Case Facts Issue Held

1. Citibank v. CA, November27,1998

Citibank and El Toro Security Agency, Inc. Entered into a contract for the former to provide security and protective services to safeguard and protect the bank's premises. Under the contract, El Toro obligated itself to provide the services of security guards to safeguard and protect the premises and property of Citibank against theft, robbery or any other unlawful acts committed by any person or persons, and assumed responsibility for losses and/or damages that may be incurred by Citibank due to or as a result of the negligence of El Toro or any of its assigned personnel. Citibank renewed the security contract with El Toro yearly until it expired. Then, Citibank Integrated Guards Labor AllianceSEGATUPAS/FSM (CIGLA) filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a request for preventive mediation based on Unfair labor practice;Dismissal of union officers/members;and Union busting. CIGLA converted its request for preventive mediation into a notice of strike for failure of the parties to reach a mutually acceptable settlement of the issues, which it followed with a supplemental notice of strike alleging as supplemental issue the mass dismissal of all union officers and members. Citibank filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, a complaint for injunction and damages. CIGLA filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the complaintallegingamongothersthattheCourthadnojurisdiction,thisbeinglabordispute.

WON the case involves a labor dispute

No. Article 212, paragraph l of the Labor Code provides the definition of a "labor dispute". It "includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. El Toro was an independent contractor. Thus, no EE and ER existed between Citibank and the security guard members of the union in the security agency who were assigned to secure the bank's premises and property. Hence, there was no labor dispute and no right to strike against the bank. The dispute involved is a civil one and the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint lies with the regionaltrialcourt

2. PAL v. NLRC, March 20,1998

Ferdinand Pineda and Godofredo Cabling are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were dismissed from the service for their alleged involvement in the April 3, 1993 currency smuggling in Hong Kong. One person in the name of Joseph Abaca was intercepted at the airport carrying a bag containing 2.5 million pesos that allegedly found said plastic bag at the Skybed section of arrival flight PR300/03whereprivaterespondentsservedasflightattendants.After having been implicated by Abaca in the incident before the respondents disciplinary board, it is was Abaca himself who gave exculpating statements to the same board and declared that the private respondents were not the owners of the said currencies, that just as petitioners thought that they were already fully cleared of the charges, as they no longer received any summons/notices on the intended additional hearings mandated by the Disciplinary Board, that they were already fully cleared of the charges, as they no longer received any summons/notices on the intended additional hearings mandated by the Disciplinary Board, they were surprised to find out that they were terminatedbyPAL.Aggrieved by said dismissal, private respondents filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction prayingthat:"I. Upon filing of this Petition, a temporary restraining order be issued, prohibiting respondents (petitioner herein) from effecting or enforcing the Decision dated Feb. 22, 1995, or to reinstate petitioners temporarily while a hearing on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunctionisbeingundertaken;"II. After hearing, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering respondent to reinstate petitioners to their former positions pending the hearing of this case, or, prohibiting respondent from enforcing its Decision dated February 22,1995 while this case is pending adjudication;"III. After hearing, that the writ of preliminary injunction as to the reliefs sought for be made permanent, that petitioners be awarded full back wages, moral damages of PHP 500,000.00 each and exemplary damages of PHP 500,000.00 each, attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent of whateveramountisawarded,andthecostsofsuit."

W/N the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion on issuing thewritofinjunction

Yes. In labor cases, Article 218 of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC "(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision infavorofsuchparty.Complementing the abovequoted provision, Sec. 1, Rule XI of the New RulesofProcedureoftheNLRC,pertinentlyprovidesasfollows:"Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Dispute.A preliminary injunction or a restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the bases of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of, involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectualanydecisioninfavorofsuchparty.From the foregoing provisions of law, the power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ originates from "any labor dispute" upon application by a party thereof, which application if not granted "may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party." The term "labor dispute" is defined as "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees."

The NLRC issued the writ of injunction. PAL moved for reconsideration on the ground that has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or restraining order since this may be issued only under Article 218 of the Labor Code if the case involves or arises from labor disputes and thereby divesting the labor arbiterofitsoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoverillegaldismissalcases.

The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in reality an action for illegal dismissal. This is clear from the allegations in the petition which prays for: reinstatement of private respondents;award of full back wages, moral and exemplary damages;and attorney's fees. As such, the petition should have been filed with the labor arbiter who has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural: (1) Unfair labor practice;(2) Termination disputes;(3) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employeremployee relations;(5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;and (6) Except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employeremployee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P 5,000.00), whether or not accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. The jurisdiction conferred by the foregoing legal provision to the labor arbiter is both original and exclusive, meaning, no other officer or tribunal can take cognizance of, hear and decide any of the cases therein enumerated. The only exceptions are where the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the NLRC exercises the power of compulsory arbitration, or the parties agree to submit the matter to voluntary arbitration pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code. On the other hand, the NLRC shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by labor arbiters as provided in Article 217(b)oftheLaborCode.In short, the jurisdiction of the NLRC in illegal dismissal cases is appellate in nature and, therefore, it cannot entertain the private respondents' petition for injunction, which challenges the dismissal orders of petitioner. Article 218(e) of the Labor Code does not provide blanket authority to the NLRC or any of its divisions to issue writs of injunction, considering that Section 1 of Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC makes injunction only an ancillaryremedyinordinarylabordisputes.

3. Penaranda v. Bagang Plywood Corp, May3,2006

SYNOPSIS: Managerial employees and members of the managerial staff are exempted from the provisions of the Labor Code on labor standards. Since petitioner belongs to this class of employees,heisnotentitledtoovertimepayandpremiumpayforworkingonrestdays.FACTS: Petitioner Charlito Pearanda was hired as an employee of Baganga Plywood Corporation (BPC) to take charge of the operations and maintenance of its steam plant boiler. Respondent (BPC) is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws and is representedhereinbyitsGeneralManagerHUDSONCHUA,theindividualrespondent.Pearanda through counsel in his position paper alleges that he was employed by respondent Baganga on March 15, 1999 with a monthly salary of P5,000.00 as Foreman/Boiler Head/Shift Engineer until he was allegedly illegally terminated on December 19, 2000. Further, he was not paid his overtime pay, premium pay for working during holidays/rest days, night shift differentials. The

WON Penaranda is entitled to monetary benefits under art. 82 oftheLaborCode.

