bloch con law case outline

8/6/2019 Bloch Con Law Case Outline

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Bloch Con law case outline

I. The role of the Supreme Court

The Basic Framework

Marbury v. MadisonFacts of the Case:

The case began on March 2, 1801, when an obscure Federalist, William Marbury, wasdesignated as a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. Marbury and severalothers were appointed to government posts created by Congress in the last days of

John Adams's presidency, but these last-minute appointments were never fullyfinalized. The disgruntled appointees invoked an act of Congress and sued for their

jobs in the Supreme Court.Question:Is Marbury entitled to his appointment? Is his lawsuit the correct way to get it? And, isthe Supreme Court the place for Marbury to get the relief he requests?Conclusion:

Yes; yes; and it depends. The justices held, through Marshall's forceful argument,that on the last issue the Constitution was "the fundamental and paramount law ofthe nation" and that "an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void."In other words, when the Constitution--the nation's highest law--conflicts with an actof the legislature, that act is invalid. This case establishes the Supreme Court's powerof judicial review.

Martin v. Hunters LesseeFacts of the Case:Lord Fairfax held land in Virginia. He was a Loyalist and fled to England during theRevolution. He died in 1781 and left the land to his nephew, Denny Martin, who was aBritish subject. The following year, the Virginia legislature voided the original landgrant and transferred the land back to Virginia. Virginia granted a portion of this land

to David Hunter. The Jay Treaty seemed to make clear that Lord Fairfax was entitledto the property. The Supreme Court declared that Fairfax was so entitled, but theVirginia courts, where the suit arose, refused to follow the Supreme Court's decision.Question:Does the appellate power of the Supreme Court extend to the Virginia courts?Conclusion:

The Court rejected the claim that Virginia and the national government were equalsovereigns. Reasoning from the Constitution, Justice Story affirmed the Court's powerto override state courts to secure a uniform system of law and to fulfill the mandateof the Supremacy Clause.

Cooper v. AaronFacts of the Case:

The Governor and the Legislature of Arkansas openly resisted the Supreme Court'sdecision in Brown v. Board of Education. They refused to obey court orders designedto implement school desegregation. Local officials delayed plans to do away withsegregated public facilities.Question:Were Arkansas officials bound by federal court orders mandating desegregation?Conclusion:In a signed, unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Arkansas officialswere bound by federal court orders that rested on the Supreme Court's decision in

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Brown v. Board of Education. The Court noted that its interpretation of the FourteenthAmendment in Brown was the supreme law of the land and that it had a "bindingeffect" on the states. The Court reaffirmed its commitment to desegregation andreiterated that legislatures are not at liberty to annul judgments of the Court.

Cohens v. Virginia

Facts of the Case:An act of Congress authorized the operation of a lottery in the District of Columbia.

The Cohen brothers proceeded to sell D.C. lottery tickets in the state of Virginia,violating state law. State authorities tried and convicted the Cohens, and thendeclared themselves to be the final arbiters of disputes between the states and thenational government.Question:Did the Supreme Court have the power under the Constitution to review the VirginiaSupreme Court's ruling?Conclusion:In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction toreview state criminal proceedings. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the Court wasbound to hear all cases that involved constitutional questions, and that this

jurisdiction was not dependent on the identity of the parties in the cases. Marshallargued that state laws and constitutions, when repugnant to the Constitution andfederal laws, were "absolutely void." After establishing the Court's jurisdiction,Marshall declared the lottery ordinance a local matter and concluded that the Virginiacourt was correct to fine the Cohens brothers for violating Virginia law.

Sources of Judicial Decisions

McCulloch v. MarylandFacts of the Case:In 1816, Congress chartered The Second Bank of the United States. In 1818, the stateof Maryland passed legislation to impose taxes on the bank. James W. McCulloch, thecashier of the Baltimore branch of the bank, refused to pay the tax.Question:

The case presented two questions: Did Congress have the authority to establish thebank? Did the Maryland law unconstitutionally interfere with congressional powers?Conclusion:In a unanimous decision, the Court held that Congress had the power to incorporatethe bank and that Maryland could not tax instruments of the national governmentemployed in the execution of constitutional powers. Writing for the Court, Chief

Justice Marshall noted that Congress possessed unenumerated powers not explicitlyoutlined in the Constitution. Marshall also held that while the states retained thepower of taxation, "the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof aresupreme. . .they control the constitution and laws of the respective states, andcannot be controlled by them."

Calder v. Bull

Facts of the Case:Mr. and Mrs. Caleb Bull, the stated beneficiaries of the will of Norman Morrison, weredenied an inheritance by a Connecticut probate court. When the Bulls attempted toappeal the decision more than a year and a half later, they found that a state lawprohibited appeals not made within 18 months of the original ruling. The Bullspersuaded the Connecticut legislature to change the restriction, which enabled themto successfully appeal the case. Calder, the initial inheritor of Morrison's estate, tookthe case to the Supreme Court.Question:Was the Connecticut legislation a violation of Article 1, Section 10, of the

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Constitution, which prohibits ex post facto laws?Conclusion:In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the legislation was not an ex post factolaw. The Court drew a distinction between criminal rights and "private rights,"arguing that restrictions against ex post facto laws were not designed to protectcitizens' contract rights. Justice Chase noted that while all ex post facto laws are

retrospective, all retrospective laws are not necessarily ex post facto. Even "vested"property rights are subject to retroactive laws.

Political Control of the Supreme Court

Ex parte McCardleFacts of the Case:William McCardle was arrested by federal authorities in 1867 for writing andpublishing a series of editorials in his Mississippi newspaper. The editorials weresharply critical of Reconstruction. McCardle sought a writ of habeas corpus on theground that the Reconstruction Acts under which he was arrested wereunconstitutional. McCardle appealed to the Supreme Court under an 1867congressional statute that conferred jurisdiction on appeal to the High Court. Afterhearing arguments in the case, but prior to announcing a decision, the Congress

withdrew its 1867 act conferring jurisdiction.Question:May the Congress withdraw jurisdiction from the High Court after that jurisdiction hasbeen given?Conclusion:

The Court, speaking through Chase, validated congressional withdrawal of the Court'sjurisdiction. The basis for this repeal was the exceptions clause of Article III Section 2.But Chase pointedly reminded his readers that the 1868 statute repealing jurisdiction"does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised."

U.S. v. KleinFacts of the Case:Lincoln issued a proclamation offering a pardon to any person who had supported or

fought for the Confederate Army, with full restoration of property rights, subject onlyto taking an oath of allegiance. Congress had passed an act in 1863 that permittedan owner of property confiscated during the war to receive the proceeds from thesale of the confiscated property. Based on the statute and the President'sproclamation, V.F. Wilson took the oath of allegiance. Mr. Klein, administrator of Mr.Wilson's estate, then applied, properly, to the Court of Claims to recover theproceeds of the sale of property seized from Mr. Wilson.

In 1870, Congress passed a law that prohibited the use of a Presidential pardon asthe basis for claiming sale proceeds, and further said that acceptance of such apardon was evidence that the person pardoned did provide support to the South andwas ineligible to recover sale proceeds.Question:Was congress law in 1870 unconstitutional and did they exceed its powers?

Conclusion:The SC ruled that the 1870 statute was unconstitutional and that Congress hadexceeded its power by invading the province of the judicial branch by prescribing therule of decision in a particular cause. The Court also ruled that Congress hadimpermissibly infringed the power of the executive branch by limiting the effect of aPresidential pardon.

