bae systems environmental unexploded ordnance investigation

BAE SYSTEMS Environmental

The Moray Council

Unexploded Ordnance Investigation

RAF Balnageith

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FOI Request - RAF Balnageith, Forres - 101002117655

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BAE Systems Environmental, Westcott Venture Park, Westcott, Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire. HP18 0NP. United Kingdom.Telephone: +44 (0) 1296 652124 Fax: +44 (0) 1296 652121 http://www.baesystems.com/propertyandenvironmental/

Registered in England & Wales No 2863702. Registered Office BAE SYSTEMS Properties Limited Warwick House PO Box 87 Farnborough Aerospace Centre Farnborough Hampshire GU14 6YU

This document is of UK origin and is © BAE Systems Properties Limited. It contains proprietary information which is disclosed for the purposes of assessment and evaluation only. The contents of this document shall not in whole nor in part: (i) be used for any other purpose, (ii) be disclosed to any member of the recipient’s organisation not having a need to know such information nor to any third party individual, organisation or government, (iii) be stored in any retrieval system nor be reproduced or transmitted in any form by photocopying or any optical, electronic, mechanical or other means, without the prior written permission of the Director, BAE Systems Properties Limited, Westcott Venture Park, Westcott, Aylesbury, United Kingdom, Buckinghamshire, HP18 0NP.

FS38745 EMS 54524

AUTHORISED BYCHECKED BYORIGINATOR

BSc (Hons) PGDip FGSMRSCPaul HarrisBSc (Hons) PGDip FGS

Principal ConsultantExplosives & Munitions Remedation Manager

Principal Consultant

Issue Date: April 2008Report Ref: A0823/00-R2-1Project No: A0823/00

DOCUMENT CONTROL

The Moray Council

Unexploded Ordnance Investigation

RAF Balnageith

RAF Balnageith, Forres The Moray Council BAE Systems Environmental

A0823-00-R2-1 i April 2008

NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY

Introduction

BAE Systems Environmental was commissioned by The Moray Council to conduct an investigation for the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) at a site near Forres in Moray, Scotland (NJ 017 570).

The Site encompasses the former bomb stores of RAF Balnageith (also known as RAF Forres), operational between 1940 and 1944. Currently, part of the Site is occupied by houses and the remainder is an equestrian course and agricultural land.

In 2007, the Council commissioned BACTEC to undertake a desk-based assessment of the risk posed by UXO to site occupiers and other persons carrying out intrusive work at the Site.

BACTEC identified that the facility was used to store munitions such as bombs, pyrotechnic devices and aircraft ammunition. The assessment concluded that there was the potential for UXO to be encountered during intrusive work at the Site.

BAE Systems Environmental was commissioned to undertake a site investigation to determine whether UXO is likely to exist and assess whether the potential presence of UXO could result in any part of the Site meeting the definition of ‘Contaminated Land’ as defined in Part IIA of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (“Part IIA”).

This report presents the findings of the assessment.

Conceptual Site Model

Former buildings at the Site were used for the storage of explosive and pyrotechnic devices that could have been deliberately or accidentally discarded and be buried in shallow soil.

The types of devices include high explosive and incendiary bombs, pyrotechnic devices (e.g. flares and smoke bombs) and aircraft ammunition. These contained explosives such as RDX, TNT, ammonium nitrate, as well as pyrotechnic and incendiary compositions such as white phosphorus, magnesium and petroleum.

Devices could be found at the Site during various activities including gardening, landscaping, erection of structures such as fences, construction of foundations, and ploughing. Devices could also be initiated if they were in close proximity to bonfires or crop burning.

Site investigation for UXO

Eight areas were selected to be representative of the Site as a whole. A magnetometry survey was undertaken across the surface of each area and any significant anomalies marked. A proportion of anomalies were excavated to determine their depth and origin.

There were a large number of shallow metal objects in the survey areas, including nails, bolts and fragments of wire. None of the objects excavated were UXO related.


A0823-00-R2-1 ii April 2008

Risk assessment

The possibility of harm being caused by UXO depends on the following factors:

• the likelihood of a person encountering an item of UXO (which is a function of the likelihood of UXO existing at the Site and the likely degree of future intrusive activity and burning);

• the likelihood of the item of UXO being initiated;

• the type, quantity and reaction of the explosive (or pyrotechnic or incendiary composition) and the circumstances of the initiation, i.e. the proximity of the person or property to the UXO.

The investigation has demonstrated that there is not widespread UXO contamination at the Site. However, it is not unlikely that one or more items of UXO remain buried. The likelihood of encountering UXO at the Site is considered low because the scale of intrusive activity is relatively insignificant and the shallow soil is already likely to have been disturbed.

