batch 2(fultxt)

8/21/2019 BATCH 2(Fultxt)

1/58

2. G.R. No. 79347 January 26, 1989

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (SEPTEMBER

CONVENTION), petitioner,

vs.

DIRECTOR PURA FERRER CALLEJA of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Kalipunan ng

Manggagawang Pilipino Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa

Hundred Island Chemical Corporation and Hundred Island Chemical

Corporation, respondents.

Apolinar Sevilla for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

Dominguez, Armamento, Cabana & Associates for respondent Samahan ng

mga Manggagawa sa Hundred Island Chemical Corp., Inc.

Isidro D. Amoroso for respondent Hundred Island Chemical Corp.

PARAS, J.:

Before Us is a special civil action for certiorari, questioning the order of

respondent Director dated 27, July 1987,.which in part states:

x x x

Without going into the merits of the above-entitled case this office finds that the

best forum to determine once and for all whether or not herein appellant-

intervenor commands support of the rank-and-file in the unit is through the

process of a certification election.

WHEREFORE, in view thereof, Appellant-Intervenor, Kalipunan ng

Manggagawang Pilipino is hereby included as one of the contending unions.

Let, therefore, a certification election proceed without any further delay, withthe following choices:

1. Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hundred Island Chemical

Corporation;

2. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (September Convention) and 3.

Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino.


2/58

SO ORDERED. (pp. 26-27, Rollo)

The basic facts of this case are undisputed:

A petition for certification election among the rank-and-file workers of the

Hundred Island Chemical Corporation was filed with the Bureau of LaborRelations (BLR) by respondent Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa

Hundred Island Chemical Corporation (Samahan, for short) and was docketed

as BLR Case No. A-6-201-87. A motion to intervene, accompanied by the written

consent of twenty percent (20%) of the rank-and-file employees of the said

corporation was filed by petitioner Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions

(September Convention), or PAFLU, on 27 April 1987, Likewise the Katipunan ng

Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI, for brevity) flied its motion to intervene on 1

June 1987 but unaccompanied by a similar written consent of the employer's

workers. Due to such want of a written consent, PAFLU moved for the striking outof KAMAPI's motion for intervention. Acting on said motion, Med-Arbiter Renato

D. Parungo issued an order dated 8 June 1987 denying KAMAPI's motion for

intervention and allowing PAFLU's inclusion in the certification election. On 17

June 1987, KAMAPI appealed the said Med-Arbiter's order to the respondent

Director of the BLR, who issued the afore-quoted order. Thus, on 17 August 1987,

this petition was filed. And as prayed for in the said petition, We issued a

temporary restraining order dated 24, August 1987. Respondent Samahan has

contested the issuance of said restraining order and has prayed that it be lifted

since the delay of the certification election only defeats the constitutional rightof labor to organize.

The main issue in this petition was aptly deposited by the Solicitor General in his

consolidated comment; Whether or not KAMAPI should be allowed to

participate in a certification election thru a motion for intervention without a

prior showing that it has the required support expressed in the written consent of

at least twenty (20%) percent of all employees in the collective bargaining unit.

In taking the negative stance, petitioner cites Section 6, Rule V of the Rules

Implementing Executive Order No. 111, which reads:

SEC. 6. PROCEDURE. Upon receipt of a petition, the Regional Director shall assign

the case to a Med-Arbiter for appropriate action. The Med-Arbiter shall have

twenty (20) working days within which to grant or dismiss the petition. In a

petition filed by a legitimate organization involving an unorganized

establishment, the Med-Arbiter shall grant the petition upon verification that the

same is supported by the written consent of at least twenty (20%) of all the


3/58

employees in the collective bargaining unit, the twenty (20%) support shall be

satisfied upon the filing of the petition for certification election, otherwise, the

petition shall be dismissed. In either case, he shall cite the ground.

Pertinent to the above rule is Section 7 of E.O. 111 to which the former relates,

and which provides:

SEC. 7. Articles 257 and 258 of the Labor Code of the Philippines are hereby

amended to read as follows:

x x x

Art. 258. Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any establishment where

there is no certified bargaining agent, the petition for certification election filed

by a legitimate labor organization shall be supported by the written consent of

at least twenty (20%) percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Uponreceipt of such petition, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order the conduct

of a certification election.

Considering the above provisions of law, We rule to dismiss the instant petition

for certiorari. The respondent Director did not abuse her discretion in issuing the

contested order. It is crystal clear from the said provisions that the requisite

written consent of at least 20% of the workers in the bargaining unit applies to

petitioners for certification election only, and not to motions for intervention.

Nowhere in the aforesaid legal provisions does it appear that a motion for

intervention in a certification election must be accompanied by a similar written

consent. Not even in the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code (see Rule V,

Rules Implementing the Labor Code). Obviously, the percentage requirement

pertains only to the petition for certification election, and nothing else.

This leads Us to the question of purpose. the reason behind the 20% requirement

is to ensure that the petitioning union has a substantial interest in the

representation proceedings ** and, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor

General, that a considerable number of workers desire their representation by

the said petitioning union for collective bargaining purposes. Hence, the mere

fact that 20% of the workers in the bargaining unit signify their support to the

petition by their written consent, it becomes mandatory on the part of the Med-

Arbiter to order the holding of a certification election in an unorganized

establishment (Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. Noriel, 134


4/58

SCRA 152). The 20% requirement, thereof, is peculiar to petitions for certification

election.

In the light of the foregoing, KAMAPI must be allowed to participate in the

certification election since the essence of such proceeding is to settle once and

for all which union is preferred by the workers to represent them (PAFLU vs. BLR,

69 SCRA 132; PAFLU vs. BLR, 72 SCRA 396). As long as the motion for intervention

has been properly and timely filed and the intervention would not cause any

injustice to anyone, it should not be denied and this is so even if the eventual

purpose of the motion for intervention is to participate in the certification

election. After all the original applicant had already met the 20% requirement.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Temporary

Restraining Order dated 24 August 1987 LIFTED. With costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

3. G.R. No. 97622 October 19, 1994

CATALINO ALGIRE and OTHER OFFICERS OF UNIVERSAL ROBINA TEXTILE MONTHLY

SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION (URTMSEU), petitioners,

vs.

REGALADO DE MESA, et al., and HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondents.

C.A. Montano Law Office for petitioner.

Cabio and Ravanes Law Offices and Jaime D. Lauron for private respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify and set aside the decision dated

January 31, 1991 of the Secretary of Labor which reversed on appeal the Order

dated December 20, 1990 issued by Med-arbiter Rolando S. dela Cruz declaringpetitioners as the duly-elected officers of the Universal Robina Textile Monthly

Salaried Employees union (URTMSEU) as well as the order dated March 5, 1991

denying petitioner Catalino Algire's motion for reconsideration.


5/58

The case arose out of the election of the rightful officers to represent the union in

the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the management of Universal

Robina Textile at its plant in Km. 50, Bo. San Cristobal, Calamba, Laguna.

Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union, (URTMSEU), through

private respondent Regalado de Mesa, filed on September 4, 1990 a petition for

the holding of an election of union officers with the Arbitration Branch of the

Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Acting thereon, DOLE's med-

arbiter Rolando S. de la Cruz issued an Order dated October 19, 1990 directing

that such an election be held.

In the pre-election conference, it was agreed that the election by secret ballot

be conducted on November 15, 1990 between petitioners (Catalino Algire, et

al.) and private respondents (Regalado de Mesa, et al.) under the supervision of

DOLE through its duly appointed representation officer.

The official ballot contained the following pertinent instructions:

Nais kong pakatawan sa grupo ni:

LINO ALGIRE REGALADO

and DE MESA

his officers and his

officers

1. Mark Check (/) or cross (x) inside the box specified above who among the

two contending parties you desire to be represented for the purpose of

collecting bargaining.