Broadly speaking, Klein stands for the proposition that the legislative branch cannotimpair the exclusive powers of another branch. Put another way, Klein recognizesand supports the fundamental value of separation of powers defined by the

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Constitution. Specifically, Klein means that Congress may not direct the outcome of acase by prescribing the rule of decision, nor may Congress impair the power andeffect of a Presidential pardon. Read more broadly, Klein suggests, but does notstate, that Congress may not use the Exceptions Clause to cripple the Court's abilityto be the final arbiter of what the Constitution means.

II. Federalism at work, the scope of congress powers

The Values of Federalism and some techniques for implementing them

U.S. Term Limits v. ThorntonFacts of the Case:On November 3, 1992, Arkansas voters adopted Amendment 73 to their StateConstitution. The "Term Limitation Amendment," in addition to limiting terms ofelected officials within the Arkansas state government, also provided that any personwho served three or more terms as a member of the United States House ofRepresentatives from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a USRepresentative from Arkansas. Similarly, the Amendment provided that any personwho served two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate fromArkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Senator from Arkansas.

Question:Can states alter those qualifications for the U.S. Congress that are specificallyenumerated in the Constitution?Conclusion:No. The Constitution prohibits States from adopting Congressional qualifications inaddition to those enumerated in the Constitution. A state congressional term limitsamendment is unconstitutional if it has the likely effect of handicapping a class ofcandidates and "has the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly."Furthermore, "...allowing individual States to craft their own congressionalqualifications would erode the structure designed by the Framers to form a 'moreperfect Union.'"

Doctrinal Fundamentals: Federalism and Judicial Review

Gibbons v. OgdenFacts of the Case:A New York state law gave two individuals the exclusive right to operate steamboatson waters within state jurisdiction. Laws like this one were duplicated elsewherewhich led to friction as some states would require foreign (out-of-state) boats to paysubstantial fees for navigation privileges. In this case a steamboat owner who didbusiness between New York and New Jersey challenged the monopoly that New Yorkhad granted, which forced him to obtain a special operating permit from the state tonavigate on its waters.Question:Did the State of New York exercise authority in a realm reserved exclusively toCongress, namely, the regulation of interstate commerce?Conclusion:

The Court found that New York's licensing requirement for out-of-state operators wasinconsistent with a congressional act regulating the coasting trade. The New York lawwas invalid by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. In his opinion, Chief Justice Marshalldeveloped a clear definition of the word commerce, which included navigation oninterstate waterways. He also gave meaning to the phrase "among the severalstates" in the Commerce Clause. Marshall's was one of the earliest and mostinfluential opinions concerning this important clause. He concluded that regulation ofnavigation by steamboat operators and others for purposes of conducting interstatecommerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the Congress.

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Hammer v. DagenhartFacts of the Case:

The Keating-Owen Child Labor Act prohibited the interstate shipment of goodsproduced by child labor. Reuben Dagenhart's father had sued on behalf of hisfreedom to allow his fourteen year old son to work in a textile mill.Question:

Does the congressional act violate the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, orthe Fifth Amendment?Conclusion:Day spoke for the Court majority and found two grounds to invalidate the law.Production was not commerce, and thus outside the power of Congress to regulate.And the regulation of production was reserved by the Tenth Amendment to thestates. Day wrote that "the powers not expressly delegated to the nationalgovernment are reserved" to the states and to the people. In his wording, Dayrevised the Constitution slightly and changed the intent of the framers: The TenthAmendment does not say "expressly." The framers purposely left the word expresslyout of the amendment because they believed they could not possibly specify everypower that might be needed in the future to run the government.

Wickard v. FilburnFacts of the Case:Filburn was a small farmer in Ohio. He was given a wheat acreage allotment of 11.1acres under a Department of Agriculture directive which authorized the governmentto set production quotas for wheat. Filburn harvested nearly 12 acres of wheat abovehis allotment. He claimed that he wanted the wheat for use on his farm, includingfeed for his poultry and livestock. Fiburn was penalized. He argued that the excesswheat was unrelated to commerce since he grew it for his own use.Question:Is the amendment subjecting Filburn to acreage restrictions in violation of theConstitution because Congress has no power to regulate activities local in nature?Conclusion:According to Filburn, the act regulated production and consumption, which are local

in character. The rule laid down by Justice Jackson is that even if an activity is localand not regarded as commerce, "it may still, whatever its nature, be reached byCongress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and thisirrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have beendefined as 'direct' or 'indirect.'"

The Evolution of the Commerce Clause Doctrine

U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co.Facts of the Case:

The Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 as a response to the publicconcern in the growth of giant combinations controlling transportation, industry, andcommerce. The Act aimed to stop the concentration of wealth and economic power inthe hands of the few. It outlawed "every contract, combination...or conspiracy, in

restraint of trade" or interstate commerce, and it declared every attempt tomonopolize any part of trade or commerce to be illegal. The E.C. Knight Companywas such a combination controlling over 98 percent of the sugar-refining business inthe United States.Question:Did Congress exceed its constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause when itenacted the Sherman Anti-Trust Act?Conclusion:

The Act was constitutional but it did not apply to manufacturing. Manufacturing was

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not commerce, declared Fuller for the majority; the law did not reach the admittedmonopolization of manufacturing (in this case, refining sugar). Although AmericanSugar had monopolized manufacturing, the Court found no violation of the ShermanAct because the acquisition of the Philadelphia refineries involved intrastatecommerce. The trust did not lead to control of interstate commerce and so "affects itonly incidentally and indirectly."

Houston, E & W Texas Railway v. U.S. (The Shreveport Rail

Case)Facts of the Case:A railroad company in Texas charged higher haulage rates for service betweenShreveport, Louisiana and Dallas, Texas, than it did for service involving greaterdistances within Texas. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) ordered therailroad to charge similar rates for similar distances within and between states.Question:Did the ICC have the power to regulate intrastate rates?Conclusion:

The regulation was legitimate. Justice Hughes argued that in situations where

interstate and intrastate commerce are "so related that the government of the oneinvolves the control of the other," Congress may lawfully exercise authority. Infostering and regulating interstate commerce, Congress may take "all measuresnecessary or appropriate" even if that means affecting intrastate commerce as well.

Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case)Facts of the Case:

The defendants in the case were arrested and convicted under an Act of Congress of1895 that made it illegal to send or conspire to send lottery tickets across state lines.Question:Did the transport of lottery tickets by independent carriers constitute "commerce"that Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause?Conclusion:

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that lottery tickets were indeed "subjects oftraffic," and that independent carriers may be regulated under the CommerceClause. The Court emphasized the broad discretion Congress enjoys in regulatingcommerce, noting that this power "is plenary, is complete in itself, and is subject tono limitations except such as may be found in the Constitution." The Court arguedthat Congress was merely assisting those states that wished to protect public moralsby prohibiting lotteries within their borders.

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United StatesFacts of the case:

The regulations at issue were promulgated under the authority of the NationalIndustrial Recovery Act of 1933. These included price and wage fixing, as well asrequirements regarding the sale of whole chickens, including unhealthy one

Question:Were the NIRA provisions in excess ofcongressional power under the CommerceClause?Conclusion:

The Court distinguished between direct effects on interstate commerce, whichCongress could lawfully regulate, and indirect, which were purely matters of statelaw. Though the raising and sale ofpoultry was an interstate industry, the Courtfound that the "stream of interstate commerce" had stopped in this caseSchechter's slaughterhouses bought chickens almostexclusively from intrastatewholesalers and sold completely exclusively to intrastate buyers. Any interstate

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effect of Schechter was indirect, and therefore beyond federal reach.