Although some explosives can degrade to a more sensitive state, most devices become less sensitive over time. Numerous explosive devices are found by the public each year – in gardens, on beaches, in recreational areas etc… – but reported incidents of a member of the public being harmed by such a device are extremely rare. Generally speaking, the likelihood of initiating an item of UXO found at the Site is considered to be low.

Although there were devices stored at the Site that would not be capable of causing significant harm, the likelihood of an uncovered device causing significant harm if initiated, is considered high. Persons and property are likely to be in close proximity to an initiated device.

Given the likely small number of items of UXO remaining at the Site, the degree of ground intrusive activity and the generally low probability of initiating a device once found, the risk is not considered to be significant and the Site is considered not meet the statutory definition of ‘Contaminated Land’.


A0823-00-R2-1 iii April 2008

CONTENTS

NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. THE SITE 2

3. CONCEPTUAL SITE MODEL 3

4. SITEWORK 5

5. RISK ASSESSMENT 7

FIGURES

Figure 1 Site location plan

Figure 2 Site plan

Figure 3 Air Ministry plan

Figure 4 Geophysical survey areas

APPENDICES

Appendix 1 Anomaly locations

Appendix 2 Photographs


A0823-00-R2-1 1 April 2008

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Instruction

BAE Systems Environmental was commissioned by The Moray Council (“the Council”) to conduct an investigation for the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) at a site near Forres in Moray, Scotland.

1.2. Background & Objectives

The Site encompasses the former bomb stores of RAF Balnageith (also known as RAF Forres), operational between 1940 and 1944. Currently, part of the Site is occupied by houses and the remainder is an equestrian course and agricultural land.

In 2007, the Council commissioned BACTEC International Limited (“BACTEC”) to undertake a desk-based assessment of the risk posed by UXO to site occupiers and other persons carrying out intrusive work at the Site (report ref. 9445TA, December 2007).

BACTEC identified that the facility was used to store munitions such as bombs, pyrotechnic devices and aircraft ammunition. The assessment concluded that there was the potential for UXO to be encountered during intrusive work at the Site.

BAE Systems Environmental was commissioned to undertake a site investigation to determine whether UXO is likely to exist and assess whether the potential presence of UXO could result in any part of the Site meeting the definition of ‘Contaminated Land’ as defined in Part IIA of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (“Part IIA”).

This report presents the findings of the assessment.

1.3. Reporting Conditions

This report has been specifically prepared without the benefit of knowing the exact intentions of third parties and therefore should not be used by such organisations without prior consultation with BAE Systems Environmental.

The report refers to the conditions present at the Site at the time of the investigation and no liability can be accepted by BAE Systems Environmental for any future changes of Site conditions. It should be noted that BAE Systems Environmental has relied on the accuracy of the information contained in any documents consulted and is in no circumstances responsible for the accuracy of such information or data supplied.


A0823-00-R2-1 2 April 2008

2. THE SITE

2.1. Location

The Site is located approximately 2.2 km south-west of Forres in Moray, Scotland, centred on NJ 017 570 (see Figure 1 & 2).

The area of the Site is 11.5 ha.

2.2. History

The history of the Site and RAF Balnageith is detailed in Section 7 of BACTEC’s report and summarised below.

RAF Balnageith (also known as RAF Forres) was operational as a bomber station between 1940 and 1944.

The Site comprises the RAF station bomb store, located to the south of the grass airstrip. According to the Air Ministry plan (Figure 3) and an aerial photograph dated 1946 (BACTEC Annex E), the bomb store comprised 13 No. small buildings used to store explosive devices such as bombs, aircraft ammunition and pyrotechnics. A number of the buildings were protected by man-made or natural earth mounds (‘traverses’).

RAF Balnageith is not reported to have been used by the military after WWII. A concrete runway was constructed on part of the former RAF station for civilian use.

BACTEC did not locate any specific evidence that RAF Balnageith was bombed by the Luftwaffe.

Following the war it is understood that the Site was used for agricultural purposes prior to construction of the dwellings.

2.3. Description

The Site is a roughly rectangular piece of land divided along its long axis by a single-track road. There are 6 No. residential properties to the south of the road. Land to the north of the road is used as an equestrian course and is partly overgrown with bushes and small trees.

With the exception of the former ammunition storage building in the north of the Site, there is little surviving evidence of wartime use.

The periphery of the Site and surrounding area is arable land.

The Site is largely flat (at around 18 to 20 m above Ordnance Datum) but there is a 4 m high embankment rising along the south-east boundary to the rear of the gardens.


