bridging the gaps situational awareness and assessment public health and radiation emergency...
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Bridging the GapsSituational Awareness and Assessment
Public Health and Radiation Emergency Preparedness Conference
March 22, 2011CDC, Atlanta, Georgia
Panel
• Harvey Clark, PhD, Principal Scientist, DOE Remote Sensing Laboratory
• Bill Irwin, ScD, CHP, Radiological Health Chief, Vermont Department of Health
• James Kish, BS, Technological Hazards Division Director, FEMA
• Patricia Milligan, BS, Senior Technical Advisor, Preparedness and Response, NRC
The Setting for This Panel• We will discuss situational awareness and assessment tools,
and present questions about their value.• We will describe their use by state and federal agencies in
radiological and nuclear emergencies which include:– Nuclear power plant accidents;– Hostile actions – radiological dispersion devices, radiological exposure
devices, mass or individual poisonings;– Transportation incidents;– Nuclear weapons or improvised nuclear device (IND) detonations; and– Criticality accidents at nuclear facilities.
• Nevertheless, what is presented here can be applied in most instances if you substitute the word chemical agent or biological agent for radiological agent.
Situational Awareness and Assessment is Critical
• Who in the public needs to know what when?– Could it be that an informed populace generally responds more
constructively than if they only operate on informally obtained information?
– How much is too much to share?• How much of the status of operations should the emergency
responders be provided?– What is sufficient so they can see the whole of it and understand their
work relative to objectives?– Can too much information lead them to inappropriate action?
• What if the information is inaccurate, too complicated or poorly presented?
How the Public Builds Situational Awareness
• They will likely hear or see things about the situation in:– Commercial media– Internet– Personal conversation
• They might get some information from the government, e.g., public affairs, the communications office, the Public Information Officer (PIO) or other source.
• Can a lack of timely and accurate information from the PIO or other party in possession of the facts leave the public vulnerable to acting on inadequate or wrong information?
And What about Emergency Responders?
• They have the same sources usually, the PIO, commercial media, internet and personal conversation, but they also ought to have:– An Incident Action Plan (IAP);– Data products like maps, charts, graphs, field data,
computer models and photographs; and– The guidance of technical advisors.
• One of the challenges is getting information to field offices that may not have sufficient resources including internet access and plotters for printing large documents.
What Information Depicts the Situation for the Public and Emergency Responders?
• Likely the same for each party, though that for the public may be limited in extent and detail:– What happened;– What authorities are doing about it;– What people can do to help;– What people can do to protect themselves;– What consequences are possible;– What consequences are likely knowing what we do at the time;– Where to go for help; and– Where to get additional information.
• Photos and videos feed the mind these days; we need to use them.
Maps are Perhaps the Most Useful Means to Display Information
• Where the incident occurred• Restricted areas with traffic control points• Emergency facilities available for those
affected including– Community reception centers,– Congregate care facilities,– Medical countermeasures points of distribution,
and– Available medical facilities.
Maps are Perhaps the Most Useful Means to Display Information
• Where inputs to the food chain are restricted, and• Critical infrastructure that is not currently accessible;
– Electric, water, communications and other utilities– Government offices, including police, fire and ambulance– Businesses, especially major employers– Schools– Health care facilities– Farms– Food retailers and wholesalers– Road, rail, boat and air transportation – thos open; those closed
Dose Assessment Tools
• Dose and contamination projection models.– RESRAD: A library of models for radiation and
contamination effects for most incidents– RASCAL: for nuclear power plant and spent fuel accidents– A raft of other models from various government sites and
private firms, e.g. ALOHA, CAMEO, MARPLOT
• Field team radiation and contamination surveillance data.
• Aerial monitoring results.
Dose Assessment Tools• Environmental instruments like EPA’s RadNet, DOEs
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty monitors, and those of states and local government.– Standardized presentations – how many times standards, how many
times background, actual units– The US is severely hampered by not adopting SI units – confusion is
bad enough without having sieverts and rem, gray and rads, becquerrel and curies.
• Emergency responder and public dose and contamination records.
• Emergency responder and public contaminated injury records.• Medical records for radiation overexposures.• There are still privacy concerns to be met.
But, Its Not Just About Dose• Weather
– It may have been a cause– It may make things better or worse– It affects dispersal and fallout of the agent– It affects the timeliness and nature of many elements of the response– It affects the terrain
• Used and available beds for medical and special needs populations.
• Personal protective equipment inventories.• Medical countermeasures inventories.• Emergency responder staffing rosters.
