the chapter on Pramfna, wherein is delineated the trikaya (dharma-kdya, svabhava-k0 and jhidna-k?) of the Buddha ...." The doctrine of trikaya is nowhere elucidated by Dharmakirti. Moreover, a set of three kayas given in parentheses is quite uncommon. Dharmakirti's

religious thought is described by T. Vetter in the introduction to his book: Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakirtis Pra- manavarttika (Wien, 1984), which contains a German transla- tion of the latter half (vv. 131cd-285) of the Pramdnasiddhi

chapter of PV After examining pre-Dignfga Buddhists' and Dignaga's the-

ories of perception in chs. 3 and 4, the author proceeds to treat Dharmakirti's theory of perception from ch. 5 onward. He does not intend to scrutinize Dharmakirti's view as presented in PV, but examines (critically?) what was discussed by Stcherbatsky in his Buddhist Logic (1930) and by B. K. Matilal and some others. First he explains at length the implication of the term abhranta (non-erroneous) in Dharmakirti's definition of per- ception. In PV Dharmakirti follows Dignfga in characterizing perception by the term kalpandpodha (free from conceptual construction), but he employs in addition the term abhranta in NB (and in PVin as stated above). The author closely examines Stcherbatsky's view concerning Dignaga's non-adoption of the term 'non-erroneous' (avyabhicdra, abhranta), which was used by Asaiga to characterize perception (pp. 60-73). He does not present any new material, but puts forth occasionally philo- sophical arguments which are not based on Dharmakirti's work. Divergent views concerning the meaning of the term abhranta

in the definition of perception are examined in Sfntaraksita's Tattvasamgraha (TS), vv. 1312-29 (GOS ed.) and Kamalasila's TS-Paijika on them, which are indicated by Stcherbatsky in footnotes. The author puts strange interpretations on some pas- sages in these works. He states: "While both Dharmakirti and Sgntaraksita accede that there are some purely mental illusions such as belief in the existence of supernatural beings (bhavasd- mdnya [sic]) as objective categories,..." (p. 64). The term

bhavasdmdnya in the sense of supernatural being is quite unfa- miliar to the present reviewer. The compound bhava-sdmanya- buddhi occurs in v. 1317, in which an opponent criticizes San- taraksita's assertion that all mental illusions vanish on reflection (vicdra), that is to say, that which does not vanish on reflection is not a mental illusion, as for example, a hair-tuft perceived by a person afflicted with an eye disease (cf. TS. vv. 1312-14). To

repudiate Santaraksita's argument, the opponent points out that the Buddhists, who deny the reality of the universal on reflec- tion, do not cease to have the notions of 'entity' (bhdva) and 'universal' (sdmanya) with respect to a pot, etc. Sfntaraksita's rejoinder to this criticism is given in v. 1322.

Also the following explanation of the author is unacceptable to the present reviewer: "According to Kamalasila validity of a cognition is of two types: (i) compatibility between the appear- ance and its cognition (pratibhasam avisamvadad [sic]), and (ii) compatibility of cognition with the apprehension (adhyava- sdyam avisamvadadd [sic])" (p. 72). In TS 1324 Sfntaraksita re- fers to the view that the cognition of yellow conch-shell, even

though it is illusory, is recognized as valid perception inasmuch as it is not incompatible (avisamvdda) with effective action (arthakriyd), and criticizes this view in vv. 1325-26. The au- thor's explanation cited above is based on Kamalasila's com-

mentary on vv. 1325-26, which begins with the following sentence: prdmdnyam hi bhavad dvabhydm dkarabhyam bha- vati, yathdpratibhdsam avisamvadad yathddhyavasayam vd. Since the appearance (pratibhdsa) of an object and the appre- hension (adhyavasaya) of an object are phases of cognition, it is odd to say that a cognition is compatible with the appearance/ apprehension of an object. In PV, II (Pramanasiddhi), v. 1, Dharmakirti defines pramdna as avisamvddi jiinam (cognition possessing compatibility) and avisamvddana (compatibility) as arthakriyd-sthitih (steadiness of effective action). The thought that the cognition which infallibly leads man to effective action is valid cognition is expressed in this definition. The term avisamvdda in the above citation from Kamalagila's commen- tary is also to be taken in the same sense, viz., the compatibility of a cognition with effective action. Kamalagila distinguishes the compatibility in accordance with two phases of cognition: according to appearance (yathdpratibhasam) and according to apprehension (yathadhyavasdyam).