A0823-00-R2-1 3 April 2008

3. CONCEPTUAL SITE MODEL

3.1. Introduction

The conceptual site model (CSM) in the following paragraphs has been developed with due regard to the Statutory Guidance on Part IIA published by the Scottish Executive in 2006, ref. SE/2006/44 (“the Statutory Guidance”), which defines the criteria for identifying relevant sources, pathways and receptors for assessment of contaminated land under Part IIA.

3.2. Sources

The WWII use of the Site involved the storage of explosive and pyrotechnic devices. Such devices could have been deliberately or accidentally discarded and be buried in shallow soil.

The types of devices stored at the Site are likely to have included:

• High explosive bombs ranging from 20 to 5,500 kg and containing high explosives such as RDX, TNT and amatol (ammonium nitrate and TNT).

• Incendiary bombs ranging from 2 to 120 kg and typically containing white phosphorous and/or petroleum-based substances.

• Pyrotechnic devices such as marine markers, flares, smoke bombs, practice bombs and photoflash bombs. These contain compositions such as metal phosphides (flame generators), white phosphorus (smoke), titanium tetrachloride (smoke), magnesium (light) and aluminium (for sea marking).

• Aircraft ammunition up to 30 mm calibre and containing high explosive and/or incendiary filling, and cartridge cases containing propellant (typically a mixture of nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine).

• Small arms ammunition comprising solid projectiles and propellant filled cartridge cases.

These devices also contain components such as fuzes, primers, detonators and exploder pellets that contain substances such as gunpowder, tetryl and small quantities of sensitive ‘primary’ explosives such as lead azide, lead styphnate and mercury fulminate.

It is possible that the buildings were used to store other types of ordnance such as grenades, mortars, rockets, demolition explosives and anti-aircraft shells. It is understood that 2 No. grenades were found in the garden of Caleta House (the most north-easterly property) in the 1970s.

3.3. Pathways

Pathways by which harm could be caused are as follows:

• Detonation. The propagation of a shock wave through a high explosive causing rapid gas evolution and intense pressure on the surroundings.


A0823-00-R2-1 4 April 2008

• Deflagration. High velocity burning, often indistinguishable from detonation; for example the reaction of propellant.

• Burning. For example the reaction of incendiary and pyrotechnic compositions.

(The substances in a device are designed to undergo one of the above reactions but, dependent on the conditions, they may not react as designed; for example, high explosives are normally designed to detonate, but can also deflagrate.)

These reactions do not occur spontaneously but are caused by various stimuli. In the context of the Site, the most likely stimuli are mechanical (e.g. impact and friction caused by hand digging and mechanical excavation) and heat (e.g. domestic bonfires and crop burning).

The stimulus could either cause the device to function (i.e. by initiating the fuze) or directly initiate the substance within the device; the latter scenario is most likely to occur where an explosive has degraded to a more sensitive state.

The exception is white phosphorus (‘WP’ – widely used as a smoke generator) which spontaneously ignites on contact with air.

3.4. Receptors

The receptors at the Site are:

• Humans. Residents, equestrianists, farm workers and construction workers.

• Property. Buildings and other structures, horses and domestic animals, crops and home-grown produce.

3.5. Potential Pollutant Linkages

Based on the identified potential sources, pathways and receptors, it is considered that the following potential pollutant linkages form the CSM:

Source Pathway Receptor Accidental and/or deliberate discarding of explosive devices in shallow soil

Initiation and subsequent detonation, deflagration and/or burning

Accidental and/or deliberate discarding of pyrotechnic and incendiary devices in shallow soil

Initiation (including spontaneous combustion of WP) and subsequent burning

Humans and property

Table 1 – Conceptual site model

Most explosives, pyrotechnic and incendiary compositions are toxic to humans at relatively low concentrations. However, at the Site these substances were contained in devices and there is no evidence of storage, use or disposal that could have resulted in significant soil contamination. Harmful acute or chronic exposure to humans is not considered to be a plausible pollutant linkage.


A0823-00-R2-1 5 April 2008

4. SITEWORK

4.1. Rationale

The objective of the investigation was to determine whether UXO is likely to exist and assess whether the potential presence of UXO could result in any part of the Site meeting the Part IIA definition of ‘Contaminated Land’, in other words to determine whether the identified potential pollutant linkages are significant.

An exploratory geophysical survey was considered to be an appropriate investigation strategy, i.e. conducting a survey of shallow soil in selected areas and then excavating a proportion of anomalies including those most likely to represent UXO.

The areas were chosen to give a representative spread across the Site, covering the variety of land uses. They were also positioned to be within various distances of former explosives buildings to reflect the potential for devices to have been discarded immediately adjacent to buildings as well as in open areas.

Magnetometry from the surface was selected as the most appropriate technique for the investigation.

