bath spa university - how economic contexts shape...

Contributed Paper

How economic contexts shape calculations of yieldin biodiversity offsetting

L. Carver1 and S. Sullivan 2 ∗1Birkbeck College, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, U.K.2Bath Spa University, Newton Park, Newton St, Loe, Bath BA2 9BN, U.K.

Abstract: We examined and analyzed methods used to create numerical equivalence between sites affectedby development and proposed conservation offset sites. Application of biodiversity offsetting metrics in develop-ment impact and mitigation assessments is thought to standardize biodiversity conservation outcomes, some-times termed yield by those conducting these calculations. The youth of biodiversity offsetting in application,however, means little is known about how biodiversity valuations and offset contracts between developmentand offset sites are agreed on in practice or about long-term conservation outcomes. We examined how siteswere made commensurable and how biodiversity gains or yields were calculated and negotiated for a specificoffset contract in a government-led pilot study of biodiversity offsets in England. Over 24 months, we conductedparticipant observations of various stages in the negotiation of offset contracts through repeated visits to 3(anonymized) biodiversity offset contract sites. We conducted 50 semistructured interviews of stakeholdersin regional and local government, the private sector, and civil society. We used a qualitative data analysissoftware program (DEDOOSE) to textually analyze interview transcriptions. We also compared successiveiterations of biodiversity-offsetting calculation spreadsheets and planning documents. A particular focus wasthe different iterations of a specific biodiversity impact assessment in which the biodiversity offsetting metricdeveloped by the U.K.’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs was used. We highlight 3main findings. First, biodiversity offsetting metrics were amended in creative ways as users adapted inputsto metric calculations to balance and negotiate conflicting requirements. Second, the practice of makingdifferent habitats equivalent to each other through the application of biodiversity offsetting metrics resultedin commensuration outcomes that may not provide projected conservation gains. Third, the pressure ofcreating value for money diminished projected conservation yields.

Keywords: biodiversity yield, commensuration, conservation policy, English Biodiversity Offsetting Pilot,ethnography, value

Como los Contextos Economicos Dan Forma a los Calculos del Redito en la Compensacion de la Biodiversidad

Resumen: Examinamos y analizamos los metodos utilizados para crear equivalencias numericas entrelos sitios afectados por el desarrollo y propusimos sitios de compensacion de la conservacion. Se cree quela aplicacion de las medidas compensadoras de la biodiversidad en el impacto del desarrollo y en las val-oraciones de mitigacion estandariza los resultados de la conservacion de la biodiversidad, que a veces esdenominada redito por aquellos que realizan estos calculos. Sin embargo, lo joven que es la compensacion dela biodiversidad en la aplicacion significa que se conoce poco sobre como las valoraciones de la biodiversidady los contratos de compensaciones entre los sitios de desarrollo y compensacion son acordados en la practica,o sobre los resultados a largo plazo de la conservacion. Examinamos como se hicieron equiparables los sitios ycomo las ganancias o el redito de la biodiversidad fueron calculados y negociados para un contrato especıficode compensacion en un estudio piloto de la compensacion de la biodiversidad dirigido por el gobiernoen Inglaterra. A lo largo de 24 meses observamos a los participantes de varias etapas de la negociacionde los contratos de compensacion por medio de visitas (anonimas) repetidas a tres sitios de contrato de

∗email [email protected] submitted August 23, 2016; revised manuscript accepted February 19, 2017.

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproductionin any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

1053Conservation Biology, Volume 31, No. 5, 1053–1065C© 2017 The Authors. Conservation Biology published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Society for Conservation Biology.DOI: 10.1111/cobi.12917

http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0522-8843

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

1054 Biodiversity Offsetting

compensacion de la biodiversidad. Realizamos 50 entrevistas semi-estructuradas a los accionistas en elgobierno regional y local, al sector privado y a la sociedad civil. Utilizamos un programa de software deanalisis cualitativo de datos (DEDOOSE) para analizar textualmente las transcripciones de las entrevistas.Tambien comparamos las repeticiones sucesivas del calculo de la compensacion de la biodiversidad en lashojas de calculo y en los documentos de planeacion. Un enfoque particular fueron las repeticiones diferentesde la valoracion de un impacto especıfico sobre la biodiversidad en el que se uso la medida compensadorade la biodiversidad desarrollado por el Departamento de Ambiente, Alimentos y Asuntos Rurales del ReinoUnido. Tuvimos tres hallazgos principales. Primero, las medidas compensadoras de la biodiversidad fueronmodificadas de formas creativas conforme los usuarios adaptaban los resultados a los calculos de las medidaspara balancear y negociar los requerimientos conflictivos. Segundo, la practica de la elaboracion de diferenteshabitats equivalentes a sı mismos por medio de la aplicacion de las medidas compensadoras de la biodiver-sidad resulto en la equiparacion de los resultados que podrıan no proporcionar ganancias proyectadas dela conservacion. Tercero, la presion por crear valor para el dinero disminuyo los reditos proyectados de laconservacion.