In TS, v. 1328, Sgntaraksita quotes Dignaga's words: tadrupo hy arthaniscayah. The author's translation is given in p. 73 as follows: "the definite cognition of a thing is in the

499

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Journal of the American Oriental Society 119.3 (1999) Journal of the American Oriental Society 119.3 (1999)

form of the thing." This does not make sense. For the interpre- tation of this quarter verse, see M. Hattori, Digndga: On Per-

ception, HOS 47 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1968), 103, n. 1.62.

The meaning of the term kalpandpodha in the definition of

perception is elucidated in ch. 6 (pp. 76-92). In the following chapters the author treats "kinds of perception" (pp. 93-120), "the relation of perception to object" (pp. 121-48) and sums up the results of his investigation (pp. 149-53). It seems that the au- thor's study is not based on a proper understanding of the rele- vant Sanskrit texts. His "translation" is rough and inaccurate in

many cases. Sometimes he puts forward an argument based

merely on his arbitrary reference to a portion of a text. For

example, he insists that both Dignaga and Dharmakirti are Sau- trantikas by pointing out that the Sautrantika theory that the as-

semblage of atoms is the object of perception is accepted by Dignaga in his Alambanapariksd (AP) and by Dharmakirti in his PV (pp. 123-24). However, he does not direct attention to AP, vv. 6a-c: yad antarjieyarfpam bahirvad avabhasate, so 'rthah, nor to PV, III (Pratyaksa), vv. 320ff., in which the Yogacara- Vijfinavada view is clearly expressed (cf. M. Hattori, Review of H. Tosaki's translation of PV III, vol. II, in Indo-lranian Journal 30 [1987]: 309-10). Sanskrit sentences quoted in footnotes are

mostly unreadable and make readers unpleasantly irritable. For

example: saksaccajnanajaname samartho visayoksavata (p. 93, n. 1) for sdksac ca (v. 1. cet is better) jndnajanane samartho

visayo 'ksavat. In appendix A (pp. 154-56), the author gives a "chronolog-

ical table of philosophers," but the dates assigned to some phi- losophers are hardly acceptable. In appendix B (pp. 157-69), a

"translation of relevant kirikds of PV" is presented, but in

many cases the reviewer cannot but be hesitant in admitting the

author's work as a "translation." To cite an example, v. 50

(jiinamdtrarthakarane 'py ayogyam ata eva tat / tad ayogya-

taydrilpam tad dhy avastusu laksanam) is translated (!) as fol-

lows: "That object which offers its own form in the cognition, produces vivid form (and?) is capable of successful action in

regard to the object, is the ultimate real." This verse is intended to prove that the universal (sdmdnya) is unreal (aripa, avastu) for the reason that it is incapable (ayogya) of producing an

effect in the form of a cognition, but not to characterize what is

ultimately real. It is to be hoped that the author will try to read a text more

carefully, and base his arguments on a proper understanding of the ideas expressed in the text.

MASAAKI HATTORI

KYOTO

form of the thing." This does not make sense. For the interpre- tation of this quarter verse, see M. Hattori, Digndga: On Per-

ception, HOS 47 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1968), 103, n. 1.62.