HELD: No. Article 82 of the Labor Code exempts managerial employees from the coverage of labor standards. Labor standards provide the working conditions of employees, including entitlement to overtime pay and premium pay for working on rest days. Under this provision, managerial employees are "those whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision."The Court disagrees with the NLRCs finding that petitioner was a managerial employee. However, petitioner was a member of the managerial staff, which also takes him out of the coverage of labor standards. Like managerial employees, officers and members of the managerial staff are not

respondent [BPC] was on temporary closure due to repair and general maintenance and it applied for clearance with the DOLE, and due to the insistence of herein complainant he was paid his separationbenefits.Hence,hewasnotterminatedfromemploymentmuchlessillegally.Being a managerial employee he is not entitled to overtime pay and if ever he rendered services beyondthenormalhoursofwork,therewasnoofficeorder/orauthorizationforhimtodoso.Labor Arbiter ruled that there was no illegal dismissal because Penarandas complaint was premature because he was still employed with Baganga. The petitioner is also entitled to OT pay, premiumpay,andattorneysfees.Onappeal,NLRCdeletedtheawardofOTpay,premiumpayandattorneysfees.CAdismissedPenarandaspetitionbasedonproceduralfailures.

entitledtotheprovisionsoflawonlaborstandards.The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code define members of a managerial staffasthosewiththefollowingdutiesandresponsibilities:"(1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to managementpoliciesoftheemployer;"(2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment;"(3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial employee whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision thereof;or (ii) execute under general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training, experience, or knowledge;or (iii) execute under general supervision specialassignmentsandtasks;and"(4) who do not devote more than 20 percent of their hours worked in a workweek to activities which are not directly and closely related to the performanceoftheworkdescribedinparagraphs(1),(2),and(3)above."Petitioner supervised the engineering section of the steam plant boiler. His work involved overseeing the operation of the machines and the performance of the workers in the engineering section. This work necessarily required the use of discretion and independent judgment to ensure the proper functioning of the steam plant boiler. As supervisor, petitioner is deemedamemberofthemanagerialstaff.

4. SMCC v. Charter Chemical and Coating Corp.,March16,2011

On February 19, 1999, Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (petitioner union) filed a petition for certification election among the regular rankandfile employees of Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation (respondentcompany)withtheMediationArbitrationUnitoftheDOLE,NationalCapitalRegion.On April 14, 1999, respondent company filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss4 on the ground that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because of (1) failure to comply with the documentation requirements set by law, and (2) the inclusion of supervisory employees within petitionerunion.MedArbs ruling: the petition was denied on the grounds of the petitioner not being able to comply with the statutory requirements and that several members of the petitioner were supervisory employees who were supposedly banned from joining the same which seeked to represent rankandfileemployees.DOLEs ruling: the M.R., of the originally denied petition, was granted. There were no evidence that substantiated the findings of the medarb that some of the members were actually supervisory employees.CAsruling:themedarbsdecisionwasupheld.

WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the alleged mixture of rankandfile and supervisoryemployee[s] of petitioner [unions] membership is [a] ground for the cancellation of petitioner [unions] legal personality and dismissal of [the] petition for certificationelection.

The mixture of rankandfile and supervisory employees in petitioner union doesnotnullifyitslegalpersonalityasalegitimatelabororganization.The CA found that petitioner union has for its membership both rankandfile and supervisory employees. However, petitioner union sought to represent the bargaining unit consisting of rankandfile employees. Under Article 245 of the Labor Code, supervisory employees are not eligible for membership in a labor organization of rankandfile employees. Thus, the appellate court ruled that petitioner union cannot be considered a legitimate labor organization pursuant to Toyota Motor Philippines v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union28 (hereinafterToyota).Preliminarily, we note that petitioner union questions the factual findings of the MedArbiter, as upheld by the appellate court, that 12 of its members are supervisory employees. However, petitioner union failed to present any rebuttal evidence in the proceedings below after respondent company submitted in evidence the job descriptions of the aforesaid employees. The job descriptions indicate that the aforesaid employees exercise recommendatory managerial actions which are not merely routinary but require the use of independent judgment, hence, falling within the definition of supervisory employees under Article 212 of the Labor Code. For this reason, we are constrained to agree with the MedArbiter, as upheld by the appellate court, that petitioner union consisted of both rankandfile and

supervisoryemployees.Nonetheless, the inclusion of the aforesaid supervisory employees in petitioner union does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization. R.A. No. 6715 omitted specifying the exact effect any violation of the prohibition [on the comingling of supervisory and rankandfile employees] would bring about on the legitimacy of a labor organization.

5. Jumuad v. HiFlyer Food Inc., September 7, 2011

Pamela Florentina P. Jumuad (Jumuad) is the area manager for the entire VisayasMindanao region, comprising the provinces of Cebu, Bacolod, Iloilo and Bohol. Among the branches under her supervision were the KFC branches in Gaisano Mall, Cebu City (KFCGaisano);in Cocomall, Cebu City (KFCCocomall);and in Island City Mall, Bohol (KFCBohol). Hi Flyer conducted a food safety, service and sanitation audit at KFCGaisano. The audit revealed several sanitation violations, such as the presence of rodents and the use of a defective chiller for the storage of food. Then, HiFlyer audited the accounts of KFCBohol amid reports that certain employees were covering up cash shortages.Asaresult,thefollowingirregularitieswerediscovered:1)cashshortageamountingto62,290.85;2)delayinthedepositsofcashsalesbyanaverageofthreedays;3) the presence of two sealed cashfordeposit envelopes containing paper cutouts instead of cash;4)falsifiedentriesinthedepositlogbook;5)lapsesininventorycontrol;and6)materialproductspoilage.HiFlyer conducted another review at its KFCCocomall branch. Grout and leaks at the branchs kitchen wall, dried up spills from the marinator, as well as a live rat under postmix, and signs of rodentgnawing/infestationwerefound.HiFlyer sent Jumuad an Irregularities Report and Notice of Charges. Jumuad submitted her written explanation. HiFlyer held an administrative hearing where Jumuad appeared with counsel. Not satisfied with her explanations, HiFlyer served her a Notice of Dismissal dated October 14, 2005, effectingherterminationonOctober17,2005.Jumuad filed a complaint against HiFlyer and/or Jesus R. Montemayor (Montemayor) for illegal dismissalbeforetheNLRC.TheLA(laborarbiter)ruledthatJumuadwasillegallydismissed.Both Jumuad and HiFlyer appealed to the NLRC. Jumuad faulted the LA for not awarding backwages and damages despite its finding that she was illegally dismissed. HiFlyer and Montemayor, on the other hand, assailed the finding that Jumuad was illegally dismissed and that they were solidarily liable therefor. NLRC affirmed in toto the LA decision. According to the NLRC, there are emails that were proof that Jumuad was denied due process considering that no matter how she would refute the charges hurled against her, the decision of HiFlyer to terminate her would notchange.HiFlyer appealed the case before the CA in Cebu City alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. CA rendered the subject decision reversing the decision of the labor tribunal. The CA was of the opinion that the requirements of substantive and procedural due process were