Palabras Clave: equiparacion, etnografıa, Piloto Ingles de Compensacion de la Biodiversidad, polıtica de con-servacion, redito de la biodiversidad, valor

Introduction

In recent years the mitigation practice of biodiversityoffsetting (BDO) and associated conservation policyframeworks have expanded globally to secure con-servation investment from infrastructure development(Carroll et al. 2008; Quintero & Mathur 2011; Ben-abou 2014). Preceded by wetland mitigation bankingand species banking in the United States from the1970s and 1990s respectively (e.g., Fox & Nino-Murcia,2005; Robertson & Hayden 2008; Pawliczek & Sulli-van 2011), BDO is a relatively new conservation tech-nology. This means that there are few detailed casehistories of offset implementation or of actual, as op-posed to projected, conservation outcomes. We thusexamined the application of BDO in England under a2-year pilot study by the Department of Environment,Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) to assess the proposal thatapplication of the DEFRA technical metric standardizesassessments of biodiversity value so as to offer robustnumerical foundations on which to base planning fordevelopment and offset sites in England.

We reviewed studies of BDO, focusing on the develop-ment and application of metrics that create comparablemeasures of biodiversity so as to demonstrate measur-able gains (or yields) in biodiversity value. In researchingthe BDO pilot in England (2012–2014), we focused onthe application in practice of DEFRA’s biodiversity offsetmetrics. Over 24 months, we documented negotiationsand calculations that gave rise to a specific BDO contract,set within a broader data set of site visits, interviews, bio-diversity impact calculations, and grey-literature planningdocuments for 6 DEFRA BDO pilot sites in England (dataheld by L.C.).

Shaping the Calculation of Biodiversity Yield

Biodiversity offsetting policy and best practice guidelines(BBOP 2009, 2012; DEFRA 2012a, 2012b, 2013; Gardner

et al. 2013) are intended to support biodiversity conserva-tion outcomes by providing methodologies for the techni-cal calculation and apparent quantification of biodiversityvalues. Such methods aim to determine commensurablelosses and gains in biodiversity at different sites,thereby creating the possibility of offset compensation.Biodiversity offsets inevitably pertain to 2 separate sites.They constitute quantitative biodiversity gains reflectedas units or credits beyond a baseline over time at an offsetsite. These predicted biodiversity gains compensate forbiodiversity unit losses at a development site and shouldbe additional to a projected counter-factual scenario inthe absence of compensation (Bull et al. 2014; Tuckeret al. 2014). Following the wording of a respondent inour research, we use the term “biodiversity yield” todescribe projected gains in calculated biodiversity values.

A variety of metrological approaches exist for calculat-ing and creating equivalence between biodiversity lossesand gains at different sites and temporal moments. Inapplication, these are normally linked to the use of a stan-dardized reference system for the classification of habitatsor land cover (Quintero & Mathur 2011). In the UnitedKingdom, the basis for such calculations is the biodiver-sity offset metric developed by DEFRA (2012b), discussedin more detail below. Habib et al. (2013:1313–1314)state that “[e]xchanging dissimilar biodiversity elementsrequires assessment via a generalized metric” and therepresentation of biodiversity units by an appropriatelyfungible currency or system of credits. An aim of BDOis thus to standardize state and private-sector BDO audit-ing methods so as to improve and stabilize approachesconsidered ad hoc in practice (Gardner 2013: 1254). It isnoticeable, however, that these standardizing assessmenttechniques and metrics are themselves proliferating, suchthat direct comparisons of offset quality between con-texts becomes difficult. This phenomenon has also beenobserved for assessment methods in carbon accounting(Lohmann 2009; Lippert 2014). Tensions between ease

Conservation BiologyVolume 31, No. 5, 2017

Carver & Sullivan 1055

Table 1. Habitat scoring system for biodiversity offsetting in England.∗

Biodiversity distinctiveness

Habitat condition low (2) medium (4) high (6)

Good (3) 6 12 18Moderate (2) 4 8 12Poor (1) 2 4 6

∗Source: DEFRA (2012b).

of compliance for development interests and robustnessof conservation gain in terms of measurable biodiversityyield (Maron et al. 2012) make studies of applied BDO rel-evant for understanding how these tensions are workedout in practice.