2. This is a secret ballot. Don't write any other markings. 1

The result of the election were as follows:

Lino Algire group 133

Regalado de Mesa 133

Spoiled 6

Total votes cast 272

On November 19, 1990, Catalino Algire filed a Petition and/or Motion (RO 400-

9009-AU-002), which DOLE's Med Arbitration unit treated as a protest, to the


6/58

effect that one of the ballots wherein one voter placed two checks inside the

box opposite the phrase "Lino Algire and his officers," hereinafter referred to as

the "questioned ballot," should not have been declared spoiled, as the same

was a valid vote in their favor. The group argued that the two checks made

even clearer the intention of the voter to exercise his political franchise in favorof Algire's group.

During the schedules hearing thereof, both parties agreed to open the

envelope containing the spoiled ballots and it was found out that, indeed, one

ballot contained two (2) checks in the box opposite petitioner Algire's name

and his officers.

On December 20, 1990, med-arbiter de la Cruz issued an order declaring the

questioned ballot valid, thereby counting the same in Algire's favor and

accordingly certified petitioner's group as the union's elected officers. 2

Regalado de Mesa, et al. appealed from the decision of the med-arbiter to the

Secretary of Labor in Case No. OS-A-1-37-91 (RO 400-9009-AU-002). On January

31, 1991, the latter's office granted the appeal and reversed the aforesaid

Order. In its stead, it entered a new one ordering "the calling of another election

of officers of the Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union

(URTMSEU), with the same choices as in the election of

15 November, 1990, after the usual pre-election conference." 3

Director Maximo B. Lim of the Industrial Relations Division, Regional Office No. IVof the DOLE set the hearing for another pre-election conference on March 22,

1991, reset to April 2, 1991, and finally reset to April 5, 1991.

Catalino Algire's group filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. It was

denied for lack of merit and the decision sought to be reconsidered was

sustained.

Algire, et al. filed this petition on the following issues:

(1) the Secretary of Labor erred in applying Sections 1 and 8 (6), Rule VI, Book Vof the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code to the herein case,

considering that the case is an intra-union activity, which act constitutes a grave

abuse in the exercise of authority amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

(2) the assailed decision and order are not supported by law and evidence.


7/58

with an ex-parte motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order, alleging

that the assailed decision of the office of the Secretary of Labor as public

respondent is by nature immediately executory and the holding of an election

at any time after April 5, 1991, would render the petition moot and academic

unless restrained by this Court.

On April 5, 1991, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the holding of

another election of union officers pursuant to the January 31, 1991 decision.

There is no merit in the petition.

The contention of the petitioner is that a representation officer (referring to a

person duly authorized to conduct and supervise certification elections in

accordance with Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the

Labor Code) can validly rule only on on-the-spot questions arising from the

conduct of the elections, but the determination of the validity of the questioned

ballot is not within his competence. Therefore, any ruling made by the

representation officer concerning the validity of the ballot is deemed an

absolute nullity because such is the allegation it was done without or in

excess of his functions amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

To resolve the issue of union representation at the Universal Robina Textile plant,

what was agreed to be held at the company's premises and which became the

root of this controversy, was a consent election, not a certification election.

It is unmistakable that the election held on November 15, 1990 was a consent

election and not a certification election. It was an agreed one, the purpose

being merely to determine the issue of majority representation of all the workers

in the appropriate collective bargaining unit. It is a separate and distinct process

and has nothing to do with the import and effort of a certification election. 5

The ruling of DOLE's representative in that election that the questioned ballot is

spoiled is not based on any legal provision or rule justifying or requiring such

action by such officer but simply in pursuance of the intent of the parties,

expressed in the written instructions contained in the ballot, which is to prohibit

unauthorized markings thereon other than a check or a cross, obviously

intended to identify the votes in order to preserve the sanctity of the ballot,

which is in fact the objective of the contending parties.

If indeed petitioner's group had any opposition to the representation officer's

ruling that the questioned ballot was spoiled, it should have done so seasonably


8/58

during the canvass of votes. Its failure or inaction to assail such ballot's validity

shall be deemed a waiver of any defect or irregularity arising from said election.

Moreover, petitioners even question at this stage the clear instruction to mark a

check or cross opposite the same of the candidate's group, arguing that such

instruction was not clear, as two checks "may be interpreted that a voter mayvote for Lino Algire but not with (sic) his officers or

vice-versa,"6notwithstanding the fact that a pre-election conference had

already been held where no such question was raised.

In any event, the choice by the majority of employees of the union officers that

should best represent them in the forthcoming collective bargaining

negotiations should be achieved through the democratic process of an

election, the proper forum where the true will of the majority may not be

circumvented but clearly defined. The workers must be allowed to freely express

their choice once and for all in a determination where anything is open to their

sound judgment and the possibility of fraud and misrepresentation is minimized,

if not eliminated, without any unnecessary delay and/or maneuvering.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is hereby

AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

4. G.R. No. 76185 March 30, 1988

WARREN MANUFACTURING WORKERS UNION (WMWU), petitioner,

vs.

THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS; PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURAL, COMMERCIAL AND

INDUSTRIAL WORKERS UNION (PACIWU); and SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA

WARREN MANUFACTURING CORP.-ALLIANCE OF NATIONALIST AND GENUINE

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (SMWMC-ANGLO), respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for a preliminary injunction

and/or the issuance of a restraining order seeking to set aside: (1) Order of the

Med-Arbiter dated August 18,1986, the dispositive portion of which reads:


9/58

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a certification election is hereby ordered

conducted to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank

and file employees of Warren Manufacturing Corporation, within 20 days from

receipt of this Order, with the following choices:

1. Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industry Workers Union (PACIWU);

2. Warren Mfg. Workers Union;

3. Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Warren Mfg. Corporation petition-ANGLO;

and

4. No Union.

The representation Officer is hereby directed to call the parties to a pre- election

conference to thresh out the mechanics for the conduct of the actual election.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 15).

and (2) the Resolution dated October 7, 1986 of the Officer-in-Charge of the

Bureau of Labor dismissing the appeals of Warren Manufacturing Corporation

and herein petitioner (Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 16-18).

This certification case had its inception in an intra-union rivalry between the

petitioner and the respondent Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial

Workers Union (PACIWU for short) since 1985.

The undisputed facts of this case as found by the Med-Arbiter of the Bureau of

Labor Relations are as follows:

On June 13,1985, PACIWU filed a petition for certification election, alleging

compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

On July 7, 1985, respondent thru counsel filed a motion to dismiss the petition on

the ground that there exist a C.BA between the respondent and the Warren

Mfg. Union which took effect upon its signing on July 16, 1985 and to expire on

July 31, 1986.

While the petition was under hearing, PACIWU filed a Notice of Strike and on

conciliation meeting, a Return-to-Work Agreement was signed on July 25,1985,

stipulating, among others, as follows:


10/58

To resolve the issue of union representation at Warren Mfg- Corp. parties have

agreed to the holding of a consent election among the rank and file on August

25, 1985 at the premises of the company to be supervised by MOLE. ...

It is cleanly understood that the certified union in the said projected election

shall respect and administer the existing CBA at the company until its expiry

date on July 31, 1986.

On 12 August 1985, an Order was issued by this Office, directing that a consent

election be held among the rank and file workers of the company, with the

following contending unions:

1. Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU)

2. Warren Mfg. Workers Union;

3. No Union.

On August 25, 1985, said consent election was held, and yielded the following

results:

PACIWU----------------------------94

WMWU----------------------------193

Feeling aggrieved, however, PACIWU filed an Election Protest.

In December, 1985 a Notice of Strike was again filed by the union this time with

the Valenzuela branch office of this Ministry, and after conciliation, the parties

finally agreed, among others, to wit:

In consideration of this payment, ... individual complaints and PACIWU hereby

agree and covenant that the following labor complaints/disputes are

considered amicably settled and withdrawn/dismissed, to wit: ...

On the basis of a Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties, the Election Protest

filed by the PACIWU was ordered dismissed. (Rollo, pp. 12-13).

On June 5, 1986, the PACIWU filed a petition for certification election followed

by the filing of a petition for the same purposes by the Samahan ng

Manggagawa sa Warren Manufacturing Corporation-Alliance of Nationalist and

Genuine Labor Organizations (Anglo for short) which petitions were both

opposed by Warren Manufacturing Corporation on the grounds that neither


11/58

petition has 30% support; that both are barred by the one-year no certification

election law and the existence of a duly ratified CBA. The therein respondent,

therefore, prayed that the petitions for certification election be dismissed. (Rollo,

pp. 11-12).