Carter v. Carter Coal Co.Facts of the Case:In 1935, Congress enacted the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, also known as theGuffey Coal Act. The Act regulated prices, minimum wages, maximum hours, and

"fair practices" of the coal industry. Although compliance was voluntary, tax refundswere established as incentives to abide by the regulations. Carter, a stockholder,brought suit against his own company in an attempt to keep it from paying the taxfor noncompliance. This case was decided together with R.C. Tway Coal Co. v. Clark,R.C. Tway Coal Co. v. Glenn, and Halvering v. Carter.Question:Did the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 exceed congressional powersunder the Commerce Clause?Conclusion:In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court held that the 1935 Act overstepped the bounds ofcongressional power. The Court ruled that "commerce" is plainly distinct from"production." Employing workers, setting wages and working hours, and mining coalwere found to be part of the local process of production, separate from any trade of

goods that could be regulated under the Commerce Clause. In striking down the law,Justice Sutherland argued that "[e]verything which moves in interstate commercehas had a local origin. Without local production somewhere, interstate commerce. . .would practically disappear."

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.Facts of the Case:With the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Congress determined that labor-management disputes were directly related to the flow of interstate commerce and,thus, could be regulated by the national government. In this case, the National LaborRelations Board charged the Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. with discriminating againstemployees who were union members.Question:

Was the Act consistent with the Commerce Clause?Conclusion:

Yes. The Court held that the Act was narrowly constructed so as to regulate industrialactivities which had the potential to restrict interstate commerce. The justicesabandoned their claim that labor relations had only an indirect effect on commerce.Since the ability of employees to engage in collective bargaining (one activityprotected by the Act) is "an essential condition of industrial peace," the nationalgovernment was justified in penalizing corporations engaging in interstate commercewhich "refuse to confer and negotiate" with their workers.

United States v. DarbyFacts of the Case:In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act to regulate many aspects of

employment including minimum wages, maximum weekly hours, and child labor.Corporations which engaged in interstate commerce or produced goods which weresold in other states were punished for violating the statute.Question:Was the act a legitimate exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstatecommerce?Conclusion:

The unanimous Court affirmed the right of Congress to exercise "to its utmost extent"the powers reserved for it in the Commerce Clause. Relying heavily on the Court's

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decision in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), Justice Stone argued that the "motive andpurpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative

judgment . . . over which the courts are given no control." Congress acted withproper authority in outlawing substandard labor conditions since they have asignificant impact on interstate commerce.

Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United StatesFacts of the Case:Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial discrimination by places of publicaccommodation if their operations affected commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel inAtlanta, Georgia, refused to accept Black Americans and was charged with violating

Title II.Question:Did Congress, in passing Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, exceed its CommerceClause powers by depriving motels, such as the Heart of Atlanta, of the right tochoose their own customers?Conclusion:

The Court held that the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to regulate localincidents of commerce, and that the Civil Right Act of 1964 passed constitutional

muster. The Court noted that the applicability of Title II was "carefully limited toenterprises having a direct and substantial relation to the interstate flow of goodsand people. . ." The Court thus concluded that places of public accommodation hadno "right" to select guests as they saw fit, free from governmental regulation.

Katzenbach v. McClungFacts of the Case:

The owner of Ollie's Barbecue, in Birmingham Alabama, refused to serve blacks inapparent violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Part of the Act preventedrestaurants serving interstate travelers, or receiving a substantial amount of theirfood from interstate commerce, from discriminating on the basis of race.Question:Does a restaurant's refusal to serve blacks burden interstate commerce to an extent

that Congress can legitimately prohibit such discrimination?Conclusion:The Court found that discrimination in restaurants posed significant burdens on "theinterstate flow of food and upon the movement on products generally." Furthermore,argued Justice Clark, discrimination also posed restrictions on blacks who traveledfrom state to state. Congress's solution to this problem was appropriate and within itsbounds to regulate interstate commerce.

United States v. LopezFacts of the Case:Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into hisSan Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas law with firearmpossession on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after

federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute, the Gun-FreeSchool Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess afirearm at a place that [he] knows...is a school zone." Lopez was found guiltyfollowing a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years'supervised release.Question:Is the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act, forbidding individuals from knowinglycarrying a gun in a school zone, unconstitutional because it exceeds the power ofCongress to legislate under the Commerce Clause?Conclusion:

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Yes. The possession of a gun in a local school zone is not an economic activity thatmight, through repetition elsewhere, have a substantial effect on interstatecommerce. The law is a criminal statute that has nothing to do with "commerce" orany sort of economic activity.

United States v. Morrison

Facts of the Case:In 1994, while enrolled at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech), ChristyBrzonkala alleged that Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both students andvarsity football players at Virginia Tech, raped her. In 1995, Brzonkala filed acomplaint against Morrison and Crawford under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy.After a hearing, Morrison was found guilty of sexual assault and sentenced toimmediate suspension for two semesters. Crawford was not punished. A secondhearing again found Morrison guilty. After an appeal through the university'sadministrative system, Morrison's punishment was set aside, as it was found to be"excessive." Ultimately, Brzonkala dropped out of the university. Brzonkala then suedMorrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in Federal District Court, alleging thatMorrison's and Crawford's attack violated 42 USC section 13981, part of the ViolenceAgainst Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which provides a federal civil remedy for the

victims of gender-motivated violence. Morrison and Crawford moved to dismissBrzonkala's suit on the ground that section 13981's civil remedy wasunconstitutional. In dismissing the complaint, the District Court found that thatCongress lacked authority to enact section 13981 under either the Commerce Clauseor the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had explicitly identified as thesources of federal authority for it. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed.Question:Does Congress have the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act of 1994under either the Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment?Conclusion:No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court heldthat Congress lacked the authority to enact a statute under the Commerce Clause orthe Fourteenth Amendment since the statute did not regulate an activity that

substantially affected interstate commerce nor did it redress harm caused by thestate. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that [i]f the allegations here aretrue, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide [Brzonkala] a remedy for theconduct of...Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must be provided bythe Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United States." Dissenting, JusticeStephen G. Breyer argued that the majority opinion "illustrates the difficulty offinding a workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone." Additionally, Justice DavidH. Souter, dissenting, noted that VAWA contained a "mountain of data assembled byCongress...showing the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce."

Other Powers of Congress: Taxing, Spending, and War PowersThe Taxing Power

Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.Facts of the Case:As an exercise of its taxing powers Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1919, alsocalled the Child Labor Tax Law. Under the law, companies employing children underfourteen years of age would be assessed ten percent of their annual profits. Duringthe same year in which the act was passed, Drexel Furniture Company was found inviolation of it and required to pay over $6000 in taxes, which it did under protest.Question:Did Congress violate the Constitution in adopting the Child Labor Tax Law in

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attempting to regulate the employment of children, a power reserved to the statesunder the Tenth Amendment?Conclusion:

Yes. The Court found that the Child Labor Tax Law was in violation of the Constitutionas it intruded on the jurisdiction of states to adopt and enforce child labor codes.Chief Justice Taft argued that the tax law in question did much more than simply

impose an "incidental restraint" but exerted a "prohibitory and regulatory effect" in arealm over which Congress had no jurisdiction. Taft feared that upholding this lawwould destroy state sovereignty and devastate "all constitutional limitation of thepowers of Congress" by allowing it to disguise future regulatory legislation in thecloak of taxes.