The meaning of the term kalpandpodha in the definition of

perception is elucidated in ch. 6 (pp. 76-92). In the following chapters the author treats "kinds of perception" (pp. 93-120), "the relation of perception to object" (pp. 121-48) and sums up the results of his investigation (pp. 149-53). It seems that the au- thor's study is not based on a proper understanding of the rele- vant Sanskrit texts. His "translation" is rough and inaccurate in

many cases. Sometimes he puts forward an argument based

merely on his arbitrary reference to a portion of a text. For

example, he insists that both Dignaga and Dharmakirti are Sau- trantikas by pointing out that the Sautrantika theory that the as-

semblage of atoms is the object of perception is accepted by Dignaga in his Alambanapariksd (AP) and by Dharmakirti in his PV (pp. 123-24). However, he does not direct attention to AP, vv. 6a-c: yad antarjieyarfpam bahirvad avabhasate, so 'rthah, nor to PV, III (Pratyaksa), vv. 320ff., in which the Yogacara- Vijfinavada view is clearly expressed (cf. M. Hattori, Review of H. Tosaki's translation of PV III, vol. II, in Indo-lranian Journal 30 [1987]: 309-10). Sanskrit sentences quoted in footnotes are

mostly unreadable and make readers unpleasantly irritable. For

example: saksaccajnanajaname samartho visayoksavata (p. 93, n. 1) for sdksac ca (v. 1. cet is better) jndnajanane samartho

visayo 'ksavat. In appendix A (pp. 154-56), the author gives a "chronolog-

ical table of philosophers," but the dates assigned to some phi- losophers are hardly acceptable. In appendix B (pp. 157-69), a

"translation of relevant kirikds of PV" is presented, but in

many cases the reviewer cannot but be hesitant in admitting the

author's work as a "translation." To cite an example, v. 50

(jiinamdtrarthakarane 'py ayogyam ata eva tat / tad ayogya-

taydrilpam tad dhy avastusu laksanam) is translated (!) as fol-

lows: "That object which offers its own form in the cognition, produces vivid form (and?) is capable of successful action in

regard to the object, is the ultimate real." This verse is intended to prove that the universal (sdmdnya) is unreal (aripa, avastu) for the reason that it is incapable (ayogya) of producing an

effect in the form of a cognition, but not to characterize what is

ultimately real. It is to be hoped that the author will try to read a text more

carefully, and base his arguments on a proper understanding of the ideas expressed in the text.

MASAAKI HATTORI

KYOTO

Sukrtidatta Pantas Kartaviryodaya: Ein neuzeitliches Sanskrit-

Mahakdvya aus Nepal. By JOHANNES SCHNEIDER. Indica et

Tibetica, vol. 27. Swisstal Odendorf: INDICA ET TIBETICA

VERLAG, 1996. Pp. 430. DM 84.

This volume, a revised version of a 1994 doctoral disserta- tion at the Philipps-Universitat in Marburg, deals with one of the works of Sukrtidatta Panta, who was born in the year 1823- 24 in a village near the city of Baglung (Bagaluna) in western

Nepal. Sukrtidatta's ancestors, including his father Bhavadatta, as well as his three elder brothers, were Sanskrit scholars and teachers. Schneider's provisional list of Sukrtidatta's works

(pp. 27-29) includes twenty-eight items. Only one of these, the

Bhdvdmrtavydkhyd, a commentary on the tenth sarga of Jaya- deva's Gitagovinda (dated 1843-44), has been published so far,

by Prapannacarya (Pokhara and Lalitapura, v.s. 2049 [1992-

93]). Schneider is concerned with Sukrtidatta's "Spatwerk"-it is labeled anuja to six other works in the final stanzas of six of its sargas-Kdrtaviryodaya (henceforth KVU) which, accord-

ing to verse 17.35, was completed ndgendra-netra-nava-bhu- mita-vikramabde vaisdkha-masa-sita-paksa-trtiya-tithydm, i.e., on April 23, 1871 (p. 193), just a few years before the author's death.

The KVU is a mahakdvya in 17 sargas and 1745 stanzas. Based on personal information which Sukrtidatta provides in the final chapter, Schneider describes the author's goal as fol- lows: "In einer Zeit, als das Sanskrit schon langst zur Sprache einer kleinen Bildungsschicht geworden war, unternahm es

Sukrtidatta Panta, das Genre des Mahakavya fortzufiihren. Seine Gedanken sind daher nicht nur wertvoll als Aussagen eines Dichters iiber sein eigenes Werk-sie sind auch als