Empire '09 06/04 - Thank You from Vermont Health Commissioner Wendy Davis, MD (pdf)
05/29 -Vermont to Exercise Public Health Response to "Dirty Bomb"
This site documents the simulated events as they unfold. This is NOT a real event.
THIS IS AN EXERCISE. THIS IS NOT A REAL EVENT.
Status Update:
06/04 (1600) - Field Lab Tests on Some Crops Show Excess Contamination
06/03 (1000) - Field Measurements in Vermont Show Low Contamination So Far
06/02 (1100) - Statement by Department of Health Commissioner Wendy Davis, MD (pdf)
06/01 (1800) - Environmental Testing in Vermont Shows Low Contamination So Far
06/01 (0900) - Low Levels of Contamination Detected. Special Precautions for Vermonters
05/31 (2100) - Updated: Instructions for Vermonters
05/31 (1800) - Instructions for Vermonters
05/31 (1800) - Explosions in Albany, NY Confirmed to be “Dirty Bombs”
05/31 (1230) - Explosions in Albany, NY
Public Information Line: Dial 2-1-1 for Vermont information (2-1-1 monitoring exercise only)
Facts About Dirty Bombs (exit VDH) For Hospitals & Health Care Providers Facts about Americium-241 For Individuals and Families(exit VDH) Facts about Cesium-137 Radiological Field Testing Frequently Asked Questions Exercise News and Advisories
Vermont Department of Health | 108 Cherry Street | Burlington, VT 05402 Voice: 802-863-7200 | In Vermont 800-464-4343 | Fax: 802-865-7754 | TTY/TDD: Dial 711 first
VDH District Offices | Contact Us | Accessibility Policy (pdf) | Privacy Policy A Vermont Government Website
©2005 Vermont Department of Health. All rights reserved.
Public information was useful for situation awareness for responders
. The Department of Energy can get these kinds of maps to sophisticated fixed facilities. For field units to get them, they must have laptops and air cards. To use them for briefings or other display, they need printers or large monitors
A National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) data product. Great for decision makers. What about other emergency responders? What about the public? How do you keep from confusing any of these audiences with this unique language and unsettling and mysterious source of exposure?
The state has tested field teams which collect environmental samples for laboratory analysis for many years. The teams had no incident command structure, however, after they were deployed to forward camps. We asked Region 1 EPA to bring in an Emergency Response Team. They provided us additional sampling teams and an ICS structure. Their tent wasn’t bad either.
As teams deploy, we must maintain accountability as well as progress toward meeting incident objectives
In addition to having a wealth of communications platforms which made internet communications possible, the EPA mobile command post also came with a plotter that could be used to print large documents needed to provide briefings to large groups and to show activities taking place across the four state region affected by the RDDs in Albany, NY.
The EPA deployed its RadNet units for detailed beta and gamma radiation, airborne radioactivity measurements and basic weather which are sent by wireless signals to EPA headquarters in Washington, DC. This one was at the sampling base camp. Others were deployed to forward areas of fallout deposition.
States, even the biggest, are not likely to have sufficient people to do it all. We had to sample more than 6,000 square miles that were modeled as contaminated. How can you integrate federal and other state teams without situational awareness?
Some may require teleconference capabilities to link widely Briefings are critical. dispersed assets. One briefing here used a blackberry on speaker phone for an address to all emergency responders from a high ranking government official
Connecticut lent us their mobile radiochemistry laboratory under the New England Compact. We were able to process high priority samples right at the sampling base camp. Who should hear the sampling results?
Geographical information systems (GIS) are invaluable for displaying the situation over layers of critical infrastructure like health care facilities, fire stations, ambulance facilities, utilities, farms, reservoirs and roads.
The Resources of the Department of Energy and the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
(FRMAC)
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2
Radiological Assistance Program
• Advise on radiological issues• First responder - arrives in 4-6 hours• Assist with radioactive material recovery• Assist with the characterization of
radiological incident
Advisory TeamAdvisory Team
Provides coordinated advice and Provides coordinated advice and recommendations on environment, food recommendations on environment, food and health matters to the Federal, state, and health matters to the Federal, state, local and tribal governments. local and tribal governments.