The Spending Power

United States v. ButlerFacts of the Case:As part of the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Congress implemented a processingtax on agricultural commodities, from which funds would be redistributed to farmerswho promised to reduce their acreage. The Act intended to solve the crisis inagricultural commodity prices which was causing many farmers to go under.

Question:Did Congress exceed its constitutional taxing and spending powers with the Act?Conclusion:

The Court found the Act unconstitutional because it attempted to regulate andcontrol agricultural production, an arena reserved to the states. Even thoughCongress does have the power to tax and appropriate funds, argued Justice Roberts,in this case those activities were "but means to an unconstitutional end," andviolated the Tenth Amendment.

Steward Machine Co. v. DavisFacts of the Case:

The Steward Machine Company challenged the validity of a tax imposed by the SocialSecurity Act. The Act established a federal payroll tax on employers; however, if

employers paid taxes to a state unemployment compensation fund (created by thestates subject to federal standards), they were allowed to credit those paymentstoward the federal tax.Question:Did the Act arbitrarily impose taxes in violation of the Fifth Amendment or subvertprinciples of federalism?Conclusion:In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the tax under the Social Security Act was aconstitutional exercise of congressional power. The Court found that the tax wasuniform throughout the states and did not coerce the states in contravention of the

Tenth Amendment. The Court took note of recent unemployment statistics from theyears 1929 to 1936, maintaining that "[i]t is too late today for the argument to beheard with tolerance that in a crisis so extreme the use of the moneys of the nation

to relieve the unemployed and their dependents is a use for any purpose narrowerthan the promotion of the general welfare. . .The nation responded to the call of thedistressed."

Congress Enforcement Power under the Reconstruction Amendments

Katzenbach v. MorganFacts of the case:Prior to the 1960s, many states and municipalities in the United States used literacytests in order to disenfranchise minorities. In 1959, the U.S. Supreme Court held thatliteracy tests were not necessarily violations ofEqual Protection Clause of the

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Fourteenth Amendment nor of the Fifteenth Amendment. Lassiter v. NorthamptonElection Board(1959).

In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which sought to safeguardthe voting rights of previously disenfranchised minorities. Among other provisions,the Voting Rights Act made some literacy tests illegal. Section 4 (e) was aimed atsecuring the franchise for New York City's large Puerto Rican population and

"provides that no person who has completed the sixth grade in a public school, or anaccredited private school, in Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction wasother than English shall be disfranchised for inability to read or write English."

Question:Did Congress exceed its powers of enforcement under the 14th AmendmentCongress infringe on rights reserved to states by the 10th Amendment?Conclusion:Section 4(e) was constitutional. Justice Brennan stressed that Section 5 of theFourteenth Amendment is "a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congressto exercise its discretion in determining the need for and nature of legislation tosecure Fourteenth Amendment guarantees." Justice Brennan applied theappropriateness standard ofMcCulloch v. Maryland(1819) to determine whether thelegislation passed constitutional muster.

Section 4(e) arguably expanded rights beyond what the Court had recognized inLassiter, but Justice Brennan ruled that Section 4(e) was appropriate. In doing so,Brennan has often been credited with introducing the "ratchet theory" forcongressional legislation enacted under Section 5. The "ratchet theory" held thatCongress could ratchet up civil rights beyond what the Court had recognized, but thatCongress could not ratchet down judicially recognized rights. The "ratchet theory"essentially set judicially recognized rights as a support, on which Congress couldexpand if it so chose. According to this "ratchet" theory, Justice Brennan's opinionallowed for multiple interpreters of the Fourteenth Amendment, as opposed to justthe judiciary.

City of Boerne v. Flores

Facts of the Case:The Archbishop of San Antonio sued local zoning authorities for violating his rightsunder the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), by denying him a permitto expand his church in Boerne, Texas. Boerne's zoning authorities argued that theArchbishop's church was located in a historic preservation district governed by anordinance forbidding new construction, and that the RFRA was unconstitutionalinsofar as it sought to override this local preservation ordinance. On appeal from theFifth Circuit's reversal of a District Court's finding against Archbishop Flores, theCourt granted Boerne's request for certiorari.Question:Did Congress exceed its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers by enactingthe RFRA which, in part, subjected local ordinances to federal regulation?Conclusion:

Yes. Under the RFRA, the government is prohibited from "substantially burden[ing]"religion's free exercise unless it must do so to further a compelling governmentinterest, and, even then, it may only impose the least restrictive burden. The Courtheld that while Congress may enact such legislation as the RFRA, in an attempt toprevent the abuse of religious freedoms, it may not determine the manner in whichstates enforce the substance of its legislative restrictions. This, the Court added, isprecisely what the RFRA does by overly restricting the states' freedom to enforce itsspirit in a manner which they deem most appropriate. With respect to this case,specifically, there was no evidence to suggest that Boerne's historic preservation

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ordinance favored one religion over another, or that it was based on animus orhostility for free religious exercise.

The Tenth amendment as a federalism based limitation on congressionalpower

Missouri v. Holland

Facts of the Case:In December 1916, the United States and Great Britain entered into a treaty toprotect a number of migratory birds in the U.S. and Canada. Congress passed theMigratory Bird Treaty Act in 1918 in order to facilitate enforcement of the treaty.When Ray P. Holland, the U.S. Game Warden, threatened to arrest citizens of Missourifor violating the Act, the state of Missouri challenged the treaty.Question:Did the treaty infringe upon rights reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment?Conclusion:No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the national interest in protecting thewildlife could be protected only by national action. The Court noted that the birds thegovernment sought to protect had no permanent habitats within individual states andargued that "[b]ut for the treaty and the statute there soon might be no birds for any

powers to deal with." The Court thus upheld the exercise of the treaty power andthus found no violation of the Tenth Amendment.

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit AuthorityFacts of the Case:

The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA), the main provider oftransportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area, claimed it was exempt from theminimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. SAMTAargued that it was providing a "traditional" governmental function, which exempted itfrom federal controls according to the doctrine of federalism established in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery (1976). Joe G. Garcia, an employee of SAMTA, brought suitfor overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act.Question:

Did principles of federalism make the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authorityimmune from the Fair Labor Standards Act?Conclusion:In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the guiding principles of federalismestablished in National League of Cities v. Usery were unworkable and that SAMTAwas subject to Congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause. The Courtfound that rules based on the subjective determination of "integral" or "traditional"governmental functions provided little or no guidance in determining the boundariesof federal and state power. The Court argued that the structure of the federal systemitself, rather than any "discrete limitations" on federal authority, protected statesovereignty.

New York v. United States

Facts of the Case:The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 requiredstates alone or in compacts with other states to dispose of such radioactive wastewithin their borders. New York State and Allegany and Courtland counties werefrustrated in their compliance efforts by resistance from residents to proposedradioactive waste sites and a lack of cooperation from neighboring states. New Yorkfiled suit against the federal government, questioning the authority of Congress toregulate state waste management.Question:Does the Low-Level Waste Act violate the Tenth Amendment and the "guarantee

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clause" of Article Four?Conclusion:In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld two of the three provisions of the Act underreview, reasoning that Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause touse financial rewards and access to disposal sites as incentives for state wastemanagement. The third provision, the "take-title" qualification, stipulated that states

must take legal ownership and liability for low-level waste or by the regulatory act."Either type of federal action," wrote Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "would'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, andwould for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authoritybetween federal and state governments." This last provision violated the TenthAmendment.