Hand-held magnetometers are generally capable of detecting large items of ordnance such as high explosive bombs to 3 m depth. Smaller items such as aircraft cannon projectiles can be detected shallower than 0.5 to 1 m.

Therefore, the method is capable of detecting the majority of the types of devices stored at the Site, and up to the depth of soil likely to be disturbed by intrusive activity in the future (likely to be shallower than 3 m).

The extent of the survey was considered adequate to determine the likely distribution and nature of UXO contamination.

4.2. Scope of Work

The investigation took place between 26 and 28 March 2008 and comprised:

• magnetometer survey of 8 No. areas (‘A’ to ‘H’, see Figure 4);

• excavation of anomalies to determine their depth and origin; and,

• determining locations of anomalies and survey areas relative to National Grid.

The survey areas were as follows:


A0823-00-R2-1 6 April 2008

Ref Area (m2) Location Former buildings No. of

anomalies No.

excavated

A 487 Garden of Whitely House Adjacent to incendiary bomb and pyrotechnics store 29 19

B 420 Garden of Sonnagreen Near heavy bomb store 21 5

C 1,000 Garden of Cherrylea, Connamara and agricultural Includes heavy bomb store 51 17

D 731 Garden of Cherrylea None 56 10

E 720 Embankment in garden of Cherrylea, Caberfeidh and Caleta House

Includes heavy bomb store 57 29

F 1,902 Equestrian course on north side of road

Near pyrotechnic store and fuzed bomb store 34 18

G 864 Grass area on north side of road

Includes part of small bomb fuzing point 35 16

H 1,910 Equestrian course on north side of road

Includes aircraft and small arms ammunition store 19 13

Table 2 – Survey areas

Each area was systematically surveyed using magnetometers (Foerster 4.032 and Shonstedt). Any significant anomalies were marked; those considered most likely to potentially represent UXO were excavated using hand tools. (The depth and size of an object can be inferred to some extent by the magnitude of the reading and the change in reading as the detector passes across the anomaly.) The item was then identified and the depth recorded.

Of the 302 No. anomalies detected, a total of 127 No. (42%) were excavated.

The hole was backfilled with arisings and reinstated as far as practicable.

The location of each anomaly was determined relative to National Grid.

4.3. Findings

The plans and table in Appendix 1 give the location, depth and identity of each anomaly.

A selection of photographs taken during the survey is provided in Appendix 2.

There were a large number of metal objects in each survey area. On the embankment behind the houses there was a high degree of interference from fragments of chicken wire and other fence wire.

The objects recovered were typically at a depth of between 0.05 and 0.2 m, with an average of 0.14 m and maximum of 0.6 m.

The objects recovered were an assortment of metal items including; nails, fragments of wire, bolts, horseshoes, fragments of corrugated iron, and metal brackets. Buried bricks, concrete and clinker also produced anomalies.

None of the items excavated were UXO related.


A0823-00-R2-1 7 April 2008

5. RISK ASSESSMENT

5.1. Introduction and Context

The context of this risk assessment is the test of whether any part of the Site meets the definition of ‘Contaminated Land’ as defined in Part IIA. The background is explained further in the following paragraphs including references to relevant passages in the Statutory Guidance.

In terms of human health and property effects, the Part IIA definition of ‘Contaminated Land’ is:

“any land which appears to the Local Authority in whose area it is situated to be in such a condition, by reason of substances in, on or under the land that significant harm is being caused or there is significant possibility of such harm being caused” (para. 2.1).

In order for there to be such harm there must be a ‘significant pollutant linkage’ involving a contaminant source, receptor and pathway by means of which such harm may be caused (para. 2.6).

The investigation did not determine the presence of a UXO source. The potential pollutant linkages have not been confirmed as existing.

In this section, the risk has been assessed on the basis that a source (i.e. an item of UXO) does in fact exist at the Site.

Assessment of the significance of pollutant linkages is based on the principles of risk assessment, i.e. taking into account both the probability of occurrence of a defined hazard and the seriousness of the consequences (para A.10).

The Statutory Guidance provides the following guidance on the assessment of the significance of harm caused by explosion and fire:

• For human health effects, the “assessment should take into account the levels of risk which have been judged unacceptable in other similar contexts” giving “particular weight to cases where the [harm] would be irreversible or incapable of being treated [and/or] would affect a substantial number of people” (Table B & para. A33).

• For property effects, harm is significant if it “is more likely than not to result from the pollutant linkage” (Table B).

Following an assessment, in determining that significant harm is being caused the local authority should be “satisfied on the balance of probabilities that [such] harm is being caused” (para. B.44). For significant possibility of significant harm, the assessment must show that there is such harm and that “there are no suitable and sufficient risk management arrangements in place to prevent such harm” (para. B.45).