Representatives from:Representatives from: EPAEPA - FDA- FDA CDCCDC - USDA- USDA Other Federal agencies as neededOther Federal agencies as needed
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AMS On-Call Response
• Beech King Air B-200 • Avg. post-flight data processing
time: 1 hour• Data Products: Breadcrumb
overlay plot• Real-time data telemetry
Mission: Get data from large area quickly, Fly high and fastActivation: 5 to 10 hours on site
AMS Radiological Mapping Helicopter Response
Bell-412• Data product: Contoured ground exposure
map• Data processing time: 3-4 hours• Intermediate phase product
• Mission: Get more detailed data. Fly low and slow• Activation: 8 to 20 hours to site
CM Response Team I
Mission: Initial field element of FRMACActivation: 4 hours following notification
Operations – 24 hours (for limited time)
Capabilities• Assessment• Geographical Information Systems• Health & Safety• Monitoring & Sampling• Five field teams• Logistics
CM Response Team II
• Additional responders• 24-hour/day operation for several weeks• Augmented monitoring, sampling and
assessment
• Additional equipment• 20 field teams
• Laboratory Analysis• Sample receipt• Prepare samples for transport to labs
• Training for additional responders
Mission: Complete CMRT staffing for full 24-hour operationsActivation: 12 hours following notification
Briefing ProductsCritical to explain for each Data Product
• What decisions or actions are being addressed
• Key points they should take away
• Actions that should be considered
• Assumptions and limitations of Data Product
• How each Data Product fits into the overall situation
Transfer from DOE to EPA• At a mutually agreeable time
• After consultation with DHS, the JFO Coordination Group, state, local, and tribal officials
• The following conditions are to be met before transfer:– Immediate emergency condition is stabilized– Offsite release of radioactive material has ceased– Offsite radiological conditions have been characterized– Initial long-range monitoring plan has been developed– Other Federal agencies will commit required resources
Environmental Protection Agency
• Assist with non-radiological hazards– Such as chemical spills, hazardous materials fires,
accidental hazmat releases due to radiological event
• Coordinate off-site cleanup activities– with NRC– with appropriate jurisdiction
• Eventually close FRMAC in time and transition to EPA-only or other monitoring program
CM / FRMAC Contact Information
Colleen O’LaughlinNNSA / NSO - [email protected]
FRMAC Program Informationhttp://www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/homelandsecurity/frmac/default.htm
Emergency Response Numbers (24-hr)
NNSA / HQ – 202-586-8100NARAC – 925-422-7627
Manuals
• FRMAC Operations Manual – Oct. 2010– This manual describes the Federal Radiological Monitoring and
Assessment Center’s (FRMAC) response activities in a major radiological emergency
• FRMAC Assessment Manuals (2 volumes) – April 2010– These manuals provide the scientific basis and methods for
assessment calculations
• FRMAC Monitoring Manuals (2 volumes) – Dec. 2005– These manuals provide the monitoring and sampling methods for a
radiological response
Manuals (cont)
• FRMAC Laboratory Analysis Manual – Dec. 2005– This manual provide general guidance relating to sample
tracking and analysis
• FRMAC Health and Safety Manual – May 2001– The manual describes how radiological health and safety
plans will be implemented for FRMAC
Link:http://www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/homelandsecurity/default.htm
Typical Response Process
LocalSupport or Response
StateSupport or Response
FederalSupport or Response
Incident
National Response Framework
DHS designatesg. Other types of incidents not otherwise addressed above
DOD or DOEf. Nuclear weapon accident/incident (based on custody at time of event)
(1) DHS/USCG
(2) EPA
e. Foreign, unknown or unlicensed material:(1)Incidents involving foreign or unknown sources of radioactive material in certain areas of the coastal zone(2)All others
(1) NASA or DOD(2) DHS/USCG(3) EPA
d. Space vehicles containing radioactive materials:(1)Managed by NASA or DOD(2)Not managed by DOD or NASA impacting certain areas of the coastal zone(3)All others
(1) DOD or DOE(2) NRC(2) DHS/USCG
(4) EPA
c. Transportation of radioactive materials:(1)Materials shipped by or for DOD or DOE (2)Shipment of NRC or Agreement State-licensed materials(3)Shipment of materials in certain areas of the coastal zone that are not licensed or owned by a Federal agency or Agreement State (see USCG list of responsibilities for further explanation of “certain areas”)(4)All others
(1) DOD or DOE(2) NRC(3) EPA
b. Nuclear facilities:(1)Owned or operated by DOD or DOE(2)Licensed by NRC or Agreement State(3)Not licensed, owned, or operated by a Federal agency or an Agreement State, or currently or formerly licensed, but of which the owner/operator is not financially viable or is otherwise unable to respond
(1) DOD or DOE(2) NRC(3) DOE
a. Radiological terrorism incidents (e.g. RDD/IND or Radiological Exposure Device):(1)Material or facilities owned or operated by DOD or DOE(2)Material or facilities licensed by NRC or Agreement State(3)All others
Coordinating AgencyType of Incident
NRC Roles & Responsibilities
• Monitor and independently assess licensee’s actions.