As above stated, the Med-Arbiter of the National Capital Region, Ministry of

Labor and Employment, ordered on August 8, 't 986 the holding of a certification

election within twenty 20) days from receipt to determine the exclusive

bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of the Warren se

Manufacturing Corporation, with the above-mentioned choices.

Both Warren Manufacturing Corporation and petitioner herein filed separate

motions, treated as appeals by the Bureau of Labor Relations, which dismissed

the same for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

This petition was filed solely by the Warren Manufacturing Workers Union, with

the company itself opting not to appeal.

The Second Division of this Court in the resolution of November 3, 1986 without

giving due course to the petition, required the respondents to comment and

issued the temporary, restraining order prayed for (Rollo, pp. 18-20).

The comment of the respondent PACIWU was filed on November 27, 1986

(Ibid.,pp. 29-32). The public respondent through the Hon. Solicitor General filed

its Comment to the petition on December 10, 1986 ( Ibid., pp. 34-43) and private

respondent ANGLO, filed its comment on December 16, 1986 ( Ibid., pp. 45- 51).

The petitioner with leave of court filed its reply to comment entitled a rejoinder

on January 6,1987 (Ibid., pp. 52-62).

In the resolution of January 26, 1987, the petition was given due course and the

parties were required to submit their respective memoranda (Ibid., p. 76).

Memorandum for public respondent was filed on February 20,1987 (Ibid., p. 82-

88). Respondent PACIWU's memorandum was filed on March 18, 1987 ( Ibid., pp.

95-99). SMWMCANGLO'S Memorandum was filed on March 23,1987 ( Ibid., pp.

100-1 09) and the petitioner's memorandum was filed on March 31,1987 ( Ibid.,

pp. 110-120).

In its memorandum, petitioner raised the following issues:


12/58

A. The holding of a certification election at the bargaining unit is patently

premature and illegal.

B. The petition filed by private respondents do not have the statutory 30%

support requirement.

C. Petitioner was denied administrative due process when excluded from med-

arbitration proceedings.

The petition is devoid of merit.

A.

Petitioner's contention is anchored on the following grounds:

Section 3, Rule V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code

provides, among others:

... however no certification election may be held within one (1) year from the

date of the issuance of the declaration of a final certification result.

and

Article 257, Title VII, Book V of the Labor Code provides:

No certification election issue shall be entertained by the Bureau in any

Collective Bargaining Agreement existing between the employer and a

legitimate labor organization.

Otherwise stated, petitioner invoked the one-year no certification election rule

and the principle of the Contract Bar Rule.

This contention is untenable.

The records show that petitioner admitted that what was held on August 25,1985

at the Company's premises and which became the root of this controversy, was

a consent election and not a certification election(Emphasis supplied). As

correctly distinguished by private respondent, a consent election is an agreed

one, its purpose being merely to determine the issue of majority representation

of all the workers in the appropriate collective bargaining unit while a

certification election is aimed at determining the sole and exclusive bargaining

agent of all the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of

collective bargaining. From the very nature of consent election, it is a separate


13/58

and distinct process and has nothing to do with the import and effect of a

certification election. Neither does it shorten the terms of an existing CBA nor

entitle the participants thereof to immediately renegotiate an existing CBA

although it does not preclude the workers from exercising their right to choose

their sole and exclusive bargaining representative after the expiration of the sixty(60) day freedom period. In fact the Med-Arbiter in the Return to Work

Agreement signed by the parties emphasized the following:

To resolve the issue of union representation at Warren Mfg. Corp., parties have

agreed to the holding of a consent election among the rank and file on August

25,1985 at the premises of the company to be supervised by the Ministry of

Labor and Employment .....

It is clearly understood that the certified union in the said projected election shall

respect and administer the existing CBA at the company until its expiry date onJuly 31, 1986. (Rollo, pp. 46, 48-49).

It is, therefore, unmistakable that the election thus held on August 25, 1985 was

not for the purpose of determining which labor union should be the bargaining

representative in the negotiation for a collective contract, there being an

existing collective bargaining agreement yet to expire on July 31, 1986; but only

to determine which labor union shag administer the said existing contract.

Accordingly, the following provisions of the New Labor Code apply:

ART. 254. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining

agreement.When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to

bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate or modify

the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the

duty of both parties to keep thestatus quo and to continue in full force and

effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day

period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.

Corollary to the above, Article 257 of the New Labor Code expressly states that

No certification election issue shall be entertained if a collective agreement

which has been submitted in accordance with Article 231 of this Code exists

between the employer and a legitimate labor organization except within sixty

(60) days prior to the expiration of the life of such certified collective bargaining

agreement." (Rollo, pp. 83-84)


14/58

Thus, as stated by this Court in General Textiles Allied Workers Association v. the

Director of the Bureau of labor Relations (84 SCRA 430 [19781) "there should be

no obstacle to the right of the employees to petition for a certification election

at the proper time. that is, within 60 days prior to the expiration of the three year

period ...

Finally, such premature agreement entered into by the petitioner and the

Company on June 2, 1986 does not adversely affect the petition for certification

election filed by respondent PACIWU (Rollo, p. 85).

Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code

clearly provides:

Section 4. Effect of Early Agreement.There representation case shall not,

however, be adversely affected by a collective agreement submitted before or

during the last sixty days of a subsisting agreement or during the pendency of

the representation case.

Apart from the fact that the above Rule is clear and explicit, leaving no room for

construction or interpretation, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that

administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to

interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law and

are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137

SCRA 314 [1985)).

As aforestated, the existing collective bargaining agreement was due to expire

on July 31, 1 986. The Med-Arbiter found that a sufficient number of employees

signified their consent to the filing of the petition and 107 employees authorized

intervenor to file a motion for intervention. Otherwise stated, he found that the

petition and intervention were supported by more than 30% of the members of

the bargaining unit. In the light of these facts, Article 258 of the Labor Code

makes it mandatory for the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a certification

election (Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills, Inc. v. Noriel, et al., 134

SCRA 152 [1985]). In the case of Federation of Free Workers (Bisig ng

Manggagawa sa UTEX v. Noriel etc., et al., 86 SCRA 132 [1978]), this Court was

even more specific when it stated "No administrative agency can ignore the

imperative tone of the above article. The language used is one of command.

Once it has been verified that the petition for certification election has the

support of at least 30% of the employees in the bargaining unit, it must be


15/58

granted, The specific word used can yield no other meaning. It becomes under

the circumstances, "mandatory"..."

The finality of the findings of fact of the Med-Arbiter that the petition and

intervention filed in the case at bar were supported by 30% of the members of

the workers is clear and definite.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED,

SO ORDERED.

5. G.R. No. L-51602 January 17, 1985

GEORGE & PETER LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.

ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) HON. CARMELO NORIEL, DIRECTOR, BUREAU

OF LABOR RELATIONS, MINISTRY OF LABOR, respondents.

Manuel B. Pastrana for petitioner.

Gerardo E. Gestopa Jr. for private respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Petitioner George and Peter Lines, Incorporated, is a domestic corporation

engaged in shipping, while respondent Associated Labor Unions (ALU) is a

legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Ministry of Labor.

On July 6, 1978, a Petition for Direct Certification was filed by respondent ALU

with Region VII, Cebu City, of the Ministry of Labor, praying that it be certified as

the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file

employees of petitioner corporation there being no labor union organized

thereat.

Petitioner corporation OPPOSED the petition stating that respondent Union does

not represent the majority of the employees concerned; and that more than

80% of the licensed and unlicensed crew of its vessels claim that they are not

members of any union and have no desire to join any. It then filed on August 17,

1978, a Petition for Certification Election to determine once and for all whether


16/58

the employees concerned wanted respondent ALU to be their sole bargaining

representative.

On August 25, 1978, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order directly certifying

respondent ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the licensed and

unlicensed employees of petitioner corporation, opining that the majority

membership status of any union is determined before or at the time of filing of

the petition and not thereafter, otherwise, the union can be ousted anytime.