English Biodiversity Offsetting Pilot

Along with the United States, Australia, South Africa, andGermany, England is considered at the forefront of devel-oping BDO. In England, BDO has been enthusiasticallyendorsed at the ministerial level (DEFRA 2013) and in anumber of recent environmental-policy documents andreports (e.g., Lawton et al. 2010; DEFRA 2011; NPPF2012). A DEFRA BDO pilot project ran for 2 years fromApril 2012 to April 2014 and involved 6 local planningauthorities (Devon, Doncaster, Essex, Greater Norwich,Nottinghamshire, and Coventry, Warwickshire, and Soli-hull) as well as private-sector organizations (e.g., DEFRA2012a; Apostolopoulou & Adams 2015; Carver 2015).

Key to the DEFRA BDO pilot was the metric for numer-ically scoring the harm to biodiversity by a developmentand then scoring the possibilities for onsite and offsitemitigation of this harm (Table 1). These numerical scoresenable the calculation of commensurable losses and gainsof biodiversity in development and potential offset sites(DEFRA 2012b; Hannis & Sullivan 2012; Sullivan 2013). Inapplying the metric, development sites are first “mappedand divided into habitat parcels” (DEFRA 2012b: 7)and then classified according to the habitat designationsof the Joint Nature Conservation Committee, a publicbody that advises the U.K. central and devolved govern-ments on nature conservation (http://jncc.defra.gov.uk).These mapped and classified sites are then scored ac-cording to their observed condition and biodiversity dis-tinctiveness with the scoring matrix of the BDO metric(Table 1). Distinctiveness is determined based on theguidelines in Treweek et al. (2010) and especially onspecies richness, diversity, rarity, and the unique poten-tial for the area to support species rarely found else-where (DEFRA 2012b). The habitat condition grades areadapted from the Higher Level Agri-Environment Scheme(HLS) Farm Environment Plan Manual (FEP). A habitattype scored as in good condition (specific to habitattype within the FEP but usually based on percent cover

Table 2. Categories and subcategories (abbreviations in parenthe-ses) of stakeholders interviewed regarding biodiversity offsetting inEngland.

Category Subcategory

Regional and localgovernment

1. local planning authority (LPA)2. natural England (NE)

Private sector 3. developer (DEV)4. consultant ecologist (CE)5. planning consultant (PC)

Civil society 7. conservation and wildlife NGO (NGO)8. local resident (LR)9. landowning offset provider (OP)

of indicator species, for example, cover of undesirablespecies <5%) with high distinctiveness (incorporatingrarity and endemism) would be assigned the highest nu-merical score. The metric thus aligns a numerical scorefor an area’s ecological distinctiveness with a score forits condition. Scores for an area of habitat range from 2(lowest distinctiveness and condition) to 18.

Methods

We observed how biodiversity calculations and valua-tions were made for a 2-year pilot study of BDO led byDEFRA from 2012 to 2014. Field research followed threephases and was based primarily on repeat site visits to DE-FRA pilot and voluntary offset sites as well as analysis andcomparisons of associated policy and planning texts andsuccessive biodiversity impact assessment (BIA) spread-sheets. We conducted 50 semistructured interviews with30 key actors, organized into three stakeholder categories(regional and local government, the private sector andcivil society) and nine subcategories (see Table 2) (seeSupporting Information for interview questions). In re-ferring to interview transcripts below, stakeholder cat-egories for the DEFRA pilot sites are numbered 1 to 5(as a sample of the 6 local planning authorities [LPA]that took part in the pilot), and the complementary vol-untary pilot offsetting site is denoted by a “comp” pre-fix. Sequential codes for interviewees follow the formatof stakeholder category, followed by site number, theindividual within that site, and date of interview (e.g.,LPA2.3 130515 means the third individual interviewedwithin the LPA stakeholder category at pilot site 2, onMay 13, 2015). We conducted structured textual analysisof interview transcripts with DEDOOSE, a cloud-basedqualitative data-analysis program that facilitates deductiveand inductive coding of text excerpts to enable assess-ment of overarching themes and perspectives (Sullivan &Hannis 2015). All respondents and offsetting cases wereanonymized.

