beyond the ‘salvation’ paradigm - r2p

8/13/2019 Beyond the Salvation Paradigm - R2P

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SAGE Publications, http://sdi.sagepub.comVol. 40(6): 575595, DOI: 10.1177/0967010609350632

Beyond the Salvation Paradigm:

Responsibility To Protect (Others) vs thePower of Protecting Oneself

FRDRIC MGRET*

Faculty of Law, McGill University, Montreal, Canada

The emergence of the idea of a responsibility to protect has domi-nated debates about what should be done to stop atrocities. I arguethat, despite notable progress, R2P remains embedded in a vision ofinternational rescue as primarily coming from outside, and as suchends up neglecting the very real and often much more decisive rolethat people individuals, civil society, resistance movements havehad in protecting themselves. I argue for a rehabilitation of the roleof resistance to atrocities, a better understanding of how the interna-tional intervention paradigm may affect it, and a new understandingof the proper role of the international community one of helpingpeople to help themselves in the face of massive violence.

Keywords responsibility to protect civil society human security violence intervention

IN SOME WAY OR OTHER, the idea of a responsibility to protect (R2P)has dominated debates on what to do to prevent grave atrocities in thelast decade. After several years of soul-searching, along with numerousoverlapping institutional and academic initiatives, R2P appears as the inter-national communitys best approximation as to what should be done, ideally,to stop the worst types of human violence in their tracks (Evans & Sahnoun,2002; Thakur, 2002). R2P profoundly renews the debate by developing a fullstrategy to avert atrocities that goes beyond the old debate on humanitarianintervention.

There is undeniably something appealing about the proclamation of sucha responsibility. The spectacle of UN debacles in the wake of mass violencehas done more to discredit the organization than any of its other failings. R2Pdraws on a rather noble form of global solidarity, and proposes a more force-ful sort of response to the problem of atrocities than has been seen so far. At

the same time, it is fair to say that, despite some discrete achievements, the


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promise of R2P has so far failed to materialize in all cases. The example ofDarfur stands as a vivid and painful reminder of the inability of mere wordsto trigger action (Williams & Bellamy, 2005). For all the talk about the inter-national community stepping in to protect individuals from acts of genocide

and crimes against humanity, relatively little tangible action has occurred interms of intervention in the cases where it would matter most, to the point ofmaking the whole idea at times seem a little vacuous (Bellamy, 2005).

What are we to make of this failing? The most familiar response is to urgestates to rise up to the challenge of meeting their collective responsibility.This leads to ever more pressing calls to achieve global mobilization, as illus-trated for example by the Darfur campaign. These calls may yet reach theirobjective and, if not for Darfur, the international community may one dayachieve a higher degree of readiness to confront atrocities.

However, these arguments tend to take it for granted that the problem withR2P is one of feasibility, rather than flaws with the design. I want to suggest,conversely, that there may be something fundamentally incomplete with thevery vision presupposed by R2P, even if it worked better. My main conten-tion will be that R2P fails because, despite evolutions, it is still too focused onthe role of the international community when it comes to the actual commis-sion of atrocities. As a result, it ends up largely neglecting the contributionthat local non-state actors, civil society, social movements, indeed victimsthemselves can make toresist the commission of atrocities. In contrast, I wantto make the case for the need to pay more attention to the growing work onhow atrocities have historically been averted or at least minimized thanksto the power and resilience of a certain spirit of resistance by victims. Thechallenge, then, is to find ways to connect this reality with evolving ideasabout R2P.

In order to address this, I do three things. First, I analyse R2P as embeddedin an internationalist discourse that tends to shut out the role of local civilsociety at or near the point of commission of atrocities. Second, I examine the broad historical record of local resistance initiatives in the context of atroci-ties (with an emphasis on genocide), with a view to highlighting the potential

of resistance. Third, I look at how the internationalist paradigm has some-times served to demobilize local attempts at resistance, and suggest that thechallenge should be to think about ways in which international actors mightassist those seeking to protect themselves.

576 Security Dialogue vol. 40, no. 6, December 2009


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Frdric Mgret Beyond the Salvation Paradigm 577

Some Limitations of R2P

Background

The idea of R2P arose against a background of persistent soul-searching bythe international community about the ends and means of intervention in acontext of systemic failure by the United Nations to avert ethnic cleansing inBosnia and genocide in Rwanda. In the wake of the Kosovo crisis, a variety ofinitiatives were launched in an attempt to formulate a clearer concept of whenintervention should occur. Following a request by the UN Secretary-General,the Canadian government established in 2000 an independent InternationalCommission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), whose explicitmandate was to build a broader understanding of the problem of reconcilingintervention for human protection purposes and sovereignty (ICISS, 2001:2). The Commission issued a report in December 2001 that framed the con-cept of R2P for the first time, in the following terms:

Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency,repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avertit, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect(ICISS, 2001: xiii, 91).