5.2. Risk Assessment

Significant harm caused by explosives and fire, as defined in the Statutory Guidance, includes: death and serious injury to humans; death and serious physical damage to


A0823-00-R2-1 8 April 2008

domestic animals and crops; and, structural failure and substantial damage to buildings and other structures.

Clearly, significant harm is not occurring, so it is the possibility of significant harm that must be assessed.

The possibility of significant harm is dependent on the following factors:

• the likelihood of a person encountering an item of UXO, which is a function of:

o the likelihood of UXO existing, and

o the likely degree of future intrusive activity and burning;

• the likelihood of the item of UXO being initiated;

• the type, quantity and reaction of the explosive, pyrotechnic or incendiary composition; and,

• the circumstances of the initiation, i.e. the proximity of the person or property to the UXO at the point of initiation.

With reference to the Site, these factors are discussed in the following sections.

Likelihood of encountering UXO

The investigation has demonstrated that there is not widespread UXO contamination at the Site. However, it is not unlikely that one or more items of UXO remain buried.

In residential gardens, intrusive activity is likely to include planting, landscaping and erection of external structures (e.g. fences, patios, foundations for outbuildings) using hand tools and mechanical excavators. There are likely to be larger scale excavations associated with the foundations of new properties, including the proposed building adjacent to Connamara. Shallow soil will be disturbed during ploughing adjacent fields.

This scale of intrusive activity is relatively insignificant when compared to the total volume of soil within which UXO could exist. Furthermore, the shallow soil across much of the Site is likely to have already been disturbed by agricultural activities after the war, during which UXO of any significant size would have most likely been discovered.

UXO could be initiated by burning. However, the likely extent and frequency of domestic bonfires is likely to be minimal and, again, the shallow soil is likely to have already been disturbed.

It is considered that the likelihood of encountering UXO in excavations or by burning at the Site is low.

Likelihood of initiation

The likely stimuli that could cause initiation of UXO include: striking with hand tools, striking with a mechanical excavator, and introduction of heat (i.e. by a fire at the surface).

Although some explosives can degrade to a more sensitive state, most devices become less sensitive over time. Experience in the UK and elsewhere has shown that there is


A0823-00-R2-1 9 April 2008

only a remote chance of initiating WWII UXO. Numerous explosive devices are found by the public each year – in gardens, on beaches, in recreational areas etc… – but reported incidents of a member of the public being harmed by such a device are extremely rare.

Munitions in storage are configured such that accidental initiation is highly unlikely, using arming and safety mechanisms for example, and/or by storing the fuze and main body separately.

The range in sensitivity of UXO varies considerably. An unfuzed bomb filled with RDX/TNT would be very difficult to initiate whereas a corroded detonator may be relatively highly impact sensitive. However, generally speaking, the likelihood of initiating an item of UXO found at the Site is considered to be low.

Again, pyrotechnic devices containing white phosphorus are an exception. These will spontaneously ignite if broken open exposing white phosphorus to air.

Type, quantity and reaction

A wide variety of explosive, pyrotechnic and incendiary devices were stored at the Site, ranging from bombs containing tonnes of high explosive to small arms ammunition containing a few grams of propellant.

The consequences of initiation vary accordingly. At one end of the scale would be the combustion of propellant in a small arms cartridge case, the initiation of a small flare, or the burning of an incendiary bomb. On the other hand, the harm caused to humans and property from detonating a high explosive bomb would be extremely significant.

White phosphorus has the potential to cause burns but is unlikely to cause serious injury.

Although there were devices stored at the Site that would not be capable of causing significant harm, the likelihood of an uncovered device causing significant harm if initiated, is considered high.

Circumstances of initiation

There may be circumstances where a person finding and initiating a device is protected from its effects by distance or some other condition (e.g. the protection of an excavator or tractor cab). If a device is initiated by hand tools then there would be little protection from the effects.

5.3. Summary and Risk Evaluation

In summary:

a) The investigation findings suggest that there is not widespread UXO contamination. The level of future intrusive activity and burning at the Site is likely to be relatively insignificant. The likelihood of a device being encountered during intrusive activity or burning is considered to be low.

b) With the exception of devices containing white phosphorus, the likelihood of initiating a device is considered to be low.

c) If a device is uncovered and initiated, it is likely to cause significant harm.


A0823-00-R2-1 10 April 2008

As mentioned in Section 5.1, the advice provided by the Statutory Guidance on assessing the significance of risk to human health from explosion and fire is that the assessment should take into account the levels of risk which have been “judged unacceptable in other similar contexts”. For property effects, the harm is significant if it is judged more likely than not to occur.

This non-specific guidance is intended for all causes of explosion and fire, including methane and combustible materials.