Petitioner corporation moved for reconsideration alleging that the employees

concerned, consisting of about 80%, denied their membership with respondent

Union, and that a certification election should be called in the interest of fairness

and justice.

The entire records of the case were forwarded to the Director of the Bureau of

Labor Relations. On February 5, 1979, the BLR Director modified the Order of

August 25, 1978 by directing a certification election among the rank and file

employees of petitioner corporation. Reconsideration sought by respondent

Union was denied by the BLR Director on May 31, 1979, on the ground that there

exists a doubt regarding the majority status of respondent ALU because of the

withdrawal of membership by the workers, and directing the Labor Relations

Division of the Regional Office of origin to hold a pre-election conference, and

to conduct the certification election.

Respondent Union, in its Second Motion for Reconsideration, argued that publicrespondent erred in finding its majority status doubtful as the same was proven

during the hearing of the case before the Med-Arbiter.

The BLR Director, in its questioned Decision of August 13, 1979, reconsidered its

Resolution of May 31, 1979, and directly certified respondent ALU as the sole

bargaining age it of all the rank and file employees of petitioner corporation

Thus, this Petition for certiorari wherein petitioner seeks to set aside the said

Decision, posing the following issues.

(1) Did the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Ministry of Labor

commit grave abuse of discretion by abruptly reversing his two previous

resolutions for the holding of a certification election?

(2) Are petitioner's employees entitled to choose their sole and exclusive

bargaining representative with petitioner thru a certification election? and


17/58

(3) Is petitioner entitled to file the petition for certification election?

It is not disputed that after the filing of the petition for direct certification by

respondent Union, a written manifestation duly signed by about 80% of the

employees concerned, retracting their membership from said union, was

submitted by them to the MOLE. Respondent Union submits, however, that the

employees were merely pressured by management into withdrawing their

membership. On the other hand, petitioner corporation argues that the

retraction by the employees cast a serious doubt on the alleged majority

representation of the Union. In ultimately resolving the issue in the Union's favor,

public respondent held that the withdrawal of membership from the Union

subsequent to the filing of the petition for direct certification did not affect the

same nor did it divest it of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition.

We find for petitioner.

The employees have the constitutional right to choose the labor organization

which it desires to join. 1The exercise of such right would be rendered nugatory

and ineffectual if they would be denied the opportunity to choose in a

certification election, which is not a litigation, but a mere investigation of a non-

adversary character, 2the bargaining unit to represent them. 3The holding of a

certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. 4

As the right of respondent Union to represent the employees is seriously put in

doubt by the withdrawal of 80% of the membership, which the Union claims tobe involuntary, the best forum to determine if there was, indeed, undue pressure

exerted upon the employees to retract their membership is in the certification

election itself, wherein they can freely express their choice in a secret

ballot. 5Certification election is the best and most appropriate means of

ascertaining the will of the employees as to their choice of an exclusive

bargaining representative. 6That there are no competing Unions involved

should not alter that principle, the freedom of choice by the employees being

the primordial consideration besides the fact that the employees can still

choose between ALU and No Union. Even if the withdrawals of the employeesconcerned were submitted after the Petition for direct certification had been

filed, the doubt as to the majority representation of the Union has arisen and it is

best to determine the true sentiment of the employees through a certification

election. If respondent Union is confident that it commands the majority of the

workers, there is no reason why it should object to the holding of a certification

election.


18/58

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of August 17, 1979 is hereby SET ASIDE. The

Regional Office concerned of the Ministry of Labor and Employment is hereby

directed to cause the holding of a certification election within thirty (30) days

from notice.

SO ORDERED

8. G.R. No. 75037 April 30, 1987

TANDUAY DISTILLERY LABOR UNION, petitioner,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LAMBERTO SANTOS, PEDRO ESTERAL,

ROMAN CHICO, JOSELITO ESTANISLAO, JOSE DELGADO, JUANITO ARGUELLES,

RICARDO CAJOLES, and JOSEFINO PAGUYO, respondents.

No. 75055 April 30, 1987

TANDUAY DISTILLERY, INC., petitioner,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), LAMBERTO SANTOS, PEDRO

ESTERAL, ROMAN CHICO, JOSELITO ESTANISLAO, JOSE DELGADO, JUANITO

ARGUELLES, RICARDO CAJOLES, and JOSEFINO PAGUYO, respondents.

Jaime G. de Leon for petitioner in G.R. No. 75037.

Pacifico de Ocampo and Benjamin C. Gascon for petitioner in G.R. No. 75055.

GUTIERREZ, JR.:

These consolidated petitions for certiorari seek the review and setting aside of

respondent National Labor Relations Commission's decision in NLRC Case No.

AB-6-11685-81 dated May 26, 1986, affirming the October 12, 1984 decision of

the Labor Arbiter, and of the NLRC resolution dated June 28, 1986, which denied

the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Private respondents were all employees of Tanduay Distillery, Inc., (TDI) and

members of the Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (TDLU), a duly organized and

registered labor organization and the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank

and file employees of the petitioner company.


19/58

On March 11, 1980, a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), was executed

between TDI and TDLU. The CBA was duly ratified by a majority of the workers in

TDI including herein private respondents, and a copy was filed with the Ministry

of Labor and Employment (MOLE) on October 29, 1980 for certification. The CBA

had a term of three (3) years from July 1, 1979 to June 30, 1982. It also containeda union security clause. which provides:

All workers who are or may during the effectivity of this Contract, become

members of the Union in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws shall, as

a condition of their continued employment, maintain membership in good

standing in the Union for the duration of the agreement.

On or about the early part of October 1980, while the CBA was in effect

and within the contract bar periodthe private respondents joined another

union, the Kaisahan Ng Manggagawang PilipinoKAMPIL) and organized its localchapter in TDI, with private respondents Pedro Esteral and Lamberts Santos

being elected President and Vice-President, respectively.

On November 7, 1980, KAMPIL filed a petition for certification election to

determine union representation in TDI, which development compelled TDI to file

a grievance with TDLU on November 7, 1980 pursuant to Article XV of the CBA.

Acting on the grievance of TDI, TDLU wrote the private respondents on

December 23, 1980 requiring them to explain why TDLU should not take

disciplinary action against them for, among other things

Disloyalty to the Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (T.D.L.U.) by forming and joining

another union with a complete takeover intent as the sole and exclusive

bargaining representative of all rank and file employees at TDI. (p. 16, Rollo)

TDLU created a committee to investigate its erring members in accordance with

its by-laws which are not disputed by the private respondents. Except for

Josefino Paguyo who, despite due notice, was absent during the investigation

conducted on January 2, 1981, all the private respondents were present and

given a chance to explain their side. Thereafter, in a resolution dated January 9,

1981, TDLU, through the Investigating Committee and approved by TDLU's Board

of Directors, expelled the private respondents from TDLU for disloyalty to the

Union effective January 16, 1981. By letter dated January 10, 1981, TDLU notified

TDI that private respondents had been expelled from TDLU and demanded that


20/58

TDI terminate the employment of private, respondents because they had lost

their membership with TDLU.

Acting on the demand of TDLU, TDI, in a Memorandum dated January 13, 1981,

notified "that effective January 16, 1981, we shall file the usual application for

clearance (with preventive suspension to take effect on the same day) to

terminate your services on the basis of the union security clause of our CBA.

Accordingly, TDI filed with the MOLE on January 14, 1981 its application for

clearance to terminate the employment of private respondents. This application

docketed as Case No. NCR-AC-1-435-81 specifically stated that the action

applied for was preventive suspension which will result in termination of

employment, ... due to (T)hreat to (P)roduction traceable to rival (U)nion

activity. The private respondents then filed with the MOLE a complaint for illegal

dismissal against TDI and Benjamin Agaloos, in his capacity as President of TDLU,which complaint was docketed as Case No. STF-1-333-91. The cases were jointly

heard and tried by Labor Arbiter Teodorico Dogelio.