The Commission on Human Security, which was set up by the governmentof Japan, also issued a report in 2003 that supported the broad outline of R2P(Commission on Human Security, 2003: 23, 31, 68, 136). The UN High-LevelPanel on Threats, Challenges and Change subsequently released a report in2004 suggesting that there was an emerging norm of a collective internationalresponsibility to protect and incorporating R2P as part of an overall strat-egy to confront threats to global security (United Nations, 2004: 66). Furtherendorsement for R2P is to be found in the report In Larger Freedom: TowardsDevelopment, Security and Human Rights for All, presented to the UN GeneralAssembly on 21 March 2005, in which the UN Secretary-General insisted thatthe UN must move towards embracing and acting on the responsibility toprotect(United Nations, 2005a: 35).

Finally, on 20 September 2005, a version of R2P was adopted by the UNGeneral Assembly in the so-called 2005 World Summit Outcome document.Two paragraphs referred to UN member-states willingness to take collec-tive action when needed. The General Assembly affirmed that the inter-national community, through the United Nations . . . has the responsibilityto use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, inaccordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect pop-ulations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes againsthumanity (United Nations, 2005b: 31). Both preventive and reactive action

was envisaged.


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The idea has since been endorsed by the Security Council both in a generalway, through a thematic resolution on the protection of civilians in armedconflict (United Nations, 2006a), and operationally in Resolution 1706 onDarfur, which mentions the World Outcome Summit documents resolution

in its preamble (United Nations, 2006b).

The Structure of R2P

Although formulations of R2P have varied, there is arguably a deep structurecommon to all of them, along with a propensity to reproduce some of the biases of the humanitarian intervention debate even as one seeks to tran-scend them. At the heart of that structure is a tendency to pit against eachother two main actors: the state and the international community.

The starting point of almost all statements on R2P is, in accordance withdeeply held beliefs about international order and law, a ritual recognition ofthe role of the state. A More Secure World emphasizes that the new securityconsensus is that the front-line actors in dealing with all the threats we face,new and old, continue to be individual sovereign States (United Nations,2004: 1). Indeed, one of the foundations of the responsibility to protect isobligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty (ICISS, 2001: xi). For ICISS(2001: 17), the responsibility to protect resides first and foremost with thestate whose people are directly affected. As the 2005 World Summit Outcomedocument puts it, Each individual State has the responsibility to protect itspopulations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes againsthumanity (United Nations, 2005b: 30). The General Assembly, followingICISSs (2001: 17) insistence on the need to help states build capacity to pro-tect their populations, has proclaimed its intention to encourage and helpStates to exercise their responsibility to protect (United Nations, 2005b: 30).

There are very good reasons why this should be the case. The state is bestplaced to take action to prevent problems from turning into potential con-flicts and also best placed to understand them and to deal with them (ICISS,2001: 17). Indeed, much UN action has been geared toward reinforcing the

states ability to deal with threats, as exemplified for example by the Secretary-Generals efforts in Kenya. However, if states always fulfilled their responsibility to protect their populations, the debate on R2P would not have arisen.Behind these references to the role of the state lies the very real possibilitythat the state will fail, even with the support of the international community.In fact, the corollary of state responsibility is that whenever states behaveirresponsibly, they risk relinquishing their claim to exercise sovereigntyuntrammelled (Cohen & Deng, 1996).

From there, the key question is who should step in when the state is defi-cient (Pattison, 2008). There is little doubt that the international communityis the big winner in the process, since it is the actor primarily called upon to


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intervene in cases of state failure. Indeed, at the heart of the debates on R2Plies one that deals with the legitimacy of initiatives by the international com-munity or one of its incarnations. The World Summit Outcome document,for example, mentions the international community, the United Nations

and regional organizations (United Nations, 2005b: 31). The focus is, ifanything, on transcending the state from above, through some form of col-lective will. R2P is an emerging norm of acollective international responsibilityto protect (United Nations, 2004: 66; my emphasis). A tremendous part of thepolicy and scholarly conversation on R2P is focused on issues of internationalauthority and process, along with the need to overcome the reluctance tointervene.

The risk, then, is that R2P will remain embedded in what one might call aparadigm, of salvation, one quite characteristic of earlier debates on human-itarian intervention (Pasic & Weiss, 2006), in which those who rescue are out-siders (Seybolt, 2007) and those who are saved are others (Orford, 2003) orstrangers (Wheeler, 2000).

The Blind Spot of Salvation: The Victim as Resister

The project, rooted as it is in deep assumptions about the right actors of theinternational system, is always at risk of excluding certain actors, particularlyvictims of atrocities themselves. The risk is that civil society will have a roleonly in calling for and legitimizing international intervention. ICISS (2001:17) is maybe one of the only R2P sources that expresses the view that rightintention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported byregional opinionand the victims concerned (my emphasis) and suggests theneed for an evaluation of the issues from the point of view of those seek-ing or needing support. The literature also evidences an interest in solicitinglocal approval from the narrow angle of determining an international inter-ventions prospects of success (Gizelis & Kosek, 2005).