Whether or not Jumuad was illegally dismissed

No, Article 282 of the Labor Code provides: Termination by Employer. An employermayterminateanemploymentforanyofthefollowingcauses:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawfulordersofhisemployerorrepresentativeinconnectionwithhiswork;(b)Grossandhabitualneglectbytheemployeeofhisduties;(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by

hisemployerordulyauthorizedrepresentative;(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person

of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative;and(e)Othercausesanalogoustotheforegoing.In this case, Jumuad willfully breached her duties as to be unworthy of the trust and confidence of HiFlyer. Jumuad was a managerial employee. Jumuad executed management policies and had the power to discipline the employees of KFC. Article 212 (m) of the Labor Code defines a managerial employee as one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge,assignordisciplineemployees.As long as there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his position,amanagerialemployeemaybedismissed.Reports of HiFlyer show that there were anomalies committed in the branches managed by Jumuad. On the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility alone, Jumuad may be held liable for negligence in the performance of her managerial duties. She may not have been directly involved in causing the cash shortages in KFCBohol, but her involvement in not performing her duty monitoring and supporting the day to day operations of the branches and ensure that all the facilities and equipment at the restaurant were properly maintained and serviced, could have truly prevented the whole debacle from ever occurring. Management has the prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose appropriate penalties onerringworkerspursuanttocompanyrulesandregulations.

complied with affording Jumuad an opportunity to be heard first, when she submitted her written explanation and then, when she was informed of the decision and the basis of her termination. As for the email exchanges between Montemayor and the officers of HiFlyer, the CA opined that they did not equate to a predetermination of Jumuads termination. It was of the view that the email exchanges were mere discussions between Montemayor and other officers of HiFlyer on whether grounds for disciplinary action or termination existed. The emails just showed that HiFlyer extensively deliberated the nature and cause of the charges against Jumuad. CA considered the deplorable sanitary conditions and the cash shortages uncovered at three of the seven KFC branches supervised by Jumuad as enough bases for HiFlyer to lose its trust and confidence in her.ThusthisPetitionforReviewonCertioarari

In this case, HiFlyer exercised in good faith its management prerogative as there is no dispute that it has lost trust and confidence in her and her managerial abilities, to its damage and prejudice. Her dismissal, was therefore,justified.

6. Peoples Broadcasting Service v. Sec of Labor, March 6, 2012 (DOLE can determine existence of EE Rel and summary on128,129and217)

Private respondent Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against petitioner with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City, for illegal deduction, nonpayment of service incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of wages and noncoverage of SSS, PAGIBIG and Philhealth. After the conduct of summary investigations, and after the parties submitted their position papers, the DOLE Regional Director found that private respondent was an employee of petitioner, and was entitled to his money claims. The Acting DOLE Secretary dismissed petitioners appeal. When the matter was brought before the CA, where petitioner claimed that it had been denied due process, it was held that petitioner was accorded due process as it had been given the opportunity to be heard, and that the DOLE Secretary had jurisdiction over the matter, as the jurisdictional limitation imposed by Article 129 of the Labor Code on the power of the DOLE SecretaryunderArt.128(b)oftheCodehadbeenrepealedbyRepublicActNo.(RA)7730.In the prior decision of the Supreme Court, the CA Decision was reversed and set aside, and the complaint against petitioner was dismissed. The Court found that there was no employeremployee relationship between petitioner and private respondent. It was held that while the DOLEmay make a determination of the existence of an employeremployee relationship, this function could not be coextensive with the visitorial and enforcement power. NLRC was held to be the primary agency in determiningtheexistenceofanemployeremployeerelationship.From the decision, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed a Motion for Clarification of Decision (with Leave of Court). The PAO sought to clarify as to when the visitorial and enforcement power of the

Whether or not the DOLE can make a determination of whether or not an employeremployeerelationshipexist.

Yes. No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an employeremployee relationship. No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a preliminary finding, that the power was primarily held by the NLRC. The law did not say that the DOLE would first seek the NLRCs determination of the existence of an employeremployee relationship, or that should the existence of the employeremployee relationship be disputed, the DOLE would refer the matter to the NLRC. The DOLE must have the power to determine whether or not an employeremployee relationship exists, and from there to decide whether or not to issue compliance orders in accordance with Art. 128(b) of theLaborCode,asamendedbyRA7730.

DOLE be not considered as coextensive with the power to determine the existence of an employeremployeerelationship.

7. ExBataan Veterans Security Agency v. Sec. Laguesma, November 20,2007

: ExBataan Veterans Security Agency, Inc. (EBVSAI) is in the business of providing security services while private respondents are EBVSAI's employees assigned to the National Power CorporationatAmbuklaoHydroElectricPlant,Bokod,Benguet(AmbuklaoPlant).On 20 February 1996, private respondents led by Alexander Pocding (Pocding) instituted a complaint4 for underpayment of wages against EBVSAI before the Regional Office of the DepartmentofLaborandEmployment(DOLE).On 7 March 1996, the Regional Office conducted a complaint inspection at the Ambuklao Plant where the following violations were noted: (1) nonpresentation of records;(2) nonpayment of holiday pay;(3) nonpayment of rest day premium;(4) underpayment of night shift differential pay; (5) nonpayment of service incentive leave;(6) underpayment of 13th month pay;(7) no registration;(8) no annual medical report;(9) no annual work accidental report;(10) no safety committee;and (11) no trained first aider.5 On the same date, the Regional Office issued a notice of hearing6 requiring EBVSAI and private respondents to attend the hearing on 22 March 1996. Otherhearingsweresetfor8May1996,27May1996and10June1996.EBVSAI filed a motion for reconsideration and alleged that the Regional Director does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the money claim of each private respondent exceeded P5, 000. EBVSAI pointed out that the Regional Director should have endorsed the case totheLaborArbiter.In a supplemental motion for reconsideration, EBVSAI questioned the Regional Director's basis for thecomputationofthedeficienciesduetoeachprivaterespondent.In an Order dated 16 January 1997, the Regional Director denied EBVSAI's motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration. The Regional Director stated that, pursuant to Republic Act No. 7730 (RA 7730), the limitations under Articles 129 and 217(6) of the Labor Code no longer apply to the Secretary of Labor's visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128(b). The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives are now empowered to hear and decide, in a summary proceeding, any matter involving the recovery of any amount of wages and other monetary claims arising out of employeremployee relations at the time of the inspection.EBVSAIappealedtotheSecretaryofLabor.RulingofSec.Labor:affirmedtheRegionalDirectorsdecisionCAruling:affirmedtheSecretaryofLaboranddismissedallothermotions

Whether the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives have jurisdiction over the money claims of private respondents which exceed P5, 000.