If it were possible to quantitatively assess the UXO risk then the result could be compared to numerical thresholds derived for other contaminated land risks; for example, the excess lifetime risk of developing cancer or the boundary between ‘tolerable’ and ‘unacceptable’ risks used by the Health and Safety Executive.

Since it is not possible to quantify the risk, we have qualitatively assessed the relative importance of factors a) to c) listed above to determine whether the pollutant linkages, if existing, are significant.

Our conclusion is that, given the likely small number of items of UXO remaining at the Site, the degree of ground intrusive activity and the generally low probability of initiating a device once found, if a pollutant linkage exists then it would not be significant and the Site, nor any part thereof, would not meet the Part IIA definition of ‘Contaminated Land’.

5.4. Duties under CDM 2007

As part of this commission, BAE Systems Environmental was requested to assess the risk posed by potential UXO to construction workers during development of a new residential property at the Site.

Under the Construction (Design & Management) Regulations 2007, clients, designers and contractors have duties to reduce risks as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).

For example, designers are required so far as is reasonably practicable to avoid foreseeable risks to persons carrying out construction work (s11(2)&(3)), and contractors must plan and manage construction work in a way which ensures that, so far as is reasonably practicable, it is carried out without risks to safety (s13(2)).

Based on the level of risk determined in Section 5.2 and 5.3, we consider that the requirements of CDM 2007 can be met by providing an ordnance awareness briefing to personnel undertaking excavations associated with the development. This would inform personnel of how to identify potential UXO and what to do if a suspicious object is found.

RAF Balnageith The Moray Council BAE Systems Environmental

A0823-00-R2-1 April 2008

Figures

BAE Systems EnvironmentalWestcott Venture Park, Westcott, Aylesbury, HP18 0NP

Tel. 01296 652124 Fax. 01296 652121

Figure Title:

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Figure 1 - Site location plan

RAF Balnageith

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Figure 3 - Air Ministry plan

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0 50 10025 Meters

Site boundary

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RAF explosives store

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Figure 4 - Geophysics areas

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Geophysics areas


A0823-00-R2-1 April 2008

Appendix 1

Anomaly locations

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A19

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A17

A16

A14

A13A12A11

A10

A09A08

A07

A06

A05A04A03

A02A01


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Appendix 1 - Area A

RAF Balnageith

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0 10 205 Meters

Site boundary

! Anomaly excavated

! Anomaly not excavated

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Appendix 1 - Area B

RAF Balnageith

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0 6 123 Meters

Site boundary

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C42

C41

C40

C39

C38

C37

C36

C35

C34 C33

C32

C31

C30 C29 C28 C27

C26

C25

C24

C23C22

C21

C20C19

C18C16

C15C14C13

C12C11

C10C09

C08

C06

C03

C02

C01


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Appendix 1 - Area C

RAF Balnageith

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0 6 123 Meters

Site boundary

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D55D54

D53

D52D51

D50

D49

D48D47D46

D45

D44

D43D42

D41

D40D37

D36

D35D34

D33

D32D31

D30

D29D28

D27D26

D25

D24

D23

D22

D21 D20

D19

D18D17D16

D15

D14

D13D12

D11

D10D09 D08

D07 D06D05

D04

D03

D02

D01

C20C19

C18C16

C15C14C13

C12

C11

C10

C08

C06

C03

C01

D20A


Tel. 01296 652124 Fax. 01296 652121

Figure Title:

Project:


Appendix 1 - Area D

RAF Balnageith

A0823/00 A0823/00-R2-1 see bar

0 6 123 Meters

Site boundary

! Anomaly excavated


RAF explosive store

O

!

!!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

! !

!!

!

!

!

!

!

!!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

F

F32

F31

F30F29

F28

F27

F26

F25

F24

F23

F22F22

F21

F20

F19

F18

F17

F16F15

F14F13

F12

F11

F10

F09

F08F07

F06

F05

F04

F03F02

F01

F07A


Tel. 01296 652124 Fax. 01296 652121

Figure Title:

Project:


Appendix 1 - Area F

RAF Balnageith

A0823/00 A0823/00-R2-1 see bar

0 10 205 Meters

Site boundary

! Anomaly excavated


RAF explosive store

O

!

!

!!!

!

!!

!!!

!

!! !

!

!!

!

!

!

!!!

!!

!!

!!

!

!!

!

!

!!

!!!

!

!

! !

!! !

!!

!

!!

!

!

!

!

!