ICISS was notable, it is true, for seeking to transcend the internationalist bias by paying much more attention to the role of civil society. Civil society

appears in its report under two principal guises, but closer scrutiny showsthat even there the transcending is only partial. First, civil society has a role inhelping prevent atrocities. ICISS (2001: 17, 19) speaks of the responsibility ofcommunities and emphasizes that when solutions are needed, it is the citi-zens of a particular state who have the greatest interest and the largest stakein the success of those solutions, and that a commitment to helping localefforts to address both the root causes of problems and their more immediatetriggers should be at the heart of international efforts. Second, civil societyis seen as a partner in thepost-conflict stage. ICISS (2001: 45), for example,has made the case for achieving local ownership and strik[ing] a balance between the responsibilities of international and local actors in post-conflict


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societies where what is at issue is devolving responsibility back to the localcommunity. It also insists that international authorities must take care not toconfiscate or monopolize political responsibility on the ground, and under-lines the need for local actors to take over responsibility (ICISS, 2001: 45).

However, what these pre- and post- scenarios seem to miss is some-thing more like the stage of actual commission of atrocities. Despite notableopenings to civil society in the ICISS report (which do not find much of anequivalent in the much shorter World Summit Outcome document), it is asthough formulations of R2P all stopped short of recognizing that victims (orintended victims) of atrocities might have a role in averting atrocities at thepoint when they are being committed. Whereas neighbouring branches ofthe international discourse (e.g. conflict mediation, development) are increas-ingly explicit about the need to forge direct relations with civil society actorseven at the height of conflict (Pfaffenholz, Kew & Wanis-St. John, 2006), R2Pseems marked by a reversal to the high politics of international interventionin times of unfolding crisis.

This is no doubt partly a result of a broader difficulty in engaging non-stateactors in conflict settings, although that difficulty should be mostly appar-ent with theperpetrators of atrocities (Kwesi Aning, 1999). But, it also resultsfrom a particularly humanitarian way of constructing victims as essentiallypassive, depoliticized and in need of international intervention. The victim iscause, object, but never actor or subject. The vision of civil society proposed isone that is very civil, in that civil society is seen as having a role primarily inthe safeguarding of the orderly functioning of society while atrocities can still be averted, rather than a more pugnacious one involved in defiance, resist-ance, civil disobedience or struggles against oppression. There is no mention,for example, of civil society acting in ways that could be conceived as unlaw-ful or clandestine. Anne Orford (1999: 695) is one of the few persons to havenoted that

missing is any sense of the agency of the peoples of the states where intervention is to be conducted. There is no sense in which these peoples are understood to be themselvesactively working to shape their communities and their world, except to the extent ofseeking the protection of the international community.

Although this comment was made before the R2P debate, it still rings partlytrue today.

Even more improbable in terms of R2P formulation is the idea that theinternational community might have any role in stimulating, encouragingor supporting local resistance, or that it should, at the very least, be wary ofthe degree to which its own interventions might negatively affect domesticefforts. Among all the measures recommended to assist victims of atrocities,not one R2P instrument even suggests in passing the possibility of assistance for example, to resistance movements that would be other than classi-cally humanitarian. ICISS (2001: 30), for example, identifies a dozen things


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the international community should do before it considers intervening mili-tarily (including economic, political and diplomatic sanctions), none of whichinvolve any support of local forces of resistance. Even the anti-imperialistcritique of humanitarian intervention often seems to fall into the trap of ignor-

ing resistance (Bauer, 2007), more obsessed as it often is with great-powerinterference and the need to protect sovereignty than it is with solidarity withlocal actors bearing the brunt of local oppression.

The Power of Resistance

Challenging this view of what is happening in and what is required duringatrocities, I want to suggest the possibility of an alternative understanding ofR2P, one that is rooted not in the international communitys ability to act butin the will of victims and civil society more generally to resist persecutions.

Rehabilitating Resistance

There is a considerable gap between contemporary normative debates aboutwhat the international community should do to save people, on the onehand, and the reality of what we know about how people have historically been saved, on the other. This gap is in part a disciplinary gap: whereas inter-national policymakers and international lawyers are by training resolutelyfocused on the international, historians have done a considerable job in thelast 50 years of rediscovering the many and multifaceted forms of local resist-ance to atrocities. It is of course the case that in some situations only a majorinternational military effort has put an end to atrocities (the obvious example being the Holocaust and the Allied defeat of Nazi Germany), and interven-tion by the international community has at times contributed indirectly tosaving considerable numbers of people (through the interdiction of territoryor the provision of protection). But, apart from the fact that in some cases

it is non-state groups that have entirely stopped atrocities (e.g. the RwandaPatriotic Front in Rwanda), there is a difference between the ultimate goal ofwholly stopping atrocities and the intermediary, but no less significant, goalof minimizing their impact while a more definitive cessation is achieved. Thisis especially the case since it has often taken a long time at least too long toput an end to mass atrocities. It is at this micro level that people have made aconsiderable contribution to combating and limiting atrocities, thus ensuringthat as many as possible survived to see the resolution of the larger situationgiving rise to those atrocities.