However, on January 26, 1981, the Med-Arbiter granted the private respondents'

petition calling for a certification election among the rank and file employees of

TDI. The Med-Arbiter's Order stated, inter-aliathat the existence of an uncertified

CBA cannot be availed of as a bar to the holding of a certification election

(Emphasis supplied). On appeal of TDI and TDLU to the Bureau of Labor Relations

(BLR), the order for the holding of a certification election was reversed and set

aside by the BLR on July 8,1982, thus:

A careful perusal of the records of the case will reveal that the uncertified CBA

was duly filed and submitted on 29 October 1980, to last until June 30, 1982.

Indeed, said CBA is certifiablefor havingcomplied with all the necessary

requirements for certification. Consistent with the intent and spirit of P.D. 1391

and its implementing rules, the contract bar rule should have been applied in

this case. The representation issue cannot be entertained except within the last

sixty (60) days of the collective agreement. (Emphasis supplied) (p. 243, Rollo)

The last 60 days in a collective bargaining agreement is referred to as the

"freedom period" when rival union representation can be entertained during the

existence of a valid CBA. In this case, the "freedom period" was May 1 to June

30, 1982. After the term of the CBA lapsed, KAMPIL moved for a reconsideration

of the July 8, 1982 decision of the BLR on July 23, 1982 on the same ground that

since the CBA then in question was uncertified, the contract bar rule could not


21/58

be made to apply. On December 3, 1982, the BLR reversed itself, but for a

different reason and heldthat:

Movant union (Kampil) now seeks for the reconsideration of that Order on the

ground, among others, that the CBA in question is not certifiable and, hence,

the contract bar rule cannot properly apply in this case.

After a more careful examination of the records, this Bureau is of the view that

the instant motion should be given due course, not necessarily for the

arguments raised by herein movant.

It should be noted that the alleged CBA has now expired. Its expiry date being

30 June 1982. Consequently; there appears to be no more obstacle in allowing

a certification election to be conducted among the rank and file of

respondent. The contract bar rule will no longer apply in view of the supervening

event, that is, the expiration of the contract. (Emphasis supplied) (pp. 244-245,

Rollo)

TDLU filed a petition for review of the BLR decision with the Supreme Court,

docketed as Case No. G.R. No. 63995 TDI argued that KAMPIL did not have a

cause of action when the petition for certification was filed on November 7,

1980 because the freedom period was not yet in effect. The fact that the BLR

issued its order when the 60-day freedom period had supervened, did not cure

this defect. Moreover, the BLR decision completely overlooked or ignored the

fact that on September 21, 1982, a new CBA had been executed between theTDLU and TDI so that when the BLR allowed a certification election in its order

dated December 3, 1982, the contract bar rule was applicable again. This Court

denied TDLU's petition in a minute resolution on November 14,1983.

Using the foregoing as relevant and applicable to the consolidated cases for

the clearance application for termination filed by TDI and the illegal dismissal

case filed by the private respondents on October 12, 1984, Labor Arbiter

Teodorico Dogelio rendered a decision denying TDI's application to terminate

the private respondents and ordering TDI to reinstate the complainants with

backwages. It should be noted that the Labor Arbiter rendered the decision

even before the petitioner company could file its memorandum, formal offer of

exhibits and its manifestation and motion to correct tentative markings of

exhibits. This decision of the arbiter was upheld by the respondent NLRC in NLRC

Case No. AB-6-11685-81 in its decision dated May 20,1986.


22/58

TDI and TDLU moved for reconsideration of the questioned decision, In its

motion, TDI alleged, inter alia, that respondent NLRC did not rule on the validity

of the CBA as a contract, neither did it resolve squarely the validity of the

enforcement of the union security clause of the CBA. TDI stated further that

respondent NLRC failed to consider the fact that at the time the privaterespondents were expelled by TDLU and consequently terminated by TDI, the

union security clause of the CBA was in full force and effect, binding TDI and

TDLU.

For its part, TDLU said that the decision of the Supreme Court in the certification

case could not be used by respondent NLRC to justify its decision in the dismissal

case because the issues on the cases are entirely different and miles apart. It is

for this reason that there are two (2) cases that are involved. TDLU explained

that the Supreme Court decided to dismiss the petition for certiorari of TDI and

TDLU in the certification case because the original CBA existing at the time the

private respondents formed and joined KAMPIL had already expired. However,

TDLU made it clear that when the private respondents organized KAMPIL in TDI,

the same CBA was still in force and the disaffiliation did not take place within the

freedom period. Hence, at that point in time, the private respondents

committed disloyalty against the union.

On June 26, 1986, respondent NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration filed

by TDI and TDLU for lack of merit. In its petition, TDI alleged that:

I

RESPONDENT COMMISSION ACTED IN EXCESS AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS

DISCRETION AND IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO LAW IN RENDERING ITS DECISION

EN BANC OF MAY 20, 1986 AND IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION THEREOF IN ITS RESOLUTION SOLUTION DATED JUNE 26, 1986

BECAUSE

1. THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION HAS IGNORED THE FACT THAT THE PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS WERE EXPELLED BY TDLU FROM ITS MEMBERSHIP ON JANUARY 16,

1981 AND, CONSEQUENTLY, TDLU HAD DEMANDED OF THE PETITIONER OF THE

ENFORCEMENT OF THE UNION SECURITY CLAUSE OF THE CBA, THE SAID CBA WAS

AN EXISTING AND A VALID CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND TDLU, AND

EFFECTIVE BETWEEN THE PARTIES;


23/58

2. IT IS FUNDAMENTAL THAT A UNION SECURITY CLAUSE PROVISION IN COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING AGREEMENT IS BINDING BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE CBA UNDER

THE LAWS;

3. THE EXPULSION OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FROM TDLU WAS THE UNION'S

OWN DECISION. HENCE, WHEN TDLU DEMANDED OF THE PETITIONER THE

ENFORCEMENT OF THE SECURITY CLAUSE PROVISION OF THE CBA BY SEPARATING

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FROM THEIR EMPLOYMENT, FOR HAVING LOST THEIR

MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNION, THE PETITIONER WAS DUTY BOUND TO DO SO;

4. THE ALLUSION THAT THE CBA WAS NOT CERTIFIED BY THE BUREAU OF LABOR

RELATIONS (BLR) HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ITS EFFECTIVENESS AS A VALID

CONTRACT BETWEEN ALL PARTIES THERETO.

II

RESPONDENT COMMISSION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN

EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DID NOT

COMMIT ACTS PREJUDICIAL TO THE PETITIONER'S PRODUCTION EFFORTS TO BE

SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THEIR PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION AND EVENTUAL REMOVAL.

On the other hand, petitioner TDLU in essence contends that:

THE CBA IS VALID AND BINDING NOT ONLY ON TDI AND TDLU BUT LIKEWISE ON

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE RATIFIED THE SAME IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL

CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF TDLU; HENCE, THE UNION SECURITY CLAUSE IS VALID

AND BINDING ON THEM;

THE ACTION OF TDLU IN REQUESTING FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE UNION

SECURITY CLAUSE OF THE CBA BETWEEN TDI AND TDLU IS PART OF THE INHERENT

RIGHT TO SELF- ORGANIZATION;

TDLU CANNOT BE MADE LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF BACKWAGES BECAUSE ALL

THAT IT DID WAS ASK FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF A CBA, WHICH CBA HAS NEVER

BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AND THE UNION SECURITY CLAUSE SOUGHT TO

BE ENFORCED WAS NOT ALSO DECLARED NULL AND VOID;

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DISAFFILIATED THEMSELVES FROM TDLU BY ORGANIZING

THE LOCAL CHAPTER OF KAMPIL IN TDI IN OCTOBER 1980, BUT THE ACT OF

DISAFFILIATION WAS COMMITTED OUTSIDE THE FREEDOM PERIOD PROVIDED

UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1391 WHICH LIMIT ALL PETITIONS FOR

CERTIFICATION ELECTION, DISAFFILIATION AND INTERVENTION TO THE 60 DAY


24/58

FREEDOM PERIOD PRECEDING THE EXPIRATION OF THE CBA. HENCE, PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS COULD BE EXPELLED FROM MEMBERSHIP FOR DISLOYALTY AND

OTHER INIMICAL ACTS AGAINST THE INTEREST OF TDLU.