EE60

E58

E57

E56

E55

E54E52

E50

E49

E48E47E46

E45E44E43

E42E41

E40

E39E38

E37E36E35

E34

E33E32E31

E30 E29

E28

E27

E26

E25

E24E23

E22

E21E20

E19

E18E17

E16

E15E14E13E12

E11E10E09

E08E07

E06

E05E04E03

E02

E01


Tel. 01296 652124 Fax. 01296 652121

Figure Title:

Project:


Appendix 1 - Area E

RAF Balnageith

A0823/00 A0823/00-R2-1 see bar

0 6 123 Meters

Site boundary

! Anomaly excavated


RAF explosive store

O

!

!!

!

!!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!!

!

!

!

!!

!

!!

!!

!

!

!!

!

!

!!!

G

G36G35

G34G33

G32

G31 G30

G29

G28G27 G26

G25G24

G23G22

G21

G20

G19

G18G17

G16

G15

G14

G13

G12G11

G10

G09

G08

G06

G05G04

G03

G01


Tel. 01296 652124 Fax. 01296 652121

Figure Title:

Project:


Appendix 1 - Area G

RAF Balnageith

A0823/00 A0823/00-R2-1 see bar

0 10 205 Meters

Site boundary

! Anomaly excavated


RAF explosive store

O

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

H

G

H20H19

H18

H17

H16

H15

H14

H12

H11

H09

H08

H07

H06

H05

H05

H04

H03

H02

H01


Tel. 01296 652124 Fax. 01296 652121

Figure Title:

Project:


Appendix 1 - Area H

RAF Balnageith

A0823/00 A0823/00-R2-1 see bar

0 10 205 Meters

Site boundary

! Anomaly excavated


RAF explosive store

O

RAF BalnageithThe Moray Council

Ref Excavated Depth (m) Origin Ref Excavated Depth (m) OriginA01 Yes 0.1 Scaffolding clamp C12 NoA02 Yes 0.1 Scaffolding clamp C13 NoA03 Yes 0.15 Clinker C14 NoA04 Yes 0.1 Bolt C15 NoA05 Yes 0.05 Bolt C16 Yes 0.1 Wire fenceA06 No C18 NoA07 No C19 NoA08 No C20 Yes 0.1 Scrap of ironA09 No C21 Yes 0.1 Scrap of ironA10 No C22 Yes 0.15 Horse shoeA11 No C23 Yes 0.1 BoltA12 No C24 Yes 0.3 Scrap of ironA13 No C25 NoA14 No C26 NoA16 No C27 NoA17 Yes 0.15 Bolt C28 Yes 0.3 Scrap of ironA18 Yes 0.15 Bolt C29 Yes 0.3 Scrap of ironA19 Yes 0.45 Concrete C30 Yes 0.2 Scrap of ironA21 Yes 0.1 Wire C31 NoA22 Yes 0.1 Wire C32 NoA23 Yes 0.1 Nail C33 NoA24 Yes 0.1 Nail C34 NoA25 Yes 0.1 Scrap of steel C35 NoA26 Yes 0.1 Scrap of steel C36 NoA27 Yes 0.1 Nail C37 Yes 0.1 BoltA28 Yes 0.1 Nail C38 Yes 0.1 Horse shoeA29 Yes 0.1 Nail C39 Yes 0.5 Metal fence postA30 Yes 0.2 0.3m rectangular section C40 NoA31 Yes 0.1 Bolt C41 NoB01 Yes 0.1 Nail C42 NoB02 No C43 NoB03 No C44 NoB04 No C45 NoB05 No C46 NoB06 No C47 NoB08 No C48 NoB09 Yes 0.1 Nail C49 NoB11 No C50 Yes 0.1 ScrapB12 No C51 NoB13 No C52 NoB14 No C53 NoB15 No C54 Yes 0.1 ScrapB16 Yes 10.1 Stop cock cover C55 Yes 0.6 Chicken wireB17 Yes 0.1 Bracket D01 Yes 0.2 WireB19 Yes 0.1 Pliers D02 Yes 0.1 WireB20 No D03 Yes 0.2 WireB21 No D04 Yes 0.2 WireB22 No D05 Yes 0.2 WireB23 No D06 NoB27 No D07 NoC01 Yes 0.3 Reinforced concrete D08 NoC02 Yes 0.1 Wire fence D09 NoC03 No D10 NoC06 No D11 NoC08 No D12 NoC09 No D13 NoC10 No D14 NoC11 No D15 No

A0823/00-R2-1April 2008 1 of 3 BAE Systems Environmental


Ref Excavated Depth (m) Origin Ref Excavated Depth (m) OriginD16 No E18 NoD17 No E19 Yes 0.1 WireD18 No E20 Yes 0.1 WireD19 No E21 Yes 0.1 WireD20 Yes 0.2 Wire E22 Yes 0.2 Beer can