EBVSAI maintains that under Articles 129 and 217(6) of the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter, not the Regional Director, has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the case because the individual monetary claim of private respondents exceeds P5, 000. In Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. v. Sec. of Labor,weruledthat:While it is true that under Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear and decide cases where the aggregate money claims of each employee exceeds P5,000.00, said provisions of law do not contemplate nor cover the visitorial and enforcement powers of the SecretaryofLabororhisdulyauthorizedrepresentatives.Rather, said powers are defined and set forth in Article 128 of the Labor Code(asamendedbyR.A.No.7730)thus:Art.128Visitorialandenforcementpower.xxx(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article[s] 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employeremployee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to [the labor standards provisions of this Code and other] labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentaryproofswhichwerenotconsideredinthecourseofinspection.The aforequoted provision explicitly excludes from its coverage Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Code thereby retaining and further strengthening the power of the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of said Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officer or industrial safety engineer made in thecourseofinspection.This was further affirmed in our ruling in Cirineo Bowling Plaza, Inc. v. Sensing, where we sustained the jurisdiction of the DOLE Regional Director and held that "the visitorial and enforcement powers of the DOLE Regional Director to order and enforce compliance with labor standard laws can be exercisedevenwheretheindividualclaimexceedsP5,000."However, if the labor standards case is covered by the exception clause in Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, then the Regional Director will have to endorse the case to the appropriate Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. In order to divest the Regional Director or his representatives of

jurisdiction, the following elements must be present: (a) that the employer contests the findings of the labor regulations officer and raises issues thereon (b) that in order to resolve such issues, there is a need to examine evidentiary matters and (c) that such matters are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. The rules also provide that the employer shall raise such objections during the hearing of the case or at any time afterreceiptofthenoticeofinspectionresults.In this case, the Regional Director validly assumed jurisdiction over the money claims of private respondents even if the claims exceeded P5, 000 because such jurisdiction was exercised in accordance with Article 128(b) of theLaborCodeandthecasedoesnotfallundertheexceptionclause.The Court notes that EBVSAI did not contest the findings of the labor regulations officer during the hearing or after receipt of the notice of inspection results. It was only in its supplemental motion for reconsideration before the Regional Director that EBVSAI questioned the findings of the labor regulations officer and presented documentary evidence to controvert the claims of private respondents. But even if this was the case, the Regional Director and the Secretary of Labor still looked into and considered EBVSAI's documentary evidence and found that such did not warrant the reversal of the Regional Director's order. The Secretary of Labor also doubted the veracity and authenticity of EBVSAI's documentary evidence. Moreover, the pieces of evidence presented by EBVSAI were verifiable in the normal course of inspection because all employment records of the employees should be kept and maintained in or about the premises of the workplace, which in this case is in Ambuklao Plant, the establishment where privaterespondentswereregularlyassigned.

8. Locsin v. Nissan Lease Philippines October 20, 2010 (Intracorporatedispute)

: Locsin was elected Executive Vice President and Treasurer (EVP/Treasurer) of NCLPI. Locsin held this position for 13 years, having been reelected every year since 1992, until January 21, 2005,whenhewasnominatedandelectedChairmanofNCLPIsBoardofDirectorsOn August 5, 2005, a little over seven (7) months after his election as Chairman of the Board, the NCLPI Board held a special meeting at the Manila Polo Club. One of the items of the agenda was the election of a new set of officers. Unfortunately, Locsin was neither reelected Chairman nor reinstatedtohispreviouspositionasEVP/Treasurer.Aggrieved, on June 19, 2007, Locsin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages and attorneys fees before the Labor Arbiter againstNCLPIandBanson,whowasthenPresidentofNCLPI.On July 11, 2007, instead of filing their position paper, NCLPI and Banson filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter did not have jurisdiction over the case since the issue of Locsins removal as EVP/Treasurer involves an intracorporate dispute. Locsin argues otherwise, maintaininghispositionthatheisanemployeeofNCLPI.LaborArbiteragreedwithLocsin

Whether or Not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case

NOLocsin was undeniably Chairman and President, and was elected to these positions by the Nissan board pursuant to its Bylaws. As such, he was a corporate officer, not an employee. The CA reached this conclusion by relying on the submitted facts and on Presidential Decree 902A, which defines corporate officers as those officers of a corporation who are given that character either by the Corporation Code or by the corporations bylaws. Likewise, Section 25 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 69, or the Corporation Code of the Philippines (Corporation Code) provides that corporate officers are the president, secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be provided forinthebylaws.Given Locsins status as a corporate officer, the RTC, not the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC, has jurisdiction to hear the legality of the termination of his relationshipwithNissan.

NCLPI elevated the case to the CA, arguing that the Labor Arbiter commited grave abuse of discretion. The CA Decision Locsin was a corporate officer;the issue of his removal as EVP/Treasurer is an intracorporate dispute under the RTCs jurisdiction. crutinizing the records, We hold that petitioners successfully discharged their onus of establishing that private respondent was a corporate officer who held the position of Executive VicePresident/Treasurer as provided in the bylaws of petitioner corporation and that he held such position by virtue of election by the Board of Directors.That private respondent is a corporate officer cannot be disputed. The position of Executive VicePresident/Treasurer is specifically included in the roster of officers provided for by the (Amended) ByLaws of petitioner corporation, his duties and responsibilities, as well as compensationassuchofficerarelikewisesetforththereinLocsins Argument: Locsin submits that he is a regular employee of NCLPI since as he argued beforetheLaborArbiterandtheCAhisrelationshipwiththecompanymeetsthefourfoldtest.First, Locsin contends that NCLPI had the power to engage his services as EVP/Treasurer. Second, he received regular wages from NCLPI, from which his SSS and Philhealth contributions, as well as his withholding taxes were deducted. Third, NCLPI had the power to terminate his employment.[22] Lastly, Nissan had control over the manner of the performance of his functions as EVP/Treasurer, as shown by the 13 years of faithful execution of his job, which he carried out in accordance with the standards and expectations set by NCLPI.[23] Further, Locsin maintains that even after his election as Chairman, he essentially performed the functions of EVP/Treasurer handling the financialandadministrativeoperationsoftheCorporationthusmakinghimaregularemployeeNissansArgument:NissanmaintainsthatLocsinisacorporateofficerandnotanemployee.