The private respondents admit that the root of the whole controversy in the

instant case is the organization of a Local Union Chapter of KAMPIL at TDI and

the subsequent filing of a petition for certification election with the MOLE by said

local chapter. This local chapter of KAMPIL was organized with the help of,

among others, the private respondents some of whom were elected union

officers of said chapter. They contend that their act of organizing a local

chapter of KAMPIL and eventual filing of a petition for certification election was

pursuant to their constitutional right to self-organization.

The issues to be resolved are the following: (a) whether or not TDI was justified in

terminating private respondents' employment in the company on the basis ofTDLU's demand for the enforcement of the Union Security Clause of the CBA

between TDI and TDLU; and (b) whether or not TDI is guilty of unfair labor

practice in complying with TDLU's demand for the dismissal of private

respondents.

We enforce basic principles essential to a strong and dynamic labor movement.

An established postulate in labor relations firmly rooted in this jurisdiction is that

the dismissal of an employee pursuant to a demand of the majority union in

accordance with a union security agreement following the loss of seniority rights

is valid and privileged and does not constitute an unfair labor practice.

Article 249 (e) of the Labor Code as amended specifically recognizes the closed

shop arrangement as a form of union security. The closed shop, the union shop,

the maintenance of membership shop, the preferential shop, the maintenance

of treasury shop, and check-off provisions are valid forms of union security and

strength. They do not constitute unfair labor practice nor are they violations of

the freedom of association clause of the Constitution. (See Pascual, Labor

Relations Law, 1986 Edition, pp. 221-225 and cases cited therein.) There is no

showing in these petitions of any arbitrariness or a violation of the safeguardsenunciated in the decisions of this Court interpreting union security

arrangements brought to us for review.

In this light, the petitioner points out that embedded at the very core and

asraison d'etrefor the doctrine which enforces the closed-shop, the union shop,

and other forms of union security clauses in the collective bargaining


25/58

agreement is the principle of sanctity and inviolability of contracts guaranteed

by the Constitution.

This Court speaking thru Mr. Justice Labrador, in Victorias Milling Co., Inc., v.

Victorias-Manapia Workers Organization(9 SCRA 154), ruled:

Another reason for enforcing the closed-shop agreement is the principle of

sanctity or inviolability of contracts guaranteed by the Constitution. As a matter

of principle the provision of the Industrial Peace Act relating freedom to

employees to organize themselves and set their representative for entering into

bargaining agreements, should be subordinate to the constitutional provision

protecting the sanctity of contracts. We can not conceive how freedom to

contract, which should be allowed to be exercised without limitation may be

subordinated to the freedom of laborers to choose the organization they desire

to represent them. And even if the legislature had intended to do so and madesuch freedom of the laborer paramount to the sanctity of obligation of

contracts, such attempt to override the constitutional provision would

necessarily and ipso factobe null and void.

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he action of the respondent company in enforcing the terms of the closed-

shop agreement is a valid exercise of its rights and obligations under the

contract. The dismissal by virtue thereof cannot constitute an unfair labor

practice, as it was in pursuance of an agreement that has been found to beregular and of a closed-shop agreement which under our laws is valid and

binding.

In the instant case, the CBA in question provides for a Union Security Clause

requiring:

(c) All workers who are or may during the effectivity of this contract become

members of the union in accordance with its constitution and by-laws shall as a

condition of their continued employment, maintain membership in good

standing in the union for the duration of the agreement. (Emphasis supplied)

Having ratified that CBA and being then members of the TDLU, the private

respondents owe fealty and are required under the Union Security Clause to

maintain their membership in good standing with it during the term thereof, a

requirement which ceases to be binding only during the 60-day freedom period

immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA. When the private


26/58

respondents organized and joined the KAMPIL Chapter in TDI and filed the

corresponding petition for certification election in November 1980, there was no

freedom period to speak of yet. For under Presidential Decree No. 1391,

promulgated May 29, 1978, the law applicable in this instance provides:

No petition for certification election for intervention disaffiliationshall be

entertained or given due course except within the 60 day freedom period

immediately preceding the execution of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

and under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules Implementing PD 1391 "... pending

certification of a duly filed collective bargaining agreement nopetition for

certification electionin the same bargaining unit shall be entertained or

processed." (promulgated September 19, 1978). The Labor Code further

mandates that "no certification election shall be entertained if a Collective

Bargaining Agreement which has been submitted in accordance with Article231 of the Code exists between the employer and a legitimate labor

organization except within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the l ife of such

collective agreement (Art. 257).

The fact, therefore, that the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) failed to certify or

act on TDLU's request for certification of the CBA in question is of no moment to

the resolution of the issues presented in this case. The BLR itself found in its order

of July 8, 1982 that "the certified CBA was duly filed and submitted on October

29, 1980, to last until June 30, 1982 is certifiable for having complied with all the

requirements for certification.

The validity of the CBA is not here assailed by private respondents. They

admitted having organized the local chapter of KAMPIL at TDI, although it is

claimed that this was done when there was no certified CBA between TDI and

TDLU that would constitute a bar to the certification election. Of significance is

the ruling inManalang v. Artex Development Co., Inc.,(21 SCRA 561, 569)

decided on a factual setting where the petitioners had affiliated themselves

with another labor union, Artex Free Workers, without first terminating their

membership with Bagong Buhay Labor Union (BBLU) and without the knowledgeof the officers of the latter union, for which reason the petitioners were expelled

from the BBLU for acts of disloyalty; and the company, upon the behest of BBLU

dismissed them from employment pursuant to the closed-shop stipulation in a

Collective Bargaining Agreement. This Court ruled:


27/58

The validity of the Collective Bargaining Agreement of March 4, 1960 is not

assailed by the petitioners. Nor do they deny that they were members of the

BBLU prior to March 4, 1960 and until they were expelled from the union. ...

The petitioners further contention that the closed-shop provision in the collective

Bargaining Agreement is illegal because it is unreasonable,restrictive of right of

freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution is a futile exercise in

argumentation of this Court has in a number of cases sustained closed-shop as

valid union security.

Finally, even if we assume, in gratia argumenti,that the petition were unaware of

the stipulation set forth in the collective bargaining agreement since their

membership in the BBLU prior to t the expulsion thereform is undenied there can

be no question that as long as the agreement with closed-shop provision was in

force they were bound by it. Neither their ignorance of,nor their dissatisfactionwith, its terms and condition would justify breach thereof or the formation by

them of a union of their own.As has been aptly said the collective bargaining

agreement entered into by officers of a union as agent of the member,and an

employer,gives rise to valid inforcible contractual relation against the individual

union members in matters that affect the entire membership or large classes of

its member who employed under an agreement between the union and his

employer is bound by the provision thereof,since it is a joint and several contract

of the members of the union and entered into by the union as their agent.

In an earlier case, this Court held:

Nor can it be said that the stipulation providing that the employer may dismiss

an employee whenever the union recommends his expulsion either for disloyalty

or for any violation of its by-laws and constitution is illegal or constitute of unfair

labor practice, for such is one of the matters on which management and labor

can agree in order to bring about harmonious relations between them and the

union, and cohesion and integrity of their organization And as an act of loyalty

a union may certainly require its members not to affiliate with any other labor

union and to consider its infringement as a reasonable cause for separation. Thisis what was done by respondent union. And the respondent employer did

nothing but to put in force their agreement when it separated the herein

complainants upon the recommendation of said union. Such a stipulation is not

only necessary to maintain loyalty and preserve the integrity of the union but is

allowed by the Magna Charta of Labor when it provided that while it is

recognized that an employee shall have the right to self-organization, it is at the


28/58

same time postulated that such right shall not injure the right of the labor

organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention

of membership therein (Section 41(b) par. 1, Republic Act 875). This provision is

significant. It is an indirect restriction on the right of an employee to self-

organization. It is a solemn pronouncement of a policy that while an employeeis given the right to join a labor organization, such right should only be asserted

in a manner that will not spell the destruction of the same organization The law

requires loyalty to the union on the part of its members in order to obtain to the

full extent its cohesion and integrity.We therefore, see nothing improper in the

disputed provisions of the collective bargaining agreement entered into

between the parties. (Ang Malayang Manggagawa ng Ang Tibay Enterprises, et

al. v. Ang Tibay, et al. 102 Phil. 669) (Emphasis supplied)

We agree with petitioner TDLU that the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in

G.R. No. 63995 entitled TDLU v. Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipinacould not

be construed as to extinguish the right of TDLU to expel private respondents for

acts of disloyalty when they organized a local chapter of KAMPIL in October

1980 in TDI. The subject matter brought to this Court in G.R. No. 63995 was the

decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated December 3, 1982 requiring the

holding of certification election in TDI within twenty (20) days from receipt of said

BLR's decision which reads:

Movant union (KAMPIL) now seeks for the reconsideration of that order on the

ground, among others, that the CBA in question is not certifiable and, hence,the contract bar rule cannot properly apply to this case.