From June 2013 to January 2014, we interviewed indi-viduals from the ecology or green infrastructure depart-ments of county or district councils where pilot sites had


http://jncc.defra.gov.uk


been established (see Supporting Information for inter-view questions). Following interviews, we selected 2 ofthe DEFRA pilot sites for the compilation of detailed casestudies. Our selection was based on the availability ofbiodiversity impact as well as receptor site biodiversityunit calculations (in this case study) and on the treat-ment of protected species (in the second selected casestudy) (Carver forthcoming). An additional private-sectorDEFRA pilot offset site was also selected for comparisonwith a developer-led voluntary biodiversity offset initia-tive. From January 2014 to January 2016, we made re-peated site visits to observe BDO-related scoring activitiesand negotiations at the 3 sites, conducted semistructuredinterviews, and examined planning documents and BIAs.This triad of methods formed the basis of our 3 detailedcase histories that tracked the design and developmentof offset contracts in England from 2013 to the present(data held by L.C.). A third and ongoing research phaseentailed textual analysis of documents connected withBDO policy in England, interviews of participants in otherlocal government, nongovernmental, and private-sectoroffset efforts (i.e., projects not part of the DEFRA pilotstudy). These interviews were categorized by stakeholdertype and analyzed as for interviews of stakeholders in theDEFRA pilot study. The scope and depth of these casestudies and space limitations mean that, while drawingon perspectives and findings derived from the broaderdata set, for this paper we focused on the negotiatedcalculations of development and offset locations that ledto one particular BDO contract.

We examined the process used to make biodiversitycalculations so that biodiversity values could be referredto in terms of losses or gains (or yields) and prices couldbe assigned to different sites in the offset agreement fora particular offset contract. These values and prices werenegotiated over 32 months from March 2013 to Decem-ber 2015. We drew on our multiple sources of data todescribe the development site and to present in detailthe metric calculations in the BIA applied to the devel-opment and offset sites. We focused on the negotiationprocess that ensued regarding the levels of mitigation andcompensation payments required and on the biodiversityyields projected to arise from these transactions. The orig-inal format of the BIA Excel spreadsheet (version 17.4) isin Supporting Information. At the time of writing, localgovernment ecologists were using version 18 of the BIA.The different iterations of the BIA affected the scores ofvalues arising from its application independently of thebiophysical dimensions of the areas being assessed.

Results

The Development Case

A planning application was submitted for delivery of 200residential properties, a sports stadium, and playing fields

across 13 ha of mostly agricultural fields. Under the guid-ance of the DEFRA BDO pilot and with the assistanceof a private offsetting brokerage firm, the developmentbecame subject to BDO compensation payments in linewith the calculated value of affected biodiversity at thedevelopment site. The proposed development site con-sisted largely of amenity grassland, improved grassland,hedgerows, scattered tall ruderal vegetation, and 4 ponds,one with great crested newts (Triturus cristatus), whichare protected under the Conservation of Habitats andSpecies Regulations 2010. The site formed the south-western fringe of a small medieval market town and wasbordered to the north by an industrial and residentialdevelopment and to the west and east by roads withopen countryside beyond. The planning application wassubmitted in March 2013 by the property owners, thelocal football and bowls clubs, and a large residentialdeveloper who would oversee the bulk of the planningprocess and build, market, and sell the residential prop-erties. Under new requirements shaped by the DEFRABDO pilot study, the local planning authority asked thedeveloper to apply the DEFRA metric, in the form of a BIA,to guide the biodiversity mitigation and compensationmeasures required to offset the development.

The Biodiversity Impact Assessment (BIA)

The developer’s consultant ecologists completed site sur-veys and used existing records to provide information onthe condition and distinctiveness of the habitats consid-ered represented at the development site. These recordsformed the basis of an ecological impact assessment re-port for the planning application. Subsequently, to es-tablish the site’s biodiversity unit baseline and mitigationvalues in the format necessary for BDO under the DEFRApilot, the contents of the ecological impact assessmentreport were translated into a BIA by an LPA ecologist andthe offset broker assisting the LPA with the contract. Theecological condition and proposed mitigation actions atthe development site were determined by entering theexisting (i.e., pre-development) habitat scores into theBIA produced by the County Council planning-authorityecologist. The BIA spreadsheet operationalized the DE-FRA BDO metric to yield biodiversity unit scores for eachhabitat type on the development site.