Under these circumstances, we have to give precedence to the merits of the case, and primacy to the element of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the power to hear and rule on a case and is the threshold element that must exist before any quasijudicial officer can act. In the context of the present case, the Labor Arbiter does not have jurisdiction over the termination dispute Locsin brought, and should not be allowed to continue to act on the case after the absence of jurisdiction has become obvious, based on the records and the law. In more practical terms, a contrary ruling will only cause substantial delay and inconvenience as well as unnecessary expenses, to the point of injustice, to the parties. This conclusion, of course, does not go into the merits of termination of relationship and is without prejudice to the filing of an intracorporatedisputeonthispointbeforetheappropriateRTC.

9. Reyes v. RTCMakati Branch 42, August 11, 2008

Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo C. Reyes (Rodrigo) are 2 of the 4 children of the Sps. Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro, Anastacia, Oscar and Rodrigo each owned shares of stock of Zenith Insurance Corporation (Zenith). Pedro died in 1964, while Anastacia died in 1993. Pedros estate was judicially partitioned among his heirs but Anastacias estate had no similar settlement and partition,Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Oscar, a derivative suit to obtain accounting of funds and assets of Zenith, and (2) to determine the shares of stock of deceased Pedro and Anastacia that were arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated [byOscar,andwereunaccountedfor].Oscar denied the charge that he illegally acquired the shares of Anastacia Reyes, and he asserted, as a defense, that he purchased the subject shares with his own funds from the unissued stocks of Zenith, and that the suit is not a bona fide derivative suit because the requisites therefor have not been complied with. He thus questioned the SECs jurisdiction to entertain the complaint because it pertainstothesettlementoftheestateofAnastaciaReyes.In his counterclaim, Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit and claimed that the complaint is a mere nuisance or harassment suit and should, according to the Interim Rules of Procedure for IntraCorporate Controversies, be dismissed and that it is not abona fide derivative suit as it partakes of the nature of a petition for the settlement of estate of the deceasedAnastaciathatisoutsidethejurisdictionofaspecialcommercialcourt.

Whether or not there is an intracorporate relationship between the parties that would characterize the case as an intracorporate dispute

No. A review of relevant jurisprudence shows a development in the Courts approach in classifying what constitutes an intracorporate controversy. Initially, the main consideration in determining whether a dispute constitutes an intracorporate controversy was limited to a consideration of the intracorporate relationship existing between or among the parties. The types of relationships embraced under Section 5(b), as declared in the case of UnionGlass&ContainerCorp.v.SEC,wereasfollows:

a) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the public;b) between the corporation, partnership, or association and its stockholders,partners,members,orofficers;c) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the State as far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned;andd)amongthestockholders,partners,orassociatesthemselves.

The existence of any of the above intracorporate relations was sufficient to confer jurisdiction to the SEC, regardless of the subject matter of the dispute. Thiscametobeknownastherelationshiptest.However, in the 1984 case of DMRC Enterprises v. Esta del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc.,the Court introduced the nature of the controversy test. We declared in this case that it is not the mere existence of an intracorporate

The RTC denied the motion in part and declared the derivative suit consisting of the first cause of action will be taken cognizance of by the RTC The appellate court affirmed the RTC Order and denied the petition in its Decision dated May 26, 2004 and likewise denied Oscars motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal through a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the RulesofCourt.

relationship that gives rise to an intracorporate controversy;to rely on the relationship test alone will divest the regular courts of their jurisdiction for the sole reason that the dispute involves a corporation, its directors, officers, or stockholders. We saw that there is no legal sense in disregarding or minimizing the value of the nature of the transactions which gives rise to the dispute.Under the nature of the controversy test, the incidents of that relationship must also be considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether the controversy itself is intracorporate. The controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intracorporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the parties correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intracorporate regulatory rules of the corporation. If the relationship and its incidents are merely incidental to the controversy or if there will still be conflict even if the relationship does not exist,thennointracorporatecontroversyexists.x x x This twotier test was adopted in the recent case of Speed Distribution, Inc.v.CourtofAppeals:

To determine whether a case involves an intracorporate controversy, and is to be heard and decided by the branches of the RTC specifically designated by the Court to try and decide such cases, two elements must concur: (a) the status or relationship of the parties;and (2) the nature of the question that is thesubjectoftheircontroversy.

In sum, we find that insofar as the subject shares of stock (i.e., Anastacias shares) are concerned Rodrigo cannot be considered a stockholder of Zenith. Consequently, we cannot declare that an intracorporate relationship exists that would serve as basis to bring this case within the special commercial courts jurisdiction under Section 5(b) of PD 902A, as amended. Rodrigoscomplaint,therefore,failstherelationshiptest.In sum, we hold that the nature of the present controversy is not one which may be classified as an intracorporate dispute and is beyond the jurisdiction of the specialcommercial court to resolve. In short, Rodrigos complaint also failsthenatureofthecontroversytest.

10. Okol v. Slimmers World December 11, 2009

Respondent Slimmers World International operating under the name Behavior Modifications, Inc. (Slimmers World) employed petitioner Leslie Okol (Okol) as a management trainee on 15 June 1992. She rose up the ranks to become Head Office Manager and then Director and Vice President until her dismissal on 22 September 1999. Prior to Okol's dismissal, Slimmers World preventively suspended Okol which arose from the seizure by the Bureau of Customs of seven Precor elliptical

Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case filed bypetitioner.

NO. The determination of the rights of a director and corporate officer dismissed from his employment as well as the corresponding liability of a corporation, if any, is an intracorporate dispute subject to the jurisdiction of theregularcourts.

machines and seven Precor treadmills belonging to or consigned to Slimmers World. The shipment of the equipment was placed under the names of Okol and two customs brokers for a value less thanUS$500.Forbeingundervalued,theequipmentwereseized.Okol received a memorandum that her suspension had been extended pending the outcome of the investigation on the Precor equipment importation. On 19 September 1999, Okol filed her written explanation. However, Slimmers World found Okols explanation to be unsatisfactory and terminated Okols employment. Okol filed a complaint with the Arbitration branch of the NLRC against Slimmers World for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss asserting that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. The labor arbiter granted the motion to dismiss. The labor arbiter ruled that Okol was the vicepresident of Slimmers World at the time of her dismissal. Since it involved a corporate officer, the dispute was an intracorporate controversy falling outside the jurisdiction of the Arbitration branch. Upon appeal, NLRC reversed and set aside labor arbiter's order. The CA however affirmed the labor arbiter's Order. CA ruled that the case, being an intracorporate dispute, falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts pursuant toRepublicActNo.8799.