Printz v. United StatesFacts of the Case:

The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill) required "local chief lawenforcement officers" (CLEOs) to perform background-checks on prospectivehandgun purchasers, until such time as the Attorney General establishes a federalsystem for this purpose. County sheriffs Jay Printz and Richard Mack, separately

challenged the constitutionality of this interim provision of the Brady Bill on behalf ofCLEOs in Montana and Arizona respectively. In both cases District Courts found thebackground-checks unconstitutional, but ruled that since this requirement wasseverable from the rest of the Brady Bill a voluntary background-check system couldremain. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the interim background-checkprovisions were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari andconsolidated the two cases deciding this one along with Mack v. United States.Question:Using the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I as justification, can Congresstemporarily require state CLEOs to regulate handgun purchases by performing thoseduties called for by the Brady Bill's handgun applicant background-checks?Conclusion:No. The Court constructed its opinion on the old principle that state legislatures are

not subject to federal direction. The Court explained that while Congress may requirethe federal government to regulate commerce directly, in this case by performingbackground-checks on applicants for handgun ownership, the Necessary and ProperClause does not empower it to compel state CLEOs to fulfill its federal tasks for it -even temporarily. The Court added that the Brady Bill could not require CLEOs toperform the related tasks of disposing of handgun-application forms or notifyingcertain applicants of the reasons for their refusal in writing, since the Brady Billreserved such duties only for those CLEO's who voluntarily accepted them.

III. State Regulation of Interstate Commerce: Federal LimitationsCooley v. Board of WardensFacts of the Case:A Pennsylvania law required that all ships entering or leaving the port of Philadelphiahire a local pilot. Ships that fail to do so would be subject to a fine, which would go toa fund for retire pilots and their dependents. This fund was administered by theBoard of Wardens of the Port of Philadephia. Cooley was a ship owner. He refused tohire a local pilot and he also refused to pay the fine.Question:Does the law violate the Commerce Clause of the Constitution?Conclusion:According to Justice Curtis, who wrote the majority opinion, the pilotage law did notviolate the Constitution. Congress had provided in 1789 that state pilotage lawsshould govern. Navigation was commerce; and, piloting was navigation. Though the

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subject to be regulated was commerce, the interesting twist here was whether theCommerce Power was exclusive. Some subjects demand a single uniform rule for thewhole nation, while others, like pilotage, demand diverse local rules to cope withvarying local conditions. The power of Congress was therefore selectively exclusive.

Modern Approach

- Regulation must pursue a legitimate state end- Regulation must be rationally related to that legitimate end- Regulatory burden imposed by the state on interstate commerce, and any

discrimination against interstate commerce, must be outweighed by thestates interest in enforcing its regulation.

Protection against discrimination

City of Philadelphia v. New JerseyFacts of the Case:A New Jersey law prohibited the importation of most "solid or liquid waste that

originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State."Question:Did New Jersey's waste importation law violate the Commerce Clause?Conclusion:

Yes. The Court held that the law violated the principle of nondiscrimination as ittreated out-of-state waste differently than waste produced within the state. SinceNew Jersey could not demonstrate a legitimate reason for distinguishing betweenforeign and domestically produced waste, it was clear to the Court that the state had"overtly moved to slow or freeze the flow of commerce for projectionist reasons."

C&A Carbone, Inc. v. ClarkstownFacts of the Case:A New York town, Clarkstown, allowed a contractor to construct and operate a waste

processing plant within town limits. The revenue from the plant would helpcompensate the contractor. Clarkstown promised that the plant would receive120,000 tons of solid waste each year, and permitted the contractor to charge an$81 "tipping fee" for each ton received. To meet the 120,000 ton quota, Clarkstownadopted a "flow control ordinance." The ordinance required that all solid wasteflowing into and out of the town pass through the new plant. C & A Carbone, Inc.operated a similar plant within the town. To avoid paying the $81 fee, Carbonetrucked processed waste directly to an Indiana landfill. In 1991, a Carbone truckcarrying illegal waste crashed and police discovered that Carbone was violating theordinance. Clarkstown sued Carbone in a New York Supreme Court. Carboneresponded by suing Clarkstown in a federal District Court, claiming that the ordinanceviolated the Commerce Clause by disrupting interstate commerce. The District Courtagreed but dissolved its injunction against Clarkstown when the New York Supreme

Court ruled in favor of Clarkstown.Question:Does a town's "flow control ordinance," which requires that all waste pass through acertain waste processing plant, violate the interstate Commerce Clause by disruptingcommerce for waste processing plants in other states?Conclusion:

Yes. The Court held 6-3 that the Commerce Clause invalidates local laws thatdiscriminate against interstate commerce, disrupt the flow of articles of commerce,and grant municipalities disproportionate market gains. In an opinion authored by

Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court found that "the article of commerce...is the

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service of processing and disposing of [waste]." The Court held that the flowordinance was discriminatory because "[i]t hoards solid waste...for the benefit of thepreferred processing facility." For the ordinance to be constitutional, the municipalitywould have had to prove that its effects on commerce are nondiscriminatory and

justified by a "legitimate local interest."

Dean Milk Co. v. MadisonFacts of the Case:A Madison, Wisconsin ordinance prohibited the sale of milk within city limits unless itcame from a local farm or was pasteurized at an approved plant within five miles ofthe center of Madison. When the Dean Milk Company, located in Illinois, was denied apermit to sell milk, it filed suit against the city.Question:Did the Madison ordinance unconstitutionally interfere with interstate commerce?Conclusion:In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Wisconsin ordinance imposed an "undueburden" on interstate commerce. The Court argued that general discriminationagainst non-local producers was not narrowly tailored to serve the city's interests.Reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives were available to ensure milk sold in the

city was wholesome and properly pasteurized. "To permit Madison to adopt aregulation not essential for the protection of local health interest and placing adiscriminatory burden on interstate commerce would invite a multiplication ofpreferential trade areas destructive of the very purpose of the Commerce Clause."

West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. HealyFacts of the case:

Healy was the Massachusetts Commissioner Department of Food and Agriculture(respondent) Pl/pet is a milk dealer licensed within Mass. with 97% of the milk itpurchases is from out of state farmers. In response to Mass farmers losing marketshare to lower cost producers from outside, Mass enacted a pricing order. The orderrequired every dealer in Mass. to make a monthly premium payment based on the

amount of fluid milk sales into a FUND. Said fund then distributed money to localdairy farmers proportionate to their contribution into the States production of rawmilk.

Question:

Did the pricing order unconstitutionally discriminate against interstate commerce?

Conclusion:

Yes.

Principle under commerce clause is that a state may not benefit in-state economicinterests by burdening out-of-state competitors. Art. 1, 8, cl. 3.

The Commerce Clause also limits the power of the Commonwealth of Massachusettsto adopt regulations that discriminate against interstate commerce. Thus, statestatutes that clearly discriminate against interstate commerce are routinely struckdown ... unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelatedto economic protectionism. The "premium payments" are effectively a tax that

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to which South Dakota had sought to limit outside access.

The Privileges and Immunities ClauseUnited Building & Construction trades council v. CamdenFacts of the case:A municipal ordinance of the city ofCamden, New Jersey, required that at least 40%

of the employees of contractors and subcontractors working on city constructionprojects be Camden residents.Question:Was the ordinance unconstitutional based on the privileges and immunities clause?Conclusion:A city can pressure private employers to hire city residents, but the same exercise ofpower to bias private contractors against out-of-state residents may be called intoaccount under the Privileges and Immunities ClauseofArticle Four of the UnitedStates Constitution.