• Serve as an independent source of information, advice and technical analyses for State.
• Determine if the incident meets criteria for Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence.
• Coordinate Federal response and provide Federal support for licensee, State, and locals.
• Support other Federal agencies.
• Coordinate public information for the Federal Government.
Notifications• Notifications typically are made to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center
[(301) 816-5100]• Although licensees are required to classify events as described in their emergency
plans, the NRC response may vary based upon an evaluation of the situation; not solely upon the classification
Event Notification
Headquarters Operations Officer
Assesses information, then makes notifications
Headquarters Emergency Officer determines if HQ
management needs to be notified
Regional Duty Officer appropriate
regional management/decisi
on makers
Notification to other Federal
agencies
Notification to State agencies
NRC Incident Response Modes & Locations
• Response Modes:–Normal–Monitoring –Activation–Expanded
Activation
HeadquartersOperations Center
On-Scene –
Site Team
Regional Incident Response
Center
Management
Technical Assessment
Security / Safeguards
Protective Measures
Liaison
Public Information
Response Coordination
Functional Response Organization
State
Advisory Team
(EPA, HHS, USDA)
Senior NRC Official
DOE FRMAC
Field Monitoring Data
Principal Federal Official
FR
MA
CJo
int F
ield O
ffice
Laboratories
NRC Headquarters
Team
(Director)
NRC Site Team
(Site Team Director)
Regional Base Team
(Base Team Manager)
Onsite
Remote
NRC Field Interfaces
NRC Incident ResponsePost-Plume Phase Staffing
NRC Senior Official
Response Coordination
Leader
Protective Measures
Branch Leader
Government LiaisonLeader
Public Affairs Leader
Site Team Director
NRC Ingestion Pathway Team Responsibilities
• Assess the adverse consequences of the incident to the general population and the environment
• Evaluate the protective actions being considered, providing an assessment, and as appropriate, a recommendation to the Site Team Director
• Ensure that NRC radiological information is coordinated with other Federal and offsite decision-making authorities
• Together with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) representatives, coordinate and/or provide Federal assistance to the State, to assess radiological conditions
NRC Ingestion Pathway Team Responsibilities (continued)
• Coordinate relocation to the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC)
• Coordinate the dispatch of the Advisory Team for Environment, Food, and Health (ATEFH) to the site
• Coordinate the development of Federal positions on protective actions and assessment of radiological conditions with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) representatives
DHS designatesg. Other types of incidents not otherwise addressed above
DOD or DOEf. Nuclear weapon accident/incident (based on custody at time of event)
(1) DHS/USCG
(2) EPA
e. Foreign, unknown or unlicensed material:(1)Incidents involving foreign or unknown sources of radioactive material in certain areas of the coastal zone(2)All others
(1) NASA or DOD(2) DHS/USCG(3) EPA
d. Space vehicles containing radioactive materials:(1)Managed by NASA or DOD(2)Not managed by DOD or NASA impacting certain areas of the coastal zone(3)All others
(1) DOD or DOE(2) NRC(2) DHS/USCG
(4) EPA
c. Transportation of radioactive materials:(1)Materials shipped by or for DOD or DOE (2)Shipment of NRC or Agreement State-licensed materials(3)Shipment of materials in certain areas of the coastal zone that are not licensed or owned by a Federal agency or Agreement State (see USCG list of responsibilities for further explanation of “certain areas”)(4)All others
(1) DOD or DOE(2) NRC(3) EPA
b. Nuclear facilities:(1)Owned or operated by DOD or DOE(2)Licensed by NRC or Agreement State(3)Not licensed, owned, or operated by a Federal agency or an Agreement State, or currently or formerly licensed, but of which the owner/operator is not financially viable or is otherwise unable to respond
(1) DOD or DOE(2) NRC(3) DOE
a. Radiological terrorism incidents (e.g. RDD/IND or Radiological Exposure Device):(1)Material or facilities owned or operated by DOD or DOE(2)Material or facilities licensed by NRC or Agreement State(3)All others
Coordinating AgencyType of Incident
National Response FrameworkNational Response Framework