Section 25 of the Corporation Code enumerates corporate officers as the president, secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be provided for in the bylaws. An office is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an employee usually occupies no office and generally is employed not by action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid to such employee. In the motion, respondents attached the General Information Sheet (GIS) dated 14 April 1998, Minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors dated 14 April 1997 and Secretarys Certificate, and the Amended ByLaws dated 1 August 1994 of Slimmers World as submitted to the SEC to show that petitioner was a corporate officer whose rights do not fall within the NLRCs jurisdiction. The GIS and minutes of the meeting of the board of directors indicated that petitioner was a member of the board of directors, holding one subscribed share of the capital stock, and an elected corporate officer.Clearly, from the documents submitted by respondents, petitioner was a director and officer of Slimmers World. The charges of illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, unpaid commissions, reinstatement and back wages imputed by petitioner against respondents fall squarely within the ambit of intracorporate disputes. A corporate officer's dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intracorporate controversy which arises between a stockholder and a corporation. The question of remuneration involving a stockholder and officer, not a mere employee, is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management and is a corporatecontroversyincontemplationoftheCorporationCode.

11. Rural Bank of Coron v. Cortes, December 6, 2006

Virgilio Garcia, "founder" of petitioner corporations, hired Annalisa Cortes (respondent) as clerk of the Rural Bank of Coron (Manila Office). Respondent later became the Financial Assistant, Personnel Officer and Corporate Secretary of The Rural Bank of Coron, Personnel Officer of CDI, and also Personnel Officer and Disbursing Officer of The Empire Cold Storage Development Corporation(ECSDC).Shesimultaneouslyreceivedsalariesfromthesecorporations.On examination of the financial books of the corporations by petitioner Sandra Garcia Escat, a daughter of Virgilio Garcia who was previously residing in Spain, she found out that respondent was involved in several anomalies, drawing petitioners to terminate respondents services. Respondent thus demanded the payment of unpaid salary, separation pay equivalent to 12 months salary, 13th month pay and other benefits. As the demand remained unheeded, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of salaries and other benefits, with the NLRC. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, contending that the case was an intracorporate controversy involving the removal of a corporate officer, respondent being the Corporate Secretary of the Rural Bank of Coron, Inc., hence, cognizable by the SEC. The Labor Arbiterhoweverruledinfavorofrespondent.CAaffirmedLA'sorderhencethispetition.

Whether or not the NLRC had jurisdiction overthecase.

YES.TheLaborArbiterhasthusjurisdictionoverrespondentscomplaint.While, indeed, respondent was the Corporate Secretary of the Rural Bank of Coron, she was also its Financial Assistant and the Personnel Officer of the twootherpetitionercorporations.Mainland Construction Co., Inc. v. Movilla instructs that a corporation can engage its corporate officers to perform services under a circumstance whichwouldmakethememployees.

12. Halguena v. PAL October2,2009

Patricia Halaguea, et. al, (Halaguea) are flight attendants employed by Philippine Airlines Inc. (PAL) as well as members of Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), a labor organization certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the flightattendants,flightstewardsandpursersofrespondent.

Halaguea assails Sec. 144 of the CBA entered into by PALFASAP and FASAP, which provides for a compulsory retirement age of 55 for female cabin attendants and 60 for male cabin attendants, to be unconstitutional. Due to petitioners claim, Robert D. Anduiza, President of FASAP submitted their 20042005 CBA proposals and manifested their willingness to commence the collective bargaining negotiations between the management and the association, at the soonest possible time.

Petitioners also filed before the RTC of Makati, a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against PAL for the invalidity of the assailed provision of the CBA. The RTC eventually granted such petition.

Aggrieved, PAL, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order andWrit of Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals praying that the order of the RTC, which denied its objection to its jurisdiction, be annulled and set aside for having been issuedwithoutand/orwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackofjurisdiction.

The CA granted PALs petition on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over a labor dispute, hencethecaseatbar.

Issue: Whether or not the regular courts has jurisdiction over the case?

Yes, jurisdiction of the court is determined on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief prayed for irrespective of whether plaintiff is entitled to such relief.From the petitioners' allegations and relief prayed for in its petition, it is clear that the issue raised is whether Section 144, of the PALFASAP CBA is unlawful and unconstitutional. The petitioners' primary relief is the annulment of Section 144.The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, exclusively cognizable by the RTC.The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power to apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts, acourtofgeneraljurisdiction.As the Court previously held, not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasijudicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employeremployee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement. Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or viceversa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Actions between employees and employer where the employeremployee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. Here, the employeremployee relationship between the parties is merely incidental and the cause of action ultimatelyarosefromdifferentsourcesofobligation.Thus, where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the labor arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to labor arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for grantingjurisdictionoversuchclaimstotheseagenciesdisappears.

13. Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management , July 10, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent) for about five (5) years. He signed a new contract of employment with the duration of 9 months on Feb 3 1998 and he was to be deployed 10 days after. This contract was approved by POEA. A week

When does the employeremployeerelationship involving seafarerscommence?

A distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of the employeremployee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employeremployee relationship, as earlier

before the date of departure, the respondent received a phone call from petitioners wife and some unknowncallersaskingnottosendthelatteroffbecauseifallowed,hewilljumpshipinCanada.

Because of the said information, petitioner was told that he would not be leaving for Canada anymore. This prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondent. The LA held the latter responsible. On appeal, the NLRC ruled that there is no employeremployee relationship between petitioner and respondent, hence, the claims should be dismissed. The CA agreed with the NLRCs finding that since petitioner had not departed from the Port of Manila, no employeremployee relationship between the parties arose and any claim for damages against the socalledemployercouldhavenolegtostandon.

discussed, would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any employeremployee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed asagreedupon,hewouldbeliablefordamages.

Respondents act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and boarding "MSV Seaspread" constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to petitioners cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for theactualdamageshesuffered.