The Equal Protection Clause

Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. WardFacts of the case:

An Alabama statute imposes a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate ondomestic insurance companies than on out-of-state (foreign) insurance companies.The statute permits foreign companies to reduce but not to eliminate the differentialby investing in Alabama assets and securities.Question:Did the statute violate the equal protection clause?Conclusion:

The Alabama domestic preference tax statute violates the Equal Protection Clause asapplied to appellants. (a) Under the circumstances of this case, promotion ofdomestic business by discriminating against nonresidents is not a legitimate statepurpose. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization of California,451 U.S. 648, distinguished. Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is purelyand completely discriminatory, designed only to favor domestic industry within the

State, no matter what the cost to foreign corporations also seeking to do businessthere. Alabama's purpose constitutes the very sort of parochial discrimination thatthe Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. A State may not constitutionallyfavor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at a higher rate solely becauseof their residence. Although the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts the insuranceindustry from Commerce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit theapplicability of the Equal Protection Clause. Equal protection restraints are applicableeven though the effect of the discrimination is similar to the type of burden withwhich the Commerce Clause also would be concerned.(b) Nor is the encouragement of the investment in Alabama assets and securities alegitimate state purpose. Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favorable taxrate regardless of whether they invest in Alabama assets. Moreover, since theinvestment incentive provision does not enable foreign insurers to eliminate thestatute's discriminatory effect, it does not cure, but reaffirms, the impermissibleclassification based solely on residence.

Facially neutral statutes with significant effects on interstate commerce

Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Ad. Comm.Facts of the Case:In 1972, the North Carolina Board of Agriculture adopted a regulation that requiredall apples shipped into the state in closed containers to display the USDA grade ornothing at all. Washington State growers (whose standards are higher than theUSDA) challenged the regulation as an unreasonable burden to interstate commerce.

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North Carolina stated it was a valid exercise of its police powers to create"uniformity" to protect its citizenry from "fraud and deception."Question:Did the North Carolina regulation violate the Commerce Clause by placing anunreasonable burden on interstate commerce?Conclusion:

The Court voted unanimously that the North Carolina regulation was anunconstitutional exercise of the state's power over interstate commerce. Althoughthe regulation was facially neutral, it had a discriminatory impact on the Washingtongrowers while shielding the local growers from the same burden. The regulationremoved the competitive advantage gained by the Washington apples from stricterinspection standards. The regulation produced a leveling effect that works to thelocal advantage by "downgrading" apples from other states unjustly. Therefore, theregulation places an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.

Exxon Corp. v. Governor of MarylandThe Supreme Court of the United States upheld a Marylandlaw prohibiting oilproducers and refiners from operating service stations within its borders. The law wasa response to evidence that those stations, which represented about 5% of all thosein Maryland, had received preferential treatment during the 1973 oil crisis.

The challengers, including Exxon, claimed that the law violated the DormantCommerce Clause.Justice Stevens wrote for the majority, which disagreed withExxon et al.: "Since Maryland's entire gasoline supply flows in interstate commerceand since there are no local producers or refiners, such claims of disparate treatmentbetween interstate and local commerce would be meritless."

Majority held that Act does not (1) discriminate against interstate dealers (2) prohibitthe flow of interstate goods (3) place added cost on them (4) or distinguish betweenin-state or out-of-state retailers. The absence of any of these factors fullydistinguishes this case from Hunt v. Washington Apple Commission.

The Court held that the regulation was constitutional despite huge extraterritorialeffects of the regulation, less burdensome options available to the state, and no

legitimate state interest apart from a desire for cheaper oil. This case is an exceptionto the rules set forth inPike v. Bruce Church.

Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.Facts of the Case:An Iowa law restricted the length of vehicles traveling on its highways. Iowa justifiedthe law as a reasonable use of its police power to assure safety on the state's roads.Question:Did the law pose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce?Conclusion:

The Court held that the law violated the Commerce Clause for two reasons. First,Iowa could not prove that the vehicles it targeted posed potential danger to highwaytravelers. The safety interest was "illusory." Second, the law was "out of step with the

laws of all other Midwestern and Western States" which did not have similarregulations. This placed significant burdens on the flow of interstate commerce.

IV. The distribution of national powersIntroThe Federalist No. 47(Madison)Like the other Federalist Papers, No. 47 advocated the ratification the United StatesConstitution. In No. 47, Madison addressed criticisms that the Constitution did notcreate a sufficient separation of powers among the executive, judiciary, andlegislature. Madison acknowledged that the three branches intertwined but asserted

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that the blending did not violate the principle of separation of powers. To support hisargument, Madison referred to the writings ofMontesquieu. Madison attributes thewidespread support of a separation of powers to Montesquieu. According toMontesquieu, tyranny results when one branch of government simultaneously holdsthe powers of another branch. However, Madison argues that Montesquieu "did notmean that these departments ought to have no PARTIAL AGENCY in, or no CONTROL

over, the acts of each other."[1]Madison's interpretation of Montesquieu supported a system ofchecks and balancesquite similar to checks and balances the former thirteen colonies had created in theirstate constitutions. Madison tried to enlist the support of the young states byanalyzing their individual constitutions. He finds that "there is not a single instance inwhich the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate anddistinct."[2] For example, the New Hampshire Constitution allowed its senate to serveas a judicial tribunal for impeachments. The United States Constitution similarlygranted the powers of impeachment to the legislature. Madison said that if the statesdid not think their constitutions violated the separation of powers, the new nationalConstitution did not violate of the separation of powers either.

Although each branch has its distinctive powers, it cannot stand alone without thecheck and balance system of the other two branches. Madison viewed the separationof power as essential because without it only one power would rule the country,which could easily lead to abusive ruling.

The Federalist No. 48(Madison)Federalist No. 47 argued that the branches of government can be connected, whileremaining "separate and distinct". The argument of No. 48 is that, in order topractically maintain the branches as "separate and distinct", they must have "aconstitutional control" over each other.

The paper begins by asserting that "power is of an encroaching nature", i.e. thosewith power will attempt to control everything they can. It then asks how thistendency can be stopped, in order to preserve the "separate and distinct" quality ofthe branches of government. It then makes the claim that merely defining the

boundaries of the branches is an insufficient safeguard. It singles out the legislativebranch as being particularly successful in taking over power.

As an aside from the main argument, the paper notes that the danger of thelegislative branch taking over has not been thought about by the "founders of ourrepublics", i.e. the people who wrote the thirteen state constitutions.

The paper offers a number of reasons why legislative over-reaching is more likely in a"representative republic", as distinct from other types of government. These reasonsinclude the claim that the legislature is "sufficiently numerous to feel all the passionswhich actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing theobjects of its passions" and that its powers are both "more extensive, and lesssusceptible of precise limits".

Then two examples of legislative over-reaching are given: Virginia and Pennsylvania.

The Virginia example is primarily a long quote from Thomas Jefferson's Notes on theState of Virginia, in which he corroborates the claims of the paper.

In respect of Pennsylvania, the paper summarizes the conclusions of a report by a"Council of Censors" on apparent violations of the Pennsylvania constitution; it foundmany. A small rebuttal is made to the claim in the report that many violations werecommitted by the executive branch, not only the legislative branch.

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A Case Study: Presidential Seizure Youngstown, Dames & Moore

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel SeizureCase)Facts of the Case:In April of 1952, during the Korean War, President Truman issued an executive order

directing Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize and operate most of thenation's steel mills. Truman did this in order to avert the expected effects of a strikeby the United Steelworkers of America.Question:Did the President have the constitutional authority to seize and operate the steelmills?Conclusion:In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the President did not have the authority toissue such an order. The Court found that there was no congressional statute thatauthorized the President to take possession of private property. The Court also heldthat the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces didnot extend to labor disputes. The Court argued that "the President's power to seethat the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."