After a careful examination of the records, this Bureau is of the view that the

instant motion should be given due course, not necessarily for the arguments

raised by herein movant.

It should be noted that alleged CBA has now expired, its expiry date being 30

June 1982. Consequently, there appears to be no more obstacle in allowing a

certification election to be conducted among the rank and file of respondent.

The contract bar rule will no longer apply in view of the supervening even that is,the expiration of the contract.(ANNEX C, TDI's Memorandum dated November

28,1986; Emphasis supplied).

It is clearly apparent that the BLR aforesaid Order which this Court upheld in G.R.

No. 63995 when it dismissed TDLU's petition in a minute resolution, did not pass

upon the question of legality or illegality of the dismissal of private respondents


29/58

from TDI by reason of their expulsion from TDLU for disloyalty. That question was

neither raised nor passed upon in the certification case, and was not a proper

issue therein because a petition for certification election is not a litigation but a

mere investigation of a non-adversary character to determine the bargaining

unit to represent the employees (George Peter Lines, Inc. v. Associated LaborUnion, 134 SCRA 82). Hence, no inference could be derived from the dismissal of

said petition that either the BLR or this Court has decided in favor of private

respondents insofar as the question of union disloyalty and their suspension and

termination from employment of TDI is concerned.

Simply put, the BLR ordered the holding of a certification election because the

CBA in question had already expired, its expiry date being June 30, 1982.

Consequently, there appears to be no more obstacle in allowing a certification

election. "... [T]he contract bar rule will not apply in view of the supervening

event, that is, the expiration of the CBA."

But the fact that the CBA had expired on June 30, 1982 and the BLR, because of

such supervening event, ordered the holding of a certification election could

not and did not wipe out or cleanse private respondents from the acts of

disloyalty committed in October 1980 when they organized KAMPIL's local

chapter in TDI while still members of TDLU. The ineluctable fact is that private

respondents committed acts of disloyalty against TDLU while the CBA was in

force and existing for which they have to face the necessary sanctions lawfully

imposed by TDLU.

In Villar v. Inciong(121 SCRA 444), we held that "petitioners, although entitled to

disaffiliation from their union and to form a new organization of their own must

however, suffer the consequences of their separation from the union under the

security clause of the CBA: "

Inherent in every labor union, or any organization for that matter, is the right of

self-preservation. When members of a labor union, therefore, sow the seeds of

dissension and strife within the union; when they seek the disintegration and

destruction of the very union to which they belong; they thereby forfeit theirrights to remain as members of the union which they seek to destroy. Prudence

and equity, as well as the dictates of law and justice, therefore, compelling

mandate the adoption by the labor union of such corrective and remedial

measures, in keeping with its laws and regulations, for its preservation and

continued existence; lest by its folly and inaction, the labor union crumble and

fall. (Idem., p. 458)


30/58

The private respondents cannot, therefore, escape the effects of the security

clause of their own applicable collective bargaining agreement.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated May 26, 1986 and the resolution dated June 26,

1986 of respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. AB-

11685-81 are hereby SET ASIDE. The expulsion of private respondents from

TANDUAY DISTILLERY LABOR UNION and their consequent suspension and

termination from employment with TANDUAY DISTILLERY, INC., without

reinstatement and backwages, are hereby SUSTAINED. No cost.

SO ORDERED.

9. G.R. No. 94716 November 15, 1991

ASSOCIATION OF COURT OF APPEALS EMPLOYEES (ACAE), petitioner,

vs.

HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, in her capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor

Relations, and UNION OF CONCERNED EMPLOYEES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

(UCECA), respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

We are asked in this petition to ascertain the power, if any, of the Department of

Labor and Employment (DOLE), more specifically the Bureau of Labor Relations

(BLR), to supervise the activities of government employees; in this case, unions of

judiciary personnel who serve in the Court of Appeals.

The question of power is quite significant. Hitherto, the BLR has concentrated on

labor relations in the private sector. Its enforcement machinery and the mass of

law and jurisprudence governing its functions are entirely geared to the

handling of the peculiar problems arising in private employment. In this case, the

BLR has tasked itself to intervene not only in a quarrel between two groups ofgovernment employees but more important, in a quarrel between employees

working for an independent branch of government, the Judiciary.

The two issues raised in this petition are: (1) whether or not the respondent

Bureau of Labor Relations acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted

the petition for certification election to determine the certified bargaining agent


31/58

to represent the rank-and-file employees of the Court of Appeals; and (2)

whether or not a petition for cancellation of registration of the union requesting

for a certification election is a bar to the resolution of a prior petition for

certification election.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On April 4, 1990, the respondent Union of Concerned Employees of the Court of

Appeals (UCECA), a registered union filed a petition for accreditation and/or

certification election with the Bureau of Labor Relations (docketed as BLR Case

No. 4-11-90) alleging that the petitioner, Association of Court of Appeals

Employees (ACAE) which is the incumbent bargaining representative, no longer

enjoys the support of the majority of the rank-and-file employees. The UCECA

alleged that there was a mass resignation of ACAE members on April 14, 1989.

On May 10, 1990, the ACAE filed its Comment and/or Opposition. It stated that

the listing by the ACAE of its membership at three hundred three (303)

employees was a product of fraud. It charged the UCECA with

misrepresentation, forgery and perjury in attaching to its (UCECA) petition, a

copy of the names of members some of which were twice listed, written without

consent or unsigned, and some of the signatures of which were forged. In

addition, the petitioner alleged that some of the UCECA members, upon

learning of the fraudulent act, resigned from the union.

In its reply, the UCECA stated that its registry book was not smeared with fraudand claimed that any mistakes were only clerical errors.

On June 18, 1990, petitioner ACAE filed a Petition for Cancellation of Certificate

of Registration of the UCECA in BLR Case No. 6-19-90 on the ground of fraud and

misrepresentation by UCECA in obtaining its Registration Certificate No. 159 and

in preparing its Registry Book of members. On June 28, 1990, the ACAE moved

for deferment of the resolution of the case of BLR 4-11-90 pending the case of

BLR 6-19-90.

On July 16, 1990, the UCECA filed a motion to dismiss BLR 6-19-90 for being

dilatory, to which ACAE replied that the maxim ofres ipsa loquiturshould be

applied as the "fraudulent documents submitted by UCECA speak for

themselves."

On July 30, 1990, the Bureau of Labor Relationsruled that BLR 6-19-90

(cancellation proceedings) is not a bar to the holding of a certification election.


32/58

It granted the UCECA's prayer for a certification election. The BLR found that

UCECA was supported by three hundred three (303) or forty (40%) percent of

the seven hundred sixty two (762) rank-and-file employees of the court. ACAE's

motion for reconsideration was denied.

On August 21, 1990, the respondent Bureau conducted a pre-election

conference.

Feeling that it was being stampeded into participating in a certification election,

ACAE filed this petition forcertiorariand prohibition. We issued a temporary

restraining order effective August 29, 1990.

The first question that arises is the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations to

handle disputes among associations of employees working for the judiciary.

There is no question that government employees may organize provided thepurposes behind such organization are legitimate.