14. Atlas Farms Inc. v. NLRC November 18, 2002

Private respondents Jaime O. dela Pea and Marcial I. Abion, both employed under petitioner Atlas Farms Inc. were terminated on separate causes. On March 13, 1993, Pea was allegedly caught urinating and defecating on company premises not intended for the purpose while Abion caused the clogging of the fishpond drainage resulting in damages worth several hundred thousand pesos when he improperly disposed of the cut grass and other waste materials into the ponds drainage system. A formal notice was issued directing them to explain within 24 hours why disciplinary action should not be taken against the for violating company rules and regulations but they refused to receive the formal notice. Both were terminated on March 20, 1993 and October 27, 1992 respectively.Theyalsoacknowledgedreceiptoftheirseparationpays.Both private respondents worked seven days a week, including holidays, without holiday pay, rest day pay, service incentive leave pay and night shift differential pay. When terminated ,Abion was receiving a monthly salary of P4,500 while Pea was receiving P180 pesos daily wage, or an averagemonthlysalaryofP5,402.Pea and Abion filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal that were later consolidated. Both claimed that their termination from service was due to petitioners suspicion that they were the leaders in a plan to form a union to compete and replace the existing managementdominated union.On November 9, 1993, the labor arbiter dismissed their compla3ints on the ground that the grievance machinery in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) had not yet been exhausted. Private respondents availed of the grievance process, but later on refiled the case before the NLRC in Region IV. They alleged lack of sympathy on petitioners part to engage in conciliation proceedings.Their cases were consolidated in the NLRC. At the initial mandatory conference, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging private respondents themselves admitted that they were members of the employees union with which petitioner had an existing CBA. This being the case, according to petitioner, jurisdiction over the case belonged to the

Whether or not the labor arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction to decide complaints forillegaldismissal.*

YES. Article 217 of the Labor Code provides that labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination disputes. A possible exception is provided in Article 261 of the Labor Code, which providesthatThe Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and or malicious refusal to complywiththeeconomicprovisionsofsuchagreement.The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the grievance Machinery or Arbitration providedintheCollectiveBargainingAgreement.But as held in Vivero vs. CA,[14] petitioner cannot arrogate into the powers of Voluntary Arbitrators the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters over unfair labor practices, termination disputes, and claims for damages, in the absence of an express agreement between the parties in order for Article 262 of the Labor Code [Jurisdiction over other labor

grievancemachineryandthereafterthevoluntaryarbitrator,asprovidedintheCBA.In a decision dated January 30, 1996, the labor arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, finding that the case was one of illegal dismissal and did not involve the interpretation or implementation of any CBA provision. He stated that Article 217 (c) of the Labor Code[6] was inapplicable to the case. Further, the labor arbiter found that although both complainants did not substantiate their claims of illegal dismissal, there was proof that private respondents voluntarily acceptedtheirseparationpayandpetitionersfinancialassistance.Thus, private respondents brought the case to the NLRC, which reversed the labor arbiters decision. Dissatisfied with the NLRC ruling, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals by way of a petitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule65,seekingreinstatementofthelaborarbitersdecision.

disputes]toapplyinthecaseatbar.Coming to the merits of the petition, the NLRC found that petitioner did not comply with the requirements of a valid dismissal. For a dismissal to be valid, the employer must show that: (1) the employee was accorded due process, and (2) the dismissal must be for any of the valid causes provided for by law.[22] No evidence was shown that private respondents refused, as alleged, to receive the notices requiring them to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them. Without proof of notice, private respondents who were subsequently dismissed without hearing were also deprived of a chance to air their side at the level of the grievance machinery. Given the fact of dismissal, it can be said that the cases were effectively removed from the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator, thus placing them within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Where the dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation or enforcement stage, it may be referred to the grievance machinery set up in the CBA, or brought to voluntary arbitration. But, where there was already actual termination, with alleged violation of the employees rights,itisalreadycognizablebythelaborarbiter.*There were three issues discussed in the case namely: 1. The validity of the dismissal. 2. The Jurisdictio of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, and finally, 3.) The Party liable for the cost of the suit. Pursuant to the discussion on Art. 217 as set in the syllabus, the issue herein discussed pertains only to the secondone.

15. Perpetual Help Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Faburada, October 8, 2001

Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner with the Arbitration Branch, Department of Labor and Employment, Dumaguete City, for illegal dismissal, premium pay on holidays and rest days, separation pay, wage differential, moral damages, and attorney's fees. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on ground of absence of employeremployee relationship between them and private respondents. Petitioner contended that private respondents were mere volunteer workers, not regular employees. Thus, they cannot sue them. Petitioner also questioned the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the petitioner's motion to dismiss and subsequently ruled in favor of private respondents. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the findings of the labor arbiter that private respondents were illegally dismissed and were entitled to reinstatementandfullbackwages.

Hence,thispetition.

1.) WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS AN EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER RELATIONSHIP

2.) WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE FALL UNDER THE JURISDICTIONOF LABOR ARBITER

1.)In determining the existence of an employeremployee relationship, the following elements are considered: (1) the selection and engagement of the worker or the power to hire;(2) the power to dismiss;(3) the payment of wages by whatever means;and (4) the power to control the worker's conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration. The Supreme Court found that the said elements are present in this case. Petitioner hired private respondents to work for it. They work regularly on regular working hours, were assigned specific duties, were paid regular wages and made to accomplish daily time records. They worked under the supervision of the cooperative manager. Moreover, private respondents were rendering services necessary to the daytoday operations of petitioner, which qualified them as regular employees. Hence, as regular employees, private respondents are entitled to

security of tenure and can be terminated only for a valid cause, with observance of due process. The Court, however, found that private respondents' dismissal was not for a valid cause. They were dismissed because petitioner considered them to be mere voluntary workers, being its members, and as such, work at its pleasure. Moreover, the Court found that petitioner failed to comply with the twin requisites of a validnotice.

2.) With respect to the issue on jurisdiction, the Court held that disputes about payment of wages, overtime pay, restday and termination of employment are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Hence, the decision of the NLRC was affirmed by the Court with modification as to the computation of back wages.

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16. Austria v. NLRC, August16,1999(priest)

The Seventh Day Adventists(SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The petitioner wasapastoroftheSDAfor28yearsfrom1963until1991,whenhisserviceswereterminated.On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several communications form Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking him to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit thesametotheNegrosMission.The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was Pastor Buhat and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very ill to be abletodothecollecting.A factfinding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing:1)Misappropriationofdenominationalfunds;2)Willfulbreachoftrust;3)Seriousmisconduct;

1. Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the separation of churchandstate.2. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed by petitioner against the SDA.

1. No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee, which is purely secular because it has no relationship with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines. The grounds invokedforpetitionersdismissalareallbasedonArt.282ofLaborCode.2. Yes. SDA was exercising its management prerogative (not religious prerogative) to fire an employee which it believes is unfit for the job. It would have been a different case if Austria was expelled or excommunicated from theSDA.

4)Grossandhabitualneglectofduties;and5) Commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative as groundsfortheterminationofhisservices.Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA for reinstatementandbackwagesplusdamages.Decisionwasrenderedinfavorofpetitioner.SDAappealedtotheNLRC.Decisionwasrenderedinfavorofrespondent.