To arrive at these scores the development site wasfirst categorized by the LPA ecologist into habitat typesentered on separate rows of the BIA spreadsheet, eachwith a code, description, size, and numerical score forhabitat distinctiveness and condition (Table 3 & Support-ing Information). The spreadsheet allowed 3 sets of cal-culations. The first (see Table 3 rows 15–28) generated ahabitat impact score (HIS) for the total scored habitat onsite prior to the development (46.68 biodiversity units,cell O53).



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The second set of calculations (Table 3 rows 59–70)yielded a habitat-mitigation score (HMS) for the total num-ber of biodiversity units to be restored or created on siteso as to mitigate or minimize projected biodiversity losses(16.78 units, cell O89). A notable feature of this HMS isthat almost 40% of on-site mitigation was projected tobe delivered through creation of a number of footballpitches of different sizes. The spreadsheet showed thefootball pitches contributed substantial amounts of on-site biodiversity unit value and had the largest spatialhabitat value of all mitigation activities. This mitigationvalue was to be achieved by attributing biodiversity valueto the amenity grassland of the pitches themselves (cellO63) and by allowing the perimeter surface area of theproposed grassy margins to grow unmowed and therebyto provide 0.73 ha of semi-improved grassland (cell O70).Although receiving low habitat scores for both distinc-tiveness (2) and habitat condition (1), the size of thefootball pitches amenity grassland meant that in 5 yearsthis aggregate spatial area was calculated to contribute4.07 units (Fig. 1). After 15 years, the grassy marginswould contribute a further 2.29 units cell. In total, then,the football pitches would eventually make up 6.36 unitsof biodiversity value of 16.78 units of total on-site mitiga-tion and habitat creation.

The third set of calculations, through comparison ofscores from the first and second calculation sets, yieldedthe residual biodiversity net loss. This value indicatedhow many biodiversity units would need to be purchasedfor mitigation purposes if an additional off-site offset wereneeded. This net loss or gain value was the habitat bio-diversity impact score (HBIS) generated by subtractingHIS from HMS. The HBIS was calculated as an overallloss of 31.90 biodiversity units (Table 3, cell O91). It isthis calculated biodiversity value that required an off-siteoffset to satisfy planning requirements for mitigation ofon-site development impacts on biodiversity.

The Offset Site

Interviews showed that established conservation non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Wildlife Trustswere typically perceived as possessing the “experienceand expertise to ensure delivery” (LPA2.1 020714) ofoffsets, and as being familiar and experienced with con-tracted management and improvement of habitat. Theoffset site identified by the council for the supply ofscored offset units comparable to the HBIS score abovewas a 5-ha grassland meadow 5 km northeast of the de-velopment, acquired by a local wildlife and conservationNGO in 2013. The site consisted of a meadow of species-rich, semi-improved grassland in close proximity to alocal site of special scientific interest (SSSI). The site sup-ported 5 orchid species, including the largest populationof greater butterfly orchid (Plantanthera chlorantha)in the county. It also supported 4 of the county’s 6 rare

farmland butterflies, 3 of which (grizzled skipper [Pyrgusmalvae], dingy skipper [Erynnis tages], and white-letterhairstreak [Satyrium w-album]) are designated as biodi-versity priority species under the 2007 U.K. BiodiversityAction Plan. At the time of assessment the NGO was notinvesting in much active management of the site due tolimited funding, despite the site’s excellent ecologicalenhancement potential (NGO5.1 241114).

A BIA was conducted for the offset site to calculateits baseline and projected biodiversity values. This BIAindicated the NGO had intended to bring the grasslandto a moderate condition but with the offset paymentsfrom the developer would be able to fully restore thesite and thus provide a lowland meadow of national im-portance (Fig. 1). These improvements would therebydemonstrate conservation additionality (NGO5.1 OffsetSite Draft Management Plan 112013). It was hoped thatwith appropriate interventions 2 other rare farmland but-terflies, also designated nationally as biodiversity priorityspecies, would establish colonies on the site (NGO 5.1Offset Site Draft Management Plan November 2013).

To achieve this conservation additionality, the pre-dicted biodiversity yield was quantified and the cost wasestimated according to a management plan to be carriedout by the offset provider. The BDO Draft ManagementPlan was written by the NGO conservation officer. Costsincluded NGO volunteer and paid staff and external con-tractor workforces, materials, and capital or lease pay-ments for the land itself (NGO5.2 280115). The predictedbudget for improvement and 30 years of managementat the offset site totaled £204,076, of which £98,030would come from the conservation NGO budget and£106,046 from the biodiversity offset payment made bythe developers (NGO5.1 Offset Site Draft ManagementPlan 112013). The developer would pay a further 20%for brokerage fees (OB5.1 241114) and legal fees for ar-ranging the contracts among parties (NGO5.2 280115).