By resistance I mean not only organized movements but also the manyspontaneous and diffuse ways in which a whole range of private actors from


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civil society (individuals, resistance movements, organizations, churches)have opposed, thwarted and simply avoided attacks. Resistance has been,perhaps above all, that of the victims themselves. Although often not con-sidered as part of resistance, there is a case that in a situation of impending

massacre, merely heeding ones survival instinct to escape capture, often athuge personal risk and cost, is in fact an act of resistance. Individual and col-lective escapes have, at any rate, had a significant impact on the mitigation ofatrocities. In some cases, such as the Bielski otriad in the Byelorussian forests,entire communities were recreated in difficult but safe conditions (Tec, 1998).In addition to escape, countless acts of disobedience, defiance, insubordina-tion or sabotage can have an effect on the ability of the state to execute killingplans. Jacques Smelin (1989) has theorized these forms of civil resistanceas having played a crucial role in Nazi Germany, and has since extended theargument to other genocidal scenarios (Smelin, 2008). In the killing fieldsof Cambodia, even stealing rice on a small scale from collectivized propertymight prolong ones life and the lives of others through the ordeal, and thusconstitute an act of resistance (Ngor & Warner, 2003).

There are, in addition, many instances of violent insurrections against geno-cidal threats. From the insurrection of the Warsaw ghetto (Tzur, 1998) to theheroic resistance of 50,000 Tutsis in the hills of Bisesero (Verwimp, 2004); fromthe armed opposition of Armenians at Musa Dagh and Van (Werfel, 1934:16121613) to the desperate attacks by Chams against the Khmer Rouges(Kiernan, 2002); from the fierce resistance of the Peshmergas during Anfal(Rabil, 2002) to the trenches of the Patriotic League in Sarajevo (Ljubijankic,1996). Some of these efforts were doomed, but also had a larger resonanceand served as inspiration to others.

These forms of resistance were often supported by countless efforts andprivate initiatives by ordinary citizens: gentile families hiding Jewish chil-dren; Danes ferrying Jews to Sweden (Paldiel, 1993); Hutus protecting Tutsis(Jefremovas, 1995); Arab civilians bringing assistance and even rising againstthe deportation of Kurds during Anfal. Foreigners who were in a position tohelp at times went to great lengths to assist escape from atrocities: Spanish

Blue Division soldiers (Bowen, 1998), diplomats like Raul Wallenberg andSempo Sugihara (Paldiel, 1993: 252255, 319324), or some foreign priests inRwanda (Janzen, 2000). Often, relatives (especially those which, because ofdifferent group affiliation, were not targeted as such) and the family provideda precarious but occasionally decisive rampart against persecution (Mam,2006), as in the case of non-Jewish German women married to Jewish menwho demonstrated on the Rosenstrasse at the height of the war (Stoltzfus,1998).

Civil society beyond the immediate scene of atrocities often mobilized effi-ciently not only or not so much to press for intervention but to bring assistancedirectly to victims of atrocities. Some, such as Johannes Lepsius in the case


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of the Armenian genocide, sought to document ongoing atrocities, relayinginformation from the interior to often disbelieving publics abroad (Lepsius,1980). There was also the role of well-meaning insiders, however isolatedthese might have been: Oskar Schindler, a card-carrying member of the Nazi

party (Paldiel, 1993); Kurt Gerstein, a German SS Officer (Hbert, 2006); theInterahamwe member who warned Romo Dallaire of impending genocide(Piiparinen, 2007); Arab tribesmen and even Iraqi army personnel who pro-tected Kurds from executions during Anfal (Nolen, 2003).

Finally, although this is rarely highlighted as something that the internation-al community should more systematically draw lessons from, more organ-ized efforts by non-state actors have in some cases largely single-handedlystopped genocides. The best example of this is the Rwanda Patriotic Front,whose defeat of the Rwandan government and assorted militias effectivelyput an end to the Rwandan genocide. A similar argument could be madeabout the role that the Bosnian-Croat federation had in finally putting anend to ethnic cleansing (I return later to the role that well-conceived foreignassistance had in that case).

Of course, it is very difficult to know how many potential victims of atrocitieswere saved by these actions. In absolute terms, the numbers are certainly notnegligible, though they will often pale in comparison to the total of victims.The point is a more subtle one, however. Of all those who escaped atrocitieswhile atrocities were being committed, a very large proportion owed theirrescue to themselves, the courage of ordinary strangers1 or resistance move-ments. During World War II, for example, those who lived to see the daywhen Nazi Germany was defeated did not do so because the Allies bombedthe railroads to Auschwitz (they famously did not), but thanks to their ownsense of survival, organization and resilience. In Rwanda, those who survivedthe genocide did so because they had managed to escape detection until theRwanda Patriotic Front defeated the government. In all the examples referredto above, therefore, resistance by the victims of atrocities and by civil societymore broadly has proven to be possibly the most significant factor in limiting,pushing back or even stopping atrocities. Conversely, the absence of resist-

ance to atrocities by society is notoriously one of the key factors that permitsthe commission of such actions (Goldhagen, 1996; Gushee, 2004: 121).

In Praise of Resistance

There are many reasons to defend the importance of local resistance as atleast a first step in the reduction of atrocities, and one that should be takeninto account in international policy formulation. Some of the arguments can be framed in terms of efficiency. In most of the cases surveyed here, the prob-1 Nathan Tec (1986), for example, estimates that 80% of the Jewish survivors in Poland he studied had benefited from the help of strangers.