17. Department of Foreign Affairs v. NLRC September18,1996

FACTS: On 27 January 1993, private respondent, Jose Magnayi, filed a case for illegal dismissal by Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the latter's violation of the "laboronly" contracting law. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other through the Department of ForeignAffairs(DFA)ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the saleofsecuritiespursuanttothe"Charter"inrelationtothe"HeadquartersAgreement".Private respondent argues that, by entering into service contracts with different private companies, ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving rise to a waiverofitsimmunityfromsuitLabor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomaticimmunityfromsuitandruledagainstADB.The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, DFA sought a "formal vacationofthevoidjudgment."toNLRCChairman of NLRC alleged that "Except where an appeal is seasonably and properly made, neither the Commission nor the undersigned may review, or even question, the propriety of any decision by a Labor Arbiter. However, on the purely administrative aspect of the decisionmaking process, he may cause that an investigation be made of any misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance, upon complaintproperlymade.Dissatisfied,theDFAlodgedtheinstantpetitionforcertiorari

: Whether or Not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case.

Whether or Not ADB and its officers are entitled to immunity.

Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction in this case since ADB and it's officers are entitledtoimmunity.Article50(1)oftheCharterprovides:The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities.UnderArticle55thereofAll Governors, Directors, alternates, officers and employees of the Bank, includingexpertsperformingmissionsfortheBank:(1) shall be immune from legal process with respect of acts performed by themintheirofficialcapacity,exceptwhentheBankwaivestheimmunity.LikeprovisionsarefoundintheHeadquartersAgreement.The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed bythePhilippinegovernmentwhichmustberespected.InWorldHealthOrganizationvs.Aquino,wehavedeclared:It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government x x x it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the

government, x x x or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction x x x as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that `in such cases the judicial department of government follows the action of the political branch andwillnotembarrassthelatterbyassuminganantagonisticjurisdiction.'"The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization;besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to dischargeitsresponsibilitiesimpartiallyonbehalfofitsmemberstates."InthecaseofHolySeevs.Hon.Rosario,Jr.,theCourthasheld:There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperiiofastate,butnotwithregardtoprivateactoractsjuregestionis.Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertakenforgainorprofit.The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiverofimmunitywouldnotattach.

18. PNB v. Cabansag , June 21, 2005 (differentiate it with Manila Hotel v. NLRC, October13,2000

Florence Cabansag went to Singapore as a tourist. While she was there, she looked for a job and eventually applied with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank. PNB is a private banking corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. She was eventually employed and was issued an employment pass. In her job offer, it was stated, among others, that she was to be put on probation for 3 months and termination of her employment may be made by either party after 1 day notice while on probation, and 1 month notice or 1 month pay in lieu of notice upon confirmation. She accepted the terms and was issued an OEC by the POEA. She was commended

W/N the arbitration branch of the NLRC hasjurisdictionW/N the arbitration of the NLRC in the NCR isthepropervenueW/N Cabansag was

Labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employeremployee relations including termination disputes involving all workers, including OFWs. Here, Cabansag applied for and secured an OEC from the POEA through the Philippine Embassy. The OEC authorized her working status in a foreign country and entitled her to all benefits and

for her good work. However, she was informed by Ruben Tobias, the bank president, that she would have to resign in line with some cost cutting and realignment measures of the company. She refusedbutwasinformedbyTobiasthatifshedoesnotresign,hewillterminateherinstead.

illegallydismissed processes under our statutes. Although she may been a direct hire at the commencement of her employment, she became an OFWwho was covered by Philippine labor laws and policies upon certification by the POEA. When she was illegally terminated, she already possessed the POEA employment certificate.A migrant worker refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident;to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker. Here, Cabansag was a Filipino, not a legal resident of Singapore, and employed by petitioner in its branch office in Singapore. She is clearly an OFW/migrant worker. Thus, she has the option where to file her Complaint for illegal dismissal. She can either file at the Regional Arbitration Branch where she resides or the RAB where the employer is situated. Thus, in filing her Complaint before the RAB office in Quezon City, she has made a validchoiceofpropervenue.The appellate court was correct in holding that respondent was already a regular employee at the time of her dismissal, because her threemonth probationary period of employment had already ended. This ruling is in accordance with Article 281 of the Labor Code: An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. Indeed, petitioner recognized respondent as such at the time it dismissed her, by giving her one months salary in lieu of a onemonth notice, consistentwithprovisionNo.6ofheremploymentContract.

18. JULIUS KAWACHI and GAYLE KAWACHI, Petitioners,vs.DOMINIE DEL QUERO and HON. JUDGE MANUEL R. TARO,

Virgilio Kawachi hired private respondent as a clerk of the pawnshop and that on certain occasions, sheworkedbeyondtheregularworkinghoursbutwasnotpaidthecorrespondingovertimepay.Private respondent Dominie Del Quero charged A/J Raymundo Pawnshop, Inc., Virgilio Kawachi and petitioner Julius Kawachi with illegal dismissal, nonexecution of a contract of employment, violation of the minimum wage law, and nonpayment of overtime pay. The complaint was filed beforetheNational Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). He also filed an action for damages against petitioners Julius Kawachi and Gayle Kawachi before the MeTC of Quezon City, specifically sought the recovery of moral damages, exemplary damages andattorneysfees.

W/N the court has Jurisdiction over the action for damages sought under the civil code

NLRChasJurisdiction.Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employeremployee relationsin other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damagesgovernedbytheCivilCode.

Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 43, Quezon City,Respondents.TINGA,J.:

Petitioners argue that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the action for damages because the alleged injuryisworkrelated.

In the instant case, the NLRC has jurisdiction over private respondents complaint for illegal dismissal and damages arising therefrom. She cannot be allowed to file a separate or independent civil action for damages where the alleged injury has a reasonable connection to her termination from employment. Consequently, the action for damages filed before the MeTC mustbedismissed.

19. Banez v. Valdevilla, May 9, 2000 (claims of The above provisions are a result of the amendment by Section 9 of Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6715, which took effect on March 21, 1989, and which put to rest the earlier confusion as to who between Labor Arbiters and regular courts had jurisdiction over claims for damages as between employers and employees.

It will be recalled that years prior to R.A. 6715, jurisdiction over all money claims of workers, including claims for damages, was originally lodged with the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC by Article 217 of the Labor Code. On May 1, 1979, however, Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1367 amended said Article 217 to the effect

Petitioner was the sales operations manager of private respondent in its branch in Iligan City. In 1993, private respondent "indefinitely suspended" petitioner and the latter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") in Iligan City. In a decision dated July 7, 1994, Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed and ordered the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, and of backwages and attorney's fees. The decision was appealed to the NLRC, which dismissed the same for having been filed out of time. Elevated by petition for certiorari before this Court, the case was dismissed on technical grounds;however, the Court also pointed out that even if all the procedural requirements for the filing of the petition were met, it would still be dismissed for failure to show