Negotiating Biodiversity Calculations

Tracing successive calculations of HMS, HIS, and HBISscores showed additionally that the costs arrived at abovewere also the outcome of negotiations between stake-holders. These negotiations frequently involved changingthe numerical scores in the first BIA for the developmentsite. Over the course of the planning process, the calcu-lated baseline biodiversity value of the development sitewas reduced by almost 48% from 48.68 units in BIA draft1 (Table 3 & Supporting Information) to 25.52 units indraft 2. This decrease in habitat value occurred throughcategory changes to the condition of existing habitats.

Changes made to the condition values of the baselinehabitats on site and identified through comparisons ofdrafts of the BIA excel sheets had dramatic effects onfinancial compensation requirements (Table 4). Thesechanges included lowering the perceived condition of



Figure 1. Map of development site in the United Kingdom (a) before and (b) after development.



4.88 ha of improved grassland on the development sitefrom moderate to poor condition such that the BIA F3baseline value of 19.52 in Table 3 (cell O26) became9.76 units. The adjustment to the condition score con-stituted a 50% reduction of baseline biodiversity valuefor this area. Because of this habitat parcel’s size thissingle modification amounted to an almost 20% overallreduction to the baseline biodiversity unit value for theentire development site. The same process was appliedto improved and amenity grasslands in different areas.Whether these modifications increased or decreased thefinal compensation costs of development-planning appli-cations was built into the numerical adjustments that tookplace. Other iterations to the BIA over the course of thepilot study included adding category values to the BDOmetric (Table 1) with the odd numbers 1, 3 and 5 forlocal habitat types that had greater regional than nationaldistinctiveness and rarity (NGO5.1 241114), as well asextensive formatting changes and numerous editions tomake the calculator more user friendly and manageable(OB5.2 050114).

One explanation for these modifications is that localplanning authorities had a relatively limited ability todetermine the exact condition of the habitats under con-sideration. Only a few habitats were visited and verifiedby a county ecologist (LPA5.2 241114) because of thewidespread shortage of ecological expertise within localgovernments more generally (NGO 270116, NGOComp1290116). Often the ecological data were assembled andcross-referenced remotely against data in the ecologicalassessment report and biological and historical data heldby the council offices at the district council’s BiologicalRecords Centre. Indeed, the good quality and extensivescope of the ecological data held by the county counciland the size of the county’s ecological team were consid-ered anomalous in this case (LPA5.2 241114).

Underlying the overall downward recalculation of thedevelopment site’s baseline value from 48.68 to 25.52units, however, was a view that the first BIA calculationswould create too large a future compensation package,thereby threatening the financial viability of the devel-opment (DEV5.1 060315). The initial calculation for thebiodiversity offset compensation package was £300,000.The developer and the local planning authority met andthe baseline habitat condition assessments for many areason site were adjusted downward to produce the newfigure of 25.52 biodiversity units in the second draft(Table 4). Described as “ . . . something we could livewith” (DEV5.1 060315), the ensuing revised cost for thefinal compensation package was £120,000.

Discussion

Our case study provides an in-depth history of the assess-ments, calculations, and negotiations of biodiversity and

financial values for a BDO compensation contract. Thiscase illustrates several problems for biodiversity conser-vation predicted in the theoretical literature on BDO.We considered 3 problems in particular and focused ontheir broader implications for biodiversity conservationthrough the implementation of BDO.

First, evidence from repeat site visits to this and otherpilot offsetting sites in England over 24 months (data heldby L.C.) showed that making the DEFRA metric applicableto real-life planning cases is a process of constant iterationand trial and error. Our BDO case history illustrates inparticular how metrics for deciding biodiversity valuesat development and off-site mitigation sites are beingredesigned during application and are generating numer-ical values that are then further negotiated and adjusted.Instead of acting as technical means for the standardizedproduction of impartial and objective calculations basedon observed site characteristics, the new metrics associ-ated with BDO design and recommendations are beingused differently by different actors with competing inter-ests in negotiations. Such differences in application maybe appropriate in response to real-world complexities,but they conflict with the stated aims in BDO policy de-sign for standardization and comparability. The nexus ofcompeting development, conservation, and LPA interestsmeant that biodiversity values calculated through appli-cation of the metric were adjusted downward to facilitatea compensation package that was cheaper for develop-ers. In a similar case at another development site, thedevelopment firm negotiated a reduction in biodiversityoffset compensation from £300,000 to £90,000 (DEV5.1060315) (also see the example in Sullivan [2013]). Aspredicted in theory (Walker et al. 2009; Hannis & Sullivan2012), then, these case studies seem consistent with con-cerns that an emphasis on market values for biodiversityconservation and compensation will encourage develop-ers, as purchasers of impact compensation, to push pricesdownward so as to lower their costs. In doing so, boththe quality and quantity of conservation yield throughBDO may also be reduced.