Aufforderung an die Gebildeten zu verstehen, die grosse Tradi-

tion der Sanskrit-Dichtung nicht nur zu bewahren, sondern im

Stil der alten Meister sch6pferisch fortzusetzen" (p. 29). Sukrtidatta refers to several predecessors whose everlasting

kirti he wishes to share:

srikalidasa-bhavabhuti-murari-magha- sriharsa-bharavi-mukhdh kavayo 'dhundpi tisthanti kirtivapuseti mamaisa yatnas tisthami kalpam amund vapuseha vijiidh (KVU 17.32)

Yet, elsewhere he singles out one of them in particular, Sriharsa:

sriharsoktih sahrdayahrddm harsavarsam tanotu

(KVU 17.20b)

A substantial chapter of the volume (pp. 89-183) is devoted

to the "poetische Figuren im achten Sarga." Both the seventh

and the eighth sargas are, indeed, intentionally designed to il-

lustrate a variety of alamkdras. Differently from other colophons that relate directly to the progress of the kavya story-e.g., mdhismativarnanam ndma (sarga one), dattairamagamanam

Sukrtidatta Pantas Kartaviryodaya: Ein neuzeitliches Sanskrit-

Mahakdvya aus Nepal. By JOHANNES SCHNEIDER. Indica et

Tibetica, vol. 27. Swisstal Odendorf: INDICA ET TIBETICA

VERLAG, 1996. Pp. 430. DM 84.

This volume, a revised version of a 1994 doctoral disserta- tion at the Philipps-Universitat in Marburg, deals with one of the works of Sukrtidatta Panta, who was born in the year 1823- 24 in a village near the city of Baglung (Bagaluna) in western

Nepal. Sukrtidatta's ancestors, including his father Bhavadatta, as well as his three elder brothers, were Sanskrit scholars and teachers. Schneider's provisional list of Sukrtidatta's works

(pp. 27-29) includes twenty-eight items. Only one of these, the

Bhdvdmrtavydkhyd, a commentary on the tenth sarga of Jaya- deva's Gitagovinda (dated 1843-44), has been published so far,

by Prapannacarya (Pokhara and Lalitapura, v.s. 2049 [1992-

93]). Schneider is concerned with Sukrtidatta's "Spatwerk"-it is labeled anuja to six other works in the final stanzas of six of its sargas-Kdrtaviryodaya (henceforth KVU) which, accord-

ing to verse 17.35, was completed ndgendra-netra-nava-bhu- mita-vikramabde vaisdkha-masa-sita-paksa-trtiya-tithydm, i.e., on April 23, 1871 (p. 193), just a few years before the author's death.

The KVU is a mahakdvya in 17 sargas and 1745 stanzas. Based on personal information which Sukrtidatta provides in the final chapter, Schneider describes the author's goal as fol- lows: "In einer Zeit, als das Sanskrit schon langst zur Sprache einer kleinen Bildungsschicht geworden war, unternahm es

Sukrtidatta Panta, das Genre des Mahakavya fortzufiihren. Seine Gedanken sind daher nicht nur wertvoll als Aussagen eines Dichters iiber sein eigenes Werk-sie sind auch als

Aufforderung an die Gebildeten zu verstehen, die grosse Tradi-

tion der Sanskrit-Dichtung nicht nur zu bewahren, sondern im

Stil der alten Meister sch6pferisch fortzusetzen" (p. 29). Sukrtidatta refers to several predecessors whose everlasting

kirti he wishes to share:

srikalidasa-bhavabhuti-murari-magha- sriharsa-bharavi-mukhdh kavayo 'dhundpi tisthanti kirtivapuseti mamaisa yatnas tisthami kalpam amund vapuseha vijiidh (KVU 17.32)

Yet, elsewhere he singles out one of them in particular, Sriharsa:

sriharsoktih sahrdayahrddm harsavarsam tanotu

(KVU 17.20b)

A substantial chapter of the volume (pp. 89-183) is devoted

to the "poetische Figuren im achten Sarga." Both the seventh

and the eighth sargas are, indeed, intentionally designed to il-

lustrate a variety of alamkdras. Differently from other colophons that relate directly to the progress of the kavya story-e.g., mdhismativarnanam ndma (sarga one), dattairamagamanam

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