No less than the Bill of Rights specifically identifies government employees as

having the right of self-organization. It provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and

private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not

contrary to law shall not be abridged. (Article III, 1987 Constitution)

In the provisions governing the Civil Service Commission, we find:

Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,

and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled

corporations with original charters.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 2. (5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government

employees.

xxx xxx xxx

(Article IX-B, Section 2 (1) and (5), Constitution)

The article on Social Justice and Human Rights adds:


33/58

Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,

organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of

employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective

bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the

right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,

humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in

policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may

be provided by law. (Article XIII, Section 3, 1st and 2nd paragraphs)

xxx xxx xxx

The issue of what governs and who supervises unions of government employees

is of more than passing concern especially when those who organize and hope

to engage in certain forms of concerted action are court employees.

Government personnel find themselves in an equivocal and ambivalent

position. They have a right but it is not clear to what extent they may exercise it.

Congress has not legislated as yet on the complicated problems arising from

unionism in government as distinguished from unionism in the private sector.

Obviously, the same rules do not and cannot apply under the present state of

the law. A major re-ordering of government, notably its civil service laws and

budgetary and fiscal procedures would result if Congress, in enacting the laws

required by the constitutional provisions, gives exactly the same rights andprivileges to all workers in the public and private sectors.

At present, the terms and conditions of employment in the government service

are governed by law, not by the relative strengths of management and labor as

they hammer out mutually acceptable terms across the collective bargaining

table. Paradoxically, all the representatives of "labor" and "management" in

government areemployees.At the same time, everybody forms part of the

"owner" of the enterprise, the sovereign people. The qualifications and eligibilities

of civil servants, their appointment and promotion, standardization of salaries,

disciplinary actions, fringe benefits, and retirement gratuities, among others, are

governed by statutes, rules, and established principles which are the products of

decades of experience, not to mention borrowings from civil service systems

abroad.


34/58

The provisions of civil service law on the terms and conditions of employment

including the regulation of labor-management relations in the government

sector, unless Congress decides to amend or repeal them, form part of the

response to any requests or demands of organized groups of government

personnel. Any understanding between the top officials of a governmentagency and the union which represents the rank-and-file is subordinate to the

law governing the particular issue or situation.

We emphasize the above because in ascertaining what agency should

supervise certification elections in the public sector, we limit the determination

strictly to the question before us the holding of certification elections.

Jurisdiction over questions which may arise after the certified bargaining

representative flexes its muscles and engages in concerted action will have to

await the filing of more appropriate cases and, hopefully, the enactment of

applicable legislation.

The Constitution provides that the rights ofallworkers to self-organization,

collective bargaining, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to

strike, are guaranteed provided these are in accordance with law.There is

reference to the need for a law governing the procedures incident to self-

organization.

What is the law which governs certification elections in the Court of Appeals?

The Solicitor General argues that the applicable law is Executive Order No. 180issued on June 1, 1987 entitled "Providing Guidelines for the Exercise of the Right

to Organize of Government Employees; Creating a Public Sector Labor-

Management Council; and for Other Purposes."

The pertinent provisions of Executive Order No. 180 are:

SECTION 7. Government employees' organizations shall register with the Civil

Service Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment. The

application shall be filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department

which shall process the same in accordance with the provisions of the Labor

Code of the Philippines as amended. Applications may also be filed with the

Regional Offices of the Department of Labor and Employment which shall

immediately transmit the said applications to the Bureau of Labor Relations

within three (3) days from receipt thereof.

xxx xxx xxx


35/58

SECTION 8. Upon approval of the application, a registration certification shall be

issued to the organization recognizing it as a legitimate employees' organization

with the right to represent its members and undertake activities to further and

defend its interest. The corresponding certificates of registration shall be jointly

approved by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and Secretary ofLabor and Employment.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 10. The duly registered employees' organization having the support of

the majority of the employees in the appropriate organizational unit shall be

designated as the sole and exclusive representative of the employees.

SECTION 11. A duly registered employees' organization shall be accorded

voluntary recognition upon a showing that no other employees' organization is

registered or is seeking registration, based on records of the Bureau of Labor

Relations, and that the said organization has the majority support of the rank-

and-file employees in the organizational unit.

SECTION 12. Where there are two or more duly registered employees'

organizations in the appropriate organizational unit, the Bureau of Labor

Relations shall, upon petition, order the conduct of a certification election and

shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file

employees in said organization unit. (Rollo, pp. 235-237)

It is obvious that Executive Order No. 180 is at best a stop gap measure for a

limited purpose. Certain provisions and procedures in the Labor Code were

engrafted into a decree governing the entirely novel situation of unionism in the

governmental sector. Enacted a little over one month and a half before

Congress reconvened after the revolutionary government was replaced by the

present government, it unfortunately lacks a legislative record, parliamentary

debates, and the insights that only the elected representatives of all the people

can bring to bear in the regulation of a complicated and sensitive relationship.

The petitioner questions the validity of Executive Order No. 180 but limits its

challenge to an alleged violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The

argument is self-defeating because, followed to its logical conclusion, only this

Court would have the power to supervise certification elections in the Court of

Appeals. The task is not for us and we certainly have no intention to undertake it.


36/58

It is the function of this Court, and we will not hesitate to exercise the power, to

regulate all activities of Judges and court personnel, the Supreme Court

included, to the end that the independence, effectiveness, and integrity of the

judiciary as mandated by the Constitution are not impaired or compromised. It

is axiomatic, for example, that any demands of court employees for highercompensation or improved facilities must be viewed in the context of the fiscal

autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution to the Judiciary. (Constitution, Article

VIII, Section 3). Neither DOLE, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), nor any other

agency would have jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims. And since unresolved

legal questions commenced elsewhere are ultimately decided by us, the final

decision on all such questions would still be with this Court.

All this does not mean that the separation of powers doctrine requires us to

supervise the details of self-organization activities in the courts. In the same way

that CSC validly conducts competitive examinations to grant requisite eligibilities

to court employees, we see no constitutional objection to DOLE handling the

certification process in the Court of Appeals, considering its expertise,

machinery, and experience in this particular activity. Executive Order No. 180

requires organizations of government employees to register with bothCSC and

DOLE. This ambivalence notwithstanding, the CSC has no facilities, personnel, or

experience in the conduct of certification elections. The BLR has to do the job.

Executive Order No. 180 states that certificates of registration of the legitimate

employee representatives must be jointly approved by the CSC Chairman andthe DOLE Secretary. Executive Order No. 180 is not too helpful in determining

whose opinion shall prevail if the CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary arrive

at different conclusions. At any rate, we shall deal with that problem when it

occurs. Insofar as power to call for and supervise the conduct of certification

elections is concerned, we rule against the petitioner.

One final point on the petitioner's objection to the jurisdiction of the BLR. ACAE

cannot persuasively challenge the validity of Executive Order No. 180 because

its very personality to bring this suit is premised on its having organized under the

same executive order. The first paragraph of the petition reads:

1. Petitioner ASSOCIATION OF COURT OF APPEALS EMPLOYEES, ACAE for brevity,

is an association of government employees duly organized and existing under

and by virtue of Executive Order No. 180, duly accredited as the exclusive

representative of the rank-and-file employees of the Court of Appeals, with


37/58

office address at the Court of Appeals Compound, M. Orosa Street, Ermita,

Manila. (Rollo, p. 2)

The petitioner argues that the respondent UCECA failed to prove that it no

longer enjoys the support of the rank-and-file employees. ACAE claims that it

has 395 members. It states that if the fraudulently entered names numbering 88

are all deducted from the 303 listed names for UCECA, there would actually be

215 members only left. Even assuming, therefore, that the petitioning union has

satisfied the required percentage of signatures (20%) according to section of

Rule VI, Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of

Government Employees to Self-Organization, no election can be had if the

incumbent bargaining representative still has the clear majority.

It is precisely because the respondent union has been questioning the majority

status of the petitioner that a petition for certification election was filed.Nowhere in the rules is there a further requirement for a petitioning union to

prove the lack of a majority status of the incumbent representative or who

among its listed members are not actually affiliated with it. What is merely

required for a petition for certification election to be granted is the filing of a

verified petition which is supported by the signatures of at least twenty (20%)

percent of the covered employees. It is also essential that it is not filed within

one (1) year from the date a declaration of a previous final certification election

result was issued.

The BLR has satisfied

batch 2(fultxt)

Documents