Second, our case shows how the commensuration pro-cess works in practice to make different habitats equiva-lent to each other through the application of BDO metrics(Tables 1 and 3). Numerical indicators form proxies forqualitatively different ecological assemblages, calculatedwith the aid of the DEFRA biodiversity metric as repre-sented by the BIA Excel spreadsheet calculations. Some-times these commensuration processes generated unin-tuitive outcomes. It was unclear, for example, how thesports pitches, with 6.36 units of biodiversity value, wasequivalent to 6.36 units of high-quality grassland habitatthat supports a range of biodiversity-action-plan speciesat the offset site. The proposed mitigation value of thesports pitches, determined to be habitats of low distinc-tiveness and poor condition, was achieved because theywere the largest habitat type within the development.



Tabl

e4.

Nego

tiate

dch

ange

sin

calc

ulat

edbi

odiv

ersi

tyba

selin

eun

itva

lues

betw

een

biod

iver

sity

impa

ctas

sess

men

t(BI

A)dr

afts

1an

d2.

The

habi

tatc

odes

inth

efir

stco

lum

nre

late

toth

eha

bita

tco

des

inFi

g.1a

.

Dis

tin

ctiv

enes

sC

on

dit

ion

BIA

ha

bit

at

code

Ha

bit

at

des

crip

tion

Are

a(h

a)

cate

gory

cha

nge

score

cha

nge

cate

gory

cha

nge

score

cha

nge

Ori

gin

alu

nit

valu

edra

ft1

New

un

itva

lue

dra

ft2

Red

uct

ion

inu

nit

valu

e(%

)

F1im

pro

ved

gras

slan

d1.

78n

on

en

on

em

od

erat

eto

po

or

2to

17.

123.

5650

P1

wet

lan

dst

and

ing

wat

er0.

01n

on

en

on

ego

od

tom

od

erat

e3

to2

0.14

0.01

93

F2im

pro

ved

gras

slan

d3.

10n

on

en

on

em

od

erat

eto

po

or

2to

112

.40

6.20

50

F2ta

llru

der

al0.

18n

on

en

on

em

od

erat

eto

po

or

2to

10.

700.

3550

Bo

wlin

ggr

een

amen

ity

gras

slan

d0.

12n

on

en

on

en

on

en

on

e0.

240.

240

F6am

enit

ygr

assl

and

0.97

no

ne

no

ne

no

ne

no

ne

1.94

1.94

0W

est

of

foo

tbal

lgr

idim

pro

ved

gras

slan

d0.

08n

on

en

on

ego

od

tom

od

erat

e3

to2

0.48

0.32

33

F3im

pro

ved

gras

slan

d4.

88n

on

en

on

em

od

erat

eto

po

or

2to

119

.52

9.76

50

Slu

rry

pit

stan

din

gw

ater

0.01

hig

hto

low

6to

2n

on

en

on

e0.

050.

0260

Par

to

fF4

and

F5im

pro

ved

gras

slan

d1.

52n

on

en

on

em

od

erat

eto

po

or

2to

16.

083.

0450

To

tal

48.6

825

.52

48



Table 5. Biodiversity units calculated for football pitches as amenitygrassland at the development site compared with an equivalent area ofspecies-rich semi-improved grassland at the offset site.

Development site Offset site

Size (ha) 2.44 (3.8 full-sizefootball pitches)

0.64

Habitat type(qualitativecategory)

amenity grassland species-richsemi-improvedgrassland(lowlandmeadow)

Biodiversity units 4.07 5.48

This outcome shows how the numerical abstractions in-herent in the English BDO process can lead to large areasof low value for biodiversity becoming commensuratewith small, unique areas of high biodiversity value (Sul-livan 2013; Carver 2015) (Table 5). The packaging offootball pitches as habitat for on-site mitigation reducedthe financial compensation value in the final offset cal-culations by decreasing offset unit requirements by anequivalent number of biodiversity units.