D20A Yes 0.2 Bracket E23 NoD21 No E24 Yes 0.2 WireD22 No E25 Yes 0.2 Plough shearD23 No E26 NoD24 No E27 NoD25 No E28 NoD26 No E29 NoD27 No E30 NoD28 No E31 Yes 0.2 Hammer headD29 No E32 Yes 0.1 WireD30 No E33 NoD31 No E34 NoD32 No E35 NoD33 No E36 NoD34 No E37 Yes 0.1 WireD35 No E38 NoD36 No E39 Yes 0.1 WireD37 No E40 NoD40 No E41 Yes 0.1 WireD41 No E42 Yes 0.05 WireD42 No E43 Yes 0.05 WireD43 No E44 Yes 0.05 WireD44 No E45 Yes 0.05 WireD45 No E46 Yes 0.05 WireD46 No E47 Yes 0.05 WireD47 No E48 Yes 0.05 WireD48 No E49 Yes 0.05 WireD49 Yes 0.2 Bracket E50 Yes 0.05 WireD50 No E52 Yes 0.05 WireD51 No E54 Yes 0.05 WireD52 No E55 Yes 0.05 WireD53 No E56 Yes 0.05 WireD54 No E57 Yes 0.05 WireD55 No E58 Yes 0.05 WireD56 Yes 0.2 Bracket E60 NoD57 Yes 0.3 Corrugated iron F01 Yes 0.3 Horse shoeE01 No F02 Yes 0.3 Plough bitE02 Yes 0.2 Wire F03 NoE03 No F04 Yes 0.2 Scrap of steelE04 No F05 NoE05 No F06 NoE06 No F07 Yes 0.2 Iron spikeE07 No F07A Yes 0.2 Chrome trimE08 No F08 NoE09 Yes 0.2 Wire F09 Yes 0.1 BrickE10 Yes 0.2 Wire F10 Yes 0.2 BracketE11 No F11 NoE12 No F12 NoE13 No F13 Yes 0.15 Scrap of ironE14 No F14 NoE15 No F15 Yes 0.3 BoltE16 No F16 NoE17 No F17 No



Ref Excavated Depth (m) Origin Ref Excavated Depth (m) OriginF18 No H07 Yes 0.1 ClinkerF19 Yes 0.15 Brick H08 Yes 0.1 WireF20 Yes 0.2 Bolt H09 Yes 0.1 BoltF21 Yes 0.2 Scrap of iron H11 Yes 0.1 BarF22 Yes 0.2 Scrap of iron H12 Yes 0.1 Plate steelF22 No H14 NoF23 No H15 NoF24 No H16 NoF25 Yes 0.2 Brick H17 NoF26 Yes 0.3 Bar H18 Yes 0.1 BracketF27 Yes 0.1 Brick H19 NoF28 No H20 NoF29 NoF30 Yes 0.1 Scrap of ironF31 Yes 0.15 Iron barF32 NoG01 Yes 0.1 Corrugated ironG02 Yes 0.1 Corrugated ironG03 NoG04 NoG05 NoG06 NoG08 Yes 0.1 Corrugated ironG09 Yes 0.1 Corrugated ironG10 NoG11 Yes 0.1 Corrugated ironG12 Yes 0.1 Corrugated ironG13 NoG14 NoG15 Yes 0.1 WireG16 NoG17 NoG18 Yes 0.1 WireG19 Yes 0.1 WireG20 NoG21 Yes 0.1 WireG22 Yes 0.1 WireG23 NoG24 NoG25 NoG26 NoG27 NoG28 NoG29 NoG30 Yes 0.1 Corrugated ironG31 Yes 0.1 Corrugated ironG32 Yes 0.1 Corrugated ironG33 Yes 0.1 Corrugated ironG34 NoG35 NoG36 Yes 0.1 WireH01 Yes 0.05 WireH02 Yes 0.05 WireH03 Yes 0.05 WireH04 Yes 0.05 BrickH05 Yes 0.1 BracketH05 Yes 0.05 BracketH06 Yes 0.1 Clinker



A0823-00-R2-1 April 2008

Appendix 2

Photographs

FIGURE TITLE :

PROJECT : REPORT NUMBER :

A0823/00-R1-1RAF Balnageith

Appendix 2 - Photographs

Plate 1 - Looking north-east from T junction north of Caleta House

Plate 2 - Area G looking south-west

FIGURE TITLE :


Plate 3 – Area B looking west

Plate 4 – Area D looking south-east



FIGURE TITLE :


Plate 5 – Using Shonstedt in Area H

Plate 6 – Using Foerster in Area B



FIGURE TITLE :


Plate 7 – Anomaly excavation in Area B

Plate 8 – Find in Area D



bae systems environmental unexploded ordnance investigation

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