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lem has been a lack of or very tardy international intervention. However,even the most rapid intervention could probably not arrive until severalweeks after massacres had started, which, in the case of Rwanda, would have been too late (Kuperman, 2001: viii; 2004: 65). As Kuperman (2004: 64) puts it,

most violence is perpetrated faster than interveners can realistically arrive tostop it. The great strength of local civil society is that it is in a sense alwaysalready there, and that its efforts at resistance will often have begun in directresponse to patterns of violence.

Perhaps most importantly, threatened groups tend, all other things beingequal, to have more of a vested, incontrovertible interest in defending them-selves than the international community has in rescuing them. This is not tosay that victims of atrocities may not go through agonizing dilemmas aboutwhether to resist, and if so when and how; indeed, passivity and collabora-tion of victims has been an element in the commission of numerous atroci-ties (Hilberg, 1985: 10301044). But, while the international community maydither at length at little real immediate cost to itself, targeted populations areconfronted with life-and-death decisions that have a tendency to spur someof them at least into action. Although civil society resistance is certainly notautomatic, it is often more likely to occur than big power consensus.

Moreover, local groups often benefit from considerable knowledge of theterrain and a considerable ability to organize rescue and resistance opera-tions. If states have occasionally considered resistance movements to becrucially efficient in the waging of war (consider, for example, the role ofresistance movements throughout occupied Europe during World War II),then they should also extend that recognition to cases where civil society isfighting back atrocities.

Beyond efficiency, however, there are a number of potentially more princi-pled arguments in favour of putting more emphasis on resistance. Avertingatrocities requires complex arbitrages between different goals. Contrary to acertain vision of intervention that sees the political problematique as one pri-marily of international authority, these decisions often have complex domes-tic distributive impacts that border on the tragic: Who should be saved first?

Should some be sacrificed so that others can be saved? Should one contem-plate some measure of appeasement in order to increase the chance of savingsome? Given that victims of atrocities are the ones who will have to live withthe consequences of these decisions, there is a powerful argument that theirempowerment should be an integral component of any strategies aimed atmitigating atrocities.

All in all, the resistance paradigm offers a view of fighting atrocities thatis more decentralized, bottom-up, empowering, people-based and sponta-neous, where international intervention runs the risk of being centralized,top-down, paternalistic, state-based and institutional. Against a vision of thevictim as anobject of international intervention or a mere humanitarian inter-


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locutor, it reintroduces the idea of the victim as asubject of his or her fate, apolitical actor in his or her own right, capable of harnessing unusual energiesand determination to the pursuit of survival. This sense of renewed agencyof the individual in the international system may also make better sense of

evolving intuitions about the growing role of non-state actors (Rajagopal,2003), theories of the right to resist oppression (Dunr, 2005) and the cosmo-politan ends of international association.

Reconciling the Local and the International

The normative debate could be left here. After all, the point of resistanceto atrocities is that it may simplyhappen. Indeed, it may happen all themore when the international community is not doing anything about agiven situation, leading a population to consider that it has no choice left but to take matters in its own hands. Moreover, one can see such effortsas being entirely detached from what theinternational debate is andshould be about. One might think, for example, that international policy-makers should not involve themselves in issues of individual or groupresistance that ultimately lead onto the path of interference in domesticaffairs.

I take issue with this partly on normative and partly on practical grounds.At the normative level, once one has established that there may be at least acertain international legitimacy to resistance, it becomes difficult to pretendthat it is nonetheless not the international communitys concern. Failure toput the question of resistance at the heart of international preoccupationsmeans an inability to, for example, think about whether certain forms ofresistance are more legitimate than others, and has sometimes left the issueopen to simplifications (most recently those of gun-liberalization enthusiastswho argue that distributing weapons to genocide victims is the best way toavoid atrocities; see Kopel, Gallant & Eisen, 2006).2 The challenge, however, is

not to uphold one paradigm (resistance) entirely at the expense of the other(salvation), but to understand their mutual dependence and discover the best way to articulate them together, given that in practice both will almostalways coexist. In particular, the impact of the international on resistanceshould be thought out carefully on account of both the negative impact thatinternational intervention has sometimes had and the positive impact that itcould have.

2 This is not the place to respond to this article and others in the same vein, except to say that although they

have the merit of raising a number of issues in a straightforward fashion, the almost automatic link theydraw between resistance and gun ownership obfuscates a large part of the debate.


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The Potentially Negative Impact of the International InterventionParadigm on Resistance

The international interventionist agenda can have a negative impact on thespirit of resistance merely by ignoring that dimension. What is ignored inter-nationally is typically deprived of that gloss of legitimacy that comes withthings international. But, more concretely, there are at least two typical waysin which the salvation paradigm can affect the prospects of civil societyresistance.

The first is what I would call demobilization of local resistance. In thisrespect, one phenomenon that is still little studied but that is of consider-able importance is the way in which the excessive focus on the response ofthe international community, particularly on forceful intervention in times ofcrisis, can also have a powerfully demobilizing effect on efforts at local resist-ance. The whole idea that the international community will take seriously itsresponsibility to protect can lull victims into a false sense of security and pushthem to defer efforts at organizing resistance (the risk of moral hazard). TheTutsis who ran for UNAMIR cover in the early days of the Rwanda genocidelearned this at their expense. Who knows how many victims of the Holocaustwere lured by the false sentiment that the Allies would not let this happen.

An interesting metaphor, in this respect, is the tale of what happened tothe Bisesero Hills Tutsis upon the arrival of a small detachment of OperationTurquoise forces. As hundreds left their hiding places, they were informed by

the French that they did not have enough ammunition to protect them, andthat their detachment would return later. By the time it did, most of thosewho had abandoned the relative safety of the hills for the plains had beenslaughtered (Smolar, 2005: 5). Many years earlier, a very similar fate hadawaited those Armenians who had successfully fought back several Turkish battalions at Zetoun. After entrusting their fate to the German consul in Alepwho, serving as an intermediary with the Turks, promised them their livesif they put down their weapons, they abandoned their mountains only to bemassacred to the last one.

The second is the opposite risk, namely radicalization. Apart frompotentially debilitating civil society, intervention can also have the effectof radicalizing parties and of triggering violent action. As argued by AlanKuperman, the most counterintuitive aspect of humanitarian military inter-vention is that it sometimes may cause the very tragedies it is intended toprevent. Especially in a context where some groups are convinced that theinternational community would intervene to protect them from retaliation,armed rebellions have been encouraged. The tragedy is that as events playedout, these armed challenges did provoke genocidal retaliation, but interven-tion arrived too late to save many of the targets of retaliation (Kuperman,

2004: 65).


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How Resistance Could Benefit from International Support

One argument might be that since resistance happens anyhow, it is not in par-ticular need of international support. However, the fact that resistance willoften manifest itself without international assistance and indeed has oftenmanifested itself most clearly in stark cases of international abandonment does not mean that it cannot benefit from such assistance. Efforts at localresistance to atrocities have often called for some form of international sup-port, but have found it very hard to obtain such assistance (as opposed to theoccasional success in obtainingintervention). Jewish escapees during WorldWar II notoriously found closed doors and very little assistance from theAllies; German interior resistance found it extremely hard to obtain outsidesupport; Bosniac resistance was crippled by the UN arms embargo. JamesSatterwhite and others have shown how the Kosovar Albanian campaign ofnonviolent resistance to Serbian repression was not met with any substantialsupport from international organizations, something that may have doomedit (Satterwhite, 2002; see also Vickers, 1998: 281287). In Bisesero, statisticsshow that Tutsi resisters managed to stave off the inevitable longer thanany comparable group in Kibuye province (Verwimp, 2004) and could prob-ably have saved large numbers with only a modicum of international help.There are also a few cases where states encouraged non-state actors to rebel,only to then abandon them to their fate, the most obvious example beingthe Kurdish and Shiite rebellions in post-Gulf War Iraq. Here, not only did

efforts at resistance not benefit from international assistance, but non-stategroups got the worst of both worlds: international incitation to rebel, with-out the support.

Conversely, one can speculate that some form of international supportwould be a key resource in the success of resistance movements indeed thatresistance to genocide on a large scale can only succeed . . . with internation-al assistance (Weitzman, 2005). International support has certainly been akey ingredient in the success of general resistance movements (i.e. those notspecifically geared towards atrocity prevention but, instead, typically part ofa more general war effort). I return to what could be done more concretely toprop domestic resistance to atrocities in the next section.

How Intervention Might Benefit from Rethinking Itselfas Founded on the Spirit of Resistance

The logic that the international community should support resistance move-ments is also compelling from a purely international point of view. Thereare obviously material and symbolic costs involved in the international


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communitys supporting local resistance efforts, including diminished con-trol and a more humble, secondary role.

However, if the international community is, as it claims to be, truly com-mitted to atrocity prevention, these costs are outweighed by the benefits.

There is, first, as I have argued, an efficiency gain in situations where theinternational community has often proven very bad at making good on itspromises. Especially in a context of increased scepticism about humanitar-ian intervention and Global South distrust of R2P, new ideas are needed toestablish protection on a solid footing. Putting more emphasis on local effortsmight assist in resolving the perennial difficulty of distinguishing betweenjust and unjust intervention by adding a piece to the vexed puzzle of rightintention (the idea that for a humanitarian intervention to be legitimate itmust be in good faith that is, not based on some ulterior motive but fun-damentally for the benefit of those rescued) and satisfying the last resortrequirement (as endorsed, notably, in ICISS, 2001: 29, 31).

In many ways, the idea of a much more substantial contribution of localresistance to averting atrocities is one of the missing pieces to the R2P puzzle.Surely, if it were resistance movements themselves that solicited interven-tion, or if intervention arose after every conceivable effort had been madeto assist such movements, then such action would appear in a very differentlight. In the case of Darfur, for example, there is evidence that at least partof the organized Darfuri resistance is keen on an international intervention.One would think that Western supporters of intervention would empha-size this (subjective) fact, but they hardly ever do (instead emphasizing thatintervention isobjectively the right thing to do). This is a bizarre instance ofignoring the local even when the local might prove a powerful legitimizingfactor for the international agenda. Conversely, in a case where an interna-tional humanitarian intervention clearly cannot avail itself of any substantiallocal support, or totally fails to do anything to explore how it could supportand strengthen resistance, one may be in a better position to see through theillegitimacy of certain interventions.

Finally, one might argue that deferring to local solutions first is increasing-

ly consonant with a deeper principle of international regulation today thattends (in other fields at least) towards subsidiarity (or complementarity).3 Emphasizing the role of resistance can help us better conceptualize interna-tional intervention as a truly last resort, where the international communityscurrent understanding of a last-resort focuses only on what can be extractedfrom the state.

3 Both the ICISS report and the High-Level Panel use the expression unable or unwilling, which has become

closely associated with the idea of complementarity; see ICISS (2001: 11, 17, 29, 33, 49, 69); United Nations(2004: 66).


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What Can Be Done? Some Thoughts about Prospects

There are several ways one could conceive of support for local civil society.One should be wary of the possibility that third states should on their ownprovide support to civil society, because of the spectre of interference and thelong history of states supporting violent groups that had very little to do with alast-ditch effort to avert atrocities. The more likely solution, therefore, is that itis the international community that should endorse the obligation to assist.

At the very least, and following a sort of do no harm principle, the interna-tional community should be wary of the ways in which its modes of interventionmight weaken, delegitimize or otherwise hamper local resistance initiatives.The international community should also be aware of the distributional effectits failure to support certain resistance efforts has on local dynamics, particu-larly the risk of encouraging violent at the expense of nonviolent movements.The risk that the prospect of humanitarian intervention will trigger action byarmed groups in the states concerned, in particular, militates strongly for theinternational community [to] reward non-violent protest movements, ratherthan armed rebellions (Kuperman, 2001: 66). This is true at least in the pre-ventive or early stage of atrocities, although support of armed resistance mayeventually become the only solution. Timing, however, will be crucial: preco-cious support for armed resistance may precipitate more violence, whereasdelayed support for violent resistance will come too late.

Concretely, in terms of direct assistance, there are many steps that could be taken, although these will differ in nature from one context to another. Insome cases, support will indeed mean military assistance, especially when theinternational community feels that it is itself incapable of intervening or toohamstrung to do so. Military support is the most sensitive option and may not be suitable for all situations, but the point is that it has at times achieved strik-ing results. Bosnia and Kosovo provide good examples. Of course, in both ofthese cases the goal may not have been simply to avert atrocities as much as toreach a genuine end to the conflict, but US/NATO support tipped the balanceof forces to the point of equilibrium, and the end of civilian massacre was oneeffective result. The decision to support non-state groups militarily (and howto do so) should depend, in particular, on the determination of such groupsto fight at least significantly to prevent atrocities and protect populations;their ability to do so in a way that is compatible with humanitarian values;their chances of success; and the risk that use of violence might precipitatea harsh reaction from the state. Although there is much concern about howthe spread of weapons fosters insecurity, there is also a case that it is ratherindefensible to deny vulnerable groups the means to protect themselves evenas the international community is helpless to prevent the flow of weapons to

the oppressors (Polsby & Kates, 1997).


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It may be, in this context, that re-evaluations of the role of certain armedgroups, particularly civil defence forces, will be in order, especially inextreme circumstances where they may represent the lesser evil. Althoughthe international discourse concerning such groups is typically negative, and

the militianization of security is often rightly associated with increases inviolence as well as significant post-conflict difficulties (Ero, 2000), it is impor-tant not to underestimate the extent to which some groups are largely defen-sive in nature; may act and be seen as providers of security locally by certainconstituencies, including the most vulnerable (Mazurana, 2004); and may bein a position to offer credible deterrence against atrocities. It may be that whatis needed in some cases is an internationalrealpolitik of protection, one morewilling to create the conditions for active defence, including to use a type ofmetaphor popular in the study of conflicts fighting fire with (the right kindof) fire. If anything, the decision to support such groups should be based ontheir ability to provide protection rather than on some general bias againstnon-state violence. Although international engagement with such groups toensure that they respect humanitarian norms is well under way, consideringthem as a harm to be minimized is not the same thing as seeing them as actu-ally having a positive contribution to make.

However, perhaps more importantly, discussions about armed groups shouldnot overshadow the real needs of individuals, particularly those engaged innonviolent strategies, in terms of international assistance that is not mili-tary. First, political support could enhance the legitimacy of at least organ-ized groups. One is reminded in particular of the role that the UN GeneralAssembly had in the 1960s and 1970s, to great effect, in promoting the causeof national liberation movements. It is also important to remind ourselves ofthe radical solitude of many victims and rescuers and the extremely unlike-ly odds these face in standing up to an oppression that often advances withthe mask of legality and officialdom (Fogelman, 1996: 89). Strong signs ofexternal support can be a welcome validation of their cause. Political supportof local resistance might also, in cases where a sovereign has turned againstits people, help efforts at undermining the states authority over its army and

police forces, for example by encouraging defections. Second, in situationswhere atrocities are committed with a degree of secrecy, there is considerableneed for information directed specifically to populations about the immi-nence of dangers. It may in some cases be necessary to shake citizens sense ofdisbelief about what actually threatens them an approach that was adopted by the Allies during World War II, but only very rarely and in this respectnew technologies offer unprecedented potentials. Third, the internationalcommunity might facilitate avoidance strategies and escapes. There are afew isolated examples of successful international assistance by states (e.g. theFrench fleet rescuing the Armenians at Musa Dagh; see Bloxham, 2007) andnon-state actors (e.g. the flotilla that went to the rescue of Cambodian boat


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people) of efforts to at least escape atrocities. Temporary protection of refu-gees, as exemplified by the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme to airliftthreatened Kosovars, is an interesting precedent (Fitzpatrick, 2000), but moremight be done in terms of helping exfiltration when a population is captive

of a government, as well as provision of temporary asylum (Darcy, 2007: 2).Fourth, material support of groups involved in resistance to or escaping ofatrocities may be particularly welcome. Historically, all underground rail-ways have required substantial amounts of money, if only to enable indi-viduals to bribe their way to safety.

More generally, several issues seem at stake. First, there is a need to thinknot only in the strategic terms of stopping atrocities once and for all, butalso pragmatically in terms of mitigating them continuously through what-ever means are available. Second, there is a need to think in terms of muchcloser political, operational and even military liaison between the interna-tional community and a diversity of informal actors involved on the groundin resisting atrocities in other words, persisting with what R2P recommendsin the pre- and post-conflict stages vis--vis civil society, but in ways thatentertain the possibility of much more confrontational policies towards thestate. This calls for a new sense of internationallocal partnerships based onshared intelligence and decisionmaking. Third, there is a need to think less intraditional humanitarian terms, and more in robust political/human rightsones. This means understanding that victims of atrocities are less in needof humanitarian assistance than of protection, and in particular require helpto help themselves, whether through nonviolent or violent means. Fourth,what is required is a willingness to go beyond official humanitarian assist-ance and state consent, to occasionally assist victims in more clandestine orcovert ways that alone can ensure that aid does not become hostage to theregime responsible for the atrocities.

Conclusion

In an address given to the UN, Kofi Annan warned that if the collective con-science of humanity could not be found in that organization, there was agrave danger that it will look elsewhere for peace and justice (quoted inDeutscher, 2005). While it is not very clear where Kofi Annan thought human-ity might turn, I have tried to argue that there are dangers in investing toomuch hope in the ability of the international community alone to avert atroci-ties. It is important, instead, to draw from history some of the hard-learntlessons of how atrocities have actually been minimized or brought to an end,and to think further about the internationallocal interface. I have suggested,in particular, that we need to re-evaluate the role that targeted groups have


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had in resisting mass atrocities through a multitude of acts of individual andcollective, nonviolent and violent, spontaneous and organized resistance.

These lines of resistance are not the final answer to all cases of atrocities,and they are not as such exclusive of international interventions, but they

do have the potential to substantially recast the debate about the nature ofsuch interventions. The argument is a call to start from what is here, thehuge, powerful force of human resilience in the face of atrocities, instead ofstarting from what might be some hypothetical vision of a cosmopolitancommunity of mankind dictating its will to states. It is open to debate, ofcourse, what the historical record of resistance efforts has been,but the pointis that resistance often achieved less than it might have because it was neglected orabandoned, so that the current challenge is to think of better ways in which itmight be supported. In suggesting a new rapport between the internationalcommunity and populations in peril, the argument developed here may infact make better sense of cosmopolitan aspirations underlying R2P than amore top-down approach.

Although there will no doubt be many obstacles to the international com-munity moving in the direction of greater support of civil society resistanceto atrocities (for example, the dangers to sovereignty and the risk of interfer-ence), there is certainly room for an argument that the international systemcannot endlessly uphold the rights, security and dignity of the individual asthe paramount goal of international association while simultaneously denyingthe individuals substantial agency in securing these especially in situationswhere the international community is effectively leaving populations largelyto their own devices. Surely humans, as it were, have a considerable role inhuman security, and in fact the denial of that role can be seen as a source ofinsecurity itself.

Maybe the challenge should be less to think about when resistance might be justified because the international community fails to intervene. Rather,assuming that resistance to atrocities is always legitimate, the questionshould be how international intervention itself should always be subsidiaryto the failure of local efforts and every attempt to support them internation-

ally. Surely supporting internal resistance efforts is not a worse encroach-ment on sovereignty than overcoming the latter by invasive force. And, bythe time the threshold of labelling a government dangerous for its populationhas been reached, it would seem only a small step to taking sides more reso-lutely with the targeted population. Recasting international intervention asat least in part international intervention in support of self-rescue and resist-ance efforts may not solve the problem of collective will, but in some ways itmay alleviate it by helping to pull out of the to intervene or not to intervenedichotomy and more explicitly outlining an intermediary strategy.


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* Frdric Mgret is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law, McGill University, andthe Canada Research Chair in the Law of Human Rights and Legal Pluralism. He servedas a blue helmet in Sarajevo in 1995. His current research focuses on international jus-tice, peacekeeping, and the idea of resistance in international law and relations. Fundingfor the research behind this article was provided by the Canadian Social Sciences andHumanities Research Council. The author is grateful to Amar Khoday for invaluableresearch assistance.

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