*Jackson's opinion took a similarly flexible approach to the issue, eschewing any fixedboundaries between Congress' and the President's power. Jackson dividedPresidential authority vis a vis Congress into three categories, ranked in descendingorder of legitimacy: (1) those cases in which the President was acting with express orimplied authority from Congress, (2) cases in which Congress had thus far beensilent, and (3) cases in which the President was defying congressional orders. Heclassified this case as falling within the third category.

Dames & Moore v. ReganFacts of the Case:In reaction to the seizure of the U.S. embassy and American nationals in Iran,President Jimmy Carter invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act(IEEPA) and froze Iranian assets in the United States. When the hostages were

released in 1981, Treasury Secretary Donald Reagan affirmed the agreements madeby the Carter administration that terminated all legal proceedings against the Iraniangovernment and created an independent Claims Tribunal. Dames & Moore attemptedto recover over $3 million owed to it by the Iranian government and claimed theexecutive orders were beyond the scope of presidential power.Question:Did the president have the authority to transfer Iranian funds and to nullify legalclaims against Iran?Conclusion:

The Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act constituted aspecific congressional authorization for the President to order the transfer of Iranianassets. The Court further held that although the IEEPA itself did not authorize thepresidential suspension of legal claims, previous acts of Congress had "implicitly

approved" of executive control of claim settlement. The Court emphasized thenarrowness of its ruling, limiting the decision to the facts of the case.

Foreign AffairsExecutive Authority

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.Facts of the Case:Curtiss-Wright was charged with conspiring to sell fifteen machine guns to Bolivia,which was engaged in an armed conflict in the Chaco. This violated a Joint Resolution

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of Congress and a proclamation issued by President Roosevelt.Question:Did Congress in its Joint Resolution unconstitutionally delegate legislative power tothe President?Conclusion:

The Court agreed that the President was allowed much room to operate in executing

the Joint Resolution; it found no constitutional violation. Making important distinctionsbetween internal and foreign affairs, Justice Sutherland argued because "thePresident alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation,"Congress may provide the President with a special degree of discretion in externalmatters which would not be afforded domestically.

The Prize CasesFacts of the Case:Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of southern ports in April 1861. Congress authorizedhim to declare a state of insurrection by the Act of July 13, 1861. By the Act of August6, 1861, Congress retroactively ratified all Lincoln's military action. These casesinvolved the seizure of vessels bound for Confederate ports prior to July 13, 1861.Question:

Did Lincoln act within his presidential powers defined by Article II when he orderedthe seizures absent a declaration of war?Conclusion:

The President had the power to act. A state of civil war existed de facto after thefiring on Fort Sumter (April 12, 1861) and the Supreme Court would take this fact intoaccount. Though neither Congress nor the President can declare war against a stateof the Union, when states waged war against the United States government, thePresident was "bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself,without waiting forCongress to baptize it with a name."

Hamdi v. RumsfeldFacts of the Case:In the fall of 2001, Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was arrested by the United

States military in Afghanistan. He was accused of fighting for the Taliban against theU.S., declared an "enemy combatant," and transfered to a military prison in Virginia.Frank Dunham, Jr., a defense attorney in Virginia, filed a petition for a writ ofcertiorari in federal district court there, first on his own and then for Hamdi's father,in an attempt to have Hamdi's detention declared unconstitutional. He argued thatthe government had violated Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process byholding him indefinitely and not giving him access to an attorney or a trial. Thegovernment countered that the Executive Branch had the right, during wartime, todeclare people who fight against the United States "enemy combatants" and thusrestrict their access to the court system.

The district court ruled for Hamdi, telling the government to release him. On appeal,a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, finding that the separation ofpowers required federal courts to practice restraint during wartime because "the

executive and legislative branches are organized to supervise the conduct ofoverseas conflict in a way that the judiciary simply is not." The panel therefore foundthat it should defer to the Executive Branch's "enemy combatant" determination.Question:Did the government violate Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process byholding him indefinitely, without access to an attorney, based solely on an ExecutiveBranch declaration that he was an "enemy combatant" who fought against the UnitedStates? Does the separation of powers doctrine require federal courts to defer toExecutive Branch determinations that an American citizen is an "enemy combatant"?Conclusion:

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Yes and no. In an opinion backed by a four-justice plurality and partly joined by twoadditional justices, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that although Congressauthorized Hamdi's detention, Fifth Amendment due process guarantees give acitizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant the right to contest thatdetention before a neutral decision maker. The plurality rejected the government'sargument that the separation-of-powers prevents the judiciary from hearing Hamdi's

challenge. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurredwith the plurality that Hamdi had the right to challenge in court his status as anenemy combatant. Souter and Ginsburg, however, disagreed with the plurality's viewthat Congress authorized Hamdi's detention. Justice Antonin Scalia issued a dissent

joined by Justice John Paul Stevens. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented separately.

The War Powers ResolutionPage 399

Domestic AffairsExecutive Authority

United States v. NixonFacts of the Case:

A grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard Nixon's closestaides in the Watergate affair. The special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and thedefendants sought audio tapes of conversations recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office.Nixon asserted that he was immune from the subpoena claiming "executiveprivilege," which is the right to withhold information from other government branchesto preserve confidential communications within the executive branch or to secure thenational interest. Decided together with Nixon v. United States.Question:Is the President's right to safeguard certain information, using his "executiveprivilege" confidentiality power, entirely immune from judicial review?Conclusion:No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor thegeneralized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can

sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege. The Court granted that therewas a limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but gavepreference to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fairadministration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena andproduce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned shortly after the release of thetapes.

Nixon v. FitzgeraldFacts of the Case:In 1968, Fitzgerald, then a civilian analyst with the United States Air Force, testifiedbefore a congressional committee about inefficiencies and cost overruns in theproduction of the C-5A transport plane. Roughly one year later he was fired, an actionfor which President Nixon took responsibility. Fitzgerald then sued Nixon for damages

after the Civil Service Commission concluded that his dismissal was unjust.Question:Was the President immune from prosecution in a civil suit?Conclusion:

Yes. The Court held that the President "is entitled to absolute immunity fromdamages liability predicated on his official acts." This sweeping immunity, argued

Justice Powell, was a function of the "President's unique office, rooted in theconstitutional tradition of separation of powers and supported by our history."

Clinton v. Jones

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Facts of the Case:Paula Corbin Jones sued President Bill Clinton. She alleged that while she was anArkansas state employee, she suffered several "abhorrent" sexual advances fromthen Arkansas Governor Clinton. Jones claimed that her continued rejection ofClinton's advances ultimately resulted in punishment by her state supervisors.Following a District Court's grant of Clinton's request that all matters relating to the

suit be suspended, pending a ruling on his prior request to have the suit dismissed ongrounds of presidential immunity, Clinton sought to invoke his immunity tocompletely dismiss the Jones suit against him. While the District Judge deniedClinton's immunity request, the judge ordered the stay of any trial in the matter untilafter Clinton's Presidency. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denialbut reversed the trial deferment ruling since it would be a "functional equivalent" toan unlawful grant of temporary presidential immunity.Question:Is a serving President, for separation of powers reasons, entitled to absoluteimmunity from civil litigation arising out of events which transpired prior to his takingoffice?Conclusion:No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the Constitution does not grant asitting President immunity from civil litigation except under highly unusualcircumstances. After noting the great respect and dignity owed to the Executiveoffice, the Court held that neither separation of powers nor the need forconfidentiality of high-level information can justify an unqualified Presidentialimmunity from judicial process. While the independence of our government'sbranches must be protected under the doctrine of separation of powers, theConstitution does not prohibit these branches from exercising any control over oneanother. This, the Court added, is true despite the procedural burdens which ArticleIII jurisdiction may impose on the time, attention, and resources of the ChiefExecutive.

Legislative Authority

DelegationPage 418

Clinton v. New YorkFacts of the Case:

This case consolidates two separate challenges to the constitutionality of twocancellations, made by President William J. Clinton, under the Line Item Veto Act("Act"). In the first, the City of New York, two hospital associations, a hospital, andtwo health care unions, challenged the President's cancellation of a provision in theBalanced Budget Act of 1997 which relinquished the Federal Government's ability torecoup nearly $2.6 billion in taxes levied against Medicaid providers by the State ofNew York. In the second, the Snake River farmer's cooperative and one of itsindividual members challenged the President's cancellation of a provision of the

Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The provision permitted some food refiners andprocessors to defer recognition of their capital gains in exchange for selling theirstock to eligible farmers' cooperatives. After a district court held the Actunconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on expedited appeal.Question:Did the President's ability to selectively cancel individual portions of bills, under theLine Item Veto Act, violate the Presentment Clause of Article I?Conclusion:

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court first established that both the City of New York,and its affiliates, and the farmers' cooperative suffered sufficiently immediate and

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concrete injuries to sustain their standing to challenge the President's actions. TheCourt then explained that under the Presentment Clause, legislation that passes bothHouses of Congress must either be entirely approved (i.e. signed) or rejected (i.e.vetoed) by the President. The Court held that by canceling only selected portions ofthe bills at issue, under authority granted him by the Act, the President in effect"amended" the laws before him. Such discretion, the Court concluded, violated the

"finely wrought" legislative procedures of Article I as envisioned by the Framers.

Legislative Veto

INS v. ChadhaFacts of the Case:In one section of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress authorized eitherHouse of Congress to invalidate and suspend deportation rulings of the United StatesAttorney General. Chadha had stayed in the U.S. past his visa deadline and wasordered to leave the country. The House of Representatives suspended theImmigration judge's deportation ruling. This case was decided together with UnitedStates House of Representatives v. Chadha and United States Senate v. Chadha.Question:Did the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed a one-House veto of

executive actions, violate the separation of powers doctrine?Conclusion:The Court held that the particular section of the Act in question did violate theConstitution. Recounting the debates of the Constitutional Convention over issues ofbicameralism and separation of powers, Chief Justice Burger concluded that eventhough the Act would have enhanced governmental efficiency, it violated the "explicitconstitutional standards" regarding lawmaking and congressional authority.

Administrative Agencies

Myers v. United StatesFacts of the Case:An 1876 law provided that postmasters of the first, second, and third classes shall beappointed and may be removed by the President with the advice and consent of the

Senate. President Woodrow Wilson removed Myers, a postmaster first class, withoutseeking Senate approval.Question:Did the Act unconstitutionally restrict the President's power to remove appointedofficials?Conclusion:

Yes. After tracing legislative debate of the First Congress in 1789 which dealt with theinterpretation of the President's appointment power, Chief Justice Taft concluded thatthe power to remove appointed officers is vested in the President alone. According to

Taft, to deny the President that power would not allow him to "discharge his ownconstitutional duty of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed."

Humphreys Executor v. United States

Facts of the Case:President Hoover appointed, and the Senate confirmed, Humphrey as acommissioner of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In 1933, President Rooseveltasked for Humphrey's resignation since the latter was a conservative and had

jurisdiction over many of Roosevelt's New Deal policies. When Humphrey refused toresign, Roosevelt fired him because of his policy positions. However, the FTC Act onlyallowed a president to remove a commissioner for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, ormalfeasance in office." Since Humphrey died shortly after being dismissed, hisexecutor sued to recover Humphrey's lost salary.Question:

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Did section 1 of the Federal Trade Commission Act unconstitutionally interfere withthe executive power of the President?Conclusion:

The unanimous Court found that the FTC Act was constitutional and that Humphrey'sdismissal on policy grounds was unjustified. The Court reasoned that the Constitutionhad never given "illimitable power of removal" to the president. Justice Sutherland

dismissed the government's main line of defense in this case which relied heavily onthe Court's decision in Meyers v. United States (1926). In that case the Court upheldthe president's right to remove officers who were "units of the executivedepartment." The FTC was different, argued Sutherland, because it was a bodycreated by Congress to perform quasi-legislative and judicial functions. The Meyersprecedent, therefore, did not apply in this situation.

Buckley v. ValeoFacts of the Case:In the wake of the Watergate affair, Congress attempted to ferret out corruption inpolitical campaigns by restricting financial contributions to candidates. Among otherthings, the law set limits on the amount of money an individual could contribute to a

single campaign and it required reporting of contributions above a certain thresholdamount. The Federal Election Commission was created to enforce the statute.Question:Did the limits placed on electoral expenditures by the Federal Election Campaign Actof 1971, and related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, violate theFirst Amendment's freedom of speech and association clauses?Conclusion:In this complicated case, the Court arrived at two important conclusions. First, it heldthat restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns and candidates didnot violate the First Amendment since the limitations of the FECA enhance the"integrity of our system of representative democracy" by guarding againstunscrupulous practices. Second, the Court found that governmental restriction ofindependent expenditures in campaigns, the limitation on expenditures by

candidates from their own personal or family resources, and the limitation on totalcampaign expenditures did violate the First Amendment. Since these practices do notnecessarily enhance the potential for corruption that individual contributions tocandidates do, the Court found that restricting them did not serve a governmentinterest great enough to warrant a curtailment on free speech and association.

Bowsher v. SynarFacts of the Case:Due to rising government budget deficits during the first term of the ReaganAdministration, Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of1985. The act was designed to eliminate the federal budget deficit by restrictingspending during fiscal years 1986 through 1991. Under the law, if maximumallowable deficit amounts were exceeded, automatic cuts, as requested by the

Comptroller General, would go into effect. This case was decided together withO'Neill v. Synar and United States Senate v. Synar.Question:Did the functions assigned by Congress to the Comptroller General of the UnitedStates under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985 violate thedoctrine of separation of powers?Conclusion:

The Court found that the duties which the Congress delegated to the ComptrollerGeneral did violate the doctrine of separation of powers and were unconstitutional. Atwo step process led Chief Justice Burger to arrive at this conclusion. First, in

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exploring the statute defining the provisions of the Comptroller General's officerelating to the Congress's power of removal, it was clear to Burger that this officerwas subservient to the legislative branch. Second, in examining the functions thatthis officer would carry out under the Deficit Control Act, Burger concluded that theComptroller General was being asked to execute the laws and, thus, was intruding onthe perogatives of the executive branch.

Morrison v. OlsonFacts of the Case:

The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 created a special court and empowered theAttorney General to recommend to that court the appointment of an "independentcounsel" to investigate, and, if necessary, prosecute government officials for certainviolations of federal criminal laws.Question:Did the Act violate the constitutional principal of separation of powers?Conclusion:

The Court addressed a number of constitutional issues in this case and upheld thelaw. The near-unanimous Court held that the means of selecting the independentcounsel did not violate the Appointments Clause; the powers allocated to the special

court did not violate Article III; and the Act was not offensive to the separation ofpowers doctrine since it did not impermissibly interfere with the functions of theExecutive Branch.

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