Finally, elements of these 2 problems suggest that thepressure to create value for money (i.e., more conserva-tion gains for less money) in compensation strategies forconservation may be pushing BDO in directions that favorthe growth of market values and exchanges for offsetunits, but that may work against the robust generationof conservation value (Hannis & Sullivan 2012; Dauguet2015). Observations in our case study confirm this ten-dency. For example, although conservation NGOs wereconsidered convenient offset providers by district coun-cils (LPA5.1 010215),councils also recognized that toachieve market liquidity in offset units private landown-ers would have to play a significant role. Indeed, a bar-rier to the development of BDO in England has beena shortage of offset sites from which to purchase bio-diversity offset credits, as confirmed in DEFRA’s pilotevaluation report (Baker et al. 2014). The local authorityin our case thus forged partnerships with organizationsthat could assist in stimulating and brokering a greatersupply of offset credits and receptor sites through privatelandowners. High transaction costs for site identificationand preparation and legal fees are fostering economies ofscale by bringing offset provision together with the eco-nomically astute ways that large commercial landownerscan manage their farms (OB5.2 020315 and as predictedby Sullivan and Hannis [2015]). This is expected to resultin a better supply of offset credits from newly formedhabitat banks. Emerging offset brokerage firms hope thata high supply of offset credits will improve credit-supplycompetition and result in cheaper prices for developersseeking compensation. It is this combination of commer-cial outlook, farmer experience, and land managementthat makes the corporate broker now partnering with

the county council confident that with this approachthey can produce a “good biodiversity yield per hectare”across multiple sites (OB5.2 020315). In doing so, BDOis becoming further aligned with commercial agricul-tural productivity agendas that emphasise efficienciesand scale of production (i.e., agricultural yield).

The case we examined was of a biodiversity offset to beprovided directly by a conservation NGO to a local plan-ning authority. Despite months of preparation and con-siderable staff costs, the developer eventually rejectedthe proposed offset site in favor of developing an offsetarrangement with the farmer issuing the land for develop-ment in the first place (OB5.1 140116). The calculationsand negotiations presented here are nonetheless valuableas a detailed example of how the DEFRA metric is be-ing applied to biodiversity assessments at different sites.In tracking, documenting, and analyzing the calculationsand negotiations in this and other cases, we observed thatalthough BDO applies technical and apolitical practicesto calculate equivalence and commensurability betweensites of biodiversity damage and conservation investment,in practice the process is subject to frequent changes tothe input values of the metrics and valuation criteria tobalance these in order to meet the conflicting interests ofstakeholders. As such, instead of confining the decision-making process to a neutral calculative and technicalframework, the process opens up avenues through whichstakeholders can negotiate, and sometimes struggle over,specific outcomes (Coralie et al. 2015; Sullivan & Han-nis 2015). As suggested by Walker et al. (2009:149), theconcern is that “biodiversity protection interests will failto counter motivations for officials to resist and relaxsafeguards to facilitate exchanges and resource devel-opment at cost to biodiversity.” Application of scoringpractices that create numerical values may help stimu-late greater compensation payments for biodiversity lossin the English planning system and elsewhere, therebysupporting greater biodiversity outcomes (although seeCarver 2015). Obscured within these technical calcula-tion practices, however, and as predicted by Salzman andRuhl (2000), are additional value judgments and strugglesover arriving at the perceived right numerical values thatstraddle competing demands such that they are economi-cally palatable, politically pragmatic, and ecologically co-herent. Whether or not biodiversity yields are achievedthrough these negotiations depends on the bargainingpowers of stakeholders, beyond the application of stan-dardized practices to calculate and commensurate biodi-versity losses and gains.

Acknowledgments

We thank the respondents interviewed in this studyand gratefully acknowledge support from the Lever-hulme Trust (award RP2012-V-041) and from colleagues



in the Leverhulme Centre for the Study of Value(www.studyofvalue.org).

Supporting Information

The interview guide for semistructured interviews(Appendix S1) and the original development site BIA(version 17.4) of 27 June 2013 (Appendix S2) are avail-able online. The authors are solely responsible for thecontent and functionality of this material. Queries (otherthan absence of the material) should be directed to thecorresponding author. Appendix S2. Original develop-ment site Biodiversity Impact Assessment (BIA) v17.4,27 June 2013 (Source: OB5.1 140714, reproduced withpermission).

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http://www.studyofvalue.org

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0030605315000782

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0030605315000782

http://thestudyofvalue.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/WP11-Carver-2015-Measuring-what-